Preface

The Rule of Metaphor and Time and Narrative form a pair: published one after the other, these works were conceived together. Although metaphor has traditionally belonged to the theory of "tropes" (or figures of discourse) and narrative to the theory of literary "genres," the meaning-effects produced by each of them belong to the same basic phenomenon of semantic innovation. In both cases this innovation is produced entirely on the level of discourse, that is, the level of acts of language equal to or greater than the sentence.

With metaphor, the innovation lies in the producing of a new semantic pertinence by means of an impertinent attribution: "Nature is a temple where living pillars..." The metaphor is alive as long as we can perceive, through the new semantic pertinence—and so to speak in its denseness—the resistance of the words in their ordinary use and therefore their incompatibility at the level of a literal interpretation of the sentence. The displacement in \( f \) meaning the words undergo in the metaphorical utterance, a displacement to which ancient rhetoric reduced metaphor, is not the whole of metaphor. It is just one means serving the process that takes place on the level of the entire sentence, whose function it is to save the new pertinence of the "odd" predication threatened by the literal incongruity of the attribution.

Time and narrative, the semantic innovation lies in the inventing of another work of synthesis—a plot. By means of the plot, goals, causes, and chance are brought together within the temporal unity of a whole and complete action. It is this synthesis of the heterogeneous that brings narrative close to \( f \)tetaphor. In both cases, \( Jh<^c> \) new thing—the as yet unsaid, the unwritten—springs up in language. Here a living metaphor, that is, a new pertinence in the predication, there a feigned plot, that is, a new congruence in the organization of the events. In both cases the semantic innovation can be carried back to the productive imagination and, more precisely, to the schematism that is its signifying matrix. In new metaphors the birth of a new semantic pertinence marvelously
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demonstrates what an imagination can be that produces things according to rules: "being good at making metaphors," said Aristotle, "is equivalent to being perceptive of resemblances." But what is it to be perceptive of resemblance if not to inaugurate the similarity by bringing together terms that at first seem "distant," then suddenly "close"? It is this change of distance in logical space that is the work of the productive imagination. This consists of schematizing the synthetic operation, of figuring the predicative assimilation from whence results the semantic innovation. The productive imagination at work in the metaphorical process is thus our competence for producing new / logical species by 'predicative assimilation', in spite of the resistance of our current categorizations of language. The plot of a narrative is comparable to this predicative assimilation. It "grasps together" and integrates into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby schematizing the intelligible signification attached to the narrative taken as a whole. Finally, in both cases the intelligibility brought to light by this process of schematization is to be distinguished from the combinatory rationality put into play by structural semantics, in the case of metaphor, and the legislating rationality at work in narratology and scholarly history, in the case of narrative. This rationality aims instead at simulating, at the higher level of a metalanguage, the kind of comprehension rooted in this schematization.

As a result, whether it be a question of metaphor or of plot, to explain more is to understand better. Understanding, in the first case, is grasping the dynamism in virtue of which a metaphorical utterance, a new semantic pertinence, emerges from the ruins of the semantic pertinence as it appears in a literal reading of the sentence. Understanding, in the second case, is grasping the operation that unifies into one whole and complete action the miscellany constituted by the circumstances, ends and means, initiatives and interactions, the reversals of fortune, and all the unintended consequences issuing from human action. In large part, the epistemological problem posed by metaphor or by narrative consists in tying the explanation set to work by the semiotic sciences to the prior understanding resulting from an acquired familiarity with the use of language, be it poetic or narrative use. In both cases it is a question of accounting at the same time for the autonomy of these rational disciplines and their direct or indirect, close or distant filiation, beginning from our poetic understanding.

The parallel between metaphor and narrative goes even further. The study of living metaphor led me to pose, beyond the problem of structure or sense, that of reference or of its truth claim. In the Rule of Metaphor I defended the thesis that the poetic function of language is not limited to the celebration of language for its own sake, at the expense of the referential function, which is predominant in descriptive language. I maintained that the suspension of this direct, descriptive referential function is only the reverse side, or the negative condition, of a more covered over referential function of discourse, which is,

so to speak, liberated by the suspending of the descriptive value of statements. In this way poetic discourse brings to language aspects, qualities, and values of reality that lack access to language that is directly descriptive and that can be spoken only by means of the complex interplay between the metaphorical utterance and the rule-governed transgression of the usual meanings of our words. I risked speaking not just of a metaphorical sense but also of a metaphorical reference in talking about this power of the metaphorical utterance to redescribe a reality inaccessible to direct description. I even suggested that "seeing-as," which sums up the power of metaphor, could be the revealer of a "being-as" on the deepest ontological level.

The mimetic function of narrative poses a problem exactly parallel to the problem of metaphorical reference. It is, in fact, one particular application of the latter to the sphere of human action. Plot, says Aristotle, is the mimesis of an action. When the time comes, I shall distinguish at least three senses of this term mimesis: a reference back to the familiar pre-understanding we have of the order of action; an entry into the realm of poetic composition; and finally a new configuration by means of this poetic refiguring of the pre-understood order of action. It is through this last sense that the mimetic function of the plot rejoins metaphorical reference. And whereas metaphorical redescription reigns in the field of sensory, emotional, aesthetic, and axiological values, which make the world a habitable world, the mimetic function of plots takes place by preference in the field of action and of its temporal values.

It is this latter feature that I dwell on in this work. I see in the plots we invent the privileged means by which we re-configure our confused, uniformed, and at the limit mute temporal experience. "What, then, is time?" asks Augustine. "I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled." In the capacity of poetic composition to re-figure this temporal experience, which is prey to the aporias of philosophical speculation, resides the referential function of the plot. The frontier between these two functions is unstable. In the first place, the plots that configure and transfigure the practical field encompass not just acting but also suffering, hence characters as agents and as victims. Lyric poetry thereby skirts dramatic poetry. Furthermore, the circumstances that, as the word indicates, encircle action, and the unintended consequences that make up one part of the tragic aspect of action, also consist of a dimension of passivity accessible through poetic discourse, in particular in the modes of elegy and of lamentation. In this
way, metaphorical redescription and mimesis are closely bound up with each other, to the point that we can exchange the two vocabularies and speak of the mimetic value of poetic discourse and the re-descriptive power of narrative fiction.

What unfolds, then, is one vast poetic sphere that includes metaphorical utterance and narrative discourse.

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The core of this book was first formulated as the Brick Lectures, which I gave at the University of Missouri at Columbia, Missouri, in 1978. (The original French version of these lectures is printed as the first three chapters of *La Narrativite* [Paris: Ed. du C.N.R.S., 1980].) Joined to this is my Zaharoff Lecture of 1978-79, given at the Taylor Institution, St. Giles College, Oxford: *The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Various parts of the work were also developed schematically in two seminars given at the University of Toronto, when I held the Northrop Frye Chair in the Program in Comparative Literature. And several outlines of the whole project were the subject of my own seminars at the Centre d'Etudes Phenomenologiques et Hermeneutiques in Paris and at the University of Chicago.

I wish to thank Professors Joseph Bien and Noble Cunningham of the University of Missouri at Columbia, G. P. V. Collyer of the Taylor Institution, and Northrop Frye and Mario Valdes of the University of Toronto for their kind invitations, as well as my colleagues and students at the University of Chicago for their gracious reception of me and this work, their inspiration, and their helpful criticism. My thanks, too, to the National Humanities Center for the opportunity to pursue my work there in 1979-80 and again in 1980-81. I must particularly acknowledge all the participants in my seminar at the Centre d'Etudes Phenomenologiques et Hermeneutiques in Paris, who accompanied the whole course of research behind this work and who contributed to our collective volume, *La Narrativite*.

I owe a particular debt of thanks to my two translators, Kathleen Mc-Laughlin and David Pellauer. They have taken the original French text and have truly rethought and rewritten it in English. This arduous labor has strengthened our ties of friendship through the bond of our common work.
Parti

The Circle of Narrative and Temporality

The first part of this work is concerned with bringing to light the major presuppositions which in the following sections will be submitted to the scrutiny of the various disciplines dealing with either historical or fictional narrative. These presuppositions have a common core. Whether it is a question of affirming the structural identity of historiography, including the philosophy of history, and fictional narrative, as I shall attempt to prove in Part II of this volume and in volume 2, or whether it is a matter of affirming the deep kinship between the truth claims of these two narrative modes, as I shall do in volume 2, one presupposition commands all the others, namely, that what is ultimately at stake in the case of the structural identity of the narrative function as well as in that of the truth claim of every narrative work, is the temporal character of human experience. The world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world. Or, as will often be repeated in the course of this study: time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience. It is with this major presupposition that Part I of this work is concerned.

This thesis is undeniably circular. But such is the case, after all, in every hermeneutical assertion. Part I will examine this objection. In chapter 3, I shall strive to demonstrate that the circle of narrativity and temporality is not a vicious but a healthy circle, whose two halves mutually reinforce one another. To pave the way for this discussion, I thought it might be well to provide two independent historical introductions to the thesis of the reciprocity between narrativity and temporality. The first (chapter 1) deals with the theory of time in Augustine, the second (chapter 2) with the theory of plot in Aristotle.

There is a twofold justification for the choice of these two authors. First, they offer us two independent ways of entering into the circle that constitutes our problem: one from the side of the paradoxes of time, the other from the side of the intelligible organization of a narrative. Their independence does not lie solely in the fact that Augustine's *Confessions* and Aristotle's *Poetics* belong to two profoundly different cultural universes separated by several centuries and involving problematics that are not identical. What is even more important for my purpose is that the first author inquires into the nature of time without any apparent concern for grounding his inquiry on the narrative structure of the spiritual autobiography developed in the first nine books of the *Confessions*. And the second constructs his theory of dramatic plot without paying any attention to the temporal implications of his analysis, leaving to the *Physics* the problem of how to go about analyzing time. It is in this precise sense that the *Confessions* and the *Poetics* offer two points of access, independent of one another, to our circular problem.

However, the independence of these two analyses is not what principally holds our attention. They do not simply converge upon the same interrogation after starting from two radically different philosophical horizons: each engenders the inverted image of the other. The Augustinian analysis gives a representation of time in which discordance never ceases to belie the desire for that concordance that forms the very essence of the *anima*. The Aristotelian analysis, on the other hand, establishes the dominance of concordance over discordance in the configuration of the plot. It is this inverse relationship between concordance and discordance that seemed to me to constitute the major interest of a confrontation between the *Confessions* and the *Poetics*—a confrontation that may seem all the more incongruous in that it goes from Augustine to Aristotle, contrary to the chronological order. But I thought that the meeting of the *Confessions* and the *Poetics* in the mind of one and the same reader would be all the more dramatic if it were to move from the work in which the perplexity created by the paradox of time predominates toward the work in which, on the contrary, confidence reigns in the power of the poet and the poem to make order triumph over disorder.

It is in chapter 3 of Part I that the reader will find the melodic line of which the rest of the work forms the development and sometimes the counterpoint. There I shall consider in and for itself—without any further concern for historical exegesis—the inverted interplay of concordance and discordance, bequeathed to us by the sovereign analyses of time by Augustine and of plot by Aristotle.¹

The Aporias of the Experience of Time Book I I of Augustine's *Confessions*

The major antithesis around which my reflection will revolve finds its sharpest expression toward the end of Book 11 of Augustine's *Confessions.*² Two features of the human soul are set in opposition to one another, features which the author, with his marked taste for sonorous antithesis, coins *intentio* and *distentio animi*. It is this contrast that I shall later compare with that of *muthos* and *peripeteia* in Aristotle.

Two prior remarks have to be made. First, I begin my reading of Book 11 of the *Confessions* at chapter 14:17
with the question: "What, then, is time?" I am not unaware that the analysis of time is set within a meditation on the relations between eternity and time, inspired by the first verse of Genesis, "It[i] principio fecit Deus. . . ." In this sense, to isolate the analysis of time from this meditation is to do violence to the text, in a way that is not wholly justified by my intention to situate within the same sphere of reflection the Augustinian antithesis between intentio and distentio and the Aristotelian antithesis between muthos and peripeteia. Nevertheless, a certain justification can be found for this violence in Augustine's own reasoning, which, when it is concerned with time, no longer refers to eternity except to more strongly emphasize the ontological deficiency characteristic of human time and to wrestle directly with the aporias afflicting the conception of time as such. In order to right somewhat this wrong done to Augustine's text, I shall reintroduce the meditation on eternity at a later stage in the analysis with the intention of seeking in it an intensification of the experience of time.

Second, isolated from the meditation on eternity, due to the artifice in method to which I have just admitted, the Augustinian analysis of time offers a highly interrogative and even aporeti-cal character which none of the ancient theories of time, from Plato to Plotinus, had carried to such a degree of acute-ness. Not only does Augustine, like Aristotle, always proceed on the basis of aporias handed down by the tradition, but the resolution of each aporia gives rise to new difficulties which never cease to spur on his inquiry. This style, the Circle of Narrative and Temporality where every advance in thinking gives rise to a new difficulty, places Augustine by turns in the camp of the skeptics, who do not know, and in that of the Platonists and Neoplatonists, who do know. Augustine is seeking (the verb quaerere, we shall see, appears repeatedly throughout the text). Perhaps one must go so far as to say that what is called the Augustinian thesis on time, and which I intentionally term a psychological thesis in order to distinguish it from that of Aristotle and even from that of Plotinus, is itself more aporeti-cal than Augustine would admit. This, in any case, is what I shall attempt to show.

These two initial remarks have to be joined together. Inserting an analysis of time within a meditation on eternity gives the Augustinian search the peculiar tone of a "lamentation" full of hope, something which disappears in an analysis that isolates what is properly speaking the argument on time. But it is precisely in separating the analysis of time from its backdrop of eternity that its aporetical features can be brought out. Of course, this aporeti-cal mode differs from that of the skeptics in that it does not disallow some sort of firm certitude. But it also differs from that of the Neoplatonists in that the assertive core can never be apprehended simply in itself outside of the aporias it engenders.

This aporeti-cal character of the pure reflection on time is of the utmost importance for all that follows in the present investigation. And this is so in two respects. First, it must be admitted that in Augustine there is no pure phenomenology of time. Perhaps there never will be one. Hence, the Augustinian "theory" of time is inseparable from the argumentative operation by which this thinker chops off, one after the other, the continually self-regenerating heads of the hydra of skepticism. As a result, there is no description without a discussion. This is why it is extremely difficult—and perhaps impossible—to isolate a phenomenological core from the mass of argumentation. The "psychological solution" attributed to Augustine is perhaps neither a "psychology" which could be isolated from the rhetoric of argumentation nor even a "solution" which could be removed once and for all from the aporeti-cal domain. This aporeti-cal style, in addition, takes on a special significance in the overall strategy of the present work. A constant thesis of this book will be that speculation on time is an inconclusive rumination to which narrative activity alone can respond. Not that this activity solves the aporias through substitution. If it does resolve them, it is in a poetical and not a theoretical sense of the word. Emplotment, I shall say below, replies to the speculative aporia with the intention of seeking in it an intensification of the experience of time. The fusion of argument and hymn in Part I of Book 11—which I am about to bracket—already leads us to understand that a poetical transfiguration alone, not only of the solution but of the question itself, will free the aporia from the meaninglessness it skirts.

THE APORIA OF THE BEING AND THE NONBEING OF TIME

The notion of distentio animi, coupled with that of intentio, is only slowly and painfully sifted out from the major aporia with which Augustine is struggling, that of the measurement of time. This aporia itself, however, is inscribed within the circle of an aporia that is even more fundamental, that of the being or the nonbeing of time. For what can be measured is only what, in some way, exists. We may deplor the fact if we like, but the phenomenology of time emerges out of an ontological question: quid est enim tempus? ("What, then, is time?"

[11 14:17].) As soon as this question is posed, all the ancient difficulties regarding the being and the nonbeing of time surge forth. But it is noteworthy that, from the start, Augustine's inquisitive style imposes itself. On the one hand, the skeptical argument leans toward non-being, while on the other hand a guarded confidence in the everyday use of language forces us to say that, in some way, which we do not yet know how to account for, time exists. The skeptical argument is well-known: time has no being since the future is not yet, the past is no longer, and the present does not remain. And yet we do speak of time as having being. We say that things to come will
We may believe we take a decisive step forward by substituting for the notion of the present that of passing, of farther as concerns the question of "how." False certainties are still mingled with genuine evidence. However, this obstinacy of what must indeed be termed experience does not take us any

... (16:21). The protest conveyed by We compare [comparamus] them with one another and say that some are longer and others shorter. We even language and enlightened by the intelligence: "Nevertheless, O Lord, we are aware of [sentimus] periods of time. What is it, then, that holds firm against the onslaughts of skepticism? As always, it is experience, articulated by "As we have already seen quite clearly, the present cannot possibly have duration" (ibid.). The Experience of Time

... (14:15).6 However, if it is true that we speak of time in a meaningful way and in positive terms (will be, was, is), our powerlessness to explain how this comes about arises precisely from this certitude. Talk about time certainly resists the skeptical argument, but language is itself put into question by the gap between the "that" and the "how." We know by heart the cry uttered by Augustine on the threshold of his meditation: "What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled" (14:17). In this way the ontological paradox opposes language not only to the skeptical argument but to itself. How can the positive quality of the verbs "to have taken place," "to occur," "to be," be reconciled with the negativity of the adverbs "no longer," "not yet," "not always"? The question is thus narrowed down. How can time exist if the past is no longer, if the future is not yet, and if the present is not always? Onto this initial paradox is grafted the central paradox from which the theme of distension will emerge. How can we measure that which does not exist? The paradox of measurement is a direct result of the paradox of the being and nonbeing of time. Here again language is a relatively sure guide. We speak of a long time and a short time and in a certain way we observe its length and take its measurement (cf. the aside in 15:19, where the soul addresses itself: "for we are gifted with the ability to feel and measure intervals [moras] of time. What is the answer to be?"). What is more, it is only of the past and of the future that we say that they are long or short. In anticipation of the "solution" of the aporia, it is indeed of the future that we say that it shortens and of the past that it lengthens. But language is limited to attesting to the fact of measuring. The how, once again, eludes him: "But how can anything which does not exist be either long or short [sed quo pacto]?")" (15:18).

Augustine will at first appear to turn his back on this certainty that it is the past and the future that we measure. Later, by placing the past and the future within the present, by bringing in memory and expectation, he will be able to rescue this initial certainty from its apparent disaster by transferring onto expectation and onto memory the idea of a long future and a long past. But this certainty of language, of experience, and of action will only be recovered after it has been lost and profoundly transformed. In this regard, it is a feature of the Augustinian quest that the final response is anticipated several times in various ways that must first be submitted to criticism before their true meaning emerges. Indeed Augustine seems first to refuse a certitude based upon too weak an argument: "My Lord, my Light, does not your truth make us look foolish in this case too?" (15:18). He therefore turns first to the present. Was it not when it "was still present" that the past was long? In this question, too, something of the final response is anticipated since memory and expectation will appear as modalities of the present. But at this stage in the argument the present is still opposed to the past and the future. The idea of a threefold present has not yet dawned. This is why the solution based on the present alone has to collapse. The failure of this solution results from a refining of the notion of the present, which is no longer characterized solely by that which does not remain but by that which has no extension. This refinement, which carries the paradox to its height, is related to a well-known skeptical argument: can a hundred years be present at once (15:19)? (The argument, as we see, is directed solely at attributing length to the present.) Only the current year is present; and in the year, the month; and in the month, the day; and in the day, the hour: "Even that one hour consists of minutes which are continually passing. The minutes which have gone by are past and any part of the hour which remains is future" (15:20). He must therefore conclude along with the skeptics: "In fact the only time [quid . . . temporis] that can be called present is an instant, if we can conceive [intelligitur] of such, that cannot be divided even into the most minute fractions .... when it is present it has no duration [spatium]" (ibid.). At a

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clater stage of this discussion the definition of the present will be further narrowed down to the idea of the pointlike instant. Augustine first gives a dramatic turn to the merciless conclusion of the argumentative machine: "As we have already seen quite clearly, the present cannot possibly have duration" (ibid.). What is it, then, that holds firm against the onslaughts of skepticism? As always, it is experience, articulated by language and enlightened by the intelligence: "Nevertheless, O Lord, we are aware of [sentimus] periods of time. We compare [comparamus] them with one another and say that some are longer and others shorter. We even calculate [metimur] how much longer or shorter one period is than another" (16:21). The protest conveyed by sentimus, comparamus, and metimur is that of our sensory, intellectual, and pragmatic activities in relation to the measuring of time. However, this obstinacy of what must indeed be termed experience does not take us any farther as concerns the question of "how." False certainties are still mingled with genuine evidence. We may believe we take a decisive step forward by substituting for the notion of the present that of passing, of
transition, following in the wake of the earlier statement: "If we measure them by our own awareness of time, we must do so while it is passing [praeterseuntia]" (ibid.). This speculative formula seems to correspond to our practical certainty. It too, however, will have to be submitted to criticism before returning, precisely, as distentio, thanks to the dialectic of the threefold present. So long as we have not formed the idea of the distended relation between expectation, memory, and attention, we do not understand what we are actually saying when we repeat for the second time: "The conclusion is that we can be aware of time and measure it only while it is passing" (ibid.). The formula is at once an anticipation of the solution and a temporary impasse. It is thus not by chance that Augustine stops just when he seems most certain: "These are tentative theories, Father, not downright assertions" (17:22). What is more, it is not due to the impetus of this passing idea that he continues to pursue his search, but by a return to the conclusion of the skeptical argument, "the present cannot possibly have duration." For, in order to pave the way for the idea that what we measure is indeed the future, understood later as expectation, and the past, understood as memory, a case must be made for the being of the past and the future which had been too quickly denied, but it must be made in a way that we are not yet capable of articulating.12

In the name of what can the past and the future be accorded the right to exist in some way or other? Once again, in the name of what we say and do with regard to them. What do we say and do in this respect? We recount things which we hold as true and we predict events which occur as we foresaw them.13 It is therefore still language, along with the experience and the action articulated by language, that holds firm in the face of the skeptics' assault.

To predict is to fore-see, and to recount is to "discern [cernere] by the mind." De Trinitate (XV 12:21) speaks in this sense of the twofold "testimony" (Meijer-ing, p. 67) of history and of prediction. It is therefore in spite of the skeptical argument that Augustine concludes: "Therefore both the past and the future do exist [suntergo]" (17:22).

This declaration is not the mere repetition of the affirmation that was rejected in the first pages, namely, that the future and the past exist. The terms for past and future henceforth appear as adjectives: futura and praeterita. This nearly imperceptible shift actually opens the way for the denouement of the initial paradox concerning being and nonbeing and, as a result, also for the central paradox of measurement. We are in fact prepared to consider as existing, not the past and the future as such, but the temporal qualities that can exist in the present, without the things of which we speak, when we recount them or predict them, still existing or already existing. We therefore cannot be too attentive to Augustine's shifts in expression.

Just when he is about to reply to the ontological paradox, he pauses once more: "O Lord, my Hope, allow me to explore further [amplius querere]" (18:23). This is said not simply for rhetorical effect or as a pious invocation. After this pause, in fact, there follows an audacious step that will lead to the affirmation I have just mentioned, the thesis of the threefold present. This step, however, as is often the case, takes the form of a question: "If the future and the past do exist, I want to know where they are" (ibid.). We began with the question "how?" We continue by way of the question "where?" The question is not naive. It consists in seeking a location for future and past things insofar as they are recounted and predicted. All of the argumentation that follows will be contained within the boundaries of this question, and will end up by situating "within" the soul the temporal qualities implied by narration and prediction. This transition by way of the question "where?" is essential if we are correctly to understand the first response: "So wherever they are and whatever they are [future and past things], it is only by being present that they are [present]" (ibid.). We appear to be turning our back on the earlier assertion that what we measure is only the past and the future; even more, we seem to be denying our admission that the present has no duration. But what is in question here is an entirely different present, one that has also become a plural adjective (praesentia), in line with praeterita and futura, and one capable of admitting an internal multiplicity. We also appear to have forgotten the assertion that we "measure [time] only while it is passing" (16:21). But we shall return to it later when we come back to the question of measuring.

It is therefore within the framework of the question "Where?" that we take up once more, in order to carry them further forward, the notions of narration . and prediction. Narration, we say, implies memory and prediction implies expectation. Now, what is it to remember? It is to have an image of the past. How is this possible? Because this image is an impression left by events, an impression that remains in the mind.14

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The reader will have observed that after the calculated delays that preceded, suddenly everything moves very quickly.

Prediction is explained in a way that is scarcely more complex. It is thanks to a present expectation that future things are present to us as things to come. We have a "pre-perception" (praesensio) of this which enables us to "foretell" them (praemunio). Expectation is thus the analogue to memory. It consists of an image that already exists, in the sense that it precedes the event that does not yet exist (nondum). However, this image is not an impression left by things past but a "sign" and a "cause" of future things which are, in this way, anticipated, foreseen, foretold, predicted, proclaimed beforehand (note the richness of the everyday vocabulary of expectation).

The solution is elegant—but how laborious, how costly, and how fragile!
An elegant solution: by entrusting to memory the fate of things past, and to expectation that of things to come, we can include memory and expectation in an extended and dialectical present which itself is none of the terms rejected previously: neither the past, nor the future, nor the pointlike present, nor even the passing of the present. We know the famous formula whose tie to the aporia it is supposed to resolve we too easily overlook: "It might be correct to say that there are three times, a present of [de] past things, a present of [de] present things, and a present of [de] future things. Sjonne such different-times do exist in [in] the mind, but nowhere else [alibi] that I can see" (20:26).

In saying this, Augustine is aware that he is moving away somewhat from ordinary language by which he has, nevertheless, supported his position—prudently, it is true—in his resistance to the argument of the skeptics: "it is not strictly correct [proprie] to say that there are three times, past, present, and future" (ibid.). But he adds as if in a marginal note: "Our use of words is generally inaccurate [non proprie] and seldom completely correct, but our meaning is recognized nonetheless" (ibid.). Nothing, however, prevents us from continuing to speak as we do of the present, past, and future: "I shall not object or argue, nor shall I rebuke anyone who speaks in these terms, provided that he understands what he is saying" (ibid.). Everyday language is thus simply reformulated in a more rigorous manner.

In order to enable us to understand the meaning of this rectification, Augustine relies on a threefold equivalence which, it seems, is self-evident: "The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception [contuitus; later the term will be attentio, which better denotes the contrast with distentio]; and the present of future things is expectation" (20:26). How do we know this? Augustine replies laconically: "If we may speak in these terms, I can see [video] three times and I admit [fateorce] that they do exist" (ibid.). This seeing and this admission indeed constitute the phenomenological core of the entire analysis; but the fateor, joined to the viSeo, bears witness to the sort of debate to which this seeing is the conclusion. An elegant solution, but a laborious one.

Consider the memory. Certain images must be accorded the power of refer-

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ring to past things (cf. the Latin preposition de)—a strange power indeed! On the one hand, the impression exists now, on the other it stands for past things which, as such, "still" (adhuc) exist (18:23) in the memory. This little word "still" (adhuc) is at once the solution to the aporia and the source of a new enigma: how is it possible that the impression-images, the vestigia, which here present things, engraved in the soul, are at the same time "about" thejast? The image of the future presents a similar difficulty: the sign-images are said "to exist already" (jam sunt) (18:24). But "already" means two things: "whatever exists already is not future but present" (ibid.), and in this sense, we do not see future things themselves which are "not yet" (nomdum). However, "already" denotes, along with the present existence of the sign, its character of anticipation: to say that things "already exist" is to say that by the sign I announce things to come, that I can predict them, and in this way the future is "said in advance" (ante dicatur). The anticipatory image is thus no less enigmatic than the vestigial one.

What makes this an enigma lies in the very structure of an image, which sometimes stands as an impression of the past, sometimes as a sign of the future. It seems that for Augustine this structure is seen purely and simply as it presents itself.

What is even more enigmatic is the quasi-spatial language in which the question and the response are couched: "If the future and the past do exist, I want to know where they are" (18:23). To which comes the reply: "Some such different times do exist in [in] the mind, but nowhere else [alibi] that I can see" (20:26). Is it because the question has been posed in terms of "place" (where are future and past things?) that we obtain a reply in terms of "place" (in the soul, in the memory)? Or is it not instead the quasi-spatiality of the impression-image and the sign-image, inscribed in the soul, that calls for the question of the location of the future and past things? This we are unable to state at this stage of our investigation.

The solution of the aporia of the being and nonbeing of time through the notion of a threefold present continues to be fragile so long as the enigma of the measurement of time has not been resolved. The threefold present has not yet received the definitive seal of the distentio animi so long as we have not recognized in this very triplexity the slippage [la faille] that permits the soul itself to be accorded an extension of another sort than that which has been denied to the pointlike present. The quasi-spatial language, for its part, remains in suspension so long as this extension of the human soul, the ground of all measurement of time, has not been stripped of any cosmological basis. The inheritance of time in the soul takes on its full meaning only when every thesis that would place time within the sphere of physical movement has been eliminated through argumentation. In this sense the "I see it, I admit it" of 20:26 is not firmly established so long as the notion of distentio animi has not been
formed.
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THE MEASUREMENT OF TIME

It is in resolving the enigma of its measurement that Augustine reaches this ultimate characterization of human time (21-31).

The question of measurement is taken up again just where we left it at 16:21: "I said just now that we measure time as it passes [praetereuntia]" (21:27). Now this assertion, which is forcefully repeated ("I know it because we do measure time. We could not measure a thing which did not exist" [ibid.]), is immediately transformed into an aporia. What passes away is, in fact, the present. Yet, we admitted, the present has no extension. The argument, which once again throws us back toward the skeptics, merits a detailed analysis. First of all, it neglects the difference between passing away and being present in the sense in which the present is the indivisible instant (or, as will be stated later, a "point"). Only the dialectic of the threefold present, interpreted as distension, will be able to save an assertion that must first lose its way in the iniquity of the aporia. But, more important, the adverse argument is constructed precisely with the resources of the quasi-spatial imagery by means of which time is grasped as a threefold present. Passing, in effect, is being in transit. It is therefore legitimate to wonder: "Where is it coming from [unde], what is it passing through [qua], and where is it going [quo]?" (ibid.). As we see, it is the term "passing away" (transire) which necessitates dwelling in this way on quasi-spatiality. Now, if we follow the tendency of this figurative expression, we must say that passing is going from (ex) the future, through (per) the present, into (in) the past. This transit thus confirms that the measurement of time is done "in relation to some measurable period" (in ali-quo spatio) and that all the relations between intervals or time are in relation to "a given period" (spatia temporum) (ibid.). This seems to lead to a total impasse: time is not extended in space—and "we cannot measure what has no duration" (ibid.).

At this point, Augustine pauses, as at every previous critical moment. It is also here that the word puzzle or enigma is pronounced: "My mind is burning to solve this intricate puzzle [aenigma]" (22:28). Indeed it is our everyday notions that are abstruse, as we have known from the start of this investigation. But, once again, unlike in skepticism, the admission that there is an enigma is accompanied by an ardent desire which, for Augustine, is a figure of love: "Grant me what I love, for it was your gift that I should love it" (ibid.). Here the hymnic aspect of the quest becomes apparent, showing what the investigation of time owes to its inclusion within a meditation on the eternal Word. We shall return to this later. Let us limit ourselves for the moment to underscoring the guarded confidence that Augustine grants to ordinary language: "How long [quam diu] did he take to do that? How long is it [quam longo tempore] since . . . !" We use these words and hear others using them. They understand what we mean and we understand them"

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(22:28). This is why, I shall say, there is an enigma but not ignorance. In order to resolve the enigma, the cosmological solution must be rejected so that the investigation will be forced to search in the soul alone, and hence in the multiple structure of the threefold present, for the basis of extension and of measurement. The discussion concerning the relation of time to the movement of the heavenly bodies and to movement in general therefore constitutes neither a digression nor a detour.

Augustine’s vision can less than ever be said to be independent of the polemic whose long history stretches from Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s Physics to Plotinus’s Enneads III 7. The distentio animi is conquered at great pains during the course of and at the end of a tightly reasoned argument that involves the biting rhetoric of the reductio ad absurdum.

First argument: if the movement of the heavenly bodies is time, why should this not also be said of the movement of all other bodies as well? (23:29). This argument anticipates the thesis that the movement of the stars might vary, hence accelerate or slow down, something that is impossible for Aristotle. The stars are thus reduced to the level of other things in motion, whether this be the potter’s wheel or the flow of syllables uttered by the human voice. Second argument: if the lights of the sky ceased to move and if the potter’s wheel continued to turn, then time would indeed have to be measured by something other than movement (ibid.). Once again the argument presumes that the thesis of the immutability of celestial movements has been undercut. A variant of this argument: speaking of the movement of the potter’s wheel itself takes time, time which is not measured by the astral movement presumed to have been altered or stopped altogether.

Third argument: underlying the earlier presuppositions is the conviction taught by Scripture that the stars are only lights intended to mark out time (ibid.). So disqualified, if we may put it this way, the stars cannot constitute time by their movement.

Fourth argument: if one asks what constitutes the measurement we call a “day” we spontaneously think that the twenty-four hours of the day are measured by the movement of the sun through one complete circuit. But if the sun were to *turn faster* and complete its circuit in an hour, the “day” would no longer be measured by the
movement of the sun (23:30). cMeijering stresses how, through the hypothesis of a variable speed attributed to
the sun, Augustine moves away from all his predecessors. Neither Aristotle nor Plotinus, who do, however,
distinguish between time and motion, ever used this argument. For Augustine, since God is the master of
creation, he can change the speed of the stars, just as the potter can change that of his wheel, or the speaker
the flow of his syllables (Joshua's stopping the sun follows along the same lines as the hypothesis of the acceleration
of its motion, which, as such, is independent of the argument from the miraculous). Augustine alone dares to
allow that one might speak of a span of time—a day, an hour—without a
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In order to take this final step, Augustine turns back to an earlier assertion (16:21 and 21:27), which has not only remained in suspension but which seemed to have been bowled over by the skeptics' assault, namely, that we measure time *when it is passing*: not the future which is not, nor the past which is no longer, nor the present which has no extension, but "time passing." It is in this very passing, in the transit, that both the multiplicity of the present and its tearing apart are to be sought.

The function of the three celebrated examples of a sound that is resonating, a sound that has resonated, and two sounds that resonate one after the other, is to make this tearing apart appear as that of the threefold present. These examples demand close attention, for the variation from one to the next is quite subtle. First example (27:34): consider a sound that begins to resonate, that continues to resonate, and that ceases to resonate. How do we speak of it? In order to understand this passage it is important to note that it is written entirely in the past tense. We only speak of a sound's resonance once it has stopped. The not yet (*nondum*) of the future is spoken of in the past tense (*fulura erat*). The moment when it resonates, hence its present, is recounted as having disappeared—it could only be measured while it lasted: "but even then [sed et tune], it was not static [non stabat], because it was transient [ibat], moving continuously [praeterbat]" (ibid.). It is thus in the past tense that we speak of the very passing of the present. Far from securing a comfort-

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ing reply to the enigma, the first example appears to deepen it. But, as always, the direction in which to search for the solution is in the enigma itself, just as the enigma is in the solution. One feature of the example enables us to steer in this direction: "indeed [enim], while it was transient it was gaining [tendeba-tur] some extent in time [in aliquod spatium temporis] by which it could be measured, but not in present time, for the present has no extent" (ibid.). The key is indeed to be sought in what passes, as this is distinct from the pointlike present.

The second example exploits this breakthrough, but it does so by varying the hypothesis (27:34f.). The passage of time will be spoken of not in the past but in the present tense. Here another sound is resonating. Let us assume that it is still (*adhue*) resonating: "If we are to measure it we must do so while [dum] it lasts." It is now in the future perfect tense that we speak of its stopping, as if of a past future: "once the sound has ceased [cessaverit] it will be [jam] a thing of the past, and if it no longer exists [non erit], it cannot be measured" (ibid.). The question "how long" (*quanta sibi*) is then raised in the present tense. Where, then, is the difficulty? It results from the impossibility of measuring the passage while it is "still" (*adhue*) continuing. For something to stop, it is in fact necessary that there be a beginning and an end, hence a measurable interval. But if we only measure what has ceased to exist, we slip back into the earlier aporia. It has even deepened a bit more, if we can measure the time that passes neither when it has stopped nor while it continues. The very idea of the time that passes, set aside for this argument, seems to retreat into the same shadows as do the ideas of the future, the past, and the pointlike present: "Therefore we measure neither the future nor the present nor time that is passing" (ibid.).

From whence then comes our assurance that we do measure (the protest: "yet we do measure time" appears twice in this dramatic paragraph), if we do not know *how*? Is there a way to measure time passing both when it has ceased and while it continues? It is indeed in this direction that the third example steers the inquiry.

The third example (27:35), that of reciting a verse by heart—to be exact the *Deus creator omnium*, taken from a hymn by Saint Ambrose—offers a greater complexity than that of the continuous sound, namely, the alternation of four long syllables and of four short syllables within a single expression, a line of verse (versus). The complexity of this example necessitates the re-introduction of memory and retrospection that the analysis of the earlier two examples omitted. Thus it is in the third example alone that the connection is made between the question of measurement and that of the threefold present. The alternation of four short and four long syllables in fact introduces an element of comparison that immediately appeals to the senses: "I can tell this because, by pronouncing them, I find it to be the case, insofar as I can rely

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upon the plain evidence of my own hearing [quantum sensitur sensu manifesto]". But Augustine introduces sensation only in order to sharpen the aporia and to move toward its resolution, not in order to cover it with the cloak of intuition. For if longs and shorts are such only by comparison, we are not able to superimpose them as we would superimpose two beats over one beat. We must be able to retain (*tenere*) the short and to apply it (*applicare*) to the long. But what is it to retain something that has ceased? The aporia fully remains if we speak of the syllables themselves, as we spoke earlier of the sound itself, that is, as past and future things. The aporia is resolved if we speak not of syllables that no longer exist or do not yet exist but of their impressions in the memory and of their signs in expectation: "So it cannot be the syllables themselves [ipsas] that I measure, since they no longer exist. I must be measuring something which remains fixed [in-fixum manet] in [in] my memory" (ibid.).

We again find the present of the past, inherited from the analysis that concluded the first enigma—and with this expression all the difficulties of the impression-image, of the vestigium. The advantage gained is, nevertheless, immense. *We now know that the measurement of time owes nothing to that of external motion. In addition we have found in the mind itself the fixed element that allows us to compare long periods of time with short periods*
of time. With the impression-image, the important verb is no longer "to pass" (trans-sire) but "to remain" (manet). In this sense the two enigmas—that of being/nonbeing and that of measuring what has no extension—are resolved together. On the one hand, we have returned within ourselves, then, that I measure things" (27:36). And how is this? Inasmuch as, after they have passed, the impression (affectio) made on the mind by things as they pass remains there: "for everything which happens leaves an impression on it, and this impression remains [manet] after the thing itself has ceased to be. It is the impression that I measure, since it is present, not the thing itself, which makes the impression as it passes" (ibid.).

We must not think that this recourse to the impression terminates the inquiry. The notion of distentio animi has not been given its due so long as the passivity of the impression has not been contrasted with the activity of a mind stretched in opposite directions, between expectation, memory, and attention. Only a mind stretched in such different directions can be distended.

This active side of the process calls for a new look at the earlier example of recitation, but this time in its dynamics. To compose beforehand, to entrust to memory, to begin, to run through—these are all active operations dependent upon the passivity of the sign-images and the impression-images. But it would be to mistake the role of these images if we failed to stress that reciting is an act that moves from an expectation turned first toward the entire poem, then toward what remains of the poem, until (donee) the operation is completed. In this new description of the act of reciting, the present changes its meaning. It is

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is no longer a _point_. norgyena point of passage, it is a "present intention", (praesens intention) (27:3^ If attention deserves in this way to be called in-tention the present has become an active transition.

Inasmuch, w8Ch is present, is relegating [traicit] the future to the past. The"pasi increases in proportion as the future diminishes, until the future is entirely absorbed and the whole becomes past" (27:36). Of course, the quasi-spatial imagery of a movement from the future toward the past through the present has not been eliminated. No doubt it has its ultimate justification in the passivity that accompanies the entire process. But we are no longer misled by the representation of two places, one of which is filled up as the other is emptied, as soon as we have ascribed a dynamic character to this representation and have discerned the interplay of action and passion that is concealed therein. For, in fact, there would be no future that diminishes, no past that increases, without "the mind, which regulates this process (animus qui illud agit)" (28:37). The shadow of passivity accompanies three actions, now expressed by three verbs. The mind performs three functions, those of expectation [expectat], attention [attendit; this verb recalls the intention praesens], and remenK-ry [meminit] (ibid?).~ The result is that "the future, which it ex-transeat to which it attends, into the past, pects, passes..." (ibid.) To relegate is also to pass through. The vocabulary here continues to oscillate between activity and passivity. The mind expects and remembers, and yet expectation and memory are "in" the soul, as impression-images and as sign-images. The contrast appears in the present. On the one hand, inasmuch as it passes, it is reduced to a point (in puncto praeteriti). This is the most extreme illustration of the present's lack of extension. But, inasmuch as it relegates, inasmuch as through the attention that "which is to be passes towards [pergat] the state in which it is to be no more," it must be said that "the mind's attention persists [perdurat attentio]."

This interplay of action and affection in the complex expression a "long expectation of the future" must be distinguished from what Augustine makes it replace, the absurd notion of a long future, and the same applies to the expression a "long remembrance of the past," which takes the place of the notion of a long past, hisijn the soul, hence "as an impression, that expectation and memory possess extension. Bja^the impression is in the soul jpnly _in^ as much as the mind acts, that is, expects, attends, and remembers. ~In wHat,""theh7 doeTdistention consist? In the very contrast between the three tensions. If paragraphs 26:33-30:40 constitute the treasure of Book 11, paragraph 28:38, apart from all else, is the crown jewel of this treasure. The example of the song, which includes that of the sound that continues and ceases and that of the long and short syllables, is here more than just a concrete application. It marks the point at which the theory of distentio is joined to that of the threefold present. The theory of the threefold present, reformu-

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lated in terms of the threefold intention, makes the distentio arise ouLpjEL the intentio that has burst asunder. The entire paragraph must be quoted:

Suppose that I am going to recite a psalm that I know. Before I begin my faculty of expectation is engaged [tenditur] by the whole of it. But once I have begun, as much of the psalm as I have removed from the province of expectation and relegated to the past now engages [tenditur] my memory, and the scope of the action [actionis] which I am performing is divided [distenditur] between the two faculties of memory and expectation, the one looking back to the part which I have already recited, the other looking forward to the part which I have still to recite. But my faculty of attention [attendit] is present all the while, and through it passes [traicitur] what
was the future in the process of becoming the past. As the process continues [agitum et agitum], the province of memory is extended in proportion as that of expectation is reduced, until the whole of my expectation is absorbed. This happens when I have finished my recitation and it has all passed into the province of memory. (28:38)

The theme of this entire paragraph is the dialectic of expectation, memory, and attention, each considered no longer in isolation but in interaction with one another. It is thus no longer a question of either impression-images or anticipatory images but of an action that shortens expectation and extends memory. The term actio and the verbal expression agitum, which is repeated expressly, convey the impulse that governs the whole process. Expectation and memory are themselves both said to be "engaged," the first by the whole of the poem before the start of the song, the second by the part of the song that has already gone by; as for attention, its engagement consists completely in the active "transit" of what was future in the direction of what becomes past. It is this combined action of expectation, memory, and attention that "continues." The distentio is then nothing other than the shift in the noncoincidence of the three modalities of action: "and the scope of the action which I am performing is divided [distenditur] between the two faculties of memory and expectation, the one looking back to the part which I have already recited, the other looking forward to the part which I have still to recite." Is the distentio related in any way to the passivity of the impression? It would seem so, if this beautiful text, from which the affectio seems to have disappeared, is compared to the first analytical sketch of the act of reciting (27:36). There the impression appears to be still conceived of as the passive reverse side of the very "tension" of the act, even when silent, of reciting: something remains (manet) insofar as we "can go over [peragimus] poems and verses and speech of any sort in our minds." It is "man's attentive mind, which is present, [which] is relegating [tragic] the future to the past" (27:36).

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Thus, if we compare, as I believe we can, the passivity of the affectio to that of the distentio animi, we must say that the three temporal intentions are separate from one another to the extent that intentional activity has as its counterpart the passivity engendered by this very activity and that, for lack of a better name, we designate as impression-image or sign-image. It is not only these three acts that do not coincide, but also the activity and passivity which oppose one another, to say nothing of the discordance between the two passivities, the one related to expectation, the other to memory. Therefore, the more int. mind = of eU injenio, hejnoK it suffersdistentio. .......

Has the aporia of long or short time been resolved? Yes, if we admit: (1) that what is measured is neither future things nor past things, but their expectation and their memory; (2) that these are affections presenting a measurable spatiality of a uniqueTSrter,"(3) that these affections are like the reverse side of JEllicUvIt'ofHejnnacht that continues; and, finally, (4) that this action is itself threefold and thus is distended whenever and wherever it is tensively en-gaged-

Yet to tell the truth, each stage in this solution itself constitutes an enigma.

1. How can we measure expectation or memory without taking support from the "points of reference" marking out the space traversed by a moving body, hence without taking into consideration the physical change that produces the trajectory of the moving body in space?

2. What independent mode of access have we to the extension of the impression inasmuch as it is held to be purely "in" the mind?

3. Have we any other means of expressing the connection between affectio and intentio, outside of a progressive dynamization of the metaphor of the spaces traversed by expectation, attention, and memory? In this respect, the metaphor of the transit of events through the present seems unsurpassable. It is a good metaphor, a living metaphor, in that it holds together the idea of "passing away," in the sense of ceasing, and of "passing through," in the sense of relegating. There seems to be no concept that "surpasses" (aufhebt) this living metaphor. 25

4. The last thesis, if it can still be termed one, constitutes the most impenetrable enigma, that at the price of which we can say that the aporia of measurement is "resolved" by Augustine: that the soul "distends" itself as it "engages" itself — this is the supreme enigma.

But it is precisely as an enigma that the resolution of the aporia of measurement is valuable. Augustine's inestimable discovery is, by reducing the extension of time to the distention of the soul, to have tied this distention to the L slippage that never ceases to find its way into the heart of the threefold pres-ent — betweenhe' present of the future, the present _of_ the past, and the pres.→ [e7Ju5F]E→ present. In this way he sees discordance emerge again and again out of the→ very concordance of the intentions of expectation, attention, and memory.

It is to this enigma of the speculation on time that the poetic act of emplot/ The Circle of Narrative and Temporality

mcnt replies. But Aristotle's Poetics does not resolve the enigma on the speculative level. It does not really resolve it at all. It puts it to work — poetically — by producing an inverted figure of discordance and concordance. For this new solution, Augustine does leave us one word of encouragement. The fragile example of the cantius recited by heart suddenly becomes, toward the end of the inquiry, a powerful paradigm for other actiones in
which, through engaging itself, the soul suffers distension: "What is true of the whole psalm is also true of all its parts and each syllable. It is true of any longer action [in actione longiore] in which I may be engaged and of which the recitation of the psalm may only be a small part. It is true of a man's whole life, of which all his actions [actiones] are parts. It is true of the whole history of mankind, of which each man's life is a part" (28:38). The entire province of narrative is laid out here in its potentiality, from the simple poem, to the story of an entire life, to universal history. It is with these extrapolations, which are simply suggested here, that the present work is concerned.

THE CONTRAST WITH ETERNITY

I have yet to reply to the objection formulated at the beginning of this study. That objection contested a reading of Book 11 of the Confessions that artificially isolates sections 14:17-28:37 from the great meditation on eternity that frames them. I provided only a partial response to this objection when I stressed the autonomy that this investigation possesses owing to its repeated confrontations with the skeptical arguments that were essentially concerned with time. In this respect, the thesis that time is "in" the soul and finds "in" the soul the principle of measurement of time, is sufficient in itself inasmuch as it replies to the aporias found within the notion of time. In order to be understood, the notion of distentio animi requires no more than to be contrasted with the intentio immanent in the "action" of the mind.4

And yet something is missing from the full sense of distentio animi, which the contrast with eternity alone can provide. But what is missing does not concern what I shall call the sufficient sense of the distentio animi. I mean the sense that suffices to reply to the aporias of nonbeing and of measurement. What is missing is of a different order. I discern three major ways in which the meditation on eternity affects the speculation concerning time. Its first function is to place all speculation about time within the horizon of a limiting idea that forces us to think at once about time and about what is other than time. Its second function is to intensify the experience of distentio on the existential level. Its third function is to call upon this experience to surpass itself by moving in the direction of eternity, and hence to display an internal hierarchy in opposition to our fascination with the representation of a rectilinear time.

It is uncontestable that Augustine's meditation is indissolubly concerned

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with eternity and time. Book 11 of the Confessions opens with the first verse of Genesis (in one of the Latin versions known in Africa during the period when the Confessions were written): "In principio fecit Deus. . . ." Moreover, the meditation that covers the first fourteen chapters of Book 11 joins together, indissolubly, the praise of the psalmist with a type of speculation that is, for the most part, Platonic and Neoplatonic. Such a meditation leaves no place for a derivation, in any conceivable sense of the word, of eternity from time. What is posited, confessed, thought, is in one stroke the contrast of eternity with time. The work of the intelligence bears in no way on the question of whether or not eternity exists. The anteriority of eternity with respect to time—in a sense of anteriority that remains to be determined—is given in the contrast between "something that exists that was not created" and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6). This contrast is given in an exclamation: "Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they arc not created and something that has a before and an after that is subject to "change" and to "variation" (4:6).
here, and this original nothingness henceforth strikes time with an ontological deficiency. However, the decisive contrast, generating new negations—and new difficulties—is that which opposes the divine **Verbum** to the human **vox**. The creating Word is not like the human voice that "begins" and "ceases," or like syllables that are "heard" and then "die away" (6:8). The Word and the voice are as irreducible to one another and at the same time as inseparable as are the internal ear that hears the Word and receives the teaching of the internal master and the external ear that allows the **verba** to enter and transmits them to the vigilant intelligence. The **Verbum** remains, the **verba** disappear. With this contrast (and the accompanying "comparison"), time is once again struck with a negative characteristic: if the **Verbum** remains, the **verba** "are not at all, because they die away and are lost" (6:8). In this sense, the two functions of nonbeing overlap. The progression of negation will henceforth never cease to accompany that of the questioning that itself is dependent upon the confession of eternity. Once again, in fact, the question emerges out of the preceding response: "You create them by your Word alone and in no other way. Yet [nee tamen] the things which you create by your Word do not all come into being at one and the same time, nor are they eternal" (7:9). In other words, how can a temporal creature be made in and through the eternal Word? "Why is this so, O Lord my God? In some degree I see why it is, but I do not know how to put it into words" (8:10). Eternity, in this sense, is no less a source of enigmas than is time.

Augustine answers this difficulty by attributing to the Word an "eternal reason" which ascribes a beginning and an end to the being of created things. But this reply contains the seed of a major difficulty that will long occupy Augustine as he ponders what was before creation. Indeed, the way in which eternal reason ascribes a beginning and an end implies that it knows "the moment when" (quando) this thing had to begin or end. This *quando* leaves us once more at sea.

To begin, it makes both plausible and respectable the question raised by the Manicheans and by some Platonists, which other Christian thinkers had held to be ridiculous and had treated derisively. Here, then, Augustine is confronted with his adversary's threefold argument: "What was God doing before [antequam] he made heaven and earth?" "If he was at rest . . . and doing nothing, why did he not continue to do nothing for ever more, just as he had always done in the past?" "But if God's will that there should be a creation was there from all eternity, why is it that what he has created is not also eternal?" (10:12). We shall be concerned, as we consider Augustine's responses, with the progress of the ontological negativity affecting the experience of the *distentio animi*, which is itself negative on the psychological level.

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Before proposing his personal response to these difficulties which, once again, result from the confession of eternity, Augustine refines his notion of eternity one last time. Eternity is "for ever still [semper stans]" in contrast to things that are "never still." This stillness lies in the fact that "in eternity nothing moves into the past: all is present [totum esse praesens]. Time, on the other hand, is never all present at once" (11:13). Negativity reaches its highest pitch here. In order to push as far as possible the reflection on the *distentio animi*, that is, on the slippage of the threefold present, it must be "compared" to a present with neither past nor future. This extreme negation underlies his response to the apparently frivolous argument.

If Augustine takes such pains to refute the argument, it is because it constitutes an aporia produced by the very thesis of eternity.

The reply to the first formulation of the argument is forthright: "before he made heaven and earth, God made nothing" (12: 14). Certainly, the reply leaves intact the assumption that there was a "before," but the important thing is that this before is struck with nothingness. The "nothing" of "making nothing" is the before that precedes creation. We must therefore think of "nothing" in order to think of time as beginning and ending. In this way, time is, as it were, surrounded by nothingness.

The reply to the second formulation of the argument is even more remarkable. There is no before in relation to creation because in creating the world God created time: "You are the Maker of all time" (13:15). "You must have made that time, for time could not elapse before you made it" (ibid.). With one stroke, the response does away with the question: "If there was not time, there was no 'then' [non erat tun]" (ibid.). This "no then" is negative to the same extent as is the "nothing" of making nothing. Thought is thus entrusted with the task of forming the idea of the absence of time in order to think time through as that which passes. Time must be thought of as *transitory* in order to be fully experienced as *transition*.

However, the thesis that time was created along with the world—a thesis that is already found in Plato, *Timaeus* 38d—leaves open the possibility that there were other times before time. (*Confessions* 11, 30:40-end, mentions this possibility, either as a speculative hypothesis or in order to preserve a temporal dimension peculiar to angelic beings.) Whatever the case, Augustine gives his thesis the extra twist of the *reductio ad absurdum* in order to confront this possibility. Even if there were a time before time, this time would still be a created thing since God is the maker of all time. A time before all creation is thus unthinkable. This argument suffices to dismiss the assumption of God's idleness before creation. To say that God was idle is to say that there was a time in which he never did anything at all before he acted. The temporal categories, therefore, are not suited to characterizing a "before-the-world."
The reply to the third formulation of the adversary's argument provides Augustine with the opportunity to add the final touch to his opposition between time and eternity. In order to dismiss any idea of "newness" in the will of God, the idea of a "before" preceding creation must be given a meaning that excludes all temporality. Antecedence must be thought of as superiority, as excellence, as the supreme height: "It is in eternity, which is supreme [celsitu-dine] over time because it is a never-ending present, that you are at once before all past time and after all future time" (13: 16). The negations are sharpened even more: "Your years are completely present to you all at once, because they are at a permanent standstill [simul stant]" (ibid.). This simul slant as well as the "today" of which Exodus speaks assumes the atemporal meaning of that which surpasses without preceding. Passing away is less than surpassing.

If I have so insisted on the ontological negativity that the contrast between eternity and time brings to light in the psychological expression of the dixtentio animi, this is certainly not in order to lock up Augustine's notion of eternity within the Kantian function of a limiting idea. The meeting of the Hebraic tradition and of Platonism in the interpretation of Exodus 3:20—ego sum qui sum in its Latin translation—does not allow us to interpret the thought of eternity as a thought lacking an object.1 Besides, the conjoining of praise and speculation attests to the fact that Augustine does not restrict himself to thinking of eternity. He addresses himself to the Eternal, he invokes the eternal using the form of the second person. The eternal present declares itself in the first person: sum, not t'v.v.e.14 Here again, speculation is inseparable from the recognition of the one who declares himself. It is in this that it is inseparable from the hymn. In this sense, we can speak of an experience of eternity in Augustine, with the reservations that will be stated later. But it is precisely this experience of eternity that has the function of a limiting idea, when the intelligence "compares" time with eternity. It is the recoil effect of this "comparison" on the living experience of the dixtentio animi that makes the thought of eternity the limiting idea against the horizon of which the experience of the dixtentio animi receives, on the ontological level, the negative mark of a lack or a defect in being.15

The reverberation—lc retentissement, as Eugene Minkowski would have said—of this negation that is thought on the living experience of temporality will now convince us that the absence of eternity is not simply a limit that is thought, but a lack that is felt at the heart of temporal experience. The limiting idea then becomes the sorrow proper to the negative. The contrast between eternity and time is not limited to surrounding our experience of time with negativity, as we do when we link our thought of time to what is other than time. This experience is permeated through and through with negativity. Intensified in this way on the existential level, the experience of distension is raised to the level of a lamentation. The outline of this new experience of time contrast is contained in the admirable prayer of 2:3 already mentioned. The hymn includes the lamentation, and the confessio brings them both to the level of language.16

Against the backdrop of the stillness of eternity, the lamentation unashamedly displays the author's feelings. "What is that light whose gentle beams [interlucet] now and again strike through [percutit] to my heart, causing me to shudder in awe yet firing me with their warmth [et inhorresco et inardesco]? I shudder to feel how different I am from it: yet in so far as I am like it, I am aglow with its fire" (9:11). Already, in the course of the narration of the Confessions, as he recounts his vain efforts at Plotinian ecstasy, Augustine laments: "And I discovered that I was far from you in the region of dissimilarity [in regione dissimilitudinis]" (7 10: 16). This expression, which comes from Plato (Statesman 273d) and which had been transported into the Christian milieu through the intermediary of Plotinus (Ennecads I, 8:13, 16-17), becomes particularly striking here. It no longer refers, as it did in Plotinus, to the fall into the dark mire but marks instead the radical ontological difference that separates the creature from the creator, the difference that the soul discovers precisely in its movement of returning to its source and by its very effort to know its origin."

If, however, the ability to distinguish the similar from the dissimilar belongs to the intelligence that "compares" (6:8), its reverberation profoundly affects both the scope and the depth of feeling. It is remarkable in this respect that the final pages of Book 11, which complete the setting of the analysis of time into the meditation on the relationship between eternity and time (29:39-31:41), propose a final interpretation of the dixtentio animi, marked by the same tone of praise and lamentation as the first chapters of this book. Dixtentio animi no longer provides just the "solution" to the aporia of the measurement of time. It now expresses the way in which the soul, deprived of the stillness of the eternal present, is torn asunder: "But to win your favor is dearer than life itself. I see now that my life has been wasted in distractions [distinctio cst vita mea]" (29:39). It is in fact the entire dialectic of intentio-dixtentio, a dialectic within time itself, that is taken up again in terms of the contrast between eternity and time. While the dixtentio becomes synonymous with the dispersal into the many and with the wandering of the old Adam, the intentio tends to be identified with the fusion of the inner man ("until ... I am fused into one with you" [ibid.]). So the intentio is no longer the anticipation of the entire poem before its recitation which makes it move from the future toward the past, but the hope of the last things, to the very extent that the past that is to be forgotten is not the storehouse of memory but the emblem of the old Adam according to Paul in Philippians 3:12-14: "forgetting what I have left behind, I look forward [non dixtentus sed extentus], not..."
to what lies ahead of me in this life and will surely pass away, but to an eternal goal. I am intent [sed secundum intentionem] upon this one purpose, not distracted

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[secundum distentionem] by other aims" (ibid.). The same words recur: dis-tentio and intentio, but this is no longer in a purely speculative context of aporia and inquiry but rather in the dialectic of praise and lamentation. With this shift in meaning that affects the distentio animi, the borderline separating the condition of created beings from that of fallen beings is tacitly crossed: "I am divided [dissilui] between time gone by and time to come, and its course is a mystery to me" (ibid.). The "lamentations" in which our years pass are inseparably those of the sinner and the created being.

Again it is in relation to eternity that we can fully grasp the sense of all the expressions found in Augustine's other works that lend their metaphorical resources to the central metaphor of the distentio.

In an important essay on "Les Categories de la temporalite chez saint Au-gustin," in which he pays particular attention to the Enarrationes in Psalmos and the Sermones, Stanislas Boros arrives at four "synthetic images," each of which joins together what I earlier termed the sorrow of the finite with the celebration of the absolute: to temporality as "dissolution" are linked the images of devastation, of swooning, of gradually sinking, of unfulfilled aim, of dispersal, of alteration, and of extreme indigence; to temporality as "agony" are related images of the deathwatch, of sickness and frailty, of civil warfare, of fearful captivity, of aging, and of sterility; temporality as "banishment" includes the images of tribulation, exile, vulnerability, wandering, nostalgia, and vain desire; and finally, the theme of the "night" governs the images of blindness, darkness, and opacity. There is not one of these four principal images or of their variants that does not receive the strength of its meaning a contrario in relation to the opposing symbolism of eternity, in the figures of recollection, living fullness, being at home, and light.

Separated from this branching symbolism, which is engendered by the dialectic of eternity and time, the distentio animi would be no more than the sketch of a speculative response brought to the aporias that are continuously produced by skeptical argumentation. Taken up within the dynamics of praise and lamentation, the distentio animi becomes a living experience which puts flesh on the skeleton of a counterargument.

The third way in which the dialectic of time and eternity affects the interpretation of the distentio animi is no less important. At the very heart of temporal experience, it produces a hierarchy of levels of temporalization, according to how close or how far a given experience approaches or moves away from the pole of eternity. The accent here is placed less on the dissemblance than on the resemblance between eternity and time in the "comparison" made by the intelligence with regard to each of them (6:8). This resemblance is expressed in time's capacity to approximate eternity, which Plato had included in the very definition of time and which the first Christian thinkers had begun to reinterpret in terms of

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the ideas of creation, incarnation, and salvation. Augustine gives a unique accent to this reinterpretation by connecting together the themes of the teaching by the inner Word and the return. Between the eternal Verbum and the human vox there is not only difference and distance but the relation of teaching and communication. The Word is that inner master, sought and heard "within" (intus) (8:10): "It is true that I hear [audio] your voice, O Lord, telling me that only a master who really teaches us [docet nos] really speaks to us. . . . But who is our teacher except the Truth which never changes?" (ibid.). In this way, our first relationship to language is not the fact that we talk but that we listen and that, beyond the external verba, we hear the inner Verbum. The return is nothing other than this listening: for unless the principle "remained when we wandered in error, there would be none to whom we could return and restore ourselves. But when we return from error, we return by knowing the Truth; and in order that we may know the Truth he teaches us, because he is the Beginning and he also speaks to us" (ibid.). Thus are linked together teaching, recognition, and return. The teaching, we could say, bridges the abyss that opens up between the eternal Verbum and the temporal vox. It elevates time, moving it in the direction of eternity.

This is the very movement that is narrated by the first nine books of the Confessions. And in this sense the narration actually accomplishes the itinerary whose conditions of possibility are reflected upon in Book 11. This book, indeed, attests to the fact that the attraction of the eternity of the Word felt by temporal experience is not such as to plunge the narration, which is still temporal, into a contemplation free from the constraints of time. In this respect, the failure of the efforts at Plotinian ecstasy, recounted in Book 7, is definitive. Neither the conversion recounted in Book 8, nor even the ecstasy of Os-tia which marks the culmination of the narrative in Book 9, ever eliminate the temporal condition of the soul. These two culminating experiences only put an end to wandering, the fallen form of the distentio animi. But this is done in order to inspire a peregrination that sends the soul off again on the roads of time. Peregrination and narration are grounded in time's approximation of eternity, which, far from abolishing their difference, never stops contributing to it. This is indeed why, when Augustine derides the frivolousness of those who attribute a new will to God at the moment of creation, and when he contrasts the way "their thoughts still twist and turn" to the "steady" mind of the one who listens to the
In this way, without losing the autonomy that the discussion of the old apo-rias concerning time has conferred upon it, the theme of *distension* and *intention* acquires from its setting within the meditation on eternity and time an intensification that will be echoed in all that follows in the present work. This intensification does not just consist of the fact that time is thought of as abolished by the limiting idea of an eternity that strikes time with nothingness. Nor is this intensification reduced to transferring into the sphere of lamentation and wailing what had until then been only a speculative argument. It aims more fundamentally at extracting from the very experience of time the resources of an internal hierarchization, one whose advantage lies not in abolishing time but in deepening it.

The effect of this last remark on my entire undertaking is considerable. If it is true that the major tendency of modern theory of narrative—in historiography and the philosophy of history as well as in narratology—is to "de-chronologize" narrative, the struggle against the linear representation of time does not necessarily have as its sole outcome the turning of narrative into "logic," but rather may deepen its temporality. Chronology—or chronography—does not have just one contrary, the a-chronology of laws or models. Its true contrary is temporality itself. Indeed it was necessary to confess what is other than time in order to be in a position to give full justice to human temporality and to propose not to abolish it but to probe deeper into it, to hier-archize it, and to unfold it following levels of temporalization that are less and less "distended" and more and more "held firmly," *non secundum disi-tionem sed secundum intentionem* (29:39).
2

Emplotment: A Reading of Aristotle's Poetics

The second great text that animated my inquiry is Aristotle's Poetics. There are two reasons for this choice. In the first place, I found in his concept of emplotment (muthos) the opposite reply to Augustine's distentio animi. Augustine groaned under the existential burden of discordance. Aristotle discerns in the poetic act par excellence—the composing of the tragic poem—the triumph of concordance over discordance. It goes without saying that it is I, the reader of Augustine and Aristotle, who establishes this relationship between a lived experience where discordance rends concordance and an eminently verbal experience where concordance mends discordance.

In the second place, the concept of mimetic activity (mimesis) started me on the way to a second problematic, that of the creative imitation, by means of the plot of lived temporal experience. This second theme is difficult to distinguish from the first one in Aristotle, inasmuch as for him mimetic activity tends to be confused with emplotment. It will only be unfolded to its full extent and will only get its full autonomy, therefore, in what follows in this work. Indeed, the Poetics is silent about the relationship between poetic activity and temporal experience. As poetic activity, it does not even have any marked temporal character. Aristotle's total silence on this point is not without some advantage, however, insofar as from the beginning it protects our inquiry from the reproach of tautological circularity and thus sets up between the two problematics of time and narrative the most favorable distance for an investigation into the mediating operations between lived experience and discourse.

These few remarks already make clear that I do not intend to use the Aristotelian model as an exclusive norm for the remainder of this work. Rather I am evoking from Aristotle the melodic theme of a twofold reflection whose development is as important as its initial statement. This development will affect both concepts borrowed from Aristotle, emplotment (muthos) and mimetic activity.

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On the side of emplotment it will be necessary to remove a certain number of restrictions and prohibitions that are inherent in the privilege the Poetics accords to drama (tragedy and comedy) and to the epic. I concede there is something apparently paradoxical in making narrative activity the category encompassing drama, epic, and history, when, on the one hand, what Aristotle calls history (historia) in the context of the Poetics plays the role of a counterexample and when, on the other hand, narrative—or at least what he calls diegetic poetry—is opposed to drama within the single encompassing category of mimesis. Furthermore, it is not diegetic but tragic poetry that most bears the structural virtues of the art of composition. How can narrative become the encompassing term when at the beginning it is only one species among many? We shall have to say to what point Aristotle's text authorizes us to dissociate this structural model from its statement in terms of tragedy, giving rise by degrees to a reorganization of the whole narrative field. Whatever the case as regards the latitude offered by Aristotle's text, the Aristotelian concept of emplotment can be only the seed for us of a considerable development. To conserve its guiding role, it will have to undergo the test of other, more formidable counterexamples, whether provided by modern fictional narrative, as in the novel, or by contemporary history, which we might call non-narrative history.

On the side of mimetic activity, the full unfolding of the concept of mimesis demands not just that action's referential relation to the "real" be made less allusive, but also that this domain should receive other determinations besides the "ethical" ones—themselves considerable—that Aristotle assigns to it, if it is to rejoin the problematic set up by Augustine concerning our discordant experience of time. Our path beyond Aristotle will be a long one. It will not be possible to say how narrative is related to time until we have posed in its full scope the question of an interweaving reference [reference croisée]—, based upon our lived temporal experience—of fictional and historical narra-tive. If the concept of mimetic activity comes first in the Poetics, this concept of an interweaving reference—as the distant heir of Aristotelian mimesis—has to come last and has to withdraw to the horizon of our whole enterprise. This is why it will not be treated systematically until volume 2.

THE MELODIC LINE: THE PAIR MIMESIS-MUTHOS

I am not proposing to do a commentary on the Poetics. My reflection is a second-order one and assumes a certain familiarity with the great commentaries of Lucas, Else, Hardison, and, last but not least, Roselyne Dupont-Roc and Jean Lallot. Readers who have followed the same laborious course will easily recognize what my meditation owes to one or another of these works. It is not a matter of indifference that the pair mimesis-muthos is approached through the term that both launches and situates the whole analysis: the adjec-
structures. When Aristotle, substituting the *definendum* for the *definiens*, says that the muthos is "the organization of the events [e ton pragmaton sustasis]" (50a15), we must understand by *sustasis* (or by the equivalent term *sunthesis* [50a5]), not "system" (as Dupont-Roc and Lallot translate it [p. 55]), but the active sense of organizing the events into a system, so as to mark the operative character of all the concepts in the *Poetics.* This is why, from the first lines, muthos is presented as the complement of a verb that means "to compose." Poetics is thereby identified, without further ado, as the art of "composing plots" (47a2). The same mark has to be preserved in the translation of mimesis. Whether we say "imitation" or "representation" (as do the most recent French translators), what has to be understood is the mimetic activity, the active process of imitating or representing something. Imitation or representation, therefore, must be understood in the dynamic sense of making a representation, of a transposition into representative works. Following this same requirement, when Aristotle comes to enumerate and define the six "parts" of tragedy in Chapter 6, we have to understand them not as parts of the poem but of the art of composition.

If I am so insistent about this dynamic aspect which the adjective "poetic" imposes on all of the subsequent analysis, it is by design. When, in the second part of this work and in volume 2, I shall speak in defence of the primacy of our narrative understanding, in relation to explanation (sociological or otherwise) in history and explanation (structural or otherwise) in narrative fiction, I shall be defending the primacy of the activity that produces plots in relation to every sort of static structure, achronological paradigm, or temporal invariant. I will say nothing more about this here. What follows will clarify what I mean.

We shall begin by considering the pair mimesis/muthos. Aristotle's *Poetics* contains just one all-encompassing concept, that of mimesis. This concept is only defined contextually and through one of its uses, the one that interests us here, imitation or representation of action. Or still more precisely: the imitating or representing of action in the medium of metrical language, hence as accompanied by rhythms (to which are added, in the case of tragedy, the prime example, spectacle and melody). Still it is the imitation or representation of the action proper to tragedy, comedy, and epic that alone is taken into account. This is not yet defined in a form proper to its level of generality. Only the imitation or representation of action proper to tragedy is expressly defined. I shall not directly attack this powerful core of Aristotle's definition of tragedy; instead I shall follow the guideline Aristotle himself offers in the same chapter when he provides the key to the construction of this definition. It is not done generically through some specific differ-

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ence, but rather by means of an articulation into "parts": "Necessarily, therefore, there are in tragedy as a whole, considered as a special form, six constituent elements, viz. Plot, Character, Language, Thought, Spectacle, and Melody" (50a7-9).

For what follows I shall retain this quasi-identification of the two expressions "imitation or representation of action" and "the organization of the events." The second expression is, as I said, the *definens* Aristotle substitutes for the *definiendum*, muthos, plot. This quasi-identification is warranted first by placing the six parts into a hierarchy that gives priority to the "what" or object of representation (plot, characters, thought) in relation to the "by which" or means (language and melody) and the "how" or mode (the spectacle); then by a second hierarchization internal to the "what" that sets the action above the characters and the thought. "Tragedy is an imitation of action [mimesis praxeos], and it is an imitation of the agents chiefly owing to the action" (50b3). At the conclusion of this double hierarchization, the plot appears as the "first principle," the "end", the "purpose," and, if we may say so, the "soul" of tragedy. This quasi-identification is warranted by the formula: "The imitation of action is the Plot" (50a1).

This text will serve as our guide from here on. It imposes upon us the task of thinking about and defining in terms of each other the imitating or representing of action and the organizing of the events. This equivalence first of all excludes any interpretation of Aristotle's mimesis in terms of a copy or identical replica. Imitating or representing is a mimetic activity insomuch as it produces something, namely, the organization of events by employment. With one stroke we leave behind the Platonic use of mimesis, both in its metaphysical sense and its technical one in Book 3 of the *Republic* which opposes narrative "by mimesis" to "simple" narrative. Let me set aside this latter point for my discussion of the relation between narrative and drama, keeping for the time being the metaphysical sense of mimesis, associated with the concept of participation, by means of which things imitate ideas, and works of art imitate things. Platonic mimesis thereby distances the work of art by twice over from the ideal model which is its ultimate basis. Aristotle's mimesis has just a single space wherein it is unfolded—human making [*faire*], the."arts of composition." If therefore we are to conserve the character of mimesis as being an activity which *poiesis* confers on it, and if, moreover, we hold tightly to the guideline of defining mimesis by muthos, then we ought not to hesitate in understanding action—action as the object in the expression *mimesis praxeos* (50b3)—as the correlate of the mimetic activity governed by the organization of the events (into a system). I shall discuss below other ways of
constraining the relation of imitation to its "what" (the plot, the characters, and the thought). The strict correlation between mimesis and muthos suggests giving the genitive form praxeos the dominant, although perhaps not the exclusive, sense of

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being the noematic correlate of a practical nociς. The action is the "construct" of that construction that the mimetic activity consists of. I shall show below that this correlation, which tends to make the poetic text close in on itself, must not be pushed too far. And, as we shall see, this closure is in no way implied by the Poetics. This is all the more evident in that the only instruction Aristotle gives us is to construct the muthos, hence the organization of the events, as the "what" of the mimesis. The noematic correlation is therefore between mimesis praxeos, taken as one syntagmatic expression, and the organization of the events, as another. To extend this relation of correlation within the first expression to include mimesis and praxis is thus plausible, fecund—and risky.

Let us not leave the pair mimesis/muthos without saying a word about the further constraints aimed at accounting for the already constituted genres of tragedy, comedy, and epic, and also at justifying Aristotle's preference for tragedy. We must be very attentive to these additional constraints. For they have somehow to be removed if I am to extract from Aristotle's Poetics the model of emplotment I am proposing to extend to every composition we call a narrative.

The first limiting constraint is intended to account for the distinction between comedy, on the one hand, and tragedy and epic, on the other. It is not linked to the action as such but to the characters, whom Aristotle rigorously subordinates to the action, as I shall discuss below. It is, however, introduced as early as the second chapter of the Poetics. Indeed the first time that Aristotle has to give a definite correlate to what "the imitators represent," he defines it as the "persons engaged in action" (48a). If he does not go directly to the only canonical formula in the Poetics for mimesis—imitation or representation of action—it is because he needs to introduce early on into the field of representation articulated by rhythmic language an ethical criterion of nobleness or baseness, which applies to the persons represented insofar as they have this or that character. On the basis of this dichotomy, tragedy can be defined as representing a "higher moral type" and comedy a "lower" one. The second limiting constraint is the one that separates epic, on the one hand, from tragedy and comedy, on the other, which find themselves on the same side of the dividing line this time. This constraint merits the greatest attention since it runs counter to my plan to consider narrative as the common genus and epic as one species of narrative. Here the genus is the imitation or representation of action, of which narrative and drama are two coordinated species. What constraint requires us to oppose them? It is noteworthy, first, that it is not a constraint that divides the objects, the "what" of representation, but its "how" or mode. Yet if the three criteria of means, mode, and object are in principle equal, the whole weight of the subsequent analysis is on the "what." The equivalence between mimesis and muthos is an equivalence by means of the "what." And in terms of its plot, epic closely follows

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the rules of tragedy except for one variation, the "magnitude" which can be drawn from the composition alone and which in no way affects the basic rules for organizing the events. The essential thing is that the poet—whether narrator or dramatist—be a "maker of plots" (51b27). Next it is notable that the difference in mode, which is already relativized just in being a mode, continues to undergo, even within its field of application, a series of attenuations in the course of the subsequent analyses in the Poetics. In the beginning (Chapter 3), the difference is plainly drawn. It is one thing for whoever does the imitating, therefore for the author of the mimetic activity, no matter what the art form or what the quality of the characters in question, that this author acts as a "narrator" (apange/ia, apangelionta). Just another thing to make the characters the authors of the representation in that they "are presented as functioning and in action" (48a23). Here there is a distinction taken from the poet's attitude as regards his characters, which is why it constitutes a "mode" of representation. Either the poet speaks directly, and thus narrates what his characters do, or he allows them to speak and speaks indirectly through them, while they "do" the drama (48a29).

Does this distinction prohibit us from reuniting epic and drama under the title "narrative"? Not at all. First, I am not characterizing narrative by its "mode," that is, by the author's attitude, but by its "object," since I am calling narrative exactly what Aristotle calls muthos, the organization of the events. I do not differ from Aristotle, therefore, on the plane he places himself on, that of the "mode." To avoid any confusion, I shall distinguish narrative in the broad sense, defined as the "what" of mimetic activity, and narrative in the narrow sense of the Aristotelian diegcsis, which I shall henceforth call diegetic composition. Next, this transferring of terminology does proportionately less violence to Aristotle's categories in that he continues to minimize the difference, whether he takes up the side of drama or that of epic. On the side of drama, it is said that everything epic has (plot, characters, thought, rhythm), tragedy has too. What tragedy has beyond these (spectacle and music) are not
finally essential to it. Spectacle, in particular, is indeed one "part" of tragedy, but "is of all the parts the least
technical in the sense of being least germane to the art of poetry. For tragedy fulfills its function even without a
public performance and actors" (50b17- 19). Further on in the Poetics, at the moment when he takes up the
classic exercise of handing out prizes, Aristotle can credit tragedy for the fact that it can be seen, but he
immediately takes this back again: "And again, tragedy succeeds in producing its proper effect even without any
movement at all, just as epic poetry does, since when it is merely used the tragic force is manifested" (62a12)."
And on the side of epic, the relation of the poet to his characters in the act of narrating is not as direct as the
definition would have it. A first attenuation is even incorporated into it right at the start. Aristotle adds a
parenthesis to his definition of the poet as narrator: "whether the narrator speaks at times in an assumed role,
which is

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Homer's way, or always in his own person without change" (48a21-23). More precisely, Homer is praised further
on (Chapter 23) for his art of effacing himself behind his characters with their different qualities, letting them act
and speak in their own name; in short, for letting them occupy the scene. Aristotle can write, without paradox,
at the beginning of his chapter devoted to "the imitative art that . . . employs metrical language" (59a7): "it is
evident that, just as in tragedies, its plots should be dramatic in structure, etc." (59a19). Thus in the pair
drama/narrative, the first laterally qualifies the second to the point of serving as its model. In various ways,
therefore, Aristotle attenuates the "modal" opposition between diegetic imitation (or representation) and dramatic
imitation (or representation), an opposition, in any case, that does not affect the object of imitation, the
emplotment.

A final constraint merits placement under the pair mimesis/muthos, because IF gives an occasion to make more
precise the Aristotelian usage of mimesis. It is the one that subordinates consideration of the characters to con-
sideration of the action itself. This constraint seems too restrictive if we consider the modern development of the
novel and Henry James's thesis that gives character development an equal, if not higher, place than that of the
plot. Yet as Frank Kermode comments, to develop a character means more , narration, and to develop a plot
means enriching a character."-Aristotle is harder to please: "For tragedy is not an imitation of men but of actions
and of 'life. It is in action that happiness and unhappiness are found, and the end we aim at is a kind of activity,
not a quality, . . . . What is more, without action there could not be a tragedy, but there could be without
characterization" (50a16-24). We may of course attenuate the rigor of these hierarchies by observing that it is a
question only of ordering the "parts" of tragedy. All the more so as the difference between tragedy and comedy is
taken from the ethical differences affecting the characters. Assigning second place to the characters, therefore,
does not disqualify the category of character. What is more, we shall encounter in contemporary narrative
semiotics—stemming from Propp—attempts comparable to that of Aristotle to reconstruct narrative logic
beginning not from characters but from "functions," that is, from abstract segments of action.

But what is essential lies elsewhere.J3y so giving action priority over character, Aristotle establishes the mimetic
status of action. It is in ethics (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1105a30ff.) that the subject precedes the action in the
order of ethical qualities. In poetics, the composition of the action by the poet governs the ethical quality of the
characters. The subordination of character to action, therefore, is not a constraint of the same nature as the two
preceding ones. It seals the equivalence between the two expressions "representation of action" and
"organization of the events." If the accent has to be placed on this organization, then the imitation or
representation has to be of action rather than of human beings.

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THE PLOT: A MODEL OF CONCORDANCE

Let me set the question of the status of mimesis between parentheses for a while, in that it is not uniquely
defined by emplotment, and turn directly toward the theory of muthos so as to discern in it the starting point for
my own theory of narrative composition.

We should not forget that the theory of muthos is abstracted from the definition of tragedy we find in Chapter 6
of the Poetics, which was cited above. Aristotle first provides, therefore, the theory of the tragic muthos.

The question that I shall continue to pursue until the end of this work is whether the paradigm of order,
characteristic of tragedy, is capable of extension and transformation to the point where it can be applied to the
whole narrative field. This difficulty ought not to stop us here, however. The rigor of the tragic model has the
advantage of setting great store on the exigence for order at the very beginning of my investigation of our
narrative understanding. Right away, the most extreme contrast is established with the Augustinian dis-tentio
animi. That is, the tragic muthos is set up as the poetic solution to the speculative paradox of time, inasmuch as
the inventing of order is pursued to the exclusion of every temporal characteristic. It will be my task and my re-
ponsibility to draw the temporal implications of the model, in connection with the new deployment of the
theory of mimesis I propose below. However the enterprise of thinking about Augustine's distentio animi and
Aristotle's tragic muthos as one will at least appear plausible if we are willing to consider that the Aristotelian
theory does not accentuate concordance alone but, in a highly subtle way, the play of discordance internal to
concordance. It is this internal dialectic of poetic composition that makes the tragic muthos the inverted figure of
The definition of muthos as the organization of the events first emphasizes concordance. And this concordance is characterized by three features: completeness, wholeness, and an appropriate magnitude.\(^1\)

The notion of a "whole" (holos) is the pivot of the analysis that follows. For, far from being oriented toward an investigation into the temporal character of the organization, this analysis is fixed on its logical character.\(^2\) And it is precisely at the moment when the definition skirts the problem of time that it most distances itself from time: "Now a thing is a whole if it has a beginning, a middle, and an end" (50b26). But it is only in virtue of poetic composition that something counts as a beginning, middle, or end. What defines the beginning is not the absence of some antecedent but the absence of necessity in the succession. As for the end, it is indeed what comes after something else, but "either as its necessary sequel or as its usual [and hence probable] sequel" (50b30). Only the middle seems to be defined just by succession: "A middle is that which both comes after something else and has another thing following"

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it" (50b31). Yet in the tragic model it has its own logic, which is that of a "reversal" (metabole, metaballein [51a14]; metabasis [52a6]) of fortune from good to bad. The theory of the "complex" plot will contain a typology of the reversals that have a properly tragic effect. The accent, in the analysis of this idea of a "whole," is therefore put on the absence of chance and on conformity to the requirements of necessity or probability governing succession. If succession can be subordinated in this way to some logical connection, it is because the ideas of beginning, middle, and end are not taken from experience. They are not features of some real action but the effects of the ordering of the poem.

The same applies to the magnitude. It is only in the plot that action has a contour, a limit (horos) and, as a consequence, a magnitude. We shall return below, with regard to the aesthetics of reception whose seed is present in Aristotle, to the role of the attention or of memory in the definition of this criterion of perspicacity. Whatever can be said about the spectator's capacity to take in the work in one view, this external criterion comes to terms with an exigency internal to the work which is the only thing important here. "If the length is sufficient to permit a change from bad fortune to good or from good fortune to bad to come about in an inevitable or probable sequence of events, this is a satisfactory limit [horos] of magnitude" (51a2-15). Certainly, this length must be temporal—a reversal takes time. But it is the work's time, not the time of events in the world. The character of necessity applies to the events that the plot makes contiguous with each other (ephebes) (ibid.). Vacuous times are excluded. We do not ask what the hero did between two events that would have been separated in his life. In Oedipus Rex, notes Else, the messenger returns precisely at the moment the plot requires his presence, "no sooner and no later" (Else, p. 293). It is also for reasons internal to its composition that epic admits of a longer length. More tolerant about its episodic events, it requires greater amplitude, but without ever giving up the requirement for some limit.

Not only is time not considered, it is excluded. For example, in considering epic (Chapter 23), as submitted to the requirements of completeness and wholeness best illustrated by tragedy, Aristotle opposes two sorts of unity to each other: on the one hand, the temporal unity (henos khronou) that characterizes "a single period of time with all that happened therein to one or more persons, no matter how little relation one event may have had with another" (59a23-24), and, on the other hand, the dramatic unity that characterizes "a single action" (59a22) (which forms a whole, complete in itself, having a beginning, a middle, and an end). That numerous actions occur during a single period of time does not therefore make a "single action." This is why Homer is praised for having chosen in the story of the Trojan War—even though this too has a beginning and an end—"one part" for which his art alone deter-

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mined its beginning and its end. These remarks confirm that Aristotle shows no interest in the construction of a time capable of being implicated in the constructing of the plot.

If therefore the internal connection of the plot is logical rather than chronological, what logic is it? The truth is that the word "logic" never appears, although necessity and probability are familiar categories from the Organon. If the term "logic" is never used, it is probably because what is at issue is an intelligibility appropriate to the field of praxis, not that of theoria, and therefore one neighboring on phronesis, which is the intelligent use of action.

Poetry is, in fact, a "doing" (faire) and a "doing" about "doing"—the "doers" of Aristotle's Chapter 3. But it is not actual, ethical doing, rather fictive and poetic doing. Which is why it is so necessary to discern the specific features of this mimetic and mythic intelligence—in the Aristotelian sense of these two terms.

Aristotle makes clear that it really is a question of a kind of intelligence, beginning in Chapter 4, where he establishes his leading concepts by way of their genesis. Why, he asks, do we take pleasure in regarding the images of things that in themselves are repugnant—the basest animals or corpses? "For this again the reason is that the experience of learning things is highly enjoyable, not only for philosophers but for other people as well. . . . when they enjoy seeing images, therefore, it is because as they look at them they have the experience of learning and reasoning out what each thing represents, for example, that 'this figure is so and so'" (48b12-17).
Learning, concluding, recognizing the form—here we have the skeleton of meaning for the pleasure found in imitation or representation. But if it is not a question of philosophical universals, what kind of universals are these "poetic" universals? That they are universals is beyond doubt since they can be characterized by the double opposition of the possible to the actual and the general to the particular. The first pair, we know, is illustrated by the famous opposition between poetry and history in the manner of Herodotus. Thus the difference between the historian and the poet is not that the historian employs prose and the poet verse—the work of Herodotus could be put into verse, and it would be no less history with verses than without them; rather the difference is that the one tells of things that have been and the other of such things as might be. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history, in that poetry tends rather to express the universal, history rather the particular fact.

What is at issue is not entirely elucidated, however, for Aristotle is careful to oppose "such things as might happen, things that are possibilities by virtue of being in themselves inevitable or probable" to "things that have happened". And also a universal is: "The sort of thing that (in the circumstances) a certain kind of person will say or do either probably or necessarily". In other words, the possible and the general are not to be sought elsewhere.

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where than in the organization of the events, since it is this linkage that has to be necessary or probable. In short, it is the plot that has to be typical. We understand anew why the action takes precedence over the characters. It is the universalizing of the plot that universalizes the characters, even when they have specific names. Whence the precept: first conceive the plot, then add the names.

It might be objected that the argument is circular. The possible and the general characterize the necessary or the probable, but it is the necessary and the probable that qualify the possible and the general. Must we therefore assume that the organization as such, that is, as a connection akin to causality, makes the organized facts typical? For my own part, I lean in the direction of those narrativist theorists of history, such as Louis O. Mink, who put the whole weight of its intelligibility on the connection as such established between the events, or on the judicatory act of "grasping together." To conceive of a causal connection, even among singular events, is already a kind of universalization.

That such is the case is confirmed by the opposition between simple and episodic plots. It is not episodes as such that Aristotel disapproves of; tragedy can forgo them only under the penalty of becoming monotonous, and epic makes the best use of them. What he condemns is disconnected episodes: "I call episodic a plot in which the episodes follow one another [met'allela] in no probable or inevitable sequence" (ibid.). The key opposition is here: one thing after another and one thing because of another ("in a causal sequence" [di'allela]) (52a4). One after the other is merely episodic and therefore improbable, one because of the other is a causal sequence and therefore probable. No doubt is allowed. The kind of universality that a plot calls for derives from its ordering, which brings about its completeness and its wholeness. The universals a plot engenders are not Platonic ideas. They are universals related to practical wisdom, hence to ethics and politics. A plot engenders such universals when the structure of its action rests on the connections internal to the action and not on external accidents. These internal connections as such are the beginning of the universalization.

One feature of mimesis, then, is that it is directed more at the coherence of the muthos than at its particular story. Its making [fai're] is immediately a universalizing "making." The whole problem of narrative Verstehen is contained here in principle. To make up a plot is already to make the intelligible spring from the accidental, the universal from the singular, the necessary or the probable from the episodic. And is this not finally what Aristotle says in 51b29-32:

It is clear then from the foregoing remarks that the poet should be a maker of plots more than a maker of verse, in that he is a poet by virtue of his imitation and he imitates actions. So even if on occasion he takes real events as the

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subject of a poem, he is none the less a poet, since nothing prevents some of the things that have actually happened from being of the son that might probably or possibly happen, and it is in accordance with this that he is their poet. C51b27-12)

The two sides of the equation balance each other: maker of plots, imitator of action—this is the poet. The difficulty is still only partially resolved. We can verify a causal connection in reality, but what about in a poetic composition? This is an embarrassing question. If mimetic activity "composes" action, it is what establishes what is necessary in composing it. It does not see the universal, it makes it spring forth. What then are its criteria? We have a partial answer in the expression referred to above: "it is because as they look at them they have the experience of learning and reasoning out what each thing represents, concluding, for example, that 'this figure is so and so" (48b16-17). This pleasure of recognition, as Dupont-Roc and Lallot put it, presupposes, I think, a prospective concept of truth, according to which to invent is to rediscover. But this prospective concept
of truth has no place in a formal theory of the structure of the plot. It presupposes a more developed theory of mimesis than the one that simply equates mimesis with muthos. I shall return to this point at the end of this study.

INCLUDED DISCORDANCE

The tragic model is not purely a model of concordance, but rather of discordant concordance. This is where it offers a counterpart to the distentio animi. Discordance is present at each stage of the Aristotelian analysis, even though it is only dealt with thematically in terms of the complex (versus the simple) plot. It is already manifest in the canonical definition of tragedy as an imitation of action that is serious and "complete" (leleios) (49b25). Complete is not a negligible feature insofar as the end of action is happiness or unhappiness, and insofar as the ethical quality of the characters grounds the plausibility of either outcome. The action is not brought to its conclusion therefore until it produces one or the other. And the space for the "episodes" that bring action to its conclusion is thereby marked out. Aristotle says nothing against episodes as episodes. What he proscribes are not episodes but the episodic texture, the plot where the episodes follow one another by chance. The episodes, controlled by the plot, are what give amplitude to the work and thus a "magnitude."

The definition of tragedy also contains another indication: "and effecting through pity and fear [what we call] the catharsis of such emotions" (49b26-27). Let us leave aside the prickly question of catharsis for the moment and concentrate on its meaning (dia). In my opinion Else and Dupont-Roc and Emploment.

Lallot have well understood Aristotle's intention, as it is reflected in the construction of this sentence. The spectator's emotional response is constructed in the drama, in the quality of the destructive or painful incidents suffered by the characters themselves. The subsequent treatment of the term pathos, as the third component of a complex plot, will confirm this. Hence catharsis, whatever the term means, is brought about by the plot. And the first discordance is the fearful and pitiable incidents. They constitute the major threat to the plot's coherence. This is why Aristotle speaks of them again in connection with the necessary and the probable and also in the context of his criticism of episodic examples (Chapter 9). There he no longer uses the nouns pity and fear but the adjectives pitiable and fearful (52a2), which qualify the incidents the poet represents by means of the plot.

Discordant concordance is intended still more directly by the analysis of surprise. Aristotle characterizes it by an extraordinary expression in ana-culitic form, which is lost in the English translation: "when they come unexpectedly and yet occur in a causal sequence in which one thing leads to another [para ten doxan di'allela]
(52a4). The "marvelous" things (to thamastoi) (ibid.)—the height of the discordant—are those strokes of chance that seem to arrive by design.

We reach the heart of discordant concordance, still common to both simple i and episodic plots, with the central phenomenon of the tragic action Aristotle * calls "reversal" (metabole) in Chapter 11. In tragedy, reversal turns good fortune into bad, but its direction may be reversed. Tragedy does not exploit this resource, owing no doubt to the role of the fearful or the pitiable incidents. It is this reversal, however, that takes time and governs the magnitude of the work. The art of composition consists in making this discordance appear concordant. The "one because of [dia] the other" thus wins out over "one after [meta] the other" (52a18-22). The discordant overturns the concordant in life, but not in tragic art.

The reversals characteristic of the complex plot are, as is well known, reversal (peripeteia)—coup de theatre in Dupont-Roc and Lallot's apt phrase— and recognition (anagivrisis), to which must be added suffering (pathos). The definitions of these modes of reversal are given in Chapter 11 and the commentary that goes with them is well known. What is important for us is that here Aristotle multiplies the constraints on the tragic plot and thereby makes his model both stronger and more limited at the same time. More limited, inasmuch as the theory of the muthos becomes more and more identified with that of the tragic plot. So the question will be whether what we are calling narrative can draw this surprising effect from other procedures than those Aristotle enumerates, and therefore give rise to other constraints than those of tragedy. Yet the model also becomes stronger, inasmuch as reversal, recognition, and suffering—particularly when they are joined together in one work, as in Sophocles' Oedipus—bring to their highest degree of tension the fusion...
ference to happiness and unhappiness? Does not every narrated story finally have to do with reversals of fortune, whether for better or worse? It is not necessary to take suffering (pathos) as the poor cousin in this review of the modes of reversal. Aristotle, it is true, does give it a rather confining definition at the end of Chapter 11. Suffering is linked to the fearful and pitiable incidents inherent in the tragic plot, the leading generators of discordance. Suffering—"the thing suffered," says Else, "l'effet violent," according to Dupont-Roc and Lallot—just brings to their peak the fearful and the pitiable in the complex plot. Such consideration of the emotional quality of the incidents is not foreign to our inquiry, as though concern for the intelligibility proper to the search for completeness and wholeness were to imply an "intellectualism" that should be opposed to some sort of "emotionism." The pitiable and the fearful are qualities closely tied to the most unexpected changes of fortune oriented toward unhappiness. It is these discordant incidents the plot tends to make necessary and probable. And in so doing, it purifies them, or, better, purges them. We shall return again to this point. By including the discordant in the concordant, the plot includes the affecting within the intelligible. Aristotle thus comes to say that pathos is one ingredient of the imitating or representing of praxis. So poetry conjoints these terms that ethics opposes.

We must go even further. If the pitiable and the fearful can be incorporated into the plot, it is because these emotions have, as Else says (p. 375), their own rationale, which, in return, serves as a criterion for the tragic quality of . each change in fortune. Two chapters (13 and 14) are devoted to this screening effect which pity and fear exercise with regard to the very structure of the plot. Indeed, to the extent that these emotions are incompatible with the repugnant and the monstrous, or the inhuman (a lack of "philanthropy" that makes us recognize someone like ourselves in the characters), they play the Emplotment principal role in the typology of plots. This is constructed in terms of two axes: whether the characters are good or evil, and whether their end is happy or unhappy. The two tragic emotions govern its hierarchy of possible combinations "since the first is felt for a person whose misfortune is undeserved and the second for someone like ourselves" (53a3-5).

Finally, it is these tragic emotions that require that the hero be prevented by some "fault" from attaining excellence in the order of virtue and justice, without however vice or wickedness being responsible for his fall into misfortune: "We are left with the man whose place is between these extremes. Such is the man who on the one hand is not pre-eminent in virtue and justice, and yet on the other hand does not fall into misfortune through vice or depravity, but falls because of some mistake [hamartia]" (53a7f). So even the discernment of the tragic fault is brought about by the emotional quality of pity, fear, and our sense for what is human. The relation therefore is a circular one. It is the composition of the plot that purges the emotions, by bringing to representation the pitiable and fearful incidents, and it is these purged emotions that govern our discernment of the tragic. It seems hardly possible to push any further the inclusion of the fearful and the pitiable in the dramatic texture. Aristotle can, however, conclude this theme in these terms: "And since the pleasure the poet is to provide is that which comes [apo] from pity and fear through [dia] an imitation, clearly this effect must be embodied [empoioteon] in [en] the events of the plot" (53b2-13).

These are the increasing constraints to which Aristotle submits his tragic model. We may ask then whether, in augmenting the constraints on the tragic plot, he has not made his model both stronger and more limited. THE TWO SIDES OF THE POETIC CONFIGURATION

To conclude, I would like to return to the question of mimesis, the second focus of my interest in reading the Poetics. It does not seem to me to be governed by the equating of the two expressions "the imitation (or representation) of action" and "the organization of the events." It is not that something has to be taken back from this equation. There is no doubt that the prevalent sense of mimesis is the one instituted by its being joined to muthos. If we continue to translate mimesis by "imitation," we have to understand something completely contrary to a copy of some preexisting reality and speak instead of a creative imitation. And if we translate mimesis by "representation" (as do Dupont-Roc and Lallot), we must not understand by this word some redoubling of presence, as we could still do for Platonic mimesis, but rather the break that opens the space for fiction. Artisans who work with words produce not things but quasi-things; they invent the as-if. And in this sense, the Aristotelian mimesis is the emblem of the shift [décrochage] that, to use our vocabulary today, produces the "literariness" of the work of literature.

Still the equation of mimesis and muthos does not completely fill up the

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meaning of the expression mimesis praxeos. We may of course—as we did above—construe the objective genitive as the noematic correlate of imitation or representation and equate this correlate to the whole expression "the organization of the events," which Aristotle makes the "what"—the object—of mimesis. But that the praxis belongs at the same time to the real domain, covered by ethics, and the imaginary one, covered by poetics,
suggests that mimesis functions not just as a break but also as a connection, one which establishes precisely the status of the "metaphorical" transposition of the practical field by the muthos. If such is the case, we have to preserve in the meaning of the term mimesis a reference to the first side of poetic composition. I call this reference (mimesis, to distinguish it from, mimesis,^—the mimesis of creation—which remains the pivot point. I hope to show that even in Aristotle's text there are scattered references to this prior side of poetic composition. This is not all. Mimesis, we recall, as an activity, the mimetic activity, does not reach its intended term through the dynamism of the poetic text alone. It also requires a spectator or reader. So there is another side of poetic composition as well, which I call (mimesis,, whose indications I shall also look for in the text of the Poetics. By so framing the leap of imagination with the two operations that constitute the two sides of the mimesis of invention, I believe we enrich rather than weaken the meaning of the mimetic activity invested in the muthos. I hope to show that this activity draws its intelligibility from its mediating function, which leads us from one side of the text to the other through the power of refiguration.

References are not lacking, in the Poetics, to the understanding of action—and also the passions—which the Ethics articulates. These are tacit references, although the Rhetoric does include a veritable "treatise on the passions." The difference is easy to understand. Rhetoric exploits these passions, while poetics transposes human action and suffering into a poem.

The following chapter will give a more complete idea of the understanding of the order of action implied by narrative activity. The tragic model, as a limited model of narrativity, makes use of borrowings themselves limited by this pre-understanding. The tragic muthos turning on reversals of fortune, and exclusively on those from happiness to unhappiness, is one exploration of the ways in which action throws good people, against all expectation, into unhappiness. It serves as a counterpoint to ethics, which teaches how action, through the exercise of virtue, leads to happiness. At the same time it borrows from the foreknowledge of action only its ethical features."

In the first place, poets have always known that the characters they represent are "persons engaged in action" (48a8). They have always known that "character is that in virtue of which we say that the personages are of such and such quality" (50a4). They have always known that "these persons will necessarily be persons of a higher or lower moral type" (48a2). The parenthesis that follows this last phrase is an ethical one: "for this is the one divi-

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sion that characters submit to almost without exception, goodness or badness being universal criteria of character" (48a2-4). This expression "universal" (panics) is the indication of mimesis, in the text of the Poetics. In the chapter devoted to the characters (Chapter 15), "the person being imitated" (54a27) is a person according to ethics. And the ethical qualifications come from the real world. What stems from the imitation or representation is the logical requirement of coherence. In the same vein, it is said that tragedy and comedy differ in that "comedy prefers to imitate persons who are worse, tragedy persons who are better, than the present generation [ton nun]" (48a5- 18); this is the second indication of mimesis,. Therefore, that the characters may be improved or harmed by the action is something the poet knows and takes for granted: "Character is that in virtue of which we say that the personages are of such and such a quality" (50a6).36

In short, if we are to talk of a "mimetic displacement" or a quasi-metaphorical "transposition" from ethics to poetics, we have to conceive of mimetic activity as a connection and not just as a break. It is in fact the movement from mimesis, to mimesis,. If it is beyond doubt that the term muthos indicates discontinuity, the word praxis, by its double allegiance, assures continuity between the two realms of action—ethics and poetics."

A similar relationship of identity and difference could no doubt be recognized between the pathos—are the suffering—which tragic art makes one "part" of the plot (52b9ff.).

Perhaps we should push this reprise or recovery of ethics in poetics still further. Poets find not only an implicit categorization of the practical field in their cultural stock but also a first narrative organization [mise en forme] of this field. If tragic poets, unlike authors of comedy who allow themselves to support their plots with names chosen by chance, retain "historical names" (genomenon) (51b5), that is, ones received from tradition, it is because the probable—an objective feature—must also be persuasive or credible (pitha-non) (51b6)—a subjective feature. The logical connection of probability cannot therefore be detached from the cultural constraints of acceptability. Certainly art, here again, indicates a break: "So even if on occasion he takes real events [genomenaj as the subject of a poem, he is none the less a poet" (51b29-30). Yet without myths that have been passed on there would be nothing to transform poetically. Who can fully put into words the inexhaustible source of violence received from the myths which the poet transforms into a tragic effect? And where is this tragic potential more dense than in the received stories about a few celebrated houses: that of the Atrides, that of Oedipus? It is not by chance therefore that Aristotle, so concerned elsewhere about the autonomy of the poetic act, advises poets to continue to draw upon the most frightful and pitiable matter in this treasury."

As for the criterion of the probable or the possible by which poets distin-
tradition—we may doubt that it can be circumscribed by a pure poetic "logic." The reference I made to its tie to the "persuasive" leads me to think it too is somehow received. But this problem relates instead to the problematic of mimesis, to which I shall now turn.

At first glance, there seems little to expect from the Poetics concerning the second side of poetic composition. Unlike the Rhetoric, which subordinates the order of discourse to its effects on its audience, the Poetics indicates no explicit interest in the communication of the work to the public. It even reveals in places an impatience regarding the constraints tied to the institution of the public contests (51a?) and even more so regarding the poor taste of the ordinary public (Chapter 25). The reception of the work is not therefore a major category of the Poetics. It is a treatise about composition, with almost no concern for anyone who receives the result.

Thus the references that I am now bringing together under the heading of mimesis, are all the more valuable in that they are so rare. They testify to the impossibility, for a poetics that puts its principal accent on the internal structures of the text, of locking itself up within the closure of the text.

The line I am going to follow is this. The Poetics does not speak of structure but of structuration. Structuration is an oriented activity that is only completed in the spectator or the reader.

From the beginning the term poiesis puts the imprint of its dynamism on all the concepts in the Poetics and makes them concepts about operations. Mimesis is a representative activity: sustasis (or mnthesis) is the organization of the events into a system, not the system itself. Further, the dynamism (dunamis) of poiesis is intended from the opening lines of the Poetics as an exigency for completeness (47a8-10). It is what, in Chapter 6, requires that the action be brought to its conclusion (teleios). Yes, this completeness is the impossibility of the work, of its muðhos, but it is attested to only by the pleasure "which properly belongs to it" (53b11), which Aristotle calls its ergon, "the effect proper to tragedy" (52b30). All the indications of mimesis, in Aristotle's text are relative to this pleasure "which properly belongs to" tragedy and its conditions of production.

I would like to show in what way this "pleasure is both constructed in the work and made actual outside it. It joins inside to outside and requires us to treat in a dialectical fashion this relation of outside to inside, which modern poetics too quickly reduces to a simple disjunction, in the name of an alleged prohibition thrown up by semiotics against everything taken to be extralinguistic." As though language were not always already thrown beyond itself by its ontological vehemence! In the Ethics we have a good guide for articulating correctly the inside and the outside of the work. This is its theory of pleasure. If we apply to the work of literature what Aristotle says about pleasure in Books VII and X of the Nichomachean Eth-

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ics, namely, that it proceeds from unhindered action and is added to accomplished action as a crowning supplement, we ought to articulate in the same fashion the internal finality of the composition and the external finality of its reception. 40

The pleasure of learning something is the first component of this pleasure of the text. Aristotle takes it as one corollary of the pleasure we take in imitations or representations, which is one of the natural causes of the poetic art, according to the genetic analysis in Chapter 4. And he associates with the act of learning that of "concluding, for example, that 'this figure is so and so'" (59b9). The pleasure of learning is therefore the pleasure of recognition. And this is what the spectators do when they recognize in Oedipus the universal that the plot engenders through its composition. The pleasure of recognition is therefore both constructed in the work and experienced by the reader. This pleasure of recognition, in turn, is the fruit of the pleasure the spectator takes in the composition as necessary or probable. These "logical" criteria are themselves both constructed in the piece and exercised by the spectator. I have already made an allusion, in discussing extreme cases of dissonant consonance, to the connection Aristotle establishes between the probable and the acceptable—the "persuasive," the major category in the Rhetoric. Such is the case as soon as the para-doxical has to be included in the causal sequence of "one by means of the other." It is even more the case when epic accepts the alogon, the irrational, that tragedy has to avoid. The probable, under the pressure of the improbable, is thereby stretched to the breaking point. I have not forgotten the astonishing precept: "What is impossible yet probable should be preferred to that which is possible but incredible" (60a26-27). And when, in the following chapter (Chapter 25), Aristotle determines those norms that ought to guide criticism in resolving "problems," he classes representable things under three rubrics: "things as they once were or now arc; or things as people say or suppose they were or are; or things as they ought to be" (60b10-II). But what do present (and past) reality, opinion, and things as they ought to be designate if not the realm of the readily believable? We touch here on one of the more concealed sources of the pleasure of recognition, namely, the criterion of what is "persuasive," whose contours are those of the social form of the imagination." "It is true that Aristotle does explicitly make the persuasive an attribute of the probable, which is itself the measure of the possible in poetry—"possibility means credibility" (51b6). But whenever the impossible—the extreme figure of the discordant—threatens the structure, is it not the persuasive that becomes the measure of the acceptable impossibility? "Thus in reference to poetic effect, a convincing impossibility is preferable to that which, though possible, is unconvincing" (61b2-II). "Opinion" (ibid.) is the only guide here: "The improbable [or irrational] should be justified by 'what men say'" (61b4).
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Hence, by its very nature, the intelligibility characteristic of dissonant consonance—what Aristotle puts under the term "probable"—is the common product of the work and the public. The persuasive is born at their intersection.

It is also in the spectator that the properly tragic emotions flower. For the pleasure proper to tragedy is one that engenders fear and pity. Nowhere better than here do we overtake the movement from the work to the spectator. On one side, in effect, the pitiable and the fearful—as adjectives—characterize the "events" themselves that the muthos composes into one. In this sense, the muthos imitates or represents the pitiable and the fearful. How does it bring them to representation? Precisely by making them leave (ex) the organization (of the events. Here then fear and pity are inscribed (in) the events by the composition, insofar as it moves through the sieve of the representative activity (53bl3). What is experienced by the spectator must first be constructed in the work. In this sense we could say that Aristotle's ideal spectator is an "implied spectator" in the same sense Wolfgang Iser speaks of an "implied reader"—but one of flesh and blood and capable of pleasure. In this regard I agree with the converging interpretations of catharsis in Else, Golden, Redfield, and Dupont-Roc and Lallot. Catharsis is a purification—or better, as Dupont-Roc and Lallot propose, a purgation—which has its seat in the spectator. It consists precisely in the fact that the pleasure proper to tragedy proceeds from pity and fear. It consists therefore in the transformation of the pain inherent in these emotions into pleasure. Yet this subjective alchemy is also constructed in the work by the mimetic activity. It results from the fact that the pitiable and fearful incidents are, as we have said, themselves brought to representation. And this poetic representation of these emotions results in turn from the composition itself. In this sense it is not too much to say, with recent commentators, that the purgation first of all is in the poetic construction. I myself have elsewhere suggested treating catharsis as the integrating part of the metaphorical process that conjoins cognition, imagination, and feeling. And in this sense, the dialectic of inside and outside reaches its highest point in catharsis. Experienced by the spectator, it is constructed in the work. This is why Aristotle could include it in his definition of tragedy, without devoting a separate analysis to it: "effecting through [diaj pity and fear [what we call] the catharsis of such emotions" (49b28).

I willingly admit that the allusions the Poetics makes to pleasure taken as understanding and pleasure taken as experiencing fear and pity—which together, in the Poetics, form a single pleasure—constitute just the barest indication of a theory of mimesis. This only takes on its full scope when the work deploys a world that the reader appropriates. This world is a cultural world. The principal axis of a theory of reference on the second side of the work passes therefore through the relationship between poetry and culture. As James Redfield so forcefully puts it in his book Nature and Culture in the Iliad, the two relations, call the converse of the other, that we can establish between these terms "must be interpreted ... in light of a third relation: the poet as a maker of culture" (p. xi). Aristotle's Poetics makes no move into this domain. It sets up the ideal spectator, and even more so the reader with his intelligence, his "purged" emotions, and his pleasure at junction of the work and the culture it creates. In this, Aristotle, Poetics, despite its almost exclusive interest in mimesis as inventive, does offer indication of an investigation of mimetic activity in all its aspects.
3

Time and Narrative: Threefold Mimesis

The moment has come to join together the two preceding independent studies and test my basic hypothesis that between the activity of narrating a story and the temporal character of human experience there exists a correlation that is not merely accidental but that presents a transcultural form of necessity. To put it another way, **time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.**

The cultural abyss that separates the Augustinian analysis of time in the *Confessions* and the Aristotelian analysis of plot in the *Poetics* compels me to construct at my own risk the intermediary links that articulate their correlation. Indeed, as has been said, Augustine's paradoxes of the experience of time owe nothing to the activity of narrating a story. His key example of reciting a verse or a poem serves to sharpen the paradox rather than to resolve it. And on his side, Aristotle's analysis of plot owes nothing to his theory of time, which is dealt with exclusively in his *Physics.*

What is more, in his *Poetics,* the "logic" of emplotment discourages any consideration of time, even when it implies concepts such as beginning, middle, and end, or when it becomes involved in a discourse about the magnitude or the length of the plot. The mediating construction I am about to propose deliberately bears the same title as does this work as a whole: *Time and Narrative.* At this stage of the investigation, however, it can only be a question of a sketch that will require further expansion, criticism, and revision. In fact, the present study will not take into consideration the fundamental bifurcation between historical and fictional narrative, which will give birth to the more technical studies of the succeeding parts of this work. From the separate investigation of these two fields will proceed the most serious questioning of my whole enterprise, as much on the level of the claim to truth as on that of the internal structure of discourse. What is sketched out here, therefore, is only a sort of reduced model of the thesis that the remainder of this work must attempt to prove. I am taking as my guideline for exploring the mediation between time and narrative the articulation mentioned earlier, and already partially illustrated by my interpretation of Aristotle's *Poetics,* between the three moments of mimesis that, seriously and playfully, I named mimesis"," mimesis, and mimesis,. I take it as established that mimesis constitutes the pivot of this analysis. By serving as a turning point it opens up the world of the plot and institutes, as I have already suggested, the literariness of the work of literature. But my thesis is that the very meaning of the configurating operation constitutive of emplotment is a result of its intermediary position between the two operations I am calling mimesis, and mimesis,, which constitute the two sides [l']amor et l' aualf of mimesis,. By saying this, I propose to show that mimesis, draws its intelligibility from its faculty of mediation, which is to conduct us from the one side of the text to the other, transfiguring the one side into the other through its power of configuration. I am reserving for the part of this work devoted to fictional narrative the confrontation between this thesis and what I take to be characteristic of a semiotics of the text, namely, that a science of the text can be established only upon the abstraction of mimesis,, and may consider only the internal laws of a work of literature, without any regard for the two sides of the text. It is the task of hermeneutics, in return, to reconstruct the set of operations by which a work lifts itself above the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering, to be given by an author to readers who receive it and thereby change their acting. For a semiotic theory, the only operative concept is that of the literary text. Hermeneutics, however, is concerned with reconstructing the entire arc of operations by which practical experience provides itself with works, authors, and readers. It does not confine itself to setting mimesis, between mimesis, and mimesis,. It wants to characterize mimesis, by its mediating function. What is at stake, therefore, is the concrete process by which the textual configuration mediates between the prefiguration of the practical field and its reconfiguration through the reception of the work. It will appear as a corollary, at the end of this analysis, that the reader is that operator par excellence who takes up through doing something — the act of reading — the unity of the traversal from mimesis, to mimesis, by way of mimesis,.

This highlighting of the dynamic of emplotment is to me the key to the problem of the relation between time and narrative. By moving from the initial question of the mediation between time and narrative to the new question of connecting the three stages of mimesis, I am basing the whole strategy of my work on the subordination of the second problem to the first one. In constructing the relationship between the three mimetic modes 1 constitute the mediation between time and narrative. Or to put it another way, to resolve the problem of the relation between time and narrative I must establish the mediating role of emplotment between a stage of practical experience that precedes it and a stage that succeeds it. In this sense my argument in this book consists of constructing the mediation between time and narrative by demon-

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this chapter, that the circle can be something other than a dead tautology.

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Whatever the innovative force of poetic composition within the field of our temporal experience may be, the composition of the plot is grounded in a pre-understanding of the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal character. These features are described rather than deduced. But in this sense nothing requires their listing to be a closed one. And in any case their enumeration follows an easily established progression. First, if it is true that plot is an imitation of action, some preliminary competence is required: the capacity for identifying action in general by means of its structural features. A semantics of action makes explicit this competence. Next, if imitating is elaborating an articulated significance of some action, a supplementary competence is required: an aptitude for identifying what I call the symbolic mediations of action, in a sense of the word "symbol" that Cas-sirca made classic and that cultural anthropology, from which I shall draw several examples, adopted. Finally, these symbolic articulations of action are bearers of more precisely temporal elements, from which proceed more directly the very capacity of action to be narrated and perhaps the need to narrate it. A loan from Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology will accompany my description of this third feature.

Let us consider these three features—structural, symbolic, and temporal—in succession.
The intelligibility engendered by emplotment finds a first anchorage in our competence to utilize in a significant manner the conceptual network that

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structurally distinguishes the domain of action from that of physical movement. I say "conceptual network" rather than "concept of action" in order to emphasize the fact that the very term "action," taken in the narrow sense of what someone does, gets its distinct meaning from its capacity for being used in conjunction with other terms of the whole network. Actions imply goals, the anticipation of which is not confused with some foreseen or predicted result, but which commit the one on whom the action depends. Actions, moreover, refer to motives, which explain why someone does or did something, in a way that we clearly distinguish from the way one physical event leads to another. Actions also have agents, who do and can do things which are taken as their work, or their deed. As a result, these agents can be held responsible for certain consequences of their actions. In this network, the infinite regression opened by the question "Why?" is not incompatible with the finite regression opened by the question "Who?" To identify an agent and to recognize this agent's motives are complementary operations. We also understand that these agents act and suffer in circumstances they did not make that nevertheless do belong to the practical field, precisely inasmuch as they circumscribe the intervention of historical agents in the course of physical events and offer favorable or unfavorable occasions for their action. This intervention, in turn, implies that acting makes what an agent can do—in terms of "basic actions"—and what, without observation, he knows he is capable of doing, coincide with the initial state of a closed physical system. Moreover, to act is always to act "with" others. Interaction can take the form of cooperation or competition or struggle. The contingencies of this interaction then rejoin those of our circumstances through their character of helping or hindering us. Finally, the outcome of an action may be a change in fortune toward happiness or misfortune.

In short, these terms or others akin to them occur in our answers to questions that can be classified as questions about "what," "why," "who," "how," "with whom," or "against whom" in regard to any action. But the decisive fact is that to employ any one of these terms in a significant fashion, within a situation of questions and answers, is to be capable of linking that term to every other term of the same set. In this sense, all the members of the set are in a relation of intersignification. To master the conceptual network as a whole, and each term as one member of the set, is to have that competence we can call practical understanding.

What then is the relation of our narrative understanding to this practical understanding? The answer to this question governs the relationship that can be established between the theory of narrative and that of action, in the sense given this term by English-language analytic philosophy. This relationship, in my view, is a twofold one. It is a relation of presupposition and of transformation. On the one hand, every narrative presupposes a familiarity with terms such as agent, goal, means, circumstance, help, hostility, cooperation, conflict, success, failure, etc., on the part of its narrator and any listener. In this sense.

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the minimal narrative sentence is an action sentence of the form "X did A in such and such circumstances, taking into account the fact that Y does B in identical or different circumstances." In the final analysis, narratives have acting and suffering as their theme. We saw and said this in discussing Aristotle. We shall see in volume 2 to what point the structural analysis of narrative in terms of functions and acts, from Propp to Greimas, verifies this relation of presupposition which establishes narrative discourse on the basis of the action sentence. In this sense, there is no structural analysis of narrative that does not borrow from an explicit or an implicit phenomenology of "doing something."

On the other hand, narrative is not limited to making use of our familiarity with the conceptual network of action. It adds to its discursive features that distinguish it from a simple sequence of action sentences. These features no longer
belong to the conceptual network of the semantics of action. They are syntactic features, whose function is to engender
the composing of modes of discourse worthy of being called narratives, whether it be a question of historical narrative
or fictional narrative. We can account for the relation between the conceptual network of action and these rules for
narrative composition through recourse to the distinction familiar to semiotics between the paradigmatic order and the
syntagmatic one. With regard to the paradigmatic order, all terms relative to action are synchronic, in the sense that the
relations of intersignification that exist between ends, means, agents, circumstances, and the rest are perfectly
reversible. The syntagmatic order of discourse, on the contrary, implies the irreducibly diachronic character of every
narrated story. Even if this diachrony does not prevent reading the narrative backwards, which is characteristic, as we
shall see, of the act of retelling, this reading backwards from the end to the beginning does not abolish the narrative's
fundamental diachrony. In volume 2, I shall draw the consequences of this when I discuss the structuralist attempts to
derive the logic of narrative from completely achronological models. For the time being, let us confine ourselves
to saying that to understand a narrative is to master the rules that govern its syntagmatic order. Consequently, narrative
understanding is not limited to pre-supposing a familiarity with the conceptual network constitutive of the semantics
of action. It further requires a familiarity with the rules of composition that govern the diachronic order of a story. Plot,
understood broadly, as it was—in the preceding chapter, that is, as the ordering of the events (and therefore as
interconnecting the action sentences) into the total action constitutive of the narrated story, is the literary equivalent of
the syntagmatic order that narrative introduces into the practical field.

We may sum up this twofold relation between narrative understanding and practical understanding as follows. In
passing from the paradigmatic order of action to the syntagmatic order of narrative, the terms of the semantics of ac-
tion acquire integration and actuality. Actuality, because the terms, which had only a virtual signification in the
paradigmatic order, that is, a pure capacity to

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be used, receive an actual [effective] signification thanks to the sequential interconnections the plot confers on the
agents, their deeds, and their sufferings. Integration, because terms as heterogeneous as agents, motives, and
circumstances are rendered compatible and work together in actual temporal wholes. It is in this sense that the twofold
relation between rules of emplot-ment and action-terms constitutes both a relation of presupposition and one of
transformation. To understand a story is to understand both the language of "doing something" and the cultural
tradition from which proceeds the typology of plots.

The second anchorage that narrative composition finds in our practical understanding lies in the symbolic resources of
the practical field. This second feature will govern those aspects of doing something, being able to do something, and
knowing how to do something that stem from the poetic transposition.

If, in fact, human action can be narrated, it is because it is always already articulated by signs, rules, and norms. It is
always already symbolically mediated. As stated earlier, I am drawing here on the work of anthropologists who in
various ways make use of Verstehen sociology, including Clifford Geertz, the author of The Interpretation of
Cultures* The word "symbol" in this work is taken in what we might call a middle sense, halfway between its being
identified with a simple notation (I have in mind Leibniz's opposition between intuitive knowledge based on direct
insight and symbolic knowledge by way of abbreviated signs, substituted for a long chain of logical operations) and its
being identified with double-meaning expressions following the model of metaphor, or even hidden meanings,
accessible only to esoteric knowledge. Between too poor and too rich an acceptance I have opted for one close to that
of Cassirer, in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, inasmuch as, for him, symbolic forms are cultural processes that
articulate experience. If I speak more precisely of symbolic mediation, it is to distinguish, among symbols of a cultural
nature, the ones that underlie action and that constitute its first signification, before autonomous symbolic wholes
dependent upon speaking or writing become detached from the practical level. In this sense we might speak of an
implicit or immanent symbolism, in opposition to an explicit or autonomous one.3

For anthropologists and sociologists, the term "symbol" immediately accentuates the public character of any
meaningful articulation. In Geertz's words, "culture is public because meaning is" (p. 12). I readily adopt this initial
characterization which clearly indicates that symbolism is not in the mind, not a psychological operation destined to
guide action, but a meaning incorporated into action and decipherable from it by other actors in the social interplay
Next, the term "symbol"—or better, symbolic mediation—signals the

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structured character of a symbolic system. Geertz speaks in this sense of "systems of interacting symbols," of
"patterns of interworking meanings" (p. 207). Before being a text, symbolic mediation has a texture. To
understand a ritual act is to situate it within a ritual, set within a cultic system, and by degrees within the whole
set of conventions, beliefs, and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture.

A symbolic system thus furnishes a descriptive context for particular actions. In other words, it is "as a function
of" such a symbolic convention that we can interpret this gesture as meaning this or that. The same gesture of
raising one's arm, depending on the context, may be understood as a way of greeting someone, of hailing a taxi,
or of voting. Before being submitted to interpretation, symbols are interpretants internally related to some
action.16
In this way, symbolism confers an initial *readability* on action. In saying this we must not confuse the texture of action with the text the ethnologist writes, the *sittlichkeit* text which is written in categories, with concepts, using nomological principles that are the contribution of the discipline and that must not, consequently, be confused with those categories by which a culture understands itself. If we may nevertheless speak of action as a quasi-text, it is insofar as the symbols, understood as interpretants, provide the rules of meaning as a function of which this or that behavior can be interpreted. The term "symbol" further introduces the idea of a rule, not only in the sense we have just spoken of for rules of description and interpretation of individual actions, but in the sense of a norm. Some authors such as Peter Winch emphasize this feature in particular, by characterizing meaningful action as "rule-governed behavior." We can clarify this function of social regulation by comparing cultural codes to genetic ones. Like the latter, the former are "programs" for behavior; they give form, order, and direction to life. Yet unlike genetic codes, cultural codes arise in zones not subject to genetic regulation and only prolong their efficacy at the price of a complete rearrangement of the encoding system. Manners and customs, along with everything Hegel put under the title "ethical substance," the *Stittlichkeit* prior to any *Moralität* of a reflective order, thus take over from the genetic codes. So we pass without difficulty, with the term "symbolic mediation," from the idea of an immanent meaning to that of a rule, taken in the sense of a rule for description, then to that of a norm, which is equivalent to the idea of a rule taken in the prescriptive sense of this term. As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated or evaluated, that is, judged according to a scale of moral preferences. They thereby receive a relative value, which says that this action is more valuable than that one. These degrees of value, first attributed to actions, can be extended to the agents themselves, who are held to be good or bad, better or worse. We thus rejoin, by way of cultural anthropology, some of the "ethical" pre-

suppositions of Aristotle's *Poetics*, which I can therefore attach to the level of mimesis. The *Poetics* presupposes not just "doers" but characters endowed with ethical qualities that make them noble or vile. If tragedy can represent them as "better" and comedy as "worse" than actual human beings, it is because the practical understanding authors share with their audiences necessarily involves an evaluation of the characters and their actions in terms of good and bad. There is no action that does not give rise to approbation or reprobation, however small a degree, as a function of a hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles. When the time comes, I shall discuss the question of whether a mode of reading that would entirely suspend all evaluation of an ethical character is possible. What, in particular, would remain of the pity Aristotle taught us to link to unmerited misfortune, if aesthetic pleasure were to be totally dissociated from any sympathy or antipathy for the characters' ethical quality? We shall see that this possible ethical neutrality has to be conquered by force in an encounter with one originary and inherent feature of action: precisely that it can never be ethically neutral. One reason for thinking that this neutrality is neither possible nor desirable is that the actual order of action does not just offer the artist conventions and convictions to dissolve, but also ambiguities and perplexities to resolve in a hypothetical mode. Many contemporary critics, reflecting on the relation between art and culture, have emphasized the conflicting character of the norms that culture offers for poets' mimetic activity. They were preceded on this score by Hegel in his famous meditation on Sophocles' *Antigone*. But, at the same time, does not such ethical neutrality of the artist suppress one of the oldest functions of art, that it constitutes an ethical laboratory where the artist pursues through the mode of fiction experimentation with values? Whatever our response to these questions, poetics does not stop borrowing from ethics, even when it advocates the suspension of all ethical judgment or its ironic inversion. The very project of ethical neutrality presupposes the original ethical quality of action on the prior side of fiction. This ethical quality is itself only a corollary of the major characteristic of action, that it is always symbolically mediated. The third feature of a preunderstanding of action which mimetic activity at level two presupposes is just what is at stake in our inquiry. It concerns the temporal elements onto which narrative time grafts its configurations. The understanding of action, in effect, is not limited to a familiarity with the conceptual network of action and with its symbolic mediations. It goes so far as to recognize in action temporal structures that call for narration. At this level, the equation between narrative and time remains implicit. In any case, I shall not push my analysis of the temporal elements of action to the point where we could rightfully speak of a narrative structure, or at least of a *prenarrative* structure of temporal experience, as suggested by our ordinary way of talking about stories that happen to us or which we are caught up in, or simply about the story of someone's life. I am leaving to the end of this chapter the notion of a *prenarrative* structure of experience. There it will provide a good opportunity for facing the objection about a vicious circle that hants my whole analysis. I limit myself here to examining the temporal features that remain implicit in symbolic mediations of action and that we may take as the inductors of narrative. I shall not linger over the all too evident correlation that can be established, almost term for term, between this or that member of the conceptual network of action and this or that temporal dimension considered in isolation. It is
easy to see that the project has to do with the future, in a very specific way that distinguishes the future from prevision or prediction. The close kinship between motivation and the ability to mobilize in the present experience inherited from the past is no less evident. Finally, "I can," "I do," and "I suffer" manifestly contribute to the sense we spontaneously give to the present. More important than this loose correlation between certain categories of action and temporal dimensions taken one by one, is the exchange that real action makes appear between the temporal dimensions. Augustine's discordant-concordant structure of time develops some paradoxical features on the plane of reflective thought for which a phenomenology of action can sketch a first draft. By saying that there is not a future time, a past time, and a present time, but a threefold present, a present of future things, a present of past things, and a present of present things, Augustine set us on the path of an investigation into the most primitive temporal structure of action. It is easy to rewrite each of the three temporal structures of action in terms of this threefold present. The present of the future? Henceforth, that is, from now on, I commit myself to doing that tomorrow. The present of the past? Now I intend to do that because I just realized that... The present of the present? Now I can do it. The actual present of doing something bears witness to the potential present of the capacity to do something and is constituted as the present of the past. However the phenomenology of action can advance even further than this term-by-term correlation along the way opened by Augustine's meditation on the *distentio animi*. What counts here is the way in which everyday praxis orders the present of the future, the present of the past, and the present of the present in terms of one another. For it is this practical articulation that constitutes the most elementary inductor of narrative. Here the relay station of Heidegger's existential analysis can play a decisive role, but only under certain conditions that must be clearly laid out. I am well aware that a reading of *Being and Time* in a purely anthropological sense runs the risk of completely missing the meaning of the entire work inasmuch as its ontological aim may be misconceived. *Dasein* is the "place" where the being that we are is constituted through its capacity of posing the question of *Being, Time and Narrative* or the meaning of Being. To isolate the philosophical anthropology of *Being and Time*, therefore, is to overlook this major signification of the central existential category of that work. Yet in *Being and Time*, the question of *Being* is opened up precisely by an analysis that must first have some consistency as a philosophical anthropology, if it is to achieve the ontological breakthrough that is expected of it. What is more, this philosophical anthropology is organized on the basis of a thematic concept, Care (*Sorge*), that, without ever exhausting itself in a praxieology, draws from descriptions borrowed from the practical order the subversive force that allows it to overthrow the primacy of knowledge of objects and to uncover the structure of being-in-the-world that is more fundamental than any relation of a subject to an object. This is how, in *Being and Time*, the recourse to practice has an indirectly ontological import. In this regard, its analyses of tools and the toward-which, which furnish the first framework of meaningful relations, before any explicit cognitive process and any developed propositional expression, are well known. I find the same powerful breakthrough in the analyses that conclude the study of temporality in the second division of *Being and Time*. These analyses are centered on our relation to time as that "within which" we ordinarily act. This structure of within-time-ness (*Innerzeitigkeit*) seems the best characterization of the temporality of action for my present analysis. It is also the one that accords best with a phenomenology of the voluntary and the involuntary, and with a semantics of action. Someone may object that it is highly dangerous to enter *Being and Time* by way of its last chapter. What must be understood, however, is why it is the last one in the economy of this work. There are two reasons. First, the meditation on time, which occupies the second division of the book, is itself placed in a position that we may characterize as one of delay. The first division is recapitulated in it under the sign of a question that can be expressed as follows. What makes *Dasein* a unity? The meditation on time is supposed to respond to this problematic for reasons I shall return to in volume 2 of this work. In its turn, the study of within-time-ness, the only one that interests me at this stage of my own analysis, is itself slowed down by the hierarchical organization that Heidegger imposes on his meditation on time. This hierarchical organization follows a downward order of derivation and one of decreasing authenticity at the same time. As is well known, Heidegger reserves the term "temporality of action" for the most originary form and the most authentic experience of time, that is, the dialectic of coming to be, having been, and making present. In this dialectic, time is entirely desubstantialized. The words "future," "past," and "present" disappear, and time itself figures as the exploded unity of the three temporal extases. This dialectic is the temporal constitution of Care. As is also well known, *being-towards-death* imposes, counter to Augustine, the primacy of the future over the present and the closure of this future by a limit internal to all anticipation and every project. Next
It is only at the third level, therefore, that the within-time-ness occurs that I want to consider now." This temporal structure is put in last place because it is the one most likely to be flattened out by the linear representation of time as a simple succession of abstract "nows." I am interested in it here precisely because of the features by which this structure is distinguished from the linear representation of time and by which it resists that flattening or leveling which Heidegger calls the "vulgar" conception of time.

Within-time-ness is defined by a basic characteristic of Care, our being thrown among things, which tends to make our description of temporality dependent on the description of the things about which we care. This feature reduces Care to the dimensions of preoccupation (Besorgen) (p. 157). Yet however inauthentic this relation may be, it still presents some features that wreathe it from the external domain of the objects of our Care and subter- ranecously rattach it to Care itself in its fundamental constitution. It is noteworthy that, to discern these properly existential characteristics, Heidegger willingly addresses himself to what we say and do with regard to time. This procedure is close to the one we meet in ordinary-language philosophy. This is not surprising. The plane we occupy, at this initial stage of our traversal, is precisely the one where ordinary language is truly what Austin and others have said it is, namely, the storehouse of those expressions that are most appropriate to what is properly human in our experience. It is language, therefore, with its store of meanings, that prevents the description of Care, in the mode of preoccupation, from becoming prey to the description of the things we care about.

In this way, within-time-ness or being-"within"-time deploys features irreducible to the representation of linear time. Being-"within"-time is already something other than measuring the intervals between limit-instants. Being-"within"-time is above all to reckon with time and, as a consequence of this, to calculate. It is because we do reckon with time and do make calculations that we must have recourse to measuring, not vice versa. It must be possible, therefore, to give an existential description of this "reckoning with" before the measuring it calls for. Here expressions such as "have the time to," "take the time to," "to lose time," etc. are very revealing. A similar thing can be said about the grammatical network of the verbal tenses and the highly ramified network of temporal adverbs: then, after, later, earlier, since, until, so long as, during, all the while that, now that, etc. All these expressions,

with their extreme subtlety and fine differentiations, are oriented toward the datable and the public character of the time of preoccupation. Yet it is always preoccupation that determines the meaning of this time, not the things we care about. If being-"within"-time is nevertheless so easily interpreted as a function of the ordinary representation of time, it is because the first measurements of this time of our preoccupation are borrowed from the natural environment and first of all from the play of light and of the seasons. In this respect, a day is the most natural of measures. Yet a day is not an abstract measure; it is a length that corresponds to our Care and the world in which it is "time to" do something, where "now" signifies "now that. . . ." It is the time of works and days.

It is important, therefore, to see the difference in signification that distinguishes the "now" proper to this time of preoccupation from "now" in the sense of an abstract instant. The existential now is determined by the present of preoccupation, which is a "making-present," inseparable from "awaiting" and "retaining" (p. 473). It is only because, in preoccupation, Care tends to get contracted into this making-present and its difference with respect to awaiting and retaining is obliterated, that the "now" so isolated can become prey to the representation of "now" as an abstract moment.

In order to preserve the meaning of "now" from this reduction to an abstraction, it is important to note those occasions in which we say "now" in our everyday acting and suffering. "Saying 'now,'" says Heidegger, "is the discursive articulation of a making present which temporalizes itself in a unity with a retentive awaiting" (p. 469). And again: "The making-present which interprets itself—in other words, that which has been interpreted and is addressed in the 'now'—is what we call 'time'" (p. 460). It is understandable how, in certain practical circumstances, this interpretation can go adrift in the direction of the representation of linear time. Saying "now" becomes synonymous for us with reading the hour on the clock. But to the extent that the hour and the clock are perceived as derivations from the day, which itself links Care to the world's light, saying-now retains its existential meaning, but when the machines that serve to measure time are divested of this primary reference to natural measures, that saying-now returns to the abstract representation of time.

At first glance, the relation between this analysis of within-time-ness and narrative seems quite distant. Heidegger's text, as we shall see in volume 2, even seems to leave no place for it, inasmuch as the tie between history and time occurs, in Being and Time, at the level of historicality, not at that of within-time-ness. The advantage of his analysis of within-time-ness lies elsewhere. It lies in the break this analysis makes with the linear representation of time, understood as a simple succession of nows. An initial threshold is thereby crossed with the primacy given to Care. With the recognition of this threshold, a bridge is constructed for the first time between the narrative order and Care. Narrative configurations
and the most elaborated forms of temporality corresponding to them share the same foundation of within-time-
ness. We can see the richness in the meaning of mimesis. To imitate or represent action is first to preunderstand what
human acting is, in its semantics, its symbolic system, its temporality. Upon this preunderstanding, common to
both poets and their readers, emplotment is constructed and, with it, textual and literary mimetics.
It is true that, within the domain of the literary work, this preunderstanding of the world withdraws to the rank of
the "repertoire," to use the language of Wolfgang Iser, in his \textit{The Act of Reading}, or to the rank of "mention," to
use a vocabulary more familiar to analytic philosophy. Yet despite the break it institutes, literature would be
incomprehensible if it did not give a configuration to what was already a figure in human action.

\textbf{Mimesis:}

With mimesis, opens the kingdom of the \textit{as if}. I might have said the kingdom of fiction, in accordance with
current usage in literary criticism. I will not, however, allow myself the advantages of this expression so
appropriate to the analysis of mimesis, in order to avoid the equivocation created by the use of this term in two
different senses: first as a synonym for narrative configurations, second as an antonym to historical narrative's
claim to constitute a "true" narrative. Literary criticism can ignore this difficulty inasmuch as it does not take
into account the division of narrative discourse into two large classes. It can thus also ignore the difference that
affects the referential dimension of narrative and limit itself to the common structural characteristics of fictional
and historical narrative. The word "fiction" is then available for designating the configuration of a narrative for
which emplotment is the paradigm, without regard for the differences that concern the truth claims of the two
classes of narrative. Whatever the scope of the revisions that the distinction between the fictive or "imaginary"
and the "real" must undergo, a difference will remain between fictional and historical narrative that will have to
be reformulated in volume 2. While awaiting that clarification, I choose to preserve the term "fiction" for the
second of the senses just considered and to oppose fictional to historical narrative. I shall speak of composition
or of configuration for the other sense, which does not bring into play the problems of reference or of truth. This
is the meaning of the Aristotelian muthos that the \textit{Poetics}, as we saw, defines as the "organization of the events." I
now propose to disengage this configuring activity from the limiting constraints the paradigm of tragedy
imposes upon the concept of emplotment for Aristotle. Further I want to complete my model by an analysis of its
temporal structures. This analysis, we have seen, had no place in the \textit{Poetics}. I hope to demonstrate here and in volume 2
that, under the condition of a larger degree of abstraction and with the addition of appropriate temporal features,
the Aristotelian model will not be radically altered by the amplifications and corrections that the theory of
history and the theory of literary narrative will bring to it.

The model of emplotment that will be tested in the remainder of this work responds to one fundamental
requirement that was already referred to in the preceding chapter. By placing mimesis between an earlier and a
later stage of mimesis in general, I am seeking not just to locate and frame it. I want to understand better its
mediating function between what precedes fiction and what follows it. Mimesis has an intermediary position
because it has a mediating function. This mediating function derives from the dynamic character of the
configurating operation that has led us to prefer the term emplotment to that of plot and ordering to that of
system. In fact all the concepts relative to this level designate operations. The dynamism lies in the fact that
a plot already exercises, within its own textual field, an integrating and, in this sense, a mediating function, which
allows it to bring about, beyond this field, a mediation of a larger amplitude between the preunderstanding and, if
I may dare to put it this way, the postunderstanding of the order of action and its temporal features.

\textbf{Plot is mediating in at least three ways.}

First, it is a mediation between the individual events or incidents and a story taken as a whole. In this respect, we
may say equivalently that it draws a meaningful story from a diversity of events or incidents (Aristotle's \textit{proag-
meta}) or that it transforms the events or incidents into a story. The two reciprocal relations expressed \textit{by from
and into} characterize the plot as mediating between events and a narrated story. As a consequence, an event must
be more than just a singular occurrence. It gets its definition from its contribution to the development of the plot.
A story, too, must be more than just an enumeration of events in serial order; it must organize them into an
intelligible whole, of a sort such that we can always ask what is the "thought" of this story. In short, emplotment
is the operation that draws a configuration out of a simple succession.

Furthermore, emplotment brings together factors as heterogeneous as agents, goals, means, interactions,
circumstances, unexpected results. Aristotle anticipates this mediating character in several ways. First, he makes
a subset of the three "parts" of tragedy—plot, characters, and thought—with the title the "what" (of the
imitation). Nothing therefore forbids extending the concept of plot to the whole triad. This first extension gives
the concept of plot the initial scope that allows it to receive subsequent embellishments.
The concept of plot allows an even greater extension. By including pitiable and fearful incidents, sudden
reversals, recognitions, and violent effects
within the complex plot, Aristotle equates plot with the configuring we have characterized as concordant discordance. This is the feature that, in the final analysis, constitutes the mediating function of the plot. I anticipated this feature in my previous section in saying that a narrative makes appear within a syntagmatic order all the components capable of figuring in the paradigmatic tableau established by the semantics of action. This passage from the paradigmatic to the syntagmatic constitutes the transition from mimesis, to mimesis. It is the work of the configuring activity.

Plot is mediating in a third way, that of its temporal characteristics. These allow us to call plot, by means of generalization, a synthesis of the heterogeneous. Aristotle did not consider these temporal characteristics. They are directly implied, however, in the constitutive dynamism of the narrative configuration. As such, they give the full meaning of the concept of concordant discordance from the preceding chapter. In this respect, we may say of the operation of emplotment both that it reflects the Augustinian paradox of time and that it resolves it, not in a speculative but rather in a poetic mode.

It reflects the paradox inasmuch as the act of emplotment combines in variable proportions two temporal dimensions, one chronological and the other not. The former constitutes the episodic dimension of narrative. It characterizes the story insofar as it is made up of events. The second is the configurational dimension properly speaking, thanks to which the plot transforms the events into a story. This configurational act consists of "grasping together" the detailed actions or what I have called the story's incidents. It draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole. I cannot overemphasize the kinship between this "grasping together," proper to the configurational act, and what Kant has to say about the operation of judging. It will be recalled that for Kant the transcendental meaning of judging consists not so much in joining a subject and a predicate as in placing an intuitive manifold under the rule of a concept. The kinship is greater still with the reflective judgment which Kant opposes to the determining one, in the sense that it reflects upon the work of thinking at work in the aesthetic judgment of taste and in the ideological judgment applied to organic wholes. The act of emplotment has a similar function inasmuch as it extracts a configuration from a succession.

Yet poiesis does more than reflect the paradox of temporality. By mediating between the two poles of event and story, emplotment brings to the paradox a solution that is the poetic act itself. This act, which I just said extracts a figure from a succession, reveals itself to the listener or the reader in the story's capacity to be followed. To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and peripeteia under the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfillment in the "conclusion" of the story. This conclusion is not logically implied by some previous premises. It gives the story an "end point," which, in turn, furnishes

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the point of view from which the story can be perceived as forming a whole. To understand the story is to understand how and why the successive episodes led to this conclusion, which, far from being foreseeable, must finally be acceptable, as congruent with the episodes brought together by the story. It is this "followability" of a story that constitutes the poetic solution to the paradox of distention and intention. The fact that the story can be followed converts the paradox into a living dialectic.

On the one hand, the episodic dimension of a narrative draws narrative time in the direction of the linear representation of time. It does so in several ways. First, the "then, and then," by which we answer the question "and then what?" suggests that the phases of action are in an external relation. Next, the episodes constitute an open series of events, which allows us to add to the "then, and then" a "and so forth." Finally, the episodes follow upon one another in accord with the irreversible order of time common to physical and human events.

The configurational dimension, in its turn, presents temporal features directly opposed to those of the episodic dimension. Again it does so in several ways.

First, the configurational arrangement transforms the succession of events into one meaningful whole which is the correlate of the act of assembling the events together and which makes the story followable. Thanks to this reflective act, the entire plot can be translated into one "thought," which is nothing other than its "point" or "theme." However, we would be completely mistaken if we took such a point as atemporal. The time of the "fable and theme," to use Northrop Frye's expression, is the narrative time that mediates between the episodic aspect and the configurational aspect.

Second, the configuration of the plot imposes the "sense of an ending" (to use the title of Frank Kermode's well-known book) on the indefinite succession of incidents. I just spoke of the "end point" as the point from where the story can be seen as a whole. I may now add that it is in the act of retelling rather than in that of telling that this structural function of closure can be discerned. As soon as a story is well known—and this is the case for most traditional or popular narratives, as well as for those national chronicles reporting the founding events of a given community—to follow the story is not so much to enclose its surprises or discoveries within our recognition of the meaning attached to the story, as to apprehend the episodes which are themselves well known as leading to this end. A new quality of time emerges from this understanding.

Finally, the repetition of a story, governed as a whole by its way of ending, constitutes an alternative to the representation of time as flowing from the past toward the future, following the well-known metaphor of the
"arrow of time." It is as though recollection inverted the so-called "natural" order of time. In reading the ending in the beginning and the beginning in the ending, we also

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learn to read time itself backwards, as the recapitulation of the initial conditions of a course of action in its terminal consequences.

In short, the act of narrating, reflected in the act of following a story, makes productive the paradoxes that disquieted Augustine to the point of reducing him to silence.

Two complementary features that assure the continuity of the process that joins mimesis, to mimesis2, remain to be added to our analysis of the configurational act. More visibly than the preceding ones, these two features require the support of reading if they are to be reactivated. It is a question of the schematization and the

character of traditionality characteristic of the configurational act, each of which has a specific relation to time.

It will be recalled that I compared the "grasping together" characteristic of the configurational act to judgment as understood by Kant. Remaining in a Kantian vein, we ought not to hesitate in comparing the production of the configurational act to the work of the productive imagination. This latter must be understood not as a

psychologizing faculty but as a transcendental one. The productive imagination is not only rule-governed, it constitutes the generative matrix of rules. In Kant's first Critique, the categories of the understanding are first

schematized by the productive imagination. The schematism has this power because the productive imagination fundamentally has a synthetic function. It connects understanding and intuition by engendering syntheses that are intellectual and intuitive at the same time. Emplotment, too, engenders a mixed intelligibility between what has been called the point, theme, or thought of a story, and the intuitive presentation of circumstances, characters, episodes, and changes of fortune that make up the denouement. In this way, we may speak of a schematism of the narrative function. Like every schematism, this one lends itself to a typology of the sort that Northrop Frye, for example, elaborates in his Anatomy of Criticism."

This schematism, in turn, is constituted within a history that has all the characteristics of a tradition. Let us understand by this term not the inert transmission of some already dead deposit of material but the living transmission of an innovation always capable of being reactivated by a return to the most creative moments of poetic activity. So understood, traditionality enriches the relationship between plot and time with a new feature. In fact, a tradition is constituted by the interplay of innovation and sedimentation. To sedimentation must be referred the paradigms that constitute the typology of emplotment. These paradigms have issued from a

sedimented history whose genesis has been covered over.

The sedimentation is produced on multiple levels, and this requires of us a broad discernment in our use of the term paradigmatic. Thus Aristotle seems to us today to have done two, if not three, things at once. On the one hand, he establishes the concept of plot in terms of its most formal features, those

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which I have identified as the discordant concordance. On the other hand, he describes the genre of Greek tragedy (and accessorially that of epic, but as measured by the criteria of the tragic model). This genre satisfies both the formal conditions which make it a muthos and the restrictive ones which make it a tragic muthos: the reversal of meaning from good to bad fortune, pitiable and frightening incidents, unmerited misfortune, the tragic fault of a character also marked by excellence and free of vice or wickedness. To a large extent, this genre dominated the subsequent development of dramatic literature in the West. It is no less true that our culture is the

heir to several narrative traditions: Hebrew and Christian, but also Celtic, Germanic, Icelandic, and Slavic."

This is not all. What makes a paradigm is not just the form of discordant concordance or the model that

subsequent tradition identified as a stable literary genre; there are also the individual works—the Iliad and

Oedipus Rex in Aristotle's Poetics. To the extent that in the ordering of events the causal connection (one thing as a cause of another) prevails over pure succession (one thing after another), a universal emerges that is, as we have interpreted it, the ordering itself erected as a type. This is why the narrative tradition has been marked not just by the sedimentation of the form of discordant concordance and by that of the tragic genre (and the other models of the same level), but also by the types engendered at the level of individual works. If we encompass form, genre, and type under the heading "paradigm," we shall say that the paradigms are born from the labor of the

productive imagination on these various levels.

These paradigms, themselves issuing from a previous innovation, furnish the rules for a subsequent experiment within the narrative field. These rules change under the pressure of new inventions, but they change slowly and even resist change, in virtue of the very process of sedimentation.

As for the other pole of tradition, innovation, its status is correlative to that of sedimentation. There is always a place for innovation inasmuch as what is produced, in the poiesis of the poem, is always, in the last analysis, a

singular work, this work. This is why the paradigms only constitute the grammar that governs the composition of new works—new before becoming typical. In the same way as the grammar of a language governs the
production of well-formed sentences, whose number and content are unforeseeable, a work of art—a poem, play, novel—is an original production, a new existence in the linguistic [langagier] kingdom. Yet the reverse is no less true. Innovation remains a form of behavior governed by rules. The labor of imagination is not born from nothing. It is bound in one way or another to the tradition's paradigms. But the range of solutions is vast. It is deployed between the two poles of servile application and calculated deviation, passing through every degree of "rule-governed deformation." The folktale, the myth, and in general the traditional narrative stand closest to the first pole. But to the extent we distance ourselves from traditional narrative, deviation becomes the rule. Thus

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the contemporary novel, in large part, may be defined as an antinovel, to the extent that contestation wins out over the taste for simply varying the application of the paradigms. What is more, this deviation may come into play on every level, in relation to the types, the genres, even to the formal principle of concordant discordance. The first type of deviation, it would seem, is constitutive of every individual work. Each work stands apart from every other work. Less frequent is a change of genre. Such a change is equivalent to the creation of a new genre, the novel, for example, in relation to drama or the romance, or history in relation to chronicle. Still more radical is the contesting of the formal principle of discordant concordance. I shall inquire later about the room for variation allowed by this formal paradigm. I shall ask whether this contestation, made into a schism, does not signify the death of the narrative form itself. It remains, however, that the possibility of deviation is inscribed in the relation between sedimented paradigms and actual works. Short of the extreme case of schism, it is just the opposite of servile application. Rule-governed deformation constitutes the axis around which the various changes of paradigm through application are arranged. It is this variety of applications that confers a history on the productive imagination and that, in counterpart to sedimentation, makes a narrative tradition possible. This is the final enrichment by which the relationship of narrative to time is augmented at the level of mimesis.  

MIMESIS

I want now to show how mimesis, brought back to its first level of intelligibility, requires a third representative stage as its complement, which also merits being called mimesis. Allow me to recall once again that the interest brought to bear here on the unfolding of mimesis does not contain its end within itself. My explication of mimesis remains subordinated to my investigation of the mediation between time and narrative. It is only at the end of our traversal of mimesis that the thesis stated at the beginning of this chapter will receive a concrete content: narrative has its full meaning when it is restored to the time of action and of suffering in mimesis.

This stage corresponds to what H.-G. Gadamer, in his philosophical hermeneutics, calls "application." Aristotle himself suggests this last sense of mimesis-praxeos in various passages of his Poetics, although he is less concerned about the audience there than he is in his Rhetoric, where the theory of persuasion is entirely governed by the hearer's capacity for receiving the message. Still, when he says that poetry "teaches" the universal, that tragedy "in representing pity and fear . . . effects the purgation of these emotions," or even when he refers to the pleasure we get in seeing the frightening and pitiable events concur with the reversal of fortune that makes a tragedy, he does signify that it is in the hearer or the reader that the traversal of mimesis reaches its fulfilment.

Generalizing beyond Aristotle, I shall say that mimesis, marks the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader; the intersection, therefore, of the world configured by the poem and the world wherein real action occurs and unfolds its specific temporality.

I shall proceed in four steps.

1. If it is true that it is by linking together the three stages of mimesis that we institute the mediation between time and narrative, one preliminary question arises as to whether this linking together really marks a progression. I shall respond here to the objection of circularity raised at the beginning of this chapter.

2. If it is true that the act of reading is our connection to the capacity of a plot to model our experience, it has to be shown how this act is articulated by the dynamism belonging to the configuring act, prolonging it and bringing it to its end.

3. Next, approaching head-on the thesis of the refiguration of temporal experience by emplotment, I shall show how the entry of the work, through reading, into the field of communication marks at the same time its entry into the field of reference. Taking up the problem where I left it in The Rule of Metaphor, I want to outline the particular difficulties attached to the notion of reference in the narrative order.

4. Insofar, finally, as the world that narrative refigures is a temporal world, the question arises of how much aid a hermeneutics of narrated time can expect from the phenomenology of Time. The answer to this question will make appear a much more radical circularity than the one that engenders the relation from mimesis, to mimesis, across mimesis. The study of the Augustinian theory of time with which I began this work has already provided
an occasion for anticipating this. It concerns the relation between a phenomenology that does not stop engendering aporias and what I earlier called the poetic "solution" to these aporias. The question of the relationship between time and narrative culminates in this dialectic between an aporetics and a poetics.

The Circle of Mimesis

Before taking on the central problematic of mimesis, I want to face the suspicion of a vicious circle which the traversal from mimesis, to mimesis, across mimesis, must give rise to. Whether we consider the semantic structure of action, its resources for symbolization, or its temporal character, the end point seems to lead back to the starting point or, worse, the end point seems anticipated in the starting point. If such were the case, the hermeneutical circle of mimesis and temporality would resolve into the vicious circle of mimesis alone.

That the analysis is circular is indisputable. But that the circle is a vicious one can be refuted. In this regard, I would rather speak of an endless spiral that would carry the meditation past the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes. The accusation about a vicious circle proceeds from the seduction of one or the other of two versions of circularity. The first emphasizes the violence of interpretation, the second its redundance.

1. In the first case we may be tempted to say that narrative puts consonance where there was only dissonance. In this way, narrative gives form to what is uniformed. But then this form is produced by narrative may be suspected of treachery. At best, it furnishes the "as if" proper to any fiction we know to be just fiction, a literary artifice. This is how it consoles us in the face of death. But as soon as we no longer fool ourselves by having recourse to the consolation offered by the paradigms, we become aware of the violence and the lie. We are then at the point of succumbing to the fascination of the absolutely uniformed and to the plea for that radical intellectual honesty Nietzsche called Redlichkeit. It is only through a kind of nostalgia for order that we resist this fascination and that we adhere desperately to the idea that order is our homeland despite everything. From then on, the narrative consonance imposed on temporal dissonance remains the work of what it is convenient to call a violence of interpretation. The narrative solution to the paradox is just the outgrowth of this violence.

I in no way mean to deny that such a dramatization of the dialectic between narrativity and temporality reveals in a wholly appropriate fashion the characteristic of discordant concordance that is attached to the relationship between narrative and time. But so long as we place the consonance on the side of the narrative and the dissonance on the side of temporality in a unilateral fashion, as the argument suggests, we miss the properly dialectical character of their relationship.

In the first place, our experience of temporality cannot be reduced to simple discordance. As we saw with Augustine, distentio and intentio mutually confront each other at the heart of our most authentic experience. We must preserve the paradox of time from the leveling out brought about by reducing it to simple discordance. We ought to ask instead whether the plea for a radically uniformed temporal experience is not itself the product of a fascination for the uniformed that is one of the features of modernity. In short, when thinkers or literary critics seem to yield to a nostalgia for order or, worse, to the horror of chaos, what really moves them, in the final analysis, may be a genuine recognition of the paradoxes of time beyond the loss of meaning characteristic of one particular culture—our own.

In the second place, the consonance characteristic of narrative which we

are tempted to oppose in a nondialectical fashion to the dissonance of our temporal experience, must itself also be tempered. Emplotment is never the simple triumph of "order." Even the paradigm of Greek tragedy makes a place for the upsetting role of the peripeteia, those contingencies and reversals of fortune that solicit horror and pity. The plots themselves coordinate distention and intention. The same must be said for the other paradigm that, according to Frank Kermode, has governed the "sense of an ending" in our Western tradition. I am thinking of the apocalyptic model that so magnificently underscores the correspondence between beginning—Genesis—and end—the Apocalypse. Kermode himself does not fail to emphasize the innumerable tensions engendered by this model for everything touching those events that come "between times" and above all in the "end times."

Reversal is magnified by the apocalyptic model to the extent that the end is the catastrophe that abolishes time and prefigures "the terrors of the last days." Yet the apocalyptic model, in spite of its persistence as attested to by its modern resurgence in the form of Utopias or, better, uchronias, is only one paradigm among others, which in no way exhausts the dynamics of narrative.

Other paradigms than those of Greek tragedy or the Apocalypse continue to be engendered by the same process of the formation of traditions that we earlier attached to the power of schematization proper to the productive imagination. In volume 2 I shall show that this rebirth of paradigms does not abolish the fundamental dialectic of discordant concordance. Even the rejection of any paradigm, illustrated today by the antinovel, stems from the paradoxical history of "concordance." By means of the frustrations engendered by their ironic mistrust of any paradigm, and thanks to the more or less perverse pleasure the reader takes in being excited and gulled by them, these works satisfy both the tradition they leave behind and the disorganized experiences they finally end up imitating by dint of not imitating the received paradigms.
The suspicion of interpretative violence is no less legitimate in this extreme case. It is no longer "concordance" that is imposed by force on the "discordance" of our experience of time. Now it is the "discordance" engendered in discourse by the ironic distance in regard to any paradigm that undermines from within the view of "discordance" sustaining our temporal experience and that overthrows the intentio without which there would be no distentio animi. We can then legitimately suspect the alleged discordance of our temporal experience as being only a literary artifice.

Reflection on the limits of concordance never loses its legitimacy. It applies to every instance of a "figure" of discordant concordance and to discordant discordance at the level of narrative as well as at the level of time. But in every instance the circle is inevitable without being vicious.

2. The objection about a vicious circle can take on another form. Having confronted the violence of interpretation, we have also to face the opposite possibility—a redundancy of interpretation. This would be the case if mime-

sis were itself a meaning effect of mimesis., Mimesis, would then only restore to mimesis, what it had taken from mimesis, since mimesis, would already be a work of mimesis., The objection of redundancy seems to be suggested by the analysis of mimesis.. If there is no human experience that is not already mediated by symbolic systems and, among them, by narratives, it seems vain to say, as I have, that action is in quest of narrative. How, indeed, can we speak of a human life as a story in its nascent state, since we do not have access to the temporal dramas of existence outside of stories told about them by others or by ourselves?

I shall oppose to this objection a series of situations that in my opinion, constrain us to accord already to experience as such an inchoate narrativity that does not proceed from projecting, as some say, literature on life but that constitutes a genuine demand for narrative. To characterize these situations I shall not hesitate to speak of a prenarrative quality of experience.

My analysis of the temporal features of action on the level of mimesis, led to the threshold of this concept. If I did not cross it at that moment, it was with the thought that the objection of a vicious circle through redundancy would offer a more propitious occasion to indicate the strategic importance of the situations I am about to speak of in the circle of mimesis.

Without leaving everyday experience, are we not inclined to see in a given sequence of the episodes of our lives "(as yet) untold" stories, stories that demand to be told, stories that offer anchorage points for narrative? I am not unaware how incongruous the expression "(as yet) untold story" is. Are not stories told by definition? There is no argument if we are speaking of actual stories. Yet is the notion of a potential story unacceptable?

1 would like to point to two less common situations in which the expression "(as yet) untold story" imposes itself upon us with a surprising force. The patient who talks to a psychoanalyst presents bits and pieces of lived stories, of dreams, of "primitive scenes," conflictual episodes. We may rightfully say of such analytic sessions that their goal and effect is for the analysand to draw from these bits and pieces a narrative that will be both more supportable and more intelligible. Roy Schafer has even taught us to consider Freud's meta-psychological theories as a system of rules for retelling our life stories and raising them to the rank of case histories. This narrative interpretation implies that a life story proceeds from untold and repressed stories in the direction of actual stories the subject can take up and hold as constitutive of his personal identity. It is the quest for this personal identity that assures the continuity between the potential or inchoate story and the actual story we assume responsibility for.

There is also another situation which the notion of an untold story seems to fit. Wilhehn Schapp describes the case where a judge undertakes to under-

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I stand a course of actions, a character, by unraveling the tangle of plots the subject is caught up in. The accent here is on "being entangled" (verstrickt-sein) (p. 85), a verb whose passive voice emphasizes that the story "happens to" someone before anyone tells it. The entanglement seems more like the "prehistory" of the told story, whose beginning has to be chosen by the narrator. This "prehistory" of the story is what binds it to a larger whole and gives it a "background." This background is made up of the "living imbrication" of every lived story with every other such story. Told stories therefore have to "emerge" (auftauchen) from this background. With this emergence also emerges the implied subject. We may thus say, "the story stands for the per-se son" (die Geschichte steht für den Mann) (p. 100). The principal consequence of this existential analysis of human beings as "entangled in stories" is that the narrating is a secondary process, that of "the story's becoming known" (das Bekanntwerden der Geschichte) (p. 101). Telling, following, understanding stories is simply the "continuation" of these untold stories. Literacy criticism shaped by the Aristotelian tradition, for which a story is an artifice created by a writer, will hardly be satisfied with this notion of a told story that would be in "continuity" with the passive entanglement of subjects in stories that disappear into a foggy horizon. Nevertheless, the priority given the as yet untold story can serve as a critical example for every emphasis on the artificial character of the art of narrating. We tell stories because in the last "analysis human lives need and merit being narrated. This remark
takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save the history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for narrative.

Literary criticism will experience less repugnance in accepting the notion of story as that within which we are entangled, if it pays attention to one re-/cent suggestion stemming from its own domain. In The Genesis of Secrecy, Frank Kermode introduces the idea that certain narratives may aim not at illumination but at obscurity and dissimulation. This may be the case, among others, with Jesus’ parables which, according to the interpretation of the evangelist Mark, were told with the view of not being understood by “those outside” and which, according to Kermode, also rather severely expel those “inside” from their privileged position. But there are many other narratives that have this enigmatic power of “banishing interpreters from their secret places” (see pp. 33-34).

Of course, these secret places are places in the text. They are the internal mark of its inexhaustibility. Yet can we not say that the “hermeneutic potential” (p. 40) of this kind of narrative finds, if not a consonance, at least a resonance in the untold stories of our lives? Is there not a hidden complicity between the “secrecy” engendered by the narrative itself—or at least by narratives like those of Mark or Kafka—and the as yet untold stories of our lives that constitute the prehistory, the background, the living history of suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for narrative.

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Imbrication from which the told story emerges? In other words, is there not a hidden affinity between the secret of where the story emerges from and the secret to which it returns? Whatever the constraining force of this last suggestion, we can find reinforcement in it for my principal argument, which says that the manifest circularity of every analysis of narrative, an analysis that does not stop interpreting in terms of each other the temporal form inherent in experience and the narrative structure, is not a lifeless tautology. We should see in it instead a “healthy circle” in which the arguments advanced about each side of the problem aid one another.

Configuration, Refiguration, and Reading

Thus the hermeneutic circle of narrative and time never stops being reborn from the circle that the stages of mimesis form. The moment has come to concentrate our reflection on the transition between mimesis; and mimesis, brought about by the act of reading.

If this act may be taken, as stated earlier, as our connection to the plot's capacity to model experience, it is because it takes up again and fulfills the configurational act, for which I emphasized the kinship with judgment that com-prehends, that “grasps together” the details of action into the unity of the plot. Nothing bears witness to this better than the two features by means of which I characterized plot at the stage of mimesis, namely, schematization and traditionality. These features contribute particularly to breaking down the prejudice that opposes an “inside” and an “outside” of a text. Indeed, this opposition is closely knit to a static and closed conception of the structure of any text. The notion of a structuring activity, visible in the operation of emplotment, transcends this opposition. Schematization and traditionality are thus from the start categories of the interaction between the operations [operativile] of writing and of reading.

On the one hand, the received paradigms structure readers’ expectations and aid them in recognizing the formal rule, the genre, or the type exemplified by the narrated story. They furnish guidelines for the encounter between a text and its readers. In short, they govern the story's capacity to be followed. On the other hand, it is the act of reading that accompanies the narrative's configuration and actualizes its capacity to be followed. To follow a story is to actualize it by reading it.

And if emplotment can be described as an act of judgment and of the productive imagination, it is so insofar as this act is the joint work of the text and reader, just as Aristotle said that sensation is the common work of sensing and what is sensed.

Furthermore, it is the act of reading that accompanies the inteq’lay of the narrative and innovation and sedimentation of paradigms that schematizes emplotment. In the act of reading, the receiver plays with the narrative constraints, brings about gaps, takes part in the combat between the novel and the antinovel, and enjoys the pleasure that Roland Barthes calls the pleasure of the text.

Finally, it is the reader who completes the work inasmuch as (if we follow Roman Ingarden in The Literary Work of Art, and Wolfgang Iser in The Act of Reading) the written work is a sketch for reading. Indeed, it consists of holes, lacunae, zones of indetermination, which, as in Joyce's Ulysses, challenge the reader's capacity to configure what the author seems to take malign delight in defiguring. In such an extreme case, it is the reader, almost abandoned by the work, who carries the burden of emplotment.

The act of reading is thus the operator that joins mimesis, to mimesis-. It is the final indicator of the refiguring of the world of action under the sign of the plot. One of the critical problems that will occupy me in volume 2 will be to start from this point and to coordinate the relationships of a theory of reading, such as Wolfgang Iser's, and a theory of reception, such as that of Robert Jauss. For the moment, let us say that what they both have in common is seeing in the effect the text produces on its receiver, whether individual or collective, an intrinsic component of the present or actual meaning of the text. For both, the text is a set of instructions that the
individual reader or the reading public executes in a passive or a creative way. Their different approaches in The Act of Reading and Toward an Aesthetic of Reception start from this common base.

Narrativity and Reference

To complete a theory of writing with a theory of reading constitutes only the first step along the way of mimesis. An aesthetic of reception cannot take up the problem of communication without also taking up that of reference. What is communicated, in the final analysis, is, beyond the sense of a work, the world it projects and that constitutes its horizon. In this sense, the listeners or readers receive it according to their own receptive capacity, which itself is defined by a situation that is both limited and open to the world's horizon. Thus the term "horizon" and its correlative, "world," appeared twice in the definition of mimesis, suggested earlier: the intersection of the world of the text and that of the listener or reader. This definition, close to H.-G. Gadamer's notion of a "fusion of horizons," rests upon three presuppositions which underlie, respectively, acts of discourse in general, literary works among these acts of discourse, and narratives among these literary works. The order that ties together these three presuppositions is thus one of increasing specification.

Concerning the first point, I shall limit myself to repeating the thesis argued at length in The Rule of Metaphor regarding the relationship between sense and reference in all discourse. According to this thesis, if (following Ben-

veniste rather than de Saussure) we take the sentence as the unit of discourse, then the intended of discourse ceases to be confused with the signified correlative to each signifier within the immanence of a system of signs. With the sentence, language is oriented beyond itself. It says something about something. This intending of a referent by discourse is completely contemporaneous with its event character and its dialogical functioning. It is the other side of the instance of discourse. The complete event is not only that someone speaks and addresses himself to an interlocuter, it is also the speaker's ambition to bring a new experience to language and share it with someone else. It is this experience, in turn, that has the world for its horizon. Reference and horizon are correlative as are figure and ground. All experience both possesses a contour that circumscribes it and distinguishes it, and arises against a horizon of potentialities that constitutes at once an internal and an external horizon for experience: internal in the sense that it is always possible to give more details and be more precise about whatever is considered within some stable contour; external in the sense that the intended thing stands in potential relationships to everything else within the horizon of a total world, which itself never figures as the object of discourse. It is in this twofold sense of the word "horizon" that situation and horizon are correlative notions. This quite general presupposition implies that language does not constitute a world for itself. It is not even a world. Because we are in the world and are affected by situations, we try to orient ourselves in them by means of understanding; we also have something to say, an experience to bring to language and to share. This is the ontological presupposition of reference, a presupposition reflected inside language itself as a postulate lacking any immanent justification. Language is for itself the order of the Same. The world is its Other. The attestation of this otherness arises from language's reflexivity with regard to itself, whereby it knows itself as being in being in order to bear on being. This presupposition does not stem from linguistics or semiotics. On the contrary, these disciplines reject as a postulate of their method the idea of an intention oriented toward the extralinguistic. What I have just called an ontological attestation must appear to them, once their methodological postulates are stated, as an unjustifiable and inadmissible leap. In fact, this ontological attestation would remain an irrational leap if the externalization it required were not the counterpart of a prior and more originary notion, starting from our experience of being in the world and in time, and proceeding from this ontological condition toward its expression in language. This first presupposition must be coordinated with my preceding reflections on the reception of a text. An ability to communicate and a capacity to refer must be simultaneously posited. All reference is co-reference—dialogical or dialogal reference. There is thus no need to choose between an aesthetic of reception and an ontology of the work of art. What a reader receives is not just

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the sense of the work, but, through its sense, its reference, that is, the experience it brings to language and, in the last analysis, the world and the temporality it unfolds in the face of this experience. Consideration of "works of art," among all acts of discourse, calls for a second presupposition which does not abolish the first one but does make it more complex. According to the thesis 1 presented in The Rule of Metaphor and that I shall recall here, literary works, too, bring an experience to language and thus come into the world, just as all discourse does. This second presupposition runs head-on into the dominant theory of contemporary poetics, which rejects any taking into account of reference, something it regards as extralinguistic, in the name of the strict immanence of literary language in relation to itself. When literary texts contain allegations concerning truth or falsity, lies, or secrets, which ineluctably bring back the dialectic of being and appearance, this poetics undertakes to consider as a simple meaning effect what it decides, by a methodological decree, to call a referential illusion. Yet the problem of the relation of literature to the reader's world is not
Thence, it is simply set aside. "Referential illusions" are not just any textual meaning effect whatever. They require a detailed theory of the modes of "verediction." These modes, in turn, stand out against the background of a horizon of the world that constitutes the world of the text. We may certainly include the very notion of a horizon within the immanence of the text and take the concept of the world of the text for an outgrowth of the referential illusion. But reading poses anew the problem of the fusion of two horizons, that of the text and that of the reader, and hence the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the reader.

We might try to deny the problem, and take the question of the impact of literature on everyday experience as not pertinent. But then we paradoxically ratify the positivism we generally fight against, namely, the prejudice that only a datum that is given in such a way that it can be empirically observed and scientifically described is real. We also enclose literature within a world of its own and break off the subversive point it turns against the moral and social orders. We forget that fiction is precisely what makes language that supreme danger which Walter Benjamin, following Holderlin, speaks of with such awe and admiration.

A whole range of cases is opened by this phenomenon of interaction: from ideological confirmation of the established order, as in official art or state chronicles, to social criticism and even derision for everything "real." Even extreme alienation in relation to reality is still a case of intersection. And this conflictive fusion of horizons is not without some relation to the dynamics of the text, in particular the dialectic of sedimentation and innovation. The shock of the possible, which is no less than that of the real, is amplified by the internal interplay, in the works themselves, between the received paradigms and "\textquoteleft \textquoteleft\textquoteleft.

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The proliferation of divergencies, through the deviation of individual works. Thus narrative literature, among all poetic works, is a model of practical actuality by its deviations as much as by its paradigms. If therefore we do not simply reject the problem of the fusion of the text's and the reader's horizons, or of the intersection between the world of the text and that of the reader, we have to find in the very functioning of poetic language the means to cross the abyss opened between these two worlds by the method of immanence characteristic of antipoetics. I tried to demonstrate in The Rule of Metaphor that language's capacity for reference was not exhausted by descriptive discourse and that poetic works referred to the world in their own specific way, that of metaphorical reference.28 This thesis covers every nondescriptive use of language, and therefore every poetic text, whether it be lyrical or narrative. It implies that poetic texts, too, speak of the world, even though they may not do so in a descriptive fashion. Metaphorical reference, it will be recalled, consists in the fact that the effacement of descriptive reference—an effacement that, as a first approximation, makes language refer to itself—is revealed to be, in a second approximation, the negative condition for freeing a more radical power of reference to those aspects of our being-in-the-world that cannot be talked about directly. These aspects are intended, in an indirect but positively assertive way, by means of the new pertinence that the metaphorical utterance establishes. Indeed, we owe a large part of the enlarging of our horizon of existence to poetic works. Far from producing only weakened images of reality—shadows, as in the Platonic treatment of the eikon in painting or writing (Phaedrus 274e-77e)—literary works depict reality by augmenting it with meanings that themselves depend upon the virtues of abbreviation, saturation, and culmination, so strikingly illustrated by emplotment. In Ecriture et Iconographie, François Dagognet, replying to Plato's argument directed against writing and against every eikon, characterizes as iconic augmentation the painter's strategy of reconstructing reality on the basis of an optical alphabet that is limited and dense at the same 81
this shift in focus of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics in relation to Romantic hermeneutics. For some years now I have maintained that what is interpreted in a text is the proposing of a world that I might inhabit and into which I might project my ownmost powers. In the Rule of Metaphor, I held that poetry, through its muthos, redescribes the world. In the same way, in this work I will say that making a narrative [le faire narratif] resignifies the world in its temporal dimension, to the extent that narrating, telling, reciting is to remake action following the poem's invitation.

A third presupposition comes into play here, if the referential capacity of narrative works is to be subsumed under those of poetic works in general. The problem posed by narrativity is, in fact, both more simple and more complicated than the one posed by lyric poetry. More simple, because the world, here, is apprehended from the angle of human praxis rather than from that of cosmic pathos. What is resignified by narrative is what was already presignified at the level of human acting. It will be recalled that our preunderstanding of the world of action under the governance of mimesis, is characterized by the mastering of a network of intersignifications constitutive of the semantics of action, by familiarity with the symbolic mediations and the prenarrative resources of human acting. Being-in-the-world according to narrativity is a being-in-the-world already marked by the linguistic [langage] practice leading back to this preunderstanding. The iconic augmentation in question here depends upon the prior augmentation of readability that action owes to the interpretants already at work there. Human action can be oversignified, because it is already presignified by all the modes of its symbolic articulation. This is the sense in which the problem of reference is simpler in the case of the narrative mode than in that of the lyrical mode of poetry. Just as, in the Rule of Metaphor, it was by extrapolation from the tragic muthos that I elaborated the theory of poetic reference that joins muthos and redescribes, it is the metaphorization of action and suffering that is easiest to decipher.

The problem posed by narrativity, with respect to its referential intention and its truth claim, is in another sense more complicated than that posed by lyric poetry. The existence of two large classes of narrative discourse, fictional and historical narrative, poses a series of specific problems that will be treated in volume 2 of this work. I limit myself here to listing a few of them. The most apparent, and perhaps also the most intractable one, proceeds from the undeniable asymmetry between the referential modes of historical and fictional narrative. Only history can claim a reference inscribed in empirical reality, inasmuch as historical intentionality aims at events that have actually occurred. Even if the past no longer exists and if, in Augustine's expression, it can be reached only in the present of the past, that is, through the traces of the past that have become documents for the historian, still it did happen. The past event, however absent it may be from present perception, nonetheless governs the historical intentionality, conferring upon it a realistic note that literature will never equal, even if it makes a claim to be "realistic." This reference through traces to a real past calls for a specific analysis to which one whole chapter of volume 2 will be devoted. I shall have to speak, on the one hand, about what this reference through traces borrows from the metaphorical reference common to every poetic work, inasmuch as the past can only be reconstructed by the imagination, and also what it adds to it, inasmuch as it is polarized by past reality. Conversely, the question will arise whether fictional narrative does not borrow, in turn, a part of its referential dynamics from this reference through traces. Is not every narrative told as though it had taken place, as is evident from the ordinary usage of verbal past tenses to narrate the unreal? In this sense, fiction would borrow as much from history as history borrows from fiction. It is this reciprocal borrowing that authorizes my posing the problem of the interweaving reference between history and narrative fiction. This problem can be avoided only by a positivist conception of history that would not recognize the aspect of fiction in its reference through traces, and by an antireferential conception of literature that would not recognize the importance of the metaphorical reference in all poetry. This problem of interweaving reference constitutes one of the major concerns of volume 2 of this work.

But where do the reference by traces and the metaphorical reference interweave if not through the temporality of human action? Is it not human time that history and literary fiction in common refigure, by this interweaving of their referential modes?

**Narrated Time**

To narrow the framework further in which the question of the interweaving reference between history and fictional narrative will be raised again in the final part of this work, I must sketch the temporal features of the world refigured by the configurational act.

I would like to begin from the notion of iconic augmentation introduced above. We may then take up once more each of the features by which the preunderstanding of action was characterized: the network of intersignifications between practical categories, the symbolism immanent to this preunderstanding, and above all its properly practical temporality. It can then be said that each of these features is intensified, is iconically augmented.

I shall not say much about the first two features. The intersignifying of project, circumstances, and chance is exactly what plot, which I have described as a synthesis of the heterogeneous, orders. The narrative work is an
invocation to see our praxis as it is ordered by this or that plot articulated in our literature. As for the symbolism internal to action, we may say that it is exactly what is resymbolized or desymbolized—or resymbolized through de-symbolization—by means of the schematism turn by turn traditionalized and subverted by the historicity of our paradigms. Lastly, it is the time of action that, more than anything, is refigured by the configurational act. A long detour is required here. A theory of refigured time—or, we might say, tjarrated time—cannot be brought to term without the mediation of the third partner in the conversation already begun between the epistemology of history and literary criticism applied to narrativity, in the discussion of interweaving reference. This third partner is the phenomenology of time, only the initial phase of which was considered in our study of time in Augustine. The rest of this work, from Part II through volume 2, will be a long and difficult three-way conversation between history, literary criticism, and phenomenological philosophy. The dialectic of time and narrative is the ultimate stake of this confrontation, without precedent as far as I know, between three partners who usually ignore one another.

To give sufficient attention to the third partner's words it will be important to set forth the phenomenology of time from Augustine to Husserl and Heidegger, not to write its history, but to give body to a remark tossed out without any further justification in the course of my study of Book 11 of the Confessions. There is, I said, no pure phenomenology of time in Augustine. And I added, perhaps there can never be one. This impossibility of a pure phenomenology of time is what has to be demonstrated. By a pure phenomenology I mean an intuitive apprehension of the structure of time, which not only can be isolated from the procedures of argumentation by which phenomenology undertakes to resolve the aporias received from an earlier tradition, but which would not pay for its discovery with new aporias bearing a higher price. My thesis is that the genuine discoveries of the phenomenology of time cannot be definitively removed from the aporetic realm that so strongly characterizes the Augustinian theory of time. We shall have to take up again therefore our examination of the aporias created by Augustine and demonstrate their exemplary character. In this regard, Husserl's analysis and discussion in his lectures on the phenomenology of internal time consciousness will constitute the major counterexample to my thesis about the defini-

The Circle of Narrative and Temporality

lively aporetic character of the phenomenology of time. In an almost unexpected way, at least for me, we shall be brought back by our discussion to the very Kantian thesis that time cannot be directly observed, that it is properly invisible. In this sense, the endless aporias of the phenomenology of time will be the price we have to pay for each and every attempt to make time itself appear, the ambition that defines the phenomenology of time as pure phenomenology. One major step in volume 2 will be to prove this, in principle, aporetic character of the pure phenomenology of time.

This proof is necessary if we are to hold as universally valid my thesis that the poetics of narrativity responds and corresponds to the aporetics of temporality. The rapprochement between Aristotle's Poetics and Augustine's Confessions provided only a partial and in a way a circumstantial verification of this thesis. If the aporetic character of every pure phenomenology of time may be augmented in at least a plausible way, the hermeneutical circle of narrativity and temporality will be enlarged well beyond the circle of mimesis, to which the discussion in this first part had to be limited, so long as historiography and the philosophy of history along with literary criticism have not had their say about historical time and the games fiction plays with time. It is only at the end of what I have called the three-way conversation, in which the phenomenology of time joins its voice to those of these other disciplines, that the hermeneutical circle can then be compared with the circle of a poetics of narrativity (itself culminating in the problem of interweaving reference referred to above) and an aporetics of temporality. It might already be objected with respect to my thesis about the universally aporetic character of the pure phenomenology of time that Heidegger's hermeneutics marks a decisive break with Augustine's and Husserl's subjectivist hermeneutics. By founding his phenomenology on an ontology of Dasein and of being-in-the-world, is Heidegger correct in affirming that temporality, as he describes it, is "more subjective" than any subject and "more objective" than any object, inasmuch as his ontology is not bound by the subject/object dichotomy? I do not deny this. The analyses I shall devote to Heidegger will do full justice to the originality that a phenomenology founded upon an ontology and that presents itself as a hermeneutics can boast of.

To say it already, the properly phenomenological originality of the Heideggerian analysis of time—an originality due entirely to its anchorage in an ontology of Care—consists in a hierarchization of the levels of temporality or rather of temporalization. Having shown this, we shall be able to rediscover a presentiment of this theme in Augustine. Indeed, by interpreting the extension of time in terms of distension and by describing human time as raised beyond its inside by the attraction of its polar opposite, eternity, Augustine gave credit in advance to the idea of a plurality of temporal levels. Intervals of time do not simply fit into one another according to their numerical quantities, days into years, years into centuries. In a general way, the problems relative to the

[i] extension of time do not exhaust the question of human time. In fact, insofar as extension reflects a dialectic of intention and distention, the extension of
time does not have just a quantitative aspect in responding to the questions:  

// for how long a time? during how much time? in how much time? It has a qualitative aspect of graduated tension.

In my study of time in Augustine I indicated the principal epistemological incidence of this notion of a temporal hierarchy: historiography, in its battle against the history of events, and narratology, in its ambition to dechronologie narrative, seem to leave only a single choice: either chronology or achronic systemic relations. Chronology, however, does have another contrary term: temporality itself, brought to its level of greatest tension. In the Heideggerian analysis of temporality, in Being and Time, Augustine's breakthrough is exploited in the most decisive way, even though this occurs, as we shall see, beginning from Heidegger's meditation on being-towards-death and not, as in Augustine, from the structure of the threefold present. I take as one invaluable result of the Heideggerian analysis its having established, with the resources of a hermeneutic phenomenology, that our experience of temporality is capable of unfolding itself on several levels of radi-cal, and that it belongs to the analytic of Dasein to traverse them, whether from above to below, in the order followed in Being and Time, from authentic and mortal time toward everyday and public time where everything happens "in" time, or from below to above, as in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. "The direction in which the range of temporalization is traversed is less important than the hierarchization of temporal experience."

Along the ascending or regressive path, a stop at the middle level, between within-time-refers and radical temporality, marked by being-towards-death, seems of greatest importance to me. For reasons I shall mention later, Heidegger distinguishes it by the title Geschichtlichkeit, historicality. Augustine's and Heidegger's two analyses are closest to each other at this level, before diverging radically—at least in appearance—as the one directs himself toward Pauline hope, the other toward quasi-Stoic resoluteness in the face of death. In volume 2 I shall set forth an intrinsic reason for returning to this analysis of Geschichtlichkeit. Indeed, my analysis of repetition—Wiederholung—in which I shall seek an ontological answer to the epistemological problems posed by the interweaving reference between the truth claims of historical intentionality and literary fiction, leads back to it. This is why I am already indicating its point of insertion.

There is no question therefore of denying the properly phenomenological originality that the Heideggerian description of temporality owes to its anchorage in the ontology of Care. Nonetheless, on this side of the turn—the Kehre—from which proceed the works subsequent to Being and Time, it must be admitted that the ontology of Dasein remains tied up with a phenomenology that poses problems analogous to those raised by Augustine's and Husserl's phenomenology. Here, too, the breakthrough on the phenomenological plane engenders difficulties of a new sort that again augment the aporetic character of pure phenomenology. This aggravation is in proportion to this phenomenonology's ambition, which is not just to owe nothing to an epistemology of the physical and the human sciences, but to serve as their foundation.

The paradox is that the aporia has to do precisely with the relations between the phenomenology of time and the human sciences—principally history, but also contemporary narratology. Yes, the paradox is that Heidegger has made more difficult the three-way conversation between history, literary criticism, and phenomenology. We may even doubt whether he might have succeeded in deriving the concept of history familiar to professional historians, as well as the general thematic of the human sciences received from Dilthey, from the historicality of Dasein, which, for hermeneutic phenomenology, constitutes the middle level in the hierarchy of degrees of temporality. More serious yet, if the most radical temporality bears the stamp of death, how, we might ask, do we pass from a temporality so privatized by being-towards-death to that common time that requires interaction among multiple characters in every narrative and, all the more, to the public time required by history?

In this sense our passage through Heidegger's phenomenology will require a supplementary effort, which sometimes will distance us from him, to its dialectic of narrative and time. It will be one of the major concerns of volume 2 to show how, in spite of the abyss that seems to lie between the two poles, narrative and time simultaneously and mutually arrange themselves in hierarchies. At times it will be the hermeneutic phenomenology of time that provides the key to the hierarchizing of narrative, other times it will be the disciplines concerned with historical and fictional narrative that allow us to resolve poetically—to use an expression already employed—the most speculatively intractable aporias of the phenomenology of time.

Hence the very difficulty of deriving the historical disciplines from the analysis of Dasein and the still more formidable difficulty of bringing together in our thought the mortal time of the phenomenology of time and the public time of the narrative disciplines, will spur us to think through more thoroughly the relationships of time and narrative. The preliminary reflection that constitutes the first part of this work has already brought us from a conception where the hermeneutic circle is identified with the circle of the stages of mimesis to one that inscribes this dialectic within the larger circle of a poetics of narrative and an aporetics of time.

A final problem appears: that of the upper limit to the process of the hierarchization of temporality. For Augustine and the whole Christian tradition, the internalizing of the purely extensive relations of time refers to an eternity where everything is present at the same time. The approximating of eternity by time thus lies in the stability of a soul in response: "Then I shall be cast and set firm in the mould of your truth" (Confessions, Book 11, 30:40). Yet
Heidegger's philosophy of time, at least during the period of *Being and Time*, even while taking up again and developing with great rigor the theme of levels of temporality, orients its meditation not toward divine eternity but toward finitude sealed by being-towards-death. Are these two irreducible ways of guiding the most extensive duration back toward the most tensive duration? Or is this disjunction only apparent? Are we to think that only a mortal can form the plan of "giving the things of life a dignity that makes them eternal"? Can the eternity that works of art oppose to the fugacity of things be constituted only in a history? And does this history in turn remain historical only if, going beyond death, it guards against the forgetfulness of death and the dead, and remains a recollection of death and a remembrance of the dead? The most serious question this work may be able to pose is to what degree a philosophical reflection on narrativity and time may aid us in thinking about eternity and death at the same time.
Part II
History and Narrative

In the first part of this work I attempted to characterize narrative discourse without taking into account the major bifurcation that today divides its field between historiography (including work in philosophy of history) and narrative fiction. By so doing, I tacitly admitted that historiography does genuinely belong to this field. Whether it does belong to this field is what now must be examined.

Two convictions of equal strength lie at the origin of this investigation. The first says that today it is a lost cause to bind the narrative character of history to one particular form of history, narrative history. In this regard, my thesis concerning the ultimately narrative character of history in no wise is to be confused with a defense of narrative history. My second conviction is that if history were to break every connection to our basic competence for following a story and to the cognitive operations constitutive of our narrative understanding, as I described them in the first part of this work, it would lose its distinctive place in the chorus of social sciences. It would cease to be historical. What is the nature of this connection?

To resolve this problem I did not wish to surrender to the easy solution that would consist in saying that history is an ambiguous discipline, half literary, half scientific, and that the epistemology of history can only register this state of affairs with regret, ceasing to work toward a history that would no longer be a kind of narrative. I his easy eclecticism is contrary to my ambition. My thesis is that history, the most removed from the narrative form continues to be bound to narrative understanding by a line of derivation that we can reconstruct step by step and degree by degree with an appropriate method. This method does not stem from the methodology of the historical sciences per se but from a second-order reflection upon the ultimate conditions of intelligibility of a discipline that, in virtue of its scientific ambition, tends to forget this line of derivation which continues nevertheless tacitly to preserve its specificity as a historical science.

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This thesis has one immediate implication concerning historical time. I do not doubt that historians have the privilege of constructing temporal parameters appropriate to their object and their method. I do maintain, however, that the significance of these constructions is borrowed, that it derives indirectly from the significance of those narrative configurations I described in terms of mimesis, and that, by way of these, it is rooted in the temporality characteristic of the world of action. So, construction of historical time will be one of the major stakes of my enterprise. A stake—that is, both a consequence and a touchstone.

My thesis, therefore, is equally distant from two others: the one that would see in the retreat of historical narrative the negation of any connection between history and narrative, making historical time a construction without any support from narrative time or the time of action; and the one that would establish between history and narrative a relation as direct as that, for example, between a species and a genus, along with a directly readable continuity between the time of action and historical time. My thesis rests on the assertion of an indirect connection of derivation, by which historical knowledge proceeds from our narrative understanding without losing anything of its scientific ambition. In this sense, it is not a thesis that seeks to stand in the middle of the road.

To reconstruct the indirect connections of history to narrative is finally to bring to light the intentionality of the historian's thought by which history continues obliquely to intend the field of human action and its basic temporality.

By means of this oblique intention, historiography comes to be inscribed within that great mimetic circle which we traversed in the first part of this study. It too, albeit in a derived way, is a part of our pragmatic competence, with its handling of events that occur "in" time, as described in my discussion of mimesis. It too configures the field of praxis by means of temporal constructions of a higher rank which historiography grafts to the narrative time characteristic of mimesis. It too, finally, reaches its meaning in the refiguring of the field of praxis and contributes to recapitulating the existence wherein mimesis culminates.

Such is the farthest horizon of my enterprise. I shall not take it so far in this part. I must reserve for a separate investigation the final segment corresponding to mimesis. Indeed, the inserting of history into action and into life, its capacity for reconfiguring time, brings into play the question of truth in history. This question is inseparable from what I call the interweaving reference between history's claim to truth and that of fiction. The investigation to which Part II of this work is devoted, therefore, does not cover the whole field of the problematic of history. To retain the vocabulary I used in The Rule of Metaphor, it separates the question of "sense" from that of "reference." Or, remaining faithful to the vocabulary of Part I of this work, the present investiga-
The order of questions dealt with in this second part is governed by my argument for the thesis just sketched. In chapter 4, entitled "The Eclipse of Narrative," I take my distance from modern history as related to an expressly narrative form. I try to establish a convergence, in the attack against narrative history, between two currents of thought largely independent of one another. The first, closer to historical practice, and therefore more methodological than epistemological. seemed to me best illustrated by contemporary French historiography. The second stems from logical positivism's theses about the unity of science. It, therefore, is more epistemological than methodological.

In chapter 5, entitled "Defenses of Narrative," I take account of the various attempts—borrowed for the most part, with one important exception, from English-speaking authors—to extend our narrative competence directly to historical discourse. Despite my great sympathy for these analyses, which I try to integrate into my own project. I must confess that they do not seem to me to have Hilly reached their goal inasmuch as they only account for those ibrms of historiography where the relation to narrative is direct, and therefore visible.

Chapter 6, entitled "Historical Intentionality," contains the major thesis of this second part, namely my thesis of the indirect derivation of historical knowledge, beginning from narrative understanding. Within this framework I take up again the analysis I have already begun elsewhere concerning the relations between explanation and understanding. To conclude, I siive a partial answer to the question that inaugurates chapter 4, the question regarding the status of an event. This answer cannot be complete because the epistemological status of an event—the only thing at issue in this second part—is inseparable from its ontological status, which is one of the stakes in volume 2.

I must ask for my reader's patience at this point. You need to know that you will find, in the three chapters that follow, only a preparatory analysis as regards my central question about time and narrative. It is necessary first of all to elucidate the relationship between historical explanation and narrative understanding.> If we are to be able to pose the question of the contribution of historical narrative to the refiguring of time in a worthwhile manner. And this elucidation itself requires a long analysis. The nomological theory and the narrativist one must, under the pressure of the appropriate arguments, reveal their respective insufficiency if the indirect relationship between historiography and narrative is, in its turn, to be restored step by step and degree by degree. This long epistemological preparation ought not, however, to cause us to lose sight of the final ontological stake. One additional reason may be added to my plea for extending the lines of this battle. The refiguring of time by narrative is, I hold, the joint work of historical and fictional narrative. Only in the second volume of this work, devoted to fictional narrative, therefore, will we be able to take up as a whole the problematic of narrated time.

4 "The Eclipse of Narrative"

French historiography and neopositivist epistemology belong to two very different universes of discourse. The first is traditionally and unfailingly distrustful of philosophy, which it readily identifies with the philosophy of history in a Hegelian style, itself conveniently confused with the speculations of vSpengler or Toynbee. As for the critical philosophy of history, inherited from Dilthey, Rickert. Simmel, and Max Weber, and continued by Raymond Aron and Henri Marrou. it has never truly been integrated into the main current of French historiography. This is why we do not find, in those works most concerned about methodology, a reflection comparable to that of the German school at the beginning of this century, or to that in English of contemporary logical positivism and its adversaries concerning the epistemological structure of explanation in history. Its strength lies elsewhere, in direct adherence to the profession of the historian. The best accomplishment 01 this French school of history is a methodology for those actually in the field. In this regard, it provides philosophers all the more to think about in that it borrows nothing from them. The superiority of the works arising out of neopositivism. on the contrary, stems from their constant concern to measure explanation in history against models presumed to define scientific knowledge, the profound unity of this project, and its successes. In this sense these works do stem more from epistemology than from methodology. But their strength is often their weakness. in that historians' actual practice is absent from their discussion of the models of explanation. This fault is unfortunately shared by logical positivism's adversaries. As we shall see later, in our examination of "narrativist" arguments, the examples which positivist as well as antipositivist epistemology borrows from historians are rarely at the level of complexity attained today in the historical disciplines.

As heterogeneous as these two currents of thought may be. they have at least in common, besides their denial of the philosophy of history (which does not concern us here). their denial of the narrative character of history as it is written today.

This convergence in outcome is all the more striking in that the arguments are so different. For French historiography, the eclipse of narrative proceeds principally from a displacement of the object of history, which is no longer the active individual but the total social fact. For positivism, the eclipse of narrative proceeds instead from the epistemological break between historical explanation and our narrative understanding.
In this chapter I shall place the accent on the convergence of these two attacks, taking as my guideline the destiny of both what counts as an event and the historical time-span in each perspective.

THE ECLIPSE OF THE EVENT IN FRENCH HISTORIOGRAPHY

My choice of the concept of an event as a touchstone for my discussion is particularly appropriate for an examination of the contribution of French historiography to the theory of history, inasmuch as the criticism of the history of events (l'histoire evenementielle) has its well-known place there and because this criticism is taken as equivalent to the rejection of the category "narrative."\)

Prior to reflection, the concept of a historical event shares the misleading assumptions of most common-sense notions. It implies two series of assertions which are not criticized: ontological ones and epistemological ones, the latter being built on the former.

In an ontological sense, we mean by historical event what actually happened in the past. This assertion itself has several aspects. First, we admit that having already occurred differs radically from that of not yet having occurred. In this sense, the pastness of what has happened is taken as an absolute property, independent of our constructions and reconstructions. This first feature is common to physical events and to historical ones. A second feature delimits the field of the historical event. Of all the things that have happened, certain ones are the work of agents similar to ourselves. Historical events therefore are what these active beings make happen or undergo. The ordinary definition of history as knowledge of the actions of past human beings proceeds from this restricting of our interest to the sphere of events assignable to human agents. A third feature results from a delimitation within the practical field of the sphere of possible communication. To the notion of the human past is added, as a constitutive obstacle, the idea of an Otherness or an absolute difference affecting our capacity for communication. It seems as though one implication of our competence to seek understanding and agreement, wherein Habermas sees the norm of a universal pragmatics, if that our; competence to communicate encounters the strangeness of strangers as a challenge and an obstacle, and that we can hope to understand them only at the price of recognizing their otherness. To this threefold ontological presupposition—absolute having been, abso-

...
historical causality is a relation of one particular to another particular, through the medium of retrospective probability. On the scale of probabilities, the lowest degree defines what is accidental, the highest degree defines what Weber calls adequation. Just as such adequation differs from logical or physical necessity, the accidental is no longer equivalent to absolute singularity. "As for the probability born of the partial character of historical analyses and causal relations, it exists in our minds, not in things" (p. 165). In this respect, historical appraisal of probability differs from the logic of the scientist and is closer to that of the judge. For Aron, the philosophical stake in all this was the destruction of every retrospective illusion of fatality and the opening of the theory of history to the spontaneity of action oriented toward the future.

For our present/investigation, the clear result of Aron's book is that the past, conceived of as the sum of what has actually happened, is out of reach of the historian. We find an argument similar to Aron's in H. I. Marrou's *The Meaning of History* (first published in 1954). There the practice of historians is even more evident. I shall set aside here one problem to which I shall return in volume 2, namely, the connection between understanding another person and knowing the human past."

The continuity between mortal time and public time, referred to at the end of Part I. is directly implied in this. Here I shall only retain the major methodological implications of this recourse to our understanding of others that link up with Aron's axiom concerning the dissolution of the object.

First, historical knowledge, resting on the the testimony of others, is "not a science properly speaking, but only a knowledge by faith" (Marrou, p. 152). Understanding envelops the whole work of the historian inasmuch as history "is a spiritual adventure wherein the historian's personality is brought into play. History is thus endowed, for the historian, with an existential value, and from this existential value it receives its importance, its meaning and its value" (p. 204). And. Marrou adds, "this conception forms the very heart of our critical philosophy, and the focal point around which all else takes on order and clarity" (ibid.). Understanding is thereby incorporated into "The Truth of History"—the title of Marrou's chapter 9; that is, into the truth that history is capable of. Understanding is not the subjective side and explanation the objective one. Subjectivity is not a prison and objectivity is not our liberation from this prison. Far from conflicting, subjectivity and objectivity reinforce each other. "Indeed once history is true, its truth is double, for it is composed of both the past and about the testimony offered by the historian" (p. 238).

If historians are implicated in historical knowing, they cannot propose the 98 impossible task for themselves of re-actualizing the past." It is impossible for two reasons. First, history is a form of knowledge only through the relation it establishes between the lived experience of people of other times and today's historian. The set of procedures used in history is part of the equation for historical knowing. The result of this is that humanity's lived past can only be postulated, like the Kantian noumena at the origin of all empirical phenomena. Further, if this lived past were accessible to us, it would not be so as an object of knowledge. For. when it was present, this past was like our present: confused, multiform, and unintelligible. Instead, history aims at knowledge, an organized vision, established upon chains of causal or teleological relations, on the basis of meanings and values. In essence, Marrou here links up with Aron, at the precise moment when Aron announces the dissolution of the 'object, in the sense we spoke of above. *"*

The same argument that forbids us to conceive of history as reminiscence also condemns the positivism that the new French historiography takes as its bete noire. If history is the relationship of the historian to the past, we cannot treat the historian as some perturbing factor added to the past that must be eliminated. This methodological argument, we see, exactly repeats the argument drawn from understanding. If hypercriticism attaches more value to suspicion than to empathy, its moral tenor is quite in accord with the methodological illusion that the historical fact exists in some latent state in the documents and that the historian is, a parasite on the historical equation. Against this methodological illusion;it has to be affirmed that the initiative in history does not belong to the document (see ibid., chapter 3) but to the question posed by the historian. This question takes logical priority mjistorical inquiry.

In this way Marrou's Work reinforces Aron's in its battle against the partialty of the Annales school. The contribution of the Annales school to our problem differs greatly from that of Aron, the philosopher, and even from that of Marrou, the philosopher-historian, marked as they both are by the German problem of *Verstehen*. With this school, we have to deal with the methodology of professional historians, who for the most part are not concerned about the problem of "understanding.""The most theoretical essays by the historians of this school are treatises by artisans reflecting on their craft. Their tone was set by Marc Bloch in *The Historian's Craft*, a work written far from any library and interrupted two-thirds of the way through by a Nazi firing squad in 1942." This unfinished book means to be "the memorandum of a craftsman who has always liked to reflect over his daily task, the notebook of a journeyman who has long handled the ruler and the level, without imagin-
ing himself to be a mathematician" (p. 19). Its hesitations, audacities, and prudences are still valuable today. This is all the more true in that it chooses to accentuate the "unresolvable" aspects of historiography."

Of course, narratives only constitute the class of "voluntary witnesses." whose sway over history needs to be limited with the help of those "witnesses in spite of themselves" which are all the other tracks familiar to the archaeologist and the economic or social historian. But this endless enlarging of documentary sources does not mean that the notion of a witness does not encompass that of a document or does not remain the model for every observation of "tracks" (p. 64). The result is that "criticism" will essentially, if not exclusively, be a criticism of testimony, that is, a test of its veracity, a search for imposture, whether it be misleading information about an author or a date (misinformation in the juridical sense) or more fundamental deception (plagiarism, sheer invention, reshuffling the facts, or the hawking of prejudices and rumors). This considerable place given to criticism of testimony, at the expense of questions about causes or laws, which at this same time occupied English-language epistemology, is due essentially to the specifying of the notion of a track by the psychic character of historical phenomena.- Social conditions are, "in their underlying nature, mental" (p. 194). The result is that criticism of testimony, "since it deals with psychic realities, will always remain a subtle art. . . . However, it is also a rational art, which depends on methodical use of certain basic mental processes" (p. 110). The prudences, perhaps the timidities, of this work are the counterpart of this submission of the notion of a document to that of testimony. In fact, even the subsection entitled "Toward a Logic of the Critical Method" (pp. 110-39) remains a prisoner of a psycho-sociological analysis of testimony, albeit a refined one. Even though this rational art compares testimonies, looking for mutual contradictions, and weighs the reasons for lies, it still remains the heir of the erudite methods forged by Richard Simon, the Bullanderists, and the Benedictines. Not that Bloch did not glimpse, and in this sense anticipate, the role of statistical criticism, but he did not see that the logic of probability, treated twenty years earlier by Max Weber and then taken up again by Raymond Aron, no longer stemmed from the criticism of testimony but from the problem of causality in history. To use it just to disclose and explain the imperfections of testimony is inevitably to limit its import."

The real breakthrough brought about by The Historian's Craft is rather to be found in the remarks devoted to "historical analysis"—the title of chapter 4. Marc Bloch grasped perfectly that historical explanation essentially consists in the constituting of chains of similar phenomena and in establishing their interactions. This primacy of analysis over synthesis allowed him to set in place—from the cover of a quotation from Focillon, the author of the admirable Vie des Formes—the phenomenon of the discrepancy between the political, economic, and artistic aspects thereby distinguished within the over-100

The Eclipse of Narrative

all historical phenomenon, to which we shall return below with George Duby.\textsuperscript{m} Above all, it gave him the occasion for a remarkable discussion of the problem of nomenclature (see pp. 156-89). This problem is clearly bound up with that of classifying facts. However, it poses the specific problem of the propriety of our language. Ought we to name past entities with the terms already used by the documents to designate them, at the risk of forgetting that "the vocabulary of documents is, in its way, only another form of evidence. . . . hence subject to criticism" (p. 168)? Or ought we to project modern terms on them, at the risk of missing, through anachronism, the specificity of past phenomena and of arrogantly eternalizing our own categories? As can be seen, the dialectic of the similar and the dissimilar governs historical analysis as it does historical criticism.

These insightful views make all the more regrettable the violent interruption of this work at the moment when it was beginning to discuss the formidable problem of causal relations in history. The final sentence is all the more precious in that it is left unfinished: "In a word, in history, as elsewhere, the causes cannot be assumed. They are to be looked for . . . ." (p. 197).

The real manifesto of the Annales school has to be Fernand Braudel's chief work. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Aye of Philip II.

For the sake of didactic clarity, I shall concentrate upon what in Braudel's essays and in those by historians of his school goes directly against the second of our initial presuppositions, namely, that events are what active agents make . . . happen, and, that as a consequence, events share in the contingency proper to action. The model of action implied by the very notion of "making events happen" (along with its corollary of "undergoing them") is what is called into question. Action, according to this implicit model, can always be attributed to some individual agents, authors, or victims of events. Even if we include the concept of interaction in that of action, we never escape the assumption that the author of an action must always be an identifiable agent.

This tacit assumption that events are what individuals make happen or undergo is overthrown by Braudel along with two other assumptions which are closely connected with each other—and which undergo the direct fire of Braudel's and his successors' criticism. They are that the individual is the ultimate bearer of historical change and that the most significant changes are pointlike ones, those in fact that affect individual lives due to their brevity and their suddenness. In fact, Braudel reserves the title "event" just for such changes. These two explicit corollaries entail a third one which is never discussed by
for us who are inquiring precisely into the narrative status of history, this notion of narrative is never interrogated for itself, as the notions of primacy of political history and of events are. These historians are content to disown narrative history a la Ranke with a single sentence. (We have seen how narrative for Marc Bloch is one part of voluntary testimony, therefore a document.) Nor does it ever occur to Lucien Febvre, the co-founder of the Annales school with Marc Bloch, that his vehement criticism of the notion of a historical fact, conceived of as an atom of history completely given by the sources, and his plea for a historical reality constructed by the historian, fundamentally bring together historical reality, so created by history, and narrative fiction, created by the narrator. The criticism of narrative history, therefore, is done only by a way of the criticism of political history, which emphasizes individuals a/d” events. Only these two primary assumptions are attacked head-on.

To methodological individualism in the social sciences, the new historians oppose the thesis that the object of history is not the individual but the “total social fact” a term borrowed from Marcel Mauss) in every one of its human dimensions—economic, social, political, cultural, religious, etc. To the notion of an event as a temporal leap, they oppose that of a social tune whose major categories—conjecture, structure, trend, cycle, growth, crisis, etc. — are borrowed from economics, demography, and sociology. The important thing to grasp is the connection between these two types of contestation, one directed against the primacy of the individual as the ultimate atom of historical investigation, and the other against the primacy of events, in the pointlike sense of this word, as the ultimate atom of social change.

These two rejections do not result from any speculation about action and time. Instead they are the direct consequence of the displacement of the principal axis of historical investigation from political history toward social history. Political history, including military, diplomatic, and ecclesiastical history, is where individuals—heads of state, generals, ministers, diplomats, prelates—are supposed to make history. It is also the realm where events go off like explosions. The "history of battles" and the "history of events" (to use an expression of Paul Lacombe's taken up by Francois Simiand and Henri Berr!) go hand in hand.” The primacy of the individual and of the pointlike event are the two necessary corollaries of the preeminence of political history. It is noteworthy that this criticism of the history of events in no way results from philosophical criticism of a conception, itself philosophical, of history in the Hegelian tradition. It results instead from a methodological fight against the positivist tradition that prevailed in historical studies in France during the first third of our century. For this tradition, major events are already deposited in archives, which themselves moreover are already instituted and constituted

as a result of the vicissitudes and accidents affecting the distribution of power. This is why the twofold denunciation of the history of battles and that of events constitutes the polemical side of a plea for a history of the total human

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\[ \textit{phenomenon, always with a strong emphasis on its economic and social conditions. In this regard, the most conspicuous and no doubt the most numerous works of this historical school are devoted to social history, in which groups, social categories and classes, cities and the country, the bourgeois, artisans, peasants, and workers become the collective heroes of history. For Braudel, history even becomes a geohistory whose hero is the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world, until this is succeeded, for Huguet and Pierre Chaunu, by the Atlantic between Seville and the New World.} \]

The concept of a long time-span [la longue duree], opposed to the concept of gyent taken in the sense of a short time-span, was born in this critical context. In his Preface to \textit{The Mediterraneen}, then in his inaugural lecture at the College de France in 1950, and again in his \textit{Annales} article on "The Longtie Duree," Braudel never stops driving home the same point. The most superficial history is history concerned with the dimension of individuals. The history of events is the history of short, sharp, and nervous vibrations. It is I richest in humanity but also most dangerous. Under this history and its individual time unfolds "a history of gentle rhythms" (\textit{On History}, p. 3) with its "long time span" (pp. 25ff.). This is social history, the history of groups and of deep-lying trends. It is the economist who teaches the historian about this long time-span, but it is also the time of political institutions and of men-talite's. Finally, even deeper, reigns "a history that is almost changeless, the history of man in relation to his surroundings" (p. 3). With this history, we must speak of a "geographical time" (p. 4).

This series of time-spans is one of the more noteworthy contributions of French historiography to the epistemology o: history—given the lack of a more subtle discussion of the ideas of causes and laws.
The idea that the individual and the event are to be simultaneously surpassed is the strong point of this school. For Braudel, the plea for history becomes a plea for "anonymous history, working in the depths, and most often in silence" (p. 10), and thereby for social time that "goes at a thousand different paces, swift or slow" (p. 12). It is a plea and a credo: "Thus I believe in the reality of a particularly slow-paced history of civilizations" (ibid.). Still, it is the historian's profession, not philosophical reflection, affirms Braudel, in "History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée." That suggests the "living, intimate, infinitely repeated opposition," close to the heart of social reality, "between the instant of time and that time which flows only slowly" (p. 26). Awareness of this plurality of social times must become a component of the common methodology of all the human sciences. Pushing this axiom close to the point of becoming a paradox, Braudel goes so far as to say, "Social science has almost what amounts to a horror of the event. And not without some justification, for the short time span is the most capricious and the most delusive of all" (p. 28).

A reader interested in epistemology may be surprised by the lack of rigor in the expressions that characterize the plurality of temporarities. For example, Braudel not only speaks of short time and long time, that is, of quantitative differences, but also of rapid and slow time. Absolutely speaking, speed does not apply to intervals of time but to movements traversing them.

And, in the final analysis, the question has to do with these movements. Several metaphors, induced by the image of speed or slowness, confirm this. We can begin with those that deprecate events, a synonym for short-time spans. A "surface disturbance, the waves stirred up by the powerful movement of tides. A history of short, sharp, nervous vibrations" (p. 3). "We must beware of that history which still simmers with the passions of the contemporaries who felt it, described it, lived it. to the rhythm of their brief lives, lives as brief as our own" (p. 4). "A world of vivid passions, certainly, but a blind world, as any living world must be. as ours is. oblivious of the deep currents of history, of those living waters on which our frail barks are tossed like Rimbaud's drunken boat" (ibid.). A whole group of metaphors speak of the misleading character of the short time-span: sorcery, smoke, caprice, glimmers without clarity, the short term of our illusions, Ranke's delusive fallacies. Others speak of its prating assumptions: "to react against a history arbitrarily reduced to the role of quintessential heroes," "against Treitschke's proud and unilateral declaration: "Men make history" (p. 10). Traditional history, "the narrative history so dear to the heart of Ranke" offers us a "gleam but no illumination: facts but no humanity" (p. 11). Then there are the metaphors that speak of "the exceptional value of the long time span" (p. 27). Anonymous history, "working in the depths and most often in silence," which makes human beings more than they make it (p. 10); "a ponderous history whose time cannot be measured by any of our long-established instruments" (p. 12); "that most silent but imperious history of civilizations" (p. 16).

What do these metaphors conceal? What do they reveal? First, a concern for veracity as much as for modesty, the admission that we do not make history, if by "we" we mean Hegel's great world-historical figures. Hence a willingness to make visible and audible the pressure of a deep time which the glamorous drama of the short time-span has eclipsed and reduced to silence. If we now plumb this modesty, what do we find? Two contrary insights held in equilibrium.

On the one side, by means of the slowness, the weightiness, the silence of ang-lasting time, history reaches an intelligibility that belongs only to the long time-span, a coherence that belongs only to durable equilibriums, in short, a kind of stability within change. "As realities of the inexhaustibly longue durée, civilizations, endlessly readapting themselves to their destiny, exceed in longevity any other collective reality; they outlive them all" (p. 210). In his discussion of civilizations, Braudel ends up designating them as "a reality that time makes poor use of and carries along very slowly." Yes, "civilizations are realities of the extreme Longue durée" (p. 209).

Toynbee, in spite of everything that can be said against him, saw this perfectly. "He has 104... The Eclipse of Narrative committed himself to 'societies,' to social realities, or at least to those social realities which persist forever. He has committed himself to events which continue to have violent repercussions whole centuries after they have occurred, or to men well above the general run of mankind, whether Jesus, Buddha, or Mahomet, men who are equally of the longue durée" (pp. 196-97). To the smoke of events is opposed the rock of endurance. Especially when time becomes inscribed in geography, when it is gathered up in the perenniality of landscapes. "A civilization is first of all a space, a 'cultural area.' ... a locus" (p. 202). "The longue durée is the endless, inexhaustible history of structures and groups of structures" (p. 75). We might say that here Braudel reaches, by way of the notion of endurance, not so much what changes as what remains the same. The verb "to endure" says this better than does the substantive "endurance." A discrete wisdom, opposed to the frenzy of events, can be discerned behind this respect for the extreme slowness of real changes.

However the opposite perception also appears, as soon as social mathematics proposes to apply its achronological structures and its atemporal models to the long time-span. Against this pretension and this
tendency historians stand as the guardians of change. They may oppose to traditional narrative an "account of
conjunctures." but far beyond "this second account we find a history capable of traversing even greater distances,
a history to be measured in centuries this time: the history of the long, even of the very long time span, of the
*longue durée*" (p. 27). But a time-span, even the very long time-span, is still a time-span. And it is there that
historians stand guard, at the threshold where history might step over into sociology. We can see this in the
section of the essay "History and the Social Sciences: The *longue durée*" Devoted to social mathematics (see pp.
38-47), as well as in the essay "History and Sociology" (pp. 64-82). "In fact, as far as the language of history is
concerned," Braudel protests, "there can be no question of perfect synchrony" (p. 39). Mathematical sociologists
may indeed construct almost timeless models—almost timeless, that is, "in actual fact, traveling the dark,
tended byways of the extreme *longue durée*" (p. 41). In fact, such models are of varying duration: "they are
valid for as long as the reality with which they are dealing, ... for even more significant than the deep-rooted
structures of life are their points of rupture, their swift or slow deterioration under the effect of contradictory
pressures" (pp. 44-45). What counts for the historian, in the end, is the range of a model. Here a marine metaphor
is again in force: "The significant moment is when it can keep afloat no longer, and sinks" (p. 45). Qualitative
mathematical models are ill-suited to voyages in time, "above all because they are committed to traveling along
one of time's many possible highways, that of the extreme *longue durée*, sheltered from all accidents, crises, and
sudden breaks" (ibid.). Such is the case for the models constructed by Claude Levi-Strauss. In each instance they
are applied to "a phenomenon which develops only very slowly, almost timeless" (ibid.). The prohibition
ins
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of incest is one of these realities of the long time-span. Myths, which are slow to develop, also correspond to
structures of an extreme longevity. Their myths, their atoms of intelligibility, conjoin the infinitely small and the
very long time-span. But for the historian this extreme *longue durée* is the "excessive *lonjifie durée*" which
makes us forget "the diversity of life—the movement, the different time spans, the rifts and variations." (p. 47).
So we see the theoretician of the long time-span engaged in combat on two fronts, on the side of events and on
the side of the excessively long time-span, i shall attempt to say in chapter 6 to what extent this apology for the
long time-span with its twofold refusal is compatible with the narrative model of emplotment. If such were the
case, the attack against the history of events would not be the historian's last word about the notion of an event,
inasmuch as it is more important that an event contribute to the progress of a plot than that it be short and
nervous, like an explosion. Following Braudel, the whole of the Annales school was swallowed up into the breach of the long time-span. ! would like next to dwell upon another of the more significant developments of contemporary French
historiography, the large-scale introduction into history of quantitative procedures borrowed from economics and
extended to demographic, social, cultural, and even spiritual history. With this development another major
assumption about the nature of historical events was called into question, namely, that of their uniqueness, the
fact that an event never repeats itself.
Quantitative history: in fact, is basically a "serial history"—to use the expression that Pierre Chaunu made
classic.- It rests upon the constitution of a homogeneous series of "items." hence of repeatable facts, eventually
amenable to processing by a computer. All the major categories of historical time can be ever more closely
redefined in terms of a "serial" basis. For example, conjuncture moves from economic history to social history,
then to history in general, with the result that it can be conceived of as a method for integrating at some given
moment the greatest possible number of correlations between remote series. Similarly, the notion of a structure,
understood by historians in the twofold sense of the static architectural relationships of a given set and the
dynamics of a durable stability, only jonserves its precision if it can be referred to the intersection of numerous
variables which all presuppose that they can be put in a series. Hence conjuncture tends to refer to a short span of
time and structure to a long one, but as set within the perspective of "serial" history. Taken together, the two
notions thus tend to designate a polarity for historical inquiry, depending whether the victory over the accidental
and the event-like is carried so far as to absorb conjuncture into structure, or whether the long time-span—which
is generally favored by French historiography—refuses to be dissolved into the immobile time of "frozen
societies" (p. 527).
In a general way, historians—particularly specialists in economic history—are different from their economist or
sociologist colleagues in that they tend to
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conserve a temporal connotation even for the notion of structure. The notion of the long time-span has helped
them, in this battle on two fronts, to resist both the complete dechronologizing of their models and the
fascination of the accidental and isolated event. But, since the first temptation comes from the neighboring social
sciences and the second from the historical tradition itself, the battle has always been hottest on the front against
events. In large measure the development of economic history was a response to the challenge posed by the great
depression of 1929. as a means of long-term analysis that would divest that event of its catastrophic singularity.
As for the battle on the front against atemporal structures, it has never been completely absent from the scene. In
the face of the development of a purely quantitative economics by Simon Kuznets and Jean Marczewski, serial
history was forced to distinguish itself from purely quantitative history, which was reproached for becoming locked into a nation-oriented framework by adopting national accounting as its model. What the quantitative history of the economists sacrifices on the altar of the exact sciences is precisely the long time-span, regained at such great price from the dramatic time of events. This is why a foothold in large geographic areas and an alliance with Braudel's geopolitics were necessary if Aerial history was to remain faithful to the long time-span and, thanks to that mediation, stay grafted to the trunk of traditional history. It is also why conjuncture and structure, even when they are opposed to each other, imprint on diachrony the primacy of an immanent logic over the accidental, isolated event.

With his history of prices, Ernest Labrousse, pursuing the trail opened by François Simiand, turned out to be the first historian to incorporate the notions of conjuncture and structure into his discipline. At the same time, lie showed the way to an enlarging of the field opened to quantitative analysis, by LiLididint; his discipline from economic history to social history based on socio-professional inquiries. For Labrousse, structure is a social category. It has to do with human beings in their relationships to production and to other human beings, within those social circles that he calls classes. Since 1950. he has been engaged in calculating "social quantities," thereby indicating the exodus of statistical apparatus toward regions ever more resistant to quantification. Social quantity represents the passage from the first level, that of economics, to the second, social, level, following Marx's line but without any concern for Marxist orthodoxy. As an analytic model, economic history was thereby revealed to be capable of a branching development: on one side, demography, and even, as we shall see later, a sociocultural side, the side of mentalités—the third level, according to Labrousse.

The methodology of economic history marked a continuity more than a break with Marc Bloch's and Lucien Febvre's Vanpositivist battle. In fact, what the founders of the Annales school had wanted to fight against in the first place was fascination with the unique, unrepeatable event, then the identification of history with an improved chronology of the state, and finally—and perhaps above all—the absence of a criterion of choice, and therefore of any problem, in the elaboration of what counts as a "fact" in history. The facts, these historians never stop repeating, are not given in the documents, rather documents are selected as a function of a certain problem. Documents themselves are not just given. Official archives are institutions that reflect an implicit choice in favor of history conceived of as an anthology of events and as the chronicle of a state. Since this choice was not stated, the historical fact could appear to be governed by the document and historians could appear to receive their problems from these things as given.

In this conquest of the whole historical field by quantitative or serial history, special mention must be made of demographic history, particularly because of its temporal implications. For this discipline, what counts is first of all the number of people and then plotting these numbers in relation to the scale of the replacement of generations on this planet. Demographic history, which is to say demography in a temporal perspective, graphs the biological evolution of humanity considered as a whole. At the same time, it reveals the worldwide rhythms of populations that set the long time-span on a scale of half-millennia and call into question the periodization of traditional history. Demography, finally, as taken up by historians, brings to light the link between the size of populations and levels of culture and civilization.

In this sense, historical demography assures the transition between serial history on the economic level and serial history on the social level, then to the cultural and spiritual level, to recall Labrousse's three levels. By social level we must understand a wide range of phenomena running from what Fernand Braudel in his other major work calls material civilization (or the structures of everyday life) to what others call the history of mentalités. Material civilization constitutes a veritable subset of this level due to its own wide-ranging character: gestures, housing, food, etc. This is why its arrangement into stages of temporality, following the model of The Mediterranean, is held by Braudel to be so appropriate, as are the pertinence of long time-spans and number series.

Our brief incursion into the field of quantitative history has had but one goal, to indicate the continuity in French historiography's struggle against the history of events and. by implication, against a directly narrative way of writing history. In this regard it is noteworthy that the new history, in order to free itself from the clutch of events, had to join together with another discipline for which time is not a major preoccupation. We have seen the history of long time-spans born from this coupling with geography, and quantitative history, insofar as it too is a history of long time-spans, is born from a coupling with economics. Such coupling of history with another discipline makes all the more pointed the question to what extent history remains historical in this marriage of convenience. In each instance, the relationship to events furnishes an appropriate touchstone.

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Such is the case with historical anthropology, which seeks to transfer to historical distance the kind of detachment which geographical distance gives to anthropologists, and thereby to recover beyond the official discourse of the scribes in the era under consideration, hence beyond the learned culture, costume, gesture, and imagination—in short, popular culture. The best example of this type of study is that of Jacques Le Goff in Time,
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is more intimate to life, more a part of it most fascinating example of the conquest by quantitative analysis of the qualitative dimension of history. What by referring to some works devoted to the relationship of people to death. They provide the most significant and changes in material conditions and social relations, or through protest and conflict. And in fact it is historians who are interested in the transformation of structures, whether under the pressure of history, whose allure and phases do not coincide with the history of population or that of production" (p. 148). To reach this time of people, which has become an object for the anthropological historian, and in particular to spot the advance of the merchants' time, we must interrogate the manuals of confession, where we can follow the changes in the definition and categorization of sins. To appraise this mental and spiritual unsettling of the chronological framework, we must take note of the birth and diffusion of clocks, which substitute an exact time for the rural workday and the canonical hours, punctuated by the sound of bells. It is especially when the opposition between learned and popular culture is taken as the axis of their problem that historians become anthropologists. The question then is whether such history remains historical. It does so in that the long time-span remains a time-span. And in this regard, Le Goff’s mistrust about a place for the vocabulary of diachrony, a vocabulary imported from semiology and structural anthropology, recalls that of Braudel about the place of Levi-Strauss's models." In truth, what interests the historian are not just "value systems" and their resistance to change, but also their mutations. I shall return, at the end of chapter 6, to a suggestion I will risk making now as a stepping-stone for our discussion. We may inquire whether, to remain historical, history must not elaborate as quasi-events the slow changes that it foreshortens in its memory by an effect similar to that of a speeded-up film. Does not Le Goff treat the major conflict concerning the appraisal of time itself as "one of the major events of the mental history of these centuries"? We can do justice to this expression only when we are capable of giving an appropriate epistemological framework to what I am calling here, provisionally, a quasi-event."

Another way of joining history together with disciplines for which time is not a major category is expressed in the history of mentalities. The main disciplines referred to here are the sociology of ideologies, with a Marxist origin, Freudian (and sometimes, though rarely, Junean) psychoanalysis, structural semantics, and the rhetoric of forms of discourse. The kinship to anthropological history is evident. Attending to ideologies, the collective unconscious, and unrehearsed speech confers on history a sense of strangeness, of distance and difference, comparable to that of the anthropologist's gaze referred to a bit earlier. It is ordinary people, often denied the right to speak by the dominant form of discourse, who regain their voice through this type of history. Its type of rationality is also indicative of the most interesting attempt to carry quantitative analysis to the third level, that of attitudes regarding such things as sex, love, death, spoken or written discourse, ideology, and religion. If it is to remain serial history, this form of history has to find appropriate documents for establishing homogeneous series of statistically manipulutable facts. Here, as was already the case for economic history, historians are the inventors of their documents. In the earlier case these were market prices, then the required tithes. Here the emphasis is on written materials, lists of grievances, parish registers, ecclesiastical dispensations, and above all wills—"those old. sleeping documents" as someone has called them." The question of historical time will henceforth appear in a new form. According to Chaunu, quantitative analysis is only a mediating device intended to bring to light a structure, at its best a mutation, that is, the end of some structure, the rhythm of whose breakup is closely scrutinized. In this way, quantitative analysis preserves something qualitative, but it is "carefully selected and homogenized." Thus it is through their temporal aspect of stability or mutation or breaking up that structures come into the field of history. Georges Duby, whose work is an excellent illustration of the history of mentalities, poses the problem in similar terms. On the one hand, he accepts Althusser's definition of an ideology as "a system (possessing its own logic and rigor) of representations (images, myths, ideas, or concepts as the case may be) endowed with both existence and a historical role in some particular society." Hence it is as a sociologist that he characterizes ideologies as all-encompassing, distorting, in competition with one another, stabilizing, or a source of action. These features do not refer to either chronology or narration. Yet his sociology leaves a place for history inasmuch as value systems "have their own history, whose allure and phases do not coincide with the history of population or that of production" (p. 148). And in fact it is historians who are interested in the transformation of structures, whether under the pressure of changes in material conditions and social relations, or through protest and conflict. I should like to end this review of the contributions of French historiography to the exploration of historical time by referring to some works devoted to the relationship of people to death. They provide the most significant and most fascinating example of the conquest by quantitative analysis of the qualitative dimension of history. What is more intimate to life, more a part of it than death, or rather dying.' And what is more public than people's attitudes in the face of death as inscribed in
last wills and testaments? What more social than the anticipations excited by the thought of their own funerals? What more cultural than how people represent death? Hence it is easy to comprehend that the typology of death proposed by Philippe Aries, in his great book The Hour of Our Death, with its four models of death—the accepted death of the patriarch in the Old Testament, of the knight's test in the Chansons de gestes, of Tolstoy's peasant: the baroque death of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the intimate death of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: and the forbidden and hidden-away death of postindustrial societies—should have both furnished a conceptual formulation for serial inquiries such as those of Vovelle and Chaunu. and received from them the only verification that history is capable of, given its inability to experiment with the past, namely, repeatable numerical frequencies. In this respect, the history of death may not be just the farthest point reached by serial history, but perhaps by all history, for reasons that I shall discuss in volume 2.

THE ECLIPSE OF UNDERSTANDING: THE COVERING LAW MODEL IN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

In leaving the methodology of French historians for the epistemology of history issuing from logical positivism, we change thought-worlds (and sometimes, although not always, continents). It is not the practice of history that fuels the argument but a more normative than descriptive concern for affirming the unity of science in the tradition of the Vienna Circle. This plea for the unity of science is incompatible with the distinction established by Windelband between an "idiographic" method and a "nomothetic" one. Nor was the relation of history to narrative directly at issue in the first phase of the debate during the forties and fifties. Still, the very possibility of deriving history from narrative was directly undermined by an argument directed essentially against the thesis of the irreducibility of "understanding" to "explanation" which, in the critical philosophy of history in Germany at the beginning of the century, prolonged the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic methods. If I have thought it possible to put under the sign, the title of "eclipse of narrative" two attacks coming from two horizons as after Terret's the French historiography of the Annales school and the epistemology stemming from English-language analytic philosophy (which stands in continuity on this point with the epistemology inherited from the Vienna Circle), it is because both take the notion of event as their touchstone and take it as given that the fate of narrative is sealed at the same time as that of events, understood as the atomic elements of historical change. This is so true that the question of the narrative status of history, which was never at stake in the first phase of the epistemological discussion (the only one considered here), did not move to the forefront, at least in the English-speaking world, until later, due to the battle over the covering law model, where it served as a countereexample opposed to this model. This diagnosis is confirmed by the case of the only French historian—Paul Veyne—who has pleaded for a return to the notion of plot in history. For him too, as we shall see, this return is tied to a vehement criticism of any claim to a scientific status that would be incompatible with the "sublunar" status of history—thereby imitating Aristotle at the same time that he rehabsitates Max Weber!

As the subsequent discussion will confirm, the attack on understanding by the partisans of the covering law model has the same result, if not the same stake, as the attack against events does for the historians of the long time-span: the eclipse of narrative.

I will take as my starting point Karl Hempel's famous article "The Function of General Laws in History." The central thesis of this article is that "general laws have quite analogous functions in history and in the natural sciences" (p. 345). Hempel is not unaware of history's interest in particular past events. On the contrary, his thesis concerns precisely the status of an event. But it does not take it as important, not to say decisive, that in history events get their properly historical status from having been initially included in an official chronicle, eyewitness testimony, or a narrative based on personal memories. The specificity of this first level of discourse is completely ignored in favor of a direct relationship between an individual event and the assertion of a universal hypothesis, therefore of some form of regularity. It is only owing to the subsequent discussion of the covering law model by upholders of the narrativist thesis that we can underscore the fact that, from the beginning of this analysis, the notion of a historical event was divested of its narrative status and placed within the framework of an opposition between particular and universal. The historical event was subsumed under a general concept of event that included all physical events and every noteworthy occurrence, such as the bursting of a dam, a geological cataclysm, a change in some physical state, etc. Once this homogeneous conception of what counts as an event was posited, the argument unfolded as follows.

The occurrence of an event of a specific type can be deduced from two premises. The first describes the initial conditions: prior events, prevailing conditions, and the tike. The second states a regularity of a certain type, that is, a hypothesis of a universal form that, if verified, merits being called a law. If these two premises can be established correctly, we can say that the occurrence of the event under consideration has been logically deduced and therefore it has been explained. This explanation can be vitiated in
The method of empathetic understanding is not a method. At most it is a heuristic procedure which is neither
distinctive features of the historical object as meaning, relevance, determination, or dependence. The alleged
procedures warranted by the terms empathy, understanding, or interpretation, which refer to such so-called
side of genuine explanations, not on that of pseudo ones.

But the fact is that history is not yet a fully developed science, principally because the general propositions
which ground its ambition to be explanatory do not merit the title of regularities. Either, as a first case, these
generallities are not completely stated, as in the case of the incomplete explanations of daily life, where we take
for granted tacit generalities drawn from individual or social psychology. Or, as a second case, the alleged
regularities lack empirical confirmation. Apart from economics and demography, history contents itself with
eminently repeatable ones (the drop in temperature under such _and such a conditions, "ay). Hempel sees no
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explanation had to account for every characteristic of the event. All we can ask of an explanation is that it be
precise and specific, not that it be exhaustive. The unique character of any event, as a consequence, is a myth
which must be put beyond the horizon of science. The discussion will again and again return to this traditional
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If this is the universal structure of explanation applied to all events—whether natural or historical—the question
is whether history satisfies this model.

Obviously, it is a highly prescriptive model. It says what an ideal explanation must be. Hempel does not think he
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Next it must be emphasized that, in a covering law model, explanation and prediction go hand in hand. We can
expect any occurrence of type C to be followed by an occurrence of type E. Prediction is just the inverted
statement of the explanation in terms of an if/then statement. One result is that the predictive value of a
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Three comments are called for concerning the structure of explanation in this model, which, since Dray's
criticism, is called the covering law model.

First, the three concepts of law, cause, and explanation overlap. An event is explained when it is "covered" by a
law and when its antecedents are legitimately called its causes. The key idea is that of regularity. That is. every
time an event of type C occurs at a certain place and time, an event of the specific type E will occur at a place
and time related to those of the first event. The Humean idea of a cause is therefore unreservedly taken for
granted. Hempel speaks indifferently of "causes" or of "determining conditions" (ibid.). This is why he attaches
no importance to objections addressed to the terminology of causality, and the attempt, offered among others by
Russell, to use only the terms "condition" and "function."41 This dispute is not. however, a simple one of
semantics. I shall ask below if a causal explanation—especially in history—,night be possible independently of.
or prior to. the idea of a law in the sense of a verified regularity.4

Next it must be emphasized that, in a covering law model, explanation and prediction go hand in hand. We can
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But the fact is that history is not yet a fully developed science, principally because the general propositions
which ground its ambition to be explanatory do not merit the title of regularities. Either, as a first case, these
generallities are not completely stated, as in the case of the incomplete explanations of daily life, where we take
for granted tacit generalities drawn from individual or social psychology. Or, as a second case, the alleged
regularities lack empirical confirmation. Apart from economics and demography, history contents itself with
approximately universal hypotheses. We must place among such laws, whose verification is still too loose, all
statements made in terms of probabilities, yet lacking any statistical framework. It is not their probabilistic status
that is criticizable but their lack of statistical precision. In this respect, the boundary does not run between causal
and probabilistic explanation but between levels of exactitude, whether this be empirical or statistical. Finally, as
a third case, the alleged generalities may simply be pseudo-laws, borrowed from popular wisdom or unscientific
psychology, when they are not obvious prejudices, the residue of magical or mythical "explanations" of human
and cosmic realities. Therefore the line must be clearly drawn between genuine explanations and pseudo ones.

The only nuance Hempel allows to his uncompromising thesis is that, in the best case, history offers "explanation
sketchs" (p. 351). resting upon regularities that, while not being explicit and verified laws, do nevertheless point
in the direction where precise regularities are to be discovered, and that, further, prescribe the steps that must be
taken in order to satisfy the model of scientific explanation. In this sense, such explanatory sketches stand on the
side of genuine explanations, not on that of pseudo ones.

Apart from this one concession. Hempel vehemently refuses to accord any jetual epistemological value to the
procedures warranted by the terms empathy, understanding, or interpretation, which refer to such so-called
distinctive features of the historical object as meaning, relevance, determination, or dependence. The alleged
method of empathetic understanding is not a method. At most it is a heuristic procedure which is neither
model. This is why, for this school of thought, defense of this model was equivalent to a plea for objectivity in natural sciences. In France, Raymond Aron's book remains the unsurpassed witness to this thesis. Neopositivist often referred to in the tory. There is something exemplary about this debate inasmuch as it touches upon one of the difficulties most their discipline to the rank of a thoroughgoing science. It has to do with the role of selection procedures in his-
functioning of the model allows us to preserve great rigor concerning the structure of explanation. The strong and to assign the former the task of approximating the latter. In this sense, a liberal attitude with resard to the explanation thereby remains the "logical marker" tor every approximation of the same model by the weaker forms. The strong model thereby remains the "logical marker" for every approximation of the same model by the weaker forms. A second debate bears u itness to the effort referred to earlier about meeting historians in heir struggle to elevate their discipline to the rank of a thoroughgoing science. It has to do with the role of selection procedures in history. There is something exemplary about this debate inasmuch as it touches upon one of the difficulties most often referred to in the Versteifien tradition, which refuses to history an "objectivity" comparable to that of the natural sciences. In France, Raymond Aron's book remains the unsurpassed witness to this thesis. Neopositivist epistemology responded to this attack by firmly tying the fate of objectivity in history to that of the covering law model. This is why, for this school of thought, defense of this model was equivalent to a plea for objectivity in

necessary nor sufficient, for it is possible to explain things in history without any empathetic understanding. Nothing in the construction of this model, therefore, refers to the narrative nature of history, or to the narrative status of events, much less to the particu-114

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lar specificity of historical time in relation to cosmological time. As I said earlier, these distinctions are tacitly excluded as soon as no difference in principle is allowed between a historical event and a physical one which simply occurs, and as soon as it is not taken as pertinent to the historical status of an event that it was recounted in chronicles, or legendary narratives, or reports. Even an author such as Charles Frankel. who is, as we shall see, so attentive to the originality of the problematic of interpretation in history, does not incorporate within the notion of an event its contribution to the form of a narrative. The events treated by historians in their works are inscribed, as are physical ones, in "singular statements asserting the occurrence of unique events at specific places and times" (p. 411). Historians simply "give an account of individual events that have occurred once and only once" (p. 410). An explanation, because it is an explanation, abolishes this feature. The logical definition of event requires that of a singular occurrence, without any intrinsic relation to narrative. This identification is so tenacious that at first even the adversaries of the covering law model were themselves in agreement that an explanation would abolish the uniqueness, the unrepeatability of events.

Following Hempel. and in his wake, the partisans of the covering law model in essence gave themselves over to the apologetic task of minimizing the discorances between the requirements of this "strong" model and the specific features of historical knowledge. The price was a "weakening" of the model so as to ensure its viability." It is not a question of depreciating the work produced by the Hempelian school when I qualify it as being apologetic. This is the case, first. because in weakening the model, these authors brought to light some features of historical knowledge that genuinely depend upon explanation and that any adverse theory must take into account." Weakening a model is a positive work il it augments its applicability. Further, the work of reformulation led to an encounter with the actual work of historians—which we have become familiar with through the example of French historiography—in seeking to resolve the' real or alleged difficulties afflicting historical knowledge.

The first major concession, which will be exploited in various ways by the adversaries of the model, is to allow that the explanations...offered by historians do not function in history as they do in the natural sciences. History does not establish laws that figure in the major premise of the Hempelian model of deduction. It employs them. This is why they can remain implicit. It is also why they can depend upon heterogeneous levels of universality and regularity. For example. Gardiner, in his The Nature of Historical Explanation, admitted to the rank of regularities allowed in history what he calls "law-like explanations." These are a matter principally of regularities of the "dispositional" type to which Gilbert Ryle. in The Concept of Mind, assigned a major role; in the explanation of behavior. One of the functions of the connective "because" is u se: an agent's action within the framework of his "habitual" behavior. This case of explanation in terms of dispositions opens the way to reflection upon the diversity of levels of imprecision that the notion of regularity allows. This heterogeneity is completely accepted by the reader of historical works. Such a reader does not come to the text with a unique, unchanging, monolithic model of explanation in mind, but with a very broad range of expectations. This flexibility testifies that the question bearing on the structure of explanation must be completed by one bearing on its function. By function, we are to understand the correspondence between a certain type of answer and a certain type of question. For instance, the question "Why?" is one that opens the range of acceptable answers of the form "Because. . . ." In this regard, the strong model only accounts for a limited segment of the range of expectations opened by the question "Why?" and the range of acceptable answers of the form "Because. . . ." The problem, from here on, is to know what extension, and therefore what weakening, the covering law model is capable of. if we exclude any shameful return to an intuitionist or empathetic conception of historical "understanding." or. in a more general fashion, to the pure and simple substitution of understanding for explanation.

For the partisans of the covering law model, the only way to resist the dilution of explanation into more and more varied uses of "Why!" and "Because. . . ." is always to refer the weak forms or the model to the strong one. and to assign the former the task of approximating the latter. In this sense, a liberal attitude with resard to the functioning of the model allows us to preserve great rigor concerning the structure of explanation. The strong model thereby remains the "logical marker" for every approximation of the same model by the weaker forms. A second debate bears u itness to the effort referred to earlier about meeting historians in heir struggle to elevate their discipline to the rank of a thoroughgoing science. It has to do with the role of selection procedures in history. There is something exemplary about this debate inasmuch as it touches upon one of the difficulties most often referred to in the Versteifien tradition, which refuses to history an "objectivity" comparable to that of the natural sciences. In France. Raymond Aron's book remains the unsurpassed witness to this thesis. Neopositivist epistemology responded to this attack by firmly tying the fate of objectivity in history to that of the covering law model. This is why, for this school of thought, defense of this model was equivalent to a plea for objectivity in
history.

Ernst Nagel's sharp reply is exemplary in this regard, for it demonstrates in practice what an analytic argument is and how it responds to the massiveness of the objection with a work of decomposition and distinctions.\(^5\)

Do we mean by selectivity the historian's choice of a domain or a problem? No researcher escapes this. The only interesting question is "whether, once a field of inquiry has been chosen, researchers are capable of taking their
discovery.
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tance with regard to the values or passions which they have for their object. This emancipation of one's mind is not inaccessible to historians. It even defines history as "inquiry."

Do we wish to speak of the limitation of the subject matter resulting from this choice? It need not be a necessary cause of distortion unless we presuppose that to know anything we must know everything. The underlying philosophical thesis. Hegelian in origin, of the "internal" character of every relation is refuted by scientific practice, which verifies the "analytic" character of discourse.

What of selection of hypotheses? All inquiry is selective in this sense. The ending of inquiry at some point? The argument about an infinite regress is a sophism. To a definite problem there is a definite answer. The possibility of pushing the analysis further only bears witness to the progressive character of inquiry.

Finally, what if someone says that history cannot escape collective or personal prejudices? It is a truism to admit that the ideals of any inquiry are causally linked to other cultural, social, and political features. What is significant is that such prejudices can be detected and investigated. The single fact that we can distinguish what is assumed from what is not, proves that the ideal of objectivity is not a hopeless one. If not, the skeptical thesis would fall under its own claim and its validity would be limited to the circle of those who professed it. But if it escapes us own criterion, this attests that it is possible to formulate worthwhile statements about human affairs.\(^4\)

A new obstacle to the realization of a "warranted" explanation results from the limiting of historical inquiry to what it takes as the "principal" cause of a course of events. This imputation of relative importance to causal variables appeals to a "weighing" of them which does not seem capable of being made objective. We may respond that the notion of importance is not inaccessible to analysis. Even if the truth of judgments of importance is subject to debate, it is still the case that we signify something in speaking of importance. Therefore we can set up a table of meanings associated with the assigning of degrees of importance (see Nagel, pp. 382-85).\(^5\) Only perfecting the statistical material involved can reconcile this logic of the "weighing" of degrees of importance and practice. Until this is achieved, limited skepticism is called for, but there is no reason to transform this into wholesale skepticism. There is "substantial agreement among men experienced in relevant matters on the relative probabilities to be assigned to many hypotheses" (p. 385).

We can see that here this argument drawn from the practice of history re joints that of the upholders of quantitative serial history in French historiography.

Let us follow this apology for the covering law model to the point where weakening the model leads to its abandonment. In this regard, the article I have already referred to by Charles Frankel is exemplary. The model is weak-

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ended in the sense that interpretation, taken in a sense close to that of Verstehen in the critical philosophy of

interpreted as one necessary moment of historical knowing. The moment of interpretation is the one when historians appraise something, that is, when they attribute meaning and value to it. This moment must be distinguished from the moment of explanation, which establishes causal connections between events. Yet the effort to articulate these two moments stays within the realm of the covering law model inasmuch as, on the one hand, it is admitted that every good historian wants to distinguish between the two levels of operation and to justify epistemology in its ambition to isolate the explanatory kernel, and, on the other hand, interpretation itself is

- submitted to the limiting requirements of explanation.

In truth, the weakening of the model starts with a reformulating of the ex-study stage, even though Frankel holds that, ideally, the historian does not proceed any differently than do other scientists. The discrepancies with the model characterize the current state of affairs in history, not its epistemologically ideal. Are its generalizations, as Hempel said, explanation sketches? This is a contingent feature which does not create a gap between history and other

- sciences. Instead, it points to "a need for rilling in the details" (p. 411). Is the tie between explanation and prediction broken? Does the historian only suc-

ceed in giving the necessary but not the sufficient conditions of an event? What is important is not that the explanation is incomplete but that "on many occasions, it seems fully to satisfy our demand for an explanation" (p. 412). For example, we can accept a simple summary of the steps of a process as an explanation. We do\(\textup{w}\)in embryology as well as in all the other sciences dealing with development or-evolution. Such genetic explanation suggests that "not all satisfactory explanations supply us with exactly the same type of in-

formation, and that not all requests to have something explained are unequivocal requests for a single kind of answer" ibid.).\(^3\) From
here on the boundary between scientific and commonsense explanations, and the type of prudential judgment. We ordinarily make about human affairs, tends to become erased.

Now for the last distinctive feature about historical knowledge that is incompatible with the covering law model. In history, where generalities are highly frequent correlations rather than invariable relations, counterexamples do not invalidate general laws. It is not always true that power corrupts and it is impossible to verify that absolute power corrupts absolutely. What do historians do when they encounter exceptions to their explanations? They add restrictive clauses, thereby narrowing the applicable area of their generalizations. In this way, the "disencomber themselves of proposed counterexamples. Pushing his argument to the limits of the initial model's tolerance, Frankel accepts the fact that explanation is articulated on the basis of interpretation. But, so as not to brash with the model, he holds that, to be acceptable, the

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more encompassing interpretations must rest upon rigorous partial explanations. How can we assign values if they are not set upon well-established causal connections? Someone may say that the opposite is equally true. Certainly in history a cause defines not just any condition but one we may act upon. And in this sense, the values of action do infiltrate every assigning of causes. So we must say that to assign a cause is to admit a fact and to stipulate a value. But then, once again, we must apply to the concept of interpretation the same analytic spirit we applied to judgments of importance. In interpreting, we do three things: that are unequally compatible with the ideal of explanation. The least compatible undertaking consists in making pronouncements about the meaning of history in terms of ends, of goals, or of ideals. We then set into play an implicit philosophy of "internal" relations that are incompatible, as We said earlier, with the "analytic" spirit, and we impose from without a transcendent, secret project on the course of history. Less contestable is the designation of the most important cause, be it economic or something else. Interpretation here is compatible with explanation, to the extent that it is confined to providing inquiry with the guidance of some seminal idea and to indicating degrees of importance. It is no longer, as a consequence, the only worthwhile interpretation, to the exclusion of all others. But the most interesting interpretation is the one that assigns itself the task of evaluating a sequence, of events or a set of institutions in terms of their "terminal consequences" (p. 421), themselves evaluated in terms of their value or lack thereof. The overall meaning of a process is these very terminal consequences, some of which coincide with variables in the present situation. Which we may act. Thus, for Marx, the emergence of the industrial proletariat is taken as the principal cause, because it is also what bears the "cause" to be defended. This does not prevent a close attention to the facts, if the choice of terminal consequences must itself be a responsible choice. We must therefore admit that two rival interpretations account for different acts, the same events being placed according to the perspective of the different terminal consequences. Either interpretation can be objective and true with regard to the causal sequences upon which it is elaborated. We do not rewrite the same history, we write another history. But we can always discuss the two. History is not condemned to remain a battlefield between irreconcilable points of view. There is a place for a critical pluralism, which, if it admits more than one point of view, does not take them all as equally legitimate. It is difficult to go any further in the acceptance of the adverse point of view without breaking with the basic hypothesis that explanation in history does not differ fundamentally from explanation in the rest of science. Here at last lies the critical point of the whole discussion. It is to save this essential stake that the upholsters of the covering law model endeavor to refer the features of historical methodology that seem discordant with the explanatory model to

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the present state of affairs of historical science. The declared motivation of their arguments is to defend history against skepticism and to justify its struggle for objectivity. This is why the plea for objectivity and that for the covering law model, having started hand in hand, tend to become indistinguishable. The

Defenses of Narrative

The question of the narrative status of historical writing was not directly at stake for the epistemology of the historical sciences, neither for French historiography nor in the first phase of the discussion within the analytic school. Throughout this debate it was taken for granted that narrative is too elementary a form of discourse to satisfy, even from afar, the requirements for any science posed by the covering law model of explanation. The subsequent appearance of "narrativist" theses in the field of discussion was born from the conjunction of two currents of thought. On one side, the criticism of the covering law model had ended up in a breaking apart of the very concept of explanation, and this opened a breach for an approach to the problem from the opposite direction. On the other side, narrative became the object of a revaluation bearing essentially on its resources of intelligibility. Our narrative understanding thus found itself brought into prominence, while historical explanation lost some of its importance. This chapter is devoted to this conjunction of these two movements.
We saw at the end of the preceding chapter how the partisans of the covering law model tried to account for the gap between the model and the actual state of affairs in historical science by a double tactic, consisting on one side of weakening the model and on the other of taking a stand on historians’ efforts to elevate their discipline to the rank of science. The attitude of those who discern the symptom of a basic error in the construction of the model itself, in the gap between the covering law model and the actual methodology of history, is wholly different.

William H. Dray's work, *Laws and Explanations in History*, is the best wit-
this configuration projects outside of itself. In the case of *Mrs. Dalloway*, the first type of reading, while not impoverished, is clearly truncated. If the narrative is configured in the subtle manner I shall describe, this is to allow the narrator—I do not say the author but the narrative voice that makes the work speak and address itself to a reader—to offer the reader an armful of temporal experiences to share. On the other hand, I do not hesitate to admit that it is the narrative configuration of *Mrs. Dalloway*—a quite unique configuration, although one that can easily be situated in the family of "stream of consciousness" novels—that serves as the basis for the experience that its characters have of time, and that the narrative voice of the novel wants to communicate to the reader. The fictive narrator limits all of the events of the story being told to the span of time between the morning and the evening of a splendid June day in 1923, hence a few years after the end of what was called the Great War. The subtlety of the narrative technique is matched by the simplicity of the story-line. Clarissa Dalloway, a woman of around fifty belonging to upperclass London society, is giving a party that very evening, and the vicissitudes of this gathering will mark the culmination and the closure of the narrative. The emplotment functions to form an ellipse, whose second focal point is the young Septimus Warren Smith, a veteran of the Great War, whose madness leads to suicide a few hours before Mrs. Dalloway's party. The knot holding these elements of the plot together consists in having the news of Septimus's death announced by Dr. Bradshaw, a medical celebrity who belongs to Clarissa's circle of social acquaintances. The story begins with Clarissa in the morning when she is getting ready to go out to buy flowers for her party and it will leave her at the most critical moment of the evening. Thirty years before, Clarissa had almost married Peter Walsh, a childhood friend whom she expects to see soon, as he is returning from India, where his life has floundered in subordinate occupations and unsuccessful love affairs. Richard, whom Clarissa preferred to Peter in those days and who, since then, has become her husband, is an important man in parliamentary committees, without being a brilliant politician. Other characters frequenting the London social world gravitate around this core of childhood friends. It is important that Septimus not belong to this circle and that the relationship between the fates of Septimus and Clarissa is reached (by narrative techniques I shall speak of below) at a deeper level than the *coup de theatre*—the unexpected news, midway through the party, of Septimus's suicide—that allows the plot to reach its culmination. The narrative technique displayed in *Mm. Dalloway* is highly subtle. The first procedure I might mention, and the easiest to detect, consists in marking out the passing of the day as it progresses by means of numerous small events. Except for Septimus's suicide, of course, these sometimes minor events draw the narrative toward its expected end—the party given by Mrs. Dalloway. The list of comings and goings, of incidents and meetings, is long indeed: in the morning, the Prince of Wales or some other royal figure crosses her path; an airplane skywrites its advertising, tracing out capital letters that are spelled out by the crowd; Clarissa goes home to get her dress ready for the party; Peter Walsh, just back from India, surprises her while she is sewing; after having stirred the ashes of the past, Clarissa kisses him; Peter leaves in tears; he passes through the same places as Clarissa had and comes across the couple, Septimus and Rezia (she is the little Milanese milliner who has become Septimus's wife); Rezia takes her husband to a first psychiatrist, Dr. Holmes; Richard considers buying a pearl necklace for his wife but chooses roses instead (roses that circulate from one end of the narrative to the other, roses fixed for a moment on the wallpaper of Septimus's room, after he has been sentenced to a rest home by the medical profession); Richard, too bashful, cannot pronounce the message of love that the roses signify; Miss Kilman, the pious and ugly tutor of Elizabeth, the Dalloway's daughter, goes shopping with Elizabeth, who leaves her governess in the middle of her chocolate eclair; Septimus, told by Dr. Bradshaw to leave his wife for a clinic in the country, throws himself out of the window; Peter decides to go to the party given by Clarissa; then comes the big scene of Mrs. Dalloway's party, with Dr. Bradshaw's news of Septimus's suicide; Mrs. Dalloway takes the news of the suicide of this young man whom she does not know in a way that determines the tone she herself will give to the termination of the evening, which is also the death of the day. These events, large or small, are punctuated by the tolling of the powerful strokes of Big Ben and other bells in London. I shall show below that the most important meaning of this remainder of the hour is not to be sought at the level of the configuration of the narrative, as if the narrator were limited to helping the readers situate themselves in the narrated time. The strokes of Big Ben have their true place in the experience that the various characters have of time. They belong to the fictive configuration of time that this work opens out to.

To this first procedure of progressive accumulation is grafted another, even more widely recognized one. As the narrative is pulled ahead by everything that happens—however small it may be—in the narrated time, it is at the same time pulled backward, delayed so to speak, by ample excursions into the past, which constitute so many events in thought, interpolated in long sequences, between the brief spurts of action. For the Dalloway's circle, these reported thoughts—"he thought," "thought she"—are in the main a return so to speak, by ample excursions into the past, which constitute so many events in thought, interpolated in long sequences, between the fictive refiguration of time that this work opens out to.

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Thirty years before, Clarissa had almost married Peter Walsh, a childhood friend whom she expects to see soon, as he is returning from India, where his life has floundered in subordinate occupations and unsuccessful love affairs. Richard, whom Clarissa preferred to Peter in those days and who, since then, has become her husband, is an important man in parliamentary committees, without being a brilliant politician. Other characters frequenting the London social world gravitate around this core of childhood friends. It is important that Septimus not belong to this circle and that the relationship between the fates of Septimus and Clarissa is reached (by narrative techniques I shall speak of below) at a deeper level than the *coup de theatre*—the unexpected news, midway through the party, of Septimus's suicide—that allows the plot to reach its culmination. The narrative technique displayed in *Mm. Dalloway* is highly subtle. The first procedure I might mention, and the easiest to detect, consists in marking out the passing of the day as it progresses by means of numerous small events. Except for Septimus's suicide, of course, these sometimes minor events draw the narrative toward its expected end—the party given by Mrs. Dalloway. The list of comings and goings, of incidents and meetings, is long indeed: in the morning, the Prince of Wales or some other royal figure crosses her path; an airplane skywrites its advertising, tracing out capital letters that are spelled out by the crowd; Clarissa goes home to get her dress ready for the party; Peter Walsh, just back from India, surprises her while she is sewing; after having stirred the ashes of the past, Clarissa kisses him; Peter leaves in tears; he passes through the same places as Clarissa had and comes across the couple, Septimus and Rezia (she is the little Milanese milliner who has become Septimus's wife); Rezia takes her husband to a first psychiatrist, Dr. Holmes; Richard considers buying a pearl necklace for his wife but chooses roses instead (roses that circulate from one end of the narrative to the other, roses fixed for a moment on the wallpaper of Septimus's room, after he has been sentenced to a rest home by the medical profession); Richard, too bashful, cannot pronounce the message of love that the roses signify; Miss Kilman, the pious and ugly tutor of Elizabeth, the Dalloway's daughter, goes shopping with Elizabeth, who leaves her governess in the middle of her chocolate eclair; Septimus, told by Dr. Bradshaw to leave his wife for a clinic in the country, throws himself out of the window; Peter decides to go to the party given by Clarissa; then comes the big scene of Mrs. Dalloway's party, with Dr. Bradshaw's news of Septimus's suicide; Mrs. Dalloway takes the news of the suicide of this young man whom she does not know in a way that determines the tone she herself will give to the termination of the evening, which is also the death of the day. These events, large or small, are punctuated by the tolling of the powerful strokes of Big Ben and other bells in London. I shall show below that the most important meaning of this remainder of the hour is not to be sought at the level of the configuration of the narrative, as if the narrator were limited to helping the readers situate themselves in the narrated time. The strokes of Big Ben have their true place in the experience that the various characters have of time. They belong to the fictive configuration of time that this work opens out to.

To this first procedure of progressive accumulation is grafted another, even more widely recognized one. As the narrative is pulled ahead by everything that happens—however small it may be—in the narrated time, it is at the same time pulled backward, delayed so to speak, by ample excursions into the past, which constitute so many events in thought, interpolated in long sequences, between the brief spurts of action. For the Dalloway's circle, these reported thoughts—"he thought," "thought she"—are in the main a return so to speak, by ample excursions into the past, which constitute so many events in thought, interpolated in long sequences, between the fictive refiguration of time that this work opens out to.


7. Robinson Crusoe, although not a person on the same level as Don Quixote or Faust or Don Juan—our modern mythical heroes—may be taken as a hero before the fact of the *Bildungsvmnan*: placed in conditions of solitude unparalleled in real life, moved only by concern for profit and the single criterion of utility, he becomes the hero of a quest in which his perpetual isolation works like the secret nemesis of his apparent triumph over his adversities. He thus raises solitude, taken as the universal state of human existence, to the rank of a paradigm. Hence, far from the character breaking free of the plot, we should say that he engenders it. The theme of this novel, what I have called the hero's quest, reintroduces a principle of order more subtle than that in the conventional plots from the past. In this respect, everything that distinguishes Defoe's masterpiece from a simple narrative about a voyage and its adventures, and places it within the new space of the novel, can be attributed to the emergence of a configuration where the "fable" is tacitly governed by the theme—to allude here to Northrop Frye's translation of Aristotle's *muthos* as "fable and theme."

8. The mutual unfolding of the two spirals of character and action is not an absolutely new procedure. In his *The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), Frank Kermode shows how it works in the simultaneous enriching, from one gospel to another, of the character of Judas and the events narrated involving him. Cf. ibid., pp. 84-95. And Auerbach had earlier shown, in his *Minemis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953)), how the biblical characters Abraham and Peter differed from Homeric ones. Whereas the latter are flat and lacking depth, the former have a rich background capable of narrative development.

9. Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu*, which I shall also consider below, might be considered as both a *Bildungsroman* and a stream of consciousness novel. See below, pp. 130-52.

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10. From *Pamela* to *Clarissa* we can see this procedure becoming more refined. Instead of a simple correspondence between the heroine and her father, as in the first novel, *Clarissa* knits together two exchanges of letters between the heroine and her confidant and between the hero and his confidant. In fact, the parallel unfolding of two series of correspondences allows Richardson to attenuate the disadvantages of the genre while maximizing its advantages by varying the points of view. We can, I think, call by the name "plot" this subtle epistolary combination, which makes the feminine and masculine visions alternate, along with the discretion and the slowness, the show of developments and the suddenness of the violent episodes. Richardson, well aware of what he was doing and a master of his art, could boast that there was no "digression in his work that did not stem from its subject and also contribute to it, which is the formal definition of plot."

11. It was not by accident that the English work in this genre was called "novel." 11 Mendilow and Watt cite a number of striking declarations from Defoe, Richardson, 11 and Fielding that attest of their conviction that they are inventing a new literary genre, 'I in the proper sense of this term. Similarly, the word "original," which during the | Middle Ages denoted what had existed from the beginning, came to signify something undervived, independent, first-hand, in short, something "novel or fresh in character or style" (*The Rise of the Novel*, p. 14). The story told therefore had to be "novel" and its characters had to be particular beings in particular circumstances. It would not be an exaggeration to tie this confidence in simple and direct language to the choice referred to above of characters from a low social background, concerning whom Aristotle would have said that they are neither worse nor better than us, but like us, as in real life. One corollary of this will to be faithful to experience is the abandonment of traditional plots, drawn from the storehouse of mythology, history, or earlier literature, along with the invention of characters without a legendary past and stories without a previous tradition.


13. In the history of the English novel, Fielding's *Tom Jones* occupies a special place. If for a long time Richardson's *Pamela* or *Clarissa* was preferred to it, it was because critics found in these novels a more elaborated picture of the characters, at the expense of the plot in the narrow sense of this term. Modern criticism has restored *Tom Jones* to a certain preeminence due to its very elaborate treatment of narrative structure from the point of view of the interplay between narrated time and the time of the things narrated. Its central action is relatively simple, but subdivided into a series of narrative units, relatively independent of one another and of different lengths, devoted to episodes separated by shorter or longer intervals of time and themselves covering quite different lengths of time—in fact, there are three groups with six subgroups making up 18 books of 7 to 20 chapters each. Such vast problems of composition required a great variety of procedures, incessant changes, and surprising counterpoints. It is no accident that Fielding was more sensitive to the continuity between the novel and the older forms of the narrative tradition than either Defoe or Richardson, who disdained the epic stemming from Homer, or that he should have assimilated the novel to "an epic in prose." Ian Watt, who cites...
18. In this respect, the realistic novel might be accused of confusing symbol and sign. The novelististic illusion, at least in its beginnings, is born from the fusion of two heterogeneous enterprises in one principle: compose an autonomous verbal structure and represent real life.


20. My own attempt to separate configuration and regulation only as an abstraction rests on a conception close to Frye's stages of the symbol. Configuration, in effect, is in many ways a reprise at the level of mimemosis of features of the world of action already understood at the level of mimesis, across their narrative configuration (mimesis) — or, in other words, across the "fictional" and "thematic modes" of Northrop Frye.

21. "Poetry can be made out of other poems, novels out of other novels. Literature shapes itself" (*Anatomy of Criticism*, p. 97).

22. Archetypical criticism, in this sense, does not differ fundamentally from the criticism practiced by Gaston Bachelard in his theory of a "material" imagination, governed by the "elements" of nature: water, air, earth, and fire — whose metamorphosis Frye takes up within the setting of language. It is also akin to the way in which Mircea Eliade sets out hierarchies in terms of the cosmic dimensions of sky, water, life, etc., which are always accompanied by spoken or written rituals. For Northrop Frye, too, the poem, in its archetypal phase, imitates nature as a cyclical process expressed in rites (cf. *Anatomy of Criticism*, p. 145). But it is civilization that thinks of itself in this attempt to extract a "total human form" from nature.

23. When put in terms of the major symbol of the Apocalypse, the myth of the four seasons, in which this symbol readily takes up residence, loses once and for all its naturalistic character. In the archetypal phase of the symbol, nature still contains humanity. In its analogical phase, humanity is what contains nature, under the sign of the infinitely desirable.

24. In my essay referred to above, I discuss Frye's attempt to make the narrative modes correspond to the myths of Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter.

25. "In the great moments of Dante and Shakespeare, in, say The Tempest or the climax of the Purgatorio, we have a feeling of converging significance, the feeling that we are close to seeing what our whole literary experience has been about, the feeling that we have moved into the still center of the order of words" (*Anatomy of Criticism*, p. 117).

26. Cited by Frye, p. 122. Frye writes, "The conception of a total Word is the postulate that there is such a thing as an order of words" (ibid., p. 126). However it would be a serious error to find a theological resonance in this statement. Religion for Northrop Frye is too devoted to what ii and literature is too devoted to what may be for them to be identified with each other. Culture and the literature that expresses it find their autonomy precisely through the mode of the imaginary. This tension between the possible and the actual prevents Frye from giving the concept of fiction the scope and engulfing power Frank Kermode confers upon it in the work I shall consider next, where the Apocalypse occupies a place comparable to the one Frye grants it in his criticism.


29. J. Hillis Miller, "The Problematic of Ending in Narrative," *Nineteenth Century Fiction* 33 (1978): 3-7. He declares, "no narrative shows either its beginning or its ending" (ibid., p. 4). And he also states that the "aporia of ending arises from the fact that it is impossible ever to tell whether a given narrative is complete" (ibid., p. 5). It is true that he takes as his reference the relationship between knotting (desis) and un-knotting (lasis) in Aristotle's *Poetics* and that he develops the aporias of this metaphor of the knot with gusto. But the place of this text in the *Poetics* is much debated insofar as the operation of knotting and un-knotting escapes the criterion of a beginning and an end so clearly stated in the canonical chapter Aristotle devotes to plot. The incidents recounted may be interminable and are in fact so in real life, but the narrative as a muthos is too devoted to what may be for them to be identified with each other. Culture and the literature that expresses it find their configuration of the poem. This is why there is a problem about good endings and, as we shall see below, of "anticlosure."

30. One of the many merits of Barbara Hermstein Smith's work, *Poetic Closure: A Study of How Poems End* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), is that it provides the theory of narrative with not only a noteworthy model of analysis but also precise suggestions about how to extend to "poetic closure" in general its specific comments about "lyric closure." The transposition is easily justified. On both sides, we have to do with poetic works, that is, with works that are built upon the foundation of transactions in ordinary language and that therefore interrupt these transactions. Furthermore, it is a matter, in both cases, of mimetic works in the particular sense of this term that they imitate an ordinary "utterance" — an argument, a declaration, a lamentation. Hence literary narrative imitates not just an action but also ordinary narrative taken from the transactions of everyday life.

31. Barbara Hermstein Smith speaks in this regard of "self-closure reference" (ibid., p. 172), where the work refers to itself as such by its way of ending or not ending.

32. Smith distinguishes between "anticlosure" which still preserves some tie with the need for an ending through its application of the reflexive resources of language to the thematic incompleteness of the work and its recourse to ever more subtle forms of ending, and what is "beyond closure." As regards anticoloncle and the techniques of "sabotaging" language, she says, "If the traitor, language, is not to be exiled, one may disarm him and make him a prisoner of war" (ibid., p. 254). As for what is beyond closure, "the traitor, language, has here been brought to his knees and not only disarmed but beheaded" (ibid., p. 266). She does not take this step because of her conviction that, as the imitation of an utterance, poetic language cannot escape the tension between literary and nonliterary language. When the aleatory, for example, is sub-
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think, has not yet ended," says Smith (p. 271). "The paradigms survive, somehow. . . . The survival of paradigms is as much our

46. Eric Weil, admirable commentary on Aristotle's peripeteia and Kermode's discordance? Can we conceive of a culture that would contain neither

In this sense, "a text possessing a plot is built upon the base of the plotless text of which it is the negation" (ibid.). Is this not an

an event occur then? "When a character crosses the frontiers of some semantic field" (ibid., p. 233). A fixed image of the world is

classificatory system, a simple inventory—for example, a list of places, as on a map. As regards culture, it would be a fixed system of

precise concept, and thereby specifies the plot as one of the possible temporal frames, is quite unexpected and, to my knowledge, is without

even nonending stories are only interesting because of the deviations and violations they impose on the rule of closure. The notion of an

frame, that is, "the boundary separating the artistic text from the non-text" (ibid., p. 209). This is why, as I shall indicate in Part IV, the work

frontier, a text is transformed into an integral unit of signals. The notion of closure is not far off. It is introduced by the notion of a "frame,"

principle of "demarcation" unfolding, hence of inclusions and exclusions, which appear as inherent to the notion of a text. Marked by some

structural solution to the problem of the perenniality of the forms of concordance. He outlines a series of concentric circles that progressively

insinuates itself as soon as we

make it talk our language. . . .

suggests using the example of the ticking of a clock. "We ask what it

even if it turns out that it is founded on some basis in the

44. We ought to emphasize, in this respect, the failure of a simply biological or psychological justification of the desire for concordance,

function of literary fiction with regard to those narratives that have functioned authoritatively in our culture in the past. A suspicion of

another form of order then comes to light, the suspicion that fiction has usurped the authority of these foundational narratives, that this shift

of the development of the novel, the insecurity, revealed by the conviction that reality is chaotic, turns against the very idea of an orderly

composition. Writing becomes a problem for itself and its own impossibility.

38. "Crisis, however facile the conception, is unescapably a central element in our endeavours towards making sense of our world" (ibid., p. 94).

39. Cf. Kermode's discussion of Robbe-Grillet and his "icriture labyrinthine" (pp. 19-24). He correctly emphasizes the intermediary role

played by the narrative technique developed by Sartre and Camus, in Nausea and The Stranger, as contributing to the dissonance proclaimed

by Robbe-Grillet.

40. Quoted by Kermode, p. 102.

41. The expression "the consoling plot" becomes almost a pleonasm. No less important than the influence of Nietzsche is that of the poet

Wallace Stevens, especially in the last section of his "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction."

42. Whence also the overdetermination of the very term "ending." The end is the end of the world, or Apocalypse; the end of the book, or the

book of the Apocalypse; the end of the play; the end of crisis, or the myth of the/m de siecle; the end of paradigms, or schism; the

impossibility of giving a poem an ending, or the incomplete work; and finally death, the end of desire. This overdetermination explains the

irony of the indefinite pronoun in the title: The Sense of an Ending. We are never done with the end. Or as Wallace Stevens says, "The

imagination is always at the end of an era" (cited by Kermode, p. 31).

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Another exploration of the relationship between fiction and broken myth is possible, one that would focus upon the substitutinary

function of literary fiction with regard to those narratives that have functioned authoritatively in our culture in the past. A suspicion of

another form of order then comes to light, the suspicion that fiction has usurped the authority of these foundational narratives, that this shift

in power calls for, in return, an expression of Edward Said's, an effect of "molestation," if we understand by this the wound the writer

inflicts on himself when he becomes aware of the illusory and usurped character of the authority he exercises as an author (auctor), capable


44. We ought to emphasize, in this respect, the failure of a simply biological or psychological justification of the desire for concordance,

even if it turns out that it is founded on some basis in the Gestalt of perception, as in the work of Barbara Herrnstein Smith, or as Kermode

suggests using the example of the ticking of a clock. "We ask what it says: and we agree that it says tick-lock. By this fiction we humanize it,

make it talk our language. . . . Tick is a humble genesis, lock a feeble apocalypse; and tick lock is in any case not much of a plot" (ibid., pp. 44-45, his emphases). These biological and perceptual rhythms invariably send us back to language: a "supplement" of plot and fiction

insinuates itself as soon as we talk about a clock, and with this supplement comes "the time of the novelist" (ibid., p. 46).


structural solution to the problem of the perenniality of the forms of concordance. He outlines a series of concentric circles that progressively

enclose a central circle, that of the plot, whose own center in turn is the notion of an event. He begins from a general definition of language

as a system of communication using signs that are ordered in some way. From this, we obtain the notion of a text conceived of as a sequence

of signs transformed by special rules into one unique sign. Next we pass to the notion of art as a secondary modeling system, and then to

verbal art or literature as one of the secondary systems built from our natural languages. Along this chain of included elements we see a

principle of "demarcation" unfolding, hence of inclusions and exclusions, which appear as inherent to the notion of a text. Marked by some

frontier, a text is transformed into an integral unit of signals. The notion of closure is not far off. It is introduced by the notion of a "frame,"

which is related to this same concept in painting, the theater (the footlights, the curtain), architecture, and sculpture. In one sense, the

beginning and the end of a plot only specify this notion of the frame, which is directly related to that of the text. There is no plot without a

frame, that is, "the boundary separating the artistic text from the non-text" (ibid., p. 209). This is why, as I shall indicate in Part IV, the work

of art, "being limited spatially, can be the finite model of the infinite universe—a world external to the work" (ibid., p. 217). Open-ended or

even nonending stories are only interesting because of the deviations and violations they impose on the rule of closure. The notion of an

event thus figures for Lotman as the center of this ring game (cf. ibid., pp. 233ff.). The decisive determination that makes the event a more

precise concept, and thereby specifies the plot as one of the possible temporal frames, is quite unexpected and, to my knowledge, is without

parallel in the literature on this subject. Lotman begins by imagining what a text without any plot or events would be. It would be a purely

classificatory system, a simple inventory—for example, a list of places, as on a map. As regards culture, it would be a fixed system of

semantic fields (strikingly arranged in binary fashion: rich vs. poor, noble vs. base, etc.). When does 167

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an event occur then? "When a character crosses the frontiers of some semantic field" (ibid., p. 233). A fixed image of the world is

required, therefore, so that someone can transgress its internal barriers and prohibitions. The event is this crossing, this transgression.

In this sense, "a text possessing a plot is built upon the base of the plotless text of which it is the negation" (ibid.). Is this not an

admirable commentary on Aristotle's peripeteia and Kermode's discordance? Can we conceive of a culture that would contain neither

a determined semantic field nor a crossing of some frontier?


48. Barbara Herrnstein Smith and Frank Kermode, as I have indicated, come together here: "Poetry ends in many ways but poetry, I

think, has not yet ended," says Smith (p. 271). "The paradigms survive. somehow . . . The survival of paradigms is as much our

business as their erosion," says Kermode (p. 43).

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2. Roland Barthes, *Poétique du recit* (Paris: Seuil, 1977), p. 14. Regarding this presumed homology between language and literature, Tzvetan Todorov cites Valéry's remark that literature is only an "extension and application of certain properties of language" (*Poetics of Prose*, trans. Richard Howard [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977], p. 28). In this respect, the procedures of style (including the rhetorical figures) and the procedures for organizing a narrative, along with the cardinal notions of meaning and interpretation, all constitute so many manifestations of linguistic categories in the literary narrative (cf. ibid., pp. 29-41). This homology becomes even more precise once we try to apply to narrative the grammatical categories of the proper noun, the verb, and the adjective to describe the subject-agent and the action-predicate, hence the state of equilibrium or disequilibrium. A "grammar" of narrative is therefore possible, Yet we should not forget that these grammatical categories are better understood if we are acquainted with their manifestation in narratives (cf. ibid., pp. 108-19, 218-33). I would like to emphasize that the grammar of narrative finds its originality in relation to the grammar of *language* when we pass from the phrase to sentences to a higher syntactic unit or to *sequence* (cf. ibid., p. 116). It is at this level that the grammar of narrative is supposed to become equal to the operation of employment.

3. *Poétique du recit*, pp. 131-57. I have thought it better to pursue this distinction in the next chapter.

4. See below, pp. 38-44.

5. Barthes sees here Benveniste's distinction of the form that produces the units through segmentation and the meaning that gathers these units into units of a higher order.


7. This demand is satisfied to its most extreme consequences by Claude Levi-Strauss in his *Mythologiques*. However readers of his *Structural Anthropology* will also recall his essay on "The Structural Study of Myth" and its structural analysis of the myth of Oedipus. (Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," in *idem, Structural Anthropology*, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf [New York: Basic Books, 1963], pp. 206-31. See also his "The Story of Aisdiwal" in *Structural Anthropology*, vol. 2, trans. Monique Layton [New York: Basic Books, 1976], pp. 146-97.) As is well known, there the anecdotal unfolding of the myth is abolished in favor of a combinatorial law that does not bind together temporal sentences but what Levi-Strauss calls bundles of relations, such as the overrating of blood relations as opposed to their underrating, and the relation of dependence on the earth (autoch-thony) opposed to emancipation from it. The structural law of this myth will be the logical matrix of the solution brought to these contradictions. I shall forego here any incursion into the realm of mythology, having fictional narrative begin with epic by abstracting from its filiation and dependence upon myth. I shall observe this same reservation in Part IV, particularly in discussing the calendar, by not taking up the problem of the relations between historical time and mythic time.

8. Monique Schneider, from whom I am borrowing this decisive insight (Monique Schneider, "Le Temps du Conte," in Dorian Tiffeneau, *La Narrativite* [Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1980], pp. 85-123, cf. pp. 85-87) has, for example, emphasized the transformation of the "marvelous" character of the folktale, which it owes to its prior insertion in an initiatory practice, into a thoroughly intelligible object, proposing to "reawaken those powers that allow the folktale to resist this logical seizure" (ibid., p. 87). It is not these powers linked to the "marvelous" character of the folktale that interest me, but rather those resources of intelligibility it already possesses as first being a cultural creation.

9. In his "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative," Roland Barthes declared that "analysis today tends to 'dechronologize' the narrative continuum and to 'relogicize' it, to make it dependent on what Mallarme called with regard to the French language, 'the primitive thunderbolts of logic'" (Barthes, p. 270). And he added, regarding time, that "the task is to succeed in giving a structural description of the chronological illusion — it is for narrative logic to account for narrative time" (ibid.). For Barthes, at this time, it was to the extent analytic rationality is substituted for narrative intelligibility that time is transformed into a "chronological illusion." In fact, his discussion of this assertion takes us beyond the framework of mimesis: "Time belongs not to discourse strictly speaking but to the referent; both narrative and language know only a semiotic time, 'true' time being a 'realist,' referential illusion, as Propp's commentary shows. It is as such that structural description must deal with it" (ibid., pp. 270-71). I shall discuss this alleged referential illusion in Part IV. What we are considering in this chapter concerns what Barthes himself calls semiotic time.

10. Recall Le Goff's similar comment concerning the historian's reluctance to adopt the vocabulary of synchrony and diachrony, mentioned in volume 1, p. 218. Theorique de la litterature: Textes des formalizes russe (Paris: Seuil, 1965). Particularly important for our discussion are the notions of "literariness" (litterirlle), immanent system, level of organization, distinctive feature (or sign), motif and function, and typological classification. Most important is the notion of "transformation," which I shall take up below.

11. Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktaie*, 1st edition, trans. Laurence Scott, 2nd edition rev. and ed. Louis A. Wagner (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968). This work constitutes one of the culminating points in the form of literary study known as "Russian formalism" developed during the years 1915-30. For a summary of the principal methodological achievements of this movement and a comparison with subsequent developments based on linguistics during the 1960s, cf. Tzvetan Todorov, "The Methodological Heritage of Formalism," in *The Poetics of Prose*, pp. 247-67. See also his discussion in the volume he edited, *Theorie de la litterature: Textes des formalizes russe* (Paris: Seuil, 1965), pp. 146-97. Particularly important for our discussion are the notions of "literariness" (litterirlle), immanent system, level of organization, distinctive feature (or sign), motif and function, and typological classification. Most important is the notion of "transformation," which I shall take up below.

12. Propp's ambition to become the Linnaeus of the fairy tale is clearly stated (cf. ibid., p. xii). Indeed they both share the same goal: to discover the amazing unity hidden beneath the labyrinth of appearances. Their means are also the same: to subordinate the interpretative powers linked to the "marvelous" character of the folktale, which it owes to its prior insertion in an initiatory practice, into a thoroughly intelligible object, proposing to "reawaken those powers that allow the folktale to resist this logical seizure" (ibid., p. 87). It is not these powers linked to the "marvelous" character of the folktale that interest me, but rather those resources of intelligibility it already possesses as first being a cultural creation.

13. This number is almost the same as that of the phonemes in a phonological system.

14. This limitation in his field of investigation explains Propp's extreme prudence regarding an extrapolation beyond this domain. Within this domain, freedom in creation is strictly limited by the constraint of the sequence of the functions in the unilinear series. The teller of the tale is only free to omit some of the functions, to choose the species within the genus of actions defined by a function, to give this or that attribute to the characters, and to choose from the storehouse of language his means of expression.

15. If the scheme can serve as a measuring unit for individual tales, it is no doubt because there is no problem of deviation for the
fairy tale as there is for the modern novel. To use the vocabulary of the preceding chapter concerning traditionality, in the fairytale the paradigm and the particular work tend to overlap. Undoubtedly it is due to this almost complete overlapping that the fairy tale provides so fertile a field for the study of narrative constraints, the problem of "rule-governed deformations" reducing to the omission of certain functions or the specifying of generic features which define a function.

16. In fact, Propp precedes the definition of each function with a narrative proposition that mentions at least one character. This comment, as shall we see, will lead Claude Bremond to his definition of a "role" as the conjunction of an actant and an actor. Yet Propp had already written at the beginning of his work: "Function is understood as an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action" (*Morphology of the Folktale*, p. 21).

17. Once again it is appropriate to recall Frank Kermode's discussion of this point in *The Genesis of Secrecy*, pp. 75-99, where he demonstrates how in the gospels the characters Peter and Judas become more specific as the sequences involving them become larger and more complex in the Passion narratives.

18. The French translation of Propp says "sequence" instead of "move." In the English translation, "sequence" is used for what the French calls *Forsde*, that is, the uniform succession of the functions. *Cf. Morphology of the Folktale*, pp. 21-22.

19. The remainder of this chapter in Propp is devoted to the different ways the tale may combine "moves": addition, interruption, parallelism, intersection, etc.

20. I have excluded from my analysis everything concerning the contribution of *Morphology of the Folktale* to the history of the genre "fairy tale." I said earlier how Propp carefully subordinates questions of history to description, in agreement on this point with Saussurian linguistics. He does not abandon his initial reserve on this point in his concluding chapter. Yet he does risk suggesting a link between religion and fairy tales: "A way of life and religion die out, while their contents turn into tales" (ibid., p. 106). For example, the quest, so characteristic of the tale, might stem from the wandering of souls in the otherworld. Perhaps this comment is not out of bounds if we recall that the fairy tale itself is on the way to extinction. "There are no new formations at present" (ibid., p. 114). If such is the case, is the propitious moment for structural analysis one where a certain creative process has been exhausted?


22. For example, their interconnection may occur by simply setting things "end to end" (malevolence, a misdeed, etc.), or by enclosing one sequence within another (the test as part of the quest), or by parallels between independent series. As for the syntactic connections that hold these complex sequences together, they too come in many forms: pure succession, causal connection, influence, a relation of means to an end, and so on.

23. Let us also note that this first dichotomy seems to be analytically contained within the concept of a role inasmuch as the role joins together a subject noun and a predicate verb. This point does not apply to the following cases.


25. Bremond applies this idea of a "good form" to Propp's sequence type (*Logique*, p. 38).

26. Cf. Todorov, "The Grammar of Narrative," in *Poetics of Prose*, pp. 108-19. A narrative statement proceeds from the conjoining of a proper noun (a grammatical subject devoid of internal properties) and two types of predicates, one describing a state of equilibrium or disequilibrium (adjectival), the other the passage from one state to another (verbal). The formal units of narrative are thus parallel to the parts of discourse: nouns, adjectives, verbs. However, it is true that beyond the proposition the syntax corresponding to a sequence attests that "there is hardly any linguistic theory of discourse" (ibid., p. 116). And this is to admit that the minimal complete plot consists of the statement of an equilibrium, then of a transforming action, and finally of a new equilibrium stemming from a specific grammar applied to the rules for narrative transformations (cf. also "Narrative Transformations," ibid., pp. 218-33).

27. "Our analysis having decomposed the plot into its constitutive elements, the roles, it remains to consider the inverse and complementary process that brings about their synthesis in the plot" (ibid., p. 136).

28. To the question of whether "another system of roles, just as satisfactory, or even better, is conceivable" (ibid., p. 327), Bremond replies, "We need to prove that the logic of roles that we have made use of imposes itself, always and everywhere, as the only principle for a coherent organization of events in a plot" (ibid.). And speaking of "the metaphysics of the faculties of human existence upon which this system is constructed, he adds, "It is the narrative activity itself that imposes these categories upon us as the principles for shaping another narrated experience." (ibid.).

29. Bremond prefers a different way of putting it. "A basis in a metaphysics of the faculties of human existence for organizing the universe of roles is essential therefore to our undertaking" (ibid., p. 314). In fact, this assumption already governed the constitution of the elementary sequence as contingency, passage to an action, completion. It is what teaches us that we can be either the sufferer or the agent of any modification. It is not surprising, therefore, that it also governs the concepts of evaluation, influence, initiative, and retribution. It also presides over the subsequent constitution of the syntactic connection briefly referred to above: a relationship of simple coordination between successive developments, of cause to effect, of means to end, of implication (degradation implies the possibility of protection, disesteem implies the possibility of punishment). Bremond also claims the right of making recourse to natural language "to communicate to the reader an intuitive feeling for the logical organization of the roles in narrative" (ibid., p. 309).


32. "The text, because of this, could be considered as the irreducible nucleus accounting for the definition of the story
diachronically" (ibid., p. 237).
33. Greimas himself turns this consideration against Propp's treatment of the whole sequence of functions as one fixed sequence, for the test constitutes in contradiction to this a certain manifestation of freedom. But may not the same argument be turned against Greimas's own attempt to construct a paradigmatic model lacking any originary diachronic dimension? In fact, he openly concedes this: "If a diachronic residue no longer existed, the whole narrative could then be reduced to this simple structure in the form of the functional pair 'confrontation vs. success' . . . which does not let itself be transformed into an elementary semic category" (ibid., p. 236).
34. In a similar vein, he adds, "the alternative which the narrative presents is the choice between the individual's freedom (that is to say, the absence of the contract) and the accepted social contract" (ibid.).
35. "Consequently, it is the context (F)—the only functional pair not analyzable in achronic structure . . . which must account for the transformation itself" (ibid., pp. 244-45).
36. This thesis finds support in Todorov's use of the concept of "transformation" in his "Narrative Transformations," referred to above. The advantage of this concept is that it combines the paradigmatic point of view of Levi-Strauss and Greimas with the syntagmatic view of Propp. Among other things, it splits the predicates of action, of doing something, running from modalities (ought, could, does) to attitudes (likes to do). Furthermore, it makes narrative possible by bringing about the transition from the action predicate to the sequence as a synthesis of difference and resemblance. In short, "it links two facts without their being able to be identified" (ibid., p. 233). This synthesis is nothing other than what has already occurred and been understood, in my opinion, as the synthesis of the heterogeneous on the level of our narrative understanding. I also agree with Todorov when he opposes transformation to succession in his Les Genres tin discours. The notion of transformation does seem to be assigned to narratological rationality, in opposition to my notion of configuration, which I see as arising from narrative understanding. And, strictly speaking, we cannot speak of "transformation" unless we give it a logical formulation. But, to the extent that narrative gives rise to other transformations than negation, dependent upon disjunctions and conjunctions—for example, the passage from ignorance to recognition, the reinterpreting of already occurred events, or submission to ideological imperatives (cf. ibid., pp. 67f.)—it seems difficult to give a logical equivalent of all the narrative forms of organization for which we have acquired a competence, thanks to our familiarity with the plot-types inherited from our culture.
38. I discuss the question of the logical structure of the semiolic square in two long notes (numbers 4 and 11) to my essay, "La grammaire narrative de Greimas," Documents de recherches semi-linguistiques de l'Institut de la langue francaise no. 15 (1980): 5-35. The notes are on pp. 29-30 and 32-33.
39. At this stage, narrative sentences and action sentences are indiscernible. Danlo's criterion for a narrative sentence is not yet applicable. This is why we can only speak of a program statement at this point.
40. The final statement of the performance—called the attribution—is "the equiva-
41. "A syntax of operators has to be constructed independently of the syntax of operations. A metasemiotic level has to be laid out to justify the transference of values" (ibid).
42. In an interview with Frederic Nef published in Frederic Nef et al., Structures elementaires de la signification (Brussels: Complexe, 1976), Greimas asserts, "If we now consider narration in terms of the syntagmatic perspective where each narrative program appears as a process made up of acquisitions and losses of values, of enrich-ings and impoverishings of a subject, we see that each step taken along the syntagmatic axis corresponds to 'and is defined by' a topological displacement along the paradigmatic axis" (ibid., p. 25).
44. The pair sender/receiver extends Propp's concept of a mandate or the concept of an inaugural contract in Greimas's own first actantial model, the contract thanks to which the hero receives the ability to do something. However this pair sender/receiver is now situated on a more radical formal plane. There are, in fact, social and even cosmic senders as well as individual ones.
46. Maupassant suggests other even more refined distinctions having to do with doing something. The index entry faire at the end of the book gives some idea of the ramifications that theory is called upon to produce by works that are considerably more subtle than are popular tales. It is the distinction between "doing something" and "being" that seems to be the one most difficult to maintain within the framework of narrativity inasmuch as it is no longer inscribed within "doing something" alone. What is more, the being which is in question is connected to doing something through the intermediary of the idea of a state or an enduring disposition—for example, joy, which indicates entry into a euphoric state, or the freedom the "two friends," who have been deprived of all ability to do something following their capture by the Prussians, exercise when they choose to be able not to do something, that is, their refusal to obey the Prussian officer, and hence their entering a "state of being free," which is expressed at the end of the story by their ability to die standing upright.
47. See above, note 38.
48. Someone may object that I am confusing anthropomorphic categories from the surface level with human categories from the figurative level (characterized by the existence of goals, motives, and choices), or, in short, with the practical categories I described in volume 1 under the heading mimesis. But I doubt that we can define "doing something" without any reference to human action, even if it is only through such categories as the quasi-character, the quasi-plot, and the quasi-event, which I introduced in chapter 6 of dial volume.
50. The situation here is no different from the one described in our examination of Bremond's Logique du recit. There, too, the logic of narrative rested upon a phenomenology and a semantics of action, which Bremond called a "metaphysics."
52. In his interview with Frederic Nef ("Entretien," p. 25), Greimas says that it is the polenical structure of narration that allows extending the initial paradigmatic articulation of the taxonomic model to the whole syntagmatic unfolding of the narration. By opposing an antisubject to a subject, and an antiprogram to a program, and even by multiplying the actantial squares by splitting every antact into an actant, an antactict, an antiantactant, and an antiantactiant, the polenical structure assures the infiltration of the paradigmatic order into the whole syntagmatic order. There is "nothing surprising therefore about the fact that the analysis of even the least complex texts requires a multiplying of the actantial positions which reveal in this way, on the side of the syntagmatic unfolding, the paradigmatic articulation of narrativity" (ibid., p. 24). But we might also put it the opposite way. Because something happens as a conflict between two subjects, we can project this on the square. And this projection is possible in turn because this square itself has been treated "as the place where the logical operations occur" (ibid., p. 26); in short, because it has already been narrativized. All progress in applying the square of opposition—la carrefication—from one level to another, may then appear as the step-by-step advance of the paradigmatic into the heart of the syntagmatic, or as the addition of new syntagmatic dimensions (quest, struggle, etc.), secretly directed by the double paradigmatic and syntagmatic structure of the completed narrative.

53. As regards the coherence of the topological syntax as such, and the role attributed to the relationship of presupposition that brings the traversal of the corners of the semiotic square back to its beginning, cf. my "La grammaire narrative de Greimas," pp. 22-24.

54. Greimas comes close to acknowledging this later in his interview with Nef. "However it is only a question here of a syntax manipulating, with the help of disjunctions and conjunctions, statements about states of affairs, which only give the narrative a static representation of a series of narrative states of affairs. Since the taxonomic square ought only to be considered as the place where the logical operations take place, the series of statements about the states of affairs are organized and manipulated by the statements about doing something and by the transformative subjects inscribed in them" ("Entretien," p. 26).

CHAPTER THREE

1. As early as the medieval philosophers we find the wholehearted assertion of the reflective nature of judgment. It is Kant, however, who introduces the fruitful distinction between a determining judgment and a reflexive one. A determining judgment is wholly caught up in the objectivity it produces. A reflexive judgment turns back upon the operations through which it constructs aesthetic and organic forms on the basis of the causal chain of events in the world. In this sense, narrative forms constitute a third class of reflexive judgment, that is, a judgment capable of taking as its object the very sort of Ideological operations by which aesthetic and organic entities take shape.


55. A study should be done of the implications for narrative theory of the linguistics of Gustave Guillaume—Le Temps et Langage: Essai sur les structures du sujet parlant (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), has gone another step in the direction of the inquiry I am suggesting with his operative conception of language, directed toward a general anthropology wherein the constitution of human time and of the speaking subject intersect.

6. Hamburger uses the general term Dichtung to designate the three great genres: epic, drama, and lyric. Epic covers the entire narrative domain, drama covers that of action brought on stage by characters who dialogue in front of the spectators, and lyric is the expression, using poetic techniques, of the thoughts and feelings experienced by the writer. Only the epic and dramatic genres, then, belong to fiction, epic still being called mimetic, with Plato in mind. Employed in this sense, the term "epic" recalls how it was used in the discussion between Goethe and Schiller on the comparable merits of the two genres: "Überepische und dramatische Dichtung" (1797) in W. Goethe, Sämtliche Werke (Stuttgart and Berlin: Jubiläums-Ausgabe, 1902-07), vol. 36, pp. 149-52. It should be noted in this comparison the "perfect past" (vollkommen vergangen) of the epic is opposed to the "perfect present" (vollkommen gegenwartig) of drama. The novel is not at issue, unless it be as a modern variety of the epic, which explains Hamburger's
of a personified fictive narrator would, in Hamburger's eyes, weaken the break between narrating and asserting. Thus she is obliged to maintain that the field of fiction "is not the range of experience of a narrator but the product of the narrative function" (ibid., p. 270). Between the author's characters there is no place for another I-Origo.

8. I cannot give here the reasons why the narrator is held to be a fictive subject of discourse irreducible to a mere neutral function (das Erzählen). I shall take up this problem again below in my discussion of the concepts of "point of view" and "voice."

9. Another problem dealt with by Hamburger, that of the tenses in free indirect discourse or narrated monologue (erlebte Rede), calls for the same kind of supplementary explication. In erlebte Rede the words of a character are reported in the third person and in the past tense, unlike in the reported monologue where the character expresses himself or herself in the first person and in the present tense. For example, in Mrs. Dalloway, we read, "He dropped her hand. Their marriage was over, he thought, with agony, with relief. The rope was cut; he mounted; he was free, as it was decreed that he, Septimus, the lord of men, should be free; alone . . ."

Hamburger sees in this the confirmation that the grammatical past does not signify the past, since the words belong to the fictive present—alas, present too, by the way—of the character. She is not mistaken in this, if by past we can only mean the "real" past, relating to memory or to history. The erlebte Rede is more thoroughly explained, however, if it is interpreted as the translation of the discourse of a character into the discourse of the narrator, where the latter imposes her/his tense and narration in the third-person. The narrator must then be held to be a subject of discourse in fiction. I shall return to this problem below in terms of a dialectic of the narrator and the character in first- as well as in third-person fiction.

10. My argument cannot be complete until we have introduced the ideas of "point of view" and of "voice." The epic preterite will then be able to be interpreted as the fictive past of the narrative voice.

11. By "text" Weinrich means "a meaningful succession of linguistic signs between two obvious breaks in communication" (Le Temps, p. 13), such as the pauses in spoken communication, or the two covers of a book in written communication, or, finally, "cuts that are introduced deliberately and which, in a metalinguistic sense, smooth over obvious breaks in communication" (ibid.). The types of opening and closing characteristic of narrative are, in this respect, "cuts that are introduced deliberately."

12. I found it difficult to follow the French translator of Tempus, who translates Besprechung by commentaire (commentary), but finally decided to do so. This term does not take into account the "attitude of tension" characteristic of this type of communication. To a French ear, there is more detachment in the reception of a commentary than in that of a narrative. On the other hand, translating Besprechung by debate (debate, discussion) which seems preferable to me, introduces a polemical note which itself is unnecessary. Nevertheless we can "debate" or discuss something without an adversary.

13. Another enumeration is also offered. On the side of commentary are listed "poetry, drama, dialogue in general, a journal, literary criticism, scientific description" (ibid., p. 39). On the side of narratives are "the short story, the novel, and narratives of all kinds (except for dialogues)" (ibid.). What is important is that this division has nothing in common with a classification of forms of discourse in terms of "genres."

14. Weinrich notes that "the idea of tension . . . has only very recently penetrated poetics under the influence of an informational aesthetics, through notions such as 'suspense'" (ibid., p. 35). He is referring here to Todorov's The Poetics of Prose.

15. "The boundary between poetry and truth does not correspond to that between narrated world and commented world. The commented world has its truth (the con-

16. I suggest in this connection that the notion of a long time-span in Braudel be compared with Weinrich's notion of a background. The distribution of temporality in terms of three levels is wholly a work of putting-into-relief.

17. I have said nothing here about the complementary role played by other syntactic signals that have a temporal value, such as pronouns, adverbs, etc. According to Weinrich, establishing whether distributional regularities are displayed in the form of privileged combinations is a task belonging to a general survey of combinations. The affinity of the preterite with the third-person is well-known, following Benveniste's celebrated article. The affinity of certain adverbs of time such as "yesterday," "at this moment," "tonight," and so on, with the tenses of narrative is just as noteworthy. Even more so, in my opinion, is the affinity of many adverbial phrases with tenses of narrative which put-into-relief. Their abundance is particularly striking. Weinrich enumerates more than forty of them in a single chapter of Flaubert's Madame Bovary (ibid., p. 268) and almost as many in a chapter from Malraux's la Vie royal. So many adverbs for just two tenses! To which must be added the adverbs that mark narrative tempo: "sometimes," "at times," "from time to time," "always," etc., in combination, generally, with the imperfect. Finally, "all at once," "suddenly," "abruptly," etc. are most often found in combination with the preterite. Added to this are the adverbs corresponding to the question "When?" or to an analogous question connected to time (ibid., p. 270): "sometimes," "often," "finally," "next," "then," "always," "once more," "already," "now," "this time," "one more time," "little by little," "all of a sudden," "one after the other," "unceasingly," and so on. This abundance suggests that adverbs and adverbial phrases weave a considerably finer network for the schematization of the narrated world than do the verbs with which they are combined.

18. Temporal transitions also draw assistance from the combination of tenses and adverbs. What is true of the paradigmatic aspect of the problem applies even more to the syntagmatic one. The adverbs mentioned above are more aptly described as accompanying temporal transitions, reinforcing them, and making them more precise. In this way, the adverbs—"now," "then," "once," "one morning," "one evening"—stress the heterogeneous transition from background (imperfect) to foreground (preterite), while "and then," as an adverb of narrative sequence, is better suited to homogeneous transitions within the narrated world. I shall discuss below the resources this syntax of narrative transitions offers for the utterance of narrative configurations.

19. What Weinrich says of the notions of opening, closing, and simulated end (so subtly marked by Maupassant, for example, using what has been termed the imperfect tense of rupture) should be noted once again in this regard. Here, the narrative's relief is indistinguishable from the narrative structure itself.

22. This problem will be discussed further in the concluding chapter of this volume.

Notes to Pages 75-79
23. The notion of narrative voice will below (cf. p. 98) provide a more complete response to what is at issue here.
24. This can be connected to Greimas's semiotics, with regard to what he calls the "aspectuality" of transformations, which he places (it will be recalled) half-way between the logical-semantic plane and the properly discursive plane. To express this aspectuality, language has available to it expressions about duration (and about frequency) and expressions about events. In addition, it marks the transitions from permanence to incidental occurrences by means of the features of inchoativity and terminativity.
25. Other syntactic signs, such as adverbs and adverbial phrases, the abundance and variety of which we referred to above, reinforce the expressive power of the tenses.
26. The remarks that follow are in close harmony with my interpretation of metaphorical discourse as the "redescription" of reality in the seventh and eighth studies of my Rule of Metaphor.
27. I shall attempt below, at my own risk, to interpret Der Zauberberg from the point of view of the experience of time, which this Zeitroman projects beyond itself, without ceasing to be a fiction.
28. Morphologische Poetik, ed. Elena Miiller (Tubingen: M. Niemeyer, 1968) is the title that was adopted by Miiller for a collection of his essays dating from 1964—68.
29. It is worth recalling that Propp was also inspired by Goethe, as we saw in chapter 2.
30. Goethe himself is at the origin of this ambiguous relation between art and nature. On the one hand, he writes, "Kunst ist eine andere Natur." But he also says that "Kunst ... ist eine eigene Weltgegend [an original region of the world]" (cited by Miiller, p. 289).
31. The term Aussparung emphasizes both what is omitted (life itself, as we shall see) and what is retained, chosen, or picked out. The French word épargne sometimes has these two meanings: what is spared is what is available to someone and it is also what is not touched, as when we say that a village was spared by (épargne par) the bombing. The word "savings" (l'épargne), precisely, includes what is put aside for one to make use of and what is left aside and sheltered.
32. Miiller is somewhat ill at ease in speaking of this time in itself, which is neither narrated nor read, a sort of disembodied time, measured by the number of pages, in order to distinguish it from the time of reading, to which each reader contributes his own Leselempo (ibid., p. 275).
33. For example, the study of Goethe's Lehrejahre begins with a comparison between the 650 pages taken as "the measure of the physical time required by the narrator to tell his story" (ibid., p. 270) and the eight years covered by the narrated events. This is, however, the incessant variations in relative lengths that create the work's tempe. I shall say nothing here of his study of Mrs. Dulloway, as I give an interpretation of it in the next chapter that takes account of Muller's careful analysis of the insertions and the internal digressions, so to speak, that allow the depth of remembered time to rise to the surface of the narrated time. Miiller also begins his study of the Forsyte Saga, a typical example of the "family novel," with careful quantitative analysis. In 1100 pages the novel covers a span of forty years. In this vast interval of time the author has isolated five periods ranging from a few days, to a few months, to two years. Returning to the grand scheme of the Illiad proposed by Goethe, Miiller reconstructs the temporal schema of Volume II of the Forsyte Saga, with its specific dates and its reference to days of the week.

Notes to Pages 80-82
34. A detailed analysis of the highly technical nature of these varied processes of narrative composition may be found in the studies dealing with the "Zeitgeber des Erzählens" in Jürg Jenatsch (ibid., pp. 388-418) and with "Zeitgeber des Fortunatus-Volksbuch" (ibid., pp. 570-89).
35. This intending of the time of life through narrated time is finally what is at stake in each of the brief monographs referred to above. It is concerned with the relation between the two temporal orders in the Lehrejahre suiis (figt sich) or is adapted to the particular object of the narrative, human metamorphosis and Vbergeiglichkeit (ibid., p. 271). As a result, the Gestattsinn of this poetic work is not arbitrary and makes the apprenticeship—Bildung—analogous to the biological process that generates living forms. The same thing can be said about the "family history novel." But, whereas in the Bildungsroman of Lessing and Goethe, the upsurge of vital forces governs the metamorphosis of a living being, Galsworthy's family history novel strives to show the aging, the necessary return to darkness, and, beyond the fate of the individual, the ascension of new life through which time reveals itself to be both salvific and destructive. In the three examples referred to, "the putting into form of narrated time has to do with the domain of reality that is manifested in the Gestalt of a narrative poetry [einer enihlden Dichtung]" (ibid., p. 285). The relation and the tension existing between the time taken to narrate and narrated time are thus referred back to something that, over and beyond the narrative, is not narrative but life. Narrated time is itself defined as Raffung with respect to the ground against which it stands out, namely, nature as unmeaningful, or rather as indifferent to meaning.
36. In another essay in the same collection, "Ziterlebnis und Zeitgerist," Miiller introduces another pair of terms indicated by the title (ibid., pp. 229-311). The "armature of time" is the interplay between the time taken to narrate and narrated time. As for the lived experience of time, it is, in Husserlian terminology, the ground of life indifferent to meaning. No intuition gives the meaning of this time, which is never more than interpreted, intended indirectly by the analysis of the Zeitgerist. New examples taken from authors who are concerned with the stakes as well as with the game show this even more clearly. For one, Andreas Gruphus, time is only a chain of disconnected instants, which the reference to eternity alone saves from nothingness. For others, such as Schiller and Goethe, it is the very course of world time that constitutes eternity. For another, Hofmannthal, time is strangeness itself, the immensity that swallows everything up. For another, Thomas Mann, time is the numinous par excellence. With each of these authors we touch upon the "poietische Dimension" of "lived" time (ibid., p. 303).
37. In the essay "Uber die Zeitgerist des Erzählens," we read, "Since Joseph Conrad, Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Proust, Faulkner, the way in which the evolution of time is handled has become a central problem in epic representation, a terrain for narrative
experimentation, in which it is first of all a matter not of speculation on time but of the 'art of narrating' (ibid., p. 392). This avowal does not imply that temporal "experience" ceases to be what it is at stake, but that the game takes precedence over the stakes. Genette will draw a more radical consequence from this reversal. Müller does not seem inclined to reduce the stakes to the game. The focus put on the art of narrating results from the fact that the narrator does not have to speculate about time in order to intend this poetic time; this is done by giving a configuration to narrated time.


39. The term "diegesis" (diegese) is borrowed from Etienne Souriau, who first proposed it in 1948, in order to oppose the place of the signified in film to the screen-universe as the place of the signifier. Genette specifies, in Nouveau Discours du recit, vol. 1, pp. 33 — 34 and 238, n. 14.

40. Narrative theory has never, in fact, stopped oscillating between bipartition and tripartition. The Russian formalists recognize the distinction between sjuzet and fabula, the subject and the tale. For Schklovsky, the tale designates the material used in forming the subject; the subject of Eugene Onegin, for example, is the elaboration of the tale, and hence a construction. Cf. Théorie de la littérature: Textes des formalités rtisses, collected, presented, and translated by Tzvetan Todorov, Preface by Roman Jakobson (Paris: Seuil, 1965), pp. 54-55.

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43. We might wonder in this regard if the time of reading, from which the time of the narrative is borrowed, does not belong to this reason to the plane of utterance, and if the transposition brought about through the metonymy does not conceal this filiation by projecting onto the plane of the statement what rightfully belongs to the plane of utterance. In addition, I would not call this a pseudo-time, but precisely a lictive time of the (written) narrative is a 'pseudo-time' in the sense that it exists empirically for the reader of a text-space that more briefly in Narrhe Discourse (pp. 162–66). "Language signifies without imitating" (ibid., p. 164). To avoid any equivocation, however, it should be recalled that in the Republic, 111, 392c, Plato does not oppose diegesis to mimesis. Diegesis is the only generic term discussed. It is divided into "plain" diegesis when the poet narrates events or discourse with his own voice and diegesis "by imitation" (dia trimeses) when the poet speaks as if he were someone else, simulating as much as possible the voice of this other person, which is equivalent to imitating it. The relationship between diegesis and mimesis is just the opposite in Aristotelian, for whom mimesis praxisos is the generic term and diegesis the subordinate "mode." We have constantly to be on guard, therefore, against letting these two kinds of terminology become superimposed, since they have to do with two different kinds of usage. Cf. Time and Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 33 — 34 and 238, n. 14.

44. The study of anachronies (prolepsis, analepsis, and their combinations) may be superimposed rather easily on Harald Weinrich's study of "perspective" (anticipation, retrospection, zero degree).

45. I refer the reader here to the lovely page in Ntrmtiw liicirmst where Genette evokes Marcel's general "play" with the principal episodes of his existence, "which until then were lost to significance because of their dispersion and are now suddenly reassembled, now made significant by being bound all together. . . . chance, contingency, arbitrariness now suddenly wiped out, his life's portrait is now suddenly 'captured' in the web of a structure and the meaningfulness of a meaning" (ibid., pp. 56—67).

46. The reader cannot help comparing this remark by Genette to Muller's use of the notion of Sinngehalt, discussed above, as well as the opposition between meaningful and unmeaningful (or indifferent) inherited from Goethe. This opposition, in my opinion, is entirely different from the opposition between signifier and signified coming from Saussure.


48. Genette readily admits that "to the extent that they bring the narrating instance itself directly into play, these anticipations in the present constitute not only data of narrative temporality but also data of voice: we will meet them later under that heading" (ibid., p. 70).

49. The notion of Raffling in Müller, therefore, finds an equivalent here in that of acceleration.

50. "The duration of these contemplative halts is generally such that it is in no danger of being exceeded by the duration of the reading (even a very slow reading) of the text that "tells of them"" (ibid., p. 102).

51. In his Maupassant, Greimas introduces the same categories of the iterative and the singularative, and, in order to account for them, adopts the grammatical category of "aspect." The alternation of iterative and singularative also forms a parallel with Weinrich's category of "putting
into relief."

52. Genette quotes the beautiful page from *The Captive* where we read, "This ideal morning lit my mind lull o\'a (r\'rim,niirl reality, identical with all similar mornings, and infected me with . . . cleei fulness" (cited ibid., p. 124).

53. Genette is, moreover, the first to "deplore this quartering of the problems of narrative temporality" (ibid., p. 157, n. 88). But are there grounds for saying that "any other distribution would have the effect of underestimating the importance and

54. However, if the temporality of the narration governs that of the narrative, we cannot speak of the "game with time" in the work of Proust, as Genette does in his decisive pages (pp. 155-60), which I shall discuss below, until we have considered utterance and the time that goes along with it, thereby preventing the analyses of temporality from being pulled in so many directions at once.

55. E. Vendryes, for example, defined "voice" as: "a mode of action of the verb in its relation with the subject" (quoted by Genette, ibid., p. 31). *Nouveau Discours du recit* adds no new element concerning the time of utterance and the relation between voice and utterance. On the other hand, this text contains a wealth of observations concerning the distinction between the question of voice—Who is speaking?—and the question of perspective—Who is looking?—the latter being reformulated in terms of "focalization"—Where is the focus of perception? Cf. ibid., pp. 43-52.

56. As I stated above, the principal weight of the analysis of the time of the narrative in *Remembrance* bears on the relation between narrative and diegesis, a relation that is examined in the first three chapters under the headings of "order," "duration," and "frequency" (*Narrative Discourse*, pp. 33—161), while only a few of the pages dealing with "voice" (ibid., pp. 215-27) are, as an afterthought, reserved for the time of narration. This disproportion is partly explained by the addition of the triad time, mood, voice, borrowed from the grammar of verbs, to the threefold division into utterance, statement, and object. It is finally these three new classes that determine the order of the chapters on narrative discourse. "The first three (Order, Duration, Frequency) deal with time; the fourth, with mood; the fifth and last, with voice" (ibid., p. 32, n. 13). A certain amount of competition can be observed between the two schemata, such that "tense and mood both operate on the level of connections between story and narrative, while voice designates the connections between narrating and narrative and between narrating and story" (ibid., p. 32, his emphases). This competition explains why the main emphasis is placed on the relation between the time of the narrative and the time of the story, and why the time of the utterance is treated in less detail, in the discussion of voice in the last chapter.

57. "There is simply the narrative's halt at the point when the hero has discovered the truth and the meaning of his life: at the point, therefore when this 'story of a vocation'—which, let us remember, is the avowed subject of Proustian narrative—comes to an end. . . . So it is necessary that the narrative be interrupted before the hero overtakes the narrator; it is inconceivable for them both to write together: *The End*" (ibid., pp. 226-27).

58. We ought to be able to say of the metaphysical experience of time in *Remembrance of Things Past* exactly what Genette says of the "I" of the book's hero, namely, that he is neither entirely Proust nor entirely another. This is by no means a "return to the self," a "presence to the self" that would be postulated by an experience expressed in the fictional mode, but instead a "semi-homonymy" between real experience and fictive experience, similar to that which the narratologist discerns between the hero-narrator and the work's signatory (cf. ibid., pp. 251-52).

59. We saw above the grammatical means through which Genette introduces these notions in *Narrative Discourse*. Below, we shall examine what he adds to this in his *Nouveau Discours du recit*.

60. If I do not engage in a detailed discussion here of the concept of "implied author" introduced by Wayne Booth in his *Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), this is due to the distinction I am making between the contribution of voice and point of view to the (internal) composition of the work and their role in (external) communication. It is not without reason that Booth places his analysis of the implied author under the auspices of a rhetoric and a poetics of fiction. This is why

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I am reserving my discussion of the implied narrator for a later analysis of the relation of the work to the reader. It goes without saying, nonetheless, that all my analyses concerning the narrator's discourse are incomplete until they have been connected with a rhetoric of fiction that I shall incorporate into the theory of reading to be present in Part IV in volume 3.


62. We have examined above Kate Hamburger's contribution to the theory of verb tenses. However, if the epic preterite (that is, the diegetic preterite) loses, in her opinion, its power to signify real time, this is because this preterite is linked to mental verbs designating the action of *Ich-Origen* that are themselves fictive.

63. It is "epic persons," (epische Personen) she says, that "render a piece of narrative literature just that" (ibid., p. 63). Also, "epic fiction is the sole epistemological instance where the l-originarity (or subjectivity) of a third person qua third person can be portrayed [dargestellt]" (ibid., p. 83).


65. In first-person narrative fiction, the narrator and the main character are one and the same; but only in autobiography are the author, the main character, and the narrator the same. Cf. Philippe Lejeune, *Le Pacte autobiographique* (Paris: Seuil, 1975). I shall, therefore, not consider autobiography here. However, I ought not to avoid referring to it in the context of the refashioning of time performed jointly by history and fiction. It is actually the only place that can be assigned to autobiography by the strategy operating in *Time and Narrative*.

66. Two of the texts 1 will study in the next chapter—*Mrs. Dalloway* and *The ... Magic*—are third-person fictional narratives. The third is a first-person fictional narrative, *Remembrance of Things Past*, which includes a narrative in the third-person, *Swann in Love*. The equally fictive character of the "I" and the "he," Jean Santeuil (trans. Gerard Hopkins (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955)) stands as unimpeachable evidence. This exchange of personal pronouns does not signify that the choice of one technique or the other is not based on concrete reasons or that it is without particular narrative effects. It is not my purpose to weigh the advantages and drawbacks of these two narrative strategies.

67. "All comprehension is imagination" (Jean Pouillon, *Temps et Roman* [Paris: Gallimard, 1945], p. 45).


69. Quotation marks generally serve as a guide here. But this sort of mark may be missing in the contemporary novel. Nevertheless the quoted or self-quoted monologue respects the grammatical tense (usually the present) and the person (the first person) and consists in an

70. Pouillon's *Temps et Roman* anticipates the typology of narrative situations with its distinction between seeing "with," seeing "from behind," and seeing "from outside ." However, unlike more recent analyses, it takes as its basis not the dissimilarity but the deep kinship between narrative fiction and "real psychological understanding" (ibid., p. 69). In both cases, understanding is the work of the imagination. It
is therefore essential to move, in turn, from psychology to the novel and from the novel to psychology (ibid., p. 71). Nonetheless, a certain privilege is given to self-understanding, to the extent (hat "the author of a novel tries to give the reader the same 183

narrative vision") as the narrator has of himself or of herself" (ibid., p. 69). This privilege runs through the proposed categorization. For example, since all understanding consists in grasping an inside through an outside, seeing "from outside" suffers from the same drawbacks as behaviorist psychology, which thinks it can infer the inside on the basis of the outside, and even contests the relevance of the notion of "inside." As for seeing "with" and seeing "from behind," they correspond to two other uses of the imagination in understanding. In one case, it shares "with" the character the same unreflective self-consciousness (ibid., p. 80); in the other, the seeing is "disconnected," not in the same way as in seeing "from outside," but in the way that reflection objects unreflective consciousness (ibid., p. 85). This, for Pouillon, the distinction between the narrator's point of view and that of the character, which is taken directly from novelistic technique, remains closely related to the distinction, coming from Sartre, between prereflective and reflective consciousness. On the other hand, the most lastling contribution made by Pouillon seems to me to be that of the second part of his work, "The Expression of Time." The distinction he makes there between "novels of duration" and "novels of eternity" is directly related to what I am calling here the (active experience of time (cf. below, chapter 4).


72. The term Mittelbarkeit preserves a dual meaning. By offering a "medium" for presenting the character, literature "transmits" the content of the fiction to the reader.

73. "Author" is always taken here in the sense of narrator, that is, the internal locutor responsible for the composition of the work.


75. Seymour Chatman, in "The Structure of Narrative Transmission" (in Style and Literature, pp. 213-57), attempts to account for the reader's competence on the basis of an open-ended list of "discursive features" that are isolated in the same way as are the inventories of illocutionary force in speech acts by John Austin and John Searle. This is a plausible alternative to the search for taxonomies that would be both systematic and dynamic.

76. One attempt that particularly careful to combine the systematic emphasis of typology with the power to produce ever more varied "narrative modes" is sketched out by Ludomir Dolezel in "The Typology of the Narrator: Point of View in Fiction," in To Honor Roman Jakobson, vol. 1 (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), pp. 541-52. Unlike Stanzel's typology, Dolezel's rests on a series of dichotomies, beginning with the most general one, that of texts with or without a locutor. This first kind can be distinguished through a certain number of "marks"—the use of personal pronouns, verb tenses and appropriate diegetic levels, the relation of allocation, subjective implication, personal style. The second kind are "unnamed" in various ways. Narrations that are said to be "objective" belong to this category. Texts with locutors are divided according to whether the above-mentioned marks characterize the locutor as narrator or as character (narrator's speech vs. character's speech). After this follows the distinction between areas of activity (or passivity) as regards the narrator. Finally, all these dichotomies include as well that between Er- and Ich-Erzählung. Dolezel's typology is further developed in his Narrative Modes in Czech Literature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973). It adds to the preceding study a structural analysis of the narrative modes (hat can be assigned either to the narrator's speech or to that of the charac-

77. Cf. Boris Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text and a Typology of Compositional Form, trans. Valentina Zavanin and Susan Wittig (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). Uspensky defines his undertaking as a "typology of compositional options in literature as they pertain to point of view" (ibid., p. 5). This is a typology but not a taxonomy, inasmuch as it does not claim to be exhaustive or closed. Point of view is only one of the ways to reach the articulation of the structure of a work of art. This concept is common to all art concerned with representing some part of reality (film, theater, painting, etc.), that is, all the art forms presenting the duality of content and form. Uspensky's concept of the work of art is similar to that of Lotman referred to above. He, too, calls the text "any semantically organized sequence of signs" (ibid.). Lotman and Uspensky both refer to the pioneering work of Mikhail Bakhtin, Probleem of Dostoevski's Poetics, trans. R. W. Rotsel (Ann Arbor: Ardis Publications, 1973), to which I shall return below.

78. Lotman particularly emphasizes the stratified structure of the artistic text (Structure of the Artistic Text, pp. 59-69). This multilayered structure brings together the modeling activity of the work of art as regards reality and also its playful activity, which itself engages in forms of behavior that take on at least two planes at once—that of everyday practice and that of the conventions of playing. By so conjoining regular and aleatory processes, the work of art proposes a variety of more or less rich, but also true, pictures of life (ibid., p. 65). In Part IV, I shall return to this "game effect"/"jeu de jeux" (ibid., p. 67), which in French wipes out the difference between "game"/"jeu" and "play"/"jeu". For Pouillon, the most noteworthy narrative technique from the point of view of the games with verb tenses, known as erable Rede—"the style indirect libre of French critics, or the "narrated monologue" of English-speaking critics—results from the contamination of the narrator's discourse by that of the character, who superimposes his or her grammatical person and verb tense. Uspensky notes all the nuances resulting from the variety of roles played by the narrator, depending on whether he/she records, edits, or rewrites the discourse of the character.

80. This may be compared with the study of anisochronies in Proust carried out by Genette and also with Cohn's analysis of the two opposing models that predominate in the first-person narrative: the clearly retrospective and dissonant narrative of Proust, Notes to Pages 94-100 where there is a vast distance between the narrator and the hero, and Henry James's synchronic and consonant narrative, where the narrator is
contemporary with the hero.

81. The Russian language also offers the grammatical resources of "aspect" to express the iterative and durative features of behavior or of a situation.


83. In *Nouveau Discours fin recit*, Genette proposes to substitute the term "localization" for that of point of view. The personalization inevitably required by the category of narrator is then associated with the notion of voice.

84. This is why in so many German and English-language critics we find the adjective "auktorial" (Stanzel) or "authorial" (Colin). These adjectives offer the advantage of establishing another sort of relation—between author and authority, the adjective "authoritative" linking together both constellations of meaning. On the relation between author and authority. cf. Said, *Beginnings*, pp. 16, 23, 83-84. This theme is linked to his idea of "molestation," referred to above, chap. 1, n. 43.


86. The pages devoted to dialogue, as the general "metalinguistic" principle of language in all its speech acts, deserve attention just as much as the study of the particular forms of the polyphonic novel (cf. Dostoevsky's *Poezies*, pp. 150—227).

87. Cf. ibid., p. 23. Stressing the rapidity with which changes occur in the course of the narrative, Bakhtin notes that "dynamics and speed ... signify not the triumph of time, but the triumph over time, for speed is the only means of overcoming time in time" (ibid., p. 24).

88. Here we find the fourteen distinctive features that Bakhtin recognizes in car-nivalistic literature (ibid., pp. 93-97). In this regard he does not hesitate to speak of "an internal logic determining the inseparable coupling of all its elements" (ibid., p. 98). In addition, the secret spot linking the concealed discourse and the depths of a character with the discourse shown upon the surface of another character forms a peculiar position.

89. On the notion of "subsequent" narration, cf. Genette's *Narrative Discourse*, pp. 35, 223. *Noiveau Discours fin recit* adds the following: a narrator who announces ahead of time a subsequent development of the action that is being narrated "thereby posits without any possible ambiguity that this narrative act is posterior to the story told, or at least with respect to the part of the story that he anticipates in this way" (ibid., p. 54). We shall see in the final chapter of volume 3 in what way this posterior position of the narrative voice in the fictional narrative favors the historization of fiction, which compensates for the fictionalization of history.

90. I shall return at the end of volume 3 to the role of this quasi-intuition in the fictionalization of history.

91. On reading as the response to the narrative voice of the text, cf. Valdes, *Shadows in the Cave*, p. 23. The text is trustworthy to the extent that the fictional voice itself is (ibid., p. 25). This question is particularly urgent in the case of parody. The characteristic parody found in *Don Quixote*, for example, must finally be able to be identified by unmistakable signs. This "address" of the text, uttered by the narrative voice, constitutes the intentionality of the text as such (cf. ibid., pp. 26-32; see also Valdes's interpretation of *Don Quixote*, pp. 141-62).

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Cf. above, p. 5.

2. Cf. the work by Fink referred to above. Chap. 3. n. 21. In a similar sense. Lot-man places inside the "frame" that marks out every work of art, the compositional

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3. This notion of immanent transcendence exactly overlaps that of intentionality as it is applied by Mario Valdes to the text as a whole. It is in the act of reading that the intentionality of the text is actualized (*Shadows in the Cave*, pp. 45-76). This analysis should be combined with that of narrative voice considered as that which presents the text. The narrative voice is the bearer of the intentionality belonging to the text, which is actualized only in the intersubjective relationship that unfolds between the solicitation coming from the narrative voice and the response of reading. This analysis will be taken up again in a systematic way in volume 3.


5. The expression "imaginative variations" will take on its full meaning only when we are in a position to confront the range of solutions it offers to the arias of time with the resolution provided by the constitution of historical time, in the next volume of *Time and Narrative*.


7. James Hafley, contrasting Mrs. Dalloway with Joyce's *Ulysses*, writes, "| Virginia Woolfs used the single day as a unity ... to show that there is no such thing as a single day" (*The Glass Roof*, p. 75, quoted by Jean Guiguet, *Virginia Woolf and Her Works*, trans. Jean Stewart (London: The Hogarth Press, 1965), p. 389).

8. Virginia Woolf was quite proud of discovering his narrative technique and of putting it to use. In her diary she called it "the tunnelling process." "It took me a year's groping to discover what I call my tunnelling process, by which I tell the past by installments, as I have need of time." (A Writer's Diary, p. 60, quoted by Guiguet, p. 229). During the period when the first draft of *Mrs. Dalloway* was still called *The Hours*, she wrote in her diary: "I should say a good deal about *The Hours* and my discovery: How I dig out beautiful caves behind my characters: I think that gives exactly what I want; humanity, humour, depth. The idea is that the caves shall connect and each comes to daylight at the present moment" (A Writer's Diary, p. 60, quoted by Guiguet, p. 233-34). The alternations between action and remembering this become an alternation between (he superficial and the profound. The two fates of Septimus and Clarissa essentially communicate through the closeness of the subterranean "caves" visited by the narrator. On the surface, they are brought together through the character of Dr. Bradshaw, who belongs to two subplots. The news of Septimus's death, brought by the doctor, thus assures, on the surface, the unity of the plot.

9. Exploring the character of each protagonist is the main interest of the third chapter ("Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse") of Jean Alexander's *The Venture of Form in the Novels of Virginia Woolf* (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1974), pp. 85-104. Mrs. Dalloway is judged to be the only one of Virginia Woolf's novels that "evolves from a character" (ibid., p. 85). By isolating the character of Clarissa in this way, Jean Alexander can point out the tissued that is mixed with the brilliance, the compromises with a social world that, for Clarissa, never loses its solidity and its glory. Clarissa thus becomes a "class symbol," which Peter Walsh has perceived as being hard as wood and yet hollow. But the hidden relation with Septimus Warren Smith shifts the perspective by bringing to light the dangers that Clarissa's life is thought to disarm, namely, the possible destruction of the personality through the interplay of human relationships. This psychological approach gives rise to an apt analysis of the range of sentiments of fear and terror that the novel explores. Alexander's comparison with Sartre's *Nausea* (ibid., p. 97) seems completely justified to me in this regard.

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The question of the narrative status of historical writing was not directly at stake for the epistemology of the historical sciences, neither for French historiography nor in the first phase of the discussion within the analytic school. Throughout this debate it was taken for granted that narrative is too elementary a form of discourse to satisfy, even from afar, the requirements for any science posed by the covering law model of explanation. The subsequent appearance of "narrativist" theses in the field of discussion was born from the conjunction of two currents of thought. On one side, the criticism of the covering law model had ended up in a breaking apart of the very concept of explanation, and this opened a breach for an approach to the problem from the opposite direction. On the other side, narrative became the object of a revaluation bearing essentially on its resources of intelligibility. Our narrative understanding thus found itself brought into prominence, while historical explanation lost some of its importance. This chapter is devoted to this conjunction of these two movements.

THE BREAKING UP OF THE COVERING LAW MODEL

An Explanation Lacking Legality: W. Dray

We saw at the end of the preceding chapter how the partisans of the covering law model tried to account for the gap between the model and the actual state of affairs in historical science by a double tactic, consisting on one side of weakening the model and on the other of taking a stand on historians' efforts to elevate their discipline to the rank of science. The attitude of those who discern the symptom of a basic error in the construction of the model itself, in the gap between the covering law model and the actual methodology of history, is wholly different.

William H. Dray's work. Laws and Explanations in History, is the best wit-

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ness in this regard to the crisis in the covering law model. 'His book responds to a disjointed problematic with a multifaceted structure. Three fronts are opened which are relatively discontinuous with one another. On the first one. a purely negative criticism is carried out that concludes by disconnecting the concept of explanation from that of law. On the second front, he pleads for a type of causal analysis that cannot be reduced to subsumption under laws. The positive thesis underlying the first part, namely, that we can explain things in history without recourse to general laws, thereby receives an initial application, without it being affirmed that every explanation in history must assume causal language. Finally, Dray explores a type of "rational explanation" that covers only a part of the field emancipated by the criticism of explanation in terms of empirical laws. The plea for causal analysis and that for rational explanation are not derived logically from the negative thesis that explanation in history does not need a law to be an explanation, even though they do presuppose it. They must, therefore, be discussed on their own merits. Underlying the criticism of the covering law model is the conviction that it "is unlikely that we shall find any logical features according to which all historical explanations can be grasped together as historical. For the explanations found in history books are a logically miscellaneous lot" (p. 85. his emphasis). It is the recognition of this logical dispersion of explanation in history that opened the way to a reevaluation of our narrative understanding.

Beginning with the negative thesis that the idea of explanation in history does not imply the idea of law. Dray finds support for his criticism in the oscillations between the "strong" and the "weak" models of the partisans of the covering law model, which he was the first to call by this name. Already on a formal level, Dray notes, the formulation of the alleged tie between a law and the case it "covers" leaves room for hesitation. The term "because" does not commit us to any particular determinate logical structure, except perhaps in a dictionary written by the logicians of the covering law school. As for the relation of implication affirmed by the "deduced" character of the event, it is far from being univocal. And finally, the concept of explanation does not constrain us to affirm further a "covering" relation between laws and instances. To these oscillations in the formulation of the bonds of implication are added variations in the formulation of the model itself. We have seen that some authors would rather weaken the model than call it into question. A scale of decreasing rigor can in this sense be traversed, from the most strict requirement for deduction to the idea of a lawlike form, passing through that of an assumed but not yet established law. one that is tacit rather than explicit, sketched out but not Complete. These oscillations are the symptom of a logical deficiency in the model itself. Indeed it can be shown that the covering law model is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the events explained. It is not a sufficient condition because the alleged explanation cannot be converted into a prediction.

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Something is still missing. What? Let us consider the example of a mechanical accident, say, when an automobile motor seizes. To attribute the cause to an oil leak, it does not suffice that we know the various
physical laws involved. We must also be able to consider a continuous series of incidents between the onset of
the leak and the motor's breakdown. In saying "continuous," we are not committing ourselves to some
philosophical apona concerning the infinite divisibility of space and time. We limit ourselves to identifying the
lower order of events and to placing them in a series that does not allow any other events lower than those cited.
This "reference to a series of facts constituting the story of what happened between the leakage of the oil and the
seizure of the engine does explain the seizure" (p. 70). It is the same in history; the divisibility of time ends
where the most detailed analysis does.

If not sufficient, explanation in terms of laws is also not necessary. Indeed, for what condition could it be
necessary? Consider the example of an explanation a historian might give or has given: Louis XIV was
unpopular when he died because he pursued a political program harmful to the national interests of France. Let
us imagine a dialogue between this historian and a logician from the Hempelian school. How would this logician
convince the historian that laws are in fact required by the preceding explanation? The logician will say, your
explanation is valid due to some implicit law, such as "governments that pursue political programs harmful to the
interests of their subjects become unpopular." The historian will object that he had not just any political program
in mind but one such that had really been followed in the particular case under consideration. The logician will
then try to fill in the gap between the law and the historian's explanation by making the law more precise through
a series of additions, such as governments that commit their countries to foreign wars, that persecute religious
minorities, that entertain parasites at their courts, become unpopular. Still other precisions can be added: that cer-
tain political measures failed, that they involved the king's personal responsibility, and so on without mentioning
the measures the king neglected to take. The logician must then allow that, to be complete, an explanation
requires an indefinite process of specifications, for at no stage can it be proved that the case covered by the
historian is the only one covered by the law. Just one law logically binds the historian: any government taking
the same political measures, in exactly the same circumstances as those of Louis XIV, will become unpopular.
But this formulation is no longer that of a law. It has to mention, in effect, all the particular circumstances of the
case in question. (For example, it must not speak of war in general, but of the attack against the Jansenists, and
so on.) It takes on an air of generality only by introducing the expression "exactly." The result of this operation is
the production of an empty limit-case, an empty one because the notion of "exactly the same policies and cir-
cumstances" (p. 36) cannot be given meaning for any conceivable inquiry.

In return, the historian will accept a general statement such as every people

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similar to the French people "in the aspects specified" (p. 38) will detest a leader similar to Louis "in the respects
specified" (ibid.). This law is not an empty one. since the dialectic between the logician and the historian will
have furnished the means to "satisfy" the expressions in quotation marks. But this is no longer the sort of law
required by the covering law model. For far from being vague and general like implicit laws, it is so detailed a
law that it is equivalent to a "law" for a single case.

In reality, such a law for a single case is not a law at all. but the reformulation, in the guise of an empirical law.
of the historian's process of reasoning. The historian says, "E because c, . . . c,," where E designates the event to
he explained and c, . . . c. are the factors listed by the historian in his explanation. The logician rewrites this as
"if c, . . . c,, then E. Where "if" is equivalent to "whenever." But this equivalence is misleading, for the
hypothetical form can express something other than an empirical law. It can express the principle of inference
that, in similar cases, we can reasonably predict a result of this sort. Yet this principle is only an "inference
license," stated in hypothetical form. The logical phantom of a "law" thus proceeds from the confusion between
an empirical law and a principle of inference.

Two provisional conclusions follow, which later I propose to incorporate into my own analysis of the
relationships between explanation and understanding in history.

The first one concerns the notion of an event, which is also at stake in the discussion in French historiography.
Rejecting the covering law model seems, in effect, to imply a return to the conception of an event as unique. This
assertion is false if we attach to the idea of uniqueness the metaphysical thesis that the world is made up of
radically dissimilar particulars. Explanation then becomes impossible. The assertion is true, though, if we mean
that, in contrast to the practitioners of the nomological sciences, historians want to describe and explain what
actually happened in all its concrete details. But then what historians understand by "unique" means that nothing
exists exactly like their object of inquiry. Their concept of uniqueness, therefore, is relative to the level of
precision chosen for their inquiries. What is more, this assertion does not prevent them from employing general
terms such as revolution, conquest of one country by another, and the like. In fact, these general terms do not
commit historians to the formulation of general laws, but rather to the search for those respects in which the
events considered and their circumstances differ from those with which it would be natural to group them under
one, classificatory term. Historians are not interested in explaining the French Revolution insofar as it is a
revolution but insofar as its course differed from those of other members of the class of revolutions. As the
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toward the general law but from the classificatory term toward the explanation of differences.¹
The second conclusion concerns this very explanation of differences. To the extent that it gathers together unique
factors in the sense just mentioned, we can affirm that it stems from judgment rather than from deduction, where
by judgment we are to understand the sort of operation undertaken by judges when they weigh opposing
arguments and render a decision. In the same way, for historians to explain is to defend their conclusions against
adversaries who would refer to another set of factors to uphold their own thesis. They justify their conclusions by
bringing in new details to support their thesis. This way of judging about particular cases does not consist in
placing a case under a law but in gathering together scattered factors and weighing their respective importance in
producing the final result. Here historians follow the logic of practical choices instead of that of scientific
deduction. In this exercise of judgment, another explanation different from that by laws is referred to as a
"warrant"—which will be called causal explanation.

The plea for causal analysis which occupies chapter 4 of Dray's book is relatively independent of his criticism of
the covering law model of explanation. Causal analysis is just one of the alternatives to explanation by the
covering law model. If Dray discusses it, it is first of all because the contested model has often been presented in
terms of the language of causality, for example, by Karl Popper.¹ In this sense, the causal version of the covering
law model provides an appropriate transition from negative criticism to positive exploration of causal analysis.
Aside from this connection offered by the polemical aspect of Dray's book, however, the examining of causal
analysis finds its own justification in the use of causal language in history. Dray uacs this language to be
inevitable and legitimate, in spite of all the equivocations and dit-licuities attached to its use. Historians, in fact
and legitimately, do use expressions of the form "X is the cause of Y" (which we shall distinguish later from the
causal law. "the cause of Y is X"). They use them in fact with numerous variations on "cause": produces, leads to,
sets in motion (or their contraries: prevented, omits, stops). They use them legitimately by assuming the
explanatory force of a cause. This is what is at stake in this debate. The underlying thesis is that the polvxevm of
the word "cause" is no more an obstacle to the rule-governed usage of this term than is that of the term "to
explain," with which we began. The problem is to regulate this polysemy, not to conclude that the term must be
rejected.⁷

If we set aside the case in which by a cause we mean-achausal law, a discussion about causal analysis in history is
interesting only if there are singular causal connections whose explanatory force does not depend on a law.
Dray is fighting here on two fronts: against those who link the fate of the
idea of a cause to that of the idea of a law. and against those who want to exclude all explanation from the field
of historiography. Yes, historians do attempt to given causal explanations. No. causal analysis of some particular
course of events cannot be reduced to the application of some causal law. Yes. historians do use expressions of
the form "X causes Y" in a legitimate way; no, these explanations are not the application of a law of the form "if
X. then Y." What then is a causal analysis? It is an essentially selective analysis, aimed at verifying the credentials of this or
that candidate for the function of being a cause: that is. its credentials for occupying the place of "Because . . . ."
in response to the question "Why?") This selection process therefore takes on the character of a contest in which
the candidates must pass a certain number of tests. Causal analysis. I would put it, is a causal criteriology. It
consists essentially of two tests. The first is an inductive one. The factor in question must be a really necessary
one. The second is a pragmatic test. There must be a reason for selecting the condition in question from among
the conditions that as a whole constitute the sufficient condition for the phenomenon.
This pragmatic test corresponds in part to the considerations of mampuia-bility by which Collingwood defines
one of the senses of the idea of a cause, namely, that which human action "has a handle on." In another way. it
takes into account what ought to have been done, thus what can be blamed (as. for example, when we inquire as
to the causes of a war). And in yet another way. the pragmatic criterion includes what precipitated the course of
events, the spark or catalyst. In essence, such an inquiry is necessarily incomplete. It constitutes an eminently
open inquiry.

The inductive test is the most difficult one to define correctly. If consists in' justifying the assertion that "if not
X. then not Y," in the absence of any rule saying "whenever X. then Y." A historian \(\Rightarrow\)-ho is assumed to use
similar formulas means that in this particular situation—everything else otherwise being equal (or better, the
situation being what it is)—if this X had not occurred. that Y which did occur would not have happened or would
have been different. Such justification stems from a use of judgment as described earlier, which. we said, does
not require a law with the form "only if." The historian "thinks away" the suggested cause "in order to judge
what difference its non-occurrence would have made in the light of what else he knows about the situation
studied" (p. 104. his emphasis). This inductive test is not equivalent to a sufficient explanation. At most it
constitutes a necessary explanation, by eliminating from the list of candidates for the role of cause those factors
whose absence would not have changed the course of events. To obtain a complete explanation—or one as
complete as possible—the imputed cause must still be justified positively through the process described earlier.
that of "filling in" the details."

The important thing for causal analysis is that the imputation of a cause in 126

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regard to some particular event does not derive from the application of a causal law. Often it is even the opposite case that is true. Many causal laws are in reality second-order generalizations based on some series of individual diagnoses of causality, established through a use of judgment and validated independently of one another. The alleged causal law, "tyranny causes revolution," is undoubtedly of this order. The same may be said of "the cause of war is greed." Such a law assumes that we have at our command particular explanations of particular wars, then that we observe a trend in the stated law. As useful as these generalizations may be for subsequent research, they are not what justify the individual explanations they rest upon. If there is therefore no need to give up the idea of cause in history, this is so to the extent that we respect its particular logic, such as I have outlined it.

I will conclude with several strictly conservative comments. First, as concerns explanation, it seems to me that we must apply to the theory of causal analysis—as well as to rational explanations, which I have not yet spoken of—the warning addressed to the partisans of the covering law model, namely, that the explanations encountered in works of history constitute "a logically miscellaneous lot." This assertion holds against every claim to take one model of explanation as the exclusive one. This polysemy can also serve as an argument against Dray's opposite claim to separate explanation in history from the covering law model. If we limit ourselves to saying that no explanation satisfies the covering law model and that there are causal analyses that are not explanations in terms of a law, we are in error. This is why, for my part. I would prefer to emphasize the fact that laws are interpolated into the narrative fabric instead of insisting upon their mappropriateness. This is all the more true in that Dray opens the way to a more subtle dialectic between explanation and understanding when he considers the procedures for justifying a causal attribution and links them to the procedures that occur in juridical cases. The search for warrants, the weighing and evaluating of causes, the testing of candidates for the role of cause, all these activities of judgment stem from an analogy between historical and juridical argumentation which needs to be made more explicit.

And in this regard, the kinship among the recon-stitution of a continuous series of events, the procedure of the elimination of candidates for singular causality, and the exercise of judgment needs to be shown more clearly. Hence the range must be left open from explanation by laws, to singular causal explanation, to judgment procedures, . . . to rational explanation.

On the other hand, despite the prefatory assertion of always drawing upon historians' actual argumentation, the few examples considered by Dray seem borrowed from the sort of history the French historians struggle against. In the dialectic between the logician and the historian as well as in the descri-

tion of the causal analysis of singular events, it seems taken for granted that

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explanation always has to do with singular events. Of course, I am ready to admit that particular causal analysis is valid for any short-term or long-term change, on the condition that historians do take into account the particularity of the changes they consider. In this respect, everything said about the relativity of the notion of a unique event to the scale of an inquiry must be retained. But the broadening of the notion of event to include other changes than the kind that is illustrated by the example of the death of Louis XIV remains to be done:"

Most critics have seen his examination of the model of rational explanation as Dray's positive contribution to our problem (see pp. 118-55). This is not wholly wrong inasmuch as this model constitutes one coherent alternative to the covering law model. But neither is it exact, inasmuch as causal analysis already constituted an alternative to explanation in terms of laws. What is more, rational explanation does not cover the whole field opened by Dray's criticism. It is not even addressed to exactly the same examples of explanation. The previous discussion—including that of causal analysis—was applied "to explanations given of fairly large scale historical events or conditions" (p. 118). Rational explanation is applied "to a narrower range of cases," namely, "the kind of explanations historians generally give of the actions of those individuals who are important enough to be mentioned in the course of historical narrative" (ibid., his emphasis).

This is why, even though contesting the covering law model remains the negative central thread of Dray's whole book, we must respect the relative autonomy of the three fronts upon which he fights: against the covering law model: for causal analysis; for rational explanation. The relative discontinuity in these analyses bears witness precisely to what I have called the breakdown of the covering law.

The name that Dray gives to this mode of explanation sums up his program. For one thing, it applies to actions done by agents similar to ourselves. It thereby marks the intersection of the theory of history with that of action, therefore with what I have called our competence for using a conceptual framework for action in a meaningful way. However, because of this, it runs the risk of confining historical explanation to the domain of the "history of events," from which the new historians take their distance. This point must be kept in mind for our discussion in the next chapter. For another thing, the model still means to be a model of explanation. In this, Dray takes his stand equally distant from those for whom explaining something is to "cover" it with an empirical law, and those for whom understanding an action is to relive, reenact, or rethink the intentions, conceptions, and thoughts of agents. Once again Dray is fighting on two fronts, that of the positivists and that of the idealists, to the extent that these latter theorists lock themselves into a

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theory of empathy which the former thinkers denounce because of its non-scientific character. In truth, among
the "idealists." it is Collingwood whom Dray remains closest to. Relive, reenact, rethink, are Collingwood's terms. What needs to be demonstrated is that these operations do have their own logic which distinguishes them from psychology or heuristics, and which sets them on the terrain of explanations. The stake is therefore really "a logical analysis of explanation as it is given in history" (p. 121. his emphasis)."

To explain an individual's action in terms of reasons is to provide "a reconstruction of the agent's calculation of means to be adopted toward his chosen end in the light of the circumstances in which he found himself" (p. 122. his emphasis). In other words, to explain such actions "we need to know what considerations convinced him that he should act as he did" (ibid.). To explain the action is to bring to light this calculation. It constitutes the agent's "reasons" for acting as he did. Whence the term "rational explanation."

Dray adds one important touch that goes beyond "logic." To explain is to show how that what was done was "the thing to have done tor the reasons given" ip. 124). To explain, therefore, is to justify, with the nuance of "appraisal" attached to this term. It means to explain in what way the action was "appropriate." Here again we need to be clear about the meaning of these words. To justify is not to ratify the choice following our moral criteria, so as to say what the agent in question did is what I would have done too. It means "weighing" the action in terms of the agent's goals, his beliefs (even if they were erroneous ones), the circumstances he was aware of. "Rational explanation may be regarded as an attempt to reach a kind of logical equilibrium at which point an action is matched with a calculation" (p. 125, his emphasis). We look for an explanation precisely when we do not see the relationship between what was done and what we think we know about the agents involved. When such logical equilibrium is lacking, we seek to reconstitute it. "Logical equilibrium" is the best term Dray could have chosen to distance himself from understanding through empathy, projection, or identification, and at the same time remove his explanation from Hempel's criticism. For to reach this point of equilibrium, we must inductively gather the evidence that allows us to evaluate the problem as the agent saw it. Only work with the documents allows this reconstruction. There is nothing instantaneous or dogmatic about this procedure. It requires work and is open to corrections. It requires these features with causal analysis.

Dray did not ask about the relations between his analysis and that of emplot-mem. The kinship between the two approaches is therefore all the more remarkable. It is particularly striking on one point. Dray observes that rational explanation involves a type of generality or universality that is not the same as for an empirical law: "If y is a good reason for A to do v. then y would be a good reason for anyone sufficiently like A to do. v under sufficiently similar circumstances" (p. 132). We recognize here the notion of "probability" referred to by Aristotle: "What a man would necessarily or reasonably say or do." Dray is too occupied with polemizing against the covering law model and distinguishing a "principle of action" from an empirical generalization to take interest in this intersection of the theory of history with that of narrative, as he has done with the theory of action. Yet we cannot forget the Aristotelian distinction between "one because of another" and "one after the other" when Dray pleads for the polysemy of the term "because," against any reduction to univocity in covering law terms. There remains, to my eyes, the major difficulty, which is not the one Dray is arguing about. To the extent that the model of rational explanation makes the theory of history intersect with the theory of action, the problem is to account for those reasons for actions that cannot be attributed to individual agents. Here, we shall see. is the critical point for any "narrativist" theory.

Dray is not unaware of this difficulty and does devote a section to it (pp. 137-42). He proposes three responses which do not exactly correspond with one another. We can begin by saying that there is a presumption that a given action lends itself to rational explanation "if we study it closely enough" (p. 137). This presumption is the wager that it is always possible to "save the appearance" of rationality by discovering, through hard work, the distant — and perhaps strange—beliefs allowing us to construct the presumed calculation and to reach the sought-for point of equilibrium between reasons and actions. This presumption of rationality has no limits. It includes recourse to unconscious motives, and even an "irrational" explanation is still a case of explanation by reasons. However, this first response only holds to the degree that we can identify the individual agents of an action. What happens when rational explanation is applied to groups? Dray suggests that by an elliptical process historians do find it legitimate to personify entities such as Germany and Russia and to apply a quasi-rational explanation to these super-agents. For example, Germany's attack on Russia in 1941 can be explained by
referring to Germany's fear of being attacked from the rear by Russia—as though a calculation of this sort did
hold for the actions of a super-agent named Germany (see p. 140).

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This ellipsis itself is justified in two ways. We can, through very detailed studies, demonstrate that the
calculation in question is in the final analysis one that applies to those individuals authorized to act "for
Germany." And in other cases, we extend by analogy a "typical" explanation for an individual to a group. (For
example, the Puritans in the eighteenth century fought against the system of taxation in England.)
The third response is that with large-scale historical phenomena we run into what Whitehead called the
"senseless side" of history, that is, that rationally explainable actions produce unintended and unwanted effects,
even adverse ones. For example, Christopher Columbus's voyage can be said to be the cause of the spread of
European culture, in a sense of the word "cause" that has nothing to do with Columbus's intentions. The same
may be said for most large-scale social phenomena. At this point, an objection might be made that links up with
French historiography's considerations about the long time-span and social history. Dray grants that the result of
such large-scale changes cannot be explained by the purposes of some individual "who stage-managed the whole
ting." In other words, there is no place here for referring to some equivalent substitute for the Hegelian
cunning of reason, which would still allow us to speak of unintended results of action in intentional terms. Yet
this admission does not prevent more detailed inquiry into individuals' or groups' contribution to the final result
and therefore into the calculations that presided over their activities. There is no one super-calculation but rather
a batch of calculations to be treated in a "piecemeal" fashion.

As we see, the argument is valid only if we take the social process as equivalent to the sum of individual
processes analyzed in intentional terms and if we take the gap that separates them as simply "meaningless." This
equivalence, however, is a problem. There is the question, in fact, whether what distinguishes historical
explanation from rational explanations of action is not first of all the scale of phenomena it refers to, namely,
edentities with a societal character that are not reducible to the sum of their individual members. Next there is the
appearance of effects not reducible to the sum of individual intentions, and hence to their calculations. Finally,
there are those changes not reducible to variations in the time experienced by individuals taken one at a time." In
short, how are we to tie social processes to the acts of individuals and their calculations without professing a
"methodological individualism" that has yet to produce its credentials?

William Dray confines himself to the resources of a theory of action close to the one I developed in Part I under
the title of mimesis,. It remains to be seen whether a "narrativist" treatment of our historical understanding,
which would draw upon the resources of the intelligibility of narrative stemming from mimesis, might span the
gulf that remains between explanation in terms of an individual or quasi-individual agent's reasons and
explanation of large-scale historical processes in terms of nonindividual social forces.

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Historical Explanation According to G. H. Von Wright

Criticism of the covering law model takes a decisive step with the work of Georg von Wright." It does not, as
with Dray, consist in opposing causal explanation to explanation in terms of laws and constructing, as a partial
alternative model, rational explanations. It aims instead at conjoining causal explanation and teleological
inference within a "mixed" model, that of quasi-causal explanation, intended to account for the most typical
mode of explanation in the human sciences and in history.

It is not insignificant that von Wright, a specialist in deontological logic, should recognize, at the threshold of
his enterprise, the duality of traditions that have presided over theory-building in the "humanistic and social"
disciplines. The first tradition, which goes back to Galileo, and even Plato, gives priority to causal and
mechanistic explanation. The second, which goes back to Aristotle, pleads for the specificity of teleological or
finalistic explanation. The former requires a unified scientific method. The latter defends a methodological
pluralism. Von Wright rediscovers this ancient polarity in the opposition, familiar to the German tradition,
between Verstehen (understanding) and Erklären (explanation)." But even though the covering law model was
forced to deny that understanding possessed any explanatory value, without for all that succeeding in accounting
for the intellectual operations actually at work in the human sciences, von Wright proposes a sufficiently
powerful model to get close to. through a series of successive extensions of the initial language of classical
propositional logic, the domain of historical understanding, with regard to which he always recognizes an
originary capacity of apprehension as regards the meaning of human action. What is interesting, for our invest-
igation, lies exactly in this approximation without annexation of the domain of understanding through a model
stemming from the enrichment of propositional logic by modal logic and the theory of dynamic systems."

Whoever speaks of approximation speaks at the same time of the construction through successive extensions of
some initial language of a richer model, yet one that is coherent with the theoretical requirements of this
language, and also of the polarization of the theoretical model due to the attraction exercised upon it of some
originary apprehension of meaning, which in the end remains external to the purely internal process of enriching
the model. The question will be whether this approximation goes as far as becoming a logical reformulation of
the underlying concepts of historical understanding.
Unlike the covering law model, which limits itself to superimposing a covering law upon what is given without any internal logical connection, von Wright's model extends its empire to the conditional relations between earlier and later states implied in dynamic physical systems. This extension constitutes the underlying structure for his logical reformulation of the whole problem of understanding.

There is no question here of reproducing the argumentation that governs 132

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this passage from propositional logic to the logic of dynamic physical systems. I shall limit myself to a rapid presentation of the formal-logical apparatus that governs von Wright's work.¹ He makes the following assumptions: a set of logically independent generic states of affairs (that the sun is shining, that someone is opening a door, etc.);¹¹ the occurrence of these states of affairs on given (spatial or temporal) occasions: the assumption that logically independent states of affairs combine with one another in a finite number of ways constituting a total state or world; the possibility of constructing a language that, through a conjunction of its sentences, describes those states that are the atoms or elements of this possible world: and, finally, the possibility of considering, among the set of states of affairs, "state-spaces" and, among these, finite state-spaces. This set of presuppositions can be summed up as follows. "Assume that the total state of the world on a given occasion can be completely described by stating for any given member of some state-space, whether or not this member obtains on that occasion. A world which satisfies this condition might be called a Tractatus-world. It is the kind of world which Wittgenstein envisaged in the Tractatus. It is a species of a more general conception of how the world is constituted. We can call this general conception logical atomism" (p. 44, his emphasis).

As to saying whether the world in which we actually live satisfies this model, that remains "a deep and difficult metaphysical question, and I do not know how to answer it" (ibid.). The model indicates only that states of affairs are the sole "ontological building-bricks" of those worlds we are studying and that we do not attend to the internal structure of these bricks.

At this stage of the analysis, it is difficult to see what step has been taken in the direction of practical and historical understanding. A first significant extension concerns the addition to this system of a principle of development. Von Wright does this in the simplest possible way, by adding a rudimentary "tense-logic" to his two-valued propositional logic. Using the vocabulary of this logic, we add a new symbol T which is reducible to a binary connector. "The expression "pTq" can be read: '(now) the state p obtains and next, viz., on the next occasion, the state q obtains'. ... Of particular interest is the case when they are state-descriptions. The whole expression then says that the world is now in a certain state and on the next occasion in a certain total state, the same or a different one as the case may be" (p. 45). If we consider further that the p and q that frame the T can also themselves contain the symbol T—we can construct chains of states marked by succession which allow us to state fragments of the world's history, where the term "history" indicates both the succession of total states of the world and the expressions depicting that succession. We must further enrich the calculus of the connective T, first with a temporal quantifier ("always" "never," "sometimes"), then by a modal operator M. These successive additions govern the formalizing of the logic of conditions as well as what von Wright will later call causal analysis.

Instead of developing this calculus further, he limits himself to a "quasi-

formal method of exposition and illustration" bringing into play simple to-pological figures (or "trees") (p. 48).

These figures consist only of total states of the world (made up of n elementary states of affairs), represented by small circles, a progression from left to right from one total state to another, hence a "history," represented by the line connecting the circles, and finally alternate possible progressions, represented by branches of the tree.

As formal as this model may be, it already bears the imprint of every subsequent development. The most fundamental condition of history is constituted by the "freedom of movement"—the theoretically unlimited indetermina-tion—the world has, or would have had, at each stage of the progression. We must never lose sight of the fact that, when we speak of a system, we have only to do with "a fragment of the history of the world." "A system, in this sense, is defined through a state-space, an initial state, a number of stages of development, and a set of alternative moves for each stage" (p. 49). Far then from the idea of a system excluding the intervention of free and responsible subjects—whether it be a question of making a plan or a physical experiment—it fundamentally conserves this possibility and calls for it as its complement. How¹¹¹

A second addition is necessary here, if the logic of dynamic physical systems is to rejoin our originary understanding of action and history. It concerns the status of causal explanation in relation to causal analysis, it being understood that it is the former that is of interest to understanding.

Causal analysis is an activity that runs through systems in the form of to-pological trees. Considering some final state, it inquires into the "causes" of its coming into being and its composition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Let us briefly recall the distinction between these two types of condition. To say that p is a sufficient condition of q is to say that whenever p, then q (p suffices to assure the presence of q). To say that p is the necessary condition of q is to say that whenever q, then p (q suffices to assure the presence of p). The
difference between these two types of conditions is illustrated by the asymmetry in how the system is considered, that is, whether it is approached retrogressively or progressively, due to the alternatives opened by the branches. Causal explanation differs from causal analysis in that in the latter a system is given and we explore the conditional relations internal to the system, whereas in causal explanation an individual occurrence of a generic phenomenon (an event, process, or state) is given and we look for a system wherein this generic phenomenon—the explanandum—can be linked to another one following some relation of conditionally. The reader will recognize the step being taken in the direction of the human sciences by this passing from causal analysis to causal explanation, and by the application to the latter of the distinction between a necessary and a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition relation governs manipulation (in producing p we bring about q). The necessary condition relation governs prevention.

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I in setting aside p we prevent everything from happening for which p is a necessary condition. We respond to the question "Why did such a state necessarily happen?" in terms of a sufficient condition. On the other hand, we respond to the question "How was it possible for such a state to occur?" in terms of a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. In the explanation of the first kind, prediction is possible. Explanations of the second kind do not authorize prediction, but rather retrodiction. In the sense that, beginning from the fact that something has happened, we infer, backward through time, that the antecedent necessary condition must have occurred and we look for its traces in the present, as is the case in cosmology, geology, and biology, as well as, I shall say later, in certain historical explanations.

We are now ready for the decisive step, the articulation of causal explanation on the basis of what we originally understand action as being. (Note that at this stage the theories of action and of history overlap.) The phenomenon of "interference," which we anticipated in speaking of producing and bringing about, or of setting aside and preventing, requires such articulation, in the sense that it conjoins that ability to do something of which an agent has an immediate understanding, with the internal conditional relations of a system. The originality of Explanation and Understanding is that it seeks the condition of such interference in terms of the very structure of systems.

The key concept is that of the closure of a system, which comes from causal analysis. In fact a system can be called closed only on some occasion, for a given exemplification. An occasion—or a sequence of occasions—is given, where its initial state occurs and the system unfolds following one of its possible courses of development over n given steps. Among the possible types of closure we can include isolating a system from external causal influences. No state, at any step of the system, has an antecedent causal condition outside the system. Action realizes another noteworthy type of closure, in that it is in doing something that an agent learns to "isolate" a closed system from its environment and to discover the possibilities of development inherent to this system. The agent learns this by setting the system in motion, beginning from some initial state the agent has "isolated." It is this setting things in motion that constitutes interference, at the intersection between one of the agent's abilities and the resources of the system.

How does this intersection occur? Von Wright's argument runs as follows. Given q, the initial state of a system for a given occasion, assume "now there is a state a such that we feel confident, on the basis—of past experience, that a will not change to a state a, unless we change it to a. And assume this is something (we know), we can do" (p. 60, his emphases). These sentences contain the whole theory of interference. Here we touch something irreducible. I am certain that I can... No action would happen and, in particular, no scientific experiments would occur, without this confidence and this assurance that through our interference we can produce changes in the world. And this assurance does not depend upon a relation of conditionality. Instead a marks an interruption of the chain: "a. we assumed, will not change to a unless we change it" (p. 61. his emphasis). Conversely, we can simply let the world change without our interference. Thus we have "to isolate a fragment of the world's history to a closed system and get to know the possibilities land necessities) which govern the developments inside a system. . . . partly by repeatedly putting the system in motion through acts of producing its initial stage and then watching ('passively') the successive stages of its development, and partly by comparing these successive stages with developments in systems originating from different initial states" (pp. 63-64).

Von Wright is correct when he states that "in the idea of putting systems in motion the ideas of action and causation meet" (p. 64). Here he renew a relationship with one of the oldest meanings of the idea of a cause, of which language has conserved a trace. Science may well struggle against analogical and abusive uses of the idea of a cause as some responsible agent, but this idea has its roots in the idea of doing something and of intentionally interfering with the course of nature.

As for the logical structure of "doing something," von Wright adopts the distinctions introduced by Arthur Danto. 'With Danto, he distinguishes between doing something (without having to do something else in the meantime) and bringing something about (by doing something else). We have to decide whether to say: "The
thing done is the result of an action: the thing brought about is the consequence of an action” (p. 67). This distinction is important because interference in a system rests finally on the first type of actions, which Danto calls "basic actions." The tie between a basic action and its result is intrinsic and logical, not causal (if we retain from the Humean u-del the idea that cause and effect are logically extrinsic to each other). Action is therefore not the cause of its result—the result is a part of the action. So in this sense, the action of putting a system in motion, reduced to a basic action, identifies the initial state of a system with the result of an action, in a non-causal sense of the word "result."

The metaphysical consequences of this concept of interference are important and indirectly concern history, inasmuch as it relates actions. Being able to do something, we say, is to be free: "In the race' between causation and agency, the latter will always win. It is a contradiction in terms to think that agency could be completely caught in the nets of causality” (p. 81). If we doubt this, it is first because we take as our models the phenomena of disabilities and incapacitations, rather than successful interferences, which rest upon the intimate certainty we have of being able to do something. This certitude is not derived from acquired knowledge bearing on our inabilities. If we doubt our freedom to do something, it is because we extrapolate to the whole world the regular sequences we have observed. We forget that causal relations

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are relative to the fragments of the history of a world that has the characteristics of a closed system. The capacity to put systems in motion by producing their initial states is a condition for their closure. Action is therefore implied in the discovery of causal relations.

Let us stop at this stage of the demonstration. Are we justified in saying that the theory of dynamic systems furnishes a logical reformulation of what we have already understood as being an action, in the strong sense of the term, that is, as implying an agent's conviction of being able to do something? It does not seem so. Action's lead over causality, suggested in the text just cited, is definitive. Causal explanation runs after our conviction of being able to do something but can never catch up. Approximation, in this sense, is not a logical reformulation without any remainder, but rather the progressive reduction of the interval that allows logical theory to explore the frontier it has in common with understanding.

The reader will have noted that, in my analysis of the phenomenon of interference, I have not distinguished the theory of action and that of history. Or rather, the theory of history has been considered as only one mode of the theory of action.

The extension of the initial logical model is guided, in its approximation of the historical field, by another phenomenon of which we have an understanding just as originary as that of our ability to do something, namely, the understanding we have of the intentional character of action. This intentional character was in one sense implicitly contained in the earlier analysis of "doing something." With Danto, we in effect distinguished basic actions, by which we do something without an intervening intermediary action, and those other actions, by means of which we do something so that something else happens—that is, those things we bring about, and, among them, those which we bring about through other people. We are going to see what extending of the model this originary apprehension of meaning gives rise to. and we shall ask ourselves whether the new approximation this extension gives rise to can take advantage of a full logical reformulation of our understanding of the intentional character of action.

The adding of teleological explanation to causal explanation is called for by the logic of "in order that." Let us set aside the case of quasi-teleological explanation which is only disguised causal explanation, as when we say a wild animal is attracted by its prey, or that a rocket is drawn to its target. The teleological language cannot conceal the fact that the validity of these explanations rests entirely on the truth of their nomic connections. Adaptive phenomena, and in general functional explanations in biology and history, arise from this type of explanation. (Conversely, we shall see later, history presents quasi-causal explanations which, in this instance, conceal in a causal vocabulary, in the nomic sense of this word, genuine segments of teleological expla-

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Teleological explanation bears on actionlike forms of behavior. The phases of an action, in its outer aspect, are not tied together here by a causal bond. Their unity is constituted by their being subsumed under the same intention, defined by what the agent intends to do (or to abstain from doing, or to neglect to do). Von Wright's thesis is that intention cannot be treated as a Humean cause of behavior, if we define such causes by the distinctive feature that the cause and effect are logically independent of each other. Von Wright is here adopting the "logical connection argument," which says that the tie between a reason for actine and the action itself is an intrinsic, not an extrinsic, one. "It is a motivational mechanism and, as such, not causal but ideological” (p. 69).

The question posed here is knowing to what point the logic of teleological explanation accounts for what has already been understood as an intention. As previously in the analysis of interference, we discover a new relation between understanding and explaining. It is no longer a matter of incorporating an "1 :an" into a causal chain but
an intention into a teleological explanation. To succeed at this, it suffices to take teleological explanation as an
inverted practical inference, written as follows.
A intends to bring about \( p \).
A considers that he cannot bring about \( p \) unless he does \( a \).
Therefore \( A \) sets himself to do \( a \).

In a teleological explanation, the conclusion of the practical inference is both a premise and the major term of the
conclusion: \( A \) sets himself to do \( a \) "because" \( A \) intends to bring about \( p \). The practical inference, therefore, is,
what has to be considered. But in order "to become teleologically explicable... behavior must first be
intentionalistically understood" (p. 121, his emphasis). "Intentional" and "teleological" are thus terms that
overlap without being identical with each other. The description in which the action to be explained is stated,
von Wright calls intentional; the explanation itself which brings into play a practical inference, he calls
teleological. The two terms overlap inasmuch as the intentional description is required in order to constitute the
premise of a practical inference. They are distinct inasmuch as the teleological explanation is applied to objects
distant from an intention, which are reached precisely at the end of the practical inference. On one side,
therefore, the intentional description only constitutes the rudimentary form of a teleological explanation. Only
the practical inference brings about the passage from the intentional description to the teleological explanation
properly speaking. On the other side, there would be no need for a logic of the practical syllogism if an
immediate apprehension of the meaning bearing on the intentional character of the action did not give rise to it.
Just as in the movement between our lived experience of acting and causal explanation, action always won, must we not say that in the movement between intentional interpretation

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of action and teleological explanation, the former always wins! Von Wright comes close to admitting this in the
passage already cited: "In order to become teleologically explicable... behavior [mentioned in the conclusion
of the practical syllogism] must first be intentionalistically understood." And he also says: "a teleological
explanation of action is normally preceded by an act of intentionalist understanding of some behavioral data" (p.
132, his emphasis)."

Let me make my point another way: in completing causal explanation with teleological explanation, have we
reached that understanding of history that I rie to narrative understanding?" In truth, we have not yet accounted
for what distinguishes the theory of history from that of action. The practical syllogism as just described allowed
me to lengthen, if I may put it this way, the range of the intentional aim of action. This is why teleological
explanation by itself does not allow us to distinguish history from action. In fact, we have only spoken until now
of history in an extremely formal sense. A system, we said, is "a fragment of the history of a world." But this
assertion is valid for every possible world satisfying the criteria for a "Tractatus-world." The term "history," in
the concrete sense of a "story," appears just once in the analysis of teleological explanation. It is introduced in
the following way. We can observe with Wittgenstein that intentional behavior resembles the use of language. "It
is a gesture whereby I mean something" (p. 114). The use and the understanding of language presuppose the
context of a linguistic community, which is a life-community. "An intention," we are told in Wittgenstein's Piitll-
't'sphical Investigation'. (section 337), "is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions." One
result is that we cannot understand or ideologically explain a form of behavior completely foreign to us. It is this
reference to the context of an action that calls for the comment that "the behavior's intentionality is its place in
a story about the agent" (von Wright, p. 115, his emphasis). It is not sufficient therefore to establish the
equivalence between intentionality and teleological explanation to account lor explanation in history. It is also
necessary to give a logical equivalent for the relationship of an intention to its context, which, in history, is made
up of all the circumstances and all the unintended effects of the action.
It is to approach a degree closer to this particular status of explanation in history that von Wright introduces the
concept of quasi-causal explanation.
In a general way, quasi-causal explanation takes the form: "this happened because... ." For example, a people
rose up in rebellion because the government was corrupt. This explanation is said to be causal because the
explanans refers to a factor that preceded the explanandum. But it is only quasi-causal, for two reasons. The
negative reason is that the validity of the two statements does not require—as is the case for causal explanation
and for quasi-teleological explanation—the truth of a lawlike connection. The positive reason is that the second
statement contains an implicitly teleological

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structure. The goal of the uprising was to throw off" the evil the people were suffering.
What therefore is the relation between quasi-causal explanation and teleological explanation?
Let us say first of all that it is not the only mode of explanation in history. History seems rather, from an explanatory point of view, to constitute a mixed genre. Hence, if there is a place for explanations of a causal type, that place is peculiar and in a characteristic sense subordinate to other types of explanation" (p. 135).^4 Causal explanation occurs in two major forms: explanation in terms of sufficient conditions (why did this type of state of affairs necessarily occur?) and explanations in terms of necessary conditions (how was it possible that...?). The subordination of these two forms of causal explanation to other types of explanation can be shown in the following way. Consider the ruins of a city. What was the cause of its destruction? A flood or an invasion? We have a Humean cause (a physical event) and a Humean effect (another physical event, the conquest being considered as a physical agent). But this fragmentation of causal explanation is not, as such, the province of history. It arises only indirectly from history, inasmuch as, behind the material cause, a background of political rivalries takes shape between cities and inasmuch as, beyond the material effect, political, economic, and cultural consequences of the disaster develop. It is this non-Humean cause and non-Humean effect that historical explanation wants to tie together. In this first type, therefore, the "role of the Humean explanation proper is often to link the nonhumean causes of its .\textit{explanandum} with the nonhumean effects of its .\textit{explanandum}" (p. 137).—Here is an explanation in terms of necessary conditions. How could the inhabitants of this place have been able to construct such a colossal city wall! The .\textit{explanandum} is a Humean cause: the material means used for their construction. But the explanation is only a historical one if it takes a detour through action (city planning, architecture, etc.). The .\textit{explanandum} is the result of this causal explanation, in the sense that we said that a result of action is not a Humean effect. Once again the causal explanation is one segment of the historical explanation, which also includes a non-lawlike (causal) segment.

As for quasi-causal explanation, it is significantly more complex than are the preceding forms. The answer to the question "Why?" is extraordinarily ramified in it. The example introduced earlier (that the people rose up because their government was corrupt) masks the real complexity of the historian's work. Consider the thesis that the First World War broke out "because" the Austrian archduke was assassinated at Sarajevo in July 1914. What kind of explanation is this supposed to be? Conceive for the sake of argument that-the cause and effect are logically independent: in other words, that the two events are considered as different from each other." In his sense, the .\textit{explanandum} clearly has a causal form. Yet true mediation is assured by the whole range of motivations affecting the parties involved. This range of motivations must be schematized by an equal number of practical inferences, which engender new facts (in virtue of the link we have spoken of between intention and action in a practical syllogism). These facts constitute new situations for all the agents, who evaluate their situation by incorporating the new fact into the premises of their new practical inferences, which in turn engender new facts which affect the premises of the practical inferences utilized by the various parties involved.**

Quasi-causal explanation thus turns out to be more complex than rational explanation in Dray's sense of this term. This latter form only overlaps the properly teleological segments of the "mixed" model—the causal-teleological aspects. These segments do derive from "a set of singular statements which constitute the premises of practical inferences" (p. 142). But, if it is true that these segments of a practical inference are not reducible to nomic connections, quasi-causal explanation, in turn, is not reducible to the reconstruction of a calculation, as in rational explanation.

In sum, quasi-causal explanation correctly restores several specific characteristics of explanation in history. First, the conjunction between causal explanation and the theory of action due to the phenomenon of interference allows us to include within the mixed model the reference of history to human actions, whose signification as action is attested to by the conviction the agent 1ms that he is able to do what he does. Further, the teleological segments of the explanatory schema testify to the fact that it is reasonable for the historian to inquire about the intentions of actors in history in terms of a practical inference arising out of a specific logic, that which was i. augurated by the Aristotelian theory of the practical syllogism. Finally, the model expresses the necessity of coordinating these modes of an ability to do something and these segments of practical inference with nonpractical and nonteleological segments of a properly causal type.

In return, we can ask whether, despite the extraordinary effort at attaching the various modes of explanation to a very powerful logical model, the types of explanation are not more scattered than ever. We have, in fact, a proposal for three schemas of historical explanation, without having been shown how the first two are incorporated into the third one. Moreover, an important scattering factor appears on the causal level. In a properly analytic approach, we are led to distinguish between "external" factors (climate, technology, etc.) and "internal" ones (motives, reasons, etc.), without being able to say which are "causes" and which are "effects." An integrating factor appears to be lacking here, whose importance and perhaps unavoidability are indicated by ideologies. From its side, the motivational field contains factors as disparate as commands, hindrances, n. rmative pressures, badges of authority, sanctions, and the like which add to the scattering
of explanation. It is difficult to see how all these heterogeneous causes are to be incorporated into the premises of a practical syllogism. Here we touch upon the claim of overall explanations such as those of historical materialism. Since it is equally impossible to prove [hem with a priori reasons or to refute them on the basis of experience alone, we have to admit that the “prime measure of their truth is their fertility for furthering our understanding of history or the social process” (p. 145). The boundary between scientific explanation and ideology is revealed as a fragile one, owing to the lack of an effort, which we shall only encounter in Hayden White, to integrate into historical explanation more numerous variables than those considered by von Wright and to confer on all these explanatory modes the unity of a style.

To stick with the model of quasi-causal explanation, in its most elementary presentation, however, we might ask what assures the unity of the nomic and the teleological segments inside the overall schema. This discontinuity inside the model, joined to the other scattering factors of explanation just referred to, leads us to ask whether a guideline from the order of understanding is not lacking for holding together the nomic and the teleological segments of a quasi-causal explanation. For me, this guideline is plot, insofar as it is a synthesis of the heterogeneous. Plot, in effect, "comprehends" in one intelligible whole, circumstances, goals, interactions, and unintended results. May we not say, therefore, that plot is to quasi-causal explanation what the assurance of our ability to do something was earlier to an agent's interfering in a nomic system, and what intentionality was to teleological explanation? Must we not, in the same way, say that causal explanation must be preceded by our narrative understanding, in the sense that we could say with von Wright that a "teleological explanation of action is normally preceded by an act of inten-tionalist understanding of some behavioral data"6 Is this not so because in understanding a plot, we take as a whole nomic and teleological segments, because we look for a model of explanation appropriate to that eminently heterogeneous concatenation that the diagram for quasi-causal explanation so well throws into relief?

I find some justification for my interpretation in von Wright's own analysis. Each result of a practical syllogism is said to create a new fact which changes the "motivation background" assignable to the action of different historical agents. Is not this change what we have constantly called the circumstances of an action, and what narrative incorporates into the unity of the plot? Is not the virtue of the explanatory schema, consequently, that it generalizes the notion f circumstances, to the point of making it designate not just an initial "ita fen," but all the interpolated situations which, by their novelty, constitute a motivation background within the field of interactions? That a fact affects the premises of a practical inference, that a new fact emerges from the conclusion drawn from the premises, is what must be understood as a synthesis of the 142

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heterogeneous, before the logic of explanation proposes a more adequate reformulation of it. But this reformulation, far from substituting itself for our narrative understanding, remains an approximation of a more original operation on the same level as our certitude of being able to do something and an intentional descnepfon of behavior.

NARRATIVIST ARGUMENTS

The bringing together of history and narrative, I said at the beginning of this chapter, is born from the conjunction of two movements of thought. To "weakening and breaking up of the covering law model corresponded a re-evaluation of narrative and its resources of intelligibility. The fact is that for the advocates of the covering law model, narrative was too elementary and too poor a mode of articulation to claim as explanatory. I shall say, using the vocabulary proposed in Part I of this work, that for these authors narrative has only an episodic character, not a configurational one. This is why they saw an epistemological break between history and narrative.

The question now is whether the reconquest of the configurational features of narrative justifies hope that our narrative understanding can take on an explanatory value, at the same time that historical explanation ceases to be measured by the standard of the covering law model. My own contribution to this problem will be born, in the next chapter, from the admission that a "narrativ-ist" conception of history only partially answers this expectation. This conception does tell us what prior mode of understanding explanation is granted to, but it does not give us a narrative equivalent or substitute for explanation. This is why I am looking for a more indirect tie between historical explanation and our narrative understanding. The present investigation will not have been in vain, however, inasmuch as it will have allowed us to isolate one necessary but not sufficient component of historical knowledge. A half failure remains a half success.

"Narrative Sentences" According to Arthur Danto

It is noteworthy that the first plea in favor of a narrativist interpretation of history should have been formulated within the framework of analytic philosophy itself. It is found in Arthur C. Danto's book. Analytic Philosophy of History."

The guiding thread of his argument is not so much the epistemrolo'gy of historiography, as it is practiced by historians, as it is the conceptual framework governing our use of a certain type of sentences called narrative sentences. This inquiry stems from analytic philosophy, if we mean by this term the description of our ways of
thinking and talking about the world, and correlative
tively the description of the world such as these ways of thinking and speaking oblige us to conceive it. Analytic philosophy, so understood, is in essence a theory of descriptions.
Applied to history, this analytic conception of philosophy comes down to asking to what extent our ways of thinking and speaking about the world involve sentences using verbs in the past tense and irreducibly narrative statements. This type of question, according to Danto, is carefully avoided by empiricism, which only deals with present-tense verbs corresponding to statements about perception. Linguistic analysis in this way implies a metaphysical description of historical existence. By this quasi-Kantian turn, analytic philosophy of history excludes in principle and as a hypothesis what Danto calls "substantive philosophy of history." Generally speaking, this is any Hegelian type of philosophy of history. Analytic philosophy of history rightly attributes to such philosophy the claim to grasp the whole of history, but it interprets this claim as follows. To talk about the whole of history is to compose a complete picture of the past and the future. But to pronounce on the future is to extrapolate from the configurations and concatenations of the past in the direction of what is still to come. This extrapolation, constitutive of prophecy, consists, in turn, of speaking about the future in terms appropriate to the past. But there is no history of the future (nor, as we shall see later, a history of the present) due to the nature of narrative sentences, which re-describe past events in light of subsequent ones unknown to the actors themselves. Such a meaning can be conferred on events "only in the context of a story" (p. 11, his emphasis). The vice of substantive philosophies of history, as a consequence, is that they write narrative sentences with regard to the future when they can only be written with regard to the past.
The argument is an impeccable one so long as it is formulated in negative terms. If the philosophy of history is thought concerning the whole of history, it cannot be the expression of a narrative discourse appropriate to the past. But the argument cannot eliminate the hypothesis that discourse about the whole of history does not have a narrative nature and constitutes its meaning in another way. Hegelian philosophy of history is assuredly not narrative. Nor can we say that the anticipation of the future in a philosophy or theology of hope is narrative. On the contrary, narration is there reinterpreted beginning from hope, certain founding events—for example, the Exodus or the Resurrection—being interpreted as marking out the path of hope.
As long as we keep the argument in its negative form it has the twofold virtue of delimiting in an almost Kantian way the space where narrative sentences are valid and imposing a limit on them. Not only, as Danto rightly says, is narrative discourse intrinsically incomplete, since every narrative sentence is subject to revision by a later historian, but also every intelligible thing we can say about history does not inevitably have a narrative character. This second implication is directed against what at remains dogmatic in the analytic phi-
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sos of narrative philosophy of history, in spite of its deliberately critical turn when it sets out the internal limits of historical knowledge. It is not certain that "what the substantive philosophy of history attempts is to make the same kind of statement about the future that historians try to make about the past" (p. 26).
The presuppositions for an analytic philosophy of history having been stated, the study of narrative sentences presents itself as the study of a class of sentences. It establishes the differentiating feature of historical knowledge and, in this sense, provides a minimal characterization of history. I am not saying, however, that it attains the core of historical understanding, inasmuch as the "context of history" is not denned by the structure of the narrative sentence. The properly discursive feature of history is missing, as we shall see later.
This study rests on the theory of descriptions as applied to one particular sector of reality, namely, the changes produced by human action. The same change stemming from human action can be variously described and a narrative sentence is one of the possible descriptions of such action. I shall speak later about what distinguishes these accounts that we give of action, within the framework of what is usually called the theory of action.
Danto's ingenious idea is to approach the theory of narrative sentences by way of a detour: criticism of the prejudice that the past is determined, fixed, eternally standing still in its being, while the future is open and undecided (in the sense of Aristotle's and the Stoics' "future contingencies"). This presupposition rests upon the hypothesis that events fall into a receptacle where they accumulate without being able to be altered: neither their order of appearance can be changed, nor can anything be added to their content, except by adding to what follows them. A complete description of an event should therefore register everything that happened, in the order in which it happened. But who j could do such a thing? Only an Ideal Chronicler could be such an absolutely j faithful witness and absolutely sure about this entirely determined past. This 'Ideal Chronicler would be gifted with the faculty of being able to give an instantaneous transcription of whatever happens, augmenting his testimony in a purely additive and cumulative way as events are added to events. In relation to this ideal of a complete and definitive description, the historian's task would be merely to eliminate false sentences, to reestablish any upset in the order of true sentences, and to add whatever is lacking in this testimony.
The refutation of this hypothesis is simple. One class of descriptions is missing from this absolute chronicle, the one precisely in terms of which an event cannot be witnessed; that is, the whole truth concerning this event can-
not be known until after the fact and long after it has taken place. This is just the sort of story only a historian can tell. In short, we have neglected to equip the Ideal Chronicler with a knowledge of the future.

We can now define narrative sentences: "they refer to* at last two time-separated events though they only describe (are only about) the earliest event

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to which they refer" (p. 143. his emphasis). Or more exactly, they "refer to two distinct and time-separated events. E, and E,." And they "describe the earliest of the events referred to" ip. 152. his emphasis). It is also necessary to add that the two events must both be in the past as related to the time of the utterance. Three temporal positions are therefore implied in a narrative sentence: that of the event described, that of the event in terms of which the first event is described, and that of the narrator. The first two concern the statement, the third its being stated.

The paradigmatic example which this analysis rests upon is illustrated by the following sentence. In 1717. the author of Rameau's Nephew was born. No one. at that time, could utter such a sentence, which re-describes the birth of a child in light of another event, the publication of Diderot's famous book. In other words, writing Rameau's Nephew is the event in terms of which the first event—Diderot's birth—is redescribed. In a while I shall pose the question whether this type of sentence, by itself, is typical of historical narrative. This analysis of narrative sentences has several implications. The first one forms the test of a paradox concerning causality. If an event is significant in light of future events, the characterization of one event as the cause of another one may occur subsequent to the event itself. It might seem, then, that a subsequent event transforms a prior one into a cause, therefore that a sufficient condition for the earlier event is produced later than the event. But this is a sophism, for what is determined after the event is not some part of the event but the predicate "is the cause of. ..." We must say therefore that E, is a necessary condition for E, to be a cause, given an appropriate description. We are simply repeating in another way that "ib the cause of. . . " is not a predicate available to the Ideal Chronicler and only characterizes narrative sentences. Examples of such a retrospective use of the category "cause" are numerous. A historian will readily say. "Anstarchus. in 270 B.C., anticipated Copernicus's theory published in A.D 1453." Similar expressions—"anticipated." "began." "preceded." "provoked," "gave rise to"—appear only in narrative sentences. A large part of the concept of significance stems from this peculiarity of narrative sentences. For whoever visits the birthplace of a famous person, this site is meaningful or important only in light of subsequent events. In this sense, the category of significance lacks meaning for the Ideal Chronicler, even though he is a perfect witness.

A second epistemological implication is even more interesting, for it allows us to distinguish the properly narrative description of action from ordinary descriptions of it. J-lere Danto says something that Dray could not anticipate with his model of rational explanations, which takes into account only historical actors' calculations at the moment when they occurred. Both descriptions, it is true, have in common their use of verbs that we may call "project verbs." These verbs do more than simply describe a particular action. Expressions such as "make war" or "raise cattle," or "write a book" contain verbs

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that cover many detailed actions, which may be totally discontinuous and implicate numerous individuals in a temporal structure for which the narrator carries the responsibility. In history we encounter innumerable uses of such project verbs, which organize numerous microactions into one unique overall action. But in ordinary discourse about action, the meaning of a project verb is not affected by the outcome of the action—whether it takes place or not. whether it succeeds or fails. So if history is characterized by statements that account for the truth of a particular occurrence in terms of its unintended consequences, the truth of the statements bearing on the subsequent events is important for the meaning of the narrative description.

The theory of narrative sentences thus is valuable in a discriminating way as regards discourse about action in ordinary language. The discriminating factor lies in the "retroactive re-alignment of the Past" (p. 168) brought about by the properly narrative description of action. This realignment is far-reaching. To the extent that the past is considered temporally in terms of unintended consequences, history tends to weaken the intentional accent in action: "frequently and almost typically, the actions of men are not intentional under those descriptions given of them by means of narrative sentences" (p. 182). This last feature accentuates the gap between the theory of action and that of history: "For the whole point of history is not to know about actions as witnesses might, but as historians do, in connection with later events and as parts of temporal wholes" (p. 183). This gap between the theory of action and narrative theory helps us better to understand in what sense narrative description is one
kind of description among other kinds.
The final consequence is that there is no history of the present, in the strictly narrative sense of that term. Such a thing could be only, an anticipation of what future historians might write about us. The symmetry between explanation and prediction, characteristic of the nomological sciences, is broken at the very level of historical statements. If such narration of the present could be written and known to us, we could in turn falsify it by doing the opposite of what it predicts. We do not know at all what future historians might write about us. Not only do we not know what events will occur, we do not know which ones will be taken as important. We would have to foresee the interests of future historians to foresee under what descriptions they will place our actions. Peirce's assertion "the future is open" means "no one has written 'the history of the present.'" This latter remark brings us back to our starting point, the internal limit of narrative statements.
In what measure does the analysis of narrative sentences clarify the problem of the relationships between our narrative understanding and historical explanation?
Danto nowhere declares that the theory of history is exhausted by his analysis of narrative sentences. Nowhere does he say that a historical text is reduci-
Following a Story

W. B. Gallic's work, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, centered on the concept of the "followability" of a story, leads us a step further in the direction of a structural principle of narrative. This concept, in my opinion, lills a hole left by Danto's analysis of narrative Sentences. If the narrative sentence's twofold reference to the event it describes and a later event in light of which the description is made constitutes a good discriminating factor in relation to other descriptions of action, for example, in terms of the agent's own intentions and reasons, nevertheless the mentioning of a difference between two dates, or two temporal localizations, does not suffice to characterize a narrative as a connection between events. A gap remains between the narrative sentence and the narrative text. This is the gap the notion of the follow-ability of a story tries to fill. But it is really in terms of one fundamental hypothesis that Gallic sets forth his analysis, namely, "whatever understanding and whatever explanations a work of history contains must be assessed in relation to the narrative form from which they arise and whose development they subserve" (p. xi). This thesis is as prudent as it is resolute. It does not deny that explanation does something more than simply narrate. It just limits itself to affirming, first, that explanation is not born from nothing but "proceeds" in some way or another from some discourse that already has a narrative form. Second, it says that in some way or another, explanation remains "in the service of" trie narrative form. This form therefore is both the matrix of explanation and its setting. In this sense, the narrativist thesis says nothing about the structure of explanation. The notion of followability therefore has the ambition of satisfying this twofold requirement.

What, then, is a story? And what does it mean "to follow" a story? A story describes a sequence of actions and experiences done or undergone by a certain number of people, whether real or imaginary. These people are presented either in situations that change or as reacting to such change. In turn, these changes reveal hidden aspects of the situation and the people involved, and engender a new predicament which calls for thought, action, or both. This response to the new situation leads the story toward its conclusion (p. 22).

As the reader will see, this sketch of the notion of a story is not far from what I have called emplotment. If Gallic did not find it useful to relate his concept of a story to that of plot, it was no doubt because he was less interested in the immanent structural constraints on narrative than in the subjective conditions under which a story is acceptable. These conditions of acceptability are what constitute a story's aptitude for being followed.

To follow a story, in effect, is to understand the successive actions, thoughts, and feelings in the story inasmuch as they present a particular "directedness." Let us understand by this that we are "pulled toward" by the development, as soon as we respond to this force with expectations concerning the completion and outcome of the whole process. The reader will immediately perceive how understanding and explanation are inextricably mixed together in this process. "Ideally, a story should be self-explanatory" (p. 23). It is only when the process is interrupted or blocked that we "demand an explanation as a supplement. To say that we are oriented in a certain direction is to recognize a teleologi-cal function in the "conclusion." the same one I emphasized in my analysis of the "ending." " However, in response to the covering law model we need to add that a narrative "conclusion" is not something that can be deduced or predicted. A story that included no surprises or coincidences or encounters or recognition scenes would not hold our attention. This is why we have to follow a story to its conclusion, which is something completely different than following an argument whose conclusion is compelled to be what it is. Rather than being predictable, a narrative's conclusion has to be acceptable. Looking back from the conclusion toward the intermediary episodes, we must be able to say that this end demanded those events and that chain of actions. Yet this backward look is itself made possible by the teleologically oriented move- ment of our expectations when we were following the story. An incompatibility, posited abstractly, between the contingency of the incidents and the, acceptability of the conclusion is precisely what the followability of a story belies. Contingency is unacceptable only to a mind that attaches the idea of mastery to that of understanding. To follow a story is "to find [the events] intellectually acceptable after all" (p. 31. his emphasis). The intelligence CA-t
first of all, Gallie's strategy is precisely to inscribe the epistemological discontinuity between them—which he in no way denies—in the framework of the continuity of narrative interest. This strategy, quite clearly, attacks head-on the problematic set forth in the previous chapter. The question will be whether the analysis that follows has any application outside of narrative history, which Gallie takes as exemplary. The object of such history is past actions that were recorded or that we can infer on the basis of records and reports. The history we write is the history of those actions whose projects or results can be seen as akin to our own action. And in this sense, all history is one fragment or segment of a unique world of communication. This is why we expect works of history, even if they are isolated works, to indicate in their margins the unique history which, however, no one can write. If this narrative continuity between story and history was little noticed in the past, it was because the problems posed by the epistemological break between fiction and history, or between myth and history, turned attention to the question of evidence, at the expense of the more fundamental question of what accounts for the interest of a work of history. It is this interest that assures the continuity between history based on historiography and ordinary narration.

As a narrative, all history has to do with "some major achievement or failure of men living and working together, in societies or nations or any other lastingly organized groups" (p. 65). This is why, in spite of their critical relation to traditional narrative, histories that deal with the unification or the disintegration of an empire, with the rise or fall of a class, a social movement, a religious sect, or a literary style are narratives. In this regard, the difference between an individual and a group is not decisive. Sagas and ancient epics were already centered on groups, not just on isolated figures. "All history is, like saga, basically a narrative of events in which human thought and action play a predominant part" (p. 69). Even when history deals with currents, tendencies, or trends, it is the act of following the narrative that confers an or-

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ganic "city" on them. A trend only manifests itself in the succession of events we follow. It is "a pattern-quality of those particular events" (p. 70). This is why: (1) the reading of these historians' stories derives from our competence to follow stories. We follow them from one end to the other, and we follow them in light of the issue promised or glimpsed through the succession of contingent events. (2) Correlatively, the theme of these stones is worth being recounted and their narratives are worth following, because this theme is superimposed on interests that are our own as human beings, however distant this theme might be from our present feelings. Through these two features, "history is a species of the genus story" (p. 66).

As we see, Gallie delays the moment when he has to take up the problem from the other side. Why do historians seek to explain things in a different way than that given by the contours of traditional stones, which they break away from? And how are we to articulate the discontinuity introduced by critical reason into history on the one hand, and fiction or traditional narratives on the other?

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actions assignable to individuals, we have to refer to those institutional facts within which they act. And finally, we are not really interested in what individuals do as individuals. Against all expectations, Gallic is very careful not to take sides with the nominalist thesis. Nominalists, in fact, do not explain why it is in the historian's interest to proceed to an abbreviation of individual facts which subordinates them to the abstraction of an institutional one. Nor why historians are indifferent about enumerating every individual action and reaction in order to understand the evolution of an institution. Nominalists do not see the close tie between the use of abstractions and the eminently selective character of historical interest. Nor do they see, for the most part, that the actions attributable to individuals are done by them as individuals, but only insofar as they are rilling some institutional role. Finally, nominalists do not see that to understand global phenomena such as "social discontent" or "economic institutions" requires use of "dummy variables," some x that marks the place where all the as yet unexplored interactions capable of standing in the place of this x cross." In all these respects, the Weberian method of "ideal-types" turns out to be the best way to explain this sort of abstraction. Yet if the historian's practice belies the extreme thesis that only individual things exist, including persons, it does not justify the realist thesis that all human action implies a tacit reference to some social institutional fact of a general character, and is sufficiently explained when we have made explicit this reference. The nominalist thesis, despite its epistemological inadequacy, indicates the goal of historical thought, which is to account for the social changes that interest us (because they depend upon the ideas, choices, places, efforts, successes and failures of individual men. and-women). However the realist does give a better "amount of the way" (p. 87), realizing this goal, namely, by appealing to all knowledge Available rt*P/rng so'methi'ng to do with social life, "from traditional truisms to the theorems and abstract models of the social sciences" (p. 84).

Far from aligning his narrativist theor'y with the nominalist one, therefore, Gallic tries to seek a combination of the epistemology implied by the realist thesis and the fundamentally individualistic ontology implied by the nominalist one. This eclecticism would be a weak solution if it did not represent fairly well what professional-historians do in practice when they come to the crucial

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moments of their work. Their whole effort then consists in determining as exactly as possible how this or that individual or group of individuals adopted, maintained, abandoned, or failed to hold on to certain institutional roles. In return, m between these crucial moments, they content themselves with general summaries, formulated in institutional terms, because during these intervals anonymity prevails until some rupture worth recounting happens to alter the course of the institutional or social phenomenon. Such is the case generally in economic and social history, where the massive anonymity of forces, currents, and structures reigns. Yet even this type of history which, at the limit, is written without dates or proper names, does not fail to account for initiatives, qualities of mind, courage, desperation, the flair of individual human beings, "even if their names have usually been forgotten" (p. 87).

As for our second problem, that of the function of laws in historical explanation, it is important to be on guard in this regard against a false interpretation of what historians expect from these laws. They do not expect them to eliminate contingencies, but rather to provide a better understanding of their contribution to the march of history. This is why their problem is not to deduce or to predict but to understand better the complexity of the intertwinings that have converged into the occurrence of this or that event. In this historians are different than physicists. They do not seek to increase the field of generalities at the price of a reduction in contingencies. Instead they want better to understand what has happened. The same point applies even to those areas where it is contingencies that hold their interest, whether it be a question of conflicts between nation-states, social struggles, scientific discoveries, or artistic innovations." Interest in these events, which I would compare with the Aristotelian peripeteia, does not signify that historians give in to the sensational. Their problem is precisely to incorporate these events into an acceptable narrative, therefore to inscribe contingency within an overall schema. This feature is essential to the followability of any fact capable of being narrated. One result of this primacy of the concept of followability is that the explanations, for which historians borrow laws from the sciences to which they link their discipline, have no other effect than to allow us better to follow the story, when our vision of its interconnections is obscured or when our capacity to accept the author's vision is carried to the breaking point. It would be completely erroneous therefore to see here the weakened forms of a strong covering law model. Explanations simply bring their help to our capacity for following a story. In this sense, their function in history is "an ancillary one" (p. 107).

Such a thesis would be unacceptable if we did not know that every narrative explains itself, in the sense that to narrate what has happened is already to explain why it happened. In this sense, the smallest story incorporates generalizations, whether of a classificatory, a causal, or a theoretical order. Con-154

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sequently, nothing prevents ever more complex generalizations and explanations from being grafted onto and in a way interpolated into historical narrative. However if every narrative so explains itself, in another sense no
historical narrative does so. Every historical narrative is looking for an explanation to incorporate into itself, because it has failed to explain itself. It needs to be put back on the trail again. Hence the criterion of a good explanation is a pragmatic one. Its function is an eminently corrective one. Dray's rational explanations satisfied this criterion. We reconstruct an agent's calculations when a course of action surprises us, intrigues us, or leaves us perplexed.

In this regard, history does nothing different from what philology or textual criticism does. When the reading of some received text or interpretation appears to be discordant in relation to other accepted facts, the philologist or textual critic rearranges the details to make everything intelligible again. "Rewriting is rewriting. For historians, everything jigsawed becomes a challenge to those criteria of what, in their eyes, makes a history followable and acceptable.

In this work of recasting earlier ways of writing history, historians come closest to the Hempelian type of explanation. Confronted with a strange course of events, they will construct a model of a normal course of action, then ask how the behavior of the actors in question deviates from it. Every explanation of possible courses of action has recourse to such generalizations. The most frequent and most noteworthy case of such recasting is the one where a historian puts forth an explanation that not only was not accessible to the actors in question but that differs from the explanations offered by previous histories, which have become opaque and enigmatic to the new historian. In this case, to explain is to justify the reorientation of historical attention, which leads to a general re-vision of a whole course of history. The great historian is the one who succeeds in rendering acceptable a new way of following history.

But in no case does explanation exceed its ancillary and corrective function as regards understanding applied to the followability of historical narrative.

In the next chapter, we shall ask whether this "ancillary" function of explanation suffices to account for the "unleaving" brought about by historical inquiry in relation to the entities and procedures of narrative. The Configurational Act

With the work of Louis O. Mink, we come even closer to the main argument of the "narrativist" conception, that narratives are highly organized wholes, requiring a specific act of understanding that takes the nature of a judgment. This argument is all the more interesting in that it makes no use of the concept of plot from literary criticism. In turn, this lack of reference to the structural resources of fictional narrative may explain a certain shortcoming in Mink's analysis, which I shall discuss at the end of this section. Still nobody has tone as far as Mink has in recognizing the synthetic character of narrative activity. Already in an article published in 1965. his arguments against the covering law model pave the way for characterizing historical understanding as an act of judgment, in the twofold sense that Kant's "tir.t and third Critiques assign to this term, namely, the synthetic function of "grasping" together" along with the reflective function attached to every synoptic operation. 41 In this article he reviews the main discrepancies, already emphasized by other critics, between the highly prescriptive requirements of the covering law model and the actual understanding displayed by current work in history. He shows that these discrepancies can be accounted for only if the autonomy of historical understanding is correctly established.

Why can historians aspire to explain things when they cannot predict them? Because explaining is not always equivalent to subsuming facts under laws. In history, to explain is often to make use of "colligations"—to use Whewell's and Walsh's term—which comes down to "explaining an event by tracing its intrinsic relations to other events and locating it in its historical context" (p. 171). This procedure is at least characteristic of sequential explanations. Why are hypotheses not falsifiable in history in the same way they are in science?

Because hypotheses are not the goal of history, only landmarks for delineating a field of investigation, guides serving a mode of understanding which is fundamentally that of interpretative narrative, which is neither chronology nor "science." Why do historians so willingly make recourse to imaginative reconstruction? Because the task of an overall view is "comprehending [the constitutive events] in an act of judgment which manages to hold them together rather than reviewing them seriatim" (p. 178). Consequently, this overall viewpoint is not a "method." nor "a technique of proof nor an organon of discovery but a type of reflective judgment" (p. 179). Why are there no "detachable" conclusions in a historian's argument or work? Because the narrative as a whole is what supports these conclusions. And they are exhibited by the narrative order rather than demonstrated. "The actual meanings are provided by the total context" (p. 181). The notion of a comprehensive synthesis. a synoptic judgment, similar to the operation that allows us to interpret a synthesis as a whole, clearly comes to the forefront with this argument. "The logic of confirmation is appropriate to the testing of detachable conclusions. but ingredient meanings require a theory of judgment" (p. 186). Why can historical events be both unique and similar to other events? Because similarity and uniqueness are alternately accentuated as a function of the contexts at hand. Once again historical understanding comes down to "comprehending a complex event by 'seeing things together' in a total and synoptic judgment which cannot be replaced by any analytic technique" (p. 184). Why do historians aspire to address a potentially universal audience and not simply a scientific forum?
Because what they attempt to communicate is a kind of judgment closer to Aristotle's *phronesis* than to "science." The historian's problem "be-156 comes intelligible ... if it is seen as an attempt to communicate his experience of seeing-things-together in the necessarily narrative style of one-thing-after-another" (p. 188).

The conclusion of this article is especially worth quoting: the historian "cultivates the specialized habit of understanding which converts congeries of events into concatenations, and emphasizes and increases the scope of synoptic judgment in our reflection on experience" (p. 191). Mink readily admitst that this identification of historical thought with "synoptic judgment" leaves open epistemological problems, such as "the questions whether "interpretative syntheses" can be logically compared, whether there are general grounds for preferring one to another, and whether there are criteria of historical objectivity and truth" (ibid.). But these epistemological questions presuppose that we have identified "what distinguishes sophisticated historical thinking from both the everyday explanations of common sense and the theoretical explanations of natural science" (pp. 191-92).

He makes his own approach to these questions more specific in an article published in 1968. on the basis of a criticism of Gallic's book. The phenomenology applied to our capacity for following a story is not debatable as long as we have to do with stories whose outcomes are unknown to the listener or reader, as is the case when we are following a game. Here our knowing the rules of the game is of no help in predicting the outcome. We have to follow the series of incidents to its conclusion. The contingencies, for a phenomeno-logical understanding, amount to surprising and unexpected incidents in the given circumstances. We expect some conclusion but we do not know which one. out of the several that are possible, v. ill occur. This is why we have to follow the series from one end to the other. It is also why our feelings of sympathy or hostility should help support the dynamism of the whole process. But. argues Mink, this condition of ignorance and with it the unreflective activity that constitute the following of the story are not characteristic of the historian's procedure. History "is not the writing, but the rewriting of stories" (p. 687). Its readers, in turn, apply themselves to a "reflective" following, corresponding to the situation of the historian as re-recounting and rewriting the story. History appears once the game is over." Its task is not to accentuate the accidents but to reduce them. The historian is always tracing the lines backwards, for "there are no contingencies going backwards" (ibid.). It is only when we tell the story that "we retrace forward what we have already traced backward" (ibid.). This does not mean that, knowing the outcome, readers could have predicted it. They follow in order "to see" the series of events as an intelligible "pattern of relationships" (p. 688). This retrospective intelligibility rests upon a construction that no witness could have put together when the events were occurring, since this backward way of proceeding would be unavailable to any contemporary witness. He makes two further comments. In a phenomenology limited to the situa-

tion where a story is followed for the first time, the function of explanation runs the risk of being underemphasized and reduced to the act of filling in lacunae or of setting aside anything obscure that obstructs the narrative flow. Explanation appears less ancillary and as a result less theoretical, if the historian's task is to proceed backwards and if, as Mink says, "there are no contingencies going backwards." "The logic of explanation should have something to do with the phenomenology of understanding; the former, one hopes, should serve to correct the latter and the latter to enrich the former." 41

His second argument is more debatable. Gailie. he says, "wishes to transfer the openness and contingency of our present future to the narrative of past events, since it seems to him that we can think of them in no other way than as once having been future" (p. 688). By doing so, Gailie follows an erroneous ontology of time, the leading feature of which is "the principle that the past and the future are not categorically different from each other: the past consists of past futures and the future of future pasts" (ibid.). This argument does not strike me as convincing. First. I do not think that past futures and future pasts are categorically similar to each other. On the contrary, the lack of symmetry between them nourishes what Mink quite rightly calls "the poignancy of the historical consciousness" (ibid. i. Next. the determinate character of the past is not such as to exclude the sort of retroactive changes in meaning to which Danto has so successfully called attention. Third, the process of tracing forward anew the pathway we have already covered going backward may well reopen, if I can put it this way. the space of contingency that once belonged to the past when it was present. It may reinstate a sort of learned wonder, thanks to which "contingencies" recover a part of their initial surprising force. This power may well belong to the fictional character of historical understanding which I shall discuss later. More precisely, it may be tied to that aspect of action that Aristotle characterized as the mimesis of action. It is at the level of initial contingencies that some events enjoy the status of having been future with regard to the course of action that is retrospectively reconstructed. In this sense, there must be a place for past futures even in an ontology of time, to the extent that our existential time is shaped by the temporal configurations that history and fiction together establish. I shall return to this discussion in the second volume of this investigation.

Here 1 would rather emphasize the kind, of unilateralness that results from substituting a phenomenology of retrospective grasping for the direct grasping of a story followed for the first time. Does not Mink run the risk of abolishing, at the level of retelling, those features of the narrative operation that telling and retelling really have

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in common, because they stem from the same structure of narrative, namely, the dialectic between contingency and order, episode and configuration, discordance and concordance? Across this dialectic, is it not the specific temporality of narrative that runs the risk of being misunderstood? The fact is that we can observe in Mink's analyses a tendency

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to divest the very act of "grasping together," characteristic of the configurational operation, of every temporal attribute. His refusal to attribute having once been future to narrated events already is indicative of this orientation. And it appears to be reinforced by his insistence on the act of retelling at the expense of the act of following a story for the first time. A third article by Mink clearly demonstrates this thesis.*
The strong point of this article is its construing of the configurational mode as one of three modes of "comprehension" in the broader sense, which also includes the theoretical and the categorial modes. According to the theoretical mode, objects are comprehended in terms of a case or as examples of a general theory. The ideal type of this mode is represented by Laplace's system. According to the categorial mode, often confused with the preceding one, to comprehend an object is to determine what type of object we are dealing with, what system of a priori concepts organizes an experience that otherwise would remain chaotic. Plato aims at this categorial comprehension, as do most systematic philosophers. The configurational mode puts its elements into a single, concrete complex of relations. It is the type of comprehension that characterizes the narrative operation. All three modes do have a common aim, which is no less implicit in the configurational mode than in the other two. Comprehension in the broad sense is defined as the act "of grasping together in a single mental act things which are not experienced together, or even capable of being so experienced, because they are separated by time, space, or logical kind. And the ability to do this is a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition of understanding" (p. 547. his emphasis). Comprehension, in this sense, is not limited to either historical knowledge or temporal acts. To understand a logical conclusion as resulting from its premises is a kind of comprehension without any narrative features, even though it does imply several temporal presuppositions, inasmuch as what we try to think of as a whole consists of "the complicated relationships of parts which can only be experienced seriatim" (p. 548). But this is just a way of saying with Kant that all experience occurs in time, even if it also occurs in space, since we have to trace, retain, and recognize all the components and steps of the related experience. In short, "comprehension is an individual act of seeing-things-together, and only that" (p. 553).
Furthermore, comprehension in the broad sense presents one fundamental feature that has important implications for the narrative mode of comprehension. All comprehension. Mink declares, has an ideal aim, even if it is "unattainable, of comprehending the world as a totality. To put it another way, this goal is unattainable because it would amount to divine comprehension; yet it is significant because "the human project is to take God's place" (p. 549). This sudden intrusion of a theological theme is in no way marginal. The alleged ultimate goal of the three modes of comprehension proceeds from a transposition into epistemology of Boethius's definition of "God's knowledge
of the world as a totum simul. in which the successive moments of all time are copresent in a single perception, as of a landscape of events" (ibid.).

Mink does not hesitate to apply this goal of comprehension in the broad sense to the configurational mode. "The totum simul which Boethius regarded as God's knowledge of the world would of course be the highest degree of configurational comprehension" (ibid., pp. 551). In light of this declaration, the earlier criticism of a phenomenology confined to the act of following a story asks on a new aspect. What ultimately appears to be refused to narrative comprehension, in the name of the totum simul. is the sequential form of Atones which this phenomenology had succeeded in preserving. 1 wonder if the argument, valuable in itself, that history consists more of having followed than of following is not pushed too far and even weakened, by the subsequent thesis in which he holds that in the act of configurational understanding "actions and events, although represented as occurring in the order of time, can be surveyed as it were in a single glance as bound together in an order of significance, a representation of the a/nun simul which we can never more than partially achieve" (ibid., pp. 554).

I also wonder whether what is held to be a superior degree of configurational comprehension is not rather the mark of its abolition. To avoid this troublesome consequence for narrative theory, must we not assign an opposite function to the idea of a totum simul. namely, precisely to limit comprehension's ambition to abolish the sequential character of time underlying the episodic side of emplotment. The totum simul/1 would then have to be recognized as an idea in the Kantian sense of a limit-idea rather than as a goal or a guide. For the moment, it will suffice to ask ourselves whether this ideal goal is really the appropriate extrapolation of what is implied in the actual comprehension of narratives.

The argument that in current historiography chronology recedes—and along with it the concern for dates—is a perfectly reasonable one. But the question remains open to what point the surpassing of simple chronology implies the abolition of every mode of temporality. From Augustine to Heidegger, every ontology of time tries to disentangle from purely chronological time those temporal properties founded upon succession but not reducible to either simple succession or chronology. The argument that understanding is complete when we grasp a certain action as the response to an event (where "sending a telegram" responds to "receiving an offer") is equally correct. But the link between sending a telegram and the reception of an offer is assured by a mediating term: acceptance of the offer, which engenders a change from the initial state of affairs to the terminal one. We do not have the right, consequently, to generalize on the basis of the "response." and to say that "the actions and events of a story comprehended as a whole are connected by a network of overlapping descriptions" (ibid., his emphasis). The abolition of sentences marked by verbal tenses in this network of overlapping descriptions is the sign that the narrative quality of history has disappeared along with the temporal ties. We may well say that, in retrosp ect, all the incidents that occur in the story of Oedipus can be grasped together in the portrait of Oedipus. But this portrait is equivalent to the "thought" of the tragedy Oedipus Rex. And the "thought." or what Aristotle named the dianoia, is an aspect derived from the plot in the same way the characters are.

It remains to be seen in what way a transferral of the concept of plot from literary criticism to the epistemology of history may illumine the concrete dialectic between discordance and concordance in narrative, a dialectic of narrative which has not been taken into account enough in the analysis of the configurational mode of understanding that tends to dissolve its temporal quality in the name of the goal given it of becoming equal to the totum simul of divine knowledge.

Exposition by Et employment

The procedures of emplotment which 1 earlier set forth in terms of mimesis, are tor the first time assigned to the narrative structure of history writing in the work of Hayden White. However, they do not cover the whole field. The force of White's analyses is due to the lucidity with which he makes explicit the presuppositions of his analyses of major historical texts and defines the universe of discourse in which these presuppositions in turn find their place.

His first presupposition runs as follows. Following in the wake of Mink's work. White reorganizes the relationship between history and fiction along other lines than those of an epistemology for which the problematic of objectivity and proof determines the basic criterion of every classification of the modes of discourse. Whatever may be said about this problematic, the first presupposition of a "poetics" of historical discourse is that fiction and history belong to the same class as regards their narrative structure. The second presupposition is that this bringing together of history and fiction entails another one, this time bringing together history and literature. This overturning of the usual classifications requires that the characterization of history as
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taken seriously. "The writing of history," to use the title of a work by Michel de Certeau, is not external to the
conceiving and composing of history. It does not constitute some second-order operation, stemming only from
the rhetoric of communication, that we could neglect as belonging simply to the redactional order. It is
constitutive of the historical mode of understanding. History is intrinsically historio-graphy—or : ; it in a
deliberately provocative way, a literary artifact.’’’ Hence the third presupposition is that the boundary drawn by
epistemologists between historians’ history and the philosophy of history must also be called into question,
insomuch as, for one thing, every great historical work unfolds an overall vision of the historical world and, for
another, philosophies of history have recourse to the same resources of articulation as Jo the great works of
history. This is why in his own major work, Metahistory. White does not hesitate in placing Michelet. Ranke.

He calls this "poetics" of historiography "metahistory" to distinguish it from an epistemology oriented to the
characteristics of inquiry in history, and therefore riveted on the conditions of objectivity and truth that ground
the epistemological break between history as a science and traditional or mythical narrative.

His three presuppositions entail, in effect, a displacement and a reclassification of this problematic, the exclusive
attention given to the conditions for the scientific status of history being taken as responsible for the
misapprehension of those structures that set history within the space of narrative fiction. Only a ‘’metahistory can
dare to consider historical narratives as verbal fictions close to literary counterparts because of their content
and their form. Later, the question must arise whether it is possible to reclassify history as a literary artifact
without declassifying it as knowledge which claims to be scientific.

It is undeniable that this displacement and reclassification of the problematic of history does imply a transferring
to historiography of categories borrowed from literary criticism.

The irony of this situation is that these loans are made from the very authors who are opposed to them. We have
not forgotten the firmness with which Aristotle excludes historia from his problematic concerning muthos. To
grasp the significance of White’s gesture that transgresses the Aristotelian interdiction, we need to understand the
reasons for this prohibition. Aristotle does not confine himself just to asserting that history is too "episodic" to
satisfy the requirements of his Poetics—after all, this judgment is easily revocable ever since the work of
Thucydides. He also tells why history is episodic: because it reports what really Happened. And the real, unlike
the possible which the poet conceives, and which the peripeteia illustrate, implies a contingency that escapes the
poet’s control. It is because poets are the authors of their plots that they can uproot themselves from the
contingently real and raise themselves to

Transgressing the Aristotelian interdiction meets no less resistance from the side of literary criticism, to which
White’s work is even closer. For Auerbach. Booth. and Scholes and Kellogg, the imaginary is defined in
opposition to the "real" and history continues to be the model for realism of representation. The height of the
irony is that Northrop Frye. whom White especially borrows from, is one of the most vigilant guardians of this
boundary. Fiction, for Frye, concerns the possible, history has to do with the real. Following Aristotle. Frye will
say that the poet works from a form of unification, the historian works toward it. For Frye, only philosophies of
history, such as those of Spengler. Toynbee, or H. G. Wells, can seem to belong to the same "poetic" category as
do drama and epic.

White's metahistory must therefore break through two resistances: that of the historians who hold that the
epistemological break between history and traditional and mythical narrative uproots the former from the circle
of fictional, and that of the literary critics for whom the distinction between the imaginary and the real is beyond
question.

I shall reserve for my second volume those aspects of verbal fiction that force us to return to the notion of the
representation of the real in history, a problem I have chosen to consider in terms of what I have called mimesis.,
Here I shall remain within the limits of fiction understood as configuration, in the sense of mimesis., I am aware
of the injustice I am doing to White’s work by separating his more formal analyses from those concerning
historical reality—the dividing line passes between his considerations concerning emplot-ment and those that
concern the prefiguring of the historical field which he assigns to a theory of tropes (metaphor. metonymy, etc.).
The compensation for this loss, in my view, is the advantage gained in not tying the outcome of the formal
analyses, which seem more solid to me, to that of the theory of tropes, which I think is more fragile."

It is important to note that emplotment does not receive from White the large-scale treatment I am giving it
except on the condition of not entirely identifying the notion of "historical narrative" with it. He is very careful,
in his articles as well as in Metahistory, to situate emplotment among a number of other operations, whose
enumeration varies from one work to another. This is why, for didactic purposes, I shall first consider all that is
not "plot" in order then to concentrate the essential part of my remarks on it. In an article published in 1972, plot is placed between the story and the argument. Story is taken here in a limiting sense, that of "telling stories," in the sense of an essentially sequential narrative, having a beginning, a middle, and an end. In truth, it is the concept of "story-line" rather than that of "story" that serves as a benchmark. White visibly wants to rid himself of the argument that history, as it is written today, is no longer narrative. This objection only holds, he says, if we reduce story to story-line. This delineation of story from plot, which is disconcerting to not a few critics, seems to White to be more urgent in history than in literary criticism, because in history the events constituting the narrated story-line are not produced by the historian's imagination but rather are submitted to proof procedures. For my part, I see in this argument one way of responding to Aristotle's interdiction. The price for this exemption is the distinction between story and plot.

This distinction is not always easy to maintain, inasmuch as a story is already a mode of organization in that it is distinguished from a simple chronicle of events and organized in terms of "motifs" and "themes" which unify and delineate subsets within it. In this way, a story is already capable of an "explanatory effect." It is precisely to do justice to this explanatory effect belonging to a story that Metahistory distinguishes story from chronicle, which then becomes the very first articulation of the historical field. As for this notion of the "historical field" (see Metahistory, p. 30), which we shall rediscover in the work of Paul Veyne, it poses the problem of a still earlier articulation. We can, in fact, speak from inside an already organized narrative only of an "unprocessed historical record" (p. 5), that is, of a preconceptual background open to processes of selection and arrangement.

Emplotment conserves an explanatory effect distinct from that of the story, in the sense that it does not explain the events of the story but rather the story itself, by identifying the class to which it belongs. The story-line allows us to identify a unique configuration, while emplotment invites us to recognize a traditional class of configurations. These plot categories, as a function of which the story itself, not its events, is encoded, are akin to those "relational cryptograms" that, according to E. H. Gombrich, in Art and Illusion, govern our way of "reading a painting."

In this way, White thinks he can escape the antinarrativist arguments of the partisans of Hempel's theory by abandoning to them the organization of history in terms of causes and laws, while taking away from them the categorical explanation proper to emplotment. But he does so only at the price of disjoining the explanation of a story and the explanation of an event.

The boundary between plot and argument is no easier to trace. The argument designates "the point of it all" or what it all adds up to (Metahistory, p. 11), in short, the thesis of a narrative. Aristotle included the argument in the plot under the cloak of the plot's probability and necessity. We might say, in any case, that it is history as different from epic, tragedy, and comedy that requires this distinction at the level of "explanatory effects." It is precisely because explanation by argument can be distinguished from explanation by emplotment that logicians invented the covering law model. Historians do argue in a formal, explicit, discursive way. What the partisans of the covering law model failed to see, however, was that their field of argumentation is considerably vaster than that of general laws, borrowed from the sciences con-164.

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conflictual structure, which calls for an appropriate typology. White borrows it, although he reworks and simplifies it. from Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia. In this way, he postulates four basic ideological positions: anarchism, conservatism, radicalism, and liberalism. Whatever the case may be as regards the propriety of this typology for the great historical works of the nineteenth century, whose examination is precisely the major objective of Metahistory, it is important to underline the fact that, by adding the ideological mode, White satisfies two distinct, if not opposed, demands. On the one hand, he serves the cause of truth by reintroduc-ing, by way of the post-Marxist concept of ideology, components of historical knowledge that the Verstehen tradition, represented in France by Aron and Marrou, has always emphasized, namely, the historian's implication in historical work, the consideration of values, and history's tie to action in the world of the present. Ideological preferences bearing in the final analysis on social change, on its desirable scope and its desirable rhythm, concern raetahistory insofar as they are incorporated into the explanation of the historical field and the construction of the verbal model by which history orders events and processes in narratives. On the other hand, in distinguishing argument and ideology, White indicates the place for the critique of ideology, and submits ideology to me same rule of discussion that applies co the mode of explanation by formal arguments.

So enframed by the story-line la level itself split into chronicle and the chain of motifs and the argument (split into formal arguments and ideological implications), explanation by emplotment for White takes on a strict and limited sense, which allows him to say both that it is not the whole narrative structure and yet is its pivot. By emplotment, he means much more than the simple combination of the linear aspect of the story and the argumentative aspect of the proposed thesis. He means the kind of story, therefore one of the configurative categories we have learned to distinguish in our culture. Let us say, to clarify this problem, that White appeals to the theme I developed at length in Part I. of the role of paradigms in emplotment. along with the constitution of a narrative tradition by the interplay of innovation and sedimentation. While I characterize the entire scale of exchanges between paradigms and individual stories by emplotment. White retains just their function of categorization for his notion of emplotment. This explains why he carries over to his notion of story the purely linear aspect. Emplotment so conceived constitutes a mode of explanation, "explanation by emplotment" (see Metahistory, pp. 7-11). Here, to explain is to provide a guide for progressively identifying the class of emplotment ("The Structure of Historical Narrative." p. 9). ••providing the 'meaning' of a story by identifying the kind of story that has been told is called explanation by emplotment" (Metahistory. p. 1. his emphasis). A given historian "is forced to emplot the whole set of stories making up his narrative in one comprehensive or archetypal story form" (p. 8, his emphasis).

White borrows his typology of emplotment from Frye's Anatomv of Criticism: romance, tragedy, comedy, satire. (E_pjc is left out, because it appears as. the implicit form of the chronicle..) The genre of satire has a peculiar position in that, for Frye, stories constructed in the ironic mode draw their effect from the fact that they defraud their readers of the sort of resolution they expect of stories constructed in the romantic, comic, or tragic modes. Satire, in this sense, is diametrically opposed to the romantic genre, which demonstrates the final triumph of the hero, but it is also opposed, at least in part, to tragedy where, in lieu of celebrating humanity's ultimate transcendence over the fallen world, a reconciliation is contrived for the spectators, who are led to perceive the law governing the outcome. Finally, satire also takes its distance from the mutual reconciliation of human beings, society, and the world brought about in comedy by its happy ending. In each case, this opposition is only partial. There can be a satirical tragedy or a satirical comedy. Satire starts from the ultimate inadequacy of the visions of the world dramatized in romance, comedy, and tragedy.

What benefit can the epistemology of historical knowledge draw from this distinction between these "modes of explanation" (and their corresponding «Jp "explanatory effects") and the three typologies proposed respectively at the fc •• "-.

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levels of plot, argument, and ideology? Essentially, what is gained is a theory of histonographical style, if we understand by style a remarkable intersecting of the possibilities opened by the diverse narrative categories involved (see pp. 29-31).

We can build up this theory of style degree by degree, by following the combinatory system's order of complexity.

At a first level, the theory of style plays upon the basic trilogy: story, emplotment. argument. Thus, in his 1972 article, this tripartite division is illustrated by three works: explanation as a function of the story-line is illustrated by Ranke's History of Germany During the Age of the Reformation, explanation in terms of plot by Tocqueville's Democracy in America, and explanation in terms of argument by Burchhardt's Culture of the Renaissance in Italy. Each of these works includes, of course, a story-line, plot, and argument, but in varying proportions. Linear order prevails in Ranke. His history has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and has taken
place before the present of the reader. His argument can be reduced to the changes that befall the entity Germany, which conserves its identity. And his plot is confined to showing "how one thing led to another" (p. 6). In this sense, everything for Ranke is a story that illustrates the "narrativist" type of historiography. Tocqueville also has a story, but one open on the end turned toward us, who bear the burden of giving it an end through our own action. Everything he narrates, if you will, is only the extended middle of his story. However the accent is placed on the type of structure binding together social classes, political democracy, culture, religion. With Burckhardt, on the contrary, we can say that everything is argument. His story only serves to illustrate his thesis about individualism in the Renaissance.

Vet imperceptibly, White's theory of historical style passes to a second level, by combining the tripartite division into story, plot, and argument with the typology of emplotment. If Burckhardt illustrates the primacy of argument over plot and story, he also illustrates the ironic mode of emplotment. for a story that does not go anywhere destroys our expectation of a moral or intellectual conclusion, such as it would have been forged by the other paradigms of emplotment: romance, comedy, and tragedy. Michelet, on the other hand, does construct his story in the romantic mode, Ranke in the comic one, and Tocqueville ≈ the tragic one.

Finally, the theory of style passes to a third level by combining the three typologies corresponding to emplotment, argumentation, and ideological implication. We thus obtain a combinatory system that takes account of, if not all the combinations possible, at least those "elective affinities" that outline the network of compatibility from which emerge the identifiable historicographi-graphical styles: "In my view, a histonographical style represents a particular combination of modes of emplotment, argument, and ideological implication." 167 But we misapprehend things if we see in a style a necessary combina-

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tion of modes of explanation: "the dialectical tension which characterizes the work of every master historian usually arises from an effort to wed a mode of emplotment with a mode of argument or of ideological implication which is inconsonant with it" (p. 29)." "We are thus led by way of a long detour to my theme of dissonant consonance." One primary source for it proceeds from the opposition between the three modes, taken together, that confer an explanatory function on the narrative structures." Another source of consonance stems from the confrontation between various manners of emplotment. not only in the work of different historians, but at the heart of a major work.

In sum, the notion of narrative structure, with which we began, covers a larger terrain than what "narrativist" authors usually allow to it, while the notion of plot receives from its opposition to story and argument an uncommon precision.

Most of all, we must not lose sight of the fact that the threefold typology upon which this theory of historical style rests does not claim any "logical" authority. The modes of emplotment, in particular, are the products of a tradition of writing which has given them the configuration that the historian uses. This aspect of traditionality is in the end the most important thing. A historian, as a writer, addresses a public likely to recognize the traditional forms of the art of narration. These structures are not therefore inert rules. They are the forms of a cultural heritage. If we say that no event is in itself tragic and that the historian only makes it appear as such by encoding it in a certain way, it is because the arbitrariness of the encoding is limited, not by the narrated events, but by the reader's expectation of encountering known forms of encoding: "the encodation of events in terms of such plot structures is one of the ways tha' a culture has of making sense of both personal and public pasts" ("The Historical Text as Literary Artifact." p. 85). The encoding is thus governed more by the expected meaning effects than by the material to be encoded. Such meaning effects consist essentially of making the unfamiliar familiar. The encoding contributes to this to the extent that the historian shares with his public an understanding of the forms "that significant human situations must take by virtue of his participation in the specific processes of sense-making which identify him as a member of one cultural endowment rather than another" (ibid., his emphasis).64

In this way, the dynamic character of emplotment is restored through its character of traditionality, even if its generic character is the only one considered. What is more, this trait is counterbalanced by the continuity that the notion of historiographical style reestablishes between chronicle, the chain of motifs, plot, argument, and ideological implication. This is why we may—somewhat counter to White, but thanks to his work—take emplotment as the operation that dynamizes every level of narrative articulation. Emplotment is much more than one level among many. It is what brings about the transition between narrating and explaining.

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It struck me that it might be interesting to return at the end of this chapter to French historiography. The work of Paul Veyne. Comment on ecrh l'his-loire—which stands alone on the French landscape—has the noteworthy advantage of uniting a scientific abasement of history with an apology for the notion of plot.65 Veyne thus finds himself curiously situated at the confluence of the two currents of thought I have just described, even though he starts from Max Weber and not the English-language "narrativist" current, and even though he preserves a tie to logical positivism which that current has broken. Nevertheless, by placing him at this strategic crossroads I hope
to add to the sting of a work that is already quite provocative.

His book can, in effect, be read as an expert performance intertwining two motifs: history is "nothing but a truthful narrative" (p. 13). and history is too "sublunar" a science to be explained in terms of laws. To abase the explanatory claim while elevating the narrative capacity—these two movements balance each other in an incessant seesawing.

The goal of elevating the narrative capacity is attained if we join together narrative and plot, something neither Marc Bloch, nor Lucien Febvre, nor Fernand Braudel, nor even Henri-Irene Marrou ever tried to do, because for them the narrative is what the actors themselves bring about, being given over to the confusion and opacity of their own present. But, precisely because the narrative is a construct, it revives nothing. "History," says Veyne, "is a bookish, not an existential, notion. It is the organization by the intelligence of givens that refer to a temporality other than that of my Dasein" (p. 90). "History is an intellectual activity that, through consecrated literary forms, serves the ends of simple curiosity" (p. 103). Nothing links this curiosity to some existential ground.*

In one sense, Veyne is calling narrative what Aron and Marrou called reconstruction. But this change in terminology has its own importance. By linking historical understanding to narrative activity, he allows us to push even further the description of "the object of history" (the title of his first section). If, in fact, we cling to the intrinsic character of the notion of an event—that is, every individual and unrepeatable occurrence—nothing qualifies it as historical or as physical. "The true difference does not lie between historical facts and physical ones, but between history and the physical sciences" (p. 21). The latter subsume facts under laws, the former integrates them into plots. Emplotment is what qualifies an event as historical: "(fe facts only exist in and through plots wherein they take on the relative importance that the human logic of the drama imposes on them" (p. 70). And "since every event is as historical as any other, we can cOf) up the field of events as we like" (p. 83). Here Veyne rejoins those narrativist authors we have studied. A historical

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event is not what happens but what can be narrated, or what has already Tjeen narrated in chronicles or legends. Furthermore, historians do not despair of having to work only with mutilated fragments. One makes a plot with what one knows, and a plot is by nature "mutilated knowledge."

By so reconnecting event and plot. Paul Veyne can undramatize the argument over events and nonevents [''evenementiel et du non-evenementriel, started by the Annales School. The long time-span is just as much about an event as is the short time-span, if plot is the only measure of an event. The nonevent marks the gap between the determined field of events and the already plowed region of plots. "What is not an event are those events not yet hailed as such: The history of terrors, of mentalities, of madness, or of the search for security across the ages. We shall therefore call the nonevent that historicity which as such we are not yet aware of" (p. 31).

What is more, if we define what counts as a plot broadly enough, even quantitative history reenters its orbit. There is a plot whenever history brings together a set of goals, material causes, and chance. A plot is "a very human and very unscientific mixture of material causes, ends, and chance events" p. 46). Chronological order is not essential to it. In my opinion, this definition is completely compatible with the notion of the synthesis of the heterogeneous proposed above in Part I.

So long as we can recognize this disparate combination, there is a plot. And in this sense, nonchronological series, series of items for the quantitative historians, remain within the domain of history in virtue of their tie, however tenuous, to a plot. This tie between a plot and a series of items, which is not clearly explained by Veyne, seems to me assured by the notion he borrows from Cournot to which Aron also referred at the beginning of his 1937 book), of the interweaving of causal series. "The field of events is an inter-- weaving of series" (p. 35). BjJtjs every interweaving of series a plot?

Veyne thinks he can extend the notion of plot to the point where the notion of time is no longer indispensable to it. "What would become of a history that succeeded in ridding itself of all remaining singularities, of all units of time and place, so as to present itself completely as just the unity of the plot?" This is what has appeared over the course of this book? (p. 84). Veyne thus wants to carry to the extreme one of the possibilities opened by the the Aristotelian notion of plot which, we have seen, also ignores time, even though it implies a beginning, a middle, and an end. This possible achronicity has also been worked out by various English-speaking authors (such as Louis O. Mink, whom I discussed above). This possibility is tied to the fundamental feature of a plot upon which Aristotle constructed his Poetics, namely,. its. capacity to gschithe universal. We've also seen above how Hayden White exploits this generic or categorial resource of emplotment.

I find the same accent in Veyne when he develops the apparent paradox that the object of history is not the individual but the specific. Once again it is the 170 ".

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notion of plot that turns us away from any plea for history as the science of the concrete. To put an event in a plot is to state something intelligible and therefore something specific. "Everything we can state about an individual possesses a sort of generality" (p. 73). "History is the description of what is spe-__cific that is understandable, in human events" ip. ~5i. This thesis blends with the one about description in terms of items and
the one about the interweaving of series. The individual is an intersection for a series of items, on the condition that a set of items is still a plot.

With this intelligible component of a plot we pass over to the other side of Veyne's work, that of reducing the explanatory claim. Here Veyne acts as a provocateur. History, he says, has a critique and a topic, but not a method. No method? Let us take him as meaning no rule for bringing about a synthesis of the facts. If the historical field, as we said, is completely undetermined, everything found there really happened, yet numerous itineraries can be traced through it. As for the art of tracing them out, it stems from the historical genre, with all the different ways that has been conceived across the centuries.

The only "logic" compatible with the notion of a plot is a logic of the probable, whose vocabulary Veyne borrows from Aristotle. Science and its laws do not rule in the sublunar order, for "the sublunar is the kingdom of the probable" (p. 44). To say that history stems from the sublunar order or that it proceeds by plots is the same thing. History "will always be a plot because it is human: sublunar, because it will not be a part of determinism" (p. 46). Probability is a corollary of the historian's capacity freely to slice up the field of events. But since the probable is a characteristic of the plot itself, there are no grounds for distinguishing between narrative, understanding, and explanation. "What people call explanation is barely anything more than the way the narrative organizes itself into an understandable plot" (p. 111). From this we can expect that, in the sublunar order, explanation in the scientific sense of this word does not exist. "To explain, for a historian, means 'to show the unfolding of the plot, to make it understood'" (p. 1 12). The explanation of the French Revolution "is the summary of it and nothing more" (p. 114. his emphasis). Thus sublunar explanation is not to be distinguished from understanding. With this stroke, the problem of the relationship between understanding and explanation, which had so bothered Raymond Aron, vanishes. As for the word "cause," disconnected from the term "law." Veyne uses it as does Maurice Mandelbaum: "The causes are the various episodes of the plot" (p. 115). And the narrative "is from the outset causal, understandable" (p. 118). In this sense, "to explain more is to narrate better" (p. 119). This is the only depth we can assign to history. If explanation seems to push beyond our immediate understanding, it is because it can explain the factors of a nar-

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In sum, the notion of narrative structure, with which we began, covers a larger terrain than what "narrativist" authors usually allow to it. while the notion of plot receives from its opposition to story and argument an uncommon precision.

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How One Writes History—It struck me that it might be interesting to return at the end of this chapter to French historiography. The work of Paul Veyne. Comment on écrit l'histoire—which stands alone on the French landscape—has the noteworthy advantage of uniting a scientific abasement of history with an apology for the notion of plot.5 Veyne thus finds himself curiously situated at the confluence of the two currents of thought I have just described, even though he starts from Max Weber and not the English-language "narrativist" current, and even though he preserves a tie to logical positivism which that current has broken. Nevertheless, by placing him at this strategic crossroads I hope to add to the sting of a work that is already quite provocative.

His book can, in effect, be read as an expert performance intertwining two motifs: history is "nothing but a truthful narrative" (p. 13). and history is too "sublunar" a science to be explained in terms of laws. To abase the explanatory claim while elevating the narrative capacity—these two movements balance each other in an incessant seesawing.

The goal of elevating the narrative capacity is attained if we join together narrative and plot, something neither Marc Bloch. nor Lucien Febvre. nor Fernand Braudel. nor even Henri-Irene Marrou ever tried to do, because for them the narrative is what the actors themselves bring about, being given over to the confusion and opacity of their own present. But. precisely because the narrative is a construct, it revives nothing. "History," says Veyne. "is a bookish. not an existential. notion. It is the organization by the intelligence of givens that refer to a temporality other than that of my Dasein" (p. 90). "History is an intellectual activity that. through consecrated literary forms. serves the ends of simple curiosity" (p. 103). Nothing links this curiosity to some existential ground.*

In one sense. Veyne is calling narrative what Aron and Marrou called reconstruction. But this change in terminology has its own importance. By linking historical understanding to narrative activity. he allows us to push even further the description of "the object of history" (the title of his first section). If. in fact. we cling to the intrinsic character of the notion of an event—that is. every individual and unrepeatable occurrence—nothing qualifies it as historical or as physical. "The true difference does not lie between historical facts and physical ones. but between history and the physical sciences" (p. 21). The latter subsume facts under laws. the former integrates them into plots. Emplotment is what qualifies an event as historical: "the facts only exist in and through plots wherein they take on the relative importance that the human logic of the drama imposes on them" (p. 70). And "since every event is as historical as any other. we can cut up the field of events as we like" (p. 83).
Here Veyne rejoins those narrativist authors we have studied. A historical event is not what happens, but what can be narrated, or what has already "been narrated in chronicles or legends. Furthermore, historians do not despair of having to work only with mutilated fragments. One makes a plot with what one knows, and a plot is by nature "mutilated knowledge."

By so reconnecting event and plot, Paul Veyne can undramatize the argument over events and nonevents ["l'évenementiel et du non-événementel], started by the Annales School. The long time-span is just as much about an event as is the short time-span, if plot is the only measure of an event. The nonevent marks the gap between the determined field of events and the already plowed region of plots. "What is not an event are those events not yet hailed as such: The history of terrors, of mentalités, of madness, or of the search for security across the ages. We shall therefore call the nonevent that historicity which as such we are not yet aware of" (p. 31).

What is more, if we define what counts as a plot broadly enough, even of quantitative history reenters its orbit. There is a plot whenever history brings together a set of goals, material causes, and chance. A plot is "a very human and very unscientific mixture of material causes, ends, and chance events" (p. 46). Chronological order is not essential to it. In my opinion, this definition is completely compatible with the notion of the synthesis of the heterogeneous proposed above in Part I.

So long as we can recognize this disparate combination, there is a plot. And in this sense, nonchronological series, series of items for the quantitative historians, remain within the domain of history in virtue of their tie, however tenuous, to a plot. This tie between a plot and a series of items, which is not clearly explained by Veyne, seems to me assured by the notion he borrows from Cournot (to which Aron also referred at the beginning of his 1937 book), of the interweaving of causal series. "The field of events is an interweaving of series" (p. 35). Is every interweaving of series a plot?

Veyne thinks he can extend the notion of plot to the point where the notion of time is no longer indispensable to it. "What would become of a history that succeeded in ridding itself of all remaining singularities, of all units of time and place, so as to present itself completely as just the unity of the plot? This is what has appeared over the course of this book" (p. 84). Veyne thus wants to carry to the extreme one of the possibilities opened by the Aristotelian notion of plot which, we have seen, also ignores time, even though it implies a beginning, a middle, and an end. This possible achronicity has also been worked out by various English-speaking authors (such as LouisO. Mink, whom I discussed above). This possibility is tied to the fundamental feature of a plot upon which Aristotle constructed his Poetics, namely, its capacity to "en Cirie. universal. We've also seen above how Hayden White exploits this generic or categorial resource of emplotment.

I find the same accent in Veyne when he develops the apparent paradox that the object of history is not the individual but the specific. Once again it is the 170 *; •••

Defenses of Narrative notion of plot that turns us away from any plea for history as the science of the concrete. To put an event in a plot is to state something intelligible and therefore something specific. "Everything we can state about an individual possesses a sort of generality" (p. 73). "History is the description of what is specific, that is, understandable, in human events" (p. 73). This thesis blends with the one about description in terms of items and the one about the interweaving of series. The individual is an intersection for a series of items, on the condition that a set of items is still a plot.

With this intelligible component of a plot we pass over to the other side of Veyne's work, that of reducing the explanatory claim. Here Veyne acts as a provoqueur. History, he says, has a critique and a topic, but not a method. No method? Let us take him as meaning no rule for bringing about a synthesis of the facts. If the historical field, as we said, is completely undetermined, everything found there really happened, yet numerous itineraries can be traced through it. As for the art of tracing them out, it stems from the historical genre, with all the different ways that has been conceived across the centuries.

The only "logic" compatible with the notion of a plot is a logic of the probable, whose vocabulary Veyne borrows from Aristotle. Science and its laws do not rule in the sublunar order, for "the sublunar is the kingdom of the probable" (p. 44). To say that history stems from the sublunar order or that it proceeds by plots is the same thing. History "will always be a plot because it is human: sublunar, because it will not be a part of determinism" (p. 46). Probability is a corollary of the historian's capacity freely to slice up the field of events. But since the probable is a characteristic of the plot itself, there are no grounds for distinguishing between narrative, understanding, and explanation. "What people call explanation is barely anything more than the way the narrative organizes itself into an understandable plot" (p. 111). From this we can expect that, in the sublunar order, explanation in the scientific sense of this word does not exist. "To explain, for a historian, means 'to show the unfolding of the plot, to make it understood'" (p. 112). The explanation of the French Revolution "is the summary of it and nothing more" (p. 114. his emphasis). Thus sublunar explanation is not to be distinguished from understanding. With this stroke, the problem of the relationship between understanding and explanation, which had so bothered Raymond Aron, vanishes. As for the word "cause," disconnected from the term "law."
Veyne uses it as does Maurice Mandelbaum. "The causes are the various-episodes of the plot" (p. 115). And the narrative "is from the outset causal, understandable" (p. 118). In this sense, "to explain more is to narrate better" (p. 119). This is the only depth we can assign to history. If explanation seems to push beyond our immediate understanding, it is because it can explain the factors of a narrative.

The topic of history remains to be considered. History does not have a method but it does have a critique and a topic. "What do we do other than understand plots? And there are not two ways of understanding" (p. 157). To particular plots. "One apparent exception to the thesis that, in history, to explain is to make understood is represented by retrodiction (see Veyne. pp. 176-209) that inductive operation by which historians rill in a lacuna in their narrative through an analogy with a similar concatenation in another series but one without a fault. Here explanation seems quite clearly to be distinguished from understanding, inasmuch as retrodiction brings into play a causal explanation. And it seems to intervene precisely when the documents do not furnish a plot. We then return through retrodiction to some presumed cause (we might say. for example, too many fiscal laws made Louis XIV unpopular). We reason here from something similar to something else similar, with no guarantee that in this particular circumstance our analogy may not betray us. This is a case for recalling that sublunar causality is irregular, confused, and only valid "most of the time" and "except for . . ."! Within these narrow limits of what is reasonable, retrodiction compensates for the lacunae in our documents. The kind of reasoning retrodiction most resembles is putting things into a series, as practiced by epigraphists, philologists, and iconographers. What provides the historian with the equivalent of a series is the resemblance that assures the relative stability of the customs, conventions, and types from one civilization or era to another. It is what allows us to know, broadly speaking, what to expect from the people of a given era. Retrodiction, therefore, does not escape the conditions of sublunar knowledge. It has nothing in common with a law of subsumption. It is much closer 10 causal explanation in Dray's and Mandelbaum's sense. "Historical explanation is not nomological. it is causal" (p. 201). After all this is what Aristotle said about plot. It makes "one because of another" prevail over "one after another."

We might ask, however, whether causal explanation and understanding through the plot always coincide. This point is not seriously discussed. When action displays nonintentional effects, which is the normal situation a historian encounters, as Danto and Lubbe emphasize, using different arguments, explanation does seem to indicate a defeat for the plot. Veyne even seems to concede this. "The interval between the intention and the effect is the place that we reserve for science, when we are writing history and when we are doing it" (p. 208). Perhaps we should reply that the plot, as not coinciding with the perspective of an agent but as expressing the narrator's "point of view"—the "narrative voice," so to speak—knows nothing of unintended effects.

Defenses of Narrative

We must now do justice to the two complementary theses that history does not have a method but that it does have a critique and a topic. What is its critique? It does not constitute the equivalent of a method, nor does it substitute for one. As the term—which is Kantian—indicates, it refers rather to the vigilance historians exercise with regard to the concepts they use. In this respect. Veyne professes a nominalism without any concessions. "Abstractions cannot be efficient causes, for they do not exist. . . . No more do forces of production exist: only human beings who produce things exist" (p. 138). This abrupt declaration ought not to be separated. I think, from the thesis mentioned earlier that history does not know the individual but rather the specific. Put simply, the generic is not the specific. Here Veyne has in mind something like Weber's ideal-types whose heuristic and nonexplanatory character he underscores. Because they are heuristic, the historian is never finished with readjusting them in order to escape the countermeanings they give rise to. Concepts in history are instead composite representations, extracted from earlier designations, and extended in an exploratory fashion to analogous cases. However, the continuities they suggest are misleading and their genealogies are abusive. But such is the realm of sublunar concepts which are perpetually false and constantly somewhat out of focus. So the historian's vigilance must be particularly severe whenever history enters, as it must, the way of a comparative approach. Marc Bloch was correct, in his Feudal Society, to compare serfdom in Europe and Japan. Yet comparison does not uncover a more general reality, nor does it provide for a more explanatory history. It is only a heuristic approach that leads to particular plots. "What do we do other than understand plots? And there are not two ways of understanding" (p. 157).

The topic of history remains to be considered. History does not have a method but it does have a critique and a topic (p. 267). The term "topic" is borrowed, following Vico's example, from the Aristotelian theory of topoi or "commonplaces," which itself is related to rhetoric. As is well known, these commonplaces constitute the stock of appropriate questions that an orator must possess to speak effectively before an assembly or a tribunal. What is the purpose of history's topic? It has just one purpose: "to expand the questionnaire" (pp. 253ff.). This
expanding of the questionnaire is the only progress history is capable of. How does it come about, if not through a parallel enrichment of the concepts involved? Veyne's nominalism, so strongly associated with his theory of understanding, must therefore be counterbalanced by an apology for the conceptual progress thanks to which the modern historian's vision is richer than that of a Thucydides. Veyne, of course, does not formally contradict himself, inasmuch as he assigns the topic of history to its heuristic aspect, hence to its art of asking questions, and not to explanation, if we take this to apply to the art of answering questions. But does this topic stay within the bounds of heuristics and not encroach upon explanation? In the most fre-

A.

Historical Intentionality

INTRODUCTION

The aim of the present chapter is to examine the indirect connection that must be maintained, in my opinion, between history and our narrative competence, as this has been analyzed in the third chapter of Part I. The fact that this connection must be maintained but that it cannot be a direct connection is the result of the confrontation presented in the two preceding chapters.

The analyses in the first chapter establish the idea of an epistemological break between historical knowledge and our ability to follow a story. This break affects this ability on three levels: the level of procedures, the level of entities, and the level of temporality. On the level of procedures, history is born as inquiry—historia, Forschung, recherche—out of the specific use it makes of explanation. Even if admit, with W. B. Gallic, that a narrative is "self-explanatory," history as a science removes the explanatory process from the fabric of the narrative and sets it up as a separate problematic. It is not that the narrative is oblivious to the forms "why" and "because." but its connections remain immanent to the emplotment. For historians, the explanatory form is made autonomous; it becomes the distinct object of a process of au-thentification and justification. In this respect, historians are in the situation of a judge: placed in the real or potential situation of a dispute, they attempt to prove that one given explanation is better than another. They therefore seek "warrants." the most important of which is documentary proof. Now it is one thing to explain by recounting. It is quite another to set up the explanation itself as a problem in order to submit it to discussion and to the judgment of an audience, which, if not universal, is at least reputed to be competent, and is, composed first of all of the historian's peers.

Making historical explanation autonomous in this way in relation to the explanatory sketches immanent in the narrative has several corollaries, all of which accentuate the break between history and narrative. The first corollary is that tied to the work of explanation is a work of conceptualization, which some people even hold to be the principal criterion of history. This critical problem can belong only to a discipline which, if it has no method, according to Paul Veyne, does indeed
possess a critique and a topic. There is no epistemology of history that does not at one time or another take a
stand on the great quarrel over (historical) universals and that does not painfully retrace, following the medieval
scholars, the back-and-forth movement between realism and nominalism (Gallic). This is of no concern to
narrators. Certainly they use universals, but they are unaware of the question posed by "extending the
questionnaire" (Veyne).

Another corollary of the critical status of history as inquiry is that whatever the limits of historical objectivity
may be, there is a problem of objectivity: a history. According to Maurice Mandelbaum, a judgment is termed
"objective" "because we regard its truth as excluding the possibility that its denial can also be true." This is a
claim that is never made good but that is included in the very project of historical inquiry. The objectivity in
question has two sides to it: first, we can expect that the facts dealt with in historical works, when they are taken
one at a time, interlock with one another in the manner of geographical maps, if the same rules of projection and
scale are respected, or, yet again, like the different facets of the same precious stone. Whereas there is no sense
in placing stories, novels, and plays side by side, it is a legitimate and unavoidable question how the history of a
given period interlocks with that of some other period, the history of France with that of England, for example,
or how the political or military history of a given country at a given time dovetails with its economic history,
with its social history, and its cultural history. A secret dream of emulating the cartographer or the diamond
cutter animates the historical enterprise. Even if the idea of universal history must forever remain an Idea in
Kant's sense of this term, since it is incapable of constituting a Leibnizian geometrai, the work of approximation
that brings the concrete results attained by individual or collective inquiry ever closer to this idea is neither
useless nor meaningless. To this desire to tie things together on the side of historical facts corresponds the hope
that the results reached by different investigators can be combined, due to their complementarity, and that they
can mutually correct one another. The credo of objectivity is nothing other than this twofold conviction that the
facts related by different histories can be linked together and that the results of these histories can complete one
another.

The final corollary is that, precisely because history has objectivity as a project, it can pose the limits of
objectivity as a specific problem. This question is foreign to the innocence and naivete of the narrator, who
instead expects from the public, in Coleridge's familiar expression, a "willing suspension of disbelief." Historians
address themselves to distrustful readers who expect from them not only that they narrate but that they
authenticate their narrative. In this sense-, to recognize an "ideological implication" (White) among explanatory
modes of history is to be capable of recognizing an ideology as such, hence to pick it out from the properly
argumentative modes, 176

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hence also to place it within the scope of a critique of ideology. This final corollary might be called the critical
reflection of historical inquiry.

Conceptualization, the search for objectivity, and critical reexamination thus mark the three steps in making
explanation in history autonomous in relation to the "self-explanatory" character of narrative.

Corresponding to this process of makina explanation autonomous is a similar process as regards the entities
historians take as their sufficient object. Whereas in the traditional or mythical narrative, and also in the
chronicle that precedes history, action is imputed to agents who can be identified, designated by a proper name,
and held responsible for the actions imputed to them, history as a science refers to objects of a new type
appropriate to its form of explanation. Whether these are nations, societies, civilizations, social classes, or men-
talities, history replaces the subject of action with entities that are anonymous. in the strict sense of the term. This
epistemological break on the level of entities reaches its culmination in the French Annales school, with its
expunging of political history in favor of economic, social, and cultural history. The place formerly held by those
heroes of historical action whom Hegel called the great figures of world history is henceforth held by social
forces, whose action can no longer be ascribed in a distributive manner to individual agents. This new history
thus seems to lack characters. And without characters, it could not continue to be narrative.

The third break results from the preceding ones. It concerns the epistemological status of historical time. This
appears to have no direct connection to the time of the memory, expectation, and circumspersion of individual
agents. It no longer seems to refer to the living present of a subjective consciousness.; Its structure is exactly
proportional to the procedures and the entities that history as a science deals with. On the one hand, historical
time appears to resolve itself into a succession of homogeneous intervals, the bearers of causal or nomological
explanation. On the other hand, it is scattered into a multiplicity of times, depending on the scale of entities
considered: the short time-span of the event, the moderately long time-span of conjunctures, the long time-span
of civilizations, the very long time-span of the symbol systems that found the social as such. These "times of
history," to use Braudel's expression, seem to be without any apparent relation to the time of action, to that
"intratemporality" of which we said, following Heidegger, that it is always a favorable or an unfavorable time, a
time "for" something.

And yet, despite this triple epistemological break, history cannot, in my opinion, sever every connection with
narrative without losing its historical character. Conversely, this connection cannot be so direct that history can
simply be considered a species of the genus story (Gallje). By converging on one another without ever meeting, the two halves of chapter 5 have heightened the necessity for a new type of dialectic between historical inquiry and narrative competence.

On the one hand, the criticism of me covering law model with which we began led to a diversification of explanation that makes it less foreign to narrative understanding, without thereby denying the explanatory vocation that keeps history within the circle of the human sciences. First we saw the covering law model weaken under the pressure of criticism. In this way it became less monolithic, allowing a greater diversity of scientific precision for alleged > explanatory generalities, extending from laws worthy of the name to the common-sense generalities that history shares with ordinary language (Berlin), by way of the generalities of a dispositional nature mentioned by Ryle and Gardiner. Then we saw "rational" explanation demand its proper place, with the same requirements of conceptualization, authentification, and critical vigilance as any other mode of explanation. Finally, as we saw with G. H. von Wright, causal explanation was distinguished from causal analysis, and the form of quasi-causal explanation was separated from causal-nomological explanation and was seen to integrate within itself segments of teleological explanation. Following these three lines, the explanation peculiar to historical inquiry does . needless appear to move part of the way along the path separating it from the explanation immanent in a narrative.

To this weakening and diversification of the models of explanation proposed by epistemology corresponds a symmetrical attempt in the analysis of narrative structures to hold up the explanatory resources of the narrative and to bring them, so to speak, to meet the return movement of explanation in the direction of narration. I stated above that the partial success of the narrativist theories was at the same time a partial failure. This admission must not lessen the acknowledgment of the partial success. The narrativist theses, in my opinion, are basically correct on two points.

First, the narrativists have successfully demonstrated that to narrate is already- to explain. The ital/etal—the "one because of the other" that, according to Aristotle, forms the logical connection of the plot—is henceforth the necessary starting point for any discussion of historical narration. This basic thesis has a number of corollaries. If every narrative brings about a causal connection merely by reason of the operation of emplotment. this construction is already a victory over simple chronology and makes possible the distinction between history and chronicle. What is more, if plot construction is the work of judgment, it links narration to a narrator, and therefore allows the "point of view" of the latter to be disassociated from the understanding that the agents or the characters of the story may have of their contribution to the progress of the plot. Contrary to the classical objection, a narrative is in no way bound to the confused and limited perspective of the agents and the eye-witnesses of the events. On the contrary, the putting at a distance that constitutes a "point of view" makes possible the passage from the narrator to the historian (Schoies and Kellogg). Finally, if emplotment integrates into a meaningful unity components as heterogeneous as circumstances, calculations, actions, aids and obstacles, and, lastly, results, then it is equally possible for history to take into account the unintended results of action and to produce descriptions of action distinct from its description in purely intentional terms (Danto).

Second, the narrativist theses reply to a diversifying and hierarchizing of the explanatory models with a comparable diversifying and hierarchizing of the explanatory resources of narrative. The structure of the narrative sentence was. for example, seen to lend itself to a certain type of historical narrative based on documented dating (Danto). We then witnessed a certain diversification in the act of configuration (Mink), and we even saw. for the same author, how the configurational explanation itself becomes one explanatory mode among others, along with categorial explanation and theoretical explanation. Finally with Hayden White, the "explanatory effect" characteristic of emplotment is situated halfway between that of the argumentation and that of the story-line, to the point that what occurs here is no longer a diversification but a breaking apart of the narrative function. Following this, explanation by em-plotment, which had already been distinguished from the explanation inherent in the story-line, becomes part of a new explanatory configuration by linking up with explanation by argument and explanation by ideological implication. This redeploying of narrative structures is equivalent to a disavowal of the strictly "narrativist" theses, which are reassigned to the lower level of the story-line.

The simple narrativist thesis has thus suffered a fate comparable to that of the covering law model: to attain the level of properly historical explanation, the narrativist model has been diversified to the point of disintegrating altogether.

This adventure brings us to the brink of the major difficulty: does a narrativist thesis, which has been reworked to the point of becoming anti-narrativist, have any chance of replacing the explanatory model? This question must unreservedly be answered in the negative. A gap remains between narrative explanation and historical explanation, a gap that is inquiry as such. This gap prevents us from taking history, as Gallje does, as a species of the genus "story."
And yet the intersections hinted at in the converging movement by the explanatory model toward narration and by the narrative structure toward historical explanation attest to the reality of the problem to which the narrativist thesis gives too brief a reply.

The solution to this problem depends on what could be called a method of "questioning back." This method, practiced by Husserl in his *Krisis*, stems from what Husserl calls a genetic phenomenology—not in the sense of a psychological genesis but of a genesis of meaning. The questions that Husserl raised concerning Galilean and Newtonian science, I am raising concerning the historical sciences! I am asking in turn about what I shall henceforth call the intentionality of historical knowledge or, by abbreviation, *historical intensionality*. By this I refer to the *meaning of the noetic intention* that forms the historical character of history and keeps it from dissolving into the other types of knowledge with which history is joined through its marriage of convenience with economics, geography, demography, ethnology, and the sociology of *mentalités* and of ideologies.

The advantage we may have over Husserl in his investigation of the "life-world" to which, according to him, Galilean science refers, is that this questioning back, applied to historiographical knowledge, refers to a cultural world that is already structured and not at all to immediate experience. It refers to a world of action that has already received a configuration through narrative activity, which with regard to its meaning is prior to scientific history. Indeed, this narrative activity already has its own dialectic that makes it pass through the successive stages of mimesis, starting from the prefigurations inherent in the order of action, by way of the constitutive configurations of emplotment—in the broad sense of the Aristotelian μῦθος—to the re-figurations that arise due to the collision of the world of the text with the life-world.

From this, my working hypothesis becomes more specific: I propose to explore by which indirect paths the paradox of historical knowledge (in which the two preceding chapters culminate) transposes onto a higher level of complexity the paradox constitutive of the operation of narrative configuration. This paradox, we recall, arises from the median position of narrative configuration between that which comes before and that which comes after the poetic text. This narrative operation already presents the opposing features that are sharpened in historical knowledge. On the one hand, it emerges Out of the break that sets up the kingdom of the plot and splits it off from the order of real action. On the other hand, it refers back to the understanding immanent in the order of action and to the prenarrative structures stemming from real action. The question, therefore, is as follows. Through what mediations does historical knowledge succeed in transposing into its own order the twofold constitution of the configuring operation of narrative? Or: by what indirect derivations does the triple epistemological break that makes history a form of inquiry proceed from the break established by the configuring operation on the level of mimesis? Does history nevertheless continue obliquely to intend the order of action on the level of mimesis, in accordance with its own resources of intelligibility, of symbolization, and of prenarrative organization? The task is all the more arduous in that the conquest of the scientific autonomy of history does seem to have as its corollary, if not as its precondition, a concerted forgetfulness of its indirect derivation, starting from the activity of narrative configuration, and of its referring back, through forms that are further and further removed from the narrative base, to the field of praxis and its prenarrative resources. This feature, once again, relates my enterprise to that *80* of Husserl in the *Krisis*. Galilean science, too, broke its ties with the prescientific world, to the point of making it almost impossible to reactivate the active and passive syntheses constituting the "life-world." However, our inquiry may have a second advantage in relation to the Husserlian efforts at genetic phenomenology, directed primarily at "the constitution of the object" by way of perceptual phenomena, the advantage of finding at the very heart of historical knowledge a series of relay stations for our questioning back. In this sense, the derivation is never so completely forgotten that it cannot be reconstructed with some sureness and naor.

This reconstruction will follow the order in which I presented above the different aspects of the epistemological break: the autonomy of explanatory procedures, the autonomy of the entities referred to, and the autonomy of the time—or rather of the times—of history.

Beginning with the explanatory procedures. I would like, in light of the encouragement provided by von Wright's analyses, to return to the disputed question about causality in history or, more precisely, about singular causal attribution or imputation. I do so not in order to oppose it, in a polemical spirit, to explanation by laws but, on the contrary, in order to discern within it the transitional structure between explanation by laws, often identified with explanation as such, and explanation by emplotment. Often identified with understanding. In this sense, singular causal imputation does not constitute one explanation among others, but is rather the nexus of all explanation in history. As such, it constitutes the requisite mediation between the opposing poles of explanation and understanding, to preserve a now obsolete vocabulary, or, better, between notnological explanation and explanation by emplotment. The affinity preserved between singular causal imputation and emplotment authorizes us to speak of the first form, by analogy, in terms of a quasi-plot.

As for the entities set in place by historical discourse, I would like to show that they are not all of the same order but that they can be arranged along the lines of a strict hierarchy. History, in my opinion, remains historical to
the extent that all of its objects refer back to first-order entities—peoples, nations, civilizations—that bear the indelible mark of concrete agents’ participatory belonging to the sphere of praxis and narrative. These first-order entities serve as the transitional object between all the artifacts produced by history and the characters of a possible narrative. They constitute quasi-characters capable of guiding the intentional reference back from the level of the science of history to the level of narrative and, through this, to the agents of real action. Between the relaying by singular causal imputation and that by first-order entities—between the nexus of explanation and the transitional object of the description—there are tight interconnections. The distinction between these two lines of derivation—derivation of procedures, derivation of entities—presents in this respect a purely didactic character, so closely knit are these two lines. It is important, nonetheless, to keep them distinct in order better to understand their complementarity and, if may put it this way, their reciprocal genesis. The reference back to primary entities, which I am calling “participatory belonging,” occurs principally by way of singular causal imputation. Reciprocally, the intention that runs through a causal imputation is guided by the interest the historian continues to have in the contribution made by historical agents to their fate, even though this fate slips out of their hands due to the perverse effects that, precisely, distinguish historical knowledge from the simple understanding of the meaning immanent to their action. In this sense, quasi-plot and quasi-characters belong to the same intermediary level and have a similar function, serving as a relay station for the movement of history's questioning back toward narrative and, beyond the narrative, in the direction of actual practice.

A final test of my working hypothesis concerning historical knowledge is obviously necessary. It concerns the epistemological status of historical time in relation to the temporality of a narrative. Our inquiry about history must venture to this point if it is to remain faithful to the principal subject of this work: narrative and temporality. It is important to show two things: On the one hand, that the time constructed by the historian is constructed to the second, the third, the rv" level upon an already constructed temporality, the theory of which was expounded in Part I under the title of mimesis: and on the other hand, that this is constructed time, however artificial it may be. never ceases to refer back to the temporality of praxis described by mimesis.: Constructed on .... referring back to .... these two intertwining relations also characterize the procedures and the entities built by history. The parallel with the other two mediations ‘oes ever, further. Just as I am searching in historical causality and in (rst-order entities tor the relay stations capable of guiding [he reference of the structures of historical knowledge back to the work of narrative configuration, which itself refers back to the narrative prefigureations found in the lied of praxis, in a similar way I should like to show, in the fate of the historical event, both the indication of the ever-increasing gap separating historical time from the time of narrative and from lived time and the indication of the ineffaceable reference of historical time back to the time of action by way of the time of narrative.

In these three successive spheres I will call upon the testimony of history alone as it pursues to the very end its critical self-reflection.

**SINGULAR CAUSAL IMPUTATION**

Singular causal imputation is the explanatory procedure that accomplishes the transition between narrative causality—the structure of “one because of the other” which Aristotle distinguished from “one after the other”—and explanatory causality that, in the covering law model, is not distinguished from explanation by laws. Historical Intentionality

The search for this transition finds support in the analyses of William Dray and G. H. von Wright presented at the beginning of the preceding chapter. Dray familiarized us with the thesis that the causal analysis of a particular course of events cannot be reduced to the application of a causal law. The double test, inductive and pragmatic, by which we verify the credentials of his or that candidate for the function of cause is not far from the logic of causal imputation offered by Max Weber and Raymond Aron. But a connection is lacking between the theory of causal analysis and that of analysis by reasons. This connection is forged by G. H. von Wright in his analysis of quasi-causal explanation. Rational explanation is identified with the segments of teleological inference linked together in this specific type of explanation. Teleological inference, in turn, rests on the prior understanding we have of the intentional character of action. And the latter, too, refers to the familiarity we have with the logical structure of doing something (making something happen, doing somethings so that something happens). Making something happen is interfering with the course of events by setting a system in motion and, by this, also ensuring that it is a closed system. By this series of connections—teleological inference, intentional understanding, practical interference—quasi-causal explanation, which as causal explanation applies only to individual occurrences of generic phenomena (events, processes, states), ultimately refers back to what I shall now designate by the term “singular causal imputation.”

The most precise presentation of the logic of singular causal imputation is Sound in the critical study Max Weber devoted to Edward Meyer’s work Zur rieiteirie mid Method der Geschichcie,’ to which must be added the contribu-
tions made by Raymond Aron, in the third section of his *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, which are
decisive for our investigation. This kind of logic consists essentially of the constructing by our imagination of a
different course of events, then of weighing the probable consequences of this unreal course of events, and,
finally, in comparing these consequences with the real course of events. "In order to penetrate the real causal
interrelationships, we construct unreal ones" (Weber, pp. 185-86, his emphasis). And Aron: "Every historian, to
explain what did happen, asks himself what might have happened" (p. 160).
This probabilist, imaginary construction presents a twofold similarity, on the one hand, with emplotment, which
is itself a probable imaginary construction, and, on the other hand, with explanation in terms of laws.
Let us examine Max Weber's reasoning more closely.7
Consider, as an example, Bismarck's decision to declare war on Austria-Hungary in 1866. As Weber observes,
"And yet, despite all this, the problem: what might have happened if, for example, Bismarck had not decided to
make war is by no means an "idle" one" (p. 164). We need to understand this question. It consists in asking what
"causal significance" is properly to be at-
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tributed to this individual decision in the context of the totality of infinitely numerous 'factors.' all of which had to be in such and such an arrangement and in no other if this result were to emerge, and what role it is therefore to be assigned in an historical explanation" (ibid., his emphases). It is the phrase "all of which had to be in such and such an arrangement and in no other" that marks the entrance on stage of the imagination. Reasoning, from this point on, moves in the arena of unreal past conditionals. But history shifts into the sphere of the unreal only in order better to discern there what is necessary. The question becomes "what consequences were to be anticipated had another decision been taken?" (p. 165). This then involves an exploration of the probable or necessary interconnections. If the historian in his thinking can affirm that, by the modification or omission of an individual event in a complex of historical conditions, there would have followed a different series of events "in certain historically important respects" (p. 166, his emphasis), then the historian can make a judgment of causal imputation that decides the historical significance of the event.
This reasoning, in my opinion, runs in two different directions: on the one hand in the direction of emplotment, and on the other in the direction of scientific explanation.
Nothing in Weber's text, in fact, indicates that he perceived the first connection. We shall have to establish it. using the present-day resources of narratology. However, two of Weber's remarks do tend in this direction. He says, first of all, that the historian is and is not in the position of the agent who, before acting, weights the possible ways of acting, given this or that aim. This or that available means. It is indeed a question that Bismarck could have asked himself that we formulate, except that we know the outcome. This is why we raise it "with hotter chances of success" (p. 165) than he did. The expression "better chances 01 success" announces, of course, the logic of probability that will be referred to later. But does it not in the first place refer to that extraordinary laboratory of the probable constituted by the paradigms of emplotment? Max Weber also notes that historians both resemble criminologists and differ from them. By investigating guilt they also investigate causality, although to causal imputation they add ethical imputation. But what is this causal imputation divested of any ethical imputation if not the testing of different plot schemata?
Causal imputation is also related at every stage to scientific explanation. First of all, explanation supposes a detailed analysis of factors, aiming at "the selection of the causal links to be incorporated into an historical exposition" (p. 168, n. 35). Certainly, this "thought process" is guided by our historical curiosity, that is, by our interest in a certain class of results. This is one of the senses of the term, "importance." In the murder of Caesar, historians are interested only in the notable consequences of the event for the development of world history, which they consider to be most significant. (In this respect, a
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discussion that would get bogged down again in the quarrel opposing objectivity and subjectivity in history would miss the highly intellectual character of the operation of abstraction that precedes that of sorting out possibilities.) Next, to modify mentally in a specific way this or that factor, which first has been isolated, is to construct alternate courses of events among which the event whose importance is being weighed acts as the deciding factor. Weighing the consequences of eliminatina the supposed event thus gives the causal argument its logical structure. Now, how do we construct the consequences that should have been expected if we assume a particular factor to be eliminated, if not by including in our reasoning what Weber calls "an empirical rule" (p. 173). that is, in the final analysis, a knowledge that must indeed be called "nomological" (p. 174)? Of course, these rules based on experience quite often do not go beyond the level of a dispositional knowledge, as Ryle and Gardiner would put it. Max Weber has specifically in mind those rules "relating to the ways in which human beings are prone to react under given situations" (ibid.). Nevertheless, they are sufficient to show, as we stated earlier, how laws can be used in history even though they are not established by history.
These first two features—analysis into factors and recourse to rules based on experience—are not absolutely foreign to narrative "logic." especially if this is shifted from the surface of the text to its deep grammar. The true mark of the scientific character of a construction, considered as both unreal and necessary, results from applying to the compared weight of different causes the theory of "objective possibility" that Weber borrows from the physiologist von Kries." It
is this third feature that marks the true distance separating explanation by narration from explanation by causal imputation.

The theory in question aims mainly at raising such unreal constructions to the level of judgments of objective possibility, which ascribe a degree of relative probability to the various causal factors and in this way allow them to be placed along a single scale, although the gradations resulting from this type of judgment cannot be quantified as is the case in what we call the "calculation of probabilities" in the strict sense. This idea of a graduated causality gives causal imputation an exactness that is lacking in the probability invoked by Aristotle in his theory of the plot. The various degrees of probability thus range in order from a low point, which defines accidental causality (as, for example, between the movement of a hand throwing dice and a particular number turning up), and a high point, which defines, in von Kries' terms, adequate causality (as in the case of Bismarck's decision). Between these two extremes we can speak of the more or less favorable influence of a certain factor. The danger is, obviously, that, by reason of an insidious anthropomorphism, we may materialize the degrees of relative probability ascribed to the various causes that our reasoning sets in competition with one another, in the form of antagonistic tendencies struggling to transform a possibility into a reality. Ordinary language is conducive to this when it has us say that this or that event helped or thwarted the appearance of some other event. In order to rid ourselves of this misunderstanding, it is enough to remember that these possibilities are unreal causal relations that we have constructed mentally, and that the objectivity of the various "chances" belongs to the judgment of possibility.

It is only at the end of this testing process that a factor is attributed the status of a sufficient cause. This is an objective status, in the sense that the argument does not stem from a mere psychology of discovering hypotheses; rather, irrespective of genius, which is no more lacking in a great historian than in a great mathematician, it constitutes the logical structure of historical knowledge or, in Max Weber's own words, a "firm skeletal structure of established causes" (p. 176).

We see where the continuity between emplotment and a singular causal imputation resides and where the discontinuity is to be found. The continuity resides at the level of the role played by the imagination. In this regard we might say of emplotment what Max Weber says of the mental construction of a different course of events: "In order to penetrate the real causal relationships, we construct unreal ones." The discontinuity has to do with the analysis into factors, the insertion of rules from experience, and, especially, the assignment of degrees of probability that determine adequate causality.

It is for this reason that historians are not simply narrators: they give reasons why they consider a particular factor rather than some other to be the sufficient cause of a given course of events. Poets also create plots that are held together by causal skeletons. But these latter are not the subject of a process of argumentation. Poets restrict themselves to producing the story and explaining by narrating. In this sense, Northrop Frye is right: poets begin with the form, historians move toward it." The former produce, the latter argue. And they argue because they know that we can explain in other ways. They know this because, like a judge, they are in a situation of contestation and of trial, and because their plea is never finished—for the test is more conclusive for eliminating candidates for causality, as William Dray would say. than for crowning any particular one once and for all. And yet. let me repeat, the filiation of historical explanation, starting from narrative explanation, is unbroken, inasmuch as adequate causality remains irreducible to logical necessity alone. The same relation of continuity and of discontinuity is found between singular causal explanation and explanation by laws as between the former and emplotment.

Let us first consider the discontinuity. It is more clearly stressed in Aron's analysis than in Weber's. In the section he devotes to the relation between causality and chance. Aron does not restrict himself to situating accidents at one end of the scale of retrospective probability, with adequate probability at the opposite end The definition of an accident as possessing an objective pos-

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sibility of almost zero is valid only for isolated series. His consideration, borrowed from Cournot, of the notion of coincidences between series or between systems and series throws into relief more clearly the notion of accident and emphasizes the relative character of Weber's probabilist theory: "An event may be said to be accidental with reference to one system of antecedents, adequate with reference to another. Chance, since many series have come together, rational, since at a higher level an ordered whole is found" (p. 175). We must reckon, in addition, with "the uncertainty which lies in the fixing of the limits of systems and series, with the plurality of fortuitous con-~tructs which the scholar is free to set up or imagine" (p. 176). For all these reasons, a reflection on chance cannot restrict this notion to a simple opposition to adequate causality, within a process of reasoning based on retrospective probability.

The continuity between singular causal explanation and explanation by Saws is no less evident than their discontinuity. The relation between history and sociology is exemplary in this respect. Raymond Aron describes it in These words: "sociology is characterized by the attempt to set up laws tor at least regularities or
generalities), whereas history is limited to narrating events in their peculiar sequence” (p. 187). In the same sense: "Historical research sticks to the antecedents of a singular fact, sociological research to the causes of a fact which may be repeated" (p. 226). But then the word "cause" changes its meaning: "cause, as seen by sociologists, is the constant antecedent" ip. 188. his emphasis). Nevertheless, the points of intersection between the two kinds of causality—historical causality and sociological causality—are more noteworthy than their divergences. For example, when a historian establishes the relative probability of some historical constellation or other, this includes within it, as a nomological segment, empirical generalizations that provoke an inquiry into regularities by the person whom Aron calls the "scholar" in opposition to the "judge." The entire study devoted to sociological causality in his book tends to show both the originality of this enterprise and its dependence with respect to historical causality, hence with respect to singular causal imputation. In this way historical causality has the strange status of being an investigation found lacking in relation to the search for regularities and laws, and yet deemed excessive in relation to the abstractions of sociology. It constitutes an internal limit on sociology's claim to be a science, just when it borrows from the latter the regularities upon which its probability is founded.

It is due to this epistemological ambivalence that historical determinism, which claims to be located at an even higher level than that of sociological explanation, is, in its turn, chipped away from inside by the contingency preserved in historical causality: "Causal relations are dispersed, they do not fall into a pattern, so that they do not explain each other as do the classified laws of a theory in physics" (p. 205). In this sense, sociological causality refers back to historical causality rather than absorbing it into itself: "the partial determinism develops regularly only in a single constellation which is never exactly reproduced" (p. 224). And again: "abstract relations never exhaust the unique constellation" (p. 230).

It must therefore be concluded that the same dialectic of continuity and discontinuity is observed on the second side of the mediation performed by singular causal imputation between the narrative level and the epistemological one as is found on the first side: "Both complementary and divergent at the same time, sociological and historical causality complement each other” (p. 187).

Here again, Aron's originality in relation to Weber is confirmed. It results from the philosophical intention that animates his whole book. Thus the insistence with which the dependence of partial determinism on singular historical causality is stressed is in profound harmony with the "historical philosophy' (to use Gaston Fessard's title) that directs the epistemology of Introduction to the Philosophy of History, namely, his struggle against the illusion of fatality created by historical retrospection and his plea for the contingency of the present required by political action. Set against the backdrop of this great philosophical design, the logic of retrospective probability bears a precise meaning, which is of direct interest to our investigation into historical temporality. "The investigation of cause by the historian." says Aron. "is directed not so much at tracing the broad outlines of the relief of history as at preserving for or restoring to the past the uncertainty of the future" (p. 179). And again: "Unreal constructions must still remain an integral part of science, even if they do not go beyond an uncertain probability, for they offer the only means of escaping the retrospective illusion of fatality" (p. 183. his emphasis). How is this possible? We must understand that the imaginative operation by which the historian assumes in thought that one of the antecedents has disappeared or been modified, and then tries to construct what would have happened in accordance with this hypothesis, has a significance that, goes beyond epistemology. The historian acts here as a narrator who redefines the three dimensions of time in relation to a fictive present. Dreaming of a different event, he opposes "uchroma" (a timeless time) to the fascination with what, once was. The retrospective estimation of probabilities thus contains a moral and a political significance that exceeds its purely epistemological one. It recalls to the readers of history that the "historian's past has been the future of the characters in history" (p. 184). Due to its probabilist character, causal explanation incorporates into the past the unpredictability that is the mark of the future and introduces into retrospection the uncertainty of the event. The final lines of the section entitled "Limits and Meaning of Historical Causality" (pp. 179-85), which concludes the analysis of historical causality, thus occupy a strategic position in the economy of this book: "Anticipatory calculation is a condition of reasonable conduct, as retrospective probabilities are of the true account. If decisions and moments are neglected, one substitutes for 188 Historical Intentionality the living world a natural world or fatality. In this sense, historical science, the resurrection of politics, becomes contemporary with its heroes” (p. 184. trans. altered).
limitations of the example chosen by Max Weber: Bismarck's decision to attack Austria-Hungary in 1866. Does not this choice confine the argument, from the very start, to the political sphere, hence to the plane of the history of events? Does this not condemn it to being only another version of "rational" explanation? No. not if the argument can be extended by analogy to large-scale historical events in which the cause, while remaining singular, is no longer the individual.

This analogical extension is made possible by the very nature of the question raised concerning the original example. Even when historians inquire into the responsibility an individual has in a course of events, they distinctly distinguish causal imputation from ethical responsibility, on the one hand, and from nomothetic explanation, on the other. With regard to the first point, we must say that "causal analysis provides absolutely no value judgment and a value judgment is absolutely not causal explanation" (Weber, p. 123). In the example chosen by Weber, following Meyer, causal imputation consists in asking "why the decision to go to war was at that moment the appropriate means to achieve the goal of the unification of Germany" (p. 121). We must not be misled by the use of such categories as means and ends. The argument does, of course, include a teleological segment, but overall it is causal. It concerns the causal value to be attributed to a certain decision in a course of events that includes factors other than the rational core of the decision considered, and among these the nonrational motivations of all the protagonists in this course of action and, in addition, "meaningless factors" stemming from physical nature. It is causal imputation alone that can say up to what point the outcome of an action failed to live up to or betrayed the intentions of the actors. The gap between the intention and the consequences is precisely one of the aspects of the causal value related to decision.

These remarks go along with the thesis I have stated several times, namely, that causal explanation, even when it concerns the historical role of an individual decision, is distinguished from a phenomenology of action inasmuch as it evaluates intentions not only in terms of aims but also in terms of results. In this sense, causal imputation, as presented by Weber, coincides with von Wright’s quasi-causal explanation, which contains teleological segments and epistemic segments.”

If, then, the argument of singular causal imputation is rightfully extended...
pansion with similar situations, in particular, that of the Persian protectorate as it concerned the Jews returning from Exile. On the other hand, there is the tree Hellenic spirit as this actually developed. The victory of Salamis can be held to be the adequate cause of this development. Indeed, when the event is eliminated in thought, a whole series of factors is eliminated with it: the construction of the Attic fleet, the development of the struggles for freedom, curiosity about history—factors that are summed up under the heading or the “possibility” following upon this event. It is, no doubt, the price we attach to the irreplaceable cultural values of the free Hellenic spirit that creates our interest in the Greco-Persian wars. But it is the construction of the “imaginary tableau” produced by abstraction and the weighing of the consequences of the event assumed to be eliminated that constitutes the logical structure of the argument. In this way, the argument remains that of a singular causal imputation, even when it is no longer applied to an individual decision. Max Weber's own work offers us an even more remarkable example of singular causal imputation outside of the sphere of individual decision and of politico-military history. The reasoning used in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism exactly satisfies the method of causal inference that has just been described. The alleged connection between certain features of the Protestant ethic and certain features of capitalism constitutes a singular causal chain, even though it does not concern individuals taken one at a time, but rather roles, attitudes, and institutions. What is more, the causal connection provides the structure for a single process that renders irrelevant the distinction between a pointlike event and a long time-span. The thesis upheld in Weber's essay is, in this sense, a remarkable case of singular causal imputation.

How is this argument constructed? Faithful to the method of abstraction, Weber isolates the specific component of the work ethic on the side of the religious phenomenon and, on the side of the economic phenomenon, the spirit of acquisition characterized by rational calculation, the precise adaptation of available means to desired ends, and the value attached to labor as such. The problem is then precisely set out. It is not a question of explaining the birth of capitalism as an overall phenomenon but rather the particular vision of the world it implies. The religious conception of ascetic Protestantism is itself considered only in terms of the relation of adequate causality that it maintains in regard to the spirit of capitalism. When the problem is set out in this way, the question is that of the adequacy of the causal imputation in the absence of any regularity of a nomological type. Empirical generalizations are involved, of course—for example, the assertion that a doctrine such as predestination, which divests the individual of ultimate responsibility, was bearable only when it was compensated by other factors that increased self-assurance such as this belief in personal salvation, attested to by active involvement in wfrkt However, empirical geh**ficinations of this sort are only argumentative segments incorporated into the inductive inference that draws

191 as i conclusion the imputation of the spirit of capitalism to the Protestant ethic, therefore a singular causal imputation, inasmuch as these two configurations and their conjunction remain unique in history. In order to uphold this causal imputation, Weber does exactly what he recommends in his article on Edward Meyer. He imagines a historical course from which the spiritual factor considered would be absent and in which other factors would have played the hypothetical role assumed by the Protestant work ethic—among these other factors are the rationalization of law, the organization of commerce, the centralization of political power, technological inventions, the development of the scientific method. A probability calculation applied to these various factors suggests that in the absence of the spiritual factor under consideration these other factors would not have been sufficient to produce the effect in question. For example, the advent of the scientific method would have been capable of focusing energy on a specific goal, the precise organization of ends and means. But it would have lacked the emotional force and the power of dissemination that the Protestant ethic alone could contribute. In this sense, the probability that the scientific method might have transformed the traditional ethic into the bourgeois work ethic is slight. The same reasoning has to be repeated with respect to the other candidates for the role of cause before the Protestant ethic can be held to be the adequate cause of the development of the spirit of capitalism. This is why the adequacy of the causal imputation is not equivalent to an argument based on necessity but only to one based on probability.

With this extension of singular causal imputation to historical developments in which neither individual decisions nor pointlike events can any longer be discerned, we have reached the point where historical explanation appears to break its moorings to narrative. And yet the reconstruction of the various stages of filiation I have just made, in my free reading of Weber's text, with the help of Aron's Introduction to the Philosophy of Histori1, authorizes us to apply the notion of plot by analogi to all singular causal imputation. This is, in my opinion, what justifies the use of the term "plot" by Paul Veyne, who designates by this all the singular configurations that satisfy the criterion that I have proposed for the notion of emplotment, namely, the synthesis of such heterogeneous factors as circumstances, intentions, interactions, adversity, good or bad fortune. This, moreover, as we have seen, approximates Veyne's definition of plot: the conjoining of aims, causes, and chance occurrences. In keeping with my argument for the indirect relation of historical explanation to the structure of the narrative. I shall speak of a quasi-plot in order to indicate the analogous nature of the extension of singular causal imputation on the basis of its prime example, the causal explanation of the results of an individual decision. I shall take this analogy as my theme as I move from the question of explanatory procedures to that of the basic entities of historical knowledge. 192

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THE FIRST-ORDER ENTITIES OF HISTORY

For didactic reasons, I have distinguished three paths along which we may question back: the one that leads from the explanatory procedures of scientific history back to the explanatory power contained in the emplotment of narrative; the one that leads from the entities constructed by the historian back to the characters in narrative; and, finally, the one that leads from the multiple times of history back to the temporal dialectic of narrative. These three paths are inseparable, as were the three types of epistemological break described in the introduction to this chapter. They are characterized not only (1) by the same style of indirect filiation linking history to narrative understanding, but also (2) by the same recourse to certain relay stations that history itself provides for the task of reconstructing the historical intentionality. My emphasis will be placed first on the indirect character of the narrative filiation, a character that can be verified on the level of entities as well as on that of procedures. The epistemological break between historiographical entities and the characters in narratives is, as I see it, the presupposition with which we must start here. Characters can be identified, designated by proper names, and held to be responsible for the actions ascribed to them. They are their authors or their victims. And these actions make them happy or unhappy. Now, the entities to which history refers the changes it attempts to explain are not characters, if we limit ourselves to its explicit epistemology. The social forces that operate in the background of individual actions are, strictly speaking, anonymous. The force of this presupposition seems to me to be overlooked by every form of "epistemological individualism," for which any social change can, in principle, be divided up into simple actions, asensible to the individuals who are the authors of these actions and who bear the final responsibility for them. The error of methodological individualism lies in requiring in principle a reductive operation that can never actually be accomplished. In this I see the expression of a demand for a direct derivation that fails to grasp the specific nature of the questioning back, which alone is practicable in this domain. Only an indirect derivation can respect the epistemological break without shattering the intentional aim of historical knowledge. The question is, then, whether this intentional aim actually possesses, on the level of historiographical entities, a relay station similar to that of singular causal imputation on the level of explanatory procedures. This relay station does exist in the form of the first-order entities of historical knowledge, that is, those societal entities that, while they are indecomposable into a dust cloud of individuals, nevertheless do refer, in their constitution and in their definition, to individuals capable of being considered as the characters in a narrative. In the introduction to this chapter I called these first-order entities "entities of participatory belonging." The following discussion should justify naming them in this way.

1. Some help for this attempt at indirect derivation can be found in Maurice Mandelbaum's work, *The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge*, despite the author's hostility to the narrativist theses. From him I have learned a double lesson that I shall incorporate into my method of questioning back. The first concerns the ordering of the entities assumed by the historian's discourse. The second concerns the correlation between what Mandelbaum takes as the first-order entities of historical knowledge and the procedure of causal imputation, the theory of which was worked out above. This second lesson will enable us to tie together the two paths of questioning back, the path of entities and the path of procedures. But let us begin by reflecting on the basic entities.
Maurice Mandelbaum's epistemology places him at an equal distance from the proponents of a subsumption model and from those of the narrativist version. In opposition to the former, he holds that, despite the typical character of the situations and events that history treats and despite its recourse to generalizations, history deals fundamentally with "what was characteristically true of some particular place over some particular span of time. . . . Thus, the familiar thesis that historians are concerned with the particular, rather than with establishing explanatory generalizations, appears to me sound" (p. 5). In other words, Mandelbaum takes into account Windelband's distinction between idiosyncratic and nomothetic sciences. In opposition to the latter, he holds that history is an investigation, that is, a discipline concerned with authenticating its statements, with accounting for the relations it establishes between events. This is why the interest it displays in singular constellations cannot at the same time exclude the interpolation of regularities into its chains of relations. I shall not discuss these presuppositions, which accord quite well with the conclusions of the preceding two chapters. Against this backdrop, the thesis I shall be attending to stands out clearly: the irreducible object of history is of a societal order. History sees the thoughts, feelings, and actions of individuals in the specific context of their social environment: "It is only insofar as individuals are viewed with reference to the nature and changes of a society existing at a particular time and place that they are of interest to historians" (Mandelbaum, p. 10). At first sight, this thesis, taken in isolation, confirms the discontinuity between the level of history and that of a narrative in which characters have to be identifiable as individuals responsible for their actions. A more precise determination of the term "society" sets us on the path of the problematic specific to these basic entities. It results from a distinction between two kinds of history: "general history" and "special histories" (p. II). General history takes as its theme particular societies, such as peoples and nations, whose existence is continuous. Special histories takes as their theme abstract aspects of culture such as technology, art, science, religion, which lack continuous existence and which are linked together only through the initiative of the historian who is responsible for defining what counts as art, as science, as religion.

The notion of society, as the ultimate reference of history, receives from its opposition to the notion of culture a determination that will later allow me to characterize it as a transitional object between the plane of narrative and the plane of explanatory history. Let us specify further Mandelbaum's notion of society in its opposition to that of culture: "A society, I shall hold, consists of individuals living in an organized community that controls a particular territory; the organization of such a community is provided by institutions that serve to define the status occupied by different individuals and ascribe to them the roles they are expected to play in perpetuating the continuing existence of the community" (ibid., his emphasis).

All three components of this definition are important: the first ties the community, and hence its duration, to places: the second connects it to individuals by assigning to them an institutionalized role; the third characterizes the community in terms of its uninterrupted existence. This third component will later enable us to bridge the gap between the basic entities and the procedures of causal connection that correspond to them at this level. The notion of culture covers all or the achievements stemming from social relations and implicated in individual use that are transmitted by a tradition: language, techniques, arts, philosophical or religious attitudes and beliefs, insofar as these diverse functions are included in the social heritage of the various individuals living within a particular society.

The difference between society and culture is, of course, difficult to maintain in all cases. Why, it will be asked, are institutions, which define the role of individuals and include kinship systems, the distribution of goods, and the organization of labor, placed on the side of society rather than on that of culture? The answer is provided by the third feature of society, namely, that it is particular and exists continuously. From this it follows that an institution belongs to society and not to culture inasmuch as it constitutes an integrating factor in a particular and continuously existing society. In return, the activities that define culture are abstracted from particular societies and their modes are gathered together under a single classificatory concept by the delimitation that historians ascribe to them, a definition that can vary widely from one author to another. This distinction between the history of particular societies and that of classes of activities indicates the two poles at either end of a range of intermediary cases. For example, the societal phenomenon can be analyzed into various aspects—political, economic, social—and the ways in which these aspects are cui up, defined, and put into relation stem from methodological choices that make them into artifacts in the same way as the activities classified under the heading of culture are made into artifacts. But as long as these aspects are thought of as the "facets" of a particular society, they provide its ultimate characterization. These facets can be referred back to the global societal phenomenon due to a noteworthy feature of the latter, namely, that it constitutes a network of institutions and powers, whose indefinite density lends itself to investigations on varying scales, after the manner of geographical maps. This capacity of the societal phenomenon of being analyzed into aspects, dimensions, or facets ensures the transition from general (I would prefer to say global) history to the special (or better,
Belonging and the role of symbolic mediations—norms, customs, rites—by which the recognition of this to the level of language. The same emphasis must be given to both the ontological anteriority of the connection that depend on the conception they may have of art. However, this manner of separating out a class by stipulating conditions is not left to the sole discretion of the art historians. The works themselves are set within traditions and within a framework of influences that mark their root-edness in the historical continuity of particular societies, from which the works receive a borrowed continuity. In this way, specialized histories refer back to general or global history.

Consequently, depending upon whether the accent is placed on the artificial character of the connections between cultural products or upon the traditions that allow them to participate in the temporal continuity of particular societies, the investigation leans to the side of specialized history or to the side of global history. It is the semi-autonomy of institutions and activities that allows us to relate them either to the singular constellations that define a societal phenomenon or to the classes of products and of works that define the cultural phenomenon. In what sense does the notion of society, in Mandelbaum's sense, offer a relay station in the derivation of historical entities starting from the characters in a narrative? Just as singular causal imputation presents an affinity with em-plotment that justifies our speaking with regard to it of a quasi-plot. And even of plot in the broad sense of the word, so too society, once it is considered a singular entity, appears in historical discourse as a quasi-character. This analogical transfer is not reducible to a rhetorical effect. It is founded twice over, in the theory of narrative and in the structure of the societal phenomenon.

On the one side, nothing in the notion of character, understood in the sense of someone who performs an action, requires that this character be an individual human being. As our literary analysis in volume 2 will amply confirm, the role of character can be held by whomever or whatever is designated in the narrative as the grammatical subject of an action predicate in the basic narrative sentence "X does R." In this sense history only extends and amplifies the dissociation made between character and real actor in emplotment. It could even be said that history helps to give to the character his, her, or its full narrative dimension. In this sense, individual responsibility is just the first in a series of analogies, among which we find peoples, nations, classes, and all the communities that exemplify the notion of a singular society.

On the other side, the societal phenomenon itself contains a decisive feature that governs the analogical extension of the role of characters. The definition given by Mandelbaum of a singular society is incomplete without an oblique reference to the individuals who make it up. This oblique reference, in turn, allows us to deal with the society itself as one great individual, analogous to the individuals who make it up. It is in this sense that Plato spoke of the City as a soul writ large and that Husserl in his fifth Cartesian Meditation calls historical communities "personalities of a higher order." Two things are to be pointed out in this argument.

The first concerns the oblique reference in every definition of the societal phenomenon to the individuals who compose it. The second concerns the support this oblique reference provides for the analogical extension of the role of characters to the first-order entities of historical discourse.

This oblique reference to individuals is contained in the features by which Mandelbaum defines society: territorial organization, institutional structure, temporal continuity. All three refer back to individuals who inhabit the territory, who till the roles assigned by the institutions, and who provide, as generation replaces generation, the historical continuity of the society in question. I call this an oblique reference because it is not part of the historian's direct discourse, which can, without too many qualms, restrict itself to collective entities and make no explicit reference to their individual components. But if it is not up to history as a scientifically oriented discipline to thematize this oblique reference, it is. On the contrary, the task of a genetic phenomenology to discover in the phenomenon of the we-relation the origin of the connection between individuals and particular societies. It finds this connection in the phenomenon of participatory belonging that relates first-order historical entities to the sphere of action. This connection defines the bearers of action as members of... It can be called a real, ontological connection insofar as it has precedence with respect to the consciousness the members have of it. Of course, it is characteristic of this connection that it be capable of being recognized as such, that it be capable of being experienced and stated; but that's recognition is grounded in the connection itself, which it brings to the level of language. The same emphasis must be given to both the ontological anteriority of the connection of belonging and the role of symbolic mediations—norms, customs, rites—by which the recognition of this
connection is confirmed. As a result, neither varying degrees of consciousness nor the modes of its becoming conscious are actually constitutive of this connection. With this qualification in mind, let us consider for a moment the perspective of the varying degrees of consciousness. The connection of belonging can be experienced with great intensity of feeling, as in patriotism, class-consciousness, or prejudice, but it can also be forgotten, neglected, dissimulated, even vehemently denied by those whom the rest of society considers as outcasts or traitors or by those who consider themselves dissidents, exiles, or outlaws. It can then be the task of a critique of ideology to unmask their hidden allegiance. But this critique, in its turn, presupposes the anteriority of the connection in relation to consciousness (and to the possibility of bringing it into the sphere of explicit consciousness). As for the modes of explicit consciousness, the experience of participatory belonging can be tinged with the widest range of evaluations—198

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...
reconstruction can take two forms, depending on whether it emphasizes temporal continuity or structural unity. Causal explanation must then reconstruct the continuity broken by the analysis. This occurs when the analysis into factors, phases, and structures is itself freed from the overall grasping of the total social phenomenon. "What?" becomes a separate theme of inquiry. And the question "Why?" becomes autonomous when the analysis into factors, phases, and structures is itself freed from the overall grasping of the total social phenomenon. Causal explanation must then reconstruct the continuity broken by the analysis. This reconstruction can take two forms, depending on whether it emphasizes temporal continuity or structural unity.

historical discourse. One essential function of causal attribution is, in effect, to reestablish the continuity of a process in which the unity of development appears, for one reason or another, to be interrupted, or even nonexistent. We recall that continuous existence is, in Mandelbaum's vocabulary, a major feature in distinguishing society from culture.

This function of causal explanation is one of the primary theses of Mandelbaum's work. This thesis deliberately breaks with the empiricist tradition stemming from Hume, for which causality expresses a regular connection between two types of logically distinct events. According to this tradition, the nomothetic character of the causal relation is rigorously tied to the atomist character of the notions of cause and effect. Mandelbaum attacks just this atomist character of causal connection when he defines the basic social phenomenon in terms of continuous existence.

Starting from the perceptual level, causality expresses the continuity of a singular process. The cause is the whole process, the effect is its end point. For the observer, the fact that a ball is hit is the cause of its movement, and the cause is included within the complete event. It is only for the sake of convenience that we isolate from the whole process the most variable of its factors and make it a cause distinct from its effect—for example, bad weather for a 200 historical event.

Against Hume it must be said that an "analysis of the cause of a particular occurrence involves tracing the various factors that are jointly responsible for the occurrence being what it was, and not being different" (p. 74)."

Causal explanation always involves linking a cause and its effect together "in such a way that they may be said to constitute aspects of a single ongoing process" (p. 76). Conversely, explanation in terms of one discrete antecedent is always the sign of an abbreviated and truncated explanation. The pragmatic advantage of these truncated explanations must not make us forget that the "cause is the whole set of actual ongoing occurrences or events that resulted in this, and no other, particular effect" (p. 93). In this sense there is a logical gap between causal explanation, which always concerns the factors responsible for a particular occurrence, and the statement of a law, which concerns the invariant connection between types of events or properties. Laws have an unlimited range of application, precisely "because they do not attempt to state connections between actual occurrences, but between properties characteristic of occurrences of given types" (p. 98). or, if one prefers, "between types of factors rather than between types of actual events" (p. 100).

This has two consequences, whose importance for the theory of history must not be underestimated. The first concerns the insertion of regularities into a singular causal attribution. If, in the course of the explanation of a singular process, we make recourse to generalities, to laws, this generality characteristic of laws cannot be substituted for the singularity of causal explanation. If we say, X was killed by a bullet that passed through his heart, the physiological laws concerning blood circulation are linked to "abstract factors, not to the concrete phases of the actual process. They provide the mortar, not the materials. Laws apply to the sequence of conditions only seriatim. Therefore the series of occurrences leading to the final result must be accounted for causally in order for the laws to be applied to this series."

Second consequence: the explanation makes the effect of a continuous process appear to be determined necessarily, once the initial state of the system is given; nothing other than this particular result could have occurred. But this does not mean that the event, as a whole, has been determined. For it is always in a closed system that a process can be said to be determined. The entire universe would have to be considered as a single system in order to identify the idea of causal determination with that of determinism. The initial conditions cannot be said to lead logically to their effect, since this effect results from the contingent fact that each of the occurrences taken at the start took place at a given moment and at a given place. Causal necessity is therefore a conditional necessity: given the complete set of causal conditions that took place (and not others) it was necessary that the effect that was actually produced occur. These two consequences confirm the irreducible but nonexclusive position of causal explanation."

The decisive feature—and to my knowledge without equivalent anywhere—historical Intemionality

else—of Maurice Mandelbaum's theory of causal explanation is, as has been stated, its close affinity with the analysis of first-order entities in history. Indeed, it is general history—in the sense denned above—that most fully illustrates his three-point thesis concerning causa, explanation: namely, that causality is the internal linkage of a continuous process, that generalizations in the form of laws are to be inserted into singular causal explanation, and that causal necessity is conditional and does not imply a belief in determinism. Let us consider each of these three points further.

The affinity between causal reasoning and the continuous nature of social phenomena is easily explained. As was stated earlier, history passes from description to explanation as soon as the question "Why?" is freed from the question "What?? and becomes a separate theme of inquiry. And the question "Why?? becomes autonomous when the analysis into factors, phases, and structures is itself freed from the overall grasping of the total social phenomenon. Causal explanation must then reconstruct the continuity broken by the analysis. This reconstruction can take two forms, depending on whether it emphasizes temporal continuity or structural unity.
In the first case, that of longitudinal analysis, if we may call it, the social phenomenon calls for analysis and the work or reconstruction due to the fact that the web of events has the noteworthy property of constituting "an infinitely dense series" (p. 123). This property allows every possible change in scale. Any event can thus be analyzed into subevents or integrated into a larger-scale event. In this sense, the difference between short term, middle term, and long term is simply the temporal aspect of the relation of part to whole that predominates in historical explanation.

To these changes of scale in the longitudinal analysis correspond equally variable degrees in the structural analysis. A society is an institutional fabric of tighter or looser stitches that permits variable degrees of abstraction in the institutional \textit{lopos}. Thus, the end point of our analysis may lie in the distinction between economics and ideology on the whole, as in Marx, or between political, economic, social, and cultural phenomena, but we may also take each of these terms as a starting point for a functional analysis.

These two lines of analysis are largely autonomous, due to the fact that it "is unlikely that all aspects of societal life and all phases of culture will change in a synchronous fashion" (p. 142). These discordances encourage the splitting apart of general history into special histories. And in turn, this splitting apart renders the task of general history all the more urgent and specific: "the degree of unity to be found in any age becomes not an explanatory principle but something that is itself to be explained" (ibid.). This degree of unity fails not to be sought anywhere but in the way in which the parts are related to each other: "the explanation of the whole will depend upon understanding the connections that exist in the patterning of its parts" (ibid.)

The second thesis, the necessary insertion of generalities in singular causal \textit{Historical Intentionality} explanation, results from the analytical character of explanation: the historical field is a relational field in which no connection, whether longitudinal or transversal, is taken as given once and for all. This is why generalizations of every order, of every epistemological level, and of every scientific origin are required to "cement" causality together. They concern institutional structures no less than the dispositions that give human conduct a certain stability and make it relatively accessible to prediction. But these generalizations function \textit{historically} only under the condition of accounting for temporal structures and sequences whose cohesiveness is due to the fact that they are parts of a continuous whole.

Finally, the distinction between conditional causal necessity and universal determinism is perfectly homogeneous with the distinction between general history and special histories. Since the individual societies that constitute the ultimate term of reference for general history are ineluctably multiple, the necessity that historians may claim in reconstructing the continuity of their sequential or structural constitution remains fragmentary and somewhat regional. Mandelbaum's reasoning here hooks up with that of G. H. von Wright concerning the closure of systems, the intervening role played by agents in this very operation of closure, and the impossibility for any subject to be at one and the same time the observer of systemic connections and the active operator who puts the system into motion. Mandelbaum also here links up with the distinction made by Max Weber between adequate causality and logical necessity. And lastly, he reinforces Raymond Aron's argument against the retrospective illusion of fatality and Aron's defense of a fragmentary determinism open to free political action.

Yet the root of the distinction between conditional causal necessity and universal determinism is to be sought in the very nature of the first-order entities, which are always individual societies. Whatever lies behind this word, be it nation, class, people, community, or civilization, the participatory belonging that founds the societal bond engenders the quasi-characters who are as numerous as are the quasi-plots of which they are the heroes. Just as, for historians, there is no single plot that could encompass every possible plot, neither is there, for them, a single historical character who would be the superhero of history. The pluralism of peoples and civilizations is an unavoidable fact of every historian's experience because it is an unavoidable fact of the experience of those who make or who suffer history. This is why singular causal, attribution, which operates within the limits of this pluralism, can claim only a causal necessity conditioned by the hypothesis that a particular singular society is given in which there exist human beings who are acting in common.

3. I shall only briefly discuss the second- and third-order entities constructed by historians and the correlation between their explanatory procedures and these derived entities.

The passage from general history to special histories in Maurice Mandelbaum is once again a good guide. Let us recall the characteristics he attributes to the cultural phenomena which special histories are concerned with, technology, the sciences, the arts, religion. They are (1) discontinuous phenomena (2) delimited by the historian, who establishes by stipulation what counts as a cultural phenomenon of this or that class, and, consequently, (3) are less inclined toward objectivity than is general history. Since my topic here is not the debate between objectivity and subjectivity in history but the epistemological status of the entities constructed by the historian. I am going to bracket everything that concerns the degree of arbitrariness allowed by special histories and will concentrate instead on the relation of derivation that connects special histories to general history.

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This derivation is made possible by the analysis into phases and structures that already prevails on the level of
general history, as well as by the recourse made to general terms in the course of causal explanation.
Starting from this twofold work of abstraction the interest of the historian has no difficulty in shifting from the
societal phenomenon, taken in its continuity and its singularity, to cultural and generic phenomena. New entities
then occupy the stage of history that are simply correlates of the work of conceptualization characteristic of
scholarly history. These entities are, we must admit, classes, generic beings, not singular entities. For the most
part, they are borrowed from the social sciences with which history combines to form a pair: economics,
demography, the sociology of organizations, the sociology of attitudes and of ideologies, political science.
Historians will be all the more tempted to take these entities for historical realities if they are successful in
dealing with them as invariants, for which singular societies are nt more than variants or, better, variables.
This is what Paul Veyne does in L'Inventaire des Differences. He constructs an invariant, imperialism, and
among its variants the imperialism that consists in occupying all the available space in order to acquire a
monopoly of power. Roman singularity is thus localized, without any consideration of space and time, on the
specific entity defined by the invariant taken as the starting point. This conceptual mechanism is perfectly
legitimate and of great heuristic and explanatory force. It becomes faulty only when it is forgotten that second-
order entities, such as imperialism, are derived—with respect to their existence—from first-order entities, to
which acting individuals have belonged and in which they have participated through their actions and inter-
actions. Perhaps historians can only "believe" in these conceptual beings by forgetting and reversing the true
order of derivation. The merit of Maurice Mandelbaum's argument is that it combats this forgetfulness by
reminding us that no history of art, of science, or of any other function of a given society preserves a historical
significance unless, at least implicitly, historians keep in mind the concrete entities from which their histories
were abstracted. In other 204

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words, these histories have no historical significance in themselves but only in reference to the continuously
existing entities which are the bearers of these functions.
The derivation of second-order entities from first-order ones has as its corollary the derivation we have
continuously observed of nomological explanation from singular causal explanation. I shall not return to this
argument itself but rather to one of its aspects that more directly expresses the kinship between the two lines of
derivation, that of procedures and that of entities. I have in mind the sort of quarrel over universals occasioned in
the area of historical studies by the work of conceptualization, which, as I stated in the introduction to this
chapter, is one of the corollaries of the epistemological break that gives rise to history as a scientific
investigation. Mandelbaum's thesis, that the objects proper to special histories are classes and not singular
entities, helps to strengthen the moderate nominalism professed by many epistemologists concerning the status
of the conceptual apparatus employed by the new historians.
Henri-Irene Marrou, in a chapter of his book, entitled "The Use of the Concept" (pp. 155-76), distinguishes five
large categories of concepts. (1) History, he says, uses "concepts having a universal ambition" (p. 157), which
are not so rare as the relativist critique would have them be, concerning that which is least variable in human
beings. For my part, I would connect them to the conceptual network constituting the semantics of action
(mimesis),. (2) History, in addition, makes an "analogical or metaphorical use ... of some special image" (p.
162); for example, the adjective "baroque" taken out of context and transposed on the basis of a reasoned
comparison to periods other than the Baroque, strictly speaking. (3) Next comes the nomenclature of "special
terms designating institutions, instruments or tools, manner of acting, thinking or feeling, in short, the facts of
civilization" (p. 166). The limits of their validity are not always perceived, for example, when these terms are
extrapolated from one specific sector of the past and applied to another—consul, Roman virtue, etc. (4) Of
greater importance is Max Weber's class of ideal-types, if by ideal-type we mean "a plan of relatively general
value built up by the historian from rudiments observed in the study of special cases, an organic scheme of
mutually dependent parts. ... expressed with precision and severity by the historian in a definition which
exhausts the contents" (p. 168). For example, the notion of the ancient City as it was set out by Fustel de
Coulanges. However, Marrou observes, "(as Max Weber emphasizes with some insistence), it is only legitimate
to use the Ideally pus as long as the historian remains fully conscious of its strictly nominalistic character" (p.
171). We cannot, then, be too much on guard against the temptation to reify ideal types. (5) Finally, there are
names such as Classical Antiquity, Athens, the Renaissance, the Baroque, the French Revolution. "This time it is
a matter of particular terms that are incapable of exhaustive definition. They

denote an ensemble, for example a more or less vast period of the history of a certain human milieu, or of the
history of art or of thought: the totality of all that we are able to know of the object thus defined" (p. 174). 
In my opinion, this last class is heterogeneous in relation to the preceding ones, because it designates third-order
entities that combine the themes, procedures, and results of special histories into new holistic entities. These totalitys are in no way comparable to the concrete totalities characteristic of first-order entities. They differ from them due to the complex procedures of special histories. Their synthetic character is the counterpart of the deliberately analytical spirit that governs the construction of second-order entities. In this sense, despite their appearance of being concrete, these entities are the most abstract of all. This is why the procedures that govern this level are as far removed as possible from the procedures of emplotment that can be analogously extended to the collective "heroes" of general history. This nominalism of historical concepts is, in my opinion, the epistemological corollary of the derived nature of the second- and third-order entities. When we consider these entities, we are dealing with "constructs" whose basis in narrative and, all the more so, in experience, is less and less apparent. We can no longer discern in these constructs the equivalent of what we call project, goal, means, strategy, or even occasion and circumstance. In short, at this derived level we may no longer speak of a quasi-character. The language appropriate to second- and third-order entities is too far removed from that of narrative, and even more so from that of real action, to retain any trace of its indirect derivation. It is only by way of the relation of derivation of second-order entities starting from first-order ones that this filiation can be reactivated. Only the highly refined method of questioning back can, therefore, recon- struct the channels by which not only the procedures but also the entities of historical investigation indirectly refer back to the plane of narrative understanding. Only this questioning back accounts for the intelligibility of history as a historical discipline.

HISTORICAL TIME AND THE FATE OF THE EVENT

The reader will not be surprised if I conclude my inquiry into the epistemology of history with the question of historical time. This is, indeed, what is at stake throughout the whole of Part II of this work. The question of the epistemological status of historical time in relation to the temporality of narrative has been constantly anticipated in the two preceding sections. Singular causal imputation has been shown to be closely akin to the historian's positing of first-order entities, one of whose distinctive features is, in its turn, continuous existence. Even if this feature cannot be reduced to temporal continuity, since it concerns all the structural aspects of the relations between the parts and the whole, nevertheless the notion of change applied to structural relations unceasingly leads back to the question of historical time. Does my thesis, that both the procedures and the entities stemming from the epistemological break characteristic of history as science refer back by an indirect path to the procedures and entities of the narrative level, have an equivalent on this third level as well? Can it be demonstrated that the time constructed by the historian stems, through a succession of ever-widening gaps, from the temporality proper to the narrative? Here again I have sought an appropriate relay station. I thought this could be found in the extremely ambiguous use that historians make of the notion of event. For this demonstration I will once again rely on French historiography. Of course, I am taking as given what has been amply demonstrated above, namely, that the history of long time-spans has now carried the day and tends to occupy the entire field of historical studies. In taking up once more the plea for the long time-span from the viewpoint of the fate of the event, I will attempt to find in it an expansion—one characteristic of history—of the dialectic between the configuration of time by narrative composition and the temporal prefigurations of practical lived experience. Let us first recall what the "mythic" configuration—in the Aristotelian sense of the term—makes of the event. We remember the epistemological and ontological postulates related to the notion of event. Let us leave aside for the moment the ontological postulates, which we shall return to in volume 2 when I discuss the reference of history to the past. Let us restrict ourselves to the epistemological postulates implicit in the current use of the term "event"—singularity, contingency, deviation—and let us attempt to reformulate them in terms of my theory of plot, as presented under the heading of mimesis. This reformulation proceeds from the major connection between event and narrative through the plot. As was shown above, the events themselves receive an intelligibility derived from their contribution to the development of the plot. As a result, the notions of singularity, contingency, and deviation have to be seriously modified. Plots, in fact, are in themselves both singular and nonsingular. They speak of events that occur only in this particular plot, but there are types of plot that universalize the event. In addition, plots combine contingency and probability, even necessity. Like the peripeteia in Aristotle's Poetics, events occur by surprise, changing, for example, good fortune into bad. But the plot makes contingency itself a component of what Gallic rightly calls the followability of the story. And, as Louis O. Mink has noted, it is really in the case of re-telling a story—reading the story backward from its conclusion to its beginning—that we understand things had to "turn out"—as they did. Plots, finally, combine submission to paradigms with deviation from the established models. The emplotment process oscillates between servile conformity with respect to the narrative tradition and rebellion with respect to any paradigm received from that tradition. Between these two extremes
lies the entire range of combinations involving sedimentation and invention. Events, in this regard, follow the fate of the plot. They too follow the rule and break it, their genesis oscillating from side to side of the median point of "rule-governed deformation."

Thus, due to the fact that they are narrated, events are singular and typical. contingent and expected, deviant and dependent on paradigms, even if this is in the ironic mode.

My thesis is that historical events do not differ radically from the events framed by a plot. The indirect derivation of the structures of history starting from the basic structures of narrative, a derivation established in the preceding sections, allows us to think that it is possible, through the appropriate procedures of derivation, to extend to the notion of historical event the reformulation of the concepts of singularity, contingency, and absolute deviation imposed by the notion of emplotted event.

I would like to return to Fernand Braudel's work, despite—or even because of—the case made there against the history of events, in order to show in what sense the very notion of the history of a long time-span derives from the dramatic event in the sense just stated, that is, in the sense of the emplotted event.

I will start from the indisputable achievement of the Braudelian methodology, namely, the idea of the plurality of social times. The "dissecting of history into various planes." to employ the terms of the Preface to the The Mediterranean (p. 21), remains a major contribution to the theory of narrative time. The method of questioning back must therefore start from here. We must ask ourselves what enables us to make the very distinction between a "history whose passage is imperceptible." a history "of slow but perceptible rhythms" (p. 20), and a history "on the scale ... of individual men" (p. 21), namely, that history of events which the history of the long time-span is to dethrone.

It seems to me that the answer is to be sought in the principle of unity which, despite the separation into different spans of time, holds the three parts of Braudel's work together. The reader cannot be content with merely recognizing the right of each of these parts to exist by itself—each part, the Preface states, "is itself an essay in general explanation" (p. 20). This is all the more incumbent in that the title of the work, by its twofold reference—on the one hand to the Mediterranean, on the other to Philip II—invises its readers to ask themselves in what way the long span of time brings about the transition between structure and event. To understand this mediation performed by the long time-span is, in my opinion, to recognize the plot-like character of the whole that is constituted by the three parts of the work. 208

I would like to base my interpretation not on the declarations concerning method collected in the work On History, but on a patient reading of The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (in the 1976 French third edition). This reading reveals the important role of the transitional structures that ensure the overall coherence of the work. These structures, in turn, allow us to consider the arrangement of the entire work in terms of its quasi-plot.

By transitional structure. I mean all the procedures of analysis and exposition that result in a work's having to be read both forward and backward. In this regard, I would be prepared to say that if the first part itself retains a historical character despite the predominance of geography, this is by virtue of all the elements that point to the second and third parts and set the stage upon which the characters and drama of the rest of the work will be played out. The second part is devoted to the long time-span, properly speaking, and serves to hold the two poles together: the Mediterranean, the referent of the first part, and Philip II, the referent of the third. In this sense it constitutes both a distinct object and a transitional structure. It is this last function that makes it interdependent with the two parts that frame it. Let me demonstrate this in some detail.

Consider the first level, whose theme seems to be space rather than time. What is immobile is the Inland Sea. And everything he writes about is already part of a history of the Mediterranean. For example, the first three chapters are devoted to this landlocked sea. They refer to inhabited or uninhabitable spaces, including watery plains. Humans are everywhere present and with them a swarm of symptomatic events. The mountains appear as a refuge and a shelter for free people. As for the coastal plains, they are not mentioned without a reference to colonization, to the work of draining them, of improving the soil, the dissemination of populations, displacements of all sorts: migrations, nomadism, invasions. Here, now, are the waters, their coastlines, and their islands. They, too, enter into this geohistory on the scale of human beings and their navigation. The waters are there to be discovered, explored, traveled. Even on this first level, it is not possible to speak of them without mentioning relations of economic and political dominance (Venice, Genoa). The great conflicts between the Spanish and Turkish empires already cast their shadows over the seascape. And with these power struggles, events are already taking shape.

Thus, the second level is not only implied but actually anticipated in the first: geohistory is rapidly transformed into geopolitics. In fact, the first part is essentially concerned with establishing the polarity between the Turkish and Spanish empires. Maritime zones are from the very beginning political zones. Our view may try to concentrate on the silent life of the islands, their slow rhythm of ancient and new. But global history never ceases to come ashore on these islands and to link the peninsulas, so "political supremacy passed from one peninsula to another and along with it supremacy in other
fields, economic and cultural” (p. 166). Geography has so little autonomy that the boundaries of the space considered are continually redrawn by history. The Mediterranean is measured by its sphere of influence. The phenomenon of trade is, in the same stroke, already implied. The Mediterranean space must be extended as far as the Sahara and to the European isthmuses. Braudel does not shy from stating right in the middle of his first part: “It is worth repeating that history is not made by geographical features, but by the men who control or discover them” (p. 225). Thus the final chapter of the first level openly leads from a physical unity to that human unity “with which this book is concerned” (p. 276). Consider human labor (“The different regions of the Mediterranean are connected not by the water, but by the peoples of the sea” [ibid.]), it produces a space-in-motion made of roads, markets, and trade. This is why it is necessary to speak of banks and of industrialism and trading families, and especially of cities, whose appearance changes the face of the land.”

The second level is, of course, the one where the historian of the long time-span finds himself most at home. But the extent to which this level, considered in itself, lacks coherence must be noted. Oscillating between the sphere of structure and the sphere of conjunction, it places three competing systems of organization on stage: that of economic conjunction, in overall expansion: that of the political implications of the physical and geographical relations, as observed in the mobile polarity of Spain and Turkey; and that of civilizations. These three systems do not correspond exactly, and this perhaps explains the increasing temptation, from one edition to the next, to give in to the unifying materialism of the economic conjunction. Already under the title of "economies"—the first system of organization—relatively disparate problems are considered: the constraints of space and of the number of people with respect to the governing of the empires, the role of the influx of precious metals, monetary phenomena and the evolution of prices, and finally, trade and transportation. As he is setting up this first system, Braudel raises, with ever increasing emphasis, the question of the specific level at which the totalizing factor, if there is one, is to be located: "Can the model of the Mediterranean economy be constructed?" Yes, if a content can be given to the notion of a "world-economy," considered as an "internally coherent zone" (p. 419) despite its uncertain and variable limits. But this is a risky endeavor, because of a lack of monetary standards by which to draw up an account of all the exchanges. In addition, a flurry of dated events concerning the four corners of the quadrilateral Genoa-Milan-Venice-Florence, as well as the history of the other marketplaces, confirms the fact that level three continually merges with level two. And the growth of states, joined to that of capitalism, makes the long history of economies repeatedly fall back upon the history of events. Discussing trade and transportation, Braudel reiterates his purpose: "My intention is ... to discover a general pattern" (p. 542). But the 210

pepper trade, the wheat crisis, the invasion of the Mediterranean by ships from the Atlantic, oblige him to cover a great number of events (the history of Portuguese pepper, the Welser and Fugger agreements, the struggle between competing routes) and at the same time to go beyond the appearances of the narrative.” The balances and the crises touching Mediterranean wheat—"the vicissitudes of the grain trade” (p. 584)—the arrival of Atlantic sailing ships, which becomes an invasion—these are so many dates ("How the Dutch took Seville after 1570 without firing a shot” [p. 636]). The historian never manages to put events behind him as he moves in the direction of general economics, of the dynamic of world-economies, which are assigned the task of explaining events on the scale of the one I have just mentioned.

And the second level must also make room for other principles of organization: empires, societies, civilizations. It sometimes seems that empires provide the fabric of history: "The story of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century is in the first place a story of dramatic political growth, with the leviathans taking their positions" (p. 660), the Ottomans to the east, the Hapsburgs to the west. The characters—Charles V, Sulaiman—are accidents, of course, but not their empires. Without denying individuals and circumstances, attention must instead be directed to the conjunction persistently favorable to vast empires, with the economic ascendancy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and, more generally, to the factors favorable or unfavorable to the vast political formations which are seen to rise and to begin to decline in the sixteenth century. It can well be said that Iberian unity is in the air, implied by the very meaning of the conjuncture, and along with it the creation of an imperial mystique, one of conquest and expansion in the direction, first, of Africa and, then, of America. But. in the face of events on the scale of the conquest of Constantinople, then of Syria, and finally of Egypt by the Turks, how hard it is not to exclaim: "surely the major event!” (p. 667). How can one fail to give life to characters as imposing as Charles V and Philip II, even if it can be written that "Philip II's withdrawal to Spain was a tactical withdrawal towards American silver” (p. 676). This does not keep the historian from expressing regret Philip II did not move his capital to Lisbon rather than shutting himself up in Madrid. If, despite everything, the long time-span wins out, this is inasmuch as the fates of states and of economies are mutually related. In opposition to Schumpeter, who overemphasizes the economy, one must place an equal weight on politics and on its institutions.” But politics cannot be discussed without discussing the agents of its greatness, legislators and their venality, the financial difficulties of the state, fiscal wars. The political enterprise has its actors.
Once again, neither economies nor empires occupy the entire stage of the second level. Civilizations are also to be considered: "Of all the complex and contradictory faces of the Mediterranean world, its civilizations are the most perplexing" (p. 757), so fraternal and so exclusive are they, mobile and per-211 manent, ready to spread their influence and determined not to borrow from the outside. Spain has its Baroque. The Counter-Reformation is its Reformation: "The refusal then was deliberate and categorical" (p. 768). In order to express these "areas of astonishing permanence," Braudel has a magnificent description: "a civilization exists fundamentally in a geographical area which has been structured by men and history. That is why there are cultural frontiers and cultural zones of amazing permanence: all the cross-fertilization in the world will not alter them" (p. 770). Mortal? Of course, civilizations are mortal, but "their foundations remain. They are not indestructible, but they are many times more solid than one might imagine. They have withstood a thousand supposed deaths, their massive bulk unmoved by the monotonous pounding of the centuries" (pp. 775-76). However yet another factor intervenes. Civilizations are many, and it is out of their points of contact, of friction, and of conflict that once again events are born. Even if the Hispanic world's refusal of any mixing is the cause, "the slow shipwreck of Islam on the Iberian Peninsula" (p. 781) has to be recounted, along with the "drama of Grenada," and even the survivals and infiltrations that allow us to speak of "the aftermath of Grenada" (p. 792), until its destruction."

Next, the fate of the Jews has to be dealt with by means of the same schema, with a parallel being drawn between the stubbornness of the Marranos and that of the Moris-cos. But, here again, we must follow the train of events back until we grasp the hidden connection between Jewish martyrdom and the movement of the conjuncture: "The chief culprit was the general recession of the western world" (p. 820). The date 1492 thus loses a bit of its dark splendor when it is placed at the end of a period of slow regression. Even the moral condemnation is found to be, if not weakened, at least nuanced. The long conjunctures of civilizations are intertwined with those of economies. It remains that the rejection of Islam and of Judaism attests to the specificity of civilizations in relation to economies. Finally, and especially, without returning to the history of battles, forms of warfare have to be placed on the level of long time-span phenomena. And yet events must also be included if we are to appreciate the forms of war, to weigh the cost—the ruin of empires—and, in particular, to discern in war itself the very test of the longevity of civilizations. Opposing ideological conjunctures that present themselves and then are replaced allow us to give their relative weight to events such as the battle of Lepanto. which was grossly overestimated by its protagonists and eyewitnesses. These superimposed conjunctures, the bearers of events, mark on land and on sea the collision of economies, empires, societies, and civilizations. This competition between several principles of organization operating on the second level has not escaped Braudel. At the end of the second part—and in later editions—he weighs the pros and cons of a history governed by economic conjuncture alone or instead by a series of numerous conjunctures: for there is not one conjuncture but several. There is not even one economic conjuncture but a 212 secular "trend" (the limit of its ebb and flow has a different date from one edition to the next) and an entire hierarchy of long, semi-long, and short conjunctures. But, most of all, it must be admitted that cultural conjunctures can only with the greatest difficulty be superimposed on economic conjunctures, even on the secular "trend." Did not the Spanish golden age continue to flower after the greatest secular upheaval? How can these late-season flowerings be explained? The historian hesitates. Despite the sirens of the economic conjuncture, he admits that history once again becomes multiple, uncertain: perhaps it is the whole that will slip through our fingers. Everything, then, in the first two parts conspires to crown the edifice with a history of events that puts on stage "politics and people." This third part of the work is by no means a concession to traditional history. In a total history stable structures and slow evolutions perhaps constitute the essential part, but "they cannot provide the total picture" (p. 901). Why? First, because events provide testimony of the deep-seated, underlying movements of history. As we saw, the first two parts make frequent use of these "ephemera of history" (ibid.), which are at one and the same time symptoms and testimonies. The great historian is not afraid of stating here: "I am by no means the sworn enemy of the event" (ibid.). But there is another reason, namely, that events raise the problem of their coherence at their own level. Braudel himself gives a twofold justification for the inevitable selection that this level of explanation requires. On the one hand, the historian retains only important events, those that have been made important by their consequences. Without naming it, Braudel encounters here the problem of singular causal explanation as it was posed by Weber and Aron, with its logic of retrodiction and its search for "ad-equation." On the other hand, the historian cannot ignore the judgment made by contemporaries concerning the importance of events, under pain of failing to take into account the way in which people of the past interpreted their history. (Braudel mentions in this regard the turning point that the Saint Bartholomew's Eve massacre represents for the French.) These interpretations, too, are part of the historical object. It thus becomes impossible to make these two series coincide, the series of economic conjunctures and that of political events in the broad sense, the series of events that contemporaries chose to consider most significant, especially in a century in which, despite everything, politics led the way. These two series still leave great gaps between them that were, we saw, filled by the history of empires, of societies, of civilizations, and of war/ itself. Braudel's art, here, is to structure his history of events—a nd h's history is not lacking in dates, battles, and
treatures—not by dividing them into periods, as all historians do, but by reanchoring them in structures and conjunctures, just as he had previously called upon events in order to attest to the structures and conjunctures. Here the event gathers up and draws together the conjunctures and structures: "In Philip II the strengths and weaknesses of the empire were incarnate" (p. 1023). What structures this political history is the sort of "physics of international relations which in the sixteenth century was busy establishing the necessary compensations between the major war fronts along which Turkish power impinged upon the outside world" (p. 1166). A vast shift of power occurs when Philip's empire turns toward the Atlantic and America. Then "Spain leaves the Mediterranean" (p. 1184). At the same time, the Mediterranean steps outside the spotlight of global history. 

If this is indeed the history that is being recounted, why was it necessary to conclude with such sumptuous pages on the death of Philip II on September 13, 1598? From the viewpoint of the total history of the Mediterranean, this death is not a great event" But it was an event of the greatest magnitude for all the protagonists "at the end of a long reign that to his adversaries had seemed interminable" (p. 1235). Have we not said that the perspective of contemporaries is also an object for history? Perhaps we ought to go even further—and this remark may well throw into question the beautiful balance of the three parts—and say that death reveals an individual destiny which does not fit exactly within the framework of an explanation that itself is not scaled to of the measurements of mortal time. "And without death as it seals a destiny such as this, could we still know that history is human history? I now come to my second thesis, namely, that it is together that the work's three levels constitute a quasi-piot. a plot in the broad sense used by Paul V'eyne. It would be a mistake to limit the kinship between this text and the narrative model of emplotment to just the third level. To do so would be to miss the major contribution of this work, which is to open up a new career for the very notion of plot and, in this, for that of event.

Nor am I prepared to look for this new form of plot in the middle level alone, although certain statements by Braudel himself suggest doing this. Does he not speak of the recitativ de la conjuncture, the conjunctures narrative? What might serve as a plot in the economic history is its cyclical character and the role that is played by the notion of crisis. The double movement of growth and decline thus represents a complete intercycle, measured by the time of Europe and more or less by that of the entire world. The third, as yet untranslated, volume of Civilization and Capitalism: 15th-18th Century, entitled Le Temps du Monde, is built entirely upon this vision of the rise and decline of world economies, in accordance with the slow rhythms of conjuncture. The notion of a "trend" tends, then, to take "the place of that of a plot." Nevertheless, I am not inclined to restrict myself to this equation, not only because it does just as much violence to the notion of cycle as to that of plot but also because it does not account for what occurs in the work at these three levels. Economic history lends itself to a plot when an initial term and a final term are chosen, and these are provided by categories other than conjunctural history itself, which, in principle, is endless, unlimited in the strict sense. A plot has to include not only an intelligible order but a magnitude that cannot be too vast, or it will be unable to be embraced by our eye, as Aristotle stresses in the Poetics (51a).

What frames the plot of the Mediterranean? We may say—without hesitation: the decline of the Mediterranean as a collective hero on the stage of world history. The end of the plot, in this regard, is not the death of Philip II. It is the end of the conflict between the two political leviathans and the shift of history toward the Atlantic and Northern Europe.

All three levels contribute to this overall plot. But whereas a novelist—Tolstoy in War and Peace—would have combined all three together in a single narrative, Braudel proceeds analytically, by separating planes, leaving to the interferences that occur between them the task of producing an implicit image of the whole. In this way a virtual quasi-plot is obtained, which itself is split into several subplots, and these, although explicit, remain partial and in this sense abstract.

The work is placed as a whole under the heading of the mimesis of action by the continual reminder that "history is not made by geographical features but by the men who control or discover them" (The Mediterranean, p. 225). In this respect, the history of conjunctures cannot by itself constitute a plot. Even on the plane of economics, several different economies—or, more precisely, the antagonisms of two economic worlds—have to be placed together. I have already quoted this passage from Part I: "Politics merely followed the outline of an underlying reality. These two Mediterraneans, commanded by warring rulers, were physically, economically, and culturally different from each other. Each was a separate historical zone" (p. 137). With one stroke, the fabric of the plot is already suggested: the great opposition between the two Mediterraneans and the decline of their conflict. If this is indeed the history Braudel is narrating, then it is understandable that its second level—which is supposed to be entirely devoted to the long time-span—requires beyond its overview of economies the addition of the physics of international relations that alone governs the subplot of the conflict between empires and the fate of this conflict. In its ascending phases, "The story of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century is in the first place a story of dramatic political growth, with the leviathans taking up their positions" (p. 660). In addition, high stakes are involved: will the Atlantic belong to the Reformation or to the Spanish? When Turks and Spaniards turn their
she choose not to?" (p. 703). In turn, the s'ibplot of the conflict between empires, and the retreat of this conflict from the Mediterranean area, demands to be linked up with the subplot of the collision of monolithic civilizations. We recall the statement, "Of all the complex and contradictory faces of the Mediterranean world, its civilizations are the most perplexing" (p. 757). The reversals of these conflicts have been mentioned above: the fate of the Moriscos, the fate of the Jews, foreign wars. We must now speak of the contribution these subplots make to the overall plot. Referring to the alternation of foreign wars and internal wars as "plain to see" (p. 842), the dramatist writes: "It offers a new perspective on a confused period of history, illuminating it in a way which is neither artificial nor illusory. It is impossible to avoid the conviction that contrasting ideological patterns were first established and then replaced" (ibid.). Thus, just as Homer picked from the stories of the Trojan War the set he chose to tell in the Iliad, Braudel picks from the great conflict between civilizations in which the Occident and the Orient alternate the conflict whose protagonists are Spain and Turkey at the time of Philip II and whose framework is the decline of the Mediterranean as a historical zone. Having said this, we must admit that the overall plot that constitutes the unity of the work remains a virtual plot. -Didactic reasons require that the "three different conceptions of time" (p. 1238) remain disconnected, the aim being "to bring together in all their multiplicity the different measures of time past, to acquaint the reader with their coexistence, their conflicts and contradictions, and the richness of experience they hold" (ibid.). However, even if it is virtual, the plot is nonetheless effective. It could become real only if a total history were possible without doing violence to any of its parts.2

Finally, by his analytical and disjunctive method, Braudel has invented a new type of plot. If it is true that the plot is always to some extent a synthesis of the heterogeneous, the virtual plot of Braudel's book teaches us to unite structures, cycles, and events by joining together heterogeneous temporalities and contradictory chronicles. This virtual structure permits us nevertheless to judge between two opposite ways of reading The Mediterranean. The first subordinates the history of events to the history of the long time-span and the long time-span to geographical time—the main emphasis is then placed on the Mediterranean. But then geographical time is in danger of losing its historical character. For the second reading, history remains historical insofar as the first level itself is qualified as historical by its reference to the second level and, in turn, the second level derives its historical quality from its capacity to support the third level. The emphasis is then placed on Philip II. But the history of events lacks the principles of necessity and of probability that Aristotle attributed to a well-constructed plot. The plot that includes the three levels equally authorizes both readings and makes them intersect at the median position of the history of the long time-span, which then becomes the unstable point of equilibrium between them. In my opinion, it is the long detour by way of the quasi-plot that finally allows us to question once more the notion of event that Braudel holds to be canonical.4 For me, the event is not necessarily brief and nervous, like some sort of explosion. It is a variable of the plot. As such, it does not belong only to the third level but to all the levels and their various functions. When it emerges on the third level, it appears with the sign of necessity or probability that it owes to having having crossed through the other levels. It is in this way that Lepanto loses its brilliance and falls lower on the scale of importance. The death of Philip II remains a major event only because of the subplot of "Politics and People." This death tends to become a nonevent when it is placed within the overall plot of the struggle between political giants and on the trajectory of the decline of the Mediterranean, which comes to its relative conclusion only several decades later. After all, we have seen events proliferate also on the second and even on the first level, except that the event loses its explosive character there and acts rather as a symptom or a testimony.

The truth is that the event is what distinguishes the historian's concept of structure from that of the sociologist or the economist. For the historian, the event continually appears in the very midst of structures. And this occurs in two ways: on the one hand, all structures do not change at the same pace. It is when "these different time-spans" (On History, p. 48) no longer coincide that their dissonance becomes event-like. In the same way, the exchanges between numerous zones of civilization, the borrowings and rejections constitute quasi-pointlike phenomena which do not mark a civilization on all of its levels at the same time: "it is not so much time which is the creation of our own minds, as the way in which we break it up" (ibid.). On the other hand, in contrast to the sociologist, the historian in dealing with structures is attentive...
to their breaking points, their sudden or slow deterioration, in short, to the
consideration that they die out. In this respect Braudel is no less preoccupied
with the decay of empires than the traditional historian. In one sense, The
Medieval is the gradual progress, the slowed-down march of the major
event: the retreat of the Mediterranean from general history. Once again, the
fragility of human works comes to the foreground and with it the dramatic
dimension, from which the long time-span was supposed to free history.
I have found in other French historians who come within the sphere of influence of the Annales indications:—
often furtive ones—that betray this return to the event by means of the long time-span itself.
For example, in The marriage between history and anthropology as it is ad-vocaled by Le Goff, and which has
produced Time, Work, and Culture in the 217

Middle Ages, it is, of course, the long—the very long—time-span that occupies the foreground ("the long stretch
of the Middle Ages," "the long period relevant to our history," "the history of preindustrial society" (p. xj). Yet.
on the other hand. Le Goff, no less strongly than Braudel, resists the seductiveness of the atemporal models
characteristic of a certain type of sociology. First of all, because this very span of time is not without events, but
indeed is punctuated by repeated or expected events (festivals, ceremonies, rituals) which recall all that is
liturgical in historical societies. Next, because this particular long time-span no longer exists: the name medieval
civilization is well chosen, for it is a "transition" society. Of course, the attitudes emphasized by historico-
ethnology are those that "change least" in historical evolution (p. 229), but "mental systems are historically
datable, even if they do carry a heavy freight of debris from archeo-civilizations, dear to Andre Vara-gnae" (ibid.).
In particular, history, if it is to remain history in its union with anthropology, cannot convert itself into
"an ethnology that stands outside time" (p. 236). This is why the historian cannot conform to the vocabulary of
diachrony, as it is borrowed from linguistics. The latter, in fact, functions in accordance with "abstract systems of
transformation very different from the evolutionary schemes used by the historian in attempting to apprehend
the process of becoming in the concrete societies he studies" (p. 235)." Instead, the historian has to try to go beyond
"the false dilemma of structure versus conjuncture and, even more important, structure versus event" (ibid.). In
fact, in Le Goff I find an intimation of the thesis that the,.past owes its historical quality to its capacity for
being integrated in that memory that Augustine called "the present of the past." Le Goff defines his "total,"
"long" "Middle Ages of the depths" in the following terms. "It is the time of our grandparents" (p.xi); "the
primordial past in which our collective identity, the quarry of that anguished search in which contemporary
societies are engaged, acquired certain of its essential characteristics" (ibid.). Given this, it is not surprising if,.in
this constituting of our memory, the long time-span is shortened into the form of quasi-events. Does not Le Goff
describe the conflict between the time of the church and the time of the tradesmen, symbolized by the
confrontation between bells and clocks, "as one of the major events in the mental history of these centuries at
the heart of the Middle Ages, when the ideology of the modern world was being formed under pressure from
deteriorating economic structures and practices"? (p. 30). What, in fact, constitutes the event is "the essential
separateness and the contingent encounter" (p. 38, trans, altered) of these two times.
The historian of mentalites encounters the same problem. For example, Georges Duby begins with an entirely
nonnarrative sociological analysis of ideologies—he calls them total, deforming, competitive, stabilizing, action-
generating—yet he sees the event infiltrate these structures due not only to

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. external borrowings, rejections, and internal conflicts but also to dissonances, "deviations of temporality" that
appear at the point of intersection of objective situations, mental representations, and individual or collective
behavior. The historian is thus brought to stress "critical periods in which the movement of material and political
structures ends by reverberating on the level of ideological systems, thereby sharpening the conflict that opposes
them.6 Just as above. I am tempted to speak of a quasi-event to describe what Duby jails here "the burst of
acceleration." set off by polemics, "within the tendencies covering long spans of time which guide the evolution
of the dominant ideology" (p. 157).
And the vehicle of the quasi-event, as I tried to show in Braudel. is again the quasi-plot. I would like to
demonstrate the same thing with regard to Georges Duby's work by placing side by side the article on method
just referred to, "Histoire sociale et ideologies des siecles." and the application of his working hypothesis in one
of the works most representative of what he means by the history of ideologies. I have chosen The Three Orders:
Feudal Society Imagined. " I propose to show once again here how the author dramatizes an ideological structure
by constructing a quasi-plot containing a beginning, a middle, and an end. The structure in question is the
imaginary representation of the entire society in the form of a hierarchy of three orders: those who pray, those
who fight, and those who by their labor feed the rest. The formulation of this imaginary representation is taken
from a seventeenth-century author. Charles Loyseau, in his Traite des Ordres et Simples Dignites, published in
1610. However, Duby does not simply consider a period of six centuries, as it is staked out by descriptions akin
to Loyseau's. Instead, renewing the art of the author of the *Iliad*, he picks from among all the vicissitudes of the trifunctional image a history that has a beginning—the initial formulations by Adalbero of Laon and Gerard of Cambrai—and an end—the battle of Bouvines in 1214. The middle is formed by the reversals that dramatize the historical role of this ideological representation. So Duby attacks a problem different from that posed by Georges Dumezil, the untiring advocate of the trifunctional image. Whereas the latter attempts to establish—by comparison and through its recurrence in different historical constellations—that this schema belongs to the latent structures of human thought, in order to lead up to the question of why and how *"the human mind is constantly making choices among its latent riches,"* Duby replies to Dumezil's two questions with two other questions, the historian's questions of *where* and *when*. He chooses to show how this trifunctional image "functions as a major cog in an ideological system" (p. 8). The ideological system in question is feudalism as it emerges and then triumphs. And to describe how it functions, he constructs what I am calling a quasi-plot in which the trifunctional image plays the role of, in his own terms, the "book's central character" (ibid.).

The outline Duby follows is very instructive in this respect. Since what is in 219

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The question is indeed a structure, that is, a mental representation that "has withstood all the pressures of history" (ibid. 5), he entitles his first part "Revelation." in order to indicate clearly the transcendence of the system in relation to its fragmentary representations. The system is already historicized to a great extent by the variations in the first formulations and by the reconstitution of their political framework, the decline of the Carolingian monarchy and of the power that went along with it. that of the bishops. It is only at the end of this first inquiry that the organization of the "system" can be described (pp. 56-69). This includes the postulate of a perfect coherence between heaven and earth: a concept of order which has become an attribute of the perfect city: the division into the order of bishops and the order of kings: the division into dominant groups—priests and nobles: the addition to this binary arrangement of a third order characterizing the dominant functions—the class of subjects; and, finally, the concept of mutuality, of reciprocity within hierarchy, which in structural terms calls for a ternary division.

The mere description of this system demonstrates how equivocal the notion of trifunctionality actually is and how very little it resembles a true system. First of all, the third function appears in the form of an addition to two binary oppositions (bishop/king, priest/nobL). Next, the relation dominant/dominated is added, as another specific binary system, to the internal binarism of domination just mentioned, whence the extreme instability of the system. Finally, the system does not imply that the three parts be filled by roles as well specified as those in Dumezil. *Order* alone is the key word. We can thus understand why the system is so easily a prey to history." Before entering into the plot properly speaking, Duby attempts, under the title "Genesis." to take a retrospective look at the formation of the system beginning with Gregory the Great. Augustine, and Dionysius the Areopagite. He then shows how the shift could occur from theological speculation on celestial hierarchies to political reflection on order and on orders, linking up in this way the celestial example and the ternary distribution of terrestrial functions." The quasi-plot really commences when the system is put to the test of "circumstances" (pp. 121-66), undergoes a long "eclipse" (pp. 167-268), and then finally reemerges, this "resurgence" (pp. 269-353) culminating in the system's "adoption," an adoption that is not merely symbolized but realized and finalized by the victory of the king—and hence the victory of the bishops as well—for whom the system had been intended, at Bouvines. These are the three major reversals between which Duby divides his plot. It is noteworthy that the narrated story is set in motion by a crisis in which royalty appears to founder. This is, first of all, a political crisis. But, above all, on the symbolic level, there is a competition with rival systems, which are themselves tripartite: the heretical model, the model of God's peace, the monastic model created at Cluny. The polemic engaged in by these competing systems is precisely what dramatizes the model. The triumph of Cluny an 220

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nounces the "eclipse." Contributing to this is the feudal revolution which forces a reclassing of all the orders to make room for the third party, the peasants. And this places in competition, at the beginning of the eleventh century, not three but four ideological models (pp. 161-62): the model bound for victory and the three rival models just referred to.

The ideological model of Adalbero and Gerard is placed in the strange position of being not a reflection but an anticipation: an anticipation of the decline of monasticism. an anticipation of the restoration of the episcopate, an anticipation of the renaissance of the monarchical state."

This curious split between an apparent survival and a real anticipation governs the system's "eclipse," as it is told in Part IV. This is "the age of the monks," who benefit from the waning of the Capetian royalty and, with it. of the episcopal institution. But an "eclipse" is by no means a disappearance. The time of eclipse is also the emergence of "new times": the times of the Cistercians, of the merchants, of the clerks, of the schoolmasters and their students.
As for the "resurgence," it is marked by the clerks' reconquest of the first rank at the expense of the monks; the knights' takeover of the second rank, the stronghold of the princes; and the takeover of the third rank by the laborers. But if the time of the eclipse was, for the trifunctional model, a time of anticipation, the time of resurgence is that of delay: "The obstacle," Duby says, "was Royal France ... the obstacle was Paris, treasure and symbol of a kingdom allied with the pope, with the bishops, with the reformed Church, with the schools, with the communes, with the people" (p. 307). This is what makes the resurgence the final reversal. "The adoption" alone constitutes a conclusion, inasmuch as it ensures the reconciliation between the model dreamed of and the real institution. Bouvines is the instrument of this encounter. Capetian has taken the place of Carolingian. However, it is curious that, with regard to the systematizing spirit that seems to govern the work, the king is hot part of the tripartite schema: "He himself sat enthroned above order, i.e., above the three orders that made up court society" (p. 346).

Regardless of the doubts we may have concerning the coherence of the trifunctional model, the plot ends when the symbol shifts from the dreamed imaginary to the constituting imaginary. So it is indeed the "adoption" that at one and the same time provides an end to the story and confers a sense upon the "middle" represented by the triad: "circumstance," "eclipse," "resurgence." This is all I wanted to show: the quasi-events that indicate the critical periods of the ideological system are set within quasi-plots, which assure their narrative status. It is in the field of political history that the return to the event is most urgently felt. "How does one interpret such an event?" asks Francois Furet at the start of a work that is called, precisely, Interpreting the French Revolution. "Interpreting—this the historian can do if he frees himself from the alterna-

"tive of commemoration or execration in which he is caught up as long as he continues to participate in "the obsession with origins, the underlying thread of all national history" (p. 2) since 1789. Then the historian is inspired by intellectual curiosity alone, in the same way as any other scholar. Thanks to this assumed distance, he can claim to conceptualize the event, without himself assuming the actors' belief in the meaning of the event as a break with the past and as the origin of new times, in short, without sharing the French Revolution's illusion about itself. But at what price does the historian arrive at interpreting the French Revolution as an event?" It is noteworthy that he only partially succeeds by combining two explanations which, separately and perhaps even together, leave a remainder, and this remainder is the event itself. To interpret the French Revolution with Tocqueville is to see it not as a break and an origin, but as the completion of the work of the monarchy, as the dissolution of the social body to the benefit of the state administration. There is an enormous gap here between historiography and the tyranny of the actors' lived historical experience, with its myth of origin. What Furet is inquiring into is precisely the gap between the actors' intentions and the role they play. In the same stroke, the event disappears, at least as a break, when the analysis proceeds by means of explicit concepts. This analysis actually breaks off the historical narrative: Tocqueville. Furet notes, "treats a problem rather than a period" (p. 17).

The event, however, has not been eliminated in every respect, if Tocqueville accounts well for the result of the Revolution (Furet says of "the revolu-tion-as-content"). the very process of the Revolution (what Furet calls "the revolution-as-mode") remains to be explained, that is to say, the particular dynamics of collective action which were responsible lor the fact that this result of the Revolution, according to Tocqueville, was not achieved by an English-style evolution but by a revolution. This is where the event resides: "the tacit remains that the revolutionary event, from the very outset, transformed the existing situation and created a new mode of historical action that was not intrinsically a part of that situation" (p. 22. his emphasis).

A second model must therefore be introduced in order to account for the appearance on the stage of history of a practical and ideological mode of social action that is nowhere inscribed in what preceded it. This second model must take into account what it is that makes the Revolution "one of the basic-forms of historical consciousness of action" (p. 24), namely, the way "it was ever ready to place ideas above actual history, as if it were called upon to restructure a fragmented society by means of its own concepts" (p. 25). The Jacobin phenomenon is described in this way.

Augustin Cochin's explanatory model then takes over from Tocqueville's model in order to show how a new political sensibility was produced alongside the old, one which gives rise to a new world based on the individual and not on institutional groups, built upon the tie of opinion alone. Cochin indeed finds in the "philosophical societies sociétés de pense" the matrix of a con-

Historical Intentionality

ception of power that rests on the principle of equality, on the transformation of isolated individuals into a
type—the sole imaginary actor of the Revolution—and on the suppression of every sort of screen between the people and its self-designated spokesmen.

Jacobinism, however, is not just an ideology, it is an ideology that took power. Consequently, the revolution-as-event is totally accounted for neither by the historian's dismantling of what he holds to be an "illusion of politics," nor by identifying the channels through which this new power is exercised over society. The series of
splits and conspiracies that ensue are indeed plots, in the most common sense of the word. Of course, it can be shown how the conspiracy mentality proceeds from the new political sociability that casts as an enemy anyone who has been unable to occupy the symbolic seat of power as the system defines it. In this respect, the pages on conspiracy as the consequence of the new political symbolism are quite brilliant and convincing. Nevertheless, it seems to me that taking power continues to be an event that is not deduced from the ideological system that defines power. Events, chronology, and great individuals come back in full force under the cloak of conspiracy. Even when it is deduced from the ideological system, I would say that X conspiracy brings back the event with the plot. For even if conspiracy is a theater of madness, this madness is at work, generating events. This is why Thermidor is an event, for interpretation of course, but only up to a certain point. It "marked the end of the Revolution because it is the victory of representative over revolutionary legitimacy ... and as Marx said, the reassertion of real society on the illusion of politics" (p. 58). But this "ideological coding" (p. 59) of the Robespierre phenomenon, in turn, does not exhaust, it seems to me, its historical meaning. To say that it incarnates an ideology—the struggle for one imaginary system against another—is only, as in Greek tragedy, to name the theme that corresponds to a plot. For it is as a result of the plot that "he was the mouthpiece of [the Revolution's] purest and most tragic discourse" (p. 61). From the Jacobin ideology has been deduced "what is purest" but not "what is most tragic" in the event.

This is why I would not venture to say, with Francois Furet, that Thermidor, in that it represents "society's revenge on ideology" (p. 74), leads from Cochin back to Tocqueville, for the continuation of the aneien regime passes not only by way of the ideological acceleration of Jacobinism but by the actions that this political illusion engendered. In this sense, the second schema of the French Revolution, "that provided by Augustin Cochin, is no more capable of getting to the bottom of the event than is the first, provided by Tocqueville. No conceptual reconstruction will ever be able to make the contingency with the aneien regime pass by way of the rise to power of an imaginary order experienced as a break and as an origin. This rise to power is itself on the order of an event. And it results in the fact that the fantasy of an origin is itself an origin, to reverse Francois Furet's formula."

Has Furet then been successful in "riffing the event" that is the French Revolution? I would say, in line with my reflection on Braudel's long time-span: the remainder left by every such attempt i in the way that the third part of Braudel's The Mediterranean constitutes both a supplement and a complement), as a dissonance between explanatory structures, and finally, as the life and death of the structures themselves.

If the discovery of the long time-span did not lead us back to the event in accordance with one of these three modes, the long time-span would be in danger of severing historical time from the living dialectic of past, present, and future. A long time can be a time without any present and, so, without past or future as well. But then it is no longer a historical time, and the long time-span only leads back from human time to the time of nature. Evidence of this temptation can be seen in Braudel himself and results from the absence of a philosophical reflection on the relation between what he somewhat too hastily calls the subjective time of the philosophers and the long time of civilizations. For the discovery of the long time-span may simply express the fact that human time, which always requires the reference point of a present, is itself forgotten. If the brief event can act as a screen hiding our consciousness of the time that is not of our making, the long time-span can, likewise, act as a screen hiding the time that we are. This disastrous consequence can be avoided only if an analogy is preserved between the time of individuals and the time of civilizations: the analogy of growth and decline, of creation and death, the analogy of fate.

This analogy on the level of temporality is of the same nature as the analogy I tried to maintain on the level of procedures between causal attribution and emplotment, and then on the level of entities between societies for civilizations) and the characters in a drama. In this sense, all change enters the field of history as a quasi-event. This declaration is by no means equivalent to a cunning return to the brief event, which has been criticized by the history of the long time-span. When it was not the reflection of the actors’ confused consciousness and of their illusions, this brief event was just as much a methodological artifact, even the expression of a world view. In this respect, Braudel is perfectly justified in exclaiming: "I argue against Ranke or KarlBrande, that the narrative is not a method, or even the objective method par excellence, but quite simply a philosophy of history" (The Mediterranean, p. 21).

By quasi-event we signify that the extension of the notion of event, beyond short and brief time, remains correlative to a similar extending of the notions of plot and character. There is a quasi-event wherever we can discern, even if only very indirectly, very obliquely, a quasi-plot and quasi-characters. The event in history corresponds to what Aristotle called a change in fortune—metabole—in his formal theory of emplotment. An event, once again, is not 224 Historical Intentionality only what contributes to the unfolding of a plot but what gives it the dramatic form of a change in fortune. It follows from this kinship between quasi-events and quasi-plots that the plurality of historical times extolled by
Braudei is an expansion of the cardinal feature of narrative time, namely, its ability to combine in variable proportions the chronological component of the episode and the achronological component of the configuration. Every one of the temporal levels required by historical explanation may be seen as a duplication of this dialectic. It might perhaps even be said that with the brief event the episodic continues to dominate in plots that are nevertheless extremely complex, and that the long time-span gives precedence to the configuration. However, the emergence of a new event-like quality at the end of our effort to work out the historical structures echoes as a reminder. It reminds us that something happens to even the most stable structures. Something happens to them—in particular, they die out. This is why, despite his reticence, Braudei was unable to avoid ending his magnificent work with the description of a death, not, of course, the death of the Mediterranean but of Philip II.

Conclusions

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f would now like to sum up the results attained at the end of this second part of my study. With respect to the aims advanced in chapter 3 of the first part, these results stand within precise limits. To begin with, only one of the two great narrative modes has been submitted to examination—history. I have excluded from the field of investigation all that will be placed, in volume 2, under the title of "Fictional Narrative"—let us say, from the ancient epic to the modern novel. Therefore, only half of the ground to be covered by the inquiry has actually been traveled.

The restriction of my analysis to historical narrative has not only resulted in leaving other narrative modes outside, it has resulted in an amputating of the internal problematic of history itself. In fact, the ambition of truth by which history, in Paul Veyne's apt expression, claims the title "true" [verité] displays its full meaning only when it can be opposed to the deliberate suspension of the true/false alternative, characteristic of the fictional narrative.  

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This first limitation, in turn, leads to a second, more serious one that directly concerns the relation of narrative to time. As I have just said, by bracketing history's ambition to attain the truth. I have set aside any attempt to thematize, in and of itself, the relation of history to the past. In fact, I have deliberately abstained from taking a stand on the ontological status of the historical past as having-been. In this way, when I have discussed the concept of event, I have carefully dissociated the epistemological criteria currently associated with this notion (unity, singularity, divergence) from the ontological criteria by which we distinguish what is only feigned from what actually took place (occur, make happen, differ in novelty from every reality that has already taken place). With this stroke, the relation between history, as the guardian of humanity's past, and the whole set of attitudes by which we relate to the present and to the future, is left in abeyance.

Consequently the question of historical time has not been unfolded to its full extent. Only the aspects of time directly implied in the configurational operations that connect history to narrative have been taken into consideration. Even my discussion concerning the long time-span remained within the limits of an epistemology applied to the constructions characteristic of explanation in history. The relations between the long time-span and the event were discussed, but there was no attempt to rind out what is actually involved in the relation between the multiple temporalities distinguished by historians and what they, casting a mistrustful eye, regard as the subjective time of the philosophers—whether by this is meant Bergsonian duration, the absolute flow of consciousness in Husserl, or Heidegger's historicity. Once again, the contribution of history to this debate could not be clarified without that of fictional narrative. I implied this when, in chapter 3 of Part 1, I subordinated the question of time as refigured by narrative to the resolution of the problem of the intertwining reference of true narrative and fictional narrative. It must even be suspected that, thanks to the greater freedom it has with respect to events that actually occurred in the past, fiction displays, concerning them, porality, resources not allowed to the historian. As I shall say in volume 2, literary fiction can produce "fables about time" that are not merely "fables of time." Hence it is not inconceivable that we must wait until after our long detour by way of the time of fiction before making any definite statement about the relation of history to time.

Admitting the limits of the analyses in my second part by no means forces me to minimize the importance of the results I think I have attained. It is just that these limits remind us that the investigation was placed on the level of mimesis, and did not take into account the mediating function performed by this mimetic stage between prenarrative experience and an experience that is refigured by the work of narrative in all its forms.

The whole of my second part has been an investigation of the relations between the writing of history and the operation of emplotment, which Aristotle elevates to the rank of the dominant category in the art of composing works that imitate an action. If, indeed, the subsequent confrontation between historical narrative and fictional narrative is to make sense, I had first of all to be sure that history belongs to the narrative field defined by this
configurating operation. And this relation, as it was progressively verified, revealed itself to be extraordinarily complex. In order to circumscribe it, I first of all had to employ, in chapters 4 and 5, an antithetical strategy in which theses that were on the whole nomological were contrasted with wholly narrativist theses. In the course of this polemic, there was no thesis submitted to criticism that did not in some way contribute, at the cost of a series of rectifications, to an initial approximation of the relation between history and narrative. Some of these rectifications appeared only later. Thus, in part one of chapter 4, the plea for a nonevent history, which is 227

held by French historians to be incompatible with a narrativist interpretation of history, was left without any immediate critical response, until a more sophisticated concept of historical plot, in the last part of chapter 6, permitted the reintegration of nonevent history into the narrative field. But, first, it was necessary, in setting aside a naive narrative reading of history, to pose the problem within the epistemological situation most unfavorable to a direct and immediate relation between history and narrative. If, in return, the covering law model was promptly submitted to rather strong criticism, first internally at the end of chapter 4 and then externally in chapter 5, this double criticism was not purely negative. From examining the covering law model, I retained the idea of an epistemological break which distances historical explanation armed with generalizations in the form of laws, from simple narrative understanding. Once this epistemological break was recognized, it was no longer possible to adopt the overly simple thesis that history must be held to be a species of the genus story. Even if, on the whole, a narrativist interpretation of history seemed to me more correct than a nomological one, the narrativist theses examined in chapter 5—even if they were reworked and refined—did not appear really to do justice to the specificity of history in the narrative field. Their main drawback is that they do not sufficiently take into account the transformations that have driven contemporary historiography further and further away from a naive narrative style of writing, and that they have not been successful in integrating explanation in terms of laws into the narrative fabric of history. And yet the narrativist interpretation is correct in its clear perception that the specifically historical property of history is preserved only by the ties, however tenuous and well-hidden they may be, which continue to connect historical explanation to our narrative understanding, despite the epistemological break separating the first from the second.

This twofold requirement, doing justice to the specificity of historical explanation and maintaining history's belonging within the narrative field, led me in the sixth chapter to join the antithetical strategy of chapters 4 and 5 to the method of questioning back, related to the genetic phenomenology of the later Husserl. This method aims at accounting for the indirect character of the filiation that connects history to our narrative understanding by reactivating the phases of the derivation by which this filiation is realized. To be precise, this questioning back is no longer epistemological. Strictly speaking, nor does it correspond to a simple methodology adapted to the historian's day-to-day work. It corresponds to a genesis of meaning, which is the responsibility of the philosopher. This genesis of meaning would not be possible if it were not supported by the epistemology and the methodology of the historical sciences. The latter provide the relay stations capable of guiding, in each of the three spheres under consideration, the reactivation of the narrative sources of scholarly history. For example, singular causal explanation provides the tran-228

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sitional structure between explanation in terms of laws and understanding by means of the plot, in their turn, the first-level entities to which the historian's discourse ultimately refers make us look in the direction of the modes of participatory belonging that maintain the kinship between the object of history and the characters in a narrative. Finally, the discordant rhythms of the multiple temporalities, interwoven in the overall becoming of societies, reveal a profound kinship between the least pointlike historical changes and the sudden changes in fortune that, in narrative, are considered to be events. Thus the historians' profession, the epistemology of the historical sciences, and genetic phenomenology combine their resources to reactivate that fundamental noetic vision of history which, for the sake of brevity, I have called historical intentionality. The most significant result of this critical examination of history has not yet been stressed. It results from the subsequent impact of the examination on the initial model proposed in chapter 3 of Part I. Certainly, the essential features of the basic model have been preserved in the analyses of the second part. These include: the dynamic character of the configurational operation, the primacy of order over succession, the competition between concordance and discordance, the narration's schematization of generalities in the form of laws, the conflict between sedimentation and innovation in the formation of traditions throughout the course of the development of the historical sciences. But, as I noted at the time, a study based on a simple confrontation between the Augustinian distentio animi and the Aristotelian muthos could only be expected to provide "a sketch, that will require further expansion, criticism, and revision."

In fact, my examination of history was not limited to verifying the relevance of this model by applying it to a
rather vast area of narrative composition. A good example of expanding the model was provided by the complexity of the discordant concordance offered by historical narration, which has no parallel in Aristotle's Poetics. The idea of the synthesis of the heterogeneous, which was merely suggested in Part I, is completely freed from the limits imposed upon it by the literary "genres" and "types" with which it is still confused in the Poetics.

For this very reason, the expansion of the initial example tends toward a critique, if not of the model as such, at least of the interpretations of historical explanation that have remained too closely tied to this model. This is so whenever the theory of history is not dearly distinguished from a theory of action and does not give to the circumstances, the anonymous forces, and, especially, the unintended consequences the place that is due them. "What transforms actions into histories?" asks a philosopher. Precisely those factors that escape a simple reconstruction of the calculations made by the agents of the action. These factors give the employment a complexity unequalled in the 229

R "del that, in Aristotle, is still patterned on Greek tragedy (without forgetting, as well, epic and, to a lesser extent, comedy). The model of explanation proposed by von Wright, which combines tectological segments and law-like segments within a composite model, gives a good idea of the critique to which a model of historical explanation based purely on the concept of action must be submitted. Would I go so far as to speak of a revision of the initial model by the theory of history?" Yes, up to a certain point. This is attested to by the concepts of quasi-plot, quasi-character, and quasi-event that I had to construct in order to respect the very indirect form of filiation by which the history that is the least narrative in its style of writing nevertheless continues to rely on narrative understanding.

In speaking of quasi-plot, quasi-character, and quasi-event I wanted to bring the initial concepts worked out within the sphere of mimesis, close to their breaking point. The reader will recall to what extent the plot that threads through Braudel's great work. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. is deeply buried and difficult to reconstruct. Nor have I forgotten the care with which proper names have to be used when they are applied to the first-level entities of history. Finally, the notion of event had to lose its usual qualities of brevity and suddenness in order to measure up to the discordances and ruptures that punctuate the life of economic, social, and ideological structures of an individual society. The term "quasi" in the expressions "quasi-plot." "quasi-character." and "quasi-event." bears witness to the highly analogical nature of the use of narrative categories in scholarly history, fn any event, this analogy expresses the tenuous and deeply hidden tie that holds history within the sphere of narrative and thereby preserves the historical dimension itself.

Notes

PART ONE


CHAPTER ONE


2. This meditation extends from 1:1 to 14:17 and is taken up again in 29:39 and carried to the end. 31:41.

3. J. Guittot, attentive to the tie between time and consciousness in Augustine, observes that the aporia of time is also the aporia of the self (Guittot, p. 224). He quotes Confessions 10, 16:25: "O Lord, I am working hard in this held, and the field of my labours is my own self. I have become a problem to myself, like land which a farmer only works with difficulty and at the cost of much sweat. For I am not now investigating the tracts of the heavens, or measuring the distance of the stars, or trying to discover how the earth hangs in space. I am investigating myself, my memory, my mind [ego sum, qui memini, ego animus]."

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19. Augustine's hesitation can be related to two other assertions: first, that the movement of the lights of the sky "marks out" the distinction has no real consequences. With Guitton in p. 229, we can say that for Augustine "time is neither (notare) but more morsa than moms." The dissenio animi has no more tie to morsa than it does to morsa.

18. This substitution explains why Augustine no longer makes use of the distinction between moms and morsa: "my question is whether a day is that movement [mots] itself, the time needed [mora] for its completion, or a combination of both" (23:30). Since all three hypotheses are discounted and the investigation into the very sense of the word "day" is abandoned, the distinction has no real consequences. With Guitton in p. 229, we can say that for Augustine "time is neither morsa nor morsa but more morsa than moms." The dissenio animi has no more tie to morsa than it does to morsa.

17. Meijering stresses in this regard the role of concentration which, at the end of the book, will be related to the hope of stability which gives the human present a certain resemblance to God's eternal present. We might also say that the narrative of Books 1-9 is the history of the quest for this concentration and this stability. On this point, see volume 2 of this study.

16. The quasi-kinetic language of the transition from the future toward the past through the present (cf. below) will help to further consolidate this quasi-spatial language.

15. Perhaps it is a little more than a little. Consider the predetermination of a future action. Like expectation, it is present, whereas the future action does not yet exist. But the "sign"-"cause" is here more complicated than mere prediction. For what I am anticipating is not only the beginning of an action but its completion. Carrying myself forward beyond its beginning, I see its beginning as the past of its future completion. We then use the future perfect: "Once we have set to work [aggressi fuerimus] and started to put our plans into action [agere coeperimus], that action exists, because it is not future but present" (18:23). The future present is anticipated here through the use of the future perfect. The systematic study of verbal tenses by Harald Weinrich in his Tempus will pursue further this sort of investigation. See volume 2, chapter 3.

14. The entire paragraph must be cited: "When the past correctly, "it is not past facts which are drawn out of our memories but only words based on our memory-pictures of those facts, because when they happened they left an impression on our minds, by means of our sense-perception" (18:23). The number of prepositions concerning place or location is striking: it is out of (ex) our memories that we draw words based on (ex) memories that leave an impression on (in) our minds. My "own childhood, which no longer exists, is in [in] past time, which also no longer exists. But when I remember those days... it is in [in] the present that I picture them to myself: because their picture is still present in [in] my memory" (ibid.). The question "where" 232 I want to know where (ubicumque) they are..." sot.es to Pages 12-16 i "if the future and the past do exist, calls for the response, "in."

13. The argument about prediction which concerns all human beings must be clearly distinguished from the argument about prophecy which concerns only the inspired prophets. This second argument presents a different problem, that of the way in which God (or the Word) "reveals" the future to the prophets (see 19:25). On this point, cf. Guitton, pp. 261-70. He stresses the liberating character of the Augustinian analysis of expectatio in relation to the entire pagan tradition of divination and manti-cism. To this extent, prophecy remains an exception and a gift.

12. It is after having excluded the idea of being and nonbeing that Augustine will be able to return to this assertion in more or less the same terms: "we measure time while it is passing" (21:27). It is thus always in relation to the notion of measurement that the idea of passing imposes itself. But as yet we do not have the means at our disposal to understand the latter.

11. Meijering (p. 66) recognizes in the Augustinian quaero the Greek Zetin which makes the difference between the Augustinian aporia and the complete ignorance of the skeptics. Jean Guitton disirns a non-Greek source for the Zetin in the Hebrew wisdom tradition which finds an echo in Acts 17:26.

10. Concerning the argument of the indivisible instant that has no extension, there is in Meijering (pp. 63-64) a reference to the texts of Sextus Empiricus and a fortunate reminder of the Stoic discussion presented by Victor Goldschmidt in Le Systeme stoïcien et le Temps, pp. 37ff. and pp. 184ff. It will have been noted that Augustine is perfectly aware of the dependence of his analysis on a speculative argumentation: si quid intelligitur temporis. . . . Here there can be no pretense of a pure phenomenology. In addition, the appearance of the notion of temporal extension should be noted. But this is not yet at the stage where it will take root: "For if its duration [that of the present] were prolonged, it could be divided into past and future jnam si extenditur. dividitur..."

9. No more than this classical antiquity. Augustine has no word for units smaller than the hour. This does not change until the eighteenth century. Meijering (p. 64) refers in this regard to H. Michel. "La Notion de l'heure dans l'antiquite." Janus 57 (1970): 115-24.

8. Regarding God's laughter, see Meijering, pp. 60-61.

7. This role of anticipation is well noted by Meijering in his commentary.

6. The contrast with eternity if decisive: "As for the present, if it were always present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be time but eternity" (14:15). We can: however, note in this respect that, regardless of the understanding we may have of eternity, the argument can be limited to appealing to our use of language involving the word "always." The present is not always. In this way passing requires the contrast of remaining. (Meijering refers in this regard to Sermo 108 in which passing is opposed in a number of different ways to remaining.) As the argument continues we shall see the definition of the present become finer and finer.

5. I shall henceforth simply give the reference 14:17, 15:18 etc., whenever I am citing Book 1 of the Confessions.

4. This audacious assertion, which is asken up again at the end of Part 1, object or a long discussion in volume 2.

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1. Our memories that leave an impression on our minds, by means of our sense-perception "(18:23). The number of prepositions concerning place or location is striking: it is out of (ex) our memories that we draw words based on (ex) memories that leave an impression on (in) our minds. My "own childhood, which no longer exists, is in [in] past time, which also no longer exists. But when I remember those days... it is in [in] the present that I picture them to myself: because their picture is still present in [in] my memory" (ibid.). The question "where" 232 I want to know where (ubicumque) they are..." sot.es to Pages 12-16 i "if the future and the past do exist, calls for the response, "in."

0. It perhaps is a little more than a little. Consider the predetermination of a future action. Like expectation, it is present, whereas the future action does not yet exist. But the "sign"-"cause" is here more complicated than mere prediction. For what I am anticipating is not only the beginning of an action but its completion. Carrying myself forward beyond its beginning. I see its beginning as the past of its future completion. We then use the future perfect: "Once we have set to work [aggressi fuerimus] and started to put our plans into action [agere coeperimus], that action exists, because it is not future but present" (18:23). The future present is anticipated here through the use of the future perfect. The systematic study of verbal tenses by Harald Weinrich in his Tempus will pursue further this sort of investigation. See volume 2, chapter 3.
spatial marks, in order to fulfill their role as points of reference for the length of time, do not make the measurement of time necessarily dependent on the regular motion of some moving body other than the soul. I shall return to this difficulty below. 20. On this point, cf. Beierwaltes's commentary on Enneads III 7. 11.41. diastasis ̋o:es; A. Solignac, "Notes complementaires," pp. 588-91; and Meijering. pp. 90-93. The free adaptation of the Plotinian terms diastema—diastasis by Christian writers goes back to Gregory of Nyssa, as has been established by J. Callahan, the author of Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy. See his essay "Gregory of Nyssa and the Psychological View of Time," in Acts of the Twelfth International Congress of Philosophy (Florence: Sansoni, 1960), p. 59. Confirmation of this claim can be found in David L. Balas, "Eternity and Time in Gregory of -Nyssa's Contra Eunomion," in H. Dorrie, M. Altenburger, and U. Simryhe, eds., Gregory von Nyssa und die Philosophe: The Second International Colloquy on Gregory of Nyssa, 1972 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), pp. 128-53. In the same collection, T. Paul Verghese establishes that the notion of diastema is used essentially as a criterion for distinguishing the divine trinity from the creature. In God there is no diastema between the Father and the Son. no interval, no distance. Consequently diastema characterizes creation as such, partic- 233

ularly the interval between the Creator and the creature. See T. Paul Verghese. "Di-astema and Diastasis in Gregory of Nyssa: Introduction to a Concept and the Posing of a Concept." in ibid., pp. 243-58. Even assuming that this adaptation of the Plotinian terminology by the Greek fathers was known to Augustine, his originality remains. He is the only one to derive the distemio from just the extension of the soul. 21. Note the slight shift in the emphasis. "A ̋b:ti earlier AugusTime rejected the possibility of measuring the momentlike present: quia nullo spatio tenditur. "because it has no extent" (26:33). In my opinion, tenditur announces the intentio of which the dis-tenantio is but the reverse side. In fact, the momentlike present has neither tension or distension: only the "time that passes" can admit these. This is why in the following paragraph it must be said of the present, inasmuch as it passes ifiraetenen. it that it "gains some extent" as a sort of lapse of time. This is no longer the present considered as a point but the living present, both under tension and distended. 22. Solignac stresses the aporetical character of this page by giving as the subtitle of his translation of 27:34 "Deeper Analysis. New Aporias" (p. 329). 23. If the sensur confounds the skeptics, the quantum, notes Meijening (p. 95). indicates a certain reservation with respect to the Epicureans and their overconfidence in sensation. Here. Augustine is following the middle road of Platonism. that of a guarded confidence in the senses controlled by the intelligence. 24. My analysis differs here from that of Meijering. who pays almost exclusive attention to the contrast between eternity and time and does not stress the internal dialectic of time itself, involving intention and distension. It is true, as will be stated later, that this contrast is accentuated by the striving for eternity that animates the intentio. However. Guitton strongly emphasizes this tension of the mind with respect to which disstemio stands as the reverse side: "Saint Augustine, as his reflection progressed. was obliged to attribute opposing qualities to time. Its duration is an extensio. a distension which includes within it an attentio. an intentio. As a result of this. time is closely related to actio. of which it is the spiritual form" (p. 232). Thus the instant is "an act of the mind" (p. 234). 25. Kant will encounter the same enigma of a passivity that is actively produced with the idea of Selbststatiktion in the second edition of The Critique <>t Pure Reason. See B67-6V i Immmanuel Kant. Crinuie ou Pure Reason. trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St Martin's Press. 1965). pp. S"- S; I shall return to this point in volume 2. 26. Two other objections might also arise. First of all, what is the relation of the Augustinian dixiemo tinimi to Plotinus's duistasis ̋o:es! And what is the relation of the whole of Book I to the narration of the first nine books of the Confessions! To the first objection, I would reply that my purpose here does not allow me to treat the relation of Augustine to Plotinus in terms of the history of ideas. However I readily acknowledge that a good understanding of the mutation undergone by the Plotman analysis of time can contribute to deepening the enigma that Augustine willed to posterity. A few footnotes obviously do not suffice m this regard, I would refer the reader to the commentaries of Solignac and Meijering on the Confessions to fill this gap. as well as to Beierwalte's study on Plotinus fiber Ewigkeit und Zeit. With regard to the speculation on time and the narration of the first nine books, this is of particular interest to me. I shall return to it in the second volume of the present work within the framework of a reflection on repetition. Something in this regard can already be intimated here if we refer to the confessio within which Augustine's entire work is cloaked. 27. In this respect, we cannot consider the great prayer of 2:3 to be a mere rhetorical ornament. (The French translator has very judiciously chosen to give a version in verse.) It contains the melodic line that speculation, along with the hymn, will develop: "Yours is the day. Yours the night. No moment of time passes except by your 234 will. Grant me some part of it for my meditations on the secrets of your law. Do not Jase your door to those who knock: do not close the boote of your law to me." Speculation and hymn are joined together in the "confession." It is in a confessional tone that the principium of Genesis 1:1 is invoked in the prayer of 2:3: "Let me acknowledge jomfitia tibl as yours whatever I find in your books. Let me listen to the sound of your praises. Let me drink you in and contemplate the wonders of your law from the very beginning, when you made heaven and earth, to the coming of your kingdom. when we shall he forever with you in your holy city." 28. In this knowledge is summed up both the affinity and the radical difference between Plotinus and Augustine. The theme of the creation constitutes this difference. Guitton takes the measure of this gap in a few pages (pp. 136—1-5). Augustine, he says, "poured into the mold provided by the Enneads an inspiration that was foreign to Plotinus. even opposed to his thinking. and such that its entire dialectic tended to deny it. to prevent it from emerging, or to dissolve it" (ibid., p. 140). From the idea of creation resulted a temporary cosmos, a temporal conversion, and a historical religion. In this way time is justified as well as founded. As for the anthropomorphism which Plotinian emanationism seems to avoid, we might wonder whether the metaphorical resources of Augustine's material anthropomorphism are not more precious as regards the schema of creative causality than the Neoplatonic exemplarism which reposes in the identity of "the one" and which does not avoid a more subtle, because it is purely formal, anthropomorphism. The metaphor of creation keeps us attentive as well as on our
guard, whereas exemplarism attracts us by its philosophical character. On this point, see Guitton. pp. 198-99. On the "eternal creator and temporal creation." cf. Meijering's exhaustive commentary, pp. 17-57. He gives all the pertinent references to the *rimea* and the *Enneads.*

29. If this ontological deficiency has a function in the argumentation other than that of the nonbeing of the skeptical argument about time, tied to the "not yet" of the future and the "no longer" of the past, nevertheless it stamps this nonbeing with the seal of the lack that is peculiar to created beings: "for we know. O Lord, that the extent to which something once was. but no longer is. is the measure of its death: and the extent to which something once was not. but now is. is the measure of its beginning" 17: <*>). Henceforth the two adjectives "eternal" (along with its synonym "immortal" I and "temporal are opposed to each other. Temporal means not eternal. Later, we shall wonder if the negation does not work both ways. Already here, in 7:9, to be eternal implies *nun* "giving place to the next," With respect to the synonyms of eternity (*iuo-moalitias. incorrupt
tilitas. incommutabilitas), see Meijering. p. 32. who refers to rimea 29c. Let us therefore retain these first two moments of the limiting function of the idea of eternity contained in the two negatives: it is not like an artisan working with some earlier material that the Word creates: it is not with a voice that sounds in time that the Word speaks.

30. The translators and the interpreter of the Confessions in the "Bibliothèque Au-justiniennne" indicate a caesura between 10:11 and 10: 12. and divide Book I I in the following way: I. The creation and the creating Word (3:5-10: 12). 11.-The problem of time: (a) before the creation. 10: 12-14: 17: (b) the being of time and its measurement. 14: 17-29:39. My own analysis leads me to group together I and 11(a) under the simple heading: the intensification of the *distendio amni* by its contrast with eternity. In addition, the apparently preposterous question that begins at 10: 12 possesses the same aporetical style characterized by the questions "How?" (5:7) and "Why?" (6:8), which appeared to us to be provoked by the very confession of eternity. Finally, the aporia and the responses to it will give rise to the same sort of deepening reflection concerning the negative discussion of temporality begun at 3:5.

31. Already in Timaeus 37e. Plato had excluded the past and the future from etc-235
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yet speaking of the eternal present. Meijering. p. 46. cites other texts of Augustine that interpret the *stare* and the *manere* of God as the eternal present. He strongly emphasizes (p. 43) that Augustine accepts the part of the argument of 10: 12 that says that "the will of God is not a created thing. It is there before any creation takes place. . . . The will of God. then, is part of his substance." Meijering also likens this text to Plotinus's *Enneads* VI 8: 13 and 9: 14. He identifies the first expression of the eternal present in the middle Platonism of Numenius before its formulation in Plotinus (he refers in this regard to Beierwaltes. pp. 170-73), then in Gregory of Nyssa and Athanasius.

32. Today we have trouble imagining how animated—not to say violent—were the quarrels to which the idea of a temporal creation gave rise. Guitton shows how they were exacerbated by the conflict between literal exegesis and allegorical exegesis incited by the biblical narrative of creation "in six days" and. more especially, by the sense to be given to the "three days" preceding the creation of the great heavens. Cf. Guitton. pp. 177-91.

33. The question here is not that of the faithfulness of the Latin translation to the Hebrew, but that of its influence within the philosophical tradition.

34. A. Solignac (pp. 583-84) refers here to Etienne Gilson. *Philosophie et Incarnation chez saint Augustin,* in which he studies the principal texts of Augustine's work concerning the famous verse from Exodus and other verses from the psalms, in particular Sermo I. Solignac comments, "the transcendence of eternity in relation to time for Augustine is the transcendence of a personal God who created other persons and who converses with them. It is thus the transcendence of a *being* who possesses himself in an endless present in relation to the *existence* of beings whose contingency is manifestly within the vicissitudes of time" Moid., p. 584).

35. I am not discussing here the question whether the idea of eternity is itself entirely positive, as we are led to believe by the terms *manere. stans. semper. toturn esse praesens.* To the extent that "beginning." "ceasing." and "passing" are themselves positive terms. eternity is also the negative of time; "the other" of time. Even the expression "completely present" denies that God's present has a past and a future. Memory and expectation are positive experiences due to the presence of the vestige-images and vigil-images. The eternal present does not appear to be a purely positive notion except by reason of its homonymy with the present that passes. To say that it is eternal, we must deny that it is the passive and active transit from the future toward the past. It is still insofar as it is not a present that is "pa-t-ed through." Eternity is also conceived of negatively, as that which does not include time, as that which is not temporal. In this sense, there is a double negation: I must be able to deny the features of my experience of time in order to perceive this experience as a lack with respect to that which denies it. It is this double and mutual negation whereby eternity is the other of time that, more than anything else, intensifies the experience of time.

36. Pierre Courcelle. *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin* (Paris: de Boccard. 1950). chapter I, emphasizes that the term "confession" in Augustine goes far beyond the confession of sins and includes the confession of faith and the confession of praise. The analysis of Mine and the *elegia* or "he distendio. nun* are related to the second and third senses of the Augustinian confession. Narrative, as I shall state below, is also included within it.

37. The expression in *regione dissimilitudinis* has inspired a number of works which are recalled in a lengthy note. no. 16. in A. Solignac (pp. 689-93). The fortune of this expression from Plato to the Christian Middle Ages is particularly stressed in Etienne Gilson. "Regio dissimilitudinis de Platon a saint Bernard de Clairvaux," *Medieval Studies* 9 (1947): 108—30, and Pierre Courcelle. "Traditions neo-platoniciennes et traditions chretiennes de la region de dissemblance." *Archives d'Histoire Litteraire et 236

*Doctrinale dit Io en At&re 24 1927*: 5-33. reprinted as an appendix to his *Recherches sur les Confessions tie saint Augustin.*

38. But must we go so far as to distinguish, as does Guitton. "two internal movements which can be distinguished by consciousness, although they are mutually interrelated, *expectatio futurorum* which bears us toward the future and *extentio ad supe-riora* which orientates us. once and for all. toward the eternal*" (p. 137). Do these constitute "two forms of time"
order to designate narrative as narrated by the narrator (following the definition in Chapter 3 of the 15. Dupont-Roc and Lallot, in their commentary (p. 370), do not hesitate to speak of
becomes one large category encompassing both diegetic and diegetic composition.
mesis) was opposed to "simple narrative," as narrative delegated to a character versus direct narrative, with Aristotle mimesis
14. Aristotle uses both apangelia (chap. 3) and diegesis (chaps. 23 and 26): "in epic the narrative form (en de te epoepoia dia to diegesin)" (59b26).
12. Better or worse than what? The text says "better than we are" (48al8). Below I shall discuss this reference in the Poetics to a feature of ethical action in the "real" world. I shall attach this reference to a usage of the term mimesis less strictly managed by the noematic correlation to muthos. It should be noted that this reference to ethics rightly applies to the whole field of mimetic activity, in particular to painting. The distinction between comedy and tragedy is not one application of the criterion of "how" to the arts of versified language. Cf. 48al - 18.
13. In his commentary on Chapter 3, devoted to the mode of mimesis. Else notes that the three modes—narrative, mixed, and dramatic—constitute a progression that makes the dramatic mode the imitation par excellence, thanks to the direct character of the expression of human truth, the characters themselves doing the represented or imitated action. See Else. p. 101.
14. Aristotle uses both apangelia (chap. 3) and diegesis (chaps. 23 and 26): "in epic the narrative form (en de te epoepoia dia to diegesin)" (59b26). This vocabulary comes from Plato, The Republic. 392c-394c. But while for Plato narrative "by mimesis" was opposed to "simple narrative," as narrative delegated to a character versus direct narrative, with Aristotle mimesis becomes one large category encompassing both dramatic and diegetic composition.
15. Dupont-Roc and Lallot, in their commentary (p. 370), do not hesitate to speak of recit diegetique and recit narratif in order to designate narrative as narrated by the narrator (following the definition in Chapter 3 of the Poetics). We may
therefore also speak of dramatic narrative and thereby give the term "narrative" a generic character in relation to its two species, the dramatic and the diegetic.

16. We may attenuate the contradiction between his two judgments about the spectacle, and also his slight bad faith which wants to gain acceptance for his preference for tragedy without compromising his formal model that excludes the need for an ac-238

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tuital performance, in the following way. We may say, with Dupont-Roc and Lallot (pp. 407-8), that the script contains all the constitutive features of the mimetic activity, without the existence of the spectacle, and also that the way the dramatic text is stated contains the requirement that it be seen. I would put it this way: the script, without the spectacle, is a prescription for the spectacle. The actual spectacle is not necessary for the existence of this prescription. This status also applies to the orchestral score.


18. Frank Kermode. The Genesis of Secrecy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1979), pp. 75-77. In the same way, Redfield observes that the Iliad is constructed around Achilles anger as well as Hector's tragic fate. But in an epic where the characters have no declared inwardness, only the interaction among them counts. Con-"equently a character only acquires significance by engendering a plot (Redfield. p. 22). There is no longer a quarrel over priority if we further understand by plot "that implicit conceptual unity which has given the work its actual form" (ibid., p. 23). This is the choice I have made throughout this work.

19. "I have posited that tragedy is an imitation of an action that is whole [teleios] and complete in itself [holes] and of a certain magnitude (Immegethos)" (50b23-25).

20. Else is particularly firm about this disjunction between logic and chronology (see his commentary on 50b21-34). The only thing that counts is internal necessity that makes probability or necessity "the grand law of poetry" (ibid., p. 282). He goes so far as to see in this ideally dense temporal schema "a kind of Parmenidian on' in the realm of art" (ibid., p. 294). He bases his argument on the fact that, in speaking of epic in Chapter 23. Aristotle cautions that "its structure should not resemble histories, which necessarily present not a single action but a single period of time [henos khroutou]" (59a22-23). To this "report of a single time" Aristotle will oppose his uni-versals that are "timeless" (Else. p. 574). I do not believe it necessary to push the opposition between logic and chronology so far, at the price of having to renounce the kinship between the Poetics and the Ethics. For my part. I shall attempt in the following chapter to elaborate an achronological notion of narrative temporality. Does not Else himself speak of the events contained within a drama as "events which are not in time at least in the usual sense" (ibid.). So dramatic time cannot be completely ignored as soon as we accord epic the privilege of representing "various parts [of the story] as being enacted simultaneously [hamas]" (59b27). The unique temporal perspective imposed by an action performed by the characters themselves merits reflection about the time of the dramatic narrative as distinct from diegetic narrative and about the time of the plot that governs both of them.

21. Regarding our "intellectual response" to an artist's imitations, see G. Else's commentary on 48b4-24. James Redfield, too. strongly emphasizes that for this pedagogical function of imitation (see Redfield. pp. 52-55). the probable is universal in its own way (ibid., pp. 55-60). The plot gives rise to knowledge (ibid., pp. 60-67). In this, the Poetics remains close to fifth-century rhetoric and its emphasis on argumentation. Whereas in the law court the argument is added to the narrative, which is itself contingent, the drama includes its argument in its plot and constructs the conditions of the event on the basis of the plot: "we can then define fiction as the outcome of a hypothetical inquiry into the intermediate causes of action, an inquiry which has led the poet to the discovery and communication in a story of some universal pattern of human probability and necessity" (Redfield, pp. 59-60). So "fiction is the outcome of a kind of inquiry" (ibid., p. 79): how did it happen that . . . ? Who acted in such a way? Similarly, Golden says. "Through imitation, events are reduced to form and j thus, however impure in themselves, the events portrayed are gufiied—clarified—into intelligibility" (Golden, p. 236).

22. Dupont-Roc and Lallot say "chronicile" rather than "history," which is their term for translating mythos. This choice does have the advantage of leaving room tor a less negative judgment about the writing of history.

23. Else exclaims. "The maker of what happened! Not the maker of the actuality of events but of their logical structure, of their meaning: their having happened is accidental to their being composed." Else. p. 321.

24. We gave the fuller quotation earlier: "an action that is serious, complete, and possessing magnitude" (50b24-25i. In the immediate context of this passage Aristotle only comments on "complete" and "magnitude."

25. Redfield translates 52al-4 as follows. "The imitation is not only of a complete action but of things pitiable and fearful; such things must happen when they happen contrary to expectation because of one another fdi'allej. Else has: "Contrary to experience but because of one another." Leon Golden: "unexpectedly, yet because of one another."

26. Does the tragedy of Oedipus preserve its character of peripeteia for us who know the framework of the story and its outcome? Yes, if we do not define surprise in terms of some external knowledge but in terms of the relationship of the character portrayed is given to the spectator in the context of the whole event, or in the context of the story as a whole. So the events portrayed are gulfed—clarified—into intelligibility" (Golden, p. 236).

29. The model's limits are perhaps more apparent in the case of recognition, where the changes from ignorance to knowledge
take place within relationships "leading either to friendship or to hostility on the part of those persons who are marked for
good fortune or bad" (52a31). Friendship certainly goes beyond blood relations, but it constitutes a very narrow constraint.
We might inquire whether the modern novel, at least in the form it took with Richardson's *Pamela*, making love the only
outcome of action, does not reconstitute the equivalent of this constraint of friendship or hostility, as a labor of lucidity itself
equivalent to Aristotelian recognition.
30. Redfieid says. "pathe and learning together constitute the characteristic value to us of a well-made narrative. I suspect
that Aristotle meant by *katatharsis* exactly this combination of emotion and learning" (p. 67).
31. The *hamareia* is not just an extreme case of discordance. It contributes much to the tragic work's character of being an
investigation. It makes the unmerited misfortune problematic. Interpreting the tragic error is the task of tragedy as "inquiry
into the strengths and weaknesses of culture" (Redfieid. p. 89). I shall return again to this role of the poetic work as
revelatory of the "dysfunctions" (ibid., p. 111. n. 1) of a culture.
32. Else notes correctly that this discernment makes us judges. However it is "as a court of fellow human beings," not as
ministers of the law. that we pass judgment. The 240
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catharsis of pity and fear thus takes the place of condemnation and execration. And it is not we who bring about this
purification, but rather the plot. See Else. p. 437. We rediscover here the connection suggested above between the tragic fault
and recognition. Catharsis is the whole process governed by its structure as culminating in recognition.
33. Golden translates this as: "Since the poet should produce pleasure from [apo] pity and fear through [dia] imitation, it is
apparent that this function must be worked into the incidents [en tois pragmasin empoieteon]" (p. 23). Else comments, "the
pleasure is derived from [apo] the pity and fear but [h] means of [dia] the imitation" ip. 411. his emphasis).
34. It will have been noted that I have not discussed the distinction between "complication" (desis) and "denouement" (lasis)
in Chapter 13. The fact that Aristotle includes the complication among the events "outside" the plot makes me think we ought
not to place this distinction on the same plane as the other features of the complex plot, all of whose criteria are "inside" it.
This is why a critique of the concept of narrative closure whose argument draws on the aorpias of this analysis, only touches
a peripheral and heterogeneous category and perhaps one added later by Aristotle (see Else, p. 520), not the core of his
concept of plot.
35. James Redfieid forcefully emphasizes this tie between ethics and poetics. It is visibly warranted by the common terms
praxis, action, and ethos, character. More profoundly, both disciplines are concerned with the realization of happiness. Ethics,
in effect, deals with happiness in its potential form. It considers its conditions, the virtues. But the connection between these
virtues and the circumstances of happiness remains dependent upon contingencies. In constructing their plots, poets give
intelligibility to this contingent connection. Whence the apparent paradox: "Fiction is about unreal happiness and
unhappiness. but these in their actuality" (Redfieid. p. 63). It is at this price that narration "teaches" about the happiness and
life named in the definition of tragedy: "For tragedy is not an imitation of men but of actions and of life. It is in action that
happiness and unhappiness are found" (50a17—18).
36. In volume 2. we shall see what use Claude Bremond makes of these notions of improvement and harm in his "logic of
possible narratives." We might follow Dupont-Roc and Lallot when they state that the *Poetics* inverts the relationship of
priority ethics establishes between the action and the characters. In ethics, they say, the characters are first, in poetics they
move to the second rank: "this inversion in the relationship of priority between agent and action results directly from the
definition of dramatic poetry as the representation of action" (p. 196: see also pp. 202-4). Or we might note, with Else (on
48a5—9), that for ethics too it is action that confers moral quality on the characters. In any case, how wotrfid this alleged
reversal be perceived if the order of precedence that the *Poetics* inverts were not preserved by the reversal? Dupont-Roc and
Lallot would no doubt agree. For them, the object of mimetic activity conserves, not just in this chapter but perhaps to the
end. the ambiguous meaning of being a model of the object (the natural object imitated) and a copy (the artifact created).
They note. regarding 48a9: "the mimetic activity (of those who represent actions) establishes a complex relation between the
two objects, model and copy. It implies at the same time resemblance and difference, identification and transformation, in
one and the same movement" (ibid., p. 15). 38.
37. 51a6-20 is striking in this regard in that it speaks of actions one person performs "that do not go together to produce a
single unified action."
38. Redfieid (pp. 31-35) observes that the stories about heroes, received from the tradition, are, unlike the stories of the gods,
stories about disasters and sufferings.
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we define this so that "it should be possible to embrace the beginning and the end in one view"? (ibid., p. 81). "The tragic poet thus tests the limits of culture. ... In tragedy culture itself becomes problematic" (ibid., p. 84). Epic, before tragedy, already exercised this function by means of its "epic distance." "Epic describes the heroic world to an audience which itself inhabits another, ordinary world" (ibid., p. 36). The poet exercises his teaching authority at first by disordering his audience, then in offering it an ordered representation of the themes of ruin and disorder from its heroic songs. But he does not resolve life's dilemmas. In the Iliad, for example, the funeral ceremony of reconciliation reveals no meaning, rather it makes manifest the absence of meaning in every warlike undertaking. "Dramatic art rises from the dilemmas and contradictions of life, but it makes no promise to resolve these dilemmas: on the contrary tragic art may well reach its highest formal perfection at the moment when it reveals to us these dilemmas as universal, pervasive, and necessary" (ibid., p. 219). "Poetry offers [humanity] not gratification but intelligibility" (ibid., p. 220). Such is the case, particularly, in the case of unmerited suffering, aggravated by the tragic fault. "Through the undeserved sufferings of the characters of tragedy the problem of culture is brought home to us" (ibid., p. 87). The hamartia, as the blind spot of discordance, is also the blind spot of "what tragedy teaches." It is in this sense we can risk calling art "the negation of culture" (ibid., pp. 218-23). I shall return in volume 2. with Jauss's help, to this function of the literary work where it makes problematic the lived experience of a culture.

CHAPTER THREE


1. For the concept "basic actions," see Arthur Danto. "Basic Actions." American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 141-48; reprinted in Alan R. White, ed., The Phi-

2. Redfield's whole work is oriented in terms of this theme of the effect of poetic thinking on culture, where culture is defined in the following terms: "Those things which can be made otherwise by choice, effort, and the application of knowledge constitute the sphere of culture" (ibid., p. 70). The opposition between nature and culture consists essentially in the opposition between constraint and contingency: "values and norms are ... not constraints on action but (ideologically) the sources of action" (ibid.). "Constraints constitute the sphere of nature: they are things which cannot be made otherwise" (ibid., p. 71). As a result, the meaning of a work of art is only fulfilled in its effect on culture. For Redfield, this effect is principally a critical one. The drama is born out of the ambiguities of cultural values and norms. With his eyes lixed on the norm, the poet presents his audience a story that is problematic with a character that is deviant (ibid., p. 81). "The tragic poet thus tests the limits of culture. ... In tragedy culture itself becomes problematic" (ibid., p. 84). Epic, before tragedy, already exercised this function by means of its "epic distance." "Epic describes the heroic world to an audience which itself inhabits another, ordinary world" (ibid., p. 36). The poet exercises his teaching authority at first by disordering his audience, then in offering it an ordered representation of the themes of ruin and disorder from its heroic songs. But he does not resolve life's dilemmas. In the Iliad, for example, the funeral ceremony of reconciliation reveals no meaning, rather it makes manifest the absence of meaning in every warlike undertaking. "Dramatic art rises from the dilemmas and contradictions of life, but it makes no promise to resolve these dilemmas: on the contrary tragic art may well reach its highest formal perfection at the moment when it reveals to us these dilemmas as universal, pervasive, and necessary" (ibid., p. 219). "Poetry offers [humanity] not gratification but intelligibility" (ibid., p. 220). Such is the case, particularly, in the case of unmerited suffering, aggravated by the tragic fault. "Through the undeserved sufferings of the characters of tragedy the problem of culture is brought home to us" (ibid., p. 87). The hamartia, as the blind spot of discordance, is also the blind spot of "what tragedy teaches." It is in this sense we can risk calling art "the negation of culture" (ibid., pp. 218-23). I shall return in volume 2. with Jauss's help, to this function of the literary work where it makes problematic the lived experience of a culture.

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6. This is the point where the sense of the word "symbol" I am emphasizing comes closest to the other two senses I have distanced myself from. As an interpretant of behavior, any symbolism is also a notation system that abbreviates, as does mathematical symbolism, a great number of the details of action, and prescribes, as does musical symbolism, the course of executions or performances capable of actualizing it. However it is also as an interpretant governing what Geertz calls a "thick description" that the symbol introduces a twofold relation of meaning into the gesture or the behavior whose interpretation it governs. We may take the empirical configuration of a gesture as the literal meaning bearing a figurative one. At the limit; this meaning can appear. In certain conditions neighboring on secrecy, as;"JllseSti meaning to be de-


45. Redfield's whole work is oriented in terms of this theme of the effect of poetic thinking on culture, where culture is defined in the following terms: "Those things which can be made otherwise by choice, effort, and the application of knowledge constitute the sphere of culture" (ibid., p. 70). The opposition between nature and culture consists essentially in the opposition between constraint and contingency: "values and norms are ... not constraints on action but (ideologically) the sources of action" (ibid.). "Constraints constitute the sphere of nature: they are things which cannot be made otherwise" (ibid., p. 71). As a result, the meaning of a work of art is only fulfilled in its effect on culture. For Redfield, this effect is principally a critical one. The drama is born out of the ambiguities of cultural values and norms. With his eyes lixed on the norm, the poet presents his audience a story that is problematic with a character that is deviant (ibid., p. 81). "The tragic poet thus tests the limits of culture. ... In tragedy culture itself becomes problematic" (ibid., p. 84). Epic, before tragedy, already exercised this function by means of its "epic distance." "Epic describes the heroic world to an audience which itself inhabits another, ordinary world" (ibid., p. 36). The poet exercises his teaching authority at first by disordering his audience, then in offering it an ordered representation of the themes of ruin and disorder from its heroic songs. But he does not resolve life's dilemmas. In the Iliad, for example, the funeral ceremony of reconciliation reveals no meaning, rather it makes manifest the absence of meaning in every warlike undertaking. "Dramatic art rises from the dilemmas and contradictions of life, but it makes no promise to resolve these dilemmas: on the contrary tragic art may well reach its highest formal perfection at the moment when it reveals to us these dilemmas as universal, pervasive, and necessary" (ibid., p. 219). "Poetry offers [humanity] not gratification but intelligibility" (ibid., p. 220). Such is the case, particularly, in the case of unmerited suffering, aggravated by the tragic fault. "Through the undeserved sufferings of the characters of tragedy the problem of culture is brought home to us" (ibid., p. 87). The hamartia, as the blind spot of discordance, is also the blind spot of "what tragedy teaches." It is in this sense we can risk calling art "the negation of culture" (ibid., pp. 218-23). I shall return in volume 2. with Jauss's help, to this function of the literary work where it makes problematic the lived experience of a culture.

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10. I shall return at length to the role of "repetition" in my general discussion of the phenomenology of time in volume 2.
12. "Dasein historicizes/row! day to day by reason of its way of interpreting time by dating it..." (ibid., p. 466). Recall Augustine's reflections on the "day," which he refuses to reduce purely and simply to one revolution of the sun. Heidegger does not follow him in this way. He puts the difference between the "most natural measure of time" (ibid., p. 465) and all artificial, instrumental ones. The time "within" which we are is world-time (Weltzeit) (ibid., p. 471) "more objective" than any possible object and "more subjective" than any possible subject. Hence it is neither inside nor outside.
14. At the price of this generalization a historian such as Paul Veyne will be able to define plot as a combination in varying proportions of goals, causes, and chance, and make it the guideline for his historiography in Comment on écrit l'histoire. See below, pp. 169—74. In a complementary but not contradictory way, G. H. von Wright sees in historical reasoning a combination of practical syllogisms and chains of causality governed by systemic constraints. Again, see below, pp. 132-43. In numerous ways, therefore, plot composes heterogeneous series.
15. I am borrowing the notion of a "configurational act" from Louis O. Mink. He applies it to historical comprehension and I am extending it to the whole field of narrative understanding. See below, pp. 155-61.
16. Below in chapter 6. I shall consider some other implications of the reflective character of judgment in history.
18. This typology, however, does not abolish the eminently temporal character of the schematism. We ought not to forget that Kant realizes the constituting of the schematism to what he calls the a priori determinations of time: "The schemata are thus nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules. These rules relate in the order of categories to the time-series, the time-order and lastly to the scope of time in respect of all possible objects" (8184). (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith [New York: St. Martin's Press. 1965], p. 185.) However Kant only recognized those determinations of time that contribute to the objective constitution of the physical world. The schematism of the narrative function implies determinations of a new genre which are precisely the ones we have just designated by the dialectic of the episodic characteristics and the configuring of emplotment.
19. Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, in The Nature of Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), are correct in prefacing their analysis of the major cate-244
gories of narrative activity with an ample review of the history of narration in the West. What I am calling the schematization of emplotment exists only through this historical development. This is why Eric Auerbach, in his magnificent work Mimesis. trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), chooses to graft his analysis and evaluation of the representation of reality in Western literature to a sample of numerous, yet strictly delimited, texts.
31. Nelson Goodman's saying, in Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), that literary works ceaselessly make and remake the world holds particularly for narrative works, to the extent that the poiesis of emplotment is a making that, also, bears on what is made. Nowhere is the formula of the title of Goodman's opening chapter, "Reality Remade," more appropriate, as is his maxim about "reorganizing the world in terms of works and works in terms of the world" (ibid., p. 241).

33. In earlier establishing a homology between the praxic time of mimesis, and the last of the forms derived from temporality in *Being and Time*, "within-time-ness" or "being-'within'-time," I have in fact chosen the reverse order of *Being and Time*, that of the Basic Problems.

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PART TWO

1. This does not exclude that historical explanation can be described as "mixed." In this regard I accept the thesis of Henk von Wright to whom a part of chapter 5 is devoted. "Mixed," however, means neither confused nor ambiguous. A "mixed" form of discourse is something wholly other than a compromise, if it is carefully constructed as "mixed" on the appropriate epistemological plane.


CHAPTER FOUR

1. Pierre Chaunu wrote in 1960, "epistemology is a temptation that we must resolutely resist. Does not the experience of these past years demonstrate that it can be a lazy solution for those who lose themselves in it with delight—one or two brilliant exceptions only serving to confirm the rule—the sign of an inquiry that marches in place and becomes increasingly sterile. At most it is opportune that some leading lights—which we do not in any way claim to be—devote themselves to it in order better to preserve the robust artisans of knowledge under construction—the only title we do claim—from the dangerous temptations of this morbid *Capoue* (Histoire quantitative—Histoire seriele [Paris: A. Colin, 1978], p. 10).


6. Logically speaking, "there is nothing unique in our understanding with regard to the past. It is definitely the same process that takes place in our understanding of other men in the present, and particularly in the understanding of articulated language. (Most frequently, and in the best examples, the document under consideration is a 'text' of some kind or another)" (ibid., pp. 91-92). For Marrou, the passage from individual memory to the historical past is not a problem, inasmuch as the real break is between an attachment to oneself and openness to others.

7. Here, Marrou takes his distance from one of the thinkers he most admires, Col-lingwood. But perhaps a rereading of Collingwood would put him closer to the thesis being defended here.

8. Quoting the passage by Aron I have already cited, Marrou writes, "in any case, 'there is no historical reality, ready-made, prior to knowledge, which need only be reproduced with fidelity.' History is the result of the creative effort, by which the histo- rian, the conscious subject, establishes a relationship between the past which he/ she evokes and the present which is his own" (ibid., pp. 56-57).


11. I shall return, in volume 2. to the question that occupies Bloch in his first chapter, the relationships among "history, men, and time." That history knows the past ojilyinsofar as it is human and can be defined as the science of "men in time" (ibid., p. 27); that historical time is both continuous and dissimilar: that history must abstract itself from the obsession with origins; that knowledge of our present that would be impossible without our knowledge of the past and vice versa: all these themes will return when we raise the question of the referents of history. Here we shall limit ourselves to the few epistemological insights Bloch attaches to his rapid reflections about the object of history, and especially to the status of the notions of "track" [trace] and "testimony." His audacity surely is to have linked his principal methodological notations to his definition of history as "knowledge of their tracks," to use Francois Simiand's apt expression. These tracks upon which we establish a science about human beings in time are essentially "the accounts of eye-witnesses" (p. 48). As a result, "historical observation"—the title of chapter 2—and "historical criticism"—the title of chapter 3—are essentially devoted to a typology and a criteriology of evidence. It is noteworthy that in *The Historian's Craft* narrative only appears as one species of testimony which the historian uses critically—namely, those intentional accounts destined to inform the reader—and never as the literary form the historian writes (see pp. 44, 61, III. 177).
12. The considerable role of falsehoods in medieval history also contingently explains the emphasis given to the criticism of testimony.

13. "To evaluate the probability of an event is to weigh its chances of taking place" (ibid., p. 124). Bloch is not far from Weber and Aron when he observes the singularity of this mode of reasoning, which appears to apply foresight to the past: "since the line of the present has somehow been moved back in the imagination, it is a future of bygone times built upon a fragment which, for us, is actually the past" (ibid., p. 125).

14. "And so, to add it all up, the criticism of evidence relies upon an instinctive metaphysics of the similar and the dissimilar, of the one and the many" (ibid., p. 116). It is summed up therefore in the handling of the principle of "limited similarity" (ibid., p. 118).


16. Narrative is associated with this reconstructive phase just once, this time under the cover of a quotation from Michelet: "But a great vital movement was needed, because all these diverse elements gravitated together in the unity of the story [recit]" (ibid., p. 154). Perhaps the greatest lack in The Historian's Craft, in its published part, is some reflection on the way the question of "historical analysis" (which implies the question of historical causation) is articulated in terms of "historical observation" (which includes the questions about historical facts and events). This is the point of articulation where a reflection on narrative and the connection between event and narrative could have been enlightening.


21. Below. I shall compare Braudel's practice in The Mediterranean... to his theoretical declarations in On History, to which I have limited myself here.


23. The concept of "conjuncture," forged by economists, "expresses the desire to surpass the discontinuity between the various curves established by statisticians to grasp the interdependence of all the variables and factors isolated at a given moment, and to follow—hence predict—their evolution over time" (from the article "Structure/ Conjuncture," in La Nouvelle Histoire, p. 525. emphasis in original).


25. "In the beginning was economics, but at the center of everything was man, man confronted with himself, hence with death, in the succession of generations, whence demography" (Pierre Chaunu, "La Voie demographique et ses depassements," in Histoire quantititive—Histoire seriele. p. 169).

26. P. Goubert's work, Beauvau i et le Beauvaisis du 1600 a 1730 (Paris: SEVPEN. 1960), reprinted under the title Cent Mille Provinciaux au XVII' siecle (Paris: Flam-marion. 1968). In this regard marks the full integration of demographic history and economic history into the framework of the regional monograph. In this sense, it has been perhaps demographic history more than anything else that has allowed the idea of a system of civilization... to be joined to that of a structure, and the deliminating of such a system from the turn of the thirteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, that is, to the end of rural Europe. The outline of this system of civilization only appears if demography does not signify itself to counting people, if it aims at extricating the cultural and nonnatural characteristics that govern the uneasy equilbrium of this system.


28. See below, chapter 6, pp. 208-14.

29. Jacques Le Goff, Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). This work stems from a long time-span history: "the long period of the Middle Ages," "the long period relevant to our history" (p. x). I shall return to some statements by Le Goff concerning the relationships between this "total," "long," "deep" Middle Ages and our present in volume 2 of my study.

30. Refusing to "give himself over to an ethnology that stands outside time" (ibid., p. 246). Le Goff sees diachrony as working according to "abstract systems of transformation very different from the evolutionary schemes used by the historian in attempt-

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ing to apprehend the process of becoming in the concrete societies he studies" (ibid., p. 235). The problem, he says, is to transcend the "false dilemma of structure versus conjuncture, and, even more important, structure versus event" (ibid.).
31. See below, pp. 206-25.
36. Michel Vovelle presents a critical summary of the results and the dead ends of twenty years of long time-span history, starting with Braudel's celebrated article of 1958 ("History and the Social Sciences: the Longue Durée"), in La Nouvelle Histoire, pp. 316-43. Accepting that the death of a certain historicizing history is today an accomplished fact" (p. 318), he asks whether the event struck down by Braudel has really disappeared from the historical field. He doubts that the model of embedded times, practiced by Braudel, can be transposed to other historical regions, especially social history. On the one hand, the heterogeneity of rhythms and correspondences between different time-spans tends to nullify the idea of a total history. On the other hand, the polarization between the quasi-immobility of the great mental structures and the return of the event, brought about by the recent interest in ideas about cut-off points, traumas, breaks, and revolutions, calls into question the very idea of a graduated scale of time-spans. For example, the most recent history seems to be seeking a new dialectic of short spans of time and long ones, a "condorcence of times" (p. 341).
I shall return in chapter 6 to this problem, which perhaps does not have a solution at the level of the historian's profession but rather on the level of a more subtle reflection about historical intentionality. Aside from this reflection, the historians' intellectual honesty undoubtedly lies in rejecting both immobile history and that of the event as an outburst and within this wide interval, giving free reign to the multiplying of historical times, depending on the requirements of the object under consideration and the method chosen. Thus, for example, we can see the same author. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladune, illustrating in turn the short time-span and even the use of a narrative form in his famous Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error (trans. Barbara Bray [New York: G. Braziller, 1978]); the long time-span in The Peasants of Languedoc (trans. John Day [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974]); and the extreme long time-span in Times of Feast, Times of Famine: A History of Climate Since the Year 1000 (trans. Barbara Bray [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971]), and in Part IV of The Territory of the Historian, trans. Ben Reynolds and Sian Reynolds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979): "History without People: The Climate as a New Province of Research," pp. 285-319.
40. "By a general law. we should here understand a statement of universal conditional form which is capable of being confirmed by suitable empirical findings" (ibid, p. 345).
42. Hempel's refusal to give a distinct status to the causal relation is directed against Maurice Mandelbaum. who. in chapters 7 and 8 of his Thke of Historical Knowledge (New York: Liveright, 1938), had attempted to distinguish the "causal explanation" practiced by historians from "causal analysis," identical to explanation by causal laws. See Hempel. p. 347 n.l. I shall return to Mandelbaum's thesis, in its more recent form, in chapter 6.
44. The way had been opened, in fact, by Hempel himself, with his notion of an "explanation sketch." We need to understand this strategy if we are to fully comprehend the breakthrough created by Dray's work, which we shall come to below.
45. Having to take a "weak" model of explanation into account will be a sufficient reason for us not to give in to a directly narrativist thesis and to appeal to a more indirect method of relating explanation to understanding.
46. The adversaries of the covering law model will see in this a sign that explanation in history is grafted to the prior "knowledge" practiced by historians from "causal analysis." identical to explanation by causal laws. See Hempel. p. 347 n.l. 1 shall return in chapter 6 to this problem, which perhaps does not have a solution at the level of the historian's profession but rather on the level of a more subtle reflection about historical intentionality. Aside from this reflection, the historians' intellectual honesty undoubtedly lies in rejecting both immobile history and that of the event as an outburst and within this wide interval, giving free reign to the multiplying of historical times, depending on the requirements of the object under consideration and the method chosen. Thus, for example, we can see the same author. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladune, illustrating in turn the short time-span and even the use of a narrative form in his famous Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error (trans. Barbara Bray [New York: G. Braziller, 1978]); the long time-span in The Peasants of Languedoc (trans. John Day [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974]); and the extreme long time-span in Times of Feast, Times of Famine: A History of Climate Since the Year 1000 (trans. Barbara Bray [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971]), and in Part IV of The Territory of the Historian, trans. Ben Reynolds and Sian Reynolds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979): "History without People: The Climate as a New Province of Research," pp. 285-319.
48. It is remarkable that the question of selectivity should never be related to one specific feature of history, namely, that historians belong to the field of their objects in a different way than physicists belong to the physical world. I shall return to Mandelbaum's thesis, in its more recent form, in chapter 6.
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50. Here again it is remarkable that the question of knowing why there is a question of importance in history is avoided. That the weighing of degrees of importance arises from a logic of relative guarantees is beyond question. On this point Nagel has added to the model in defending it. And a dialectic of explanation and understanding will have to take account of this. But, however indisputable it may be that such weighing concerns history as "inquiry," the question remains "frustrating this inquiry within the total process of- historical understanding.
51. We shall see later what other use may be made of this important concession. Frankel makes several others as well that weaken the model to the point of abandoning it. For example, he concedes to Isaiah Berlin (referring to Berlin's "Historical Inevitability," the Auguste Compte Memorial Lecture, 12 May 1953, in idem, Four Essays on Liberty [London: Oxford University Press, 1969], reprinted in Patrick Gardiner, ed., The Philosophy of History [London: Oxford University Press, 1974]), pp. 161-86), that if history is written in ordinary language, and if the reader does not expect specialized scientific language, it is because the success of an explanation is not measured in terms of a theory but "by the account he gives of
CHAPTER FIVE

2. I shall return to the notion of causal explanation in the next chapter.
3. To be entirely convincing, the argument must be stated as follows. The physical and mechanical laws set in play by the accident, which as such do not involve a temporal order, require reconstituting the accident phase by phase in order to apply the laws seriatim. It is this application ad seriatim that makes knowing the laws a necessary condition of the explanation. If Dray did not give his argument this form, it is because he takes as his model the mechanic who perfectly understands each phase of the accident without himself being a physicist. Does Dray thereby mean to situate the historian's knowledge on the same plane as the mechanic's? If so, we risk falling into a summarily pragmatic conception of explanation in history, substituted for a theoretical one. Dray's work presents numerous traces of such a conception. See ibid., pp. 70-76.
4. "No matter how complicated the expression with which we complete a statement of the form 'E because . . . ', it is a fact of the 'logic' of such 'because' statements that additions to the explanatory clause are never ruled out by our acceptance of the original statement" (ibid., p. 35).
5. This argument, we shall see, can easily be incorporated into the thesis that an event, as what contributes to the progression of a plot, shares with this plot the property of being both singular and typical at the same time.
6. Dray (ibid., p. 2) refers to Karl Popper, *The Open Society, and Its Enemies* 251 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1952.) vol. 2. p. 262. For many authors, asking about causality in history is simply to repeat the discussion about the place of laws in history, given either that we take cause to mean exactly the same thing as does law— when it is better to avoid speaking of a cause since the term is so equivocal—or that we take causes as specific kinds of laws, "causal laws"—then we have just a causal version of the covering law model. Saying X causes Y is equivalent to saying whenever X, Y.
7. Collingwood tried to do this in his *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1948), where he distinguished three senses of the term. According to the first sense, the only one he takes as proper to history, and also as the primitive one, a person makes another person act in a certain way by providing him with a motive for so acting. According to the second sense, the cause of something is "the handle" by means of which we control it. Therefore it is what in our power to produce or prevent. (For example, the cause of malaria is the bite of a mosquito.) He derives this second sense from the first one by broadening the notion of an effect resulting from human actions on the behavior of anyone to anything in general. Collingwood excludes this second sense from history, reserving it for the practical natural sciences and the discovery of causal laws by experimentation. Dray retains something from it, however, in his pragmatic criterion for causal attribution, although he sets it within the framework of a specific activity of judging. The third sense establishes a one-to-one relation, thanks to logical necessity, between two events or states of affairs. It is equivalent to the notion of a sufficient condition.
8. Max Weber and Raymond Aron will help us in the next chapter to push this analysis even further.
10. I am saving this apology for singular causal imputation for my own attempt to articulate historical explanation in terms of our narrative understanding. Particular causal imputation can constitute the intermediary link between levels, to the extent that, for one thing, it is already an explanation and, for another, that it is established upon a narrative base. However as regards this aspect of the problem, there is only one brief allusion in Dray's book: "to give and defend a causal explanation in history is scarcely ever to bring what is explained under a law. and almost always involves a descriptive account, a narrative
of the actual course of events, in order to justify the judgement that the condition indicated was indeed the cause" (ibid., pp. 113-14). Note also the allusion to diagnosis as the medical equivalent of individual causal imputation in history.

11. In this sense, it is an attempt to "make sense," but through arguments independent "of what Collingwood in particular has to say about historical understanding" (ibid., p. 122).

12. "Taken in isolation, it is very seldom beyond all doubt whether a given explanatory statement of the form 'He did x because of y' is to be taken in the rational sense or not. . . . The particular 'because' does not carry its language level on its face; this has to be determined by other means" (ibid., p. 133). The ambiguity of the term "because" increases if we take into account its use in explanations in terms of dispositions, which Gilbert Ryle distinguishes from explanations in terms of empirical laws and which Gardiner takes up again in The Nature of Historical Explanation, pp. 89-90 and 96-97.


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16. He pays particular attention to the threefold criticism directed against this dichotomy that he finds in Dray's Laws and Explanations in History, and in G. E. M. Anscombe. Intention (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1957), Peter Winch, The Idea of A Social Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), and Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964). Also, he shows much interest in the convergence between developments he sees, on the European continent, in the hermeneutical or dialectical-hermeneutical current of philosophy. Given the perspective of these intersecting influences, von Wright expects Wittgenstein's philosophy to have an impact on hermeneutical philosophy equal to the one it has had on analytic philosophy, thereby contributing to the drawing together of these two traditions. He interprets hermeneutics' orientation toward questions of language as one favorable sign. In dissociating "understanding" and "empathy," recent hermeneutical philosophy, that of Gadamer in particular, makes understanding "a semantic rather than a psychological category" (Explanation and Understanding, p. 30).


19. Von Wright includes the concept of event within that of a state of affairs: "an event, one could say, is a pair of successive states" (ibid., p. 12). This definition is justified in his earlier work, Norm and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), chapter 2, section 6.

20. Furthermore, causality, even when divested of any anthropomorphic interpretation, preserves an implicit tie to human action in that we call a cause either what it is sufficient to produce to obtain an effect, or what it is necessary to suppress to make the effect disappear. In this sense, to conceive of a relation between events in terms of causality is to conceive it under the aspect of possible action. Von Wright thereby rejoins Collingwood's description of a cause as a "handle." I have already referred to this problem of non-Humean uses of the idea of a cause in speaking of Dray's work. I shall return to it again in the next chapter with Max Weber, Raymond Aron, and Maurice Mandelbaum.


22. I am leaving aside the long analysis by means of which he undertakes to ameliorate the theory of practical inference stemming from Aristotle and taken up again in the modern period by Anscombe, Taylor, and Malcolm. What von Wright calls the "Logical Connection Argument"—in opposition to the argument Xos a nonlogical. that is, extrinsic, causal connection—was not presented, he says, in a convincing way by his predecessors. He wants to pose the problem instead in terms of verification. The question is a twofold one. How, we will ask, do we assure ourself that an agent has a certain intention? And how do we discover that his behavior is of the kind for which the intention is taken to be the cause? The argument then runs as follows. If it seems as though we cannot answer the first question without answering the second one, then the intention and the action are not logically independent. "In this mutual dependence of the verification of premises and the verification of conclusions in practical syllogisms 253 consists, as I see it, the truth of the Logical Connection Argument" (ibid., p. 116). I shall not pursue further the demonstration of this circular relationship, which is not necessary for my own proposal.

23. I am also ignoring von Wright's discussion of the compatibility between tele-o-logical and causal explanation. I will only speak of it insofar as his argument confirms the irreducibility of the first to the second. The argument essentially consists in saying that the two forms of explanation do not have the same explanandum. It is a question of different phenomena put into different descriptions: bodily movements on the side of causal explanation, intentional behavior on the other side. Not having the same explanandum, the two types of explanation are compatible. What is excluded is the possibility of adopting both explanations at the same time. Thus I cannot at the same time raise my arm and observe, on some screen, the changes taking place in my brain. When I am observing, I let things happen. When I am acting, I make them happen. It is a contradiction in terms therefore to let something happen and at the same time to make the same thing happen on the same occasion. No one, consequently, can observe the causes of the results of his own basic actions, in the sense of the word "result" adopted earlier. Causal and teleological explanation—irreducible to each other, and compatible—fuse in the meaning we attach to an action. "The conceptual basis of action, one could therefore say, is partly our ignorance (unawareness) of the operation of causes and partly our confidence that certain changes will happen only when we happen to be acting" (ibid., p. 130).
In an important note (ibid., pp. 200-201), remaining faithful to Wittgenstein, von Wright resists any linguistic reform that would exclude causal terminology from history, owing to the confusion possible between causal categories too exclusively dependent upon the Hempeian model. It is one thing to ask if causal terminology is appropriate to history, another to ask whether this or that causal category applies in this discipline.

This first type can be schematized as follows (see ibid., p. 137).

\[ \text{historical explanation} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>non-Humean cause *</th>
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<td>non-Humean effect ----</td>
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Humean cause
Humean effect
causal explanation

This second form of explanation can be schematized as follows (see ibid., p. 138).

(see ibid. causal antecedent)

\[ \text{explanans} \]

<table>
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<th><strong>explanans (causal antecedent)</strong></th>
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\[ \text{explanandum (result of action)} \]

causal explanation

The independence of two events is debatable, von Wright notes, if the described event is that the First World War "broke out." Is this not a "colligation." whose complete description includes the incident at Sarajevo? The discussion never ends if we lose sight of the fact that it is always in terms of some description or another that an event is dependent or independent. In this sense, quasi-causal explanation is tributary to a particularly analytic description of events. Mandelbaum would certainly recall here that this atomistic use of causality derives from an overall grasp of an uninterrupted process, affecting continuous entities such as nations. See below, pp. 194-206.

Quasi-causal explanation is thus schematized as follows (see ibid., p. 143).

Practical premises

\[ \text{explanans} \]

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Quasi-causal explanation is thus schematized as follows (see ibid., p. 143).

Practical premises

\[ \text{explanans} \]

37. See above. Part I, chapter 3, on mimesis.

38. The place given to sympathy in what I am calling subjective teleology confirms this diagnosis: What governs our expectation, Gallic says, is not some truth of an inductive kind but our sympathy or antipathy. Once embarked on a good story, "we are pulled along by it and pulled by a far more compelling part of our human make-up than our intellectual presumptions and expectations" (ibid., p. 45). His concern to distinguish his analysis from the logic of the covering law model risks, then, swinging over to the side of a psychology based on our emotional response. Unfortunately this tipping toward psychology facilitated criticism of Gallic's work by Hempel's successors. For my part, I see nothing to condemn in such an interest in the psychological conditions of the reception of a work (whether narrative or not). It has its place for a hermeneutics in which the meaning of work is fulfilled in reading. But, according to the analysis I proposed in Part I of this book, the relationships between mimesis, and mimesis, the rules for acceptability must be constructed at the same time inside and outside the work. Similarly, the notion of interest, which I shall return to in volume 2, cannot be eliminated from a theory of narrative. To accept or receive is to be interested.

39. In his criticism of nominalism, Gallic is not far from the major assumption of the historians of the Annales school: "Historical understanding therefore is not need on individual Kings—or chaps—but on those changes: - ich can be seen to of

40. Gallic likes General de Gaulle's statement in *Le Fil de l'Epee.* "c'est sur les contingencies qu'il. faut construire faction" (ibid., p. 98).


43. This argument fits perfectly with Danto's analysis of "narrative sentences" in terms of" an original theory of descriptions. History, it will be recalled, is one description of human actions (or passions), namely, the description of earlier events in terms of later events unknown to the agents (or recipients) of the first occurrence. According to Mink, there is more to be said concerning historical understanding, not less. There is more to be said inasmuch as the redescription of the past implies recently acquired techniques of knowing (economic, psychoanalytic, etc.) and especially new tools of conceptual analysis (as for example, when we talk about the "Roman proletariat"). Consequently, we need to add to the temporal asymmetry presented by Danto between the earlier event that is described and the later event whose descriptive terms are used for the first description, the conceptual asymmetry between the systems of thought available to the original agents and those introduced by later historians. This type of redescription, like Danto's, is a description post eventum. However, it stresses the process of reconstruction at work here rather than the duality of events implied by narrative sentences. In this way, "historical judgment" says more than does "narrative sentence."

44. In another article, Louis O. Mink, "History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension," *New Literary History* (1970): 541 - 58. we read: "the difference between following a story and having followed a story is more than an incidental difference between present experience and past experience" (p. 546, his emphasis). What the logic of narration neglects is "not what the structure of generic features of narratives is but what it means to - follow. but what it means to have followed a story" (ibid his emphasis).

45. "Philosophical Analysis and Historical Understanding," p 686 46. Histoy and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension "true that Mink does nuance in two ways his thesis that it is as a function of descriSon/*h j ni* comprehension can be judged. First, there are different captions ot this ideal goal of comprehension. Laplace's model of a world predict-aoie in its smallest detail does not coincide with Plato's synopsis in Book VI of The Second, these descriptions are extrapolations of the three different and mu- i e galvanic modes of comprehension. However, these two corrections do notlie principal argument, namely, that the goal of comprehension is to abo-ann character of experience in the totum simul of comprehension. Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century" rape* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973) The Introduction (pp. 1-42) is entitled "The Poetics of History."


47. In an article entitled "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact." *Clio* 3 (1974V eprinted ,n idem, *The Tropics of Discourse* (Baltimore and London: The ohns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 81-100 (I shall cite this version. White ral artifact as "a model of structures and processes that are long past and cannot therefore be subjected to either experimental or objectal controls "(ibid p is sense, historical narratives are "verbal ficton the contents of which are as ach invented as found and the forms of which have more m common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences" (ibid., his emphasis) 51. See Northrop Frye, "New Directions from Old," in his *Fables of identity: Stud.-sin Poetic Mythology* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World 1963) p 55 "My method, in short, is formalist" (Metahistory, p. 3). We shall see in what his theory of emplotment distinguishes this formalism from French
structuralism and puts it closer to that of Northrop Frye.

The organization, then, is an aspect of story elaboration; it provides a kind explanation, the kind which Mink may have in mind when he speaks of historians !'comprehension of events in their stories by 'configuring' them" ("The
structure of Historical Narrative," p. 15). Metahistory confirms this when it speaks of narration of chronicle into story as effected "by the characterization of some the chronicle in terms of inaugural motifs, of others in terms of terminating its, and of yet others in terms of transitional motifs" (ibid., p. 5). A story, in open
> to a chronicle, is "mouifically encoded" (ibid., p. 6). I am not in agreement
n H

of the field of What Mink calls the configurational act to just

however. White believes there is a confirmation of his correlation between
lonIOM act and explanation by story in the distribution Mink makes between
imaginational, categorial, and theoretical comprehension. White thinks we can as-
> categorial mode to explanation by emplotment and the theoretical mode to
expansalK

argument. Aside from the fact, that neither of these two divisions
 Mime s
 White's "can be superimposed on the other, one hardly does justice to
alization of the configuration" act by reducing its field of applicability to the
ization of a story, to the exclusion of both emplotment and argument. Like my concept
lot, Mink's configuration" act seems to me to cover all three fields that distinguishes from one another. The key to this divergence between us lies in
an, in the opposite reduction White imposes on explanation by emplotment,
lamely, identifying plot with a type, that is, the category of plot which a story belongs
to. This reduction seems arbitrary to me.
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55. This regression from story to chronicle, then from chronicle to the historical field, in Metahistory, resembles the regression undertaken by Husserl in his genetic phenomenology from active syntheses to-always prior passive syntheses. In both cases, the question arises about what precedes every active or passive synthesis. This heady question led Husserl to the problematic of the Lebenswelt. It leads White to a wholly different one, which we shall encounter again in volume 2, namely, the tro-pological articulation that "prefigures" (ibid., p. 5) the historical field and opens it to narrative structures. The concept of the historical field does not, therefore, serve just as a limit underlying the classifying of the narrative structures, it more fundamentally marks the transition from studying "explanatory effects" of narrative to its "representative" function.

56. See White, "The Structure of Historical Narrative," p. 17.

57. For the details of this construction and its illustration through the great historians of the nineteenth century, see
Metahistory, pp. 13-21, and passim.

58. "By the term 'ideology' I mean a set of prescriptions for taking a position in the present world of social praxis and acting upon it...such prescriptions are attended by arguments that claim the authority of 'science' or 'realism'" (ibid., p. 22). Here White links up with the attempts of the Frankfurt School philosophers, followed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, as well as by some anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz—and even some Marxists such as Gramsci and Althusser—to free the concept of ideology from the purely pejorative connotations which Marx saddled it with in The German Ideology.

59. We might ask what accounts for the unity of a narrative, its domain being apparently so dismembered. As usual, recourse to etymology (see White's "The Structure of Historical Narrative," pp. 12-13) is not very illuminating. The Roman mirratio is too polysemic and too dependent upon its own contexts, and the root gna—said to be common to every mode of knowing and knowability—does not provide any further determining criteria. The following suggestion is more interesting. Behind every narration is a narrator. Is it not then on the side of the narrative voice that we should seek the unity and diversity of its explanatory effects? "We might say then that a narrative is any literary form in which the voice of the narrator rises against a background of ignorance, incomprehension, or forgetfulness to direct our attention, purposefully, to a segment of experience organized in a particular way" (ibid., p. 13). But then the unity of the narrative genre is not to be sought on the side of the narrative structures, or their utterance, but on the side of narration as utterance.

60. Metahistory, p. 29. On the same page White presents a table of the affinities that govern his reading of the four major historians and four philosophers of whom his work is principally devoted.

61. Slipping from one configuration to another is always possible. The same set of events may lead to a tragic or a comic history, according to the choice of plot structure made by the historian, just as for one class, as Marx said, the eighteenth Brumaire of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte could be a tragedy, while for another class it was a farce. See White, "The Historical Text a Literary Artifact," p. 84.

62. White, too, acknowledges his debt in this regard to Kermode's The Sense of an Ending (see his "The Structure of Historical Narrative," p. 20).

63. White's theory of tropes, which I shall not discuss here, adds a supplementary dimension to historical style. But it does not add anything to explanation properly speaking. See Metahistory, pp. 31-52, and "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," pp. 88—100, on the mimetic aspect of narrative. I shall return to it in volume 2, in terms of my discussion of the relationships between the imaginary and the real in the notion of the past.

64. This rule of tradition in narrative'encoding provides a response to the objection
that the three typologies used by this theory of historiographical style are borrowed. We must say of the inherent forms of encoding what we have said about laws: historians do not establish them, they employ them. This is why recognition of a traditional form can take on in history the value of an explanation. In this regard, White compares the process of becoming familiar again with elements with which the subject has become unfamiliar with what happens in psychotherapy. ("The Historical Text as a Literary Artifact," pp. 86-87.) The comparison works in both directions, as much as the events that the historian seeks to make us familiar with have often been forgotten due to their traumatic character.


66. Neither Aron, nor above all Marrou, would have so cleanly cut the vital thread that still ties history to the understanding of others, hence to a certain aspect of lived experience.

67. See the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX


4. I am keeping the other side of the paradox for volume 2: the return from poetic composition to the order of action, which contains the seed of the classical problem of the relation between history, the science of the past, and present action (principally political action) which is open to the future.


6. The place Aron ascribes to historical causality is important. Gaston Fessard, in La Philosophie historique de Raymond Aron (Paris: Julliard, 1980), makes us aware of the rational order of Aron's book by means of a daring comparison with Ignatius Loyola's Spiritual Exercises (especially pp. 55-86, dealing with the reconstruction of the stages and the order of development of Aron's work). Aron's analysis of historical causality comes directly after the theory of understanding presented in section 2, in the conclusion of this section dealing with "The Limits of Understanding" (see Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, pp. 151-55). Placed at the start of section 3, entitled "Historical Determinism and Causal Thought," this analysis begins a three-stage inquiry, placed in succession under the auspices of the judge, the scientist, and the philosopher. The first is devoted to "the causes of a single fact," the second to "relations comparable to those of the physical sciences," and the third to "the nature of historical determinism" (ibid., p. 158). This final stage leads in turn to part 4, which is the philosophical section properly speaking: "History and Truth." The inquiry of causality is thus delineated in two ways: first by the place occupied by the third section, within the framework of the book as a whole, and, the n by the place within the third section, occupied by historical causality in relation to sociological causality and to the alleged laws of history. There is no better way of emphasizing the transitional role ascribed to historical causality, set in this way between understanding, which possesses all the features of narrative understanding, and sociological causality, which has all the features of nomological explanation.

7. This is found in the second part of his essay, under the heading "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation" (pp. 164-88). I shall return below to Part I of the essay. Raymond Aron begins his own study with a presentation of the "logical schema" of the argument he calls "retrospective probability" (pp. 158-66). We shall see what Aron adds to the strictly logical analysis.

8. See the lengthy notes on pp. 167-68 concerning the use von Kries makes of the probabilist argument and its transposition into the sphere of criminology and jurisprudence.

9. See above, p. 163.


11. Aron distinguishes in the same way between moral responsibility, legal responsibility, and historical responsibility: "The moralist views the intentions, the historian the acts, the jurist compares intentions and acts and measures them with Judicial concepts." (Introduction to the Philosophy of History, p. 166, his emphasis). "Historically responsible is the man who by his acts sets in motion the event the origins of which are being sought" (ibid., his emphasis). In so doing the historian contributes, I would say, to dissociating the notion of imputation from that of incrimination: "War ... as seen by the historian, is not a crime" (ibid., p. 173). If we add that causal imputation must also be distinguished from the psychological interpretation of intentions, then it must be admitted that these distinctions are subtle and even fragile. This explains Aron's tone, which is quite different from Weber's. The latter conducts his analysis with a great deal of self-assurance. Aron is more sensitive to all that complicates and, up to a certain point, blurs "the logical schema." We have already observed this in connection with his analysis of chance.

12. Weber is alluding here to the distinction made by Windelband in his Strasbourg lecture, which I referred to earlier, between the nomothetic procedure (peculiar to the sciences of nature) and idiographic procedure (peculiar to the sciences of culture).

13. Weber makes this distinction by opposing Real-Grund. ontological ground, and Erkenntnis-Grund. epistemological ground. "For the meaning of history as a science of reality can only be that it treats particular elements of reality not merely as heuristic instruments but as the objects of knowledge, and particular causal connections not as premises of knowledge but
as real causal factors" (ibid., p. 135, his emphasis).


15. There is no doubt that Maurice Mandelbaum introduced this distinction in order to minimize his concessions in the debate on objectivity in history that he himself provoked with his 1938 work *The Problem of Historical Knowledge*. Greater objectivity can, in fact, be attained in "general" history than in "special" history because the continuous existence of its object is given prior to historians' efforts to delimit their subject and to make correlations. An "interlocking" is therefore possible here, in principle, between different viewpoints on the same events, or between various facets (political, economic, social, and cultural) of the same events. Specialized histories are much more clearly relative to the controversial conceptions of historians, so widely do their criteria for classification vary. This is why it is much more difficult to apply to them the procedures for corroboration, rectification, and refutation which the objectivity of general history is based upon. For my part, it is not the debate on objectivity

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that interests me here, but rather the resources offered by the distinction between the singular character of societies and the general nature of the phenomenon of culture for a genetic phenomenology applied to the entities of historical discourse.

16. I shall return in volume 2 to this threefold temporal structure of the we-relation, as it is so masterfully analyzed by Alfred Schutz. In Mandelbaum, too, there is an argument in favor of this oblique reference. He grants that explanation, with its analytical and discontinuous style, could not propose to reconstruct the totalizing and continuous process of a-particular society, if historians were not already familiar with global changes as these in their own experience of life in society: "the original basis for our understanding of societal structures is, then, the experience of an individual in growing up in his society, and the enlargement of horizons that comes through a knowledge of other societies" (ibid., p. 116). History, he recalls, is not born out of nothing. It does not start from a dust cloud of facts that await history's work of synthesis in order to receive a structure. History is always born out of an earlier history that it comes to correct. And behind this primordial history lies social practice, with its internal contradictions and its external challenges.

17. I shall return in volume 2 to the ontology of the we-relation that is presupposed in the present argument, I shall ask whether Husserl, at the end of the Fifth Meditation, was successful in his attempt at deriving higher-order communities from inter-subjectivity. I shall also ask if Max Weber's definition of "social action," at the beginning of *Economics and Society*, enables him to avoid the difficulties of methodological individualism. I wish to express here my debt to the thought and work of Alfred Schutz in his *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnhart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1967). Schutz did not, in fact, limit himself to reconciling Husserl and Weber. He integrated their concepts of inter-subjectivity and social action with a concept of the we-relation borrowed from Heidegger, without losing the force of the first two thinkers' analyses, and without limiting himself to a convenient eclecticism combining all these masters. Schutz's phenomenology of social existence receives, in addition, a decisive assist from the anthropology of a George Herbert Mead, a Victor Turner, and a Clifford Geertz. My debt to them is no less than what I owe to Schutz.

18. His thesis owes a great deal to the work by H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore, *Causation in the Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959). "It is no exaggeration to say that since its appearance in 1959 the whole tenor of discussions of causation in Anglo-American philosophy has changed" (Mandelbaum, p. 50). He does not, however, follow these authors in their claim that causal explanation and the formulation of general laws apply to two separate domains of knowledge—history and law, on the one hand, and the sciences, on the other. Adhering instead to J. L. Mackie's analyses in *The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), Mandelbaum perceives, rather than a dichotomy between two vast areas of explanation, a series of explanatory levels indifferent to their areas of application, starting with the perception of causality, moving through causal attribution at the level of judgment, and reaching the establishment of laws, as the "cement" of the causal connection. This thesis moves away from that of W. Dray, having first moved toward it. With Dray and against the proponents of the covering law model, Mandelbaum affirms the primacy and the irreducibility of singular causal attribution; against pray, toe refuses to oppose once and for all singular causality and regularity, and admits that explanation in terms of laws does "cement" causal attribution.

19. In this regard, we can note that the occurrence "not being different" authorizes a comparison between this analysis and the constitution of unreal series in the reasoning of retrospective probability, as this is understood by Weber and Aron.

20. This argument holds for Hempel's example of the explosion of a radiator filled

with cold water. The physical laws set into play do not apply all at once to the initial conditions. They apply to a series of occurrences. They are instruments for the causal explanation, not substitutes for that explanation (Mandelbaum, p. 104).

21. This argument recalls that of von Wright concerning the explanation of closed systems. See above, p. 136.

22. This concept of unlimited variable density will enable us in the following section to reconsider in a new light the
question of nonevent history [histoire non-even-mentielle]. It already allows us to assert that the short term and the long term are always permutable in history. In this respect, Braudel's *The Mediterranean and Le Roy Ladurie's *Carnival in Romans* (trans. Mary Feeney [New York: George Braziller. 1979]) provide a marvelous illustration of this permutation allowed by the degrees of density of the temporal fabric of history.


24. "In accordance with its formulation, historical knowledge reveals its radical nominalism, much more radical than Max Weber ever imagined it, in spite of his profession of faith" (ibid., p. 173). Speaking more specifically of the singular terms that occupy his fifth class of concepts. Marrou goes on to say, "The use of such ideas is perfectly legitimate if we are always careful to retain their strictly nominal character" (ibid., p. 174).

25. The reader may find it unfortunate that this causal analysis in history has been discussed in three different contexts: first with William Dray, within the framework of the discussion of the covering law model: a second time with Max Weber and Raymond Aron, under the heading of the transitional procedures between narrative and explanation; and a third time with Maurice Mandelbaum, in connection with the status of the first-order entities. It did not seem to me that I could avoid this triple approach. For these are indeed three different problematics: the first is determined by the appearance in analytic philosophy of a subsumption model, with which neither Max Weber nor Raymond Aron had to come to terms; the second is determined by the question posed within the German tradition of *Verstehen* of the exact scientific status that can be claimed by the idiographic sciences, whose autonomy is in no way contested; the third is related to the new series of questions posed by the correspondence between the continuity of the final entities posited by history on the plane of existence and that of the causal process on the epistemological level.

26. In order to link up with the problems discussed in the two preceding sections. I will simply recall the close kinship between this major presupposition and the other innovations claimed by the Annales school: the documentary revolution, the extending of the questionnaire, the primacy of the problematic over the given historical "fact," the deliberately conceptualizing cast of the investigation. In this sense the long time-span is only one component of the overall shift in direction in the field of historical research. Still it has its own peculiar criteria which do call for discussion.


28. Placed under the heading of a certain type of geography that is especially attentive to human destinies, the first-level inquiry is "the attempt to convey a particular kind of history" (The *Mediterranean*, p. 23). A "history in slow motion from which permanent values can be detected" (ibid.), which therefore makes use of geography as one of its media. In this respect it is striking that the author waits until past page 262.

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:00 before making any reflections on the "physical unity" of the Mediterranean. W

-ay readily admit that the "Mediterranean 1811 is not responsible forThe st"to
down on in (ibid _ . 222), but the physical unity that in question "nthat
the permanence of certain constraints—the hostile sea. the harsh winters the
—and all that contributes to the identity of the Mediterranean people as
lake up for all that is lacking, and adjust their wars, their treaties, and their con-
ie rhythm of the seasons, under the sign of the eternal trinity: wheat olive
-"in other words an identical agrarian civilization, identical waves of


dominating the environment" (ibid., p. 236).

"Man has been the laborer of this long history" (ibid., p. 64) "Spam sent all
down to this southern region opening to the sea" (ibid., p. 84) "All of these
movements require hundreds of years to complete" (ibid., p. 101). In short, "geo-
rapical observation of long term movements guides us towards history's slowest pro-
cesses (ibid., p. 102).

le new element was the massive invasion by Northern Nordic ships, after the i s . • p

99. Not is ^ possible not to mention the war of Grenada.

These two different Mediterraneans were vehicles, one might almost say they were responsible for the twin empires" (ibid., p. 136).

Politics merely followed the outline of an underlying reality These two Medi-creteans, commanded by warring rulers, were physically, economically, and cultur-

- am each other. Each was a separate historical zone" (ibid., p. 137). These liaisons and partnerships, successively created and destroyed summarize the history of the sea" (ibid., pp. 165-66).

The Mediterranean (and the accompanying Greater Mediterranean) is as man made it. The wheel of human fortune has
determined the destiny of the sea expanding or contracting its area" (ibid., pp. 169-70).

5 The city brings about, in the geographer-historian's discourse, a flood of dates >r example, ibid., pp. 332-34), so pregnant is the history of cities, as they : designs of territorial states, expanding or dying out in the wake of eco-nitions. Yes, cities speak "of evolution and changing conditions" (ibid., p.) against the backdrop of constancies, permanence, and repetitions that are established on the first level of analysis.

36. In the chapter on precious metals, money, and prices (ibid., pp. 462-542) the i commercial practices, the influx and outflow of metals cannot help but be The advance of the Portuguese along the Atlantic coast of Africa was an event Qt major importance" (ibid., p. 469). And further on: "During the difficult war years, 133 is, the arrival of the ships carrying bullion were the great events of the port of erw" (ibid., p. 480). A profusion of dates accompanies the cycle of metals on the routes. Royal bankruptcies are dated (1596, 1607). It is a question, of course, rasping the stable factors in order to verify the
the modesty not to hide the fact that this world time does not cover the totality of human history. "This exceptional time
his ambition to grasp the history of the world "in its chronological developments and its diverse temporalities" (ibid.), he has
48. The title itself,
that, precisely, which the notion of crisis introduces—betwe en two intercycles.
47.  In Braudel's article "History and the Social Sciences," we read: "A new kind of historical narrative has appeared, that of
considering his decisions. In this way, level three casts a shadow on level two, due to the interferences between politics and
war, on the one hand and different economies, on the other.
37. "All these explanations which are in fact so many events in the pepper and spice world, tend to obscure the problem in its
entirety, a problem that is best appreciated when viewed in a world context—from the American silver mines to the Moluccas
or the Western tip of Sumatra" (ibid., pp. 568-69, his emphasis).
The life-span of empires cannot be plotted by events, only by careful diagnosis
and auscultation—and as in medicine there is always room for error" (ibid., p. 661).
The state, "quite as much as capitalism, was the product of a complex evolu-
nonary process. The historical conjuncture, in the very widest sense of the term, carries within it the foundations of all
political power: it breathes life or death into them" (ibid., p. 681).
40. "Of all the possible solutions, Spain chose the most radical: deportation, the uprooting of a civilization from its native
soil" (ibid., p. 796).
41. "Has there been any civilization at any time in the past which has sacrificed its own existence to that of another? ... the
economic situation . . . must take its share of the blame" (ibid., p. 823).
42. It is in this way that Lepanto, which Voltaire ridiculed as being so unimportant, was, indeed, "the most spectacular
military event in the Mediterranean during the sixteenth century. Daring triumph of courage and naval technique though it was, it is hard to place convincingly in a conventional historical perspective" (ibid., p. 1088). Lepanto would probably have had important consequences if Spain had been determined to pursue them. But on the whole. "Lepanto had not accomplished anything." In this regard, we may note the fine pages devoted to Don John's calculations, that "instrument of destiny" (ibid., p. 1101)—the explanatory reflection corresponds exactly to William Dray's model of rational explanation, as well as to the
Weberian model of explanation by means of contrary assumptions.
43. From time to time we see Braudel waging war against the history of events and allowing himself to be tempted by the
history of conjunctures, not only with regard to Lepanto, as has been stated, but also when he is confronted with the sheer
phenomenon of renunciation observed in the two political leviathans in conflict, and by the general decline of warfare. Did
Spain, then, miss its geographical mission by deciding not to go into Africa? "But for what they are worth, these questions
have yet to receive a proper hearing. Tomorrow's historians of political change will have to reconsider them and perhaps
make some sense of them" (ibid., p. 1142).
44. Here is Braudel speaking of the chance missed in 1601: "In its own way, the degeneration of official war was a warning
sign of the general decline of the Mediterranean, which, there can be no doubt, was becoming clearer and more apparent with
the last years of the sixteenth century" (ibid., p. 1234).
45. "I do not believe that the word Mediterranean itself ever floated in his consciousness with the meaning we now give it. or
that it conjured up for him the images of light and blue water it has for us: or even that it signified a precise area of major
problems or the setting for a clearly conceived policy. Geography in the true sense of the word was not a part of a prince's
education. These are all sufficient reasons why the long agony which ended in September 1598 was not a great event in
Mediterranean history; good reasons for us to reflect once more on the distance separating biographical history from the
history of structures, and even more so from the history of geographical areas" (ibid., pp. 1236-37).
46. This man "can only be understood in relation to a life of the purest religion, perhaps only in the atmosphere of the
Carmelite revolution" (ibid. 1236).
47. In Braudel's article "History and the Social Sciences," we read: "A new kind of historical narrative has appeared, that of
the conjuncture [le recitatif de la conjuncture], of the cycle, and even of the 'intercycle,' covering a decade, a quarter of a
century, and, at the outside, the half-century of Kondratiev's classic cycle" (On History, p. 29). In the Cambridge Economic
History of Europe, vol. 4, Braudel defines the cycle in the following way: "Because the word cycle might be applied to a sea-
sonal movement we should not be misled. The term designates a double movement, a rise and fall with a peak in between
which, in the strictest sense of the term, is called a crisis" (ibid., p. 430). I am indebted to M. Reep, in an unpublished essay,
for the reference to this text, as well as for the suggestion that the notion of cycle shares with the Aristotelian muthos the
twofold feature of constituting a mimesis of economic life

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(in the sense of mimesis, of course) and of presenting a median structure, a reversal__
that, precisely, which the notion of crisis introduces—between two intercycles.
48. The title itself, Le Temps du Monde, promises more than it can deliver, as the author admits (Avant-Propos, p. 8). If it is
his ambition to grasp the history of the world "in its chronological developments and its diverse temporalities" (ibid.), he has
the modesty not to hide the fact that this world time does not cover the totality of human history. "This exceptional time
governs, depending on the place and the age, certain spaces and certain realities. But other realities, other spaces escape it and remain foreign to it... even in advanced countries, economically and socially speaking, world time does not include everything" (ibid). The reason is that the book follows a particular line that privileges a certain sector of material and economic history. Within these avowed limits, the historian strives "to study by means of comparisons on a world-wide scale, the sole variable" (ibid., p. 9). From such a height, the historian can attempt "to dominate time, henceforth our principal, or even our only, adversary" (ibid., p. 10). It is again the long time-span that permits us to link together the successive experiences in Europe which deserve to be considered as world-economies (1) in a space that varies only slowly, (2) around a few dominant capital cities (Venice, Amsterdam, etc.) which one after the other come to predominate, and (3) finally according to a principle of hierarchization concerning the zones of contact. The subject matter is therefore the division of time (and space) as a function of conjunctural rhythms, among which the secular trend—"the most neglected of all the cycles" (ibid., p. 61)—proves to be the most fruitful. For my own reflection on time. I take note that "the trend is a cumulative process. It adds on to itself: everything happens as if it raised the mass of prices and economic activities little by little until the moment when, in the opposite direction, with the same stubbornness, it began to work to lower them through a general, imperceptible, slow, and prolonged reduction. Year by year, it is barely noticeable; century by century, it proves to be an important actor" (ibid.). The image of a tide, with wave upon wave, intrigues us more than it explains anything to us: "the final word escapes us and, along with it, the exact meaning of these long cycles that seem to obey certain laws or rules governing tendencies unknown to us" (ibid., p. 65). Must we then say that what seems to explain the most is at the same time what helps us understand the least? In volume 2.1 shall take up the problem of giving a real meaning to what is here no more than an admission, even a truism, that "short time and long time exist together and are inseparable... for we live all at once in short time and in long time" (ibid., p. 68).

49. "For it was the interaction of such pressing need, such disturbances and restorations of economic balance, such necessary exchanges, which guided and indirectly determined the course of Mediterranean History" (ibid., p. 138). Further on. Braudel speaks of the "general outline" (ibid., p. 230), the retreat of the Mediterranean from general history, a retreat delayed until the middle of the seventeenth century. Referring once'more' to the gradual replacement of city-states by capital cities, he writes: "Their message is one of evolution and changing conditions [conjuncture] which hints at their approaching destiny: that decline proclaimed by so many signs at the end of the sixteenth century and accentuated in the seventeenth century" (ibid., p. 352).

50. Discussing forms of war, especially of foreign wars (the Crusades, jihads), Braudel mentions once again the role of civilizations, those "major participants ~(personnages)~" (ibid., p. 842). These "characters," like the events in question, are defined in classical terms by their contribution to the main plot.

51. I wonder if Braudel did not think he had avoided the problem of the overall unity of his work by letting the problem of reuniting the pieces of fragmented duration be taken care of by physical time. In On History we read: "These fragments are reunited at the end of all our labors. The longue duree, the conjuncture, the event all fit into 265

each neatly and without difficulty, for they are ail measured on the same scale" (On History, p. 77). What scale, if not that of physical time? "For the historian everything begins and ends with time, a mathematical, godlike time, a notion easily mocked, time external to men. 'exogenous.' as economists would say. pushing men, forcing them, and painting their own individual times the same color: it is. indeed, the imperious time of the world" (ibid., p. 78). But then the long time-span becomes one of the paths by which historical time is led back to cosmic time, rather than one way of increasing the number of time spans and speeds. Of course, historical time builds its constructions against the backdrop of cosmic time. But it is within physical time that the unifying principle of "the diverse colors of individual times" is to be sought.

52. The polyphony comes from dozens of measures of time, each of them attached to a particular history. "Only the sum of these measures, brought together by the human sciences (turned retrospectively to account on the historian's behalf) can give us that total history whose image is so difficult to reconstitute in its rich entirety" (The Mediterranean, p. 1238). This total image would require the historian to have at once the geographer's, the traveler's, and the novelist's eye. The following are mentioned at this point by Braudel: Gabriel Audisio. Jean Giono. Carlo Levi, Lawrence Durrell. and Andre Chamson (ibid., p. 1234).

53. His frank statement on structure and structuralism should be taken into consideration: "I am by temperament a 'structuralist.' Little tempted by the event, or even by the short-term conjuncture which is after all merely a grouping of events in the same area. But the historian's 'structuralism' has nothing to do with the approach which under the same name is at present causing some confusion in the other human sciences. It does not tend towards the mathematical abstraction of relations expressed as functions, but instead towards the very sources of life in its most concrete, everyday, indestructible and anonymously human expression" ("ibid. p. 1244).

54. One last time, in the conclusion to his great work, the historian reasserts his suspicion concerning those "essentially ephemeral yet moving occurrences, the 'headlines' of the past" (ibid., p. 1243. his emphasis).

55. "A specialist in change (by saying transformation, the historian places himself sooner or later on potentially common ground with the ethnologist, providing he does not revert to the notion of the daughronic), the historian should be aware of becoming insensitive to change" (ibid., p. 236. his emphasis).

56. Georges Duby, "Histoire sociale et ideologies des societes." in Faire de l'histoire, vol. 1, p. 157. As early as my first chapter I stated how this attention to the temporal models of change leads to a conceptual reconstruction of a chain
of events such as the Crusades.
59. "The principle or necessary inequality accounts for the addition of a third function. This explains why the trifunctional schema came either before or after a treatise on submission and on the structure of a society in which the high reigned in perfection and the low grovelled in sin. Triplicity arose out of the conjunction of two kinds of dissimilarity, that instituted by the ordo—there were the priests and the others—conjoined with that instituted by nature—there were nobles and serfs" (Duby, p. 59).
60. "Establishing the system's genealogy will aid in understanding its structure, and the place within it assigned to the trifunctional figure" (ibid., p. 65).
61. "A crisis. Ideological formations reveal themselves to the historian in periods of tumultuous situation. In such grave times, the custodians of the word speak incessantly. The time has now come for us to step outside the cathedral workshop. Then 266

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the use we have seen of memory and the hazards of

Conclusions

In this regard, I would like to recall the terminological convention I am trying to respect. I do not take the term "fiction" as a general synonym for "imaginary configuration." The latter is an operation common to history and to the fictional narrative, and as such it falls within the sphere of mimesis. On the other hand, in my vocabulary the term "fiction" is reserved for the reference of narrative, which will be dealt with explicitly only in the narrative. Can legitimately take every narrative to be a fiction, insofar as they do

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for history's sake to constitute a true narrative, they do not need a 0 referential modalities into which
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Preface
Volume 2 of Time and Narrative requires no special introduction. This volume contains Part III of the single work sketched out in the opening pages of volume I. Furthermore, the theme of Part II, the configuration of time by fictional narrative, corresponds strictly to the theme of Part III, the configuration of time by historical narrative. Part IV, which will make up my third and final volume, will bring together under the title Narrated Time the threefold testimony that is provided by phenomenology, history, and fiction concerning the power of narrative, taken in its indivisible wholeness, to refigure time.

This brief preface allows me the opportunity to add to the acknowledgments made at the beginning of Volume I of Time and Narrative an expression of my gratitude to the directors of the National Humanities Center in North Carolina. The exceptional conditions offered to the Fellows there, allowed me, in large part, to carry out the research that led to this volume.

In this third part of Time and Narrative the narrative model I am considering under the title mimesis is applied to a new region of the narrative field which, to distinguish it from the region of historical narrative, I am designating as fictional narrative. This large subset of the held of narrative includes everything the theory of literary genres puts under the rubrics of folktale, epic, tragedy, comedy, and the novel. This list is only meant to be indicative of the kind of text whose temporal structure will be considered. Not only is this list of genres not a closed one, their provisional titles do not bind me in advance to any required classification of literary genres. This is important because my specific concerns do not require me to take a stand concerning the problems relative to the classification and the history of such genres. So I shall adopt the most commonly accepted nomenclature as often as the status of my problem allows. In return, I am obligated from this point on to account for the characterization of this narrative subset as "fictional narrative." This equating of narrative configuration and fiction, of course, has some justification inasmuch as the configuring act is, as I myself have maintained, an operation of the productive imagination, in the Kantian sense of this term. Nevertheless I am reserving the term "fiction" for those literary creations that do not have historical narrative's ambition to constitute a true narrative. If we take "configuration" and "fiction" as synonyms we no longer have a term available to account for the different relation of each of these two narrative modes to the question of truth. What historical narrative and fictional narrative do have in common is that they both stem from the same configuring operations I put under the title mimesis., On the the hand, what opposes them to each other does not have to do with the structuring activity invested in their narrative structures as such, rather it has to do with the "truth-claim" that defines the third mimetic relation.
Time in Fictional Narrative

In Fictional Narrative

It will be useful to linger awhile on the level of this second mimetic relation between action and narrative. Unexpected convergences and divergences will then have an opportunity to take shape concerning the fate of narrative configuration in the areas of historical narrative and fictional narrative.

The four chapters of which Part III is composed themselves constitute stages along a single itinerary: by broadening, radicalizing, enriching, and opening up to the outside the notion of emplotment. handed down by the Aristotelian tradition, I shall attempt correctly to deepen the notion of temporality handed down by the Augustinian tradition, without at the same time moving outside the framework provided by the notion of narrative configuration, hence without crossing over the boundaries of mimesis. Thus.

1. To broaden the notion of emplotment is first of all to attest to the fact that the Aristotelian *muthos* has the capacity to he transformed without thereby losing its identity. The breadth of narrative understanding is measured by this mutability of emplotment. Several questions are implied by this: (a) Does a narrative genre as new as the modern novel, for example, maintain a tie with the tragic *muthos*, synonymous with emplotment for the Greeks, so that it can still be placed under the formal principle of concordant discordance by which I defined narrative configuration? (b) Does emplotment, through all these mutations, offer a stability that would allow it to be situated in terms of the paradigms that preserve the style of traditionally characteristic of the narrative \* function, at least in the cultural sphere of the Western world? (c) What is the critical threshold beyond which the most extreme deviations from this style of traditionally force upon us the hypothesis not only of a schism in relation to the narrative tradition but the death of the narrative function itself?

In this initial inquiry the question of time is dealt with only marginally, through the intervention of concepts such as "novelty," "stability," and "decline," by which I shall attempt to characterize the identity of the narrative function without giving in to any sort of essentialism.

2. To deepen the notion of emplotment I shall confront narrative understanding, forged by our familiarity with the narratives transmitted by our culture, with the rationality employed nowadays by narratology, and in particular by the narrative semiology characteristic of the structural approach. The quarrel over priority that divides narrative understanding and semiotic rationality—a dispute we shall have to arbitrate—offers an obvious parallel with the discussion that arose in Part II concerning the epistemology of contemporary historiography and philosophy of history. We may, in fact, place on the same level of rationality both nomological explanation, which some theorists of history have claimed to substitute for the naive art of narrating, and the apprehension of the deep structures of a narrative in narrative semiotics, with respect to which the rules of emplotment are considered mere surface structures. The question arises whether we can provide the same response to this conflict over priority that we gave in the similar debate concerning history, namely, that to explain more is to understand better.

The question of time thus comes up again, but in a less peripheral manner than above. To the extent that narrative semiotics does succeed in conferring an achronic status on the deep structures of a narrative, the question arises whether its change of strategic level allows i. to do justice to the most original features of narrative temporality, those I characterized in Part I as discordant concordance, by combining Augustine's analyses of time with Aristotle's analysis of *muthos*. The fate of diachrony in narratology will help us to uncover the difficulties resulting from this second cycle of questions.

3. To enrich the notion of emplotment, along with the notion of time that is related to it, is still to explore the resources of narrative configuration that seem peculiar to fictional narrative. The reasons for according this privilege to fictional narrative will appear only later, when we shall be in a position to carry through the test between the time of history and the time of fiction on the basis of a phenomenology of time-consciousness broader than that of Augustine. Anticipating this great three-way debate between lived experience, historical time, and fictional time, I shall base my remarks on a noteworthy property of narrative "utterance": its ability to present, within discourse itself, specific marks that distinguish it from the "statement" of the things narrated. The result of this, for time, is a parallel capacity of being divided into the time of the act of narrating and the time of the things narrated. The contradictions between these two temporal modalities do not stem from the alternative of either anachronic logic or chronological development, the two branches to which our earlier discussion was in danger of limiting itself. These contradictions in fact present nonchronometric aspects which invite us to decipher in them an original—even a reflective—dimension of the distension of Augustinian time, one the division into utterance and statement is best suited to throw into relief in fictional narrative.

4. To open up the notion of emplotment—and the notion of time that corresponds to it—to the outside is to follow the movement of transcendence by which every work of fiction, whether verbal or plastic, narrative or lyric, projects a world outside of itself, one that can be called the "world of the work." In this way, epics, dramas, and novels project, in the mode of fiction, ways of inhabiting the world that lie waiting to be taken up by reading, which in turn is capable of providing a space for a confrontation between (the world of the text and the world of the reader. The problems of reconfiguration, belonging to the level of mimesis, begin, strictly speaking, only in and through this confrontation. This is why the notion of the world of the text seems to me still to be part of the problem of narrative configuration, although it paves the way for the transition from mimesis, to mimesis.

Time in Fictional Narrative

A new relation between time and fiction corresponds to this notion of the world of the text. And it is, to my mind, the most decisive one. I shall not hesitate to speak here, despite the obvious paradox of the expression, of a fictive experience of time: in order to express the proper temporal aspects of the world of the text and the ways of inhabiting the world that the text projects outside of itself. The status of the expression "fictive experience" is most precarious. On the one hand, in effect, our temporal ways of inhabiting the world remain imaginary to the extent that they exist only in and through the text. On the other hand, they constitute a sort of transcendence within immanence that is precisely what allows for the confrontation with the world of the reader.

The Metamorphoses of the Plot

The precedence of our narrative understanding in the episleinological order, as it will be defended in the following chapter in light of the rationalizing ambitions of narratology, can only be attested to and maintained if we initially give this narrative understanding a scope such that it may be taken as the original which narratology strives to copy. It follows that my task is not an easy one. The Aristotelian theory of plot was conceived during an age when only tragedy, comedy, and epic were recognized as "genres" worthy of
philosophical reflection. But new types have appeared even within the tragic, comic, and epic genres, types that may make us doubt whether a theory of plot appropriate for the poetic practice of ancient writers still works for such new works as Don Quixote or Hamlet. What is more, new genres have appeared, in particular the novel, that have turned literature into an immense laboratory for experiments in which, sooner or later, every received convention has been set aside. We might ask, therefore, whether "plot" has not become a category of such limited extension, and such an out-of-date reputation, as has the novel in which the plot predominates. Furthermore, the evolution of literature has not been confined to producing new types in old genres or even new genres within the constellation of literary forms. Its adventure seems to have brought it to blur the limits between genres, and to con-test the very principle of order that is the root of the idea of plot. What is in question today is the very idea of a relationship between an individual work and every received paradigm. Is it not true that plot is disappearing from the horizon of literature inasmuch as the very contours of the most basic distinction among the modes of composition, the one having to do with mimetic composition, are being wiped out? It is a matter of some urgency therefore that we test the capacity of the plot to be transformed beyond its initial sphere of application in Aristotle's Poet's, and that we identify the threshold beyond which this concept loses all its discriminating value.

**Time in Fictional Narrative**

**Metamorphoses of the Plot**

This investigation of the boundaries within which the concept of plot remains valid finds a guide in the analysis of mimesis, that I proposed in Part 1 of this work. That analysis contains rules for generalizing the concept of plot that now have to be made explicit.

**BEYOND THE TRACK; MIMOS**

Plot was first defined, on the most formal level, as an integrating dynamism that unifies and completes a story from a variety of incidents, in other words, that transforms this variety into a unified and complete story. This formal definition opens a field of rule-governed transformations worthy of being called plots as long as we can discern temporal wholes bringing about a synthesis of the heterogeneous between circumstances, goals, means, interactions, and intended or unintended results. This is why a historian such as Paul Veyne could assign to a considerably enlarged notion of plot the function of integrating components of social change as abstract as those brought to life by non-event-oriented history and even by serial history. Literature should be able to present expansions of the same scale. The space for this interplay is opened by the hierarchy of paradigms referred to above: types, genres, forms. We may formulate the hypothesis that these metamorphoses of the plot consist of new instantiations of the formal principle of temporal configuration in hitherto unknown genres, types, and individual works.

It is within the realm of the modern novel that the pertinence of the concept of employment seems to have been contested the most, the modern novel, indeed, has, since its creation, presented itself as the protean genre par excellence. Called upon to respond to a new and rapidly changing social situation, it soon escaped the paralyzing control of critics and censors. Indeed, it has constituted for at least three centuries now a prodigious workshop for experiments in the domains of composition and the expression of time.

The major obstacle the novel had to confront, then completely overcome, was a doubly erroneous conception of plot. It was erroneous first because it was simply transposed from two of the already constituted genres, epic and drama, then because classical art, especially in France, had imposed on these two genres a mutilated and dogmatic version of the rules from Aristotle's Poetic. It will suffice here to recall, on the one hand, the limiting and constraining interpretation given the rule about the unity of time, as it was understood in chapter 7 of the Poetics, and, on the other hand, the strict requiring to begin in media res, as Homer did in the Odyssey, then to move backward to account for the present situation, so as to distinguish clearly the literary from the historical narrative, which was held to descend the course of time, leading its characters uninterruptedly from birth to death, filling all the intervals of its time span with narration. I Under the eye of these rules, from into a supercilious didacticism, plot could only be conceived of as an easily readable form, closed in on itself, symmetrically arranged in terms of an ending, and based on an easily identifiable causal connection between the initial complication and its denouement: in short, as a form where the episodes would clearly hold together by the configuration.

One important corollary of this overly narrow conception of plot especially contributed to the misunderstanding of the formal principle of emplotment. Whereas Aristotle had subordinated characters to plot, taken as the encompassing concept in relation to the incidents, characters, and thoughts, in the modern novel we see the notion of character overtake that of plot, becoming equal with it, then finally surpass it entirely.

This revolution in the history of genres came about for good reasons. Indeed, it is under the rubric of character that we may situate three noteworthy expansions within the genre of the novel. First, exploiting the breakthrough that had occurred with the picaresque tale, the novel considerably extends the social sphere in which its action unfolds. It is no longer the great deeds or misdeeds of legendary or famous characters but the adventures of ordinary men and women that are to be recounted.

The English novel of the eighteenth century testifies to this invasion of literature by ordinary people. Furthermore, the story seems to have moved toward the episodic form through its emphasis on the interactions arising out of a much more differentiated social fabric, in particular through the innumerable imbrications of its dominant theme of love with money, reputation, and social and moral codes—in short, with an infinitely ramified praxis.

The second expansion of character, at the expense of the plot, or so it seems, is illustrated by the Bildungsroman, which reached its high point with Schiller and Goethe and which continued into the opening third of the twentieth century. Everything seems to turn on the self-awakening of the central character. First, it is his gaining maturity that provides the principle of emplotment. Whereas Aristotle had subordinated characters to plot, taken as the encompassing concept in relation to the incidents, characters, and thoughts, in the modern novel we see the notion of character overtake that of plot, becoming equal with it, then finally surpass it entirely.

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character and plot mutually influence each other."

Another new source of complexity has appeared in the twentieth century, in particular with the stream-of-consciousness novel, so marvelously illustrated by a work of Virginia Woolf, a masterpiece from the point of view of the perception of time, which I shall look at in more detailed below. What now holds

1

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The center of attention is the incompleteness of personality, the diversity of the levels of the conscious, the subconscious, and the unconscious, the stirring of unformulated desires, the inchoate and evanescent character of feelings. The notion of plot here seems to be especially in trouble. Can we still talk about a plot when the exploration of the abysses of consciousness seems to reveal the inability of even language to pull itself together and take shape?

Yet nothing in these successive expansions of character at the expense of the plot escapes the formal principle of configuration and therefore the concept of employment. I will even dare to say that nothing in them takes us beyond the Aristotelian definition of muthos as the imitation of an action. As the breadth of the plot increases, so does that of action. By "action" we have to understand more than the behavior of the protagonists that produces visible changes in their situation or their fortune, what might be called their external appearance. Action, in this enlarged sense, also includes the moral transformation of characters, their growth and education, and their initiation into the complexity of moral and emotional existence. It also includes, in a still more subtle sense, purely internal changes affecting the temporal course of sensations and emotions, moving ultimately to the least organized, least conscious level introspection can reach.

The concept of an imitation of action can thus be extended beyond the "action novel," in the strict sense of the term, to include novels oriented toward character or toward an idea, in the name of the encompassing nature of plot in relation to the more narrowly defined categories of incident, character, or thought. The sphere delimited by the concept of mimesis proceeds extends as far as does the capacity of narrative to "render" its object by strategies giving rise to singular wholes capable of producing their "particular pleasure" through an interplay of inferences, expectations, and emotional responses on the leader's part. In this sense, the modern novel teaches us to extend the notion of an imitated or represented action to the point where we can say that a formal principle of composition governs the series of changes alluding beings similar to us—be they individual or collective, the bearers of a proper name as in the nineteenth-century novel, or just designated by an initial (K) as in Kafka, or even, at the limit, unnameable as in Beckett.

The history of the genre "novel" does not require us, therefore, to give up the term "plot" as designating the core relations of narrative understanding. However we must not stop with these historical considerations concerning the extension of this genre if we are to understand the apparent defeat of the plot. There is a less obvious reason for this reduction of the concept of plot to that of mere story-line—or schema or summary of the incidents. If the plot, nice reduced to this skeleton, could appear to be an external constraint, even an artificial and finally an arbitrary one, it is because, since the birth of the novel through the end of its golden age in the nineteenth century, a more urgent problem than that of the art of composition occupied the foreground: the problem of verisimilitude. The substitution of one problem for the other was facilitated by the fact that the conquest of verisimilitude took under the banner of the struggle against "conventions," especially against what plot was supposed to be, on the basis of epic tragedy, and comedy in their ancient, Elizabethan, and "classical" (in the French sense of this term) forms. To struggle against these conventions and for verisimilitude constituted one and the same battle. It was this concern for being true—in the sense of being faithful—to reality, or for equating art and life, that most contributed to covering over the problems of narrative composition.

And yet these problems were not abolished. They were only displaced. To see this, it suffices to reflect upon the variety of novelistic procedures used to satisfy this requirement to depict life in its everyday truth in the early days of the English novel. For example, Defoe, the author of Robinson Crusoe, made recourse to a "pseudo-autobiographical form, through imitation of the innumerable diaries, memoirs, and genuine autobiographies published during the same period by people shaped by the Calvinist discipline of daily self-examination. Following him, Richardson, in Pamela and Clarissa, believed he could depict private experience—for example, the conflicts between romantic love and the institution of marriage—with even greater fidelity by using as artificial a device as the exchange of letters, despite its evident disadvantages: little selective power, the encroachment of insignificant matters and garrulity, much marching in place and repetition. But, to Richardson, the advantages won out without any need for discussion. By having his heroine immediately write things down, he could convey the impression of great closeness between writing and feeling. Moreover, use of the present tense contributed to this impression of immediacy, thanks to the almost simultaneous transcription of what was felt and its circumstances. At the same time, the unsolvable difficulties of the pseudo-autobiography, dependent as it was on the resources of an unbelievable memory, were eliminated. Finally, this method allowed the reader to participate in the psychological situation presupposed by the very use of an exchange of letters, the subtle mixture of retreats and outpourings that occupy the mind of anyone who decides to confide in writing her or his intimate feelings. On the side of the reader, we find in response to this, the no less subtle mixture arising from the indiscretion of peeking through the keyhole, so to speak, and the impunity that goes with solitary reading.

No doubt what prevented these novelists from reflecting upon the artifice of these conventions, which was the price to be paid in their novel, was the conviction they shared with empiricist philosophers of language from Locke to Reid that language could be purged of every figurative and decorative element and returned to its original vocation—the vocation, according to Locke, "to convey the knowledge of things." This confidence in the spontaneously referential function of language, returned to its literal usage, is no

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less important than the will to return conceptual thought to its presumed origin in experience of the particular. In truth, this will could not exist without this confidence. How, indeed, render the experience of the particular by language, if language cannot be brought back to the pure referentiality attached to its presumed literality?

It is a fact that, once transposed into the realm of literature, this return to experience and to simple and direct language led to the creation of a new genre, defined by the proposal to establish the most exact correspondence possible between the literary work and the reality it imitates. Implicit in this project is the reduction of mimesis to imitation, in the sense of making a copy, a sense totally foreign to Aristotle's Poetics. It is not surprising, therefore, that neither the pseudo-autobiography nor the epistolary formula really
provided any problem for their users. Memory was not suspected of being fallacious, whether the hero recounted something after the fact or as directly from the scene. For Locke and Hume themselves, memory was the support for causality and for personal identity. I lencence to render the texture of daily life as closely as possible was taken to be an accessible and, finally, not problematic task.

It is no small paradox that it was reflection on the highly conventional character of such novelistic discourse that finally led to reflection on the formal conditions of this very illusion of proximity and, thereby, led to the recognition of the basically fictive status of the novel itself. After all, the instantane–ous, spontaneous, and frank transcription of experience in the epistolary novel is no less conventional than the recalling of the past by a supposedly infallible memory in the pseudo-autobiographical novel. The epistolary genre presupposes, in fact, that it is possible to transfer through writing, with no loss of persuasive power, the force of representation attached to the living voice or theatrical action. To the belief, expressed by Locke, in the direct referential value of language stripped of ornaments and figures is added the belief in the authority of the printed word substituted for the absence of the living voice. Perhaps it was necessary that at first the declared aim of being probable had to be confused with the aim of "representing" the reality of life so that too narrow and too artificial a conception of plot could be wiped out, and that subsequently the problems of composition should be brought out by reflection on the formal conditions of a truthful representation. In other words, perhaps it was necessary to overthrow the conventions in the name of the probable in order to discover that the price to be paid for doing so is an increase in the refinement of composition, hence the invention of ever more complex plots, and, in this sense, ones more and more distant from reality and from life. Whatever may be said about this alleged cunning of reason in the history of the genre of the novel, the paradox remains that it was refinement in narrative technique, called for by the concern for faithfulness to everyday reality, that brought attention to what Aristotle called, in the broad sense, the "imitation of an action" in terms of "the organization of the events" in a plot.

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What conventions or what artifices are not required to put life into writing, that is, to compose a persuasive simulacrum in writing? It is a great paradox, one that will not be fully unfolded until we consider the connection between configuration and refiguration, that the empire of conventions should grow in proportion to the representative ambition of the novel during its longest period, that of the realistic form. In this sense, the three steps broadly defined above—the novel of action, of character, of thought—mark out a twofold history: that of the conquest of new regions by the formal principle of configuration, but also that of the discovery of the increasingly conventional character of this undertaking. This second history, this history in counterpoint, is the history of the prixic conscience of the novel as the art of fiction, to use Henry James's famous title.

During the first phase, formal vigilance remained subordinated to the realist motivation that engendered it. It was even concealed by the representative intention. Verisimilitude is still a province of truth—its image or its semblance. And the best resemblance was what best approximated the familiar, the ordinary, the everyday, in opposition to the amazing deeds of the epic or the sublime ones of classical drama. The fate of the plot thus depended upon this almost desperate effort to bring the artifice of novelistic composition asymptotically close to a reality that slipped away in proportion to the formal exigencies of composition that it multiplied. Everything happened as though only ever more complex conventions could approach what was natural and true, as if the growing complexity of these conventions made this very reality recede into an inaccessible horizon that art wanted to equal and to "render." This is why the call for verisimilitude could not long hide the fact that verisimilitude is not just resemblance to truth but also a semblance of truth. This fine distinction was lo deepened into an abyss. Indeed, insofar as the novel was recognized as the art of fiction, reflection on the formal conditions for the production of this fiction entered into open competition with the "realistic" motivation behind which these conditions first lay concealed. The golden age of the novel in the nineteenth century may be characterized by a precarious equilibrium between the always more strongly affirmed aim of faithfulness to reality and the ever sharper awareness of the artifice behind a successful composition.

One clay this equilibrium had to be lost. If, indeed, resemblance is only a semblance of (ruth, what then is fiction under the rule of this semblance but the ability to create the belief that this artifice stands for genuine testimony about reality and life? The art of fiction then turns out to be the art of illusion. From here on, awareness of the artifice involved undermines from within the realist motivation, finally turning against it and destroying it.

Today it is said that only a novel without a plot or characters or any discernible temporal organization is more genuinely faithful to experience, which is itself fragmented and inconsistent, than was the traditional novel of the nine-

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teenth century. Hut this plea for a fragmented, inconsistent fiction is not justified any differently than was the plea for naturalistic literature. The argument for verisimilitude has merely been displaced. Formerly, it was social complexity that called for abandoning the classical paradigm; today, it is the presumed incoherence of reality that requires abandoning every paradigm. But then literature, by replicating the chaos of reality by that of fiction, returns mime sis to its weakest function—that of replicating what is real by copying it. Foi tunately, the paradox remains that in multiplying its artifices fiction seals its capitulation.

We may then ask whether the initial paradox has not been turned upside down. In the beginning, it was the representative intention that motivated the convention. At the end, the awareness of the illusion subverts the convention and motivates an effort to break away from every paradigm. The questions of the limits and perhaps of the exhaustion of the metamorphoses of plot stem from this reversal.
its rules. In my programmatic chapter 3 in volume 1, I proposed comparing this prerational intelligibility to the intelligibility of the schematism from which, according to Kant, proceed the rules of the cate-gorial understanding. This schematism is not atemporal, however. It itself proceeds from the sedimentation of a practice with a specific history. It is this sedimentation that gives this schematism the unique historical style I called "traditionally."

Traditionally is that irreducible phenomenon that allows criticism to stand halfway between the contingency of a mere history of genres, or types, or

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works arising from the narrative function, and an eventual logic of possible narratives that would escape history. The order that can be extricated from this self-structuring of tradition is neither historical nor ahistorical but rather "transhistorical," in the sense that it runs through this history in a cumulative rather than just an additive manner. Even if this order includes breaks, or sudden changes of paradigms, these breaks are not themselves simply forgotten. Nor do they make us forget what preceded them, and what they separate us from. They too are part of the phenomenon of tradition and its cumulative style. If the phenomenon of tradition did not include this force for order, it would not be possible to evaluate the phenomena of deviation 1 shall discuss in the next section of this chapter. Nor would it be possible to pose the question of the death of the narrative art through exhaustion of its formative dynamism. These two phenomena of deviation and death are just the obverse side of the problem I am considering now, the problem of an order of paradigms at the level of the schematism of the narrative understanding rather than at the level of semiotic rationality.

Consideration of this problem drew me to Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism. The theory of modes we find there in the first essay, and even more the theory of archetypes in the third essay, are incontestably systematic. However, the systematic character does not work on the same level as the rationality characteristic of narrative semiotics. Instead it steins from narrative understanding in its traditionality. It aims at extricating a typology of this schematism which is always being formed. This is why it does not justify itself by its coherence or its deductive virtues but by its capacity for providing an account, by an open, inductive process, of the greatest possible number of works included in our cultural heritage. Elsewhere I have attempted a reconstruction of Anatomy of Criticism that illustrates how the system of narrative configurations proposed by Frye steins from the transhistorical schematism of the narrative understanding, not from the ahistorical rationality of narrative semiotics. Here I shall draw upon several parts of that essay that contribute to my argument. Let us first consider the theory of modes, which corresponds most closely to what I am calling here the narrative schematism, and, among these modes, those that Frye calls fictional modes to distinguish them from thematic modes. These fictional modes have to do only with the internal structural relations of the fable, to the exclusion of its theme. Their distribution is governed by a single basic criterion: namely, the hero's power to act, which may be, as we have seen in Aristotle's Poetics, greater than our own, less than our own, incomparable to our own.

Frye applies this criterion in terms of two parallel tables of modes, that of the tragic and that of the comic, which in fact are not modes but classes of modes. In the tragic modes, the hero is isolated from society (to which isolation corresponds a comparable aesthetic distance on the side of the spectator, in time in Fictional Narrative

ns is seen in the "purged" emotions of terror and pity). In the comic modes, the hero is reincorporated into society. It is under these two headings of the tragic and the comic that Frye applies his criterion of degrees of the power to act. He distinguishes under each heading five modes, divided into five columns. In the first column, that of myth, the hero is superior to us "in kind." Myths, broadly speaking, are stories about the gods. On the tragic side, we find the Dionysian myths, celebrating dying gods; on the comic side, the Apollonian myths where the divine hero is received into the society of the gods. In the second column, that of romance, the hero's superiority is no longer in kind but in degree as regards other human beings and their common environment. To this category belong folktales and legends. On the tragic side, we have ama/ing tales with alegiac tone—the death of a hero or of a martyr saint, for example. Corresponding to this on the side of the listener is a special quality of fear and pity appropriate to such ama/ent. On the comic side, the Apollonian myths are marvelous tales with an idyllic lone — the pastoral or the western, for example. In the third column, that of high mimetic, the hero is superior to other people but not to their environment, as can be seen in the epic and in tragedy. On the tragic side, the poem celebrates the hero's fall. Here catharsis gets its specific note of pity and fear from the tragic harrmarta. On the comic side, we find the old comedy of Aristophanes, to whose ridicule we respond with a mixture of sympathy and punitive laughter. In the fourth column, that of low mimetic, the hero is superior to neither his environment nor his fellow human beings. He is their equal. On the tragic side, we find the pathetic hero, isolated externally and internally, from the impostor or a/azon to the "philosopher" obsessed with himself in the manner of Faust and I lamlet. On the comic side stands the new comedy of Menander: the erotic plot, based on fortuitous encounters and recognition scenes—the domestic comedy, the picaresque tale that tells of a knife's rise in society. Here is where we should put the realistic fiction described in the preceding section. Finally, in the fifth column, that of irony, the hero is inferior to us in strength and intelligence. We look down on him from above. To this mode also belongs the hero who pretends to be lower than he is in reality, who undertakes to say less in order to signify more. On the tragic side, we have a whole collection of models who respond in different ways to the vicissitudes of life with temperaments devoid of passion and who lend themselves to the study of tragic isolation as such. The range here is vast. running from the pharkakos or scapegoat, to the hero whose fault was inevitable (Adam in Genesis. K in Kafka's The Trial) to the innocent victim (Christ in the gospels and nearby, between the irony of the inevitable and the irony of the incongruous, Prometheus). On the side of comedy, we have the expelled pharkakos (Shylock, Tartuffe), punitive comedy which avoids becoming a lynching party only through the element of play, "the barrier that separates art from savagery" (p. 46), and all the parodies of tragic irony, whose resources are exploited in the murder mystery and in science fiction.

Two other theses correct the appearance of a taxonomical rigidity offered
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1] by this sort of classification. According to the first one, fiction, in the West, has ceaselessly shifted its center of gravity from above to below, that is, from the divine hero toward the hero of tragedy and ironic comedy, including the i parody of tragic irony. This law of descent is not necessarily a law of decadence, if we consider its counterpart. First of all, as the sacred aspect of the first column and the marvelous aspect of the second column decrease, we see the mimetic tendency increase, first in the form of high mimetic, then of low i mimetic, and the values of plausibility and of verisimilitude also increase (see i pp. 51 -52). We meet again here one of the important features of my preceding analysis of the relationship between convention and verisimilitude. What is more, thanks to the diminution of the hero's strength, the values of irony are liberated and grow free reign. In one sense, this irony is potentially present as soon as there is any muhlos in the broad sense of this term. That is, every muhlos implies an "ironic retreat from reality" (p. 82). This explains why the "mythic" characterizes the second stage. This imitation brings along its own recurrences: day and night, the four seasons, life and death. To see the order of nature as imitated by a corresponding order of words is a perfectly legitimate enterprise, if we know how to construct it on the basis of the mimetic conception that is itself built upon the hypothetical conception of the symbol. This phase, called the literal one, corresponds to the first sense in this biblical hermeneutics. It is detined by our taking the hypothetical character of the poetic structure seriously. To understand a poem literally is to understand everything that constitutes it "as it stands" (p. 77). It is to interest ourselves in the unity of its structure, to read it as a poem. In this respect, the realistic novel is the form that best satisfies the criteria of the literal phase of the symbol. With the second phase, called the formal one, which recalls the allegorical sense of medieval exegesis, the poem gets a structure from its imitation of nature, without losing anything of its hypothetical quality. From nature, the symbol draws an imagery that places all of literature in an oblique, indirect relationship with nature, thanks to which it can be not only pleasing but instructive.51

The third phase is that of the "symbol as archetype" (p. 95). We should not rush to denounce the latent "Jungianism" of the archeypal criticism proper to this stage. What is first emphasized by this term is the recurrence of the same verbal forms, stemming from the eminently communicable aspect of poetic art, which others have designated with the term "intertextuality." It is this recurrence that contributes to the unification and integration of our literary experience.52 In this sense, I see in Frye's concept of an archetype an equivalent of what I have called the schematism issuing from the sedimentation of tradition. What is more, the archetype integrates into this stable conventional order the imitation of nature that characterizes the second stage. This imitation brings along its own recurrences: day and night, the four seasons, life and death. To see the order of nature as imitated by a corresponding order of words is a perfectly legitimate enterprise, if we know how to construct it on the basis of the mimetic conception that is itself built upon the hypothetical conception of the symbol." The final phase of the symbol is the one where the symbol is a "monad." This phase corresponds to the anagogical sense of medieval biblical exegesis. By a monad, Frye means imaginative experience's capacity to attain totality in terms of some center. There can be no doubt that Northrop Frye's whole enterprise hangs on the thesis that the archeypal order finally refers to a "still center of the order of words" (p. 117). Our whole literary experience points toward it. In any case, we would misconceive the whole point of archeypal criticism, and even more so of anagogical criticism, if we saw in it some kind of will to mastery, as in rationalizing reconstructions. On the contrary, the schemata arising out of these two phases testify to an order we cannot master in its cyclical composition. In fact, the imagery whose secret order we seek to discern—or for example, that of the four seasons—is dominated from above by the apocalyptic imagery that, in forms difficult to enumerate, turns upon the idea of reconciliation in unity—the unity of a one yet trune God, the unity of humanity, the unity of the animal world in the symbol of the lamb, of the vege-
Yet however illuminating this parallel between poetic closure and the law of a good form may be, it reaches its limit in the retrospective rearrangements that make the resolution itself appear as the final approbation that seals a good form.

The ending has this effect only if the experience of configuration is not just dynamic and continuous but also capable of the poem, expectations for which the closure brings about a “sense of finality, stability, and integrity” the technical solutions brought by lyric poetry to the problem of closure can be related to the reader's expectations created by visual poem of today, by way of the Romantic poem, allows us to follow with precision the fate of these rules. And finally, epigrammatic aspect. What is more, the evolution of the lyric poem from the Renaissance sonnet to the free verse and the rules for closure are easier to identify and to describe. Such is the case for the endings with a gnomic, sententious, or an

Some authors—for example. .1. Hillis Miller—take this problem to be un-decidable.” Others, such as Barbara Herrnstein Sedlak, see it as a problem of style, as the question of how the paradigms set up by the self-configurating of this tradition could have engendered and still continue to engender variations that threaten its identity of style to the point of announcing its death.

In this regard, the problems posed by the art of ending a narrative work may serve as an excellent touchstone. Because the paradigms of composition in Western tradition are at the same time paradigms of endings, we may anticipate that the eventual exhaustion of these paradigms may be seen in the difficulty of concluding a narrative. Linking these two problems together is all the more justified by the fact that the one formal feature of the Aristotelian notion of action that is whole and complete in itself” (Poetics, 50b23-25). And an action is whole and complete if it has a beginning, middle, and an end; that is, if the beginning introduces the middle, if the middle with its reversals and recognition scenes leads to the end, and if the end concludes the middle, then the configuration wins out over the episodic form, concordance overcomes discordance. Hence it is legitimate to take as a symptom of the end of the paradigmatic tradition of emplotment the abandonment of the criterion of completeness and therefore the deliberate choice not to end a work.

It is important at the beginning to be clear about the nature of the problem and not to confuse two questions, the first of which stems from mimesis, (configuration) and the second from mimesis, (refiguration). In this regard, a work may be closed with respect to its configuration and open with respect to the breakthrough it is capable of effecting on the reader's world. Reading, I shall say in Part IV, is precisely the act that brings about the transition between the effect of closure for the first perspective and the effect of openness for the second. To the extent that every work does something, it adds something to the world which was not there previously. But the pure excess we may attribute to the work as an act, its power of interrupting repetition, as Roland Barthes puts it, in his "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative," does not contradict the need for closure. "Crucial” endings are perhaps the

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ones that best combine these two effects.” So it is not a paradox to say that a well-closed fiction opens an abyss in our world, that is, in our symbolic apprehension of the world.

Before we turn to the magisterial work of Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending, it will be useful to say a few words about the perhaps insurmountable difficulties that confront any inquiry into a criterion of poetic closure. Some authors—for example. .1. Hillis Miller—take this problem to be un-decidable.” Others, such as Barbara Herrnstein Smith, have sought help in the solutions proposed for the problem of closure in the adjoining region of lyric poetry. “There the rules for closure are easier to identify and to describe. Such is the case for the endings with a gnomic, sententious, or an epigrammatic aspect. What is more, the evolution of the lyric poem from the Renaissance sonnet to the free verse and the visual poem of today, by way of the Romantic poem, allows us to follow with precision the fate of these rules. And finally, the technical solutions brought by lyric poetry to the problem of closure can be related to the reader's expectations created by the poem, expectations for which the closure brings about a "sense of finality, stability, and integrity” (Poetic Closure, p. viii). The ending has this effect only if the experience of configuration is not just dynamic and continuous but also capable of retrospective rearrangements that make the resolution itself appear as the final approbation that seals a good form. Yet however illuminating this parallel between poetic closure and the law of a good form may be, it reaches its limit in the
fact that in the case of poetic closure the configuration is a work of language, and from the fact that the feeling of completion may be obtained by very different means. It follows that the completion itself admits of many different forms, including surprise—and it is difficult to say just when an unexpected ending justifies itself. Even a disappointing ending may be appropriate to the structure of a work, if it is intended to leave the reader with residual expectations. It is equally difficult to say in which cases the deception is required by the very nascience of the work rather than just being a "weak" ending. Transposed to the narrative plane, the lyric model suggests the need for a careful study of the relation between the way of ending a narrative and the degree of integration as regards the more or less episodic aspect of the action, the unity of the characters, the argumentative structure, and what below I shall call the strategy of persuasion that constitutes the rhetoric of fiction. The evolution of lyric closure also has its parallel in narrative closure. From the tightly knit adventure novel to the symmetrical one given through a complete cycle, the structural principle goes through a gulf. Frank Kermode is right to say that this Third reversal of perspective characterizes contemporary literature. Mere the criterion of a good closure is much more difficult to manage, especially when it has to agree with the tone of irresolution of the work as a whole. Finally, the satisfaction of the expectations created by the dynamism of the work takes on, here too, varying, if not opposed, forms. An unexpected conclusion may frustrate our expectations modeled on older conventions but reveal a more profound principle of order. And if every closure responds to expectations, it does not necessarily fulfill them. It may leave behind residual expectations. An inconclusive ending suits a work that raises by design a problem the author considers to be unsolvable. It is nonetheless a deliberate and a concerted ending, which sets in relief a reflexive way the interminable character of the theme of the whole work. Its inconclusiveness declares in a way the irresolution of the problem posed.11 However 1 am in agreement with j Barbara Herrnstein Smith when she says that "anticlosure" reaches a threshold beyond which we are confronted with the alternative: either exclude the j work from the domain of art or give up the most basic presupposition of po-l eity, that it is an imitation of the nonliterary uses of language, which include the ordinary use of narrative as a means to arrange systematically what happens in life." In my opinion we must choose the first alternative. Beyond every possible suspicion, we must have confidence in the powerful institution of language. This is a wager that brings its own justification.

It is this alternative—and, in the strict sense of the word, this question of confidence—that Frank Kermode treats in his excellent book The Sense of an Ending. " Without seeking to do so, he takes up the problem again where Northrop Frye left it when he related the desire for a completeness of discourse to the apocalyptic theme, considered on the anagogical level. It is also beginning with the avatars of the apocalyptic theme that Kermode undertakes to contribute to the discussion of the art of closure, concerning which literary criticism has much difficulty reaching any agreement. However the framework now is that of a theory of fiction quite different from Frye's theory of the symbol and the archetypal.

Admitting that it is the reader's specific expectations that govern our need to give a meaningful end to a poetic work, Kermode turns toward the myth of the Apocalypse, which in the traditions of the West has most contributed to structuring these expectations, by giving the term "fiction" a range that overflows the domain of literary fiction. It is a term that is theological by way ofJudeo-Christian eschatology, historical-political by way of the strong imperial ideology that continued up to the fall of the Holy Roman/Germanic Empire, epistemological by way of the theory of models, and literary by way of the theory of the plot. At first sight, this set of reapprochements seems incongruous. Is not the Apocalypse a model of the world, while Aristotle's Poetics proposes only the model of a verbal work? The passage from one plane to the other, in particular from a cosmic stance to a poetic one, nevertheless finds some justification in the fact that the idea of the end of the world comes to us by means of the text that, in the biblical canon received in the Christian West, at least, concludes the Bible. Apocalypse can thus signify both the end of the world and the end of the book at the same time. This congruence between the world and the book extends even further. The beginning of the book is about the beginning and the end of the book is about the end. In this sense, the Bible is the grandiose plot of the history of the world, and each literary plot is a sort of miniature version of the great plot that joins Apocalypse and Genesis. In this way, the eschatological myth and the Aristotelian muthos are joined together in their way of tying a beginning to an ending and proposing to the imagination the triumph of concordance over discordance. It is not so out of place, therefore, to link the Aristotelian peripeteia to the torments of the last days in the Apocalypse. It is precisely at this intersection of discordance and concordance that the transformations of the eschatological myth may clarify our problem of poetic closure.

Let us note, in the first place, the remarkable power that the apocalyptic has long illustrated of surviving every denial in terms of how events have turned out. The Apocalypse, in this respect, offers the model of a prediction that is continually invalidated without ever being discredited, hence of an end that is itself constantly put off. Moreover, and by implication, the invalidation of the prediction concerning the end of the world has given rise to a truly qualitative transformation of the apocalyptic model. From being imminent, it has become immanent. The Apocalypse, therefore, shifts its imagery from the last days, the days of terror, of decadence, of renovation, to become a myth of crisis. This radical transformation of the apocalyptic paradigm has its equivalent in the crisis that affects literary composition. And this crisis takes place on the two levels of the closure of a work and of the wearing out of the paradigm of concordance.
Kermode sees anticipatory signs in Elizabethan tragedy of this substitution of crisis, now become an indefinitely extended peripecia, for the imminent end. This form of tragedy seems to him to have deeper attachments to Chris-

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dian apocalyptic than to Aristotle's Poetics. Even if Shakespeare might still be taken as "the greatest creator of confidence" (p. 82), his tragedies testify to the moment when apocalypse turns from imminence to immanence. Tragedy "assumes the figurations of apocalypse, of death and judgment, heaven and hell: but the world goes forward in the hands of exhausted survivors" (ibid.). However the final restoration of order seems feeble in comparison with the terrors that precede it. It is indeed the time of crisis that bears the features of the quasi-eternal, which in the Apocalypse belong only to the end, that becomes the actual dramatic time." In King Lear, for example, Lear's torment tends toward a continually postponed conclusion. Beyond the apparent worst, there is still worse, and the end is itself only an image of the horror of the time of crisis. King Lear is thus the tragedy of the sempiternal within the order of misfortune. And with Macbeth, peripecia becomes a parody of prophetic ambiguity, "a play of prophecy" (p. 84). Here again the equivocal ravages time, as can be seen in those famous verses where the hero sees his decisions as coming together in the same juncture of time." In this way, "the play of crisis" engenders a time of crisis that bears the marks of sempiternity, even if this eternity "between the acting of a dreadful thing and the first motion" is only a simulacrum of the eternal present and a usurpation of it. There is hardly need to recall how Hamlet too can be taken as "another play of protracted crisis" (p. 87).

This transition from Apocalypse to the Elizabethan tragedy points the way toward one part of the situation of contemporary culture and literature, the one where crisis replaces the end, where crisis becomes an endless transition.10 The impossibility of concluding thus becomes a symptom of the invalidation of the paradigm itself. It is in the contemporary novel that we may best see the combination of these two themes: the decline of paradigms—hence, the end of fiction; the impossibility of ending a poem—hence the ruin of the fiction of the end."

This description of the contemporary situation, which is a well-known one, is less important than the judgment the critic can make concerning it in light of the fate of the Apocalypse. The fiction of the end, we have said, has continually been invalidated, and yet it has never been discredited. Is this also the fate of literary paradigms? Does crisis equally signify for us catastrophe and "renovation? This is Kermode's deep conviction and it is one that I fully share. Crisis does not indicate the absence of every end but the conversion of the immanent end into an immanent end." We may not, according to Kermode, stretch the strategy of invalidation and of peripecia to the point where the question of closure would lose all meaning. But we may ask, what is an immanent end when the end is no longer an ending?

This question leads to a point of perplexity in Kermode's analysis, a point that we will not be able to go beyond if we consider just the form of a work, neglecting the reader's expectations. Here is where the paradigm of conso-

24 Metamorphoses of the Plot

nance takes refuge because here is where it originates. What seems unsurpassable in the last analysis is the reader's expectation that some form of consonance will finally prevail. This expectation implies that not everything will be a peripecia, otherwise peripecia itself becomes meaningless, and our expectation of order would be totally frustrated. If the work is to capture our interest as readers, the dissolution of the plot has to be understood as a signal to us to cooperate with the work, to shape the plot ourselves. We have to expect some form of order if we are to be deceived when we do not find it, and this deception can lead to a kind of satisfaction only if the reader, taking over from the author, makes the work what the author uses all his/her ingenuity not to make it. Frustration cannot be the last word. The reader's work of composition cannot be made completely impossible. This interplay of the expectation of deception and the work of bringing about order is not practical unless the conditions for its success are incorporated into the tacit or express contract the author makes with the reader. "I will distort this work, you give it shape—to your advantage." If this contract is itself not to be a deception, the author, far from abolishing every law of composition, has to introduce new conventions that are more complex, more subtle, more concealed, and more cunning than those of the traditional novel; in short, conventions derived from these forms by means of irony, parody, or derision. In this way the most audacious blows to our paradigmatic expectations do not get beyond the interplay of "rule-governed deformations" by means of which innovation has always been the reply to sedimentation. A leap beyond every paradigmatic expectation is impossible.

This impossibility is particularly striking as regards the treatment of time. Rejecting chronology is one thing, the refusal of any substitute principle of configuration is another. It is not conceivable that the narrative should have moved beyond all configuration. The time of a novel may break away from real time. In fact, this is the law for the beginning of any fiction. But it cannot help but be configured in terms of new norms of temporal organization that are still perceived as temporal by the reader, by means of new expectations regarding the time of fiction which I shall explore in Part IV. To believe that we are done with the time of fiction because we have overturned, disarticulated, reversed, telescoped, or reduplicated the temporal modalities the conventional paradigms of the novel have made familiar to us, is to believe that the only time conceivable is precisely chronological time. It is to doubt that fiction has its own resources for inventing temporal measurements proper to it. It is also to doubt that these resources encounter expectations in the reader concerning time that are infinitely more subtle than rectilinear succession."

I agree, therefore, with Kermode's conclusion to his first study, which is confirmed by his fifth study: expectations whose import is comparable to those engendered by the Apocalypse persist even though they change and even though in changing they change their pertinence.

25 This conclusion is strikingly illuminating with regard to my own thesis about the style of the traditionally of our paradigms. Further, it provides a criterion lor "a discrimination of modernisms" (p. 114). For the older form of modernism—that of Pound, Yeats, Wyndham Lewis, Eliot, and even Joyce (cf. Kermode's illuminating pages [pp. 113-14] devoted to Joyce)—the past remains a source of order, even when it is raised against and decried. For the newer form of modernism, which Kermode calls the schismatic form, order itself is what must be denied. Beckett illustrates this "shift towards schism." He is "the perverse theologian of a world which has suffered a Fall, experienced an Incarnation which changes all relations of past,
present, and future, but which will not be redeemed” (p. 115). In this respect, he preserves an ironic and parodic tie to Christian paradigms, whose order, even when inverted through the author's irony, preserves its intelligibility, "and whatever preserves intelligibility is what prevents schism" (p. 116). "Schism is meaningless without reference to some prior condition; the absolutely New is simply unintelligible, even as novelty" (ibid.), for "novelty of itself implies the existence of what is not novel, a past" (p. 117). In this sense, "newness is a phenomenon that affects the whole of the past; nothing on its own can be new” (p. 120). Gombrich said it better than anyone: "The innocent eye sees nothing."40

These powerful maxims bring us to the threshold of what 1 will call the question of confidence. (Below we shall see there is no better way of phrasing it.) Why may we—must we—not go beyond every paradigm of order, however refined, convoluted, or labyrinthine it might be?

Kermode does not make the answer easy, inasmuch as his own conception of the relationship of literary fiction to the religious myth in apocalyptic thought runs the risk of undercutting the foundations of his confidence in the survival of the paradigms that govern the reader's expectation of closure. The passage from the imminent end to the immanent end is, in fact, for Kermode, the work of the "skepticism of the clerisy " opposed to naive belief in the reality of the expected end. The status of the imminent end, as a consequence, is that of a demythologized myth, in Rudolf Bultmann's sense, or, as I would put it, in the sense of a broken myth, following Paul Tillich. If we transfer to literature the fate of the eschatological myth, all fiction, including literary fiction, also receives thereby the function of being a broken myth. It certainly conserves a cosmic intention, as we saw in the work of Northrop Frye, but the belief that underlays it is corroded by the skepticism of the clerisy. The difference here between Frye and Kermode is total. Where Frye sees the orientation of the whole universe of discourse toward the still center of words, Kermode suspects, in a Nietzschean way, a need for consolation in the face of death that in one way or another makes fiction a form of trickery.41 An insistent theme throughout Kermode's book is that the fictions of the end, in their various forms—theological, political, and literary—have to do with death as a mode of consolation. Whence the ambiguous and troubling tone—the Unheimlich-keit I would say—that gives The Sense of an Ending its fascination.42

A divorce is thus established between truthfulness and consolation. The result is that Kermode's book ceaselessly oscillates between the inescapable sus-; picion that fictions lie and deceive, to the extent that they console us,43 and the equally invincible conviction that fictions are not simply arbitrary, im asuch as they respond to a need over which we are not the masters, the need to impress the stamp of order upon the chaos of existence, of sense upon nonsense, of concordance upon discordance.44

This oscillation explains why Kermode responds to the hypothesis of schism, which after all is only the most extreme consequence of the skepticism of the clerisy with regard to every fiction of concordance, by a simple "and yet . . . " (p. 43). For example, having referred to what Oscar Wilde called "the decay of lying," he writes, "And yet, it is clear, this is an exaggerated statement of the case. The paradigms do survive, somehow. If there was a time when, in Stevens's words, 'the scene was set,' it must be allowed that it has not yet been finally and totally struck. The survival of the paradigms is as much our business as their erosion" (ibid.).

If Kermode finds himself in such an impasse, is it not because he has imprudently posed, and prematurely resolved, the problem of the relations between "fiction and reality" (a whole essay is devoted to this topic), instead of holding it in suspense, as I am attempting to do here, by isolating the problems of configuration in terms of mimesis; from the problems of refiguration in terms of mimesis. Northrop Frye seems to me to have been much more prudent in his statement of the problem, in according the apocalyptic myth only a literary status, without passing judgment about the religious significance it may bear from the eschatological perspective of a history of salvation. At first, Frye seems more dogmatic than Kermode with his definition of the eschatological myth as a "still center." In the end, he turns out to be more reserved than Kermode in that he does not allow literature and religion to become mixed or confused with each other. It is on the hypothetical order of symbols, we saw, that their analogical assemblage is constructed. For Kermode, the constant contamination of literary fiction by the broken myth gives his book both its force and its weakness—its force from the scope given to the realm of fiction, its weakness due to the conflict between confidence in the paradigms and the skepticism of the clerisy, which the linking together of fiction and broken myth entails. As for his solution, which I said is premature, this is so in the sense that it leaves no other perspective for the effort to give meaning to life than that recommended by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy, namely, the necessity of throwing an Apollonian veil over the Dionysian fascination for chaos, if we are not to die for having dared to contemplate pure nothingness. It seems legitimate to me, at this stage of our meditation, to hold in reserve other possible relationships between the fiction and the reality of

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human acting and suffering than that of consolation reduced to a vital lie. Transfiguration, as well as defiguration; transformation, as well as revelation, also have their right to be preserved.

If therefore we confine ourselves to speaking of the apocalyptic myth only in terms of literary fiction, it is necessary to find other roots for the need for the configuration of narrative than the horror of the unformed. For my part, I hold that the search for concordance is part of the unavoidable assumptions of discourse and of communication.45 Either discourse or violence, Eric Weil has said in his Logique de la Philosophie. "The universal pragmatics of discourse says what amounts to the same thing. Intelligibility always precedes itself and justifies itself.

Having said this, one may always refuse the possibility of coherent discourse. This too we can read in Weil's work. Applied to the sphere of narrative, this refusal signifies the death of every narrative paradigm, the death of narrative.

It is this possibility that Walter Benjamin refers to with such awe in his well-known essay "The Storyteller."46 Perhaps we are at the end of an era where narrating no longer has a place, he says, because human beings no longer have any experience to share. And he sees in the rule of advertising the sign of this retreat of narrative, a retreat without return.

Perhaps, indeed, we are the witnesses—and the artisans—of a certain death, that of the art of telling stories, from which proceeds the art of narrating in all its forms. Perhaps the novel too is in the process of dying as a form of narration. Nothing,
in fact, prevents our excluding the possibility the cumulative experience that, at least in the cultural space of the West, provided a historically identifiable style might be dying today. The paradigms that were spoken of heretofore are themselves only the sedimented deposits of a tradition. Nothing, therefore, excludes the possibility that the metamorphosis of the plot will encounter somewhere a boundary beyond which we can no longer recognize the formal principle of temporal configuration that makes a story a whole and complete story. And yet . . . and yet. Perhaps, in spite of everything, it is necessary to have confidence in the call for concordance that today still structures the expectations of readers and to believe that new narrative forms, which we do not yet know how to name, are already being born, which will bear witness to the fact that the narrative function can still be metamorphosed, but not so as to die.\textsuperscript{29} For we have no idea of what a culture would be where no one any longer knew what it meant to narrate things.

2

The Semiotic Constraints on Narrativity

The confrontation between narrative understanding, stemming from an unbroken familiarity with the modes of emplotment throughout history, and the rationality claimed by narrative semiotics was placed under the sign of a "deepening" of the problem in my introductory remarks to this volume. By a deepening, I mean the search for "deep" structures whose manifestation would be the concrete narrative configurations on the surface of the narrative.

It is easy to see the reason for such an undertaking. The preceding analyses have set before us the paradoxes concerning the style of traditionality of the narrative function. If a certain perenniality may be claimed for these paradigms, this is by no means identical with the atemporality attributed to essences. Such perenniality remains instead caught up in the history of forms, genres, and types. The reference at the end of the previous chapter to an eventual death of the art of narration even revealed the precariousness whose shadow accompanies this perenniality of the narrative function, which is nevertheless present in the many different ethnic cultures identified by cultural anthropology.

What motivates semiotic inquiry, in the face of this instability of what endures, is essentially the ambition to ground this perenniality of the narrative function on rules not dependent upon history. In its eyes, the preceding inquiry must appear tainted by a thoroughgoing historicism. If, through its style of traditionality, the narrative function may claim some perenniality, this has to be based upon some achronological constraints. In short, it is necessary to pass from history to structure.

How? By a methodological revolution comparable to the one in the epistemology of history that tries to superimpose a logical type of rationality on the intelligibility that already lies in the production of narratives. This methodological revolution may be characterized in terms of three major features.

It is first of all a question of trying to approach as nearly as possible a purely deductive procedure, on the basis of a model constructed in an axiomatic manner. This choice finds its justification in the fact that we are confronted with an almost uncountable variety of narrative expressions (oral, written, drawn, acted) and of classes of narrative (myths, folklore, fables, novels, epics, tragedies, dramas, films, comic strips, to say nothing of history, painting, and conversation). This situation renders any inductive approach impractical. Only the deductive way is left; that is, the construction of a hypothetical model of description from which at least some of the fundamental subclasses ought be derivable.\textsuperscript{1}

And in what discipline having to do with the facts of language is this ideal of rationality best satisfied, if not in linguistics?\textsuperscript{1}

The second characteristic of narrative semiotics, therefore, will be to construct its models as closely as possible on the basis of the one used in linguistics. This rather broad formulation allows us to embrace very different efforts, the most radical of which undertake to derive the structural values of units longer than a sentence, starting from structures of language at an even lower level than the sentence. What linguistics proposes here may be summed up in the following way. It is always possible in any given language to separate the code from the message, or, to speak as Saussure does, to isolate langue from parole. The code, or langue, is what is systematic. And to say that langue is systematic is also to admit that its synchronic—that is, its simultaneous—aspect can be isolated from its dia-chronic or successive and historical aspect. As for its systematic organization, it can in turn be mastered if it is possible to reduce it to a finite number of basic differential units, the system's signs, and to establish the set of com-binatory rules that give rise to all its internal relations. Under these conditions, a structure may be defined as a closed set of internal relations between a finite number of units. The immanence of these relations—that is, the system's indifference to any extralinguistic reality—is an important corollary of this closure rule that characterizes a structure.

As is well known, these structural principles were first applied with great success to phonology, then to lexical semantics and syntactical rules. The structural analysis of narrative can be considered as one of the many attempts to extend or to transpose this model to linguistic entities above the level of the sentence, the sentence being the last entity dealt with by linguistics. Beyond the sentence we find discourse in the strict sense of the word, that is, a succession of sentences presenting their own rules of composition. (For a long time it was one of the tasks of classical rhetoric to deal with this ordered aspect of discourse.) Narrative, as we just said, is one of the broadest classes of discourse, that is, of sequences of sentences put in a certain order.

Now, the extending of the structural principles of linguistics may signify diverse kinds of derivations stretching from vague analogy to strict homology. It was this latter possibility that was defended by Roland Barthes during the period of his "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrativ.\textsuperscript{e}" A "narrative is a long sentence, just as every constative sentence is in a way the rough outline of a short narrative" (p. 256). Taking this idea to its limits, he 3D

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even declared, "nor does the homology suggested here have merely a heuristic value: it implies an identity between language and literature" (p. 257).

A third general characteristic, which has immense implications in the case of narrative, runs as follows. Among the structural properties of a linguistic system, the most important is its organic character. By this we are to understand the priority of the
whole over the parts, and the hierarchy of levels that results from it. It should be observed at this point that French structuralists have attached more importance to this integrative capacity of linguistic systems than have the upholders of purely distributional models in American structuralism. 1 Whatever the number of levels we propose, and whatever definition we give them, it may not be doubted that a narrative is a hierarchy of instances. 2

This third characteristic is by far the most important one. It corresponds exactly to what I have described on the level of narrative understanding as the configurating operation. This is what semiotics will try to reconstruct with the hierarchizing and integrating resources of a logical model. Following Todorov, one may distinguish the level of the story (which itself includes two levels of integration, that of the actions with its logic and that of the characters with its syntax) and the level of the discourse, which includes the tense, the aspects, and the modes of the narrative. 3 Or one may follow Barthes and speak of "functions" (that is, segments of action formalized a la Propp and ' Bremond), 4 then of actions, and acts (as Greimas also does). Or even, with I Todorov again, one may separate out the level of "narration," where the narrative is what is at stake in an exchange between a sender and a receiver of the narrative. In all these cases, narrative is said to present the same combination as does language between the two fundamental processes of articulation and integration, form and meaning. 5 Essentially, it is this conjunction of articulation and integration that I am going to explore in the following pages, on the basis of this methodological revolution which ends up by eliminating history to the profit of structure. The guideline for this inquiry will be the progress semiotics has made in reconstructing both the articulated and integrated character of employment on a level of rationality that the relationship between form and meaning is disconnected from any reference to the narrative tradition. The substitution of achronological constraints for the style of traditionality of the narrative function will be the touchstone for this reconstruction. Narrative semiotics will have better satisfied its three major characteristics when it has succeeded, in Barthes' words, in "dechronologizing" and "relogicizing" narrative. 6 It will try to do so by subordinating every synchronic (and therefore temporal) aspect of narrative to a corresponding paradigmatic (and therefore achronological) aspect. 7

To comprehend what is at stake in the debate begun by this extension of linguistics to narrative semiotics, we have to take into account the revolution

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that the strategic change of level it brings about constitutes. We cannot overemphasize the transformation that structural analysis implies in the very object under study, once it is transferred from phonology or lexical semantics to narratives such as myths, tales, and heroic stories. In its application to units smaller than the sentence—from the phoneme to the moneme and lexeme—it does not deal with objects already caught up in frameworks that are symbolically elaborated. It does not enter into competition therefore with any other form of practice where its object of study would already count as a distinct cultural object. Fictional narrative, on the other hand, has already, as a narrative, been made the object of both a practice and a form of understanding before semiotics comes on the scene. In this regard, the situation here is the same as in history, where inquiry of a scientific character and ambition was preceded by legends and chronicles. This is why a comparison can be made between the signification that may attach to semiotic rationality in relation to narrative understanding and the outcome assigned to the covering law model in historiography in Part II in volume 1. What is at stake in the discussion in narratology concerns, in fact, and in a similar manner, the degree of autonomy that should be accorded to the process of logicization and de-chronologization in relation to understanding the plot and the time of the plot. As for the logicization, the question is whether a solution similar to that proposed for historiography may also hold for narratology. My thesis, it will be recalled, was that nomological explanation cannot be substituted for narrative understanding but only interpolated, in light of the adage: to explain more is to understand better. And if nomological explanation may not be substituted for narrative understanding, this is because, I said, it borrows from this understanding those features from the irreducibly historical character of history. Must we also say then that semiotics, whose right to exist is not in question, only conserves its narrative aspect insofar as it borrows from our prior understanding of narrative, whose scope was seen in the preceding chapter?

As for dechronologization, which is the reverse side of this logicization, it once again fundamentally calls into question the relationship between time and fiction. 8 It is no longer just a matter of the historicity of the narrative function (as it was in the preceding chapter), what I called its style of tradt-tionality, but of the diachronic character of the story that is narrated in its relationship to the synchronic (or rather, achronic) dimension of the deep structures of narrativity. In this respect, the change in vocabulary concerning narrative time is not an innocent one. To speak of synchrony and diachrony is already to place the discourse, which includes the tenses, the aspects, and the modes of the narrative (p. 19), that the project of logicization is set forth by the master of Russian formalism. This morphology openly links itself with Linnaeus, which is to say with a taxonomic conception of structure, but also, more discretely, with Goethe, which is to say, with an organic conception of structure. 9 So we may already just on this basis ask whether the resistance of the organic point of view to the taxonomic one does not testify, within this morphology, to a principle of configuration not reducible to formalism. Second, the linear conception of the organization of the fairy tale proposed by Propp leaves his attempt only half-way to a complete

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of the grammar of the deep structures of semiotics? Or does it too depend upon the temporal structure of narrative, described in Part I, as a declared autonomy and an unspoken dependence, like the one I have attempted to establish between explanation and understanding on the level of historiography?

PROPP'S MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLKTALE

Two reasons lead me to open this debate over the logicization and the dechronologization of narrative structures with Propp's Morphology of the Folktale. 10 First, it is on the basis of a morphology, that is, of "a description of the tale according to its component parts and the relationships of these components to each other and to the whole" (p. 19), that the project of logicization is set forth by the master of Russian formalism. This morphology openly links itself with Linnaeus, which is to say with a taxonomic conception of structure, but also, more discretely, with Goethe, which is to say, with an organic conception of structure. So we may already just on this basis ask whether the resistance of the organic point of view to the taxonomic one does not testify, within this morphology, to a principle of configuration not reducible to formalism. Second, the linear conception of the organization of the fairy tale proposed by Propp leaves his attempt only half-way to a complete
dechronologization of the narrative structure. So we may also ask whether the reasons that prevented him from completely abolishing the chronological dimension of the fairy tale do not rejoin those that prevented the organic point of view from being absorbed into the taxonomic one, and hence prevented his morphology from satisfying a more radical demand for logicization.

Propp's morphology is essentially characterized by the primacy it gives to functions over characters. By a "function," he means segments of action, or more exactly, abstract forms of action such as abstention, interdiction, violation, reconnaissance, delivery, trickery, and complicity, to name the first seven of them. These same functions occur in all the fairy tales, in innumerable concrete guises, and they can be defined independently of the characters who accomplish these actions. The first of the four basic theses stated at the beginning of this work defines quite clearly this primacy of the function in Propp's morphology: "Functions of characters serve as stable, constant elements in a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the fundamental components of a tale" (p. 21). In the commentary that follows this definition we can see the competition I have referred to between the organic and the taxonomic points of view break out. A function "is understood as an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action" (ibid.). This reference to the plot—"the course of the action"—as a teleo-logical whole corrects in advance the purely additive conception of the relations between functions within the fairy tale.

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However it is this latter conception that is progressively affirmed in the theses that follow. Mere is the second of them: "The number of functions known to the fairy tale is limited" (ibid.). Here we touch upon a postulate common to all the formalists.Appearances are innumerable but the basic components are finite in number. Leaving aside the question of the characters, which we shall see below are quite limited in number (Propp reduces them to seven), it is to the functions that he applies this principle of finite enumeration. Only a high degree of abstraction in the definition of the functions allows him to reduce their number to slightly more than two dozen, thirty-one to be exact. Here our initial question reappears in a new form: what is the principle of closure for the series? Does it have something to do with what has been called the plot or with some other factor of integration of a serial nature?

The third thesis clearly decides this question in favor of the second interpretation: "The sequence of functions is always identical" (p. 22). The identity of the succession gives the identity of the fairy tale. It is true that this thesis marks the irreducible place of chronology in Propp's model, and that it is this aspect of his model that will divide his successors. Some, the ones closest to him, will preserve a chronological element in their model; others, following the example of Levi-Strauss, will seek to reduce the chronological aspects of narrative to an underlying combinatory system, as free as possible of any chronological aspect. However, if due to its third thesis Propp's model remains, as I have said, only half-way along the road of the dechronologiciza-tion and relogicization of narrative, we must immediately emphasize that the temporality preserved on the level of this model remains precisely a chronology, in the sense of an irregular succession. Propp never asks in what time his functions succeed one another. He is only interested in the absence of arbitrariness in the sequence. This is why the axiom of succession is immediately taken as an axiom of order. An identical succession suffices to ground the identity of the fairy tale.

The fourth thesis completes this third one by affirming that all the Russian fairy tales, in presenting the same functions in the same order, constitute but one and the same fairy tale. "All the functions known to the tale will arrange themselves within a single tale" (p. 22, his emphasis). Consequently, "all fairy tales are of one type in regard to their structure" (p. 23). In this sense, every Russian fairy tale in the collection Propp works with is only a variant of a single fairy tale, which is a unique entity made from the succession of functions that are themselves generic in essence. The series of thirty-one functions merits being called the archetype of the fairy tale for which all these fairy tales are variants. This last thesis will authorize Propp's successors to oppose structure and form. The form is that of the single story underlying all the variants; the structure will be a combinatory system much more independent of plot in comparison with the cultural configuration particular to the Russian fairy tale."

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Propp's four theses each pose in their own way the question of the persistence of the organic thought inherited from Goethe in the taxonomic discourse received from Linnaeus. The same question recurs whether it be a matter of the circular relation between the definition of the functions and the unfolding of the plot they contribute to (as in thesis 1); the closure principle for the enumerating of the functions (as in thesis 2); the kind of necessity presiding over their interconnection (as in thesis 3); or finally the status of the archetype, which is singular and typical at the same time, to which the unique sequence of thirty-one functions reduces (as in thesis 4).

The detailed demonstration that follows the stating of these theses clearly makes this latent conflict between a more ideological concept of the order of the functions and a more mechanical concept of their interconnection stand out.

First of all, it is surprising that beginning with "some sort of initial situation" (p. 25) it is not counted as a function, even though "it nevertheless is an important morphological element" (ibid.). Which one? Precisely the one that opens the narrative. This opening, which corresponds to what Aristotle calls the "beginning," can only be defined ideologically, in relation to the plot considered as a whole. This is why Propp does not count it in his enumeration of functions arising out of a strict principle of linear segmentation.

Next we may observe that the first seven functions, as listed above, are both identified individually and defined as forming a subset, "the preparatory part of the tale" (p. 31, his emphasis). Taken as a set, these functions introduce the villainy or its equivalent, a lack. This new function is not just one more function, "since by means of it the actual movement of the tale is created" (ibid.). It corresponds exactly to what Aristotle calls the complication (desis) of the plot that calls for its denouement (lulus). "Therefore the first seven functions may be regarded as the preparatory part of the tale, whereas the complication [of the plot] is begun by the act of villainy" (p. 31).

In this respect, then, the villainy (or lack) constitutes the pivot point of the plot considered as a whole. The considerable number of species of villainy—Propp lists nineteen!—suggests that the high degree of abstraction here depends not so much
on the generic extension, which is broader than for the other functions, as on this function's key position at the turning point of the plot. And in this regard it is noteworthy that Propp does not propose a generic term inclusive of villainy and lack. What they do have in common is that they give rise to a quest. In relation to this quest, both villainy and lack have the same function: "In the first instance, a lack is created from without; in the second, it is realized from within. . . . This lack can be compared to a zero which, in a series of figures, represents a definite value" (p. 35). (So we ought not to think here of Claude Levi-Strauss’s "empty case" in his well-known "Introduction a l’oeuvre de Marcel Mauss.") The villainy (or lack) is in its way a beginning (p. 34), precisely that of the quest. This quest is not properly speaking any one of the functions but rather creates what was said above to be

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the "actual movement" of the tale. This notion of a quest is henceforth never absent. Propp goes so far as to extend to the subset of functions 8 to 11 (from the hero's entry to his departure) the power, already attributed to the villainy, of complicating the action. The elements of this subset, he notes, "represent the complication. Later on the course of action is developed" (ibid.). So this notation bears witness to the affinity between complication and quest in the interconnections among the functions. The following subset (11-14) (from the testing of the hero to his acquisition of a magical object) dramatizes his taking possession of a means to redress the initial wrong. The first function has a preparatory value, the last one that of an accomplishment, and numerous combinations are available for bringing them together, as may be seen in the chart Propp gives (p. 47), which anticipates the combinatory efforts of Greimas's first model.

The next functions, from some special transference to victory over the aggressor (15-18), also form a subset in that they lead to the liquidation of the initial misfortune or lack (19). Propp says of this function that it "constitutes a pair" with the initial misfortune or lack. "The narrative reaches its peak in this function" (p. 53). This is why the hero's return (20) is not noted by a letter but by a downward-pointing arrow (|) corresponding to the departure designated by ( ) . There is no better way of underscoring the prevalence of the principle of Ideological unity over that of the segmentation and the simple succession of functions. Similarly, the next functions (20-26) only delay the denouement by introducing new dangers, new struggles, and new assistance, marked by the intervention of a false hero and the real hero's undertaking of a difficult task. These figures repeat the pattern of misfortune, complication, denouement. As for the last functions—recognition of the hero (27), transfiguration of the hero (29), punishment of the false hero (30), and the hero's wedding (31)—they form a final subset that plays the role of a conclusion with regard to the plot taken as a whole and with regard to the complication: "At this point the tale draws to a close" (p. 64). But why is it necessary to end in this way? It is noteworthy that Propp speaks here of "logical and artistic necessity" to characterize the interconnections of the sequence. However, it is thanks to this double necessity that the "scheme" constituted by the unilinear sequence of thirty-one functions will play the role of "a measuring unit for individual tales" (p. 65). But what confers a unity such as this on the sequence?

Part of the answer lies in the role played by the characters in the synthesis of the action. Propp distinguishes seven classes of them: the villain, the donor (or provider), the helper, the sought-for person, the dispatcher, the hero, and the false hero. It will be recalled that he began by dissociating the characters from the functions in order to define the fairy tale solely in terms of the sequence of these functions. However, no function can be defined unless it is attributed to some character. The reason for this is that the substantive terms that define the

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function (interdiction, misfortune, and so on) refer back to action verbs that always require an agent. Furthermore, the way in which these characters are tied to the functions goes in the opposite direction of the segmentation that governs the distinguishing of the functions. The characters are related to groups of functions that constitute the spheres of action of their respective performers. This concept of a sphere of action introduces a new synthetic principle into the distribution of the functions: "many functions logically join together into certain spheres. These spheres in toto correspond to their respective performers. They are spheres of action" (p. 79). "The problem of the distribution of functions may be resolved on the plane of the problem concerning the distribution of the spheres of action among the characters" (p. 80). There are three possibilities: a sphere of action exactly corresponds to a character (the donor sends the hero), or one character occupies several spheres of action (three for the villain, two for the donor, five for the helper, six for the sought-for person, four for the hero, three for the false hero), or a single sphere of action is divided among several characters (for example, setting out on the quest brings into play the hero and the false hero).

Hence it is the characters who mediate the quest. That the hero suffers from the villain's action just at the moment that the plot thickens, that he agrees to undertake to repair the villainy or to fill the lack, that the donor provides the hero with the means to redress the wrong that has been done, in each of these cases it is the characters who preside over the unity of the subset of functions that allows the action to become more complicated and the quest to develop further. We might ask in this respect whether all emplotment does not really arise out of the mutual genesis of a character's development and the development of a story. This is why it is not surprising that Propp also names, beyond functions and characters, other elements that bind the tale together, such as motivations and the way characters are introduced, along with their attributes or their accessories. "These five categories of elements define not only the construction of a tale, but the tale as a whole" (p. 96). But is it not the function of emplotment, derived from Aristotle's definition of muthos, to join together such diverse elements, such as those even more complex examples which historiography provided us with?

Propp's final considerations are applied to "the tale as a whole" (pp. 92-117) and confirm the competition we have seen throughout this work between the two conceptions of order I have placed under the aegis, respectively, of Goethe and Propp's final considerations are applied to "the tale as a whole" (pp. 92-117) and confirm the competition we have seen throughout this work between the two conceptions of order I have placed under the aegis, respectively, of Goethe and Propp's final considerations are applied to "the tale as a whole" (pp. 92-117) and confirm the competition we have seen throughout this work between the two conceptions of order I have placed under the aegis, respectively, of Goethe and Propp's final considerations are applied to "the tale as a whole" (pp. 92-117) and confirm the competition we have seen throughout this work between the two conceptions of order I have placed under the aegis, respectively, of Goethe and Propp's final considerations are applied to "the tale as a whole" (pp. 92-117) and confirm the competition we have seen throughout this work between the two conceptions of order I have placed under the aegis, respectively, of Goethe and
ment is termed by us a move (xod). Each new act of villainy, each new lack creates a new move. One tale may have several moves, and when analyzing a text, one must first of all determine the number of moves of which it consists (p. 92)." To my mind, this unit of the tale (the move), which gives rise to a new combinatory system, does not result from the segmentation into functions but rather precedes it. It constitutes the Ideological guide for distributing the functions along the sequential line and governs such subsets as preparatory section, complication, delay, and denouement. When related to this one impulse, the discontinuous segments of the sequence take on the roles of reversal and recognition in the tragic mythos. In short, they constitute the "middle" of the plot. And the narrative time is thus no longer the simple succession of segments external to one another but the extended duration between a beginning and an ending.

I do not conclude from this critical review that Propp's archetypal tale coincides with what I have been calling a plot. This archetype reconstructed by Propp is not a tale that is told by anyone to anyone. It is a product of a certain sort of analytic rationality. The fragmentation into functions, the generic defining of these functions, and their placement along a single axis in succession are operations that transform an initial cultural object into a scientific one.

This transformation is obvious as soon as the algebraic rewriting of all the functions, by effacing any remaining names borrowed from ordinary language, leaves room only for a pure sequence of thirty-one juxtaposed signs. This sequence is no longer even an archetypal tale, for it is no longer a tale. It is a sequence, the linear track for a "move."

The rationality that produces this sequence, on the basis of the fragmentation of the initial cultural object, cannot be substituted for the narrative understanding inherent in the tale's production and reception because it continues to draw upon things not manifest in constituting itself. No segmenting operation, no placing of functions in a sequence can do without some reference to the plot as a dynamic unity and to emplotment as a structuring operation. The resistance of an organic and teleological conception of order, in the Goethean style, to a taxonomic and mechanical conception of the interconnection of functions, in the style of Linnaeus, as I have indicated, appeared to me to be one symptom of this indirect reference to the plot. So despite the epislemo-logica logical break made by narratological rationality, we can find between it and narrative understanding an indirect filiation comparable to the one I brought to light in Part II of this work between historiographical rationality and iur-ative understanding.

We can take a further step along the road toward logicization and dechronologization by beginning with the characters rather than the actions, and by for-

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malizing in an appropriate fashion the roles that these characters are capable of taking in any narrative. Then a logic of narrative becomes conceivable, one that would begin with a systematic inventory of the possible principal narrative roles, that is, those capable of being assumed by some character in any narrative whatever. This is what Claude Bremond has attempted to do in his Logique (lu recit. "For us, the question here will be about the status given to the plot and its ignmpanaljty in a jocic of narrative grounded upon a choice opposite to Propp's."

In fact, the logical aim of the model proposed by Bremond stems from a critical reflection upon Propp's work. Basically Bremond contests Propp's way of interconnecting the functions in his model. This interconnection, he thinks, is done in a rigid, mechanical, and constraining manner owing to a failure to make room for alternatives and choices (pp. 18-19). It is this constraint that explains why Propp's schema only applies to the Russian fairy tale, which is precisely that sequence of thirty-one identical functions. Propp's model is limited to ratifying the cultural choices that constituted the Russian fairy tale as one species in the field of "storytelling." To regain the formal intention of the model it is necessary to reopen the alternatives closed off by the one-way sequence of the Russian fairy tale and to substitute for its linear trajectory a map of possible itineraries.

But how can we reopen the closed-off alternatives? By calling into question, says Bremond, the teleological necessity that moves back from the ending toward the beginning—to punish the villain, the tale has him commit the villainy. The regressive necessity of a law of temporal finality blinds us, so to speak, to the alternatives that a, progressive reading, on the contrary, encounters—struggle leads either to victory or to defeat, but the teleological model only recognizes victorious struggles (pp. 31-32). "That struggle is implied in victory is a logical requirement, that victory is implied by struggle is a cultural stereotype" (p. 25).

If we do not want to remain prisoners of a plot-type like Propp's series, we have to adopt as our basic unit what Bremond calls an "elementary sequence."

It is shorter than Propp's sequence but longer than a function. If we are to narrate anything at all, it is both a necessary and a sufficient condition that some action be guided through three phases: a situation opening some possibility, the actualization of that possibility, the ending of this action. Each of these three moments opens an alternative (p. 131): I Completion Noncompletion I No passage to the act

This series of dichotomous options satisfies the double character of retroactive necessity and progressive contingency.

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Once the elementary sequence is chosen as the narrative unit, the problem is to pass from these elementary sequences to complex ones. Here logical necessity ends and the obligation arises to "restore their mobility and their maximum variability to the fixed syntagsms that serve as the material of the Russian fairy tale" (p. 30)."

The notion of a "role" remains to be formulated before we can put together the vast repertory of possible roles that are to be substituted for the limited sequential schema, as found in Propp, that of a plot type. This reformulation proceeds from a reflection upon the very notion of a "function," which was the pivotal term in Propp's analysis. We recall Propp's initial basic thesis that functions are to be defined without taking into consideration the characters of the action, therefore in abstraction
from any specific agent or passive sufferer. But, Bremond says, action is inseparable from the one who undergoes it or who does it. And he presents two arguments in favor of this assertion. A function expresses an interest or an initiative that brings into play a sufferer or an agent. Also, several functions become interconnected if the sequence concerns the story of a single character. It is necessary therefore to conjoin a subject-noun and a process-predicate into a single term, the role. Bremond thus defines a role as follows: "The attribution of some contingent, occurring, or occurred predicate-process to a subject-person" (p. 134). As we see, the elementary sequence is incorporated into the role through the intermediary predicate-process. Bremond's revision of Propp's model is complete. For the concept of a "sequence of actions," he substitutes that of an "organization of roles" (p. 133).

Here the logic, properly speaking, of narrative begins. It consists of "the systematic inventory of the principal narrative roles" (p. 134, his emphasis). This inventory is systematic in a twofold sense. First, because it gives rise to more and more complex roles, either by specifying them or by successive determinations, whose linguistic representation requires a more and more articulated form of discourse. Second, because it gives rise to groupings of roles by correlating them, often on a binary basis.

The first dichotomy opposes two types of roles: sufferers, affected by modifying or conserving processes, and, correlatively, the agents who initiate these processes (see p. 145). It is noteworthy that he begins with the roles of sufferers, taken as the most simple ones, and defined as follows. "We shall define as playing the role of a sufferer anyone whom the narrative presents as affected, in one way or another, by the course of narrated events" (p. 139). These roles of being a sufferer are not just the most simple ones but also the most numerous ones because a subject may be modified in other ways than through the initiative of an agent (see pp. 174-75).

A new dichotomy allows us to distinguish two types of roles for sufferers, depending upon the way in which they are affected. On the one hand, we have those influences that affect the subjective awareness the subject has of his fate.

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These include "information" (which governs the series: concealment, refutation, confirmation) and "affects" (satisfactions or dissatisfactions, governing, through the addition of a temporal variable, hope and fear). On the other hand, there are actions that objectively affect the sufferer's fate, either by modifying it (amelioration or deterioration) or by keeping it in the same state (protection or frustration).

The nomenclature for agents in part repeats that for sufferers: modifier or preserver, ameliorator or degrader, protector or frustrator. However one series of types of specific agents is tied to the notion of influence on the sufferer. Bremond's study of this group is certainly one of the more noteworthy contributions of the Logique du recit (see pp. 242-81). In the sufferer, an influence is addressed to the eventual agent for whom it will tend to set off some reaction. Persuasion and dissuasion, for example, operate on the level of information about what needs to be done, the means to be used, or obstacles to be surmounted, as well as on the feelings the influencer can excite or inhibit. If we add that information or an impulse can be well or poorly founded, we then arrive at some very important roles that center around the notion of a trap and which make the influencer a seducer and a deceiver, a dissimulator and a poor counselor.

This second dichotomy enriches the concept of a "role" in a number of ways. It introduces this concept, in the first place, into the field of "evaluations" by means of the concepts of amelioration or degradation and protection or frustration, in this way, the agent and the sufferer find themselves elevated to the rank of persons. Beyond this, a subjectivity capable of taking account of information and of being affected by it reaches a new field, that of "influences." Finally, the role of an agent capable of an initiative stems from a new field, that of "actions" in the strong sense of the term.

This inventory is completed by the addition of the concepts of esteem and disesteem, along with, on the side of the sufferer, the new roles of beneficiary of esteem and victim of disesteem, and, on the side of the agent, the roles having to do with the distribution of rewards and punishments. A new field is thereby opened for the exercising of roles, one added to the field of evaluations, influences, and actions—the field of "retributions."

Such, broadly speaking, is the schematism underlying this inventory aimed at defining the principal narrative roles. This inventory is equivalent to a nomenclature, a classing together of roles. In this sense, Bremond's enterprise keeps its promise. He does not present a table of plots, as does Northrop Frye, but a table of possible places occupied by the contingent characters of contingent narratives. In this sense, the inventory does constitute a "logic."

The question that arises at the end of this brief summary of the Logique du recit is whether a logic of roles succeeds any better than does a morphology of functions in formalizing the concept of narrative at a level of rationality above
which, as we have seen, obey a sequential order, but with the actors, who are called "actants" in order to distinguish them
from the roles (Bremond, p. 35). A role is not narrative. The linking of an action to an agent is the most general datum of a
semantics of action, but it concerns the theory of narrative only to the extent that the semantics of action obviously conditions this theory.

As for the systematic inventory of principal roles, it has to do with the theory of narrativity to the extent that, in Bremond's
own words, the roles listed in this way are ones "that can appear not just in a narrative, but through the narrative" (p. 134, his
emphases). There is no better way to affirm the circular relationship between role and plot. Unfortunately, the systematic
inventory of principal roles takes no account of it and is not, moreover, capable of replacing it. What is missing is "the
synthesis of the roles in the plot" (p. 322) for which Bremond only indicates the empty place. In fact, this synthesis does not
come from the logic of narrative taken in the sense of a lexicon and syntax of roles, that is, of a grammar. The synthesis of
the roles in the plot does not lie at the end of a combinatory system of roles. The plot is a movement. The roles are the places,
the positions taken up in the course of the action. To know all the places capable of being assumed—to know all the roles—
is not yet to know any plot whatsoever. A nomenclature however ramified it may be, does not make a story. Chronology and
configuration, myths and dia-noia, must also be brought into play. This operation, as Louis O. Mink has

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observed, is an act of judgment, one arising from an act of "grasping together," Or to put it another way, plot stems from a
praxis of narrating, hence from a pragmatics of speaking, not from a grammar of langite. This pragmatics is presupposed by,
but cannot be produced withilti, the framework of the grammar of roles."

The result of this effacing of the connection between the role and the plot is that the "conceptual necessities immanent in the
development of roles" (p. 133) stem more from a semantics and a logic of action than from a true logic of narrative. As we
have seen, the progressive enrichment of the table of roles, through the interplay of specifications and correlations that pass
successively from the field of evaluations to that of influences, then to that of initiatives, and finally to that of retributions, is
easily placed under the aegis of a semantics of action borrowed from ordinary language. However, the effacing of the
connection between role and plot does not go so far as to abolish it. Is it not the fit of roles to their emplotment that secretly
orients the ordering of the system of roles in terms of successive fields which they may enter into? Is it not the narrative
praxis at work in all emplotment that recruits, so to speak, by way of the semantics of action, the predicates capable of
defining narrative roles due to the capacity of bringing the structures of human action within the realm of narrative?

If this hypothesis is correct, the lexicon of narrative roles does not constitute a system prior to and higher than all
emplotment. And the plot is not the result of the combinatory properties of the system but rather of the selective principle that
makes the difference between the theory of action and that of narrative.
from the concrete characters who incarnate their roles. The advantage of this choice is twofold. As we have already seen in Propp's work, the list of actants is shorter than that of the functions—recall that the definition of the Russian fairy tale was that of a narrative with seven characters. Furthermore, the interactions of actants lend themselves directly to a paradigmatic representation rather than a syntagmatic one.

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I shall discuss below how this actantial model is both radicalized and en-
*rial stage, this model reveals the major difficulties of any achronic model as ∨ V j regards the treatment of narrative time.

The first thing the actantial model is intended to do is to ground the inventory of actantial roles, whose listing may appear to be purely contingent, on some universal characteristics of human action. And if we cannot proceed to an exhaustive description of the combinatory possibilities of human action on the surface level, then we must locate the deep principle of their construction in discourse itself. Here Greimas is following a suggestion from the French linguist Lucien Tesniere that the simplest sentence is already a miniature drama implying a process, actors, and circumstances. These three syntactical components give rise to the classes: verbs, nouns (those who take part in the process), and adverbs. And this basic structure makes the sentence "a drama which homo loquens produces for himself" (Structural Semantics, p. 198). There are many advantages to Tesniere's model. First, it is rooted in a structure of language. Next, it offers stability due to the permanence of the distribution of the roles among the syntactic components. Finally, it presents a kind of limitation and closure that fits well with systematic inquiry. It is tempting therefore to extrapolate to the syntax of discourse from this syntax of the elementary statement, thanks to the axiom of homology between language and literature we referred to above.

That the actantial model does not yet fully satisfy the systematic requirements of structuralism is betrayed, however, by the fact that the extrapolation from the syntax of the statement to that of discourse requires inventories of roles drawn by earlier analysts from diverse, empirically given collections—Propp's fairy tales and FJienne Souriau's 200,000 dramatic situations. The actantial model thus stems from a mutual adjustment of a deductive approach, governed by syntax, and an inductive one, stemming from already established inventories of roles. Whence comes the composite character of the actantial model as a mixture of a systematic construct and various "arrangements of a practical order" (Structural Semantics, p. 198). This mutual adjustment finds its equilibrium in a model with six roles resting on three pairs of actantial categories, each of which constitutes a binary opposition. The first category opposes subject and object. Its syntactic base lies in the form A desires B. Moreover, it finds support in the inventories i consulted (the hero sets out in search of someone, as with Propp). The second category rests upon a relationship of communication. A sender is opposed to a receiver. Here again there is a syntactic basis. Every message ties together a transmitter and a receiver. In this way, we meet up again with Propp's donor (the king who charges the hero with a mission, etc.) and the receiver amalgamated to the hero. The third axis is pragmatic. It opposes the helper and the opponent. This axis blends with the relation of desire or with that of commu-

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nication, either of which can be aided or hindered. Oreinas grants that the syntactic basis is less evident in this case, although certain adverbs (willingly, nevertheless), circumstantial particles, or aspects of the verb in some languages take the place of this syntactic basis. In the world of fairy tales this pair is represented by the benevolent and malevolent forces. In short, the model combines three relations—of desire, communication, and action—each resting upon a binary opposition.

Whatever may be said about the laborious character of the elaboration of this model, it recommends itself through its simplicity and its elegance. What is more, unlike Propp's model, this one is distinguished by its capacity for being applied to micro-universes that are as diverse as they are heterogeneous. However, what the theoretician finds interesting is not these thematic instances of the model but the systems of relations among the various positions.

The fate of this model lies in the passage from characters to actions, or in more technical terms from actants to functions. It will be recalled that Propp halted at an inventory of thirty-one functions in terms of which he defined the spheres of action, of characters, and the characters themselves. In an actantial model, the enterprise that Greimas characterizes as one of "reduction" and "structuration" rests upon the transformation rules for the three relations of desire, communication, and action (see p. 223). Anticipating his second model, the one in Dn Sens, he proposes to characterize all the transformations resulting from any one "semic" category as instances of conjunction and disjunction. In any corpus considered, the narrative on the syntagmatic level is taken as a process starting from the establishment of a contract that then proceeds to its breaking and its restoration. The reduction of this syntagmatic level to the paradigmatic one is obtained by assimilating the establishing probabilities to a conjunction between a mandate and its acceptance, the breaking of the contract to a disjunction between interdiction and violation, and the restoration of the contract to some new conjunction—the reception of the helper in the qualifying test, the liquidating of the lack in the principal test, and the recognition in the glorifying test. Within this general schema, numerous conjunctions and disjunctions can be introduced on the basis of the three basic relations of desire, communication, and action. But, overall, between the lack and its liquidation, there are only "identities to conjoin and oppositions to disjoint" (p. 226). The whole strategy thus amounts to a vast attempt to do away with diachrony.

However, in a purely actantial model, this strategy does not reach its goal. Instead it contributes to underlining the irreducible role of temporal development in narrative insofar as it sets into relief the concept of the test. This notion constitutes the critical moment of narrative, characterized on the dia-; chronic level as a quest. The test, in effect, brings into relation confrontation and success. But the passage from the former 1q the latter is perfectly aleatory. This is why the relationship of succession cannot be reduced to one of nece-
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The quest, for its part, gets it aleatory character from the highly axiological “aspect introduced by the very concepts of a contract, violation, and restoration. As a negation of the acceptance, the violation is an axiological negation as much as it is a logical disjunction. Greimas himself sees one positive feature in this rupture of the contract: “the affirmation of the individual's freedom” (p. 423). So the mediation that the narrative brings about as a quest cannot be simply a logical one. The transformation of the terms and their relations is really a historical one. The test, the quest, and the struggle may not therefore be reduced to the role of being the figurative expression of a logical transformation.37 The latter is instead the ideal projection of an eminently temporalizing operation. In other words, the mediation realized by the narrative is essentially practical, either, as Greimas suggests, in that it aims at restoring a prior order that is threatened, or in that it aims at projecting a new order that would be (he promise of salvation. Whether the story explains the existing order or projects another order, it posits, as a story, a limit to every purely logical reformulation of its narrative structure. It is in this sense that our narrative understanding, our understanding of the plot, precedes any reconstruction of the narrative on the basis of a logical syntax. Our meditation on narrative time finds valuable enrichment here. From the moment that the diachronic element does not allow itself to be dealt with as a residue of the analysis, we may ask what temporal quality is concealed under the word “diachrony,” whose dependence on the notions of synchrony and achrony I have already emphasized. In my opinion, the movement from the contract to the struggle, from alienation to the reestablishment of order, the movement constitutive of the quest, does not imply just “successive time,” a chronology which it is always tempting to dechronologize and logocize, as we said above. The resistance of the diachronic element in a model whose vocation is essentially achronic seems to me to be the indication of a more basic kind of resistance, that of narrative temporality to simple chronology.38 If chronology can be reduced to a surface effect, it is because the alleged surface has already been deprived of its own dialectic, namely, the competition between the sequential and the configurational dimensions of narrative, a competition that makes narrative a successive whole or whole succession. And even more fundamentally, the rift between the contract and the struggle, underlying this dialectic, reveals that aspect of time that Augustine, following Plotinus, characterized as a distension of the mind. We ought not therefore to continue to speak of time but of temporalization. This distension is, in fact, a temporal process that is expressed through the delays, the detours, the suspense, and every strategy of procrastination in the quest. This temporal distension is expressed even more by means of the alternatives, the bifurcations.47

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The narrative semiotics of Du Sens and Maupassant does not really constitute a new model so much as the radicalization and at the same time the enriching of the actantial model we have just been discussing. It is a radicalization in the sense that Greimas attempts to trace the constraints on narrativity back to their ultimate source, the constraints attached to the most elementary functioning of any semiotic system. Narrativity will then be justified as an activity from which chance has been removed. It is an enrichment in the sense that the movement of reduction to the most elementary level is compensated for by a movement of deployment that goes toward the complex forms. His ambition, therefore, is to return along the regressive path to the semiotic level that is even more basic than the discursive level itself and to find narrativity there already in place and organized prior to its manifestation. Conversely, along the progressive path, the importance of Greimas's narrative grammar lies in its effort to put together, step by step, the conditions of narrativity beginning from a logical model that is as simple as possible and that initially includes no chronological aspect. The question is whether, in rejoining the structure of narratives actually produced by oral and written traditions, the successive additions Greimas makes in order to enrich his initial model get their specifically narrative capacity from the initial model or from assumptions extrinsic to it. Ills wager is that, in spite of these additions, an equivalence can be maintained from beginning to end between the initial model and the final matrix. It is this wager that we must consider, both theoretically and practically.

Let us follow the order suggested in "The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints": first, the deep structures that define the conditions of intelligibility of semiotic objects; next the intermediate structures, termed “superficial” in relation to the former structures, where narrativization finds its actual articulation, and finally the structures of manifestation, particular to this or that language and this or that expressive material. The first stage, that of the "deep structures," is the stage of the "constitutional model." The problem Greimas seeks to resolve here is to obtain a model that immediately presents a complex character, yet without being instantiated in some linguistic or nonlinguistic substance or medium. It has to be somehow articulated, however, if it is to be narrativized. His stroke of genius, we may say, is to have sought for this already articulated character in the simplest logical structure possible, the "elementary structure of meaning" is

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(iibid.). This structure refers to the conditions for grasping a meaning, any meaning whatsoever. If something—no matter what—“means something” signifies, it is not because we have some intuition of its sense but because we can state an elementary system of relations as follows. "White" means something because we can articulate it in terms of three relations, one of contradiction (white vs. not-white), one of contrariety (white vs. black), and one of presupposition (not-white vs. black). We have then Greimas's well-known "semiotic square," whose logical force is said to preside over every subsequent enrichment of the model."
How will this constitutional model be narrativized, at least in a virtual sense? By giving a dynamic representation of the taxonomic model—that is, of the system of unoriented relations constitutive of the semiotic square—or, in short, by treating these relations as operations. Here we rediscover the very important concept of a transformation, already introduced by the actantial model in the form of conjunction and disjunction. Reformulated in terms of operations, the three relations of contradiction, contrariety, and presupposition appear as transformations by means of which one content is negated and another one is affirmed. The very first condition of narrativity is nothing else than this setting into motion of the taxonomic model by means of such oriented operations. This first reference to narrativity already bears witness to the attraction that the goal to be attained exercises over this analysis. This goal is to account for the unstable character of the narrative process at the level of manifestation. This is why it is so important to put the structure into motion. We may ask, however, whether it is not the competence gained through a long acquaintance with traditional narratives that allows us, through anticipation, to call "narrativization" the simple reformulating of the taxonomy in terms of operations, and that also requires us to proceed from stable relations to unstable operations.

The second stage—that of the "superficial" though not yet "figurative" structures—takes place through instatiating the constitutional model in the order of "doing something." To speak of the figurative level, we would have to consider real actors accomplishing tasks, undergoing tests, and attaining goals. But at the level we are considering now, we can confine ourselves to the grammar of doing something in general. This is what introduces the second constitutional stage. Its basic statement is the simple narrative statement of the type "someone is doing something." To turn this into a "program statement," we must add to it various modalities that give it different potentialities: wanting to do something, wanting to have (something), wanting to be (a value), wanting to know (something), wanting to be able (to do something). We attain the narrative level by next introducing a polemical relation between two programs, and therefore between a subject and an antisubject. It then suffices to apply the transformation rules stemming from the constitutive model to a syntagmatic series of narrative statements to obtain confrontation (through disjunction), wanting to dominate and domination (through modalization), and, at last, the attribution of an object/value to the subject of the domination (through conjunction). A syntagmatic series of the form confrontation, domination, attribution (to which we may if we wish, apply all the modalities of doing something, wanting to do something, knowing how to do something, and being able to do something) is called a "performance." In speaking of a performance as such a unified syntagmatic series, Greimas writes, "it is probably the most characteristic unit in narrative syntax" (Du Sens, p. 173). Hence it is to this complex constitution of the performance that the principle of equivalence between the deep grammar and the superficial grammar applies. This equivalence rests entirely upon the relation of implication between confrontation, domination, and attribution.

The constituting of the narrative model ends with the addition to the polemical category of a category of transference, borrowed from the structure of exchange. Reformulated, in terms of an exchange, the attribution of an object/value, the last of the three narrative statements constitutive of the performance, signifies that one subject acquires something which another subject is deprived of. Attribution can thus be decomposed into two operations: a privation, equivalent to a disjunction, and an attribution properly speaking, equivalent to a conjunction. Together they constitute the transfer expressed by two "translatives." This reformulation leads to the concept of a "performative series." And it is in such a series that we are to see the formal skeleton of every narrative.

The advantage of this reformulation is that it allows us to represent all the prior operations as changes in "places," the initial and final places of the transferences; in other words, to satisfy the conditions for a topological syntax of translatives. In this way, the four corners of the semiotic square become the points from which and toward which the transferences take place. In turn, the fecundity of this topological syntax can be spelled out in greater detail inasmuch as the topological analysis can be deployed on the two planes of "doing something" and "wanting to do something." If we first consider just the value/objects, acquired or transferred by doing something, the topological syntax can represent the ordered series of operations on the semiotic square along the lines of contradiction, contrariety, and presupposition as a circular transmitting of values. We may even say without hesitation that this topological syntax of transferences is the true active principle of the narration "insofar as it is a process that creates values" (p. 178).

If we next consider not just the operations but the operators, that is, within the schema of exchange, the senders and the receivers of the transferences, the topological syntax governs the transformations affecting the capacity to do something, hence the bringing about of the transferences of values considered above. In other words, it governs the very instituting of the 50.

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Syntactic operators by creating subjects endowed with the virtual capacity of doing something. This splitting of the topological syntax corresponds therefore to the splitting of doing and wanting (being able to, knowing how to), that is, the splitting of narrative statements into descriptive statements and modal statements, hence also the splitting into two series of performances. For example, acquisition is the transference bearing either on value-objects or on modal values (acquiring the ability, the knowledge, the wanting to do something). The second series of performances is the more important one from the point of view of unleashing the syntactic course of action. The operators have to be instituted as capable of, then as knowing how to and wanting to do something, if the transferences of objects of value are to be connected together in their turn. If therefore we ask where the first actant comes from, it is necessary to refer to the contract that institutes the subject of the desire by attributing to him, her, or it the modality of wanting. The particular narrative unit in which this wanting by a "knowing" or a "capable" subject is posited constitutes the initial performance of the narrative.

The "completed narrative" (p. 180) combines the series of transferences of objective values with the series of transferences instituting a knowing or a capable subject.

Greimas's topological emphases thus represent the most extreme attempt to push an extension of the paradigmatic as far as
possible into the heart of the syntagmatic. Nowhere does he feel closer to realizing the old dream of making linguistics into an algebra of language. The fact is that semiotics, at the end of its own passage from the level of immanence to the surface level, makes the narrative itself appear as such a passage [parcours]. But it takes this passage as the strict homology of the operations implied by the elementary structure of meaning on the level of the basic grammar. It is the "linguistic manifestation of the narrativized meaning" (DuSens, p. 183).

In fact, the passage through the semiotic levels is not so much ended as interrupted. The reader will have noted that nothing is said here of the third level, that of manifestation, where the places formally defined on the plane of the surface grammar are filled in some figurative way. The figurative level has remained up to now the poor cousin of the semiotic analysis. The reason for this, it seems, is that the figuration (whether axiological, thematic, or actantial) is not taken to be the product of an autonomous cofigurational activity. Whence the name "manifestation" given to this level—as though nothing interesting happened there, except for the displaying of the underlying structures. In this sense, this model offers figurations without configuration. All the dynamism of emplotment finds itself referred to the logical-semantical operations and to the syntagmatization of the narrative statements into programs, performances, and performance series. It is not by chance, therefore,

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that the term "plot" does not appear in the technical vocabulary of narrative semiotics. In truth, it could not find a place there, since it stems from the narrative understanding which semiotic rationality tries to provide an equivalent for or, better, a simulation of. It is necessary therefore to wait for narrative semiotics to develop a specific interest in "figurativity" before we can pass judgment on the fate reserved for the "interplay of semiotic constraints" on the figurative level.

Before proposing some critical reflections concerning this semiotic model, I would like to underscore the intensity of the inquiry that animates the work of Greimas and his school. We have already noted how the semiotic model radicalizes and enriches the initial actantial model. We ought therefore to consider DuSens as one step in an inquiry that is still under way. Maupassant adds to it and makes some important shifts in direction. I would like to point out three of them.

On the level of the deep structures, Greimas has begun to transform the achronic character of the transformation operations applied to the semiotic square by adding to them aspectual structures: "durativity" which results from the temporalizing of a state and which characterizes every continuous process; next, the two point-like aspects that delimit the process: "inchoativity" and "terminativity" (for example, the terms "dying" and "being born" in Maupassant's short story "Deux Amis");"iterativity," which we may join to "durativity"; and finally, "sensitivity," the relation of tension established between a durative "seme" and a pointlike one, which is expressed in such phrases as "ratherclose," "toomuch," and "faraway."

The place of these aspectual structures is not easy to define in relation to the deep structures, on the one hand, and in relation to the discursive structures coextensive with doing something, on the other. On the one side, in fact, these aspectual structures are homologized to logical operations. For example, the opposition permanence/occurrence governs the opposition durativity/point-like. Similarly, the temporal positions before/during/after are taken as "temporalized positiings" (Maupassant, p. 71) of the logical relations prior/concomitant/posterior. As for the articulation permanence/occurrence, it is only "the adaptation to time" of the pair continuous vs. discontinuous. Yet, with these expressions, we only make the relationship to time more distant. On the other side, we may ask whether such aspectual considerations can be introduced before any syntagmatic interconnections, any discursive traversal. This is why, in the detailed analyses of the sequences of Maupassant's short story, they are introduced on the occasion of their discursive instantiations. One hardly sees how, in fact, the logical relations could be temporalized if some process did not unfold that requires a syntagmatic structure of discourse based on some temporal linearity. So the introduction of the aspectual structures into the model does not take place without a certain difficulty.

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A second important addition—also at the turning point between the logical-semantic level and its discursive instantiation—contributes to dynamizing the model even further without weakening its paradigmatic basis. It has to do with the highly axiological character of the contents put at the top of the semiotic square. Thus the whole story in "Deux Amis" unfolds in terms of one dominant "isotopy," where life and death constitute the axis of the contraries along with their intersecting contradictions: not-life and not-death. These are not actants—otherwise we would have to talk about them using the categories of doing something—but rather "euphoric" and "dysphoric" connotations capable of underlying every narrative. Much of the remaining semiotic treatment consists of assigning characters and also slightly anthropomorphized entities (the sun, the sky, the water, Mount Valerien) to these places. Everything indicates that these underlying axiological values represent more than cultural stereotypes or ideologies. The respective values of life and death are assumed by every human being. What belongs to any culture, any school of thought, any storyteller is the instantiation of these key values in some concrete way (DuSens, p. 124). What is interesting about this placing of the euphoric and dysphoric values on the deepest level possible is not just that it assures the stability of the narrative as it unfolds, but that, by joining the axiological and the logical, it favors the narrativization of the basic model. Have we not learned from Aristotle that the changes a drama deals with most of all are those (hat change good into bad and vice versa? But, once again, the place of these axiological determinations in the general scheme is not easy to establish. First of all, it is difficult once more not to refer to the thematic roles these connotations affect, that is, to the discursive subjects that are unfolded by a narrative passage. Next, the polemical character is already hinted at by the opposition between values. Nevertheless, these oppositions are supposed to precede the roles and the subjects in their polemical relations.

A third addition to the elementary model is even more difficult to distinguish from its discursive instantiations. Yet, its logical priority in relation to doing something and to the actants, and its frankly paradigmatic character, assure it a place as close as possible to the deep structures. It has to do with the "senders" for which the actants and the thematic roles are the delegated representatives, the incarnations, the figurations, depending on the varying hierarchical level of these senders or
In other words, this question once again raises, although with regard to a considerably more refined model, the problem that nation of the deep grammar as the level of immanence and the surface grammar as the level of manifestation.

The answer to this question is presupposed beginning with the initial desigsemiotic traversal does not proceed from our ability to follow a story and our acquired familiarity with a narrative tradition. This is why Oreitnas can speak of the "proto-actantial status of the sender" (p. 63). In this way, axtiology predicates and senders are superimposed on the semiotic square of logical terms before any "figurative actors" are inscribed on it.

Even more important are the extensions Maupassant adds to the grammar of doing something, and therefore to the clearly discursive level. The modern story requires considering the processes that unfold on the cognitive level, whether it be a question of observation, information, persuasion or interpretation, trickery, illusion, lies, or secrets. Greimas takes up this requirement (which has its origin in the dramatic function of "recognition" in Aristotle and also in the well-known analyses of the trickster figure in anthropology) through a series of audacious methodological decisions. In the first place, he quite openly splits "doing something" into "doing something pragmatically" and "doing something cognitively," where the latter branch sets up the acting subject as a noological subject distinct from the bodily subject. Next, he apporitions this cognitive doing something between two poles: persuasive doing something (exercised by the sender of the cognitive activity with respect to the receiver) and interpretive doing something (which is the receiver's corresponding response). The essential advantage of so treating the cognitive dimension in terms of doing something is that it allows him to submit the operations of knowing anything at all to the same transformation rules that govern action properly speaking (recall that Aristotle had already included the characters "thoughts" in his mulhos in terms of the category of diamuias). In this way, the inferences from appearance to reality, which interpretation consists of, are forms of doing something capable of being inscribed on a narrative traversal just as the other forms of doing something are. Similarly, the polymelical relation may have to do with two persuasive forms of doing something as well as with two pragmatic ones, as, for example, in a discussion, or even with two interpretive forms, as, for example, in an accusation or a denial of guilt. Consequently, from now on we speak of a polymelical relationship, we must keep in mind the whole palette of "doing something."

However, the break introduced into the theory of doing something, which had been relatively homogeneous to this point, is a considerable one. To take account of persuasion and interpretation, we must in fact make recourse to new categories for semiotics but old ones for philosophy—the categories of being and appearing. To persuade is to make someone believe that what appears to be so is so, and to interpret is to infer reality from appearances. Yet Greimas insists that we limit these terms to "the sense of semiotic existence" (p. 107). And he calls the passage from one level to another a "fiduciary" relation which sets up such values as certitude, conviction, doubt, hypothesis, even while he claims not yet to possess the categorization warranted by such fiduciary values (cf. p. 108). In this way he believes he can preserve a logical character for the narrative transformations in which a subject, for example, by camouflaging himself, intends that another subject interpret this not-appearing as a form of nonbeing. This process is put under the category of the secret, where the first subject conjoins being and not appearing. This situation, set within the cognitive dimension of a narrative, then conserves both its narrative inscription and its logical features through the introduction of a new semiotic square, the square of "verediction," constituted beginning from the opposition being vs. appearing, and completed with the respective contradictories: nonbeing and not-appearing. Truth indicates the conjunction of being and appearing, falsity that of not-appearing and nonbeing, the lie that of apa . pearing and nonbeing, and the secret that of being and not-appearing. Trickery is the persuasive form of doing something that consists of transforming the lie into truth—making something pass for something else; that is, in presenting what appears, but is really not so, as what appears to be so and is so—and getting it accepted as such. And illusion is the interpretive form of doing something that corresponds to the lie, by accepting it as a kind of contract with the deceptive sender. The deceiver, as an actantial role, the one who passes himself, herself, or itself off as someone or something else, can thus be given a precise definition on the level of verediction.

This introduction of doing something cognitively, along with the distinction between cognitive and interpretive doing something, and the introduction of the structure of verediction constitute the most important additions of Maupassant to the categorization of "doing something," particularly if we take into account the modal forms of "being able to do something" that are grafted to it. These latter include the most important one in the story "Deux Amis," refusal—that is, wanting to be able not to do something. And in this way, Greimas can account for a complex dramatic situation in Maupassant's story of an "illusory quest" transformed into a "secret victory."

These are the most important improvements Maupassant adds to the semiotic model. I will say that they distort the model without bursting it, although it is probably the question of verediction that most threatens such an explosion. To the extent, therefore, that they do not propose any significant rewriting of the model described ten years earlier in Du Sens, neither do they undercut the criticism we can level against the basic semiotic model with its three levels of deep, superficial, and figurative structures. However, the fundamental question raised by the narrative grammar model is whether (he go-called "surface" level is not richer in narrative potential than the deep grammar, and also whether the increasing enrichment of the model as it follows the semiotic traversal does not proceed from our ability to follow a story and our acquired familiarity with a narrative tradition. The answer to this question is presupposed beginning with the initial desig-

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nation of the deep grammar as the level of immanence and the surface grammar as the level of manifestation.

In other words, this question once again raises, although with regard to a considerably more refined model, the problem that
has occupied us since the beginning of this chapter, the problem of the relationships between the rationality of narratology and narrative understanding, forged by the practice of en-plotment. For this reason, our discussion must become even more close-knit.

My initial doubt, which the subsequent argument must put to the test, is whether, from its very first stage—that is, from the construction of the semi-otic square—Greimas's analysis is not ideologically guided by an anticipation of the final stage, namely, the one where narration is a process that creates values (Du Sens, p. 178). This is where I see the equivalent on the level of semiotic rationality of what our narrative upbringing makes us understand as a plot. Let us be clear about what I am saying. This doubt in no way disqualifies Greimas's enterprise. It simply calls into question the alleged autonomy of such semiotic undertakings, just as the discussion of nomological models in history called into question the autonomy of historiographical rationality in relation to our narrative competence, this first part of my argument must stick to the level of the deep grammar.

I will set aside here the question of the logical consistency of the basic model and limit my discussion to two points. The first one has to do with the conditions the model has to satisfy if it is to preserve its efficacy all along the semiotic traversal. As it is constituted on the plane of the elementary structure of signification, it is a strong model. But, as often happens in the interpretation of some given domain with a model constructed a priori, some of its requirements must be weakened if it is to function in this domain. We have already seen one example in the domain of historiography, where the covering law model had to be weakened to take into account the actual methodology implied by the historian's craft. The initial taxonomic model preserves a logical signification only if it remains a strong model. Yet it has its full force only on the level of a "semic" analysis, which, if not completed, at least brings us to the point where it allows a "limited inventory of semic categories" (p. 161). Under this condition, contrariety does constitute a strong form of contrariety, that is, a binary opposition between scenes of the same category, as for example in the binary semic category white vs. black. Contradiction, too, is there a strong form of contradiction: white vs. not-white, black vs. not-black. And the presupposition of not-S, from S is truly preceded by the two relations of contradiction and contrariety, in the rigorous sense just spoken of. Yet, we may doubt whether these three requirements are satisfied in all their rigor in the domain of narrativity. If they were, then all the subsequent operations would also be "foreseeable and calculable" (p. 166) as Greimas says. But then nothing would happen. There could be no event, no surprise. There would be nothing to tell. We may assume therefore that the surface grammar

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more often has to do with quasi-contradictions, quasi-contrarieties, and quasi-presuppositions.

The second point I would like to consider, still on the level of the deep grammar, has to do with the narrativization of the taxonomy assured by the passage from unoriented relationships in the taxonomic model to the oriented operations that give the model a syntactical interpretation. In fact, the passage from the idea of a static relation to that of a dynamic operation implies an actual addition to the taxonomic model, which genuinely does chronologize it, at least in the sense that a transformation takes time. This addition is indicated in the text of "Elements . . . " by the notion of "a production of meaning by the subject" (p. 164). Hence there is more than a reformulation here. We have the introduction of a syntagmatic factor, on an equal basis, alongside the paradigmatic factor. The notion of equivalence then loses its sense of being a reciprocal relationship in the passage from morphology to syntax. After all, how are a stable relation and its transformation equivalent, if it is the orientation involved (that is most pertinent in the latter? We may inquire therefore whether the construction of the model was not guided by the idea of oriented transformations which are made to appear in the inert terms.

This question can be posed on each of the levels of the model. The finality of one operation seems to lie in the following operation, and finally in the concluding idea of narrativity. In fact, this is what we observe in the passage from the deep grammar to the surface grammar. The enriching of the initial model results from the massive aid provided by the various determinations of "doing something." Yet none of these new determinations stem directly from the taxonomic model but rather from a semantics of action. We know, by a form of knowing immanent to "doing anything," that doing something is the object of statements whose structure differs essentially from the structure of predicative statements of the form "S is P," as well as from relation statements of the form "X is between Y and Z." This structure of sentences that describe action has been the object of much detailed work in analytic philosophy, which I have reviewed in my essay "Le Discours de Tactum." One noteworthy characteristic of these sentences is that they involve an open-ended structure running from "Socrates says . . . " to "Brutus killed Caesar, on the Ides of March, in the Roman Senate, with a knife. . . . " This is its semantics of action that, in fact, is presupposed in the theory of the narrative sentence. "To do" something can be substituted for any of the action verbs. This assistance from the semantics of action is nowhere more evident than in the passage, through mobilization, from statements concerning "doing something" to statements about "being able to do something." How else do we know that "wanting to do something" makes "doing something" contingent? Nothing about the semiotic square allows us to suspect this. Even so, the typology of wanting to do something, wanting to have something, wanting to know something, and being able to want something is a good one. Yet it steins, from a linguistic print of view, from a particular grammar, one that analytic philosophy has spelled out in the greatest detail in terms of what it calls intentional logic. If this original grammar is required to give a logical form to the relationship between the modal statements about "wanting to . . . " and descriptive statements about doing something, it is the implicit phenomenology of action involved that gives meaning to Greimas's statement that "the modal statements which have 'wanting' as their function set up the subject as a virtually of doing something, while two other modal statements, characterized by the modalities of 'knowing' and 'being able,' determine this contingent doing of something in two different ways—either as a doing stemming from knowledge or as uniquely grounded on power" (Du Sens, p. 175). Even so, this implicit phenomenology is brought to light as soon as we interpret the modal statement as the "desire to realize" a program that is present in the form of a descriptive statement and, at the same time, serves as the object of a modal statement (cf. p. 169). The result is that
the relationship between the semiotic level and the level of actual praxis is one where each takes precedence over the other. The semiotic square brings its network of interrelated terms and its system of contradiction, contrariety, and presupposition. The semantics of action brings the major significations of "doing something" and the specific structure of those statements that refer to an action. In this sense, the surface grammar is a mixed grammar, a semiotic-praxic grammar. In this mixed grammar, it seems as though it will be quite difficult to speak of an equivalence between the structures deployed by the semantics of action and the operations implied by the semiotic square.

We can take this objection one step further by observing that the simple narrative statement is an abstraction within the superficial grammar as long as we have not introduced the polemical relationship between programs and between opposed subjects. As we have already seen above, there is nothing speculatively narrative about an isolated action sentence. Only a sequence of statements constitutes a narrative syntagm and allows us, retroactively, to speak of the action sentences that compose this chain as narrative. In this respect, the polemical relationship constitutes the first genuine threshold leading to nar-rativity in the superfi-cial grammar, the second such threshold being constituted by the concept of a performance, and the third one being indicated by the syntagmatic sequence of performances and the transference of values that it brings about. Let us consider each one of these thresholds in order, beginning with the first one, the polemical representation of logical relations.

Note, first of all, that the polemical representation brings with it new features that, before having the logical signification of contradiction or contrariety, do have an autonomous praxic signification. Confrontation and struggle pose figures of the orientation of action toward others, as this has been dealt with, for example, in an interpretive sociology such as Max Weber's. Weber's sociology, in fact, introduces struggle (Kampf) at a well-defined place in the progressive constitution of the basic categories of his masterpiece, Economy and Society. The introduction of the category of struggle, therefore, accentuates the mixed character of every narrative grammar, its half-logical, half-praxic character. Observe, further, that the equivalence on the logical level between defiance and contradiction is highly contestable. The concept of defiance, it seems to me, brings into play a type of negativity which Kant, in his opuscule Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Grossen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763), was the first to show is not reducible to contradiction. The opposition of a subject to an antisubject is not the opposition of two contradictory forms of doing something. And we may suspect that it is not a relationship of contrariety either. The addition of the categories of transference to the polemical categories poses an analogous problem. Again at this new stage, the implicit recourse to phenomenology is flagrant. If to transfer is to deprive someone of something and to give it to someone else, there is more to depriving and giving than disjoining and conjoining. The deprivation of a value/object is a subject undergoes is a modification that affects this subject as a victim. What the final stage of the constitution of the model adds, therefore, is a phenomenology of suffering and acting in which concepts such as deprivation and donation get their meaning. The whole topological language of this final phase is a mixture of logical conjunctions and disjunctions and of modifications coming not just from the praxic realm but also from the realm of suffering. This conclusion should not surprise us if it is true that the topological syntax of transferences, which repeats the traversal of the logical operations of the semiotic square, "organizes the narration inasmuch as it is a process creative of values" (DuSens, p. 178). How does this doubling pass from the syntactic operations that, within the taxonomic framework, were "foreseeable and calculable" (p. 166), to "a process creative of values"? Somewhere the logic must be inadequate to the creativity proper to narrative. This gap opens up at the level of transference, inasmuch as correlation and presupposition become distanced from the strong logical model to express the dissymmetry of deprivation and attribution and the novelty belonging to the attribution. This aspect of novelty attached to attribution is even more manifest once it is power, knowledge, and wanting to do something—that is, the very virtuality of doing something—that befall the subject.

This gap between the initial schematism, where all the relationships balance one another out, and the final schematism, where new values are produced, is concealed in the particular case of Propp's Russian fairy tales where the circulation of the values ends with a restoration of the initial state. The

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| king's daughter, enchanted by a villain who takes her off to hide her, is found by the hero and returned to her parents! Greimas himself, in his Structural Semantics, admits that the most general function of narrative has been to restore a threatened order of values. Yet we know, thanks to the schematism of plots produced by the cultures whose heirs we are, that this restoration characterizes only one category of narrative, and even no doubt one type of folktales. Plot articulates "crises" and "denouements" in so many different ways! And the hero (or antihero) is changed in the course of a plot in so many different ways. Is it even certain that every narrative can be projected onto Greimas's topological matrix made up of two programs, a polemical relation, and a transference of values? Our study of the metamorphoses of plot makes me tend to doubt this. To conclude, Greimas's model seems to me to be under a double constraint, logical on the one hand, praxic and pathetic (that is, as having to do with acting and suffering) on the other. Yet it only satisfies the first of these, in continually pushing forward the inscription on the semiotic square of the components of narrativity introduced at each new level, if along with this the understanding we have of narrative and of plot gives rise to appropriate additions of a clearly syntagmatic order—without which the taxonotic model would remain sterile and inert."

To recognize this mixed character of Greimas's model is not to refute it. On the contrary, it is to bring to light the conditions of its intelligibility, just as we have already done in Part II of volume I for the nomological models used in history.

Games with Time
The enrichment of the concept of emplotment and, correlative, of narrative time—to which the following chapter is
devoted—is most certainly a privilege belonging to fictional narrative, rather than to historical narrative, owing to the
elimination of certain constraints characteristic of historical narrative. (These constraints will be the topic of a detailed study
in Part IV in the next volume.) This privilege is due to the remarkable property narrative possesses of being split into
utterance [enunciation] and statement [evidence]. To introduce this distinction, it suffices to recall that the configurating act
presiding over emplotment is a indicative act. involving a "grasping together." More precisely, this act belongs to the family
of reflective judgments. We have been led to say therefore that to narrate a story is already to "reflect upon" the event
narrated. For this reason, narrative "grasping together" carries with it (the capacity for distancing itself from its own
production and in this way dividing itself in two.
This power of Ideological judgment to divide itself in two reappears today in a purely linguistic terminology as "utterance"
and "statement," which under the influence of Gunther Müller, Gerard Genette, and the semioticians of Greimas's school has
received the right to be used in narrative poetics. By means of such a shift in attention from the narrative statement to its
utterance, the specifically fictive features of narrative time take on a distinctive outline. They are in a sense set free by the
interplay between the various temporal levels stemming from the reflexivity of the configuring act itself. We shall consider
several versions of (this interplay, which already begins between (he statement and the things that are narrated, but which is
made possible by the split between utterance and statement.

UTTERANCE AND THE VERBAL TENSES
By way of a preface, I would like to consider the resources that the system of verbal tenses offers to utterance. This
investigation seemed to me to belong at the head of my studies devoted to the games with time resulting from the split
Time in Fictional Narrative
into utterance and statement inasmuch as the three authors I have chosen to examine have openly connected their theory of
verb tenses to the function of utterance in discourse rather than to the structure of the resulting statements, which remain
separated either from the speaker or the speech situation. In addition, the solution these authors have provided to the question
of the organization of the verb tenses in natural languages gives rise to a paradox that directly concerns the status of time in
fiction, hence of time at the level of mimesis.
On the one hand, the principal contribution of this inquiry is to demonstrate that the system of tenses, which varies from one
language to another, cannot be derived from the phenomenological experience of time and from its intuitive distinction
between present, past, and future. This independence of the system of tenses contributes to the independence of a narrative
composition on two levels. On a strictly paradigmatic level (let us say, on the level of the table of verb tenses in a given
language), the tense system provides a storehouse of distinctions, relations, and combinations from which fiction draws the
resources for its own autonomy with respect to lived experience. In this regard, language, with its system of tenses, contains a
ready-made means of modulating temporally all the action verbs throughout the narrative chain. What is more, at a level that
may be called syntagmatic, these tenses contribute to the nanativization, not only by the interplay of their differences within
the broad grammatical paradigm, but also by their successive arrangement along the chain of a narrative. The fact that French
grammar contains within the same system an imperfect tense and a preterite or absolute past tense is already a great resource.
But the fact that that succession of an imperfect tense followed by a preterite produces a new meaning-effect is an even more
admirable one. In other words, the syntagmatization of tenses is just as essential as their paradigmatic constitution. However,
the first point, just as much as the second one, expresses the autonomy of the system of tenses with respect to what, in an
elementary semantics of everyday experience, we call time.
On the other hand, the question remains open to what extent the system of tenses can be free of all reference to the
phenomenological experience of time. On this point, the hesitation of the three conceptions we are going to discuss is most
instructive. It illustrates the complexity of the relation that I myself am acknowledging between the time of fiction and the
time of phenomenological experience, whether we take this on the level of prefiguration (mimesis) or on the level of
reflexion (mimesis). The necessity of disconnecting the m of tenses from our lived experience of time and the impossibility el se uniting them completely seem to me marvelously to illustrate the status at--arative configurations as at
one and the same time being autonomous in relation to everyday experience and mediating between what precedes and what
follows p. ri'rative.
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Games with Time
If | begin with the distinction introduced by Emile Benveniste between history and discourse and continue with the
contributions of Kate Hamburger and Harald Weinrich to the problematic of verb tenses, this is for two reasons. On
the one hand, we can in this way follow the progress from a study conducted within a purely paradigmatic framework to a
conception that adds to the study of the static organization of tenses a study of their successive distribution within large
 textual units. On the other hand, we can observe, from one conception to the next, a progress in the dissociation of these
tenses from the lived experience of time—and we can measure the obstacles that prevent us from carrying this effort through
to its end. It is here that I shall seek the rut-jor contribution of these three conceptions to my own inquiry into the degree of
autonomy belonging to narrative configurations in relation to the prefigured or refigured experience of time.
Let us recall briefly the basis of the distinction introduced by Benveniste between discourse and history. In historical
utterance, the speaker is not implied: "no one speaks here; the events seem to narrate themselves" (p. 208). Discourse,
however, designates "every utterance assuming a speaker ::ziel u hearer, and in the speaker, the intention of influencing the
other in some way" (p. 209). Each mode of utterance has its own system of tenses: tenses that are included, others that are
excluded. In this way, historical utterance includes three tenses: the aorist (or preterite), the imperfect, and the pluperfect (to
which may be added the prospective—"he should have left" or "he was going to leave"). More particularly, historical
utterance excludes the present and along with it the future, which is a present to come, and the perfect, which is a present in
the past. Conversely, discourse excludes one tense, the aorist, and includes three basic tenses: the present, future, and perfect
tenses. The present is the basic tense of discourse because it marks the contemporaneity of what is stated with the
"instance of discourse." It is thus bound up with the self-referential character of the instance of discourse. This is why the two
levels of utterance are also distinguished by a second series of criteria: the categories of the persons. Historical utterance
processes belonging to a fictive subject. In the "assertive system" of language, the preterite designates the real past of a be portrayed "is the sole epistemological instance where the use of verbs designating internal processes, that is, psychic or mental processes. "Epic fiction," Hamburger states, not be closer to Aristotle, for whom fiction is a mimesis of active characters. The criterion of fiction hence consists in feelings, and actions of the narrated story. These origin that itself is real, with the I-Origines belonging to the \( I \) characters in fiction. The entire weight of fiction rests on reason for this difference. It results entirely from the fact that fiction replaces the I-Origo of assertive discourse, an which for time I shall speak of below, results from this break. Before ascertaining its consequences, we must grasp the double. It involves, first, the relation between the time of the utterance and the time of the statement and, second, the relation between these two times and the time of life or action. As for the present of the instance of discourse, it is hard to say that it is without any relation to lived time, if we add that the perfect tense is the present in the past, and the future is the present to come. The grammatical criterion of the present,, namely, the self-referential character of the instance of discourse, is one thing. The meaning of this self-reference itself, namely, the contemporaneity of what is recounted with the instance of discourse, is something else again. The mimetic relation of the grammatical categories with respect to lived experience is contained entirely within this relation, both of disjunction and conjunction, between the grammatical present of the instance of discourse and: the lived present. This mimetic relation) between the verb tenses and lived time cannot be confined to discourse if, following Benveniste's successors, we are more interested in the role of discourse in narrative than in the opposition between discourse and narrative. Can past events, whether real or imaginary, be presented without any intervention of a speaker in the narrative? Can the events simply appear on the horizon of the story without anyone speaking in any way? Does not the absence of a narrator from historical narrative result from a strategy by means of which the narrator makes himself absent from the narrative? This distinction,, which we shall examine below for its own sake, cannot help but affect even at this early stage the question I am raising concerning the relation between verb tenses and lived time. If it is within narrative itself that we must distinguish between utterance (discourse in Benveniste's terms) and statement (narrative in his vocabulary), then the problem becomes double. It involves, first, the relation between the time of the utterance and the time of the statement and, second, the relation between these two times and the time of life or action. Before entering into this debate, let us widen even further, first with Kate Hamburger, the split between the basic time and the statement is perfectly homogeneous with the shift brought about by the symbolic system as a whole on the level of mimesis, in relation to the empirical and praxic level of mimesis.,

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On the other hand, the distinction between the two systems of utterances is not entirely unrelated to time. The question arises mainly in connection with narrative. It has not perhaps been sufficiently remarked that the narrative Ben-veniste opposes to discourse is constantly termed "historical narrative" or "historical utterance." Historical utterance "characterizes the narrative of past events" (p. 206). fa this definition the term "past" is just as important as the terms "narrative" and "events." These terms designate "events that took place at a certain moment of time . . . without any intervention of the speaker" (ibid.). If there is no formal contradiction between this definition and the attempt to dissociate the system offenses from the intuitive distinction between past, present, and future-, this is insofar as reference can be made either to the actual past, as in the case of the historian, or to the fictive past, as in the case the novelist (and this alJiows Benveniste to draw one of his examples from a passage by Balzac). Nevertheless, if narrative is characterized in relation to discourse as a series of events that seem to relate themselves without the intervention of a speaker, this is so to the extent that, according to Benveniste, it is part of the notion of past, whether real or fictive, not to imply the self-reference of the speaker in his utterance, as in discourse. What is not developed here is the relation between the fictive past and the real past. Does the fictive past assume the real past, hence memory and history, or is it the very structure of historical temporal expression that produces the characterization as past? But then it is not apparent why the fictive past is perceived as a quasi-past.³

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Before entering into this debate, let us widen even further, first with Kate Hamburger, the split between the basic time of fiction—the preterite—and that of assertions made about reality, the time of ordinary conversation, and then with Harald Weinrich, the dissociation of the entire system of tenses in natural languages from the categories of lived time: the past, present, and future.

We are in debt to Kate Hamburger for the clear distinction she makes between the grammatical form of verb tenses, in particular the past tenses, and their temporal signification in the realm of fiction. No one has stressed more than she has the break that literary fiction introduces into the functioning of discourse.³ An insurmountable barrier separates assertive discourse (Aus-sagen) that refers to reality from the fictional narrative. A different logic, the implications of which for time I shall speak of below, results from this break. Before ascertaining its consequences, we must grasp the reason for this difference. It results entirely from the fact that fiction replaces the I-Origo of assertive discourse, an origin that itself is real, with the I-Origines belonging to the \( I \) characters in fiction. The entire weight of fiction rests on the invention of \( i \) characters, characters who think, feel, and act, and who are the fictive \( I \)-Origines of the thoughts, feelings, and actions of the narrated story. These \textit{Fiktive Ichpersonen} are the pivot for the logic of fiction. We could not be closer to Aristotle, for whom fiction is a mimesis of active characters. The criterion of fiction hence consists in the use of verbs designating internal processes, that is, psychic or mental processes. "Epic fiction," Hamburger states, "is the sole epistemological instance where the \textit{Ich-Origininitat} (or subjectivity) of a third-person qua third person can be portrayed ['dargestellt']" (p. 83).³

What upsets the system of tenses in the realm of fiction is the appearance in discourse of verbs designating internal processes belonging to a fictive subject. In the "assertive system" of language, the preterite designates the real past of a
real subject who determines the zero point of the temporal system—origin here is taken in the sense in which geometers speak of the origin of a system of coordinates. There is a past only for a Reals Ich-Origin; the ich participates in the sphere of reality of this I-Origo. In the realm of fiction, the epic preterite loses its grammatical function of designating the past. The narrated action does not, properly speaking, occur. In this sense, we have the right to speak of the absence of temporality in fiction (cf. pp. 89-98). We 65 lime in rit

cannot even speak of "presentification" (Vergegenwartigung) in Schiller's sense, for this would indicate a relation to the real subject of assertion and I would cancel out the purely fictive character of the I-Origines of the characters. It is rather a question of a present, in the sense of a time simultaneous with 'the narrated action, but a present that itself is unrelated to the real present of assertion.

If the introduction of verbs referring to mental states constitutes the criterion for the replacement of the I-Origo of the real subject of assertion by the I-Origines of fictive characters, the loss of the meaning of "past" in the epic preterite is a symptom of this. Other symptoms follow, for example, discordant combinations of temporal adverbs that would be impossible in assertions about reality. Thus we read in one fictional work: "Morgan war Weihnachten" ("Tomorrow was Christmas"). Or: "and, of course he was coming to her party tonight." Adding an adverb expressing the future to an imperfect proves that the imperfect has lost its grammatical function.

To say that its opposition to the assertion of reality constitutes a good definition of epic fiction and that the appearance of the fictive character can be taken as the principal sign of entry into narrative is uncontestably a strong way of marking out fiction. What remains debatable is that the loss of the meaning "past" is sufficient to characterize the system of verb tenses in fiction. Why is the grammatical form preserved, while its significan as past is abolished? Ought we not to look for a positive reason for maintaining the grammatical form, one as strong as the reason for the loss of its significan in real time? The key, it seems, is to be sought in the distinction made between the real author and the narrator, who is fictive. In fiction two discourses are held together, the discourse of the narrator and that of the characters. Kate Hamburger, who is careful to sever all connections with the system of asser-j tion, is willing to consider only a single center of consciousness, the fictive, third person in third-person narratives. We must therefore set into the play the dialectic of the character and the narrator, the narrator being considered just as fictive a construction as the characters in the narrative.

Harald Weinrich's attempt to dissociate the organization of tenses from the consideration of lived time and from the categories (past, present, and future) that grammar is supposed to have borrowed from the latter, starts from a different concern. The first separation made between the verb tenses and the categories of lived time is contemporaneous with the very first effort to verbalize experience. (In this sense, the opposition between narrating and asserting falls inside a more inclusive grammar offenses.)

This strong claim frees his project immediately from the assumption that some given tense is to be found in every language, and invites us to pay equal attention to all the tenses that make up the nomenclature of a particular lan- guage. The framework of this investigation is particularly favorable to our reflection on the relation between the organization of the tenses and the meaning of time in fiction, inasmuch as the dimension held to be most relevant is the text rather than the sentence. By breaking in this way with the exclusive privilege of the sentence, Weinrich intends to apply the structural perspective to a "textual linguistics." In this way, Weinrich gives himself enough space to do equal justice to the positional value of a tense in the nomenclature and the distribution of tenses throughout a text. It is this passage from a paradigmatic point of view to a syntagmatic one that is richest in lessons for a study of time in fiction, to the extent that fiction too takes the text, not the sentence, as its unit of measurement.

If the principle of tense organization in a given language is not based on the experience of lived time, it must be sought elsewhere. Unlike Benveniste, Weinrich borrows his principle for the classification and distribution of tenses from communication theory. This choice implies that the syntax to which the study of tenses refers consists of the network of signals addressed by a speaker to a hearer or a reader that allows him or her to receive and decode a verbal message in a certain way. And it invites us to perform an initial distribution of the possible objects of communication in relation to certain axes of communication: "reflecting this schematic partitioning of the world is precisely the role of the syntactic categories" (p. 27). Let us put aside for later discussion the mimetic feature so obviously introduced by this reference to a world upon which syntax has already conferred an initial distribution, before semantics, or, let us say, before the lexicon.

Weinrich distributes the tenses of the natural languages he examines along three axes, all of which are axes of communication.

1. The "speech situation" (Sprechsituation) governs the first distinction between narrating (erzählen) and commenting or discussing (besprechen). This is by far the most important distinction for our purposes, and it provides the subtitle for the original text: Besprochene und erzahle Welt. It corresponds to two different speech attitudes, commentary being characterized by tension or involvement (gespannte Haltung), narrative by relaxation, easing of tension, or detachment (entspannte Haltung).

Representative of the commented world are dramatic dialogues, political memoranda, editorials, testaments, scientific
reports, scholarly essays, legal treatises, and all forms of ritual, codified-, or performative discourse. This group is associated with an attitude of tension in that the interlocutors are concerned with or involved in the discourse. They are grappling with the reported content: "all commentary is a fragment of action" (p. 33). In this sense, only non-narrative speech is dangerous: *Tua res agitur*.

Representative of the narrated world are folktales, legends, short stories, novels, and historical narratives.3 Here the interlocutors are not implied. They are not in question; they do not come on stage.4 This why it may be said in 67 Time in Motional Narration reference to Aristotle's *Poetics* that even pitiful or terrifying events, when they are received with detachment, belong to the narrated world.

The division of tenses into two groups corresponding to each attitude is the signal that orients the communication situation toward tension or relaxation. "The 'obstination' of temporal morphemes in signaling commentary and narrative enable the speaker to influence the listener, to shape the reception the speaker wants to see reserved for his text" (p. 30). However, if the typology of communication situations on the basis of tension or relaxation is, in principle, accessible to common experience, it is marked on the linguistic level by the distribution of the syntactic signals that are the tenses. To two speech situations correspond two distinct groups of tenses. In French there are, for the commented world, the present, the compound past, and the future; for the narrated world, the preterite, imperfect, pluperfect, and conditional. (We shall see how these groups are subdivided in turn in relation to the two subsequent criteria that refine the basic distinction between commented world and narrated world.) Hence there is a relation of mutual dependence between the speech attitude and the tense distribution. On the one hand, these attitudes provide a motivation for the distribution of the tenses into two groups, inasmuch as the speaker employs commentary tenses in order "to make the partners feel the tension in the attitude of communication" (p. 32). On the other hand, the tenses themselves transmit a signal from the speaker to the listener indicating "this is a commentary, this is a narrative." It is in this sense that they bring about an initial distribution among the possible objects of communication, an initial schematic division of the world into a commented world and a narrated world. And this distribution has its own criteria, since it rests on a systematic tabulation based on samplings from a number of texts. The preponderance of one group of tenses in one type of text and of another group of tenses in another type of text may thus be measured.

This initial distribution of tenses is not unrelated to the distinction between discourse and narrative in Benveniste, except that it no longer involves the relation of the speaker to the utterance but the relation of interlocution and, through it, the guidance of the reception of the message in order to allow an initial distribution of the possible objects of communication. The world common to the interlocutors is therefore also affected by a purely syntactic distinction. This is why, for Weinrich, it is a question of a narrated world and a commented world. As with Benveniste, this distinction has the advantage of freeing the distribution of tenses from the categories of lived time. This "neutrality" with respect to time (Zeit) (p. 44) is of the greatest importance for defining the tenses of the narrated world. What grammars call the past and the imperfect (which I shall oppose to one another below when I discuss the notion of "putting into relief") are narrative tenses, not because a narrative basically expresses past events, real or fictive, but because these tenses are oriented toward an attitude of relaxation, of uninvolvment. What is essential is that the narrated world is foreign to the immediate and directly preoccupying surroundings of the speaker and the listener. The model in this regard is still the fairy tale. "More than any other, it takes us out of our everyday life and distances us from it!" (p. 45). The expressions "once upon a time," "il était une fois," "vor Zeiten," and "Eraser que se era"—literally, "it was that it was"—serve to mark the entry into narrative. In other words, it is not the past as such that is expressed by the past tense but the attitude of relaxation, of uninvolvment.

This initial major bifurcation based upon the interlocutor's degree of vigilance has disconcerting consequences, from the very beginning, for the concept of narrativity. The act of configuration is in effect split in two, as soon as dialogical drama falls on the side of commentary, while the epic, the novel, and history fall on the side of the narrated world. In an unexpected way, we are brought back to the Aristotelian distinction between diegesis and drama, except that the criterion used by Aristotle was based on the direct or indirect relation of the poet to the action reported. Homer himself states the facts, although he effaces himself from his account as much as the diegetic genre allows, whereas Sophocles has the action produced by the characters themselves. The paradox that results for us is the same, however, insofar as the notion of plot has been borrowed from drama, which Weinrich also excludes from the narrated world. I do not think this difficulty should detain us for long inasmuch as the universe of discourse that I am placing under the title "narrative configuration" concerns the composition of statements and leaves intact the difference affecting utterances. Besides, the distinction between tension and relaxation is not as clear-cut as it may first appear. Weinrich himself mentions the example of exciting or thrilling (spannend) novels, and notes that "if the narrator gives a certain tension to his narrative, it is by way of compensation." By means of an appropriate technique, he "counterbalances in part the relaxation belonging to the initial attitude. ... He narrates as if he were commenting" (p. 35). In Weinrich's mind this "as if" does not do away with the basic phenomenon of a withdrawal from the world of care. Instead it makes it more complex, matching up with it and overlapping it to the point of concealing it. Similarly, that the two groups of tenses do not mix confirms the persistence of the attitude of relaxation underlying that of the tension that compensates for it. But the concealment is so organically bound up with the attitude of withdrawal in all narratives that, like the novel, are related to exciting narratives, that relaxation and tension have to be superimposed rather than dissociated and a place has to be made for the composite genre born out of this sort of involvement-in-withdrawal.

With these remarks we rejoin the positions taken by Benveniste's successors, who, starting from a different division than Weinrich, have been more interested in including discourse in narrative than in severing the one from the other.
Time in Fictional Narrative

and the utterance. The entire range of speech attitudes, extending from withdrawal to involvement, will stem from the utterance.

2. With the "speech perspective" a second syntactic axis enters into play, one no less related to the communication process than the axis of the speech attitude. Here it is a question of the relation of anticipation, coincidence, or retrospection linking the time of the act with the time of the text. The possibility of a lag between the time of the act and the time of the text results from the linear character of the speech chain and hence from the unfolding of the text itself. On the one hand, every linguistic sign has something before it and something after it in the speech chain. As a result, the information already given and that anticipated contribute to determining each sign in the Textzeit. On the other hand, the orientation of the speaker in relation to the Textzeit is itself an action that has its own time, the Aktzeit. This time of action can coincide with the time of the text, fall behind it, or anticipate it.

Language has signals that warn us of the coincidence of, or the lag between, the Aktzeit and the Textzeit. Among the tenses of commentary, the compound past indicates retrospection, the future looking ahead, and the present itself is unmarked. Among the tenses of narrative, the pluperfect and the anterior past indicate retrospection, the conditional looking ahead, the preterite and imperfect the zero degree of the narrated world. The narrator is associated with the events whether engaged in them (as in first-person narrative) or whether only a witness to them (as in third-person narrative). In this way, the conditional is to narrative what the future is to commentary; both signal anticipated information. The notion of future time is thus eliminated. "'Anticipated information' only means that the information is given prematurely in relation to the moment of its realization" (p. 74). Nor are the retrospective tenses governed by the notion of the past. In commentary, I am concerned in the present with retrospective information. The retrospective tenses, therefore, open the past to our grasp while narrative makes it inaccessible to us. Debating the past is prolonging it into the present. The case of scientific history is noteworthy in this respect. Historians, in fact, both narrate and comment. They comment whenever they explain. This is why the tenses of historical representation are mixed. "In history, the basic structure of representation consists in setting narrative within commentary" (p. 79). The art of history lies in the mastery of such alternating tenses. The same manner of setting narrative within a framework of commentary can be observed in the judicial process and in certain interventions by the narrator in his story in the form of commentary. This disengagement of the syntactic function of signalling, which belongs to the tenses, in relation to the expression of time itself, is most noteworthy in the case of the French imperfect and preterite tenses that mark, not a distance back in time, but the zero degree of gap between Aktzeit and Textzeit. "The preterite (group II) indicates narrative. Its function is not to mark the past" (p. 100). In this way, past and narrative cannot be superimposed. For one thing, the past can be neutralized in other ways than simply by being narrated; for example, by being commented upon. I then hold it in the present instead of freeing myself from it or going beyond it (aufheben) through the language of narrative. For another, we can narrate other things than just the past: "the space in which fictional narrative unfolds is not the past" (p. 101). In order to put a narrative in the past we must add to the time of the narrated world other features that distinguish truth from fiction, such as the production and criticism of documents. The verb tenses no longer serve as the key to this process. 15

3. "Putting into relief" constitute, the third axis of the analysis of tenses. This is still an axis of communication, without any reference to the properties of time. This putting into relief consists in projecting certain contours into the foreground and pushing others into the background. In this analysis Weinrich attempts to distance himself from the grammatical categories characterizing the aspect or mode of action, which in his opinion are too closely related to the primacy of the sentence and too dependent on the reference to time (whether we speak of a state, a process, or an event). Once again, the function of syntax is to guide the reader's attention and expectations. This is precisely what occurs in French in the tense that is particularly suited for putting-into-relief in the narrative domain, the preterite; whereas the imperfect signals the receding into the background of the narrated contents, as is frequently observed at the beginning and the end of folktales and legends. But this same observation can be extended to the narrative parts of a text such as the Discourse on Method. Descartes uses "the imperfect when he immobilizes his thought, the preterite when he progresses methodically" (p. 222). Here again, Weinrich makes no concessions: "Putting-into-relief is the one and only function of the opposition between the imperfect and the preterite in the narrated world" (p. 117, his emphasis).

Might it be objected that the notion of slow or rapid tempo designates a characteristic of time itself? No. The impression of rapidity is explained by the concentration of values in the foreground, as in the famous expression Veni, vidi, vici or in Voltaire's brisk style in his Contes et Romans. Conversely, the slowness of description in the realistic novel, underscored by the abundance of imperfects, is explained by the complacency with which the author lingers over the sociological background of the events he reports. 16

We now see the architecture of the whole that in Weinrich's view governs the syntactic articulation of the tenses. The three relevant elements that provide the guideline for the analysis are not coordinated with one another but are subordinated one to the other and constitute a net of finer and finer mesh. First comes the broad division between narrative and commentary, with its two groups of tenses. Then, within each group, the threefold division of perspectives: live/retrospective, zero degree, and anticipation. Finally, within each perspective, the bifurcation between the first and
Harald Weinrich's book is not limited, however, to this ever more detailed study of the paradigmatic division of the tenses. This mode of division finds an indispensable complement in the distribution of the same tenses throughout the course of a text, whether in commentary or in narrative. In this respect, the analyses devoted to temporal transitions, that is, to the "passage from one sign to the other in the course of the linear unfolding of the text" (p. 199), constitute a fundamental mediacion between the resources offered by syntax and the utterance of some particular narrative configuration. This syn-tagmatic complement to the paradigmatic division of tenses in a natural language must not be overlooked if we recall that a text is composed of "signs arranged in a linear series, transmitted from speaker to listener in a chronological sequence" (p. 198).

These temporal transitions can be homogeneous, if they occur within the same group, or heterogeneous, if they are made from one group to another. The former are shown to be the most frequent. They guarantee, in effect, the consistency of the text, its textuality. The latter, however, are responsible for the richness of information. Thus we find the interruption of the narrative by direct discourse (dialogue), and the recourse to indirect discourse in the most varied and subtle forms, such as, for example, free indirect discourse (to which I shall return, below, in terms of the narrative voice). Other temporal transitions, concealed under the old name of the agreement of tenses, constitute but so many signals to guide the reading of texts.

Of all the questions that can be raised by Weinrich's dense work, I shall retain only one: what is the relevance of resorting to the syntax of tenses for an investigation of time in the realm of fiction? Let us return to the discussion at the point where Benveniste left us. Weinrich's work will enable us to make more precise the two theses I arrived at there. On the one hand, I maintained that the autonomy of tense systems in natural languages appears to be entirely compatible with the break made by fiction on the plane of mimesis. On the other hand, this autonomy of a tense system does not extend to a total independence in relation to lived time, inasmuch as this system articulates the time of fiction, which maintains a tie with lived time, on the two sides of fiction. Do Weinrich's analyses contradict this thesis?

The first part of the thesis poses no problem. The arrangement adopted by Weinrich is particularly well-suited for showing how the invention of plots is joined to the syntax of tenses. First, by taking the text and not the sentence as his field of operation, Weinrich works on units of the same size as those with which narrative poetics is concerned. Next, by imposing finer and finer distinctions on the nomenclature of tenses and by combining this nomenclature with that of numerous other temporal signs, such as adverbs and adverbial phrases, without forgetting the person of the verb, textual linguistics shows the richness of the spectrum of differences available to the art of composition. The final differentiating factor, that of "putting into relief," has in this regard the greatest affinity with emplotment. The idea of putting into relief guides us effortlessly toward distinguishing just what constitutes an event in a narrated story. Does not Weinrich fervently quote Goethe's phrase for designating the foreground, namely, "the extraordinary event," which has as its equivalent Aristotle's peripeteia? It is even clearer that the indications of tempo in a narrative resulting from the syntax of tenses and adverbs, whose rich fabric we glimpsed just above, take on their relief, precisely, as they contribute to the progress of the plot. The changes of tempo are scarcely definable outside of their use in narrative composition. Finally, by adding a table of temporal transitions to the tense groupings according to their paradigms, textual linguistics shows the meaningful sequences of tenses that are available to narrative composition for producing its meaning-effects. This syntagmatic complement constitutes the most appropriate transition between textual linguistics and narrative poetics. The transitions from one tense to another act as a guide for the transformations from an initial situation to a final situation, and this is what constitutes every plot. The idea that homogeneous transitions assure the consistency of the text, while heterogeneous transitions assure the wealth of its information-content, finds a direct parallel in the theory of emplotment. The plot, too, presents homogeneous features and heterogeneous features, a stability and a progression, recurrences and differences. In this sense, we can say that if syntax offers its range of paradigms and transitions to the narrator, these resources are actually realized in the work of composition.

This is the profound affinity that can be discerned between the theory of tenses and the theory of narrative composition.

On the other hand, I am not prepared to follow Weinrich in his attempt to dissociate the verb tenses (Tempus) from time (Zeit) in every respect. To the extent that the system of tenses can be considered as the linguistic apparatus allowing the structuring of the time appropriate for the activity of narrative configuration, we can both do justice to the analyses of Tempus and question the assertion that the tenses have nothing to do with time (Zeit). Fiction, I have said, continually makes the transition between the experience that precedes the text and the experience that follows it. In my opinion, the system of tenses, regardless of its autonomy in relation to time and its current designations, never makes a clean break in every respect with the experience of time. The system of tenses comes out of time and returns to it, and the signs of this descent and this destination are indelible in the distribution of tenses, both linearly and paradigmatically.

First of all, it is not without reason that in so many modern languages the same term designates time [le temps] and the verb tenses [les temps verbaux] or that the different designations attributed to the two orders retain a semantic kinship...
that is easily perceived by speakers. (This is the case in English between "tense" and "time," and in German the alternation between the German and Latin roots in Zeit and Tempus easily allows this kinship to be reestablished.) Next, Weinrich himself has preserved a mimetic feature in his typology of tenses, since the function of signaling and guidance ascribed to the syntactic distinctions results in an "initial schematic partitioning of the world." And what is in question in the distinction made between the tenses in terms of the speech situation in a narrated world and a commented world. I am well aware that the term "world" here designates the sum of possible objects of communication, without any explicit ontological implication, if we are not to wipe out the initial distinction between Tempus and Zeit. However, a narrated world and a commented world remain worlds nonetheless, whose relations to the world of praxis are only held in suspension, following the law of mimesis.

The difficulty returns with each of the three axes of communication that govern the distribution of tenses. Weinrich justly asserts that the preterite of folktales and legends, of the novel and the short story, signals only the entry into narrative. He finds confirmation of this break with the expression of past time in the use of the preterite in the Utopian narrative, in science fiction, and in novels dealing with the future. But can we conclude from this that the signal marking the entry into narrative has no connection whatsoever with the expression of the past as such? Weinrich does not, in fact, deny that in another communication situation these tenses express the past. Are these two linguistic facts completely unrelated? Can we not recognize, despite the caesura, a certain filiation that would be that of the as if? Does not the signal marking the entry into fiction make an oblique reference to the past through the process of neutralization, of suspension? Husserl discusses at great length this filiation by neutralization. Following him, Eugen Fink defines Bild in terms of the neutralization of mere "presentification" (Vergegenwärtigung). By this neutralization of the "realist" intention of memory, all absence becomes by analogy a quasi-past. Every narrative—even of the future—speaks of the ir-real as if it were past. How could we explain that narrative tenses are also those of memory, if there were not between narrative and memory some metaphorical relation produced by neutralization?

I am intentionally reinterpreting the criterion of relaxation proposed by Weinrich in terms of the neutralization of the presentification of the past to distinguish the narrated world from the commented world. The attitude of relaxation signaled by the narrative tenses is not limited, in my opinion, to suspending the reader's involvement in his or her real environment. It suspends even more fundamentally the belief in the past as having-been in order to transpose it to the level of fiction, as the opening phrases of fairy tales, referred to above, invite us to do. An indirect relation to lived time is thus preserved through the mediation of neutralization. The conservation of the temporal intention of the tenses, despite the break established when we enter into the realm of fiction, can also be observed along the other two axes that complete the division between narrative and commentary. As we have seen, in order to introduce the three perspectives—retrospection, anticipation, and zero degree—Weinrich is forced to distinguish between Aktzeit and Textzeit. The return of the term Zeit is not an accident. The textual unfolding, whether oral or written, is said to be "obviously an unfolding in time" (Le Temps, p. 67). This constraint results from the linear character of the speech chain. It follows that retrospection and anticipation are subjected to the same conditions of temporal linearity. Even if one tries to replace these two terms by those of reported or anticipated information, I do not see how the notions of future and past can be entirely eliminated from their definition. Retrospection and looking ahead express the most primitive structure of retention and pretension of the living present. Without this oblique reference to the structure of time, we cannot understand what anticipation or retrospection means. Similar remarks may be made concerning the third axis of communication, that of putting into relief. If it is in fact true that on the level of fiction the distinction between the imperfect and the past tense no longer owes anything to the usual tense designations, the primary sense of the distinction does seem to be tied to the capacity of discerning in the tense itself an aspect of permanence and an aspect of incidental occurrence. It seems unlikely that no aspect of this characterization of time itself passes into the tenses involved in putting-into-relief. For if this were not the case, how could Weinrich write: "In the foreground of narrative, all that occurs, moves, changes"? (p. 176). Fictive time is never completely cut off from lived time, the time of memory and of action. I myself see in this twofold relation of filiation and breaking-off that is at work between the tenses of the lived past and the tenses of the narrative an exemplary illustration of the relations between mimesis, and mimesis. Past tenses first express the past; then by a metaphorical transition that preserves what it supersedes, they state the entry into fiction without a direct, though perhaps with an oblique, reference to the past as such.

There is an additional reason, and in my opinion the decisive one, for not burning all the bridges between the verb tenses and time. It has to do with the relation to what I have described as the second side of the text, the relation that defines the stage of mimesis. Fiction not only retains the trace of the world of praxis against which it stands out; it also redirects our gaze toward features of experience that it "invents," that is to say, both discovers and creates. In this respect the tenses break with the designations of lived time, the time omitted by textual linguistics, so that they may rediscover this time with infinitely diversified grammatical resources.

If is this prospective relation with regard to an experience of time, as it is sketched out in literature, that explains that the great precursors, whose patronage Weinrich invokes, persistently tied the verb tenses to time. When Goethe and Schiller refer in their correspondence to the freedom and mobility of the omniscient narrator, who surveys a practically immobile epic action, when August Wilhelm Schlegel celebrates the "reflective serenity belonging to the narrator," they expect the emergence of a new quality of time itself from aesthetic experience. In particular, when Thomas Mann calls Der Zauberberg a Litroman, he never doubts that "its very object is time [Zeit] in its pure state" (p. 55). The qualitative difference between the time of the "flat-lands" and the easy, carefree time of those who, up above, are
devoted to the eternal snows (p. 56) is certainly a meaning-effect of the narrated world. In this sense it is as fictive as the rest of the universe of the novel. However, it does actually consist in a new consciousness of time, in the mode of the as-if. The verb tenses are in the service of this production of meaning.

I shall pursue this investigation no further here; it will be the topic of the next chapter. This investigation, in fact, involves a new notion, that of the fictive experience of time, such as this is undergone by the characters, themselves fictive, in the narrative. This fictive experience has to do with a different time:ion of the literary work than the one we are considering here, namely, its power to project a world. It is in this projected world that the characters live which have an experience of time in it, an experience which is just as fictive as they are but which nonetheless has a world as its horizon. Does not Weinrich authorize this furtive insight into the notion of a world of the work when he himself speaks of a narrated world and a commented world? Does he not give this insight a more specific legitimation by taking syntax as an initial partitioning of the world of possible objects of communication? What indeed are the possible objects if not fictions capable of orienting us later in deciphering; our own condition and its temporality?

These suggestions, which for the moment are no more than questions, allow us at least to glimpse some of the reasons why the study of tenses can no more cut its ties with the experience of time and with its customary designations than fiction can snap its moorings to the world of praxis, from which it proceeds and to which it returns.

THE TIME OF NARRATING (ERZAHLZEIT) AND NARRATED TIME (ERZAHLTE ZEIT)

With this distinction introduced by Gunther Müller and taken up again by Gerard Genette, we enter into a problematic that, in contrast to the preceding one, does not seek in the utterance itself an internal principle of differentiation that would be apparent in the distribution of the tenses, but instead looks for a new key for interpreting time in fiction in the distinction between utterance and statement.

It is of the utmost importance to state, without further delay, that unlike the three authors discussed above, Müller introduces a distinction that is not confined to within discourse. It opens onto a time of life which is not unlike the reference to a narrated world in Weinrich. This feature does not carry over in Genette's structural narratology and can only be pursued in a meditation belonging to a hermeneutics of the world of the text, such as I shall sketch in the final chapter of this volume. For Genette, the distinction between the time of the utterance and the time of the statement is maintained within the bounds of the text, without any kind of mimetic implication.

My aim is to show that Genette is more rigorous than Müller in his distinction between two narrative times, but that Müller, at the cost perhaps of formal coherence, preserves an opening through which the text allows both these interpretations: "narrating is presentifying [vergegenweldigen] events that are not perceptible to the listener's senses" (p. 247). It is in this act of presentification that the fact of "narrating" and the thing "narrated" are distinguished. This is therefore a phenomenological distinction by reason of which every narrating is narrating something (erzählen von), yet something which itself is not a narrative. From this basic distinction follows the possibility of distinguishing two times: the time taken to narrate and narrated time. But what is the correlate of presentification to which narrated time corresponds? Here we find two answers. On the one hand, what is narrated and is not narrative is not itself given in flesh and blood in the narrative but is simply "rendered or restored" (Wiedergabe). On the other hand, what is narrated is essentially the "temporality of life" (p. 251). However, "life does not narrate itself, it is lived" (p. 254). Both these interpretations are assumed by the following statement: "every narrating is narrating something that is not a narrative but a life process" (p. 261). Every narrative since the Iliad narrates this flowing (Fließen): "je mehr Zeitlichkeit des Lebens, desto reinere Epik"—"the richer life is in temporality, the purer the epic" (p. 250).

Let us keep for later discussion this apparent ambiguity concerning the status of narrated time, and let us turn toward the aspects of the division into the time of narrating and narrated time that result from a morphological poetics. Everything stems from the observation that narrating is, to use an expression borrowed from Thomas Mann, "setting aside" (aussparen), that is, both choosing and excluding. We should thus be able to submit to scientific investigation the various modes of "folding" (Raffung) by means of which the time of narrating is separated from narrated time. More precisely, comparing the two times truly becomes the object of a science of literature once literature lends itself to measurement. Whence comes the idea of a metric comparison of the two times in question. This idea of a metric
comparison of the two times seems to have come from a reflection on Fielding's narrative technique in *Tom Jones*. It is Fielding, the father of the novel that recounts the growth and development of a character, who concretely posed the technical question of *Erzählzeit*. As a master, conscious of playing with time, lie devotes each of his eighteen books to temporal segments of varying lengths—from several years to several hours—slowing down or speeding up, as the case may be, omitting one thing or emphasizing another. If Thomas Mann raised the problem of *Aussp-nahrung*, Fielding preceded him by consciously modulating the *Zeitraffung*, the unequal distribution of narrated time in the time of narrating. However, if we measure something, just what are we measuring? And is everything measurable here?

What we are measuring, under the name of *Erzählzeit*, is, as a matter of convention, a chronological time, equivalent to the number of pages and lines in the published work by reason of the prior equivalence posited between the time elapsed and the space covered on the face of a clock. It is by no means, therefore, a question of the time taken to compose the work. To what time is the number of pages and lines equivalent? To a conventional time of reading that is hard to distinguish from the variable time of actual reading. The latter is an interpretation of the time taken to tell the story which is comparable to the interpretation that a particular orchestra conductor gives to the theoretical time of performing a piece of music. Once these conventions are admitted, we may say that narrating requires "a fixed lapse of physical time" that the clock measures. What is then compared are indeed "lengths" of time, both with respect to the now measurable *Erzählzeit* as well as to narrated time, which is also measured in terms of years, days, and hours.

Can everything now be measured by means of these "temporal compressions"? If the comparison of times were limited to the comparative measurement of two chronologies, the inquiry would be most disappointing—although, even reduced to these dimensions, it leads to surprising and frequently neglected conclusions (so great is the attention paid to thematics that the subtleties of this strategy of double chronology have been largely overlooked). These compressions do not consist only in abbreviations along a variable scale. They also consist in skipping over dead time, in precipitating the progress of the narrative by a staccato rhythm in the expression (*Veni, vidi, vici*), in condensing into a single exemplary event iterative or durative features ("every day," "unceasingly," "for weeks," "in the autumn," and so on). Tempo and rhythm thus enrich, in the course of the same work, the variations of the relative lengths of the time of narration and the time narrated. Taken together, all these notations contribute to outlining the narrative's *Gestalt*.

And this notion of a *Gestalt* opens the way for investigations into structural aspects further and further removed from linearity, sequence, and chronology, even if the basis continues to be the relation between measurable time-lapses. In this respect, the three examples used in Müller's essay "Erzählzeit und Erzählte Zeit," namely, Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*, and Galsworthy's *Forsyte Saga*, are examined with an extraordinary minuteness which makes these analyses models worthy of imitation. By the choice of method, this investigation is based in each instance on the most linear aspects of narrativity but is not confined to them. The initial narrative schema is that of sequence, and the art of narrating consists in restoring the succession of events (die Wiedergabe des Nacheinanders) (p. 270)." The remarks that shatter this linearism are therefore all the more precious. The narrative tempo, in particular, is affected by the way in which the narration stretches out in descriptions of scenes as if they were tableaux or speeds up through a series of strong, quick beats. Like Braudel the historian, we must not speak of time as being simply long or short, but as rapid or slow. The distinction between "scenes" and "transitions," or "intermediary episodes," is also not strictly quantitative. The effects of slowness or of rapidity, of brief-79

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ness or of being long and drawn out are at the borderline of the quantitative and the qualitative. Scenes that are narrated at length and separated by brief transitions or iterative summaries—Müller calls them "monumental scenes"—carry the narrative process along, in contrast to those narratives in which "extraordinary events" form the narrative skeleton. In this way, non-quantifiable structural relations add complexity to the *Zusammenspiel* at play between two time-spans. The arrangement of scenes, intermediary episodes, important events, and transitions never ceases to modulate the quantities and extensions. To these features are added anticipations and flashbacks, the inter-linkings that enable the memory of vast stretches of time to be included in brief narrative sequences, creating the effect of perspectival depth, while breaking up chronology. We move even further away from a strict comparison between lengths of time when, to flashbacks, are added the time of remembering, the time of dreaming, and the time of the reported dialogue, as in Virginia Woolf. Qualitative tensions are thus added to quantitative measurements. What is it, then, that inspires in this way the transition from the analysis of the measurement of time-spans to an evaluation of the more qualitative phenomenon of contraction? It is the relation of the time of narration to the time of life through narrated time. Here Goethe's meditation comes to the fore: life in itself does not represent a whole. Nature can produce living things but these are indifferent (gleichgültig). Art can produce only dead things, but they are meaningful. Yes, this is the horizon of thinking: drawing narrated time out of indifference by means of the narrative. By saving or sparing and compression, the narrator brings what is foreign to meaning (sinnfremd) into the sphere of meaning. Even when the narrative intends to render what is senseless (sinnlos), it places this in relation to the sphere of making sense (Sinndeutung). Therefore if we were to eliminate this reference to life, we would fail to understand that the tension between these two times stems from a morphology that at one and the same time resembles the work of formation/transformation (*Bildung-Umbildung*) active in living organisms and differs from it by elevating meaningless life to a meaningful work by the grace of art. It is in this sense that the comparison between organic nature and poetic work constitutes an irreducible component of poetic morphology.
If, following Genette, we may call the relation between the time of narrating and the narrated time in the narrative itself a "game with time" this game has as its stakes the temporal experience (Zeiterlebnis) intended by the narrative. The task of poetic morphology is to make apparent the way in which the quantitative relations of time agree with the qualities of time belonging to life itself. Conversely, these temporal qualities are brought to light only by the play of derivations and insertions, without any thematic meditation on time having to be grafted onto them, as in Laurence Sterne, Joseph Conrad, Thomas Mann, or Marcel Proust. A fundamental time is implied, without itself being considered as a theme. Nevertheless, this time of life is "codetermined" by the relation and the tension between the two times of the narrative and by the "laws of form" that result from them.  

In this respect, we might be tempted to say that there are as many temporal "experiences" as poets, even as poems. This is indeed the case, and this is why this "experience" can only be intended obliquely through the "temporal armature," as what this armature is suited to, what it fits. It is clear that a discontinuous structure suits a time of dangers and adventures, that a more continuous, linear structure suits a 5/7-dungsroman where the themes of growth and metamorphosis predominate, whereas a jagged chronology, interrupted by jumps, anticipations, and flashbacks, in short, a deliberately multidimensional configuration, is better suited to a time of life that has no possible overview, no overfill internal cohe-siveness. Contemporary experiments in the area of narrative techniques are thus aimed at shattering the very experience of time. It is true that in these experiments the game itself can become the stakes.  

But the polarity of temporal experience (Zeiterlebnis) and temporal armature (Zeitgeriist) seems inescapable. In every case, an actual temporal creation, a "poietic time" (p. 311) is uncovered on the horizon of each "meaningful composition" (p. 308). This temporal creation is what is at stake in the structuration of time at play between the time of narrating and narrated time.  

UTTERANCE, STATEMENT, AND OBJECT IN GENETTE'S NARRATIVE DISCOURSE  

Giinther Miiller's Morphologische Poetik has in the end left us with three times: the time of the act of narrating, the time that is narrated, and finally the time of life. The first is a chronological time; it is a time of reading rather than of writing. We can measure only its spatial equivalent, which is counted by the number of pages and lines. Narrated time, for its part, is counted in years, months, and days and may even be dated in the work itself. It is, in turn, the result of the "compression" of a time "spared" or "set aside," which is not narrative but life. The nomenclature Gerard Genette proposes is also ternary. But it cannot, for all this, be superimposed upon Miiller's. It results from the effort of structural narratology to derive all of its categories from features contained in the text itself, which is not the case for Miiller with respect to the time of life.  

Genette's three levels are determined starting from the middle level, the narrating or diegetic universe). It is to these relations that the analyses of a mode 1 text are devoted, Proust's
Games with Time

The main emphasis of the analysis bears on the relation between the time of the narrative and the time of the diegesis, somewhat at the expense of the time of utterance, for reasons I shall state below. What is the time of the narrative, if it is neither that of the utterance nor that of the diegesis?Like Miiller, Genette holds it to be the equivalent of and the substitute for the time of reading, that is, the time it takes to cover or traverse the space of the text: "the narrative text, like every other text, has no other temporality than what it borrows, metonymically, from its own reading" (Narrative Discourse, p. 34). We must, therefore, take "for granted and accept literally the quasi-fiction of the Erzählzeit, this false time standing in for a true time and to be treated—with the combination of reservation and approval that this involves—as a pseudo-time" (p. 79, his emphasis).

I shall not take up in detail Genet't analysis of the three essential determinations—order, duration, frequency—in terms of which the relations between the time of the story and the pseudo-time of narrative can be studied. In these three registers, what is meaningful are the discordances between the temporal features of the events in the diegesis and the corresponding features in the narrative.

With respect to order, these discordances may be placed under the general heading of anachrony. The epic narrative, since the Iliad, is noted in this regard for the way it begins in media res and then moves backward in order to explain events. In Proust, this procedure is used to oppose the future, become present, to the idea one had of it in the past. The art of narrating is for Proust in part that of playing with prolepsis (narrating ahead of events) and analepsis (narrating by moving back in time), and inserting prolepses within analepses. This initial game with time gives rise to a very detailed typology, which I shall not attempt to give an account of here. For subsequent discussion, I shall retain only what concerns the ultimate [finalité] of these ethereal variations. Whether it is a question of completing the narration of an event by bringing it into the light of a preceding event, of filling in an earlier lacuna, or provoking involuntary memory by the repeated recall of similar events, or of correcting an earlier interpretation by means of a series of reinterpretations—Proustian analepsis is not a gratuitous game. It is governed by the meaning of the work as a whole. This recourse to the opposition between meaningful and unmeaningful opens a perspective on narrative time that goes beyond the literary technique of anachrony.

The uses of prolepsis within a globally retrospective narrative seems to me to illustrate even better than analepsis this relation to overall meaning opened by narrative understanding. Some prolepses take a particular line of action to its logical conclusion, to the point of rejoining the narrator's present. Others are used to authenticate the narrative of the past through testimony to its persistence in current memory ("today, I can still see . . ."). In order to account for this game with time, we have to borrow from Auerbach the notion of the "symbolic omnitemporality" of the "remembering consciousness." But then the theoretical framework chosen for the analysis proves inadequate: "A per-3 Time in Fictional Narrative

Genette states, "of fusion, of quasi-miraculous fusion, between the event recounted and the narrating instance, which is both late (final) and 'omni-temporal'" (p. 70).

Taking an overall view of the anachronies in Proust's Recherche, Genette declares that "the importance of the 'anachronic' narrative in Recherche du temps perdu is obviously connected to the retrospectively synthetic character of Proustian narrative, which is totally present in the narrator's mind at every moment. Ever since the day when the narrator in a trance perceived the unifying significance of his story, he never ceases to hold all of its places and all of its moments, to be capable of establishing a multitude of 'telescopic' relations amongst them" (p. 78). But must we not then say that, what narratology takes as the pseudo-time of a narrative is composed of the set of temporal strategies placed at the service of a conception of time that, first articulated in fiction, can also constitute a paradigm for redescribing lived and lost time?

Genette's study of the distortions of duration leads me to the same reflections. I shall not go back over the impossibility of measuring the duration of the narrative, if by this is meant the time of reading (p. 86). Let us admit with Genette that we can only compare the respective speeds of the narrative and of the story, the speed always being defined by a relation between a temporal measure and a spatial one. In this way, in order to characterize the speeding up or slowing down of the narrative in relation to the events recounted, we end up comparing, just as Miiller did, the duration of the text, measured by pages and lines, with the duration of the story measured by clock time. As in Miiller, the variations—here called "anisochronies"—have to do with large narrative articulations and their internal chronology, whether expressly given or inferred. We may then apportion the distortions in speed between the drastic slowing down of "pauses" and the dramatic acceleration of ellipses by situating the classical notion of a "scene" or "description" alongside of that of a pause, and that of a "summary" alongside of that of an ellipse. A highly detailed typology of the comparative dimensions of the length of the text and the duration of the narrated events, can then be sketched out. However, what seems to me to be important is that narratology's mastery of the strategies of acceleration and slowing down serves to enhance our understanding of procedures of emplotment that we have acquired through our familiarity with the procedures of emplotment and the function of such emplotment procedures. For example, Genette notes that in Proust the fullness (and hence the slow pace of the narrative, which establishes a sort of coincidence between the length of the text and the time taken by the hero to be absorbed by a spectacle) is closely related to the "contemplative halt," (p. 102) in the hero's experience. Likewise, the absence of a summary narrative, the absence of descriptive pauses, the tendency of the narrative to constitute itself as a scene in the narrative sense of this term, the inaugural character of the five major scenes—morning, dinner,
evening—which by themselves take up some six hundred pages, the repetition that transforms them into typical scenes; all these structural features of Remembrance of Things Past—features that leave intact none of the traditional narrative movements (p. 112), features that can be discerned, analyzed, and classified by an exact narratological science—receive their meaning from the sort of temporal immobility created by the narrative on the level of fiction. However, the modification that gives the narrative temporality of Remembrance "a completely new cadence—perfectly unprecedented" (ibid.) is certainly the iterative character of the narrative, which narratology places under the third temporal category, that of frequency (counting once or n times an event that occurs once or, times) and that it sets in opposition to the "sin-gulative" narrative. How is this "intoxication with the iterative" (p. 123) to be interpreted? The strong tendency of instants in Proust to merge together and become confused with one another is, Genette grants, "the very condition for experiencing involuntary memory" (p. 124). And yet in this exercise of narratology, it is never once a question of this experience. Why?

If the memory experience of the narrator-hero is so easily reduced to a mere "factor in (I should say rather a means of) the emancipation of the narrative with respect to temporality" (p. 156), this is in part because the inquiry concerning time has been until this point artificially contained within the limits of the relation between the stated narrative and the diegesis, at the expense of the temporal aspects of the relationship between statement and utterance, described in terms of the grammatical category of "voice." Postponing any discussion of the time of the narration is not without its drawbacks. For example, we cannot understand the meaning of the reversal by which, at the turning point in Proust's work, the story, with its steady chronology and the predominance of the singulative, takes control over the narrative, with its anachronisms and its iterations, if we do not attribute the distortions of duration, which then take over, to the narrator himself, "who in his impatience and growing anguish is desirous both of loading his final scenes . . . and of jumping to the denouement . . . that will finally give him being and legitimate his discourse" (p. 157, his emphisis). Within the time of the narrative must therefore be integrated "another temporality, no longer the temporality of the narrative but in the final instance governing it: the temporality of the narrating itself" (ibid.).

What, then, may be said about the relation between utterance and statement? Does it possess no temporal character at all? The basic phenomenon whose textual status can be preserved here is that of the "voice," a notion borrowed from grammarians and one that characterizes the implication of the narration itself in the narrative, that is, of the narrative instance (in the sense in which Benveniste speaks of the instance of discourse) with its two


protagonists: the narrator and the real or virtual receiver. If a question about time arises at this level of relation, it is irrisofar as the narrative instance, represented in the text by the voice, itself presents temporal features. If the time of utterance is examined so briefly and so late in Narrative Discourse, this has in part to do with the difficulties involved in establishing the proper order of the relations between utterance, statement, and story, but more importantly, it has to do with the difficulty that, in Remembrance, is connected to the relation between the real author and the fictive narrator, who here happens to be the same as the hero, the time of narration displaying the same fictive quality as the role of the narrator-hero's "I" calls for an analysis that is, precisely, an analysis of voice. Indeed, if the act of narration does not carry within itself any mark of duration, the variations in its distance from the events recounted is important for "the narrative's significance" (p. 216). In particular, the changes referred to above concerning the temporal dimension of the narrative find a certain justification in these variations. They make us feel the gradual shortening of the very fabric of the narrative discourse, as if, Genette adds, "the story time tended to dilate and make itself conspicuous while drawing near to its end, which is also its origin" (p. 226, his emphasis). The fact that the time of the hero's story approaches its own source, the narrator's present, without being able to catch up with it, is part of the meaning of the narrative, namely, that it is ended or at least broken off when the hero: becomes a writer.

Its recourse to the notion of the narrative voice allows narratology to make a place for subjectivity, without confusing this with the subjectivity of the real author. If Remembrance is not to be read as a disguised autobiography, this is because the "I" uttered by the narrator-hero is itself fictive. However, for lack of a notion like that of a world of the text (a notion I shall justify in the next chapter), this recourse to the notion of narrative voice is not sufficient to do justice to the fictive experience the narrator-hero has of time in its psychological and metaphysical dimensions. Without this experience, which is just as fictive as the "I" who unfolds it and recounts it, and yet which is worthy of being called "experience" by virtue of its relation to the world projected by the work, it is difficult to give a meaning to "he notions of time lost and time regained, which constitute what is at stake in Remembrance of Things Past."

It is this tacit rejection of fictive experience that makes me uneasy when I read and reread the pages entitled "The Game with Time" (pp. 155-60), which give, if not the key to the work, at least its tone. (These pages are at the very least premature, when we consider that the study of the time of narration is postponed.) The narrator-hero's fictive experience of time, because it cannot to be connected to the meaning of the narrative, is referred back to the extrinsic justification of the work that the author, Proust, gives for his narrative technique, with its interpolations, its distortions, and above all its iter-86ative condensations. This justification is assimilated to the "realist motivation" that Proust shares with other writers of the same tradition. Gerard Genette wants to stress with respect to this tradition only its "contradictions" and
"compliances" (p. 158): the contradiction between the concern with remembering things as they were lived in the instant and the concern with recounting them as they are remembered later. Hence, the contradiction between attributing at times to life and at time to memory the overlappings reflected in the anachronisms of the narrative. The contradiction, above all, inherent in a search committed both to the "extra-temporal" and to "time in its pure state." But are not these contradictions the very heart of the fictive experience of the narrator-hero? As for the compliances, they are ascribed to "those retrospective rationalizations that great artists are never niggardly with, and this in direct proportion to their genius, in other words, to the lead their practice has over any theory—including their own" (ibid., his emphasis). Narrative practice, however, is not the only thing that keeps ahead of aesthetic theory. The fictive experience that gives a meaning to this practice is also in quest of a theory that always falls short of it, as witnessed by the commentators with which the narrator overrides his narrative. It is precisely for a theoretical view foreign to the poiesis at work in the narrative itself that the experience of time in Remembrance of Things Past is reduced to "the contradictory aim" of an "ontological mystery" (p. 160).

It is perhaps the function of narratology to invert the relations between reminiscence and narrative technique, to see in the motivation referred to simply an aesthetic medium; in short, to reduce vision to style. The novel of time lost and regained then becomes, for narratology, a "novel of Time ruled, captured, bewitched, surreptitiously subverted, or better, perverted" (ibid., his emphasis). But must not this reversal itself ultimately be reversed, and must not the formal study of narrative techniques be held to make time appear as perverted in order to gain by a long detour a sharpened comprehension of the experience of time lost and regained? It is this experience that, in Remembrance of Things Past, gives meaning and intention to the narrative techniques. If not, how may we speak about the novel as a whole, as its narrator does about dreams, in terms of the "formidable game it creates with Time" (ibid.)? Could a game be "formidable," that is, frightening as well, if nothing was at stake in it?

Over and above the discussion of the interpretation of Remembrance proposed by Genette, the question remains whether, in order to preserve the meaning of the work, it is not necessary to subordinate the narrative technique to the intention that carries the text beyond itself, toward an experience, no doubt feigned but nonetheless irreducible to a simple game with time. To pose this question is to ask whether we must not do justice to the dimension that Müller, recalling Goethe, named Zeit erlebnis, and that narratology, by decree and as a result of its strict methodology, sets out of bounds. The major 87 difficulty is then to preserve the fictive quality of this Zeit erlebnis, while resisting its reduction to narrative technique alone. It is to this difficulty that my own study of Proust's Remembrance in the next chapter is devoted.

POINT OF VIEW AND NARRATIVE VOICE

Our investigation of "games with time" calls for a final complement that takes into account the notions of point of view and narrative voice, notions we encountered above, without seeing how they were connected to the major structures of narrative.59 The notion of a fictive experience of time, toward which all our analyses of the configuration of time by fictional narrative converge, cannot do without these concepts of point of view and narrative voice (categories I am temporarily considering to be identical), inasmuch as point of view is a point of view directed toward the sphere of experience to which the character belongs and the narrative voice is that which, by addressing itself to readers, presents the narrated world (to use Weinrich's phrase) to them.

How can the notions of point of view and narrative voice be incorporated into the problem of narrative composition?60 Essentially, by tying them to the categories of "narrator" and "character." The narrated world is the world of the characters and it is narrated by the narrator. The notion of a character is solidly anchored in narrative theory to the extent that a narrative cannot be a mimesis of action without being at the same time a mimesis of acting beings. And acting beings are, in the broad sense that the semantics of action confers on the motion of an agent, beings who think and feel — better, beings capable of talking about their thoughts, their feelings, and their actions. It is thus possible to shift the notion of mimesis from the action toward the character, and from the character toward the character's discourse.61 There is more. When the discourse spoken by one of the characters concerning their experience is incorporated in the diegesis, the pair utterance/statement (around which this chapter is constructed) can be reformulated in a vocabulary that personalizes the two terms. The utterance becomes the discourse of the narrator, while the statement becomes the discourse of a character. The question will then be to determine by which special narrative means the narrative is constituted as I he discourse of a narrator recounting the discourse of the characters. The notions of point of view and of narrative voice designate two of these means. It is important, first, to take the measure of the shift from the mimesis of action toward the mimesis of the character, which initiates the entire chain of notions that leads to those of point of view and narrative voice.

Having given consideration first to drama, Aristotle was led to accord an eminent place to the character and to his or her thoughts, although they are always subordinated to the inclusive category of mulhos in his theory of mimesis. The character truly belongs to the "what" of mimesis. And rs the dis-
whether the narrator's discourse predominates over that of the character. This dichotomy is easier to identify in third-

The first "mimesis of consciousness," she states, is the "mimesis of other minds" (p. 7). The study of consciousness in "first-person texts," that is, fictions that simulate a confession or an autobiography, is put in second place and is conducted following the same principles as for the study of third-person narration. This is a remarkable strategy, if we consider that, among first-person texts, there are many in which the first-person is just as fictive as the third-person narratives using "he" or "she," so much so that this fictive first-person can, without any major damage, be permuted into a no less fictive third-person, as this was experimented with by Kafka and Proust.

An excellent touchstone as regards the narrative techniques available to fiction for expressing this "inner transparency" is provided by the analysis of the ways of conveying the words and thoughts of fictive subjects in third- and first-person narratives. This is the path followed by Dorrit Cohn. It has the advantage of respecting the parallelism between third-person and first-person narrative and at the same time allowing for the extraordinary flexibility and inventiveness of the modern novel in this area.

The major technique employed on either side of the dividing line between the two great classes of narrative fiction is the direct narration of thoughts and feelings, whether the narrator attributes them to a fictive other or to him/herself. If "self-narration" in the first-person novel is mistakenly held to be self-evident, under the pretext that it simulates a first-person text, which is in truth 89 fictitious, the same cannot be said about "psycho-narration," narration applied to other minds. This affords a privileged means of access to the well-known problem of the omniscient narrator, to which we shall return below in our discussion of point of view and voice. This privilege no longer appears scandalous if we are willing to admit with Jean Pouillon that it is in any case by means of the imagination that we understand all other minds. The novelist does this, if not effortlessly, at least without any qualms, because it is part of the writer's art to supply expressions appropriate to thoughts, which he or she is able to read directly, because the novelist invents them, rather than deciphering these thoughts on the basis of their expression, as we do in daily life. All the magic of the third-person novel lies in this short circuit.

In addition to the direct narration of thoughts and feelings, there are two other techniques available to the novel. The first consists in quoting the internal monologue of a fictional other ("quoted monologue") or of having the character quote himself or herself in the course of a monologue ("self-quoted monologue"). My purpose is not to explicate the licenses, conventions, even the unlikelihoods, of this technique, which presupposes, no less than the preceding one, the transparency of the mind, since the narrator is the one who adjusts the reported words to thoughts that are apprehended directly, without having to move from words back to thoughts in daily life. To this "magic" stemming from the direct reading of thoughts, this procedure adds the major difficulty of lending to a solitary subject the use of speech intended, in practical life, for communication—what in fact does talking to oneself mean? Leading the dialogic dimension of speech off its customary path for the benefit of soliloquy poses immense technical and theoretical problems that are not within my province here, but concern a study of the fate of subjectivity in literature. However, I shall return to the relation between the narrator's discourse and the character's quoted discourse within the framework of my discussion of point of view and voice below.

The third technique, initiated by Flaubert and Jane Austen, the famous style indirect libre, or the narrated monologue, or the erlebte Rede of German stylistics, does not consist in quoting the monologue but in recounting it. So we should speak here of a "narrated" rather than a "quoted monologue." The words, as concerns their contents, are indeed those of the characters, but they are reported by the narrator, in the past tense and in the third person. The major difficulties of the quoted monologue or the self-quoted monologue are not so much resolved as they are covered over. For them to reappear, we have only to translate the narrated monologue into a quoted monologue, putting in the appropriate persons and tenses. Other difficulties, well known to readers of Joyce, arise in texts in which no boundary remains to separate the narrator's discourse from that of the characters. At any rate, this marvelous combination of psycho-narration and narrated monologue constitutes the most complete integration within the narrative fabric of others' thoughts and words. The narrator's discourse, takes in hand the character's discourse by lending this discourse its voice, while it conforms to the tone of what the character said or is saying. The "miracle" of the well-known erlebte Rede thus adds the crowning touch to the "magic" of internal transparency.

In what way are the notions of point of view and voice called for by the preceding remarks on the representation of thoughts, feelings, and words in fiction? The intermediary link is constituted by the search for a typology capable of accounting for the two great dichotomies, which I have employed spontaneously before elucidating them for ourselves. The first postulates two kinds of fiction. On the one hand, there is fiction that recounts the lives of characters taken as third parties (Dorrit Cohn's "mimesis of other minds"). Here we "speak of a third-person narrative. On the other hand, we also find fictional narratives that attribute the grammatical person of the narrator to their characters. These are termed first-person narratives. However, another dichotomy runs through this first one, depending on whether the narrator's discourse predominates over that of the character. This dichotomy is easier to identify in third-
person narratives, inasmuch as the distinction between narrating discourse and narrated discourse is maintained by grammatical distinctions concerning the persons and the verb tenses. It is more concealed in first-person fiction, inasmuch as the difference between the narrator and the character is not marked by the distinction of personal pronouns. The task of distinguishing between die narrator and the character under the identity of the grammatical "I" therefore devolves on other signals. The distance from one to the other can vary, as can the degree to which the narrator's discourse predominates in relation to the character's discourse. It is this double system of variations that has given rise to the construction of typologies that are intended to cover all possible narrative situations. One of the more ambitious of these efforts is the theory of typical narrative situations presented by Franz K. Stanzel. Stanzel does not directly employ the categories of perspective and voice. He prefers instead to distinguish between the types of narrative situations (Erzählungssituationen, abbreviated to ES) in terms of the feature that seems to him universally to characterize novel-istic fictions, namely, that they "transmit" (mediate) thoughts, feelings, and words. Either the mediation/transmission privileges the narrator, who imposes his or her perspective-irpn on high (auktoriale ES), or else the mediation is performed bx _aj-effecto(a term borrowed from Henry James), that is, by a character who thinks, feels, perceives, yet speaks not as the narrator but as one of the characters. "The reader th *; see; th : IfHer cKarace v tl rou *h t tl : :'***'t f' iis char ictei > v nale v figurale ES). Qr*htjejarj tor identit • MrnTTTerfrTerself as one of the characters, speaking in the first person and living in the same world as the other characters (Ich ES).

Actually, Stanzel's typology, despite its remarkable power of clarification, shares with many other typologies the double drawback of being too abstract nine in ricuoial iNarrative to be discriminating and too poorly articulated to cover all narrative situations. A second work of Stanzel's attempts to remedy the first drawback by taking each of the three situation-types as the marked term of a pair of op-posites placed at the poles of three heterogeneous axes. The auktoriale ES thus becomes the marked pole along the axis of "perspective," depending on whether the narrator has an external, hence broad, view of the characters, or an internal, hence limited, view of them. The notion of perspective thus receives a determined place in the taxonomy. The personale figurale ES is the marked pole along the axis of "mode," depending on whether the character does or does not define the vision of the novel in the name of the narrator, who then becomes the unmarked pole of the opposition. As for the Ich ES, it becomes the marked pole along the axis of the "person," depending on whether the narrator belongs to the same ontic domain as the other characters. In this way, Stanzel avoids reference to the purely grammatical criterion of the place of personal pronouns.

With regard to the second shortcoming, Stanzel mitigates it by inserting between each of his three situation-types, now considered axial poles, a number of intermediary situations that he places in a circle (Typenkreis). A wide variety of narrative situations can thus be accounted for, depending on whether they come closer to or move away from each of these poles. The problem of perspective and of voice thus becomes the object of a more and more detailed attention. The perspective of the narrator-author cannot be effaced without the narrative situation moving closer to the personale ES, where the figure of the reflector comes to occupy the, place left vacant by the narrator. Following the circular movement, we move away from the personale ES and move closer to the Ich ES. Here we see the character, who in the narrated monologue (erterbte Rede) still spoke through the voice of the narrator while imposing his or her own voice, share the same region of being as the other characters. It is this character who now says "I." The narrator, as a consequence, has only to borrow this voice.

Despite his effort to provide has typology with greater dynamism, Stanzel does not reply in a completely satisfactory way to the two objections raised above. We could reply adequately to the shortcoming of abstraction only if, by giving up the attempt to take as a starting point for our analysis metalanguages that present a certain logical coherence and using models such as these to describe texts, we were to search for theories that account for our literary competence, that is, the attitude readers have for recognizing and summing up plots, and for grouping similar plots together. If we were thus to adopt the rule of following closely the experience of the reader in the process of organizing step-by-step the elements of the told story in order to put a plot together, we would encounter the notions of perspective and voice less as categories defined by their place in a taxonomy than as a distinctive feature, taken from 92
object of a "poetics of composition," once the possibility of adopting variable points of view—a property inherent in the very notion of point of view—gives the artist the systematically exploited opportunity of varying points of view within the same work, of multiplying them, and of incorporating these combinations into the configuration of the work.

The typology offered by Boris Uspensky bears exclusively on these resources of composition provided by point of view. In this way, the study of the notion of point of view can be incorporated into that of narrative configuration. Point of view lends itself to a typology to the extent that, as Lotman has also stressed, the work of art can and must be read on several levels. In this fact lies the essential plurivocity of the work of art. Each of these levels also constitutes a possible place for manifesting a point of view, a space allowing for the possibilities of composition between points of view.

It is first of all on the plane of ideology, that is, of evaluations, that the notion of point of view takes shape, insofar as an ideology is the system that governs the conceptual vision of the world in all or part of a work. It may be the vision of the author or that of the characters. What is termed the "j 93

au-thorial point of view" is not the conception of the world of the real author but that which presides over the organization of the narrative of a particular work. At this level, point of view and voice are mere synonyms. The work can make voices other than the author's heard and can mark several ordered shifts in point of view, accessible to formal study (for example, a study of the use of fixed epithets in folklore).

It is on the level of phraseology, that is, on the level of the characteristics of disburse, that the study of the marks of the primary of the narrator's discourse (authorial speech) or of that of the discourse of a particular character (figural speech) in third-person or first-person fiction occurs. This study be-longs to a poetics of composition insofar as the shifts in point of view become the bearers of the structuration (as is shown in the variations in the names of characters, variations so characteristic of the Russian novel). It is on this plane that all the complexities of composition resulting from the correlation between the discourse of the author and that of the character are revealed. (I-fiere we return to my remark, made earlier, about the numerous ways of reporting the discourse of a character, as well as to a system of classification similar to that which I borrowed from Dorrit Cohn.)

"The spatial and temporal planes of expressing point of view are of prime interest to us. It is first of all the spatial perspective, taken literally, that serves as a metaphor for all the other expressions of point of view. The development of a narrative always involves a combination of purely perceptual perspectives, implying position, angle of aperture, and depth of field (as is the case for film). The same thing is true with respect to temporal position, that of the narrator in relation to the characters as much as among the characters themselves. What is important once again is the degree of complexity resulting from the composition involving multiple temporal perspectives. The narrator may walk in step with the characters, making the present of narration coincide with his or her own present, and thereby accepting the limits and lack of knowledge imposed by this perspective. Or, on the contrary, the narrator may move forward or backward, considering the present from the point of view of the anticipation of a remembered past or as the past memory of an anticipated future, etc."

"The plane of verb tenses and aspects constitutes a distinct plane, inasmuch as what is considered here are purely grammatical resources and not temporal significations properly speaking. As in Weinrich, what is important for a poetics of composition are the modulations that occur throughout the text. Uspensky is especially interested in the alternation between the present tense, wr -a- it is applied to scenes that mark a pause in the narrative, scenes in which the narrator synchronizes his or her present with the present of the halted narrative, and the past tense, when it expresses the jumps in the narrative as if they were discrete quanta."

Uspensky does not want to confuse the psychological plane with the planes just referred to. He reserves for this plane the opposition between the objective and subjective points of view, depending on whether the states described are treated as facts assumed to impose themselves on every attitude or as impressions experienced by a particular individual. It is on this plane that an external point of view (conduct seen by an observer) can legitimately be opposed to an internal point of view (that is, internal to the character described), without the localization of the speaker being necessarily determined in time and space. What is too hastily termed an omniscient observer is the person for whom psychic as well as physical phenomena are stated as observations unrelated to an interpreting subjectivity: "he thought," "he felt," and so on. A small number of formal marks suffice: "apparently," "obviously," "it seemed that," "as if," etc. These marks of a "foreign" point of view are generally combined with the presence of a narrator placed in a synchronic relation with the scene of action. The two senses of the word "internal" must therefore not be confused. The first characterizes phenomena of consciousness that can be those of a third person, while the second—the only one in question here—characterizes the position of the narrator (or of the character who is speaking) in relation to the perspective described. The narrator can be placed inside or outside by means of a process said to be internal, that is, mental.

Correlations are thereby established with the earlier distinctions, without being term-by-term correspondences; for example, between a retrospective point of view on the plane of time and objective point of view on the psychological plane, and between the synchronic point of view and the subjective point of view. However, it is important not to confuse these levels, for it is precisely out of the interconnection of these points of view, which are not necessarily congruent, that a work's dominant style of composition results. Known typologies (first- or third-person narratives, narrative situations in Stanzel's sense, etc.) in fact characterize these dominant styles, while implicitly privileging one plane or another.

One cannot help but admire the balance attained here between the spirit of analysis and the spirit of synthesis. But
what is to be praised above all else is the art with which the notion of point of view is incorporated into a poetics of composition and thus placed within the gravitational field of narrative configuration. In this sense, the notion of point of view marks the culminating point of a study centered around the relation between utterance and statement, If the privileged status of point of view in a problematic of composition is such as I have described, what are we to say about narrative voice? This literary category cannot be eliminated by that of point of view, inasmuch as it is inseparable from the inexpungable category of the narrator, considered as the fictive projection of the real author in the text itself. If the point of view can be defined without the use of a personalizing metaphor, as a place of origin, an orientation, or as the aperture of a light source, which at one and the same time illuminates its subject and captures its features, the narrator—the speaker of the narrative voice—cannot to the same extent be freed of all personalizing metaphor inasmuch as the narrator is the fictive author of the discourse. The impossibility of eliminating the notion of narrative voice is vividly confirmed by the category of novels constructed out of a polyphony of voices, where each remains perfectly distinct and yet every voice is posited in relation to every other. According to Mikhail Bakhtin, Dostoevsky is the creator of this sort of novel, which this inspired critic calls the "polyphonic novel." The import of this innovation has to be understood correctly. If this type of novel does in fact mark the culminating point of my investigation into configuration in fictional narrative, it also designates a limit placed on composition in terms of levels, a limit beyond which my starting point in the notion of plot becomes unrecognizable. The final stage of our investigation is thus to be, also, our point of exit from the field of structural analysis.

By polyphonic novel, Bakhtin means a novelistic structure that breaks with what he calls the monologic (or homophonous) principle of the European novel, including the siorows of Tolstoy. In the monological novel the voice of the narrator-author establishes itself as a single voice at the summit of the pyramid of voices, even if they are harmonized in the complex and subtle way spoken of above, by treating the point of view as the principle of composition. The same novel may be rich not only in monologues of all sorts but also in dialogues by which the novel raises itself to the level of drama. It nevertheless constitutes, as an ordered whole, the great monologue of the narrator. At first sight it seems hard to imagine that things could be otherwise as soon as the narrator is held to speak with a single voice, as will be confirmed by the rhetoric of fiction in Wayne Booth's sense. It is therefore a revolution in the conception of the narrator and the voice of the narrator, as much as in that of the character, that constitutes the strange originality of the polyphonic novel. The dialogical relation between the characters is, in effect, developed to the point of including the relation between the narrator and his/her characters. The "single and unified authorial consciousness" disappears (Dostoevsky's Poetics, p. 6). In its place appears a narrator who "converses" with his/her characters and who becomes a plurality of centers of consciousness irreducible to a common denominator. It is this "dialogization" of the narrator's own voice that constitutes the difference between the monologic novel and the dialogical novel. "The important thing is the final dialogicality, i.e. the dialogical nature of the total work" (p. 14). It is therefore the very relation between the narrator's discourse and the character's discourse that is entirely subverted.

My first reaction is to rejoice to see the very principle of the dialogical structure of discourse, of thinking, of self-consciousness, raised to the level of a structural principle of the novel. My second reaction is to ask if the dialogical principle, which appears to crown the pyramid of the principles of composition governing narrative fiction, does not at the same time undermine the base of the edifice, namely, the organizing role of emplotment, even when it is intended to include all the forms of the synthesis of the heterogeneous by means of which narrative fiction remains a mimesis of action. By sliding from the mimesis of action to the mimesis of characters, then to that of their thoughts, feelings, and language, and by crossing the final threshold, that from monologue to dialogue, on the plane of the narrator's as much as in that of the character, that constitutes the strange originality of the polyphonic novel. The dialogical relation between the characters is, in effect, developed to the point of including the relation between the narrator and his/her characters. The "single and unified authorial consciousness" disappears. The retreat of plot in the face of a principle of coexistence and of interaction bears witness to the emergence of a dramatic form in which space tends to supplant time. Another image imposes itself, that of "counterpoint," which makes all the voices simultaneous. The very notion of "polyphony," identified with that of dialogical organization, already indicated this. The coexistence of voices seems to have been substituted for the temporal configuration of action, which has served as the starting point of all my analyses. In addition, with dialogue comes a factor of incompleteness, of remaining unfinished, that affects not only the characters and their worldview but the composition itself, condemned, it seems, to remain "open-ended," if not "endless." Must we then conclude that the monologic novel alone continues to conform to the principle of composition based on emplotment?

I do not think this conclusion is called for. In the chapter devoted to "Characteristics of Genre and Plot Composition in Dostoevsky's Works" (pp. 83 — 149), Bakhtin seeks in the perenniality and the reemergence of forms of composition inherited from the adventure novel, from confessions, from the lives of the saints, and especially from the forms of serious comedy, which themselves combine Socratic dialogue and Menippean satire, the resources for a genre, which without itself being a type of plot, constitutes a matrix of plots. Termed "carnivalistic" by Bakhtin, this genre is perfectly identifiable, despite the variety of its incarnations. The carnivallistic genre thus becomes the limlessly flexible principle of a composition that can never be said to be formless.
it would be as follows. It is incontestable that the polyphonic novel stretches to the breaking point the capacity of extension belonging to the mimesis of action. At the limit, a pure novel of multiple voices—Virginia Woolf's The Waves—is no longer a novel at all but a sort of oratorio offered for reading. If the polyphonic novel does not cross this threshold, it is due to the organizing principle it receives from the long tradition marked out by the carnivalistic genre. In short, the polyphonic novel invites us to dissociate the principle of emplotment from the monologic principle and to extend it to the point where narrative fiction is transformed.

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into a new genre. But who ever said that narrative fiction was the first and last word in the presentation of consciousnesses and their world? Its privilege begins and ends at the point where narration can be identified as a "tale of time," or better yet, as a "tale about time."

The notion of voice is especially significant to me precisely because of its important temporal connotations. As the author of some discourse, the narrator in fact determines a present—the present of narration—which is just as fic-tive as the instance of discourse constituting the narrative utterance. This present of narration may be considered atemporal if, as Kate Hamburger does, we allow only one sort of time, the "real" time of "real" subjects of assertions bearing on "reality." But there is no reason to exclude the notion of a fictive present, once we admit that the characters are themselves the fictive subjects of thoughts, feelings, and discourse. These characters unfold their own time in the fiction, a time that includes a past, present, and future—even quasi-presents—as they shift their temporal axis in the course of the fiction. It is this fictive present that we attribute to the fictive author of the discourse, to the narrator. This category imposes itself for two reasons. First, the study of verb tenses in narrative fiction, in particular that of the monologue recounted in erlebte Rede, has placed us several times in the midst of an interplay of interferences between the time of the narrator and the times of the characters. This is a "game with time" that is added to those I analyzed above, for now the split between utterance and statement is extended to the split between the discourse of the speaker (narrator, fictive author) and the discourse of the character. Moreover, attributing a present of narration to the narrative voice allows us to solve a problem I have left in abeyance until now, namely, the position of the preterite as the basic tense of narration. If I agreed with Kate Hamburger and Harald Weinrich m severing the preterite of narration from its reference to lived time, hence to Erle "real" past of a "real" subject who remembers or reconstructs a "real" Historical past, it finally seems to me insufficient to say, with the first author, that the preterite preserves its grammatical form while casting off its signification of the past, and, with the second author, that the preterite is only the signal of the entry into narrative. For why would the preterite preserve its grammatical form if it had lost all temporal signification? And why should it be the privileged signal of the entry into narrative? One answer comes to mind. Could we not say that the preterite preserves its grammatical form and its privilege because the present of narration is understood by the reader as posterior to the narrated story, hence that the told story is the past of the narrative voice! Is not every told story in the past for the voice that tells it? Whence the artifices employed by writers of other ages, who pretended to have found "die diary of their hero in a chest or in an attic, or to have heard the story from a traveler. Such an artifice was intended to simulate, in

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the latter case, the signification of the past for memory, and in the former, its signification for historiography. When the novelist casts these artifices aside, there still remains the past of the narrative voice, which is neither that of memory nor that of historiography but that which results from the relation of the posteriority of the narrative voice in relation to the story it tells.

On the whole, the two notions of point of view and voice are so inseparable that they become indistinguishable. In Lotman, Bakhtin, and Uspensky, we find no lack of analyses that pass without transition from one to the other. It is rather a matter of a single function considered from the perspective of two different questions. Point of view answers the question, "From where do we perceive what is shown to us by the fact of being narrated?" Hence, from where is one speaking? Voice answers the question, "Who is speaking here?" If we do not want to be misled by the metaphor of vision when we consider a narrative in which everything is recounted, and in which making something visible through the eyes of a character is, according to Aristotle's analysis of lexis (elocution, diction), "placing before our eyes," that is, extending understanding to quasi-intuition, then vision must be held to be a concretization of understanding, hence, paradoxically, an appendix to hearing.™

Given this, only a single difference remains between point of view and voice—point of view is still related to a problem of composition (as we saw in Uspensky), and so remains within the field of investigation of narrative configuration. Voice, however, is already involved in the problems of communication, inasmuch as it addresses itself to a reader. It is therefore situated at the point of transition between configuration and refiguration, inasmuch as reading marks the point of intersection between the world of the text and the world of the reader. It is precisely these two functions that are interchangeable. Every point of view is the invitation addressed to readers to direct their gaze in the same direction as the author or the characters. In turn, the narrative voice is the silent speech that presents the world of the text to the reader. Like the voice that spoke to Augustine at the hour of his conversion, it says, Tolle! Lege!™"Take and Read."
The Fictive Experience of Time

The distinction between utterance and statement within narrative provided an appropriate framework in the last chapter for studying the games with time that result from the division into the time taken to narrate and the time of the things narrated, which itself parallels this distinction. Our analysis of this reflexive temporal structure has shown the necessity for assigning these games with time the aim [finale] of articulating an experience of time that would he what was at stake in these games. In doing this we open the field for an investigation in which the problems of narrative configuration border on those of the refiguration of time by narrative. However, this investigation will not for the moment cross the threshold leading from the first problematic to the second, inasmuch as the experience of time at issue here is a fictive experience that has an imaginary world for its horizon, one that remains the world of the text. Only the confrontation between the world of the text and the life-world of the reader will make the problematic of narrative configuration tip over into that of the refiguration of time by narrative.

Despite this restriction, posed as a matter of principle, the notion of the world of the text requires us to "open up"—to return to the expression employed earlier—the literary work to an "outside" that it projects before itself and offers to critical appropriation by a reader. This notion of an opening does not contradict that of closure implied by the formal principle of configuration. A work can be at one and the same time closed upon itself with respect to its structure and open onto a world, like a "window" that cuts out a fleeting perspective of a landscape beyond. This opening consists in the pro-position of a world capable of being inhabited. And in this regard, an inhabitable world, such as that many modern works project, is so only within the same problematic of an inhabitable space. What I am calling here the fictive experience of time is the temporal aspect of this virtual experience of being-in-the-world proposed by the text. It is in this respect that the literary work, escaping its own closure, "relates to . . .," "is directed toward . . .," in short, "is about . . ." Short of the reception of the text by the reader and the intersection between this fictive experience and the reader's actual experience, the world of the work constitutes what I shall term a transcendence immanent in the text. The, at first sight, paradoxical expression "fictive experience" therefore has no function other than designating a projection of the work, capable of intersecting the ordinary experience of action—an experience certainly, but a fictive one, since the work alone projects it.

To illustrate what I am saying, I have chosen three works, Mrs. Dalloway by Virginia Woolf, DerZaubererbPrg by Thomas Mann, and A la recherche du temps perdu by Marcel Proust. Why this choice?

First, because these three works illustrate the distinction proposed by Men-dilow between "tales of time" and "tales about time." All fictional narratives are "tales of time" inasmuch as the structural transformations that affect the situations and characters take time. However only a few are "tales about time" inasmuch as in them it is the very experience of time that is at stake in these structural transformations. The three works I shall discuss are three tales about time.

Moreover, each of these works explores, in its own way, uncharted modes of discordant concordance, which no longer affect just the narrative composition but also the lived experience of the characters in the narrative. I shall speak of "imaginative variations" to designate these varied figures of discordant concordance, which go far beyond the temporal aspects of everyday experience, whether in the sphere of praxis or of pathos, as I described them in volume I under the title of mimesis. These are varieties of temporal experience that only fiction can explore and they are offered to reading in order to refugie ordinary temporality.

Finally, these three works have in common their exploration, within the limits of the fundamental experience of discordant concordance, of the relation of time to eternity, which already in Augustine offered a wide variety of aspects. Literature, here again, proceeds by way of imaginative variations. Each of the three works under consideration, freeing itself in this way from the most linear aspects of time, can, in return, explore the hierarchical levels (hat form he depth of temporal experience. Fictional narrative thus detects temporalities that are more or less extended, offering in each instance a dilliT-cnt figure of recollection, of eternity in or out of time. and. I will add, of his secret relation between eternity and death.

Let us now allow ourselves to be instructed by these three tales about time.

BuTwuiN MORTAL TIMH ANO MONUMENTAL TIMH: Mrs. Dalloway

Before beginning my interpretation, I must stress once again the difference between two levels of critical reading with respect to the same work. On the first level, our interest is concentrated on the work's configuration. On the second level, our interest lies in the worldview and the temporal experience that 101 the instant of the event in thought, they amplify from within the moments of narrated time, so that the total interval of the narrative, despite its relative brevity, seems rich with an implied immensity. Along the line of this day, whose advance is punctuated by the strokes of Big Ben, the fits of memory, the calculations by which each character attempts to guess the conjectures the others are making about his or her appearance, thoughts, secrets—these form a series of loops that gives its specific distension to the narrated time's exten-sion®So the art of fiction here consists in weaving together the world of action and that of introspection, of mixing together the sense of everydayness and that of the inner self.

For a literary criticism more attentive to the depiction of character than to the exploration of narrated time and, through this, the time lived by the characters in the narrative, there is no doubt that this plunge into the past along with the incessant weighing of souls that the characters practice on one another, contribute along with the actions described from the outside to reconstruct from within the characters in their present state. By giving a temporal depth to the
narrative, the entanglement of the narrated present with the remembered past confers a psychological depth on the characters without, however, giving them a stable identity, so discordant are the glimpses the characters have of one another and of themselves. The reader is left holding the scattered pieces to a great game of character identification, but the solution to it escapes the reader as much as it does the characters in the narrative. The attempt to identify the characters certainly corresponds to the promptings of the fictive narrator, when this voice leaves the characters to their interminable quest."

Another procedure that belongs to the narrative technique used in *Mrs. Dalloway* — a procedure not quite so obvious as the preceding one — also deserves our attention. The narrator — to whom the reader readily grants the exorbitant privilege of knowing the thoughts of all the characters from the inside — is provided with the ability to move from one stream of consciousness to another, by having the characters meet in the same places (London streets, a public park), perceive the same sounds, be present at the same incidents (the Prince of Wales's car passing by, the airplane flying overhead, etc.). It is in this way that the story of Septimus, completely foreign to the Dalloway's circle, is incorporated for the first time into the narrative field. Septimus, like Clarissa, heard the rumors stemming from the royal incident (we shall see later the importance this takes on in the view the various protagonists have of time itself). By resorting to this same process the narrator jumps from Peter's ruminations on his lost love of yesteryear to the fatal exchange of thoughts between Rezia and Septimus, going over the disaster of their own union. The unity of place, the face-to-face discussion on the bench in the same park, is equivalent to the unity of a single instant onto which the narrator grafts the extension of a span of memory. 105 The procedure is made believable by the resonance-effect that compensates for the rupture-effect created by the jump from one stream of consciousness to another: over and done with, leaving no possibility of return, is Peter's love of yesteryear; over, and without any possible future, is also the marriage of Rezia and Septimus. We later move from Peter to Rezia through a similar transition, by way of the harpings of the old invalid woman, singing the national anthem. A bridge is built between these souls both through the continuity of place and the reverberation of an internal discourse in another person. On another occasion, the description of lovely clouds in the June sky allows the narrator to bridge the gap that separates the thoughts of young Elizabeth, returning from her escapade after escaping Miss Kilman, and Septimus's stream of consciousness as he lies on his bed under the order of the psychiatrists. A point in space, a pause in time form the footbridges between two temporalities foreign to each other.

That these procedures, characteristic of the temporal configuration, serve to bring about the sharing of a temporal experience by the narrator and the reader, or rather of a whole range of temporal experiences, therefore serves to refigure time itself in our reading — this is what it is now important to show by penetrating into the tale about time that runs through *Mrs. Dalloway*. Chronological time is, quite clearly, represented in the fiction by the striking of Big Ben and the other bells and clocks, as they ring out the hours. What is important is not this reminder of the hour, striking at the same time for everyone, however, but the relation that the various protagonists establish with these marks of time. The variations in this relation, depending on the character and the occasion, themselves constitute the fictive temporal experience (hat the narrative constructs with such extreme care in order to be convincing to the reader. Big Ben strikes for the first time when Clarissa, on her way to the deluxe shops of Westminister, goes over in her mind the breakup of her idyll with Peter, without realizing yet that he is back. The important thing is what Big Ben's striking signifies for her at this moment: "There! Out it boomed. First a warning, musical; then the hour irrevocable. The leaden circles dissolved in the air" (p. 5). This sentence, which is repeated three times in the course of the narrative, will of itself recall the sameness of clock time for everyone. The hour irrevocable? And yet in this June morning, the irrevocable is not burdensome; it gives new impetus to the joy of being alive, in the freshness of each moment and the expectation of the brilliant evening to come. But a shadow passes. If Peter were to come back, would he not call her again, with his tender irony, "The perfect hostess"? Thus passes internal time, pulled back by memory and thrust ahead by expectation. *Distentio animi*: "she always had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day" (p. 1 I). Strange Clarissa, symbol of the preoccupation forged by the world's vanity, concerned about the image of herself that she displays for the interpretation of others, on the watch for her own changing moods and, above all, *courageously* taken with life despite its precariousness and its duplicity. For her the refrain of Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* sings and will sing again in the course of the narrative: "Fear no more the heat o' the sun Nor the furious winter's rages."

But before we look at the other occasions when Big Ben strikes, it is important to note that the official time with which the characters are confronted is not only this time of clocks but all that is in complicity with it. In agreement with it is everything that, in the narrative, evokes monumental history, to use Nietzsche's expression, and to begin with, the admirable marble decor of the imperial capital (the "real" place, in this fiction, of all the events and their internal reverberations). This monumental history, in its turn, secretes what 1 will venture to call a "monumental time," of which chronological time is but the audible expression. To this monumental time belong the figures of authority and power that form the counterweight to the living times experienced by Clarissa and Septimus; of the time that, because of his severity, will lead Septimus to suicide, and that, because of her
spectives of time that speculation by itself fails to mediate. It is this sense of proportion that sets his entire professional and social life within monumental time. The narrator is not afraid to add to these authority figures, so consonant with official time, religion as it is embodied by Miss Kilman, the ugly, hateful, pious tutor who has stolen the affection of Eli/abeth away from her mother, before the young girl escapes and acquires a time of her own, with its promises and its dangers. "But Proportion has a sister, less smiling, more formidable. . . . Conversion is her name" (p. 151).

Clock time, the time of monumental history, the time of authority-figures—the same time! Dominated by this monumental time, more complex than simple chronological time, the hours are heard to ring out—or better, to strike—throughout the course of the narrative. Big Ben sounds a second time, just when Clarissa has presented her daughter to Peter. "The sound of Big Ben striking the half-hour struck out between them with extraordinary vigour, as if a young man, strong, indifferent, inconsiderate, were swinging dumb-bells this way and that" (p. 71). It is not, like the first time, a reminder of the inexorable but of the introduction—"between them"—of the incongruous. "The leaden circles dissolved in the air," the narrator repeats. For whom, then, has the half-hour sounded? "Remember my party tonight," Mrs. Dalloway calls after Peter as he goes away rhythmically modulating these words to the striking of Big Ben. Only half past eleven, he thinks. Then the bells of St. Margaret's join in, friendly, hospitable, like Clarissa. Joyous, then? Only until the sound as it dies away brings to mind Clarissa's old illness, and until the strength of the final stroke becomes the death knoll tolling her imagined death. What resources fiction has for following the subtle variations between the time of consciousness and chronological time! Big Ben rings out a third time (p. 142). The narrator has noon strike once for Septimus and Rezia on their way to give themselves up to Dr. Holmes, whose hidden relation to official time has already been stated, and for Clarissa spreading out her green dress on her bed. For each one, for no one, "the leaden circles dissolved in the air" (ibid.). Shall we say once again that the hour is the same for all? Yes, from outside; no, from inside. Only fiction, precisely, can explore and bring to language this divorce between worldviews and their irreconcilable perspectives on time, a divorce that undermines public time.

The clock strikes again, half past one; this time we hear the clocks in the wealthy business district. To Rezia in tears, they "counselled submission, upheld authority, and pointed out in chorus the supreme advantages of a sense of proportion" (pp. 154-55).

Big Ben strikes three o'clock for Richard and Clarissa. For the former, full of gratitude for the miracle that his marriage with Clarissa seems to mean to him, "Big Ben was beginning to strike, first the warning, musical, then the hour, irrevocable" (p. 177). An ambiguous message—a punctuation of happiness or of time lost in vain preoccupations. As for Clarissa in her drawing room, absorbed in the problems of her invitations, "the sound of the bell flooded the room with its melancholy wave" (p. 178). But here is Richard, before her, holding out flowers. Roses, yd again roses. "Happiness is this, is this, he thought" (p. 180).

When Big Ben strikes the next half hour, it is to punctuate the solemnity, the miracle, the miracle of the old woman glimpsed by Clarissa across the way, framed in her window, then withdrawing back into her room; it is as if the blows struck by the huge bell were reimmersing Clarissa in a domain of peacefulness where neither the vain regret of the love Peter once sought, nor the overbearing religiousness professed by Miss Kilman are able to penetrate. But two minutes after Big Ben, another bell rings, and its light sounds, messengers of futility, are mixed with the final majestic echoes of the bells of Big Ben, pronouncing the Law.

When the clock strikes six it is to inscribe within public time the supremely private act of Septimus's suicide. "The clock was striking—one, two, three: how sensible the sound was; compared with all this thumping and whispering; like Septimus himself. She [Rezia] was falling asleep. But the clock went on striking, four, live, six" (p. 227). The first three bells, like something con-107 crete, solid, in the tumult of whispers—the last three, like a flag raised in honor of the dead on the battlefield. The day advances, pulled ahead by the arrow of desire and expectation shot off at the beginning of the narrative (this evening's party to be given by Mrs. Dalloway) and pulled back by the incessant retreat into memory that, (p. 228) . . .

When Big Ben strike the hour one last time when the announcement of Septimus's suicide throws Clarissa into the contradictory thoughts I shall speak of below. And again the same phrase returns: "the leaden circles dissolved in the air." For everyone, for every sort of mood, the noise is the same, but the hour is not simply the noise that inexorable time makes in passing. . . .

We must not stop with a simplistic opposition between clock time and internal time, therefore, but must consider the variety of relations between the concrete temporal experience of the various characters and monumental time. The variations on the theme of this relation lead fiction well beyond the abstract opposition we have just referred to and make of it, for the reader, a powerful means of detecting the infinitely varied way of combining the perspectives of time that speculation by itself fails to mediate.
These variations constitute a whole range of "solutions" here, the two extremes of which are depicted by the
depth agreement between monumental time and the figures of authority epitomized by Dr. Bradshaw, and by the
terror of history"—to use Mircea Eliade's expression—represented through Septimus. Other temporal
experiences, that of Clarissa first and foremost, and that of Peter Walsh to a lesser degree, are ordered in relation
to these poles, following their greater or lesser kinship with the primary experience that the narrator sets up as a
standard for the entire exploration of temporal experience: the experience of the mortal discordance between
personal time and monumental time, of which Septimus is both the hero and the victim. We must therefore start
from this pole of radical discordance.

Septimus's "lived experience" abundantly confirms that no gulf would have opened up for him between the time
"struck" by Big Ben and the horror of history that leads to his death, if monumental history, everywhere present
in London, and the various figures of authority, epitomized in the medical profession, did not give to clock time
the train of power that transforms time into a radical threat. Septimus, too, saw the royal car pass by; he heard
the murmurs of respect from the crowd, just as he perceived the airplane flying overhead with its trail of
advertising—all of which only makes him cry. the beauty of the places making everything seem terrible. Horror!
Terror! These two words sum up for him the antagonism existing between the two temporal perspectives, just
as it exists between himself and others—"That eternal loneliness" (p. 37)—and between himself and life. If
these experiences, inex-108
pressible at their limit, do nevertheless attain internal language, it is because they have encountered a verbal
complicity in the reading of Aeschylus, Dante, and Shakespeare, a reading that has transmitted to Septimus only
a message of universal meaningless. At least these books are on his side, protesting against monumental
time and all the oppressive and repressive powers of medical science. Precisely because they are on his side,
these books create an additional screen between himself, others, and life. One passage in Mrs. Dalloway says it
all. This is when Rezia, the little milliner from Milan, lost in London where she has followed her husband, utters, "It is time.....the word
'time' split, its husk; poured its riches over him; and from his lips fell like shells, like shavings from a plane,
without his making them, hard, white, imperishable words, and (lew to attach themselves to their places in an
ode to Time; an immortal ode to 'Time" (p. 105). Time has recovered its mythical grandeur, its somber reputation
of destroying rather than generating. The horror of time, bringing back from the dead the ghost of his war
comrade, Evans, rising up from the depths of monumental history—the Great War—at the heart of the imperial
city. Note the narrator's grating humor: " I will tell you the time,' said Septimus, very slowly, very drowsily,
smiling mysteriously. As he sat smiling at the dead man in the grey suit the quarter struck—the quarter to
twelve. And that is being young, Peter Walsh thought as he passed them" (p. 106).

The two extremes of temporal experience confront each other in the scene of Septimus's suicide. Dr.
Bradshaw—Sir William!—has decided that Rezia and Septimus must be separated for the good of the patient.
"Holmes and Bradshaw were on him!" (p. 223). What is worse, "human nature" has pronounced a guilty verdict
on him, a death sentence. In the papers that Septimus asks be burned and that Rezia tries to save are his "Odes to
Time" (p. 2241. His time, henceforth, has no common measure with that of the holders of medical knowledge,
their sense of proportion, their verdicts, their power to inflict suffering. Septimus throws himself out the window.
The question arises whether, beyond the horror of history that it expresses. Septimus's death is not charged by
the narrator with another meaning that would make time the negative side of eternity. In his madness, Septimus
is the bearer of a revelation that grasps in time the obstacle to a vision of cosmic unity and in death the way of
reaching this salvific meaning. In any event, the narrator did not want to make this revelation the "message" of
the narrative. By connecting revelation and madness, the narrator leaves the reader uncertain with respect to the
very sense of Septimus's death. Moreover, it is to Clarissa, as I shall state below, that the narrator gives the task
of legitimizing, although only up to a certain point, this redemptive sense of Septimus's death. We must therefore
never lose sight of the fact that what makes sense is the juxtaposition of Septimus's and Clarissa's experience of
time. Considered separately, Septimus's worldview expresses the agony of a soul for whom

monumental time is unbearable. The relation that death can have with eternity, in addition to this, intensifies this agony
(in accordance with the interpretation of the relation of eternity to time that I proposed in my reading of Augustine's
Confessions)." It is therefore in relation to this insurmountable fissure that opened up between the monumental time
of the world and the mortal time of the soul that the temporal experiences of each of the other characters are ordered
and, with this, their way of handling the relation between the two sides of this opening. I shall limit myself to Peter
Walsh and Clarissa, although there is much that could be said about other imaginative variations carried out by the
narrator.

Peter, his former love lost forever—"it was over!"—his present life in ruins, is made to mutter: "the death of the soul"
(p. 88). If he does not have Clarissa's lively self-confidence to help him spring back, he does possess, to help him
survive, a certain levity. "It was awful, he cried, awful, awful! Still, the sun was hot. Still, one got over things. Still,
life had a way of adding day today. Still. . . . still. . . . Peter Walsh laughed out" (pp. 97-98). For if age does not
weaken passions, "one has gained—at last!—the power which adds the supreme flavour to existence,—the power of
taking hold of experience, of turning it round, slowly, in the light" (p. 1 19).

Clarissa is, quite clearly, the heroine of the novel. It is the narrative of her actions and internal discourses that sets the boundaries for the narrated time, but, even more, it is her temporal experience contrasted with that of Septimus, of Peter, and of the figures of authority that constitutes what is at stake in the game with time, as it is set out by the narrative techniques characteristic of Mrs. Dalloway.

Her social life, her acquaintance with authority-figures make part of her belong to the side of monumental time. Will she not, this very* evening, take her place at the top of her staircase, like the queen welcoming her guests to Buckingham Palace? Is she not a figure of authority in other people's eyes, by the way she holds herself straight and erect? Seen by Peter, is she not a fragment of the British empire (p. 116)? Does not Peter's tender and cruel expression define her through and through, "The perfect hostess"? And yet the narrator wants to communicate to the reader the sense of a deep kinship between Clarissa and Septimus, whom she has never seen, whose name she does not even know. The same horror dwells in her, but unlike Septimus she will confront it. sustained by an indestructible love for life. The same terror: just evoking the draining of life from Mrs. Bruton's face—the woman who did not invite her to lunch with her husband!—is enough to remind her how much "she feared the time itself" (p. 44). What maintains her fragile equilibrium between mortal time and the time of resolution in the face of death—if we may dare to apply to her this major existential category of *leben* and Time—is her love of life, of perishable beauty, of changing light, her passion for "the falling drop"

(p. 54). Whence her astonishing power to rebound from memory, to plunge "into the very heart of the moment" (ibid.). The way in which Clarissa receives the news of the suicide of this unknown young man is the occasion for the narrator to situate Clarissa on a crest between the two extremes spanned by the narrative's range of imaginative variations on temporal experience. This we guessed long ago: Septimus is Clarissa's "double"; in a certain way, he dies in her place." As for Clarissa, she redeems his death by continuing to live. The news of the suicide, thrown out for conversation right in the middle of the evening, first provokes in Clarissa this thought, at once frivolous and in complicity: "Oh! thought Clarissa, in the middle of my party, here's death," (p. 279). But deeper within herself is the unsurpassable certainty that by losing life this young man saved the highest sense of death. "Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the impossibility of reaching the centre which, mystically, evade them; closeness drew apart, rupture faded, one was alone. There was an embrace in death" (p. 281). Here the narrator joins together in a single narrative voice, the narrator's own, Septimus's voice, and Clarissa's. It is clearly Septimus's voice that says, as an echo through Clarissa's, "Life is made intolerable; they make life intolerable, men like that" (ibid.). It is through the eyes of Septimus that she sees Dr. Bradshaw as "obscurely evil, without sex or lust, extremely polite to women, but capable of sonic indescribable outrage— forcing your soul, that was it" (ibid.). Bui Clarissa's time is not Septimus's time. Her party will not end in disaster. A "sign" placed once again by the narrator will help Clarissa to link her through and through, "The perfect hostess"? And yet the narrator wants to communicate to the reader the sense of a deep kinship between Clarissa and Septimus, whom she has never seen, whose name she does not even know. The same horror dwells in her, but unlike Septimus she will confront it. sustained by an indestructible love for life. The same terror: just evoking the draining of life from Mrs. Bruton's face—the woman who did not invite her to lunch with her husband!—is enough to remind her how much "she feared the time itself" (p. 44). What maintains her fragile equilibrium between mortal time and the time of resolution in the face of death—if we may dare to apply to her this major existential category of *leben* and Time—is her love of life, of perishable beauty, of changing light, her passion for "the falling drop"

The Magic Mountain is a novel about time is too obvious for me to have to insist upon the fact. It is much more difficult to say in what sense it is one. To begin, let us limit ourselves to the most evident features that give The Magic Mountain the overall definition of Zeitroman.
First of all, abolishing the sense of measurement of time is the major feature of the way the guests at the Berghof, the Davos sanatorium, exist and live. From the beginning to the end of the novel, this effacing of chronological time is clearly underscored by the contrast between “those up here,” acclimated to this beyond-time, and “those down below”—those of the flat-land—whose occupations follow the rhythm of the calendar and of clocks. The spatial opposition reduplicates and reinforces the temporal opposition.

Next, the story-line, which is relatively simple, is punctuated by several comings and goings between those down below and those up above, and this dramatizes the bewitchment of the place. Hans Castorp's très iréal constitutes the first event of this sort. This young engineer in his early thirties from Hamburg—a flat-land if ever there was one—comes to visit his cousin, Joachim, who has been in treatment for more than six months at the Berghof. His initial intention is to stay only three weeks in this strange place. Found to be ill by Dr. Behrens, the sinister and clownish director of the institution, Hans Castorp becomes, in his turn, one of the guests at the Berghof. The departure of 112

Joachim, who returns to military life, his subsequent return to the sanatorium to die there, in his turn, the abrupt departure of Madame Chauchat—the central character in the amorous adventure that is interwoven with the tale about time—after the decisive episode of “Walpurgis-night,” her sudden return in the company of Mynheer Peeperkorn—all these arrivals and departures constitute so many points of rupture, trials, and questioning in an adventure that, for the most part, takes place in the spatial and temporal seclusion of the Berghof. Hans Castorp himself will stay there seven years, until the “thunderbolt” of the declaration of war in 1914 tears him away from the bewitchment of the magic mountain. But the irruption of great history will return him to the time of those down below only to hand him over to the “feast of death” that is war. The unfolding of the narrative in its episodic aspect, therefore, makes us tend to see in Hans Castorp's confrontation with abolished time the main thread of the narrative in The Magic Mountain.

The narrative technique employed in the work confirms, in turn, the characterization of the novel as a Zeitroman. The most visible procedure concerns the accent placed on the relation between the time of narration and the narrated time. The division into seven chapters covers a chronological span of seven years. But the relation between the length of time narrated by each chapter, and the time taken to narrate it, measured by the number of pages, is not proportional. Chapter I devotes 15 pages to “the arrival.” Chapter 2 constitutes a return through past time up to the moment when the decision is made to undertake the fatal journey; I shall discuss its meaning below. Chapter 3 devotes 54 pages to the first complete day there (the day following Haas's arrival). After this, the 89 pages of Chapter 4 suffice to cover the first three weeks, the exact interval of time that Hans Castorp intended to stay at the Berghof. The first seven months require the 160 pages of Chapter 5. The 1% pages of Chapter 6 cover one year and nine months. The remaining four and a half years take up the 175 pages of Chapter 7. These numerical relations are more complex than they appear. On the one hand, the Erzahle Zeit continually diminishes in relation to the erzahle Zeit. On the other hand, the stretching out of the chapters, combined with this abbreviation of the narrative, creates a perspectival effect, essential to the communication of the major experience, the hero's internal debate over his loss of the sense of time. To be perceived, this perspec-tival effect requires a cumulative reading that allows the totality of the work to remain present in each of its developments. In fact, due to the length of tin-work, only by rereading can we reconstitute this perspective. These considerations on the length of the narrative lead us to a final argument in favor of interpreting The Magic Mountain as a Vorsatzmuin. This argument is in a sense the most decisive. But, at the same time, it throws us into the very heart of the confusion that the reader experiences when he or she wonders in what sense and at what price this novel is indeed a Zeitroman. We
months, seven years—serves to strengthen this relation between the time of reading—considered as coextensive with the time of writing—and the narrated time, with the note of irony attached to the choice of the number seven, overcharged with hermetic symbolism: "Heaven forbid it should be seven years!" (ibid.), referring to the time that the storyteller and the reader will take to tell the story. Behind this dilatory reply is already apparent the question of the pertinence of measurements of time in the hero's experience. However, more decisive for our purpose is the enigmatic remark that precedes these allusions. Speaking of the narrated time, the Vorsat: declares that the story we are about to read has to be told "out of the depth of the past" (in der Zeitform der tiefsten Vergangenheit) (p. ix). The fact that stories are told in the past in itself constitutes a distinct problem that will occupy us in my concluding chapter in volume 3. The fact that, in addition, as regards the narrated past, "the more past the better" (ibid.), poses a specific enigma, age thereby losing its chronological character: "the degree of its [the story's] antiquity has noways to do with the passage of time" (ibid.). What, then, imposes it upon us? The ironic narrator gives an ambiguous reply. This antiquity under the circumstances splits up into a dated antiquity, which is over for us, that of the world before the Great War, and an ageless antiquity, that of the legend (Marchen). This initial allusion is not without reverberation on the problem of the experience of time produced by the told story: "the author intentionally touches upon the strange and questionable double nature of that riddling element" (ibid.). What double nature? Precisely that which, throughout the entire novel, will confront the time of calendars and clocks with a time gradually divested of any measurable character and even of any interest in measurement. At (first sight, the problem posed by this double nature of time resembles that posed by Mrs. Dalloway. Schematically: the exploration of the conflicting relations between internal time and chronological time, enlarged to the dimensions of monumental time. There is actually a considerable difference between the two novels. In The Magic Mountain, the constellations that gravitate around the two poles are entirely different, to the point of making us doubt that The Magic Mountain is solely, or even principally, a Zeitroman. We must therefore now hear another side of this debate. First, the line separating "those up there" from "those down below" separates at the same time the world of sickness and death from the everyday world—the world of life, health, and action. In fact, at the Berghof everyone is sick, including the doctors, the specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis as well as the charlatan psychiatrist. Hans Castorp penetrates a universe where the reign of sickness and death is already established. Whoever enters there is in turn condemned to death. If someone like Joachim leaves this world, he returns to die there. The magic, the bewitchment of the magic mountain is the bewitchment of death, of the death instinct. Love itself is a captive of this charm. At the Berghof, sensuality and putrefaction go hand-in-hand. A secret pact links love and death. This is also, and perhaps more than anything else, the magic of this place outside space and time. Hans Castorp's passion for Madame Chauchat is wholly dominated by this fusion between sensual attraction and the fascination with decomposition and death. Madame Chauchat is already there when he arrives. She is part, so to speak, of the institution of death. Her sudden departure and her unexpected return, accompanied by the flamboyant Mynheer Peeperkorn—who will commit suicide at the Berghof—constitute the major peripeteia in the Aristotelian sense of the term. The Magic Mountain is therefore not simply a tale about time. The problem is rather how the same novel can be both a novel about time and a novel about a deadly sickness. Must the decomposition of time be interpreted as a prerogative of the world of sickness, or does this world constitute a sort of limit-situation for an unprecedented experience of time? Assuming the first hypothesis. The Magic Mountain is a novel about sickness; assuming the second, the novel about sickness is, first and foremost, a Zeitroman. A second alternative can be added to this first one. The problem is fact complicated by the presence, in the development of the novel, of a third component alongside the effacement of time and the fascination with sickness. This third theme concerns the destiny of European culture. By giving such a large place to conversations, discussions, and controversies that take this destiny as their theme, by creating characters as clearly delineated as Settem-brini, the Italian man of letters, spokesman for the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and Naphta, the Jesuit of Jewish origin, the perverse critic of bourgeois ideology, the author has made his novel a vast apologue of the decadence of European culture, where the fascination exerted by death within the walls of the Berghof sanatorium symbolizes—as Leibniz would have said—the temptation of nihilism. Love itself is transfigured by the debate on culture to such an extent that it surpasses individuals, making us wonder if this debate has not thereby exhausted love's redemptive capacity. How then, we ask, can the same novel be a novel about time, a novel about illness, and a novel about culture? Does not the theme of the relation to time, which first seemed to predominate and then appeared to give way to
the theme of the relation to death, recede one step further if the destiny of European culture becomes what is principally at stake.' Mann, it seems, has resolved the problem by incorporating these three dimensions—time, sickness, and culture—into the singular experience (in both senses of the French word: experience and experiment) of the central character, Hans Castorp. In doing this, he has composed a work related to the great German tradition of the Bildungsroman, illustrated a century earlier by Goethe in his famous Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre. The theme of the novel is consequently that of the instruction, development, and education of a young man who is "simple," yet "curious" and "enterprising" (all these expressions are those of the narrative voice). Consequently, when the novel is read as the story of a spiritual apprenticeship, centered around the person of Hans Castorp, the real question becomes: By what means has the narrative technique succeeded in integrating the experience of time, deadly sickness, and the great debate over the destiny of culture? With regard to the first alternative mentioned above—is this a novel about time or a novel about sickness?—the narrative technique consists in raising the double confrontation with the efYacement of time and the fascination with decomposition to the level of an intellectual experience, whose transformations we shall study below. Detemporalization and corruption become, through the art of the narrative, the indivisible object of the hero's fascination and speculation. Only fiction could create the unprecedented conditions required by this temporal experience, which itself is unprecedented, by instilling a complicity between the effacement of time and the attraction of death. In this way, even before we take into account the debate over the destiny of culture, the story of a spiritual apprenticeship joins the Zeitroman to the novel about sickness within the framework of a Bildungsroman. The second alternative—the destiny of a hero, even an antihero, or the destiny of European culture—is resolved in the same way. By making Settembrini and Naphta Hans Castorp's "schoolmasters," Mann has integrated the great European debate within the individual story of une education sentimentale. The interminable discussions with the spokesmen for optimistic humanism and for a nihilism tinged with communist-leaning Catholicism are raised to the level of objects of fascination and speculation in the same way as death and time are. The Bildungsroman, within the framework of which the Zeitroman is placed, deserves this title not because what is at stake is the destiny of European culture, but because this trans-individual debate is in a sense miniaturized—if we may speak in this way about a novel of some seven hundred pages!—in the Bildungsroman centered around Hans Castorp. Thus between these three dimensions—time, death, and culture—exchanges occur. The destiny of culture becomes an aspect of the debate between love and death; in return, the deceptions of a love in which sensuality is accompanied by corruption become "schoolmasters" in the hero's spiritual quest, patterned after the teachers who use language. Is this to say that in this complex architecture the Zeitroman becomes just one aspect of the Bildungsroman, on an equal footing with the novel about sickness and the novel about European decadence? The Zeitroman preserves, in my opinion, an indelible privilege that is apparent only if we ask the most difficult question of all, that of the true nature of the spiritual apprenticeship whose story is told in the novel. Thomas Mann chose to make the hero's investigation concerning time the touchstone of all of the other investigations into sickness and death, love, life, and culture. Time is compared, at a certain point in the story which I shall speak of below, to the thermometer without any marking that is given to the patients who cheat. It then carries the meaning—semi-mythical, semi-ironic—of a "silent sister." The "silent sister" of the attraction of death, of love mingled with corruption, of the concern with great history. The Zeitroman, we might say, is the "silent sister" of the epic of death and of the tragedy of culture. Focused in this way on the experience of time, all the questions posed by the hero's apprenticeship in the various spheres into which the novel is divided are summed up in a single question: Has the hero learned anything at the Berghof? Is he a genius, as some have said, or an antihero? Or is his apprenticeship of a more subtle nature, breaking with the tradition of the Bildungsroman? Here the doubts raised by the narrator's irony come back in force. I situated the privileged place of this irony in the distancing relation established between a narrative voice, put on stage with ostentation, insistence, and obstinacy, and the whole of the story told, throughout which this narrative voice intervenes unceasingly. The narrator is cast as the cunning observer of the story he is telling. As a first approximation, this critical distance appears to undermine the credibility of the narrator and render problematic any answer to the question of whether the hero has learned anything at the Berghof about time, life and death, love and culture. However, on further reflection, we begin to suspect that this distancing relation between the narrative voice and the narrative might constitute the hermeneutical key to the problem posed by the novel itself. Might not the hero, in his debate with time, be in the same relation as the narrator with respect to the story he is telling—a relation of ironic distance? Neither vanquished by the morbid universe, nor a
Goethean victor in some triumph through action, might he not be a victim, who grows solely within the realm of lucidity, of reflective power? This is the reading hypothesis that must be tested as we go over the seven chapters of *Der Zauht'rberg* a second time.

The novel begins as follows. "An unassuming young man was travelling, in midsummer, from his native city of Hamburg to Davos-Platz in the Canton of Orisons, on a three weeks' visit" (p. 3). The *Zeitroman* is set into place by the mere mention of the three weeks." But there is more. Upon rereading, the narrative voice is recogniziable with the very first description of the hero as an "unassuming" (einfach) young man, which finds an echo in the final lines of the novel, in which the narrator unabashedly enjoins his hero: "Adventures of the flesh and in the spirit, while enhancing *steigerten* thy-simplicity, granted thee to know in the spirit what in the flesh thou scarcely could have done" (p. 716). In addition, the irony of this voice is concealed by the apparent observation, "[He] was travelling . . . on a three weeks' visit." Upon rereading, these three weeks will present a contrast with the seven years spent at the Berghof. A question is thus implied in this innocent beginning: What will happen to the simplicity of this young man when his project is torn to pieces by the adventures that he himself has undertaken? We know that the length of his stay will provide the dramatic impetus for the entire narrative.

In this very brief first chapter, the narrator makes use for the first time of the spatial relation to signify the temporal relation: going away from his native city functions like forgetfulness. "[If] me, we say, is Lethe: but change of air is a similar draught, and, if it works less thoroughly, docs so more quickly" (p. 4). Arriving at the Berghof: Hans Castorp carries with him the vision of time below. The first conversations between Hans and his cousin Joachim, who is already acclimatized to the time above, bring to the foreground the discordance between the two ways of existing, the two styles of living. Hans and Joachim do not speak the same language with regard to time. Joachim has already lost the preciseness of measurements. "Three weeks are just like a day to them. . . . One's ideas get changed" (p. 7). An expectation is thus created in the reader. Conversation will serve not only, as here, as a simple procedure for making apparent on the level of language the difference between ways of conceiveing and experiencing time; it will be the privileged medium of the hero's apprenticeship. The second full day, recounted by Chapter 3, is made up of numerous minor events that follow one upon the other. Meal seems to follow meal without respite; a multifarious population is discovered in a brief lapse of time which appears at once to be abundantly filled and, in particular, to be precisely modulated by walks, sessions with the thermometer, and rest periods. Conversations with Joachim, then with the first schoolmaster, Settembrini, put on stage early on by the narrator, aggravate the discrepancies of language that were already intimated the day before, the day of his "arrival." Hans Castorp is astonished by Joachim's vague approximation. At his first meeting with Settembrini, he defends his stay of "three weeks." But the discussion with Settembrini has from the start a different case than the conversations with Joachim. The misunderstanding is from the outset the beginning of an investigation, a quest. Settembrini is right when he says, "Curiosity is another of the prescriptive rights of shadows" (p. 5H). The section entitled Gfdankenscharfe—"Mental Gymnastic" (or "Lucidity")—introduces the preamble to a speculation that the art of narrativize will untringly attempt to narrative. In the thermometer scene, Han's assurance collapses but not his vigilance. Is it not at fixed hours and for seven (seven!) minutes that one's temperature is taken? Hans holds fast to the ordering of what could be called "clinical time"; but this is precisely what throws time off. At least Hans takes the first step toward lucidity by disassociating time as it appears to "feeling" (Gefiihl) from the time that is measured by the hands as they move around the dial of the clock (p. 66). Slim discoveries, no doubt, but ones that nevertheless must be ascribed to lucidity—even if perplexity overrides all. It is not without importance for the education of our hero that a first, sudden illumination concerning what time can truly be comes to him in a dream. How does time present itself? As "a 'silent sister,' a mercury column without degrees to be used by those who wanted to cheat" (p. 92). The thermometer scene is both repealed and abolished. The numbers have disappeared from the thermometer. Normal time has disappeared, as on a watch that no longer tells the hour. By their mood "of extravagant joy and suspense" (p. 90), the two dreams that are reported belong to the series of "happy moments"—in Proustian terms—that mark out his quest and to which our attention will be drawn in a second reading by the novel's final lines: "Moments there were, when out of death, and the rebellion of the flesh, there came to thee, as thou tookest stock of thyself jahnungsvoll und regierungsweisel, a dream of love" (p. 716). It is true that this dream is not yet one of those that the hero can be said to have "taken stock of." At least it indicates a curiosity that, although it is captive of the erotic attraction exerted by Clavdia Chauchat, is strong enough to make him resist Settembrini's advice that he leave: "He spoke with sudden insistence" (p. 87).

The erosion of the sense of time and of the language appropriate to it continues in the long Chapter 4 that covers the three weeks that Hans Castorp intended to spend as a simple visitor to the Berghof. The confusion of the seasons contributes to the blurring together of the common reference points of time, while the interminable political and cultural discussions with Settembrini get underway (Naphta has not yet been introduced). For an initial reading, these interminable discussions tend to make one lose sight of the hero's temporal experience and to force the *Bildungsroman* outside the boundaries of the *Zeitroman*. For a second reading, it appears that the role assigned to the *Exkurs iiber den Zeitsinn*—the "Excursus on the Sense of Time" (pp. 102-5)—is to reinser the great debate on the destiny of European culture within the history of the hero's apprenticeship, and in this way to ensure the balance between *Zeitroman* and *Bildungsroman*. A single expression serves as the anchor.
point in this delicate adjustment that is the work of the narrator alone: "acclimatization." "habituating oneself" (diesem Sicheinleben an fremden On) (pp. 103—4), as a phenomenon that is at once cultural and temporal. The digression moves on from here to become the rumination of the narrator himself on monotony and boredom. It is false, it is stated, that these impressions slow down the course of lime. Far from it. "Vacuity, monotony, have, indeed, the property of lingering out the moment and the hour and of making them tiresome. But they are capable of contracting and dissipating the larger, the very large time-units, to the point of reducing them to nothing at all" (p. 104). This double effect of shortening and stretching out robs the idea of a length of time of its univocity and only allows one answer to the question, How long? "Very long" (p. 105).

The general tone of the Exkurs is instead that of a warning. "There is, after all, something peculiar about the process of habituating oneself in a new place, the often laborious fitting in and getting used, which one undertakes for its own sake, and of set purpose to break it all off as soon as it is complete, or not long thereafter, and to return to one's former state" (pp. 103-4). When it is a question of something quite different from an interruption, an intermission in the main course of life, a monotony that is too uninterrupted threatens to make us lose the very consciousness of duration, "the perception of time, so closely bound up with the consciousness of life that one may not be weakened without the other suffering a sensible impairment" (p. 104). The expression "consciousness of life" (Lebensgefiilhl) is obviously not without a hint of irony. However, by attributing analogous thoughts to his hero, the narrator indicates that he has simply a slight headstart over Castrop on the road to lucidity. "The hero's curiosity is never deadened, even if at times he experiences the desire "to escape awhile from the Berghof circle [Bannkreis], to breathe the air deep into his lungs" (p. 117).

Also contributing to the effacement of time, of which the hero is the partially lucid victim, is the episode of the apparition in a waking dream-state of

Pribislav Hippe, the schoolboy with the lead pencil, whose eyes and look become those of Claudvia Chauchat. Due to the emblematic character of the leitmotiv of the lead pencil that is borrowed and returned (providing the narrator with an enigmatic ending to the Walpurgisnacht episode, which I shall discuss below), this episode, which Thieberger appropriately calls the vertraumte Intermezzo, brings to the surface again the depth of accumulated time, already probed by the return into the past in Chapter 2—a depth that in its turn gives the present instant a sort of infinite duration (p. 122). Later, the series of dreams of eternity will be built upon this depth.

Even before the planned three weeks are up, for Hans, "the refreshment of his sense of time" has faded away, and yet the days that fly by continue to stretch out "long and longer to hold the crowded, secret hopes and fears that filled it to overflowing" (p. 141). His attraction to Claudvia and the prospect of leaving still give time movement and tension.40 And yet when the end of the three weeks is in sight, Hans Castorp has already been won over by the ideas expressed by Joachim when they met. "Three weeks up here was as good as nothing at all; they had all told him so in the beginning. The smallest unit of time was the month" (p. 104). This double effect of shortening and stretching out robs the idea of a length of time of its univocity and only allows one answer to the question, How long? "Very long" (p. 105). The episodes, Erzhiitzeit und plotzliche Klarheit, "Soup Everlasting" and "Sudden Enlightenment" (pp. 183-219), do not strictly speaking contain any of the announced "miracles" but rather the ground—even the underground—against which the decisive "miracles" will stand out. A strange eternity indeed is this selfsame eternity. It is once again the narrative voice that says of this series of days, all alike, spent in bed, "They bring to breathe the air deep into his lungs" (p. 117). And by agreeing to take part in the "thermometer" sessions (an important subtitle in Chapter 4) (p. 161), has he not, like the other patients, fallen prey to the magic mountain?41

Once "habituated," Hans Castrop is nevertheless ready for the first experience of eternity, which opens Chapter 5, which is longer than the preceding chapter. The narrator has, from the start, taken things in hand in order to return to the question raised in the Vorsatz concerning the length of the novel. "We apprehend," states the narrative voice, "that these next three weeks will be over and done with in the twinkling of an eye" (p. 141). His attraction to Claudvia and the prospect of leaving still give time movement and tension.40 And yet when the end of the three weeks is in sight, Hans Castorp has already been won over by the ideas expressed by Joachim when they met. "Three weeks up here was as good as nothing at all; they had all told him so in the beginning. The smallest unit of time was the month" (p. 162). Was he not already regretting not having set aside more time for his visit? And by agreeing to take part in the "thermometer" sessions (an important subtitle in Chapter 4) (p. 161), has he not, like the other patients, fallen prey to the magic mountain?41

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requires. The meaning of Ewig-

*me* must remain in suspense until a reply is given by the other two *exp* riences of eternity, that of "Walpurgis-Night" at the end of the same chapter, and that of the "Snow" scene in Chapter 7.

The narrative element that permits this commentary by the narrator is Hans Castorp's new condition, under Dr. Behrens' orders, flat on his back in the deathbed of the preceding patient. Three weeks of this eternity fly by at a U*pp* in ten pages. All that counts is the "abiding present of that midnight hour" P*pp* 90), which is also expressed by an accumulation of remarks about time. *Ew* *Ew* *Ew* *Ew* knows what day it is; but one knows what time it is in the *Ew* artificially shortened, broken into small bits* (p. 192). Settembrini is the opportunity to discourse—in the tone of a man of letters, a humanist on the relation that everything, including religion and love, entertains with death. The X ray abruptly gives the fatal diagnosis: Hans Castorp is already the victim of sickness and death. The sight of his own ghostly self, his illuminated screen is a prefiguration of his own decom^*a* look into his own tomb. "With . . . penetrating, prophetic eyes, he seemed at this familiar part of his own body, and for the first time in his life he understood that he would die" (p. 219).

The last, precise account of time—again through the narrator's irony—at seven weeks, the seven weeks that Hans Castorp intended to spend at JBerghof; it is the narrator who gives this account (p. 219). It is not unim that this final count—six weeks are counted until Christmas and seven *par* *me* "night"—is placed under the title of the subchapter *Freiheit.. p." (p. 219). The progress of Hans Castorp's education is inseparable from his timely over a final pang of concern lor dated time, liven more important, the fact that our hero learns to distance himself from his Italian "hero: as he distances himself from time." But he will not free himself from his until he has escaped the nihilism of the Ewigkeitssuppe, which, in turn, ceases to leave its morbid imprint on love, intermingled with sickness and death.*

P portrays on Hans Castorp's education will take place on the colors of an eman^*cipa*<t*ero* by way of empty time (pp. 287-88). Another subsection of this long chapter in the course of which time steps outside of its points of reference as it *ex* *ev* *s* en weeks, is entitled Forschungen, "Research" (pp. 267-9). It is burdened with apparent digressions on anatomy, organic life, matter, death*the* mixture of voluptuousness and organic substance, of corruption and creation. Although he is infatuated with his reading on anatomy, it is nevertheless entirely by himself that Hans Castorp obtains his education on the theme of life in its relation with voluptuousness and death, under the emblem of the X-rayed hand's skeleton. Hans Castorp has already become an observer, just like the narrator. After "Research" follows Totentanz, "The Dance of Death" (pp. 286-322)—three days of festivity in honor of Christmas, where no light of the Nativity ever penetrates, but which is marked only by the contemplation of the "gentleman rider's" corpse. The sacred and indecent character of death, glimpsed before in the presence of his grandfather's earthly remains, imposes itself once more. However macabre the impulse that leads Hans Castorp from the bedside of one dying person to another, what animates him is the concern to pay homage to life, insofar as the ironic narrator has placed under the title of the sequel to the Walpurgisnacht, "Walpurgis-Night" (pp. 322-43). It begins with the informal "thou" that Hans Castorp, half drunk, addresses to Settembrini, who does not miss seeing in this the freeing of his "pupil"—"That sounds like a parting" (p. 329)—and culminates in the conversation bordering on delirium with Claudia Chauchat, in the midst of the "antics of the masked patients" (p. 335)." Following this witty but forced conversation centered upon the use of the familiar form "thou" which begins and ends with the pencil borrowed and returned—Hippo's pencil!—a dreamlike vision occurs, carrying with it the sense of eternity, an eternity quite different, surely, from the Ewigkeitssuppe, but a dreamed eternity nonetheless. "For it is like a dream to me, that we are sitting like Hippocrates, on the clouds, long, eternity, *Et* *et* a present, voice of the eternity*" (p. 336, in French in (he text). A dream of eternity which Clavdia's announcement of her impending departure, received like the news of a cataclysm, suffices to dissipate. But could Clavdia, preaching freedom through sin, danger, loss of self, have represented for Hans anything different than Ulysses' sirens, when he has himself tied to the mast of his ship to resist their songs? The body, love, and death are too closely bound together, sickness and voluptuousness, beauty and corruption still too thoroughly intermingled for the sense of the counted time to be paid for, in its turn, by 123 the courage to live, the price of which is this very loss.* The sequel to the Ewigkeitssuppe was no more than a dream of eternity, a carnival eternity—Walpurgisnacht!

The composition of Chapter 6, which by itself takes up more than half of the second part of The Magic Mountain, is a good illustration of the difference not only between Erz^*hil* and *erzahlte Zeit*, but between the narrated time and the experience of time projected by fiction.
On the level of the narrated time, the narrative framework is assured by the exchanges, increasingly infrequent and increasingly dramatic, between those up above and those down below, exchanges that at the same time provide a figure for the assaults of normal time on the detemporalized duration that is the common lot at the Berghof. Joachim, returning to his military vocation, escapes the sanatorium. Naphta, the second schoolmaster—the Jesuit of Jewish origin, at once anarchist and reactionary—is introduced into the story, breaking up the face-to-face conversation between Settembrini and Hans Castorp. The great uncle from Hamburg, as the representative of those down below, attempts in vain to tear his nephew away from the enchantment. Joachim returns to the Berghof to die there.

Out of all these events, there emerges one episode, Schnec, "Snow" (pp. 469-98), that alone deserves to be included within the series of moments and dreams of love referred to in the final lines of the book, "moments" (Augenblicke) that remain the discontinuous pinnacles, where the narrated time and the experience of time together find their culmination. The whole art of composition being to produce this conjunction at the peak between the narrated time and the experience of time.

Before this pinnacle is reached, Hans Castorp's ruminations on time—amplified by those of the narrator—stretch out the narrative framework we have just outlined to the point of bursting, as if the story of this spiritual apprenticeship never ceased to free itself from material contingencies. It is, moreover, the narrator who occupies the first scene, in a sense helping his hero to put his thoughts in order, to so great an extent does the experience of time, in evading chronology and in growing ever deeper, break up into irreconcilable perspectives. By losing measurable time, Hans Castorp has reached the same aporias that our discussion of the phenomenology of time in Augustine made apparent concerning the relationships between the time of the soul and physical change.

"What is time? A mystery, a figment—and all-powerful. It conditions the external world, it is motion married to and mingled with the existence of bodies in space, and with the motion of these" (p. 344). It is therefore not, strictly speaking, internal time that poses a problem, once it is disconnected from measurement, but the impossibility of reconciling it with the cosmic aspects of time, which, far from having disappeared with the interest in the passage of time, are going progressively to be exalted. What preoccupies Hans Castorp is precisely the equivocity of time—its eternal circularity and its capacity to produce change.

"Time is functional, it can be referred to as action; we say a thing is 'brought about' by time. What sort of thing? Change!" (ibid.). Time is a mystery precisely in that the observations that are to be made regarding it cannot be unified. (This is exactly what, for me, constitutes an unsurpassable enigma. This is why I can readily forgive the narrator for seeming to whisper Hans Castorp's thoughts to him.) How far the novel has moved away from the simple fiction of effacing measurable time! What has in a sense been freed by this effacement is the contrast between immobile eternity and the changes produced, whether it is a question of the visible changes of the seasons and the appearance of new vegetation (in which Hans Castorp take a new interest) or of more deeply hidden changes, which he experiences in himself—and this despite the Ewigkeitssippe—thanks to his erotic attraction to Clavdia, then at the time of the plenitude of Walpurgisnacht, and now in awaiting her return. Hans Castorp's passions for astronomy, which now supplants his interest in anatomy, henceforth gives the monotonous experience of time cosmic proportions. The contemplation of the sky and the stars gives their very flight an experience of Walpurgisnacht, and now in awaiting her return. Hans Castorp has discovered the immemorial—"for six long, incredible, though scurrying months" (p. 346). This profound change in the experience of time is included by the narrator within the series of events that constitutes the narrated time of the novel. On the one hand, awaiting Clavdia's return provides the occasion for another apprenticeship, that of endurance with respect to absence. Hans Castorp is now strong enough to resist the temptation to leave the magic mountain with Joachim. No, he will not leave with him, he will not desert to return to the flat-land: "Alone I should never find my way back" (p. 416). The immobile eternity has at least accomplished its negative work; he has divested himself of life. This passage by way of the negative constitutes the central peripeteia of the Bildungsroman as well as of the Zeitroman. In its turn, the repulsed attack of great-uncle Ticnappel, who has come from Hamburg to set a definite date for the fugitive's return, only transforms into obstinacy the endurance that remains the only available reply to the destructive action of eternal vanity. After this, is Hans the hostage of Dr. Behrens and his medical ideology, which merely repeats the cult of sickness and death that reigns at the Berghof? Or is he the new hero of a gnosis of eternity and of time? Both interpretations are carefully cultivated by the narrator. Hans Castorp has certainly divested himself of life, and this assuredly renders his experience suspect. In return, his resistance to the assaults from the flat-land "meant, for himself, the consummation of freedom—the thought of which had gradually ceased to make him shudder" (p. 440).

Hans Castorp exercises this freedom mainly with respect to his mentors, Settembrini and Naphta. The narrator has
most opportunely made the latter appear in the second half of his narrative, thus giving the hero the opportunity to keep at an equal distance from his two irreconcilable teachers and, in this way, to come little by little to the superior position that the narrator has ostensibly occupied since the *Vorsatz*. Naphtha represents no less of a temptation than Settembrini and his optimistic humanism. Naphtha's ramblings, in which Settembrini sees only a mysticism of death and murder, have a hidden connection to the lesson of the message left by Clavdia that famous *Walpurgisnacht*. If he does not speak of salvation through evil, he does teach that virtue and health are not "religious" states. This strange Christianity with a Nietzschean—or communist tinge, according to which "to be man was to be ailing" (p. 465), plays in the novel of Hans Castorp's education the role of diabolical temptation, of slipping away into the negative as depicted by the *Ewigkeissuppe*. But this temptation is no more successful than the emissary from the flat-land in interrupting the hero's intrepid experimentation.

The episode entitled *Schnee*, "Snow" (pp. 469-98), to which we now come, the most decisive one since *Walpurgisnacht*, owes its striking character to the fact that it directly follows the episode of Naphtha's diabolical maneuvers (an episode significantly and ironically entitled *Operationes Spirituales*). It is also important that this episode has as its setting the phantasmagoria of snowy space which, curiously, corresponds with the seashore—"The monotony of the scene was in both cases profound" (p. 473). The mountain laid waste by the snow is in truth Mian a setting for the decisive scene. It is the spatial equivalent of the temporal experience itself. "The primeval silence," *Das URSchweigen* (p. 476), unites space and time in a single symbolic system. In addition, the confrontation between human effort and nature and the obstacles it sets in the way exactly symbolizes the change of register in the relation between time and eternity, the spiritual stakes of the episode. "Everything is overturned when, courage transformed into defiance—"a repudiation of all caution whatsoever, in short ... a challenge" (p. 481)—the fighter, drunk with fatigue (and port) is visited by a vision of foliage and blue sky, the song of birds, and sunlight: "So now with the scene before him, constantly transformed and transfigured as it was before his eyes *sich offnete in wachsender Verkldrung*" (p. 490). Certainly this remembering the Mediterranean, which he has never seen, yet "always" (von je) known (ibid.), is not free from terror—the two old women dismembering a child over a basin, between flaming braziers!—as if the ugly were irremediably bound up with the beautiful. As if irrationality and death were part of life—"it would not be life without it"

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(p. 496)! Afterward, Hans has no more use for his schoolmasters. He knows. What does he know? "For the sake of goodness and love, man shall let death have no sovereignty over his thoughts" (pp. 496-97, emphasis in original). Thus the dream of eternity of *Walpurgisnacht*, indistinguishable from the cult of sickness and death, finds a reply in another eternity, an "always" that is at once the recompense for and the origin of the courage to live. Of lesser importance, then, is Joachim's return to the Berghof and the fact that this return apparently takes the form of the same temporal weightlessness as Hans' arrival in the past. Controversies may continue to rage between Settembrini and Naphtha on the themes of alchemy and free masonry, but a new relation to the world of sickness and death is established, announcing a secret change in the relation to time itself. The episode of Joachim's death attests to this. Hans attends the dying man with neither repugnance nor attraction, and closes the dead man's eyes. The lost feeling of the length of time passed, the mingling of the seasons, have brought about this disinterest for measurements of time—"for you are of time, and time is vanished" (p. 546)—and little by little life takes over from the fascination with sickness.

This new interest in life is pul to the test in Chapter 7, marked essentially by Clavdia Chauchat's return to the Berghof, unexpectedly accompanied by Mynheer Peeperkorn. The extravagance of royal anger, the bacchic delirium of this Dutch giant inspire in Hans Castorp less the expected jealousy than a fearful reverence, gradually replaced by a sort of playful affability. In this way, despite his having to give up Clavdia after she arrives with her unexpected companion, the benefit drawn from this event is large indeed. First of all, the two "educators" of our "unassuming hero" have lost all influence over him, measured against the scale of this character upon whom the narrator confers—for a short time—an extraordinary presence and power. Above all, the strange triangular relationship that is established between Mynheer, Clavdia, and Hans demands of the latter a mastery of his emotions in which malice is joined to submission. Under the instigation of the Dutchman, decisions themselves take a wild and burlesque turn. The confrontation with Clavdia is much more difficult to evaluate, so much does the narrator's irony undermine the apparent meaning. The word "spirit" surfaces: "a highly spiritual dream," "these heights of the spirit," "death is the spiritual principle," "the spiritual way" (p. 596). Has our hero become, as Clavdia lolls him, a quaint philosopher? A surprising victory over his teachers, if (he Itiliiii'ontin ten produces only a spiritual person, smitten with the hermetic and the occult." The most unreasonable hypothesis, however, would be to expect from our hero a straight line of growth, in the way that Settembrini represents the "Progress of Humanity." The Dutchman's suicide, the confusion of the ensuing feelings, throws Hans into a state for which the narrator can only find one name, *Der grosse Slumpfsinn*, "The Great God Dumps" (pp. 624-35). The great god "Dumps"--"An apocalyptic, evil name, calculated to give rise to mysterious 127

Time in Fictional Narrative

the irrevocable exteriority of clock time cannot, therefore, be what is ultimately at stake in this experiment, as we could still say in a strict sense about *Mrs. Dalloway*. As the relations between those below and those above are weakened, a new space of exploration unfolds, one in which the paradoxes brought to light are precisely those that afflict the internal experience of time when it is freed from its relation to chronological time.
The most fruitful explorations in this regard concern the relation between time and eternity. And in this respect, the relations suggested by the novel are extraordinarily varied. Between the "Soup-everlasting" of Chapter 5, "lereve bien connu, reve de tout temps, long, eternel," of Walpurgisnacht, which concludes Chapter 5, and the ecstatic experience with which the "Snow" episode concludes, the differences are considerable. Eternity unfolds its own paradoxes which the unsettling situation at the Berghof renders even more unsettling. The fascination with sickness and corruption reveals an eternity of death whose imprint on time is the sempiternal repetition of the same. For its part, the contemplation of the starry sky spreads a benediction of peace over an experience in which eternity is corrupted by the "bad infinity" of endless movement. The cosmic side of eternity, which would be better termed perpetuity, is not easily reconciled with the oneiric side of the two major experiences, Walpurgisnacht and "Snow," where eternity swings away from death and moves toward life, without for all that ever succeeding in uniting eternity, love, and life in the manner of Augustine. On the other hand, the ironic detachment which is perhaps the most "elevated" state reached by the hero, marks a precarious victory over the eternity of death that borders on stoic ataraxy. But the insurmountable situation of bewitchment to which this ironic detachment replies does not allow it to be put to the test of action. Only the eruption of Great History—DerDonnerschlag—was able to break the charm. At least ironic detachment, thanks to which Hans Castorp rejoins his narrator, will have permitted the hero to deploy a wide range of existentielle possibilities, even if he has not succeeded in making a synthesis out of them. In this sense, discordance finally wins out over concordance. But the conscious-ness of discordance has been "elevated" one step higher.

My first reading hypothesis will therefore be to consider, uncompromisingly, the narrator-hero as a fictive entity supporting the tale about time that constitutes Remembrance.

A more forceful way of challenging the exemplary value of Remembrance as a tale about time is to say, with Gilles Deleuze in Proust and S/"n.v., that what is principally at stake in Remembrance is not time but truth." This challenge grows out of the very strong argument that "Proust's work is based not on the exposition of memory, but on the apprenticeship to signs" (p. 4)—signs of the social world, signs of love, sensuous signs, signs of art. If, nevertheless, "it is called a search for lost time, it is only to the degree that truth has an essential relation to time" (p. 15). To this I would reply that this mediation by means of the apprenticeship to signs and the search for truth is in no way damaging to the characterization of Remembrance as a tale about time. Deleuze's argument undercuts only those interpretations that have understood Remembrance solely in terms of the experiences of involuntary memory and that, for this reason, have overlooked the long apprenticeship to disillusionment that gives Remembrance the scope that is lacking in the brief and fortuitous experiences of involuntary memory. If the apprenticeship to signs imposes the long, circuitous path that Remembrance substitutes for the shortcut of involuntary memory, this interpretation does not, in its turn, exhaust the meaning of Remembrance. The discovery of the extratemporal dimension of the work of art constitutes an eccentric experience in relation to the entire apprenticeship to signs. As a result, if Remembrance is a tale about time, it is so to the extent that it is identified neither with involuntary memory nor with the apprenticeship to signs—which, indeed, does take time—but poses the problem of the relation between these two levels of experience and the incomparable experience that the narrator puts off and finally reveals only after almost three thousand pages.

The singular character of Remembrance is due to the lad thai-ness of the apprenticeship to signs, as well as the interruption of involuntary memories, represent the form of an interminable wandering, interrupted rather than consummated, by the sudden illumination that retrospectively transforms the entire narrative.
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TIME TRAVERSED: Remembrance of Things Past
Are we justified in looking for a "tale about time" in Remembrance of Things Past?*
This has been contested, paradoxically, in a number of different ways. I shall not linger over the confusion,
which contemporary criticism has dispelled, between what might be considered a dissimulated autobiography of
Marcel Proust, the author, and the fictional autobiography of the character who says "I." We now know that if
the experience of time can be what is at
stake in a novel, this is not due to what the novel borrows from the experience

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of its real author but rather to literary fiction's power to create a narrator-hero who pursues a certain quest of
him/herself, in which what is at stake is, precisely, the dimension of time. It remains to be determined in just
what sense this is so. Regardless of the partial homonymy between "Marcel," the narrator-hero of Remembrance,
and Marcel Proust, the author of the novel, the novel does not owe its fictional status to the events of Proust's
life, which may have been transposed to the novel and have left their scar there, but to the narrative composition
alone, which projects a world in which the narrator-hero tries to recapture the meaning of an earlier life, itself
wholly fictive. Time lost and time regained are thus to be understood together as the features of a fictive
experience unfolded within a fictive world.
My first reading hypothesis will therefore be to consider, uncompromisingly, the narrator-hero as a fictive entity
supporting the tale about time that constitutes Remembrance.
A more forceful way of challenging the exemplary value of Remembrance as a tale about time is to say, with
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so to the extent that it is identified neither with involuntary memory nor with the apprenticeship to signs—which, indeed, does take time—but poses the problem of the relation between these two levels of experience and the incomparable experience that the narrator puts off and finally reveals only after almost three thousand pages. The singular characteristic of Remembrance is due to the lag that tin- apprenticeship to signs, as well as the irruption of involuntary memories, represents the form of an interminable wandering, interrupted rather than consummated, by the sudden illumination that retrospectively transforms the entire narrative into the invisible history of a vocation. Time becomes something that is at stake again as soon as it is a question of making the inordinately long apprenticeship to signs correspond to the suddenness of a belatedly recounted visitation, which retrospectively characterizes the entire quest as lost time. From this follows my second reading hypothesis. In order to avoid granting an exclusive privilege either to the apprenticeship to signs, which would deprive the final revelation of its role as a hermeneutical key for the entire work, or to the final revelation, which would divest the thousands of pages preceding the revelation of any significiation and eliminate the very problem of the relation between the quest and the discovery, the cycle of Remembrance must be represented in the form of an ellipse, one focus being the search and the second the visitation. The tale about time is then the tale that creates the relation between these two foci of the novel. The originality of Remembrance lies in its having concealed both the problem and its solution up to the end of the hero's course, thus keeping for a second reading the intelligibility of the work as a whole.

A third, even more forceful way of undercutting the claim that Remembrance constitutes a tale about time is to attack, as Anne Henry does in Proust romancier: le tombeau égyptien, the primacy of the narrative itself in Remembrance and to see in the novel a form the projection, on the plane of anecdote, of a philosophical knowledge forged elsewhere and therefore external to the narrative. According to the author of this brilliant study, the "dogmatic corpus that was to support the anecdote at every point" (p. 6) is to be sought nowhere but in German Romanticism, in particular in the philosophy of art first proposed by Schelling in The System of Transcendental Idealism, then continued by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation, and finally, reworked in psychological terms in France by Proust's philosophy teachers, Stàiles, Darlu, and, especially, Tarde. Considered on its narrative level, the work therefore rests on a "theoretical and cultural base" (Henry, p. 19) that precedes it. The important thing to us here is that what is at stake for this philosophy that governs the narrative process from outside is not time but what Schelling called "Identity," that is, the suppression of the division between the mind and the material world, their reconciliation in art, and the necessity of establishing the metaphysical evidence of [his in order to provide it with a lasting and concrete form in the work of art. Remembrance is a result not only not a fictive autobiography—everyone agrees on this today—but a feigned novel, the "novel of Genius" (pp. 23IT.. her emphasis). This is not all. Among the theoretical prescriptions governing the work is the psychological transposition undergone by the dialectic in order to become a novel—a transposition that also belongs to the epistemological base preceding the construction of the novel. What is more, in the opinion of Anne Henry, this transfer of the dialectic to the psychological plane indicates less a new conquest than the deterioration of the Romantic heritage. So if the passage from Schel-

ling to Tarde by way of Schopenhauer explains that lost unity, according to Romanticism, could have become lost time, and that the double redemption of the world and the subject could have been transmuted into the rehabilitation of an individual past; in sort, if in a general manner memory could have become the privileged mediator for the birth of genius, the fact must not be concealed that this translation of the combat to within one consciousness expresses the collapse as much as the continuation of the great philosophy of art received from German Romanticism.

My recourse to Proust to illustrate the notion of the fictive experience of time is thus doubly contested. Not only does the theoretical core, with regard to which the novel is held to be a demonstration, subordinate the question of time to a higher question, that of identity lost and recovered, but the passage from lost identity to lost time presents the scars of a shattered belief. By tying the promotion of the psychological, of the self, of memory, to the deterioration of a great metaphysics, Anne Henry tends to disparage all that has to do with the novel as such. The fact that the hero of the quest is a bourgeois leading a life of leisure, dragging his boredom from one unhappy love to another, and from one silly salon to another, expresses an impoverishment corresponding to the suppression of the division between the mind and the material world, their reconciliation in art, and the necessity of establishing the metaphysical evidence of [his in order to provide it with a lasting and concrete form in the work of art. Remembrance is a result not only not a fictive autobiography—everyone agrees on this today—but a feigned novel, the "novel of Genius" (pp. 23IT.. her emphasis). This is not all. Among the theoretical prescriptions governing the work is the psychological transposition undergone by the dialectic in order to become a novel—a transposition that also belongs to the epistemological base preceding the construction of the novel. What is more, in the opinion of Anne Henry, this transfer of the dialectic to the psychological plane indicates less a new conquest than the deterioration of the Romantic heritage. So if the passage from Schel-

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My recourse to Proust to illustrate the notion of the fictive experience of time is thus doubly contested. Not only does the theoretical core, with regard to which the novel is held to be a demonstration, subordinate the question of time to a higher question, that of identity lost and recovered, but the passage from lost identity to lost time presents the scars of a shattered belief. By tying the promotion of the psychological, of the self, of memory, to the deterioration of a great metaphysics, Anne Henry tends to disparage all that has to do with the novel as such. The fact that the hero of the quest is a bourgeois leading a life of leisure, dragging his boredom from one unhappy love to another, and from one silly salon to another, expresses an impoverishment corresponding to the "translation of the combat within a consciousness" (p. -46). "A life that isHat, bourgeois, never shaken by cataclysms . . . offers the ideal mediocrity for an experimental type of narrative" (p. 56). A remarkably vigorous reading of Remembrance results from this suspicion that saps from within the prestige of the narrative genre as such. Once the major stake has been shifted from lost unity to lost time, all the prestige attaching to the novel of genius loses its luster.

Let us admit, provisionally, this thesis that Remembrance is generated out of the "transposition of the system into a novel." The problem of narrative creation thereby becomes, in my opinion, all the more enigmatic and its solution all the more difficult. Paradoxically, we return here to an explanation in terms of sources. We have, of
course, done away with a naive theory of elements borrowed from Proust's life, but only to end up with a more subtle theory of elements borrowed from Proust's thought. The birth of Remembrance as a novel requires instead that we look in the narrative composition itself for the principle of the narrative's acquisition of "allogenic speculations," coining from Staillens and Tarde as well as from Schelling and Schopenhauer. The question is then no longer how the philosophy of lost unity could have degenerated into a quest for lost time but how the search for lost time, taken as the founding matrix of the work, accomplishes, through strictly narrative means, the recovery of the Romantic problematic of lost unity."

What are these means? The only way to reintegrate the "allogenic speculations" of the author into the narrative work is to attribute to the narrator-hero not only a fictive experience but "thoughts" that form its sharpest reflexive moment.¹ Have we not recognized, since Aristotle's Poetics, that dianoia is a major component of poetic muthos? Moreover, narrative theory offers us irreplaceable assistance here, and this will become my third reading hypothesis, namely, the resource of distinguishing several narrative voices in the fiction of the narrator. Remembrance makes us hear at least two narrative voices, that of the hero and that of the narrator.

The hero tells his worldly, amorous, sensuous, aesthetic adventures as they occur. Here, utterance takes the form of a march directed toward the future, even when the hero is reminiscing; hence the form of the "future in the past" that launches Remembrance toward its denouement. And it is the hero again who receives the revelation of the sense of his past life as the invisible history of a vocation. In this respect, it is of the greatest importance to distinguish between the hero's voice and that of the narrator, not only to place the hero's memories themselves back into the stream of a search that advances, but in order to preserve the event-like character of the visitation. However, we must also be able to hear the voice of the narrator, who is ahead of the hero's progress because he surveys it from above. It is the narrator who, more than a hundred times, says, "as we shall see later." But, above all, the narrator gives the meaning to the experience recounted by the hero—time regained, time lost. Before the final revelation, his voice is so low that it can barely be distinguished from the hero's voice (which authorizes us to speak of the narrator-hero).⁴ This is no longer the case in the course of and following the narrative of the great visitation. The narrator's voice takes over to such an extent that it ends up covering over that of the hero. The homonymy of the author and the narrator is then given free reign, at the risk of making the narrator the spokesman for the author in his great dissertation on art. But even then, it is the narrator's exposition of the author's conceptions as his own that is at issue for our reading. His conceptions are then incorporated into the narrator's thoughts. These thoughts of the narrator, in their turn, accompany the hero's lived experience and shed light on it. In this way, they participate in the event-like character of the birth of the writer's vocation as it is lived by the hero.

In order to put these reading hypotheses to the test, let us ask a series of three questions: (1) What would be the signs of time lost and time regained for the reader who is unaware of the conclusion to Remembrance, which we know was written during the same period as Swann's Way: in Time Regained? (2) By what precise narrative means are the speculations on art in Time Regained incorporated into the invisible history of a vocation? (3) What relation does the project of the work of art, stemming from the discovery of the writer's vocation, establish between time regained and time lost? The first two questions place us in turn in each of the two foci of Remembrance, and the third allows us to bridge the gap separating them. It is on the basis of the third question that the interpretation I am proposing for Remembrance of Things Past will be decided. Time Lost

The reader of Swann's Way—lacking the retrospective illumination projected by the end of the novel onto its beginning—has as yet no way to compare the bedroom in Combray, where between waking and sleeping a consciousness experiences the loss of its identity, its time, and its place, to the library in the Guermantes home, where an excessively vigilant consciousness receives a decisive illumination. On the other hand, this reader could not help but notice certain singular features of this opening section. From the very first sentence, the narrator's voice, speaking out of nowhere, evokes an earlier time that has no date, no place, a time that lacks an indication of distance in relation to the present of the utterance, an earlier time that is endlessly multiplied. (The uniting of the compound past with the adverb longtemps has been commented upon time and time again: "For a long time I used to go to bed early [Long-temps, je me suis couche de bonne heure]. Sometimes . . . " [I, p. 3].) In this way the beginning for the narrator refers back to an earlier time that has no boundaries (the only conceivable chronological beginning, (he birth of the hero, cannot appear in this duo of voices). It is in this earlier time, in the zone between waking and sleeping, where childhood memories are set away, that the narrative moves two steps away from the absolute present of the narrator. "These memories express themselves in reference to a unique episode, the experience of the madeleine, an episode which itself is characterized by a before and an after. Before it are only archipelagos of unrelated memories; the only thing that emerges is the memory of a certain goodnight kiss, itself placed against the backdrop of a daily ritual: "mother's kiss refused at the arrival of M. Swann; kiss awaited in anguish; kiss begged for still as the evening comes to an end; kiss obtained at last but
among themselves as the two "ways," that of the Meseglise, which turns out to be that of Swann and Gilberte, and that

In particular, however, the time of childhood continues to be made up of scattered islands, just as incommunicable

encounter contributes to transforming surrounding objects into beings to be read.

accordance with a carefully planned progression, long before Elstir, the painter, and Vinteuil, the musician). The

Combray is also the encounter with the writer Bergotte (the first of the three artists to be introduced in the narrative, in

young hero is constantly absorbed in books tends to make the image the privileged access to reality (I, p. 91).

living beings that the hero meets the general character of images to be deciphered. Along with this, the fact that the

traversed. On the other hand, through its stained glass and tapestry figures, through its gravestones, it imparts to all the

that surrounds it, owing to its enduring stability," the dimension of a time that has not vanished but that has been

Combray is first and foremost its church, "epitomising the town" (1, p. 52). On the one hand, it imposes on everything

that carries us away from speculation about involuntary memory and already directs our interpretation in the direction

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If the ecstasy of the madeleine is no more than a premonitory sign of the final revelation, it at least already possesses
certain of its qualities, opening up the door to memory and allowing the first sketch of Time Regained: the Combray
narrative (I, pp. 52-204). For a reading not acquainted with Time Regained the transition to the Combray narrative
seems to partake of the most naive of narrative conventions, even if it does not seem artificial and rheto-

rical. For a second, more educated reading, the ecstasy of the madeleine opens up the recaptured time of childhood,
just as the meditation in the library will open up that of the time when the vocation, recognized at last, is put to the test.
The symmetry between the beginning and the end is thus revealed to be the guiding principle of the entire

composition. If Combray springs out of a cup of tea (I, p. 51), just as the narrative of the madeleine emerges out of the
state between waking and sleeping experienced in a bedroom, it does so in the way that the meditation in the library
will govern the chain of subsequent experiences. This series of insets that govern the narrative composition does not
prevent consciousness from advancing. To the confused consciousness of the first pages—"I was more destitute than

now growing more and more quiet round about me that I hear them anew, like those convent bells which are so

effectively drowned during the day by the noises of the street that one would suppose them to have stopped, until they ring out again through the silent evening air" (I, p. 40). Without the recovery of the same thoughts at the end of Time Regained, would we recognize the dialectic of time lost and time regained in the barely audible voice of the narrator?

Then comes the episode of the overture—told in the preterite—the experience of the madeleine (1, p. 48). The

transition with its aftermath is made by means of a remark by the narrator on the incapacities of voluntary memory and
on leaving to chance the task of rediscovering the lost object. For someone who is unaware of the final scene in the

Guermantès library, which expressly connects the recovery of lost time to the creation of a work of art, the experience
of the madeleine may misdirect readers and put them on'the wrong track, if they do not set aside, within their own
expectations, all of the reticences that go along with the evocation of this happy moment. "An exquisite pleasure had
invaded my senses, something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its origin" (ibid.). From this arises the
question, "Whence could it have come to me, this all-powerful joy? I sensed that it was connected with the taste of the
tea and the cake, but that it infinitely transcended those savours, could not, indeed, be of the same nature. Whence did it come? What did it mean? How could I seize and apprehend it?" (ibid.). Posed in this way, however, the question holds within it the trap of an overly brief reply, which would simply be that of involuntary memory.™ If the answer given by this "unknown state" were fully accounted for by the sudden rush of memory of the first little madeleine offered long ago by Aunt Leonie, then Remembrance would already have reached its goal when it had only just got underway. It would be limited to the quest for similar rewakings, of which the least we could say is that they do not require the labor of art. That this is not the case is conveyed by a single clue that speaks to the reader with a keen ear. It is a parenthesis and it says, "(although I did not yet know and must long postpone the discovery of why this memory
made me so happy)" (I, p. 51). It is only a second reading, instructed by Time Regained, that these remarks, bracketed by the narrator, will take on meaning and force.™ Nevertheless they are already perceptible on a first reading, even if they offer only a weak resistance to the hasty interpretation according to which the fictive experience of time in Proust would consist in equating time regained with involuntary memory, held to superimpose spontaneously two distinct but similar impressions owing to chance alone.™

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..." For the first time, the narrator's voice is heard distinctly. Evoking the memory of his father, the narrator observes, "Many years have passed since that night. The wall of the staircase up which I had watched the light of his candle gradually climb was long ago demolished. ... It is a long time, too, since my father has been able to say to Mamma: 'Go along with the child.' Never again will such moments he possible for me" (I, pp. W 40). The narrator thus speaks of lime lost in the sense of time gone,
abolished. But he also speaks of time regained. "But of late I have been increasingly able to catch, if I listen
attentively, the sound of the sobs which I had the strength to control in my father's presence, and which broke out
only when I found myself alone with Mamma. In reality their echo has never ceased; and it is only because life is
now growing more and more quiet round about me that I hear them anew, like those convent bells which are so

efficiently drowned during the day by the noises of the street that one would suppose them to have stopped, until they ring out again through the silent evening air" (I, p. 40). Without the recovery of the same thoughts at the end of Time Regained, would we recognize the dialectic of time lost and time regained in the barely audible voice of the narrator?

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of the Guermantes, that of the fabulous names of an out-of-reach aristocracy, especially that of Madame de
Guermantes, the first object of an inaccessible love. Georges Poulet is correct to draw a sharp parallel here between the
incommunicability of the islands of temporality and that of the sites, places, beings." Distances that cannot be
measured separate the instants evoked as much as the places traversed. Combray is also, in contrast to the happy moments, the reminder of some events that foreshadow disillusionment, the
meaning of which is postponed

1.

until a later inquiry.74 Thus the Montjouvain scene, between Mile de Vinteuil and her friend, where the hero,
who is shown to be a voyeur, is introduced for the first time into the world of Gomorrah. It is not without
importance for the subsequent understanding of the notion of lost time that this scene contains some abominable
features: Mile de Vinteuil spitting on her father's portrait, set on a small table in front of the sofa. A secret tie is
thus established between this profanation and lost time, but it is too deeply hidden to be perceived. The reader's
attention is directed instead to the reading of signs by the voyeur and his interpretation of the intimations of
desire. More precisely, as a result of this strange episode, the art of deciphering is guided toward what Deleuze
calls the second circle of signs, that of love." The evocation of The Guer-mantes Way also acts as a springboard
for a reflection on signs and their interpretation. Guermantes represents, first of all, fabulous names attaching to
the tapestry and stained-glass figures. With an almost imperceptible touch, the narrator connects up this oneirism
of names with the premonitory signs of the vocation that Remembrance is said to recount. Yet these dream
thoughts, like his reading of Bergotte, create a sort of barrier, as if the artificial creations of dreams revealed the
emptiness of his own talent.75

And if the impressions collected during walks also create an obstacle to the artist's vocation, this is so to the
extent that material exteriority seems to govern them, maintaining "the illusion of a sort of fecundity" (1, p. 195)
which spares one the effort of seeking what "lay hidden beneath them" (ibid.). The episode of the Martinville
steeples, which corresponds to the experience of the madeleine, draws its meaning precisely from this contrast
with the excessive richness of ordinary impressions, just as is the case with recurrent dreams. The promise of
something hidden, something to be looked for and found, is closely associated with the "special pleasure" (1, p.
195) of the impression. These walks themselves guide the search. "I did not know the reason for the pleasure I
had felt on seeing them upon the horizon, and the business of trying to discover that reason seemed to me
irksome; I wanted to store away in my mind those shifting, sunlit planes and, for the time being, to think of them
no more" (I, p. 197). This is, however, the first time that the search for meaning goes first by way of words and
then by way of writing.77

Regardless of the remarks, still quite infrequent and entirely negative, relating to the history of a vocation, and,
in particular, regardless of the hidden relation between this vocation and the two happy episodes connected to
Combray, what seems to dominate the still inchoate experience of time in the section on Combray is the
impossibility of coordinating the bundles of undated events.78 which are compared to "the deepest layer of my
mental soil" (I, p. 201). An indistinct mass of memories, which only something resembling "real fissures, real
geological faults" (1, p. 201) can make distinct. In sum, the lost time of Combray is the lost paradise in which
"the faith which cre-

ates" (I, p 201) cannot yet be distinguished from the illusion of the bare and silent reality of external things.
It is doubtless in order to stress the character of autobiographical fiction of Remembrance as a whole that the
author decided to intercalate "Swann in Love"—that is, a third-person narrative—between "Combray" and
"Place-Names," which are both first-person narratives. At the same time, the illusion of immediacy that may
have been produced by the childhood narratives, due to their classical charm, is broken by this emigration of the
narrative into another character. In addition, "Swann in Love" constructs the diabolical mechanism of a love
gnawed away by illusion, suspicion, disappointment; a love condemned to pass through the anguish of
expectation, the bite of jealousy, the sorrow accompanying its decline, and the indifference that meets its death.
This construction will serve as a model for the narration of other loves, in particular the hero's love for Albertine.
It is due to this role of paradigm that "Swann in Love" says something about time.

There is no point in insisting on the fact that the narrative is not dated. It is loosely connected to the reveries,
which are themselves relegated to an indeterminate past by the sleepy narrator who speaks in the opening pages
of the book.74 In this way, the narrative of "Swann in Love" is set within the ha/y memories of childhood, as
what occurred before birth. The artifice suffices to break the chronological line once and for all and to open the
narrative up to other qualities of past time, indifferent to dates. More important is the distension of the tie
between this narrative and the history of a vocation, held to govern Remembrance as a whole. This tie occurs on
the level of the "association of memories," referred to at the end of the "Combray" section. The little phrase of
Vinteuil's sonata appears to serve as a relay station between the experience of the madeleine (and the Martinville
steeples) and the revelation of the final scene, due to its repeated appearances in the hero's story, reappearances
that are reinforced in. The Captive by the memory of Vinteuil's septet, the forceful homology to this little
phrase. This function of the musical phrase in the unity of the narrative may remain unperceived due to the close tie between the phrase and Swann's love for Odette. It is as someone who has fallen in love with the musical phrase (I, p. 231) that Swann clings to his memory. And this memory, henceforth, is too closely tied up with his love for Odette to provoke the interrogation contained in its promise of happiness. The entire field is occupied by a more pressing interrogation, pushed to the point of frenzy, one which is constantly generated by jealousy. The apprenticeship in the Verdurin salon to the signs of love, interwoven with that of the signs of society, is alone capable of making the search for lost time coincide with the search for truth, and lost time itself coincide with the defect that ravages love. Nothing, therefore, allows us to interpret lost time in terms of some time regained, the evocation of the phrase itself still being rooted in the soil of love. As for the "passion for truth" (I, p. 298) which is mobilized by jealousy, nothing allows it to be crowned with the prestige of time recaptured. Time is quite simply lost in the twofold sense of being over and done with and of having been scattered, dispersed. At the very most, all that might suggest the idea of time regained would be either the weight accorded to a few rare moments when memory "joined the fragments together, abolished the intervals between them" (I, p. 342), characterizing a time in tatters, or the quietude of a secret vainly pursued at the time of jealousy and finally pinned down at the time when love has died (I, p. 346). The apprenticeship to signs would then come to an end in this context once a certain detachment is attained.

It is worthwhile to look at the way in which the third part of Swann's Way, entitled "Place Names: The Name" (I, pp. 416-62), links up with what precedes it concerning the interconnection of time spans. For, indeed, the same "long nights of sleeplessness" (I, p. 416) that were recalled in order to serve as a setting for the childhood narratives associated with Combray are also used here in order to connect, in the dreamlike memory, the rooms at the Grand Hotel of Balbec beach with the rooms at Combray. It is therefore not surprising that a dream of Balbec precedes the real Balbec, at a period in the hero's adolescence when names foreshadow things and state reality before all perception. Thus are the names of Balbec, Venice, Florence, generators of images, and through images, of desire. At this stage of the narrative, what can readers make of this "imaginary time" in which several voyages are gathered together under a single name? (I, pp. 425-26). They can only keep it in the back of their minds, once the Champs-Elysees, quite real enough, and the games with Gilberte hide the dreams from sight: "in this public garden there was nothing that attached itself to my dreams" (I, p. 427). Is this hiatus between the "simulacrum" of an imaginary realm (ibid.) and reality another figure of lost time? Undoubtedly. The difficulty in joining this figure and all the others that follow to the general story-line is made even greater by the absence of any apparent identity between the earlier characters of Swann and, especially, of Odette—who could be thought to have "disappeared" at the end of the intermediary third-person narrative—and the Swann and Odette who turn out to be Gilberte's parents, at the period when the hero plays in the park near the Champs-Elysees. For the reader who breaks off the reading of Remembrance at the last page of Swann's Way, lost time would be summed up in "how paradoxical it is to seek in reality for pictures that are stored in one's memory, which must inevitably lose the charm that comes to them from memory itself and from their not being apprehended by the senses" (I, p. 462). Remembrance itself would seem to be limited to a hopeless struggle to combat the ever-increasing gap that generates forgetfulness. Even the happy moments at Combray, where the distance between the present impression and the past impression is magically transformed into a miraculous contemporaneousness, could appear to have been swallowed up in the same devastating oblivion. These moments of grace will never be brought up again—except in one instance—after the pages on "Combray." Only the savor of the phrase of Vinteuil's sonata—a savor we know only through a close tie between the phrase and Swann's love for Odette to provoke the interrogation contained in its promise of happiness. The entire field is occupied by a more pressing interrogation, pushed to the point of frenzy, one which is constantly generated by jealousy. The apprenticeship in the Verdurin salon to the signs of love, interwoven with that of the signs of society, is alone capable of making the search for lost time coincide with the search for truth, and lost time itself coincide with the defect that ravages love. Nothing, therefore, allows us to interpret lost time in terms of some time regained, the evocation of the phrase itself still being rooted in the soil of love. As for the "passion for truth" (I, p. 298) which is mobilized by jealousy, nothing allows it to be crowned with the prestige of time recaptured. Time is quite simply lost in the twofold sense of being over and done with and of having been scattered, dispersed. At the very most, all that might suggest the idea of time regained would be either the weight accorded to a few rare moments when memory "joined the fragments together, abolished the intervals between them" (I, p. 342), characterizing a time in tatters, or the quietude of a secret vainly pursued at the time of jealousy and finally pinned down at the time when love has died (I, p. 346). The apprenticeship to signs would then come to an end in this context once a certain detachment is attained.

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the unfinished manuscript of *Time Regained* was left to us, but which all bear the double sign of disillusionment and detachment. It is significant that *Time Regained* begins with the narrative of a stay in Tansonville, not far from the Combray of childhood, the effect of which is not to rekindle memory but to extinguish desire. In the moment, the hero is moved by this loss of curiosity, to such an extent it seems to confirm the feeling once experienced in the same place "that I would never be able to write" (III, p. 709). One must give up an attempt to relive the past if lost time is ever, in some as yet unknown way, to be found again. This death of the desire to see things again is accompanied by the death of the desire to possess the women he has loved. It is noteworthy that the narrator considers this "incuriosity" to be "brought by Time," the personified entity that will never be assigned wholly either to lost time or to eternity, and which to the end will be synhol-

ized, as in the adages of ancient wisdom, by its power of destruction. I shall return to this at the end of our discussion. All of the events recounted, all the encounters reported in what follows are placed under the same sign of decline, of death. Gilberte's narrative of the poverty of her relations with Saint-Loup, now her husband; the visit to the church in Combray, where the power of what endures accentuates the pre-curiousness of mortal beings; and, especially, the sudden mention of the "long years" that the hero has spent in a sanatorium, contributing a realistic aspect to the feeling of separateness and of distanciation required by the final vision. The description of Paris at war adds to the impression of erosion that affects everything. The frivolity of Parisian drawing rooms has an air of decadence about it (III, pp. 746-47). The campaigns for and against Dreyfus have been forgotten. Saint-Loup's visit, home from the front lines, is that of a ghost; we learn of Cottard's death, then of the death of M. Verdurin. The chance encounter with M. de Charlus in a Paris street during the war places on this sinister initiation the seal of a deadly abjection. From the degradation of his body, of his loves, rises a strange poetry (III, p. 789) which the narrator ascribes to a complete detachment, something the hero is not yet able to attain (III, p. 799). The scene in Jupien's bordello, where the baron has himself whipped with a chain by soldiers on leave, reduces the painting of a society at war to its quintessential abjection. The interconnection in the narrative between Saint-Loup's last visit, rapidly followed by the news of his death—evoking another death, that of Albertine—and the narrative of Charlus's ultimate turpitudes, leading to his arrest, give these pages the tone of a funereal maelstrom, which will again prevail, although with an entirely different signification, in the symmetrical scene that follows the great revelation, the scene of the dinner surrounded by death's-heads, the first test of the hero converted to eternity.

To stress once again the sort of nothingness that surrounds the revelation, the narrator introduces a sharp break in his story. "The new sanatorium to which I withdrew was no more successful in curing me than the first one, and many years passed before I came away" (III, p. 885). One last time, during a return trip to Paris, the hero takes stock of his pitiful state: "the falsehood of literature," "the non-existence of the ideal in which I had believed," "an unattainable inspiration," "absence of emotion" (III, pp. 886-87).

This first stage of initiation by the shadows of remembrance is followed by a much briefer second stage, marked by premonitory signs. The tone of the narrative is indeed reversed the moment the hero allows himself to be seduced, as in the early days in Combray, by the name Guermantes, printed on the invitation to the afternoon party given by the prince. This time, however, the journey by car is experienced as an airplane flight. "And like an airman who hitherto has progressed laboriously along the ground, abruptly 'taking off' I soared slowly towards the silent heights of memory" (111, p. 890). The encounter with misfortune, in the personage of M. de Charlus, convalescent after an attack of apoplexy—"upon the old fallen prince this latest illness had conferred the Shakesperian majesty of a King Lear" (III, p. 891)—is not enough to foil this takeoff. Instead, the hero sees in his wasted figure "a sort of gentleness, an almost physical gentleness, and of detachment from the realities of life, phenomena so strikingly apparent in those whom death has already drawn within its shadow" (III, p. 892). It is then that the hero receives as a salutary "warning" a series of experiences that resemble entirely, through the happiness they give him, the experiences of Combray, "of which the last works of Vinteuil had seemed to me to combine the quintessential character" (III, p. 899): tripping against the uneven paving stones, the noise of a spoon knocking against a plate, the stiffness of a starched and folded napkin. But, whereas formerly the narrator had to postpone until later clarifying the reasons for this happiness, this time he has made up his mind to solve the enigma. It is not that, as early as the period of Combray, the narrator failed to perceive that the intense joy felt resulted from the fortuitous conjunction between two similar impressions despite their distance in time. This time, too, the hero is not long in recognizing Venice and the two uneven paving stones in the baptistry of Saint Mark's under the impression of the uneven stones in Paris. The enigma to be solved therefore is not that temporal distance can be abolished in this way "by chance," "as if by magic," in the identity of a single instant—it is that the joy experienced is "like a certainty and which sufficed, without any other proof, to make death a matter of indifference to me" (III, p. 9(K)). In other words, the enigma to be solved is that of the *relation* between the happy moments, offered by chance and involuntary memory, and the invisible history of a vocation.
Between the considerable mass of narratives that extend over thousands of pages and the critical scene in the library, the narrator has thus worked in a narrative transition that shifts the sense of the *Bildungsroman* from the apprenticeship to signs to the visitation. Taken together, the two wings of this narrative transition serve at once to separate and to suture the two foci of *Remembrance*. Separation, through the signs of death, confirming the failure of an apprenticeship to signs that lacks the principle of their decipherment. Suture, through the premonitory signs of the great revelation.

We now find ourselves at the heart of the great visitation scene that determines the primary—but not the final—meaning to be ascribed to the very notion of time regained. The narrative status of what may be read as a grand dissertation on art—even as Marcel Proust's *urs /sicied.* forcibly inserted into his narrative—is maintained by the subtle diegetic tic that the narrator establishes between this major scene and the earlier narrative of the events that function as transitional points in the hero's initiation. This tic involves two levels at once. First, on the anecdotal level, the narrator has been caivful to

situate his narrative of the final signs of warning in the same place as the narrative of the great revelation: "the little sitting-room used as a library" (III, p. 900). Next, on the thematic level, the narrator grafts his meditation on time onto the moments of happiness and the premonitory signs. The speculation on time thereby arises out of the thoughts of the narrator, reflecting on what had heretofore been provided by chance. Finally, on a deeper level of reflection, the speculation on time is anchored in the narrative as a founding event in the vocation of the writer. The role of origin, assigned in this way to speculation in the history of a vocation, assures the irreducibly narrative character of this very speculation.

What may seem to place this speculation at a distance from the narrative is the fact that the time it brings to light is not, at first, time regained, in the sense of time lost that is found again, but the very suspension of time, *eternity*, or to speak as the narrator does, "extra-temporal" being (III, p. 904). And this will continue to be the case as long as speculation has not been taken in hand by the decision to write, which restores to thought the intention of a work to be done. Several remarks by the narrator confirm to us that the extra-temporal is only the first threshold of time regained. First, there is the fugitive character of contemplation itself; then, there is the necessity to support the hero's discovery of an extratemporal being that constitutes him through the heavenly nourishment of the essences of things; finally, we find the immanent, and nontranscendent, character of an eternity that mysteriously circulates between the present and the past, out of which it creates a unity. Extratemporal being therefore, does not exhaust the entire meaning of *Time Regained*. It is, of course, *sub specie aeternitatis* that involuntary memory performs its miracle in time" and that the intelligence can encompass in the same look the distance of the heterogeneous and the simultaneity of the analogous. And it is indeed extratemporal being, when it makes use of the analogies offered by chance and by involuntary memory, as well as the work of the apprenticeship to signs, that brings the perishable course of things back to their essence "outside time" (III, p. 904). Nevertheless, this extratemporal being still lacks the power "to make me rediscover days that were long past" (ibid.). At this turning point the meaning of the narrative process constituting the tale about time is revealed. What remains to be done is to join together the two valences assigned side-by-side to "time regained." Sometimes this expression designates the extratemporal, sometimes it designates the act of rediscovering lost time. Only the decision to write will put an end to the duality of meaning of time regained. Before this decision is made, this duality seems insurmountable. The extratemporal is, in fact, related to a meditation on the very origin of aesthetic creation, in a contemplative moment unconnected to its inscription in an actual work, and without any consideration of the labor of writing. In the extratemporal order, the work of art. considered with respect to its ori-

...
follows the revelation of the truth of art as well as by the hero's involvement in the work to be accomplished. This testing takes through the challenge of death. It is not an overstatement to say that it is the relation to death that makes the difference between the two meanings of time regained: the extratemporal, which transcends "my anxiety on the subject of my death" and makes me "unalarmed by the vicissitudes of the future" (III, p. 904), and the resurrection in the work of lost time. If the fate of the latter is finally handed over to the labor of writing, the threat of death is no less in time regained than in time lost."

This is what the narrator meant to indicate by having the narrative of the conversion to writing followed by the astonishing spectacle offered by the guests at the Prince de Guermantes's dinner party. This dinner, where all the guests appeared to have "put on a disguise /s'etre 'fail unc tete'" (III, p. 920)—actually, a death's head—is expressly interpreted by the narrator as a "spectacular and dramatic effect" (III, p. 959). He says, "threatened to raise against my enterprise the gravest of all objections" (III, p. 9V>.(-<>) What is this, if not I he reminder of death, which, without any hold on the extratemporal, threatens its temporal expression, the work of art itself.

Who are the characters in this dance of death? "A puppet-show, yes, but one in which, in order to identify the puppets with the people whom one had known in the past, it was necessary to read what was written on several planes at once, planes that lay behind the visible aspect of the puppets and gave them depth and forced one, as one looked at these aged marionettes, to make a strenuous intellectual effort; one was obliged to study them at the same time with one's eyes and with one's memory. These were puppets bathed in the immaterial colours of the years, puppets which exteriorized Time, Time which by Habit is made invisible and to become visible seeks bodies, which wherever it finds it seizes, to display its magic lantern upon them" (III, p. 964).•• And what do all these moribund figures announce, if not the hero's own approaching death? (III, p. 967). Here lies the danger. "I had made the discovery of this destructive action of Time at the very moment when I had conceived the ambition to make visible, to intellectualize in a work of art, realities that were outside Time" (111, p. 971). This admission is of considerable importance. Might not the old myth of destructive time be stronger than the vision of time regained through the work of art? Yes, if the second meaning of time regained is separated from the first one. And this is indeed the temptation that haunts the hero up to the end of the narrative. It is a powerful temptation, inasmuch as the labor of writing takes place in the same time as lost time. Worse, the narrative that has preceded has, in a certain way, precisely as a narrative, stressed the fugitive nature of the event, related to the discovery of its abolition in the supratemporal. But this is not the final word. For the artist who is capable of preserving the relation between revived time and the extratemporal, time reveals its other mythical side: the profound identity that beings preserve despite their altered appearance attests to "the power to renew in fresh forms that is possessed by Time, which can thus, while respecting the unity of the individual and the laws of life, effect a change of scene and introduce bold contrasts into two successive aspects of a single person" (III, pp. 977-78). When we shall later discuss recognition, as the key concept of the unity between the two foci of the ellipse of Remembrance, we should recall that what makes beings recognizable is still "Time, the artist" (III, p. 978). "He was an artist, moreover, who works very slowly" (ibid.). A sign that this pact between the two figures of Time Regained can be made and preserved is seen by the narrator in the unexpected encounter, totally unforeseen in all that has gone before: the appearance of the daughter of Gilberte Swann and Robert do Saint-Loup, who symbolizes the reconciliation of the two "ways"—Swann's way through her mother, the Guermantes way through her father. "I thought her very beautiful: still rich in hopes, full of laughter, formed from those very years which I myself had lost, she was like my own youth" (III, p. 1088). Is this appearance, which concretizes a reconciliation, one announced or anticipated several times in the work, intended to suggest that artistic creation has a pact with youth—with "natality" as Hannah Arendt would say—which makes art, unlike love, stronger than death?"

Unlike the preceding ones, this sign is neither an announcement of something to come nor a premonition. Rather, it is a "spur." "The idea of Time was of value to me for yet another reason: it was a spur, it told me that it was time to begin if I wished to attain to what I had sometimes perceived in the course of my life, in brief lightening-flashes, on the Guermantes way and in my drives in the carriage of Mme de Villeparisis, at those moments of perception which had me think that life was worth living. How much more worth living did it appear to me now, now that I seemed to see that this life that we live in half-darkness can be illumined, this life that at every moment we distort can be restored to its true pristine shape, that a life, in short, can be realised within the confines of a book?" (III, p. 1088).

From Time Regained to Time Lost

At the end of this inquiry into Remembrance of Things Past, considered as a tale about time, we have still to describe the relation that the narrative establishes between the two foci of the ellipse: the apprenticeship to signs, with its lost time, and the revelation of art, with its exaltation of the extratemporal. It is this relation that characterizes time as time regained, more precisely as time lost-regained. In order to understand this adjective,
we must interpret the verb—what is it, then to regain lost time?
To answer this question, we are interested, once again, only in the thoughts of the narrator, meditating on a work not yet written (in the fiction, this work is not the one we have just read). The result is that the meaning to be given to the act of regaining time is best designated by the difficulties expected of a work yet to be realized. We find these difficulties condensed in the declaration by which the narrator attempts to characterize the meaning of his past life in relation to the work to be realized. "And thus my whole life up to the present day might and yet might not have been summed up under the title: A Vocation" (III, p. 936).

The ambiguity, carefully nourished, between the yes and the no deserves our attention. No, "literature had played no part in my life" (ibid.); yes, this whole life "formed a reserve," an almost vegetative domain in which the germinating organism was to be nourished. "In the same way my life was linked to..." what, eventually, would bring about its maturation" (ibid., my emphasis).

What difficulties, then, must the act of regaining lost time overcome? And why does their resolution bear the mark of an ambiguity?

An initial hypothesis presents itself. Could the relation upon which the act of regaining time on the scale of Remembrance as a whole is built be extrapo-

lated from that discovered by reflection on the canonical examples of reminiscence that are elucidated and clarified? In turn, might not these infinitesimal experiences constitute the laboratory in miniature where the relation is forged that will confer unity upon the whole of Remembrance?

An extrapolation such as this may be read in the following statement: "what we call reality is a certain connexion between these immediate sensations and the memories which envelop us simultaneously with them—a connexion that is suppressed in a simple cinematographic vision, which just because it professes to confine itself to the truth in fact departs widely from it—a unique connexion which the writer has to rediscover in order to link for ever in his phrase the two sets of phenomena which reality joins together" (III, p. 924). Every element carries weight here: "unique connexion," as in the happy moments and in all the similar expressions of reminiscence, once these are clarified—a connection (or relation) to be "rediscovered"—a connection in which two different terms are "linked forever in his phrase."

The first trail is now open, and it leads us to look for others, those of the stylistic figures whose function is precisely to posit the relation between two different objects. This figure is metaphor. The narrator confirms this in one statement in which, along with Roger Shattuck, I am prepared to see one of the hermeneutical keys to Remembrance. The metaphorical relation, brought to light by the elucidation of happy moments, becomes the matrix for all the relations in which two distinct objects are, despite their differences, raised to their essence and liberated from the contingencies of time. The entire apprenticeship to signs, which contributes to the considerable length of Remembrance, thus falls under the law that is apprehended in the privileged examples of a few premonitory signs, already bearing the twofold sense that the intelligence has only to clarify. Metaphor reigns where cinematographic vision, which is purely serial, fails to relate sensations and memories. The narrator has perceived the general application that can be made of this metaphorical relation when he holds it to be "analogous in the world of art to the unique connexion which in the world of science is provided by the law of causality" (111, p. 924). It is thus not an overstatement to say that sensations and memories, on the scale of Remembrance in its entirety, are enclosed within "the necessary links of a well-wrought style" (111, p. 925).

Style, here, does not designate anything ornamental but the singular entity resulting from the union, in a unique work of the questions from which it proceeds and the solutions it gives. Time regained, in this first sense, is time lost eternalized by metaphor.

This first trail is not the only one. The stylistic solution, placed under the aegeis of metaphor, calls for. as its complement, a solution that could be termed "optical." The narrator himself invites us to follow this second trail, without pausing to identify the point where they cress, by declaring that

"style for the writer, no less than colour for the painter, is a question not of technique but of vision" (III, 931).

By vision we are to understand something other than a revivification of what is immediate: a reading of signs, which, as we know, calls for an apprenticeship. If the narrator calls the experience of regained time "vision," it is insofar as this vision is crowned with a "recognition" that is the very mark of the extratemporal on lost time. Once again, happy moments illustrate in miniature this stereoscopic vision set up as a form of recognition. But the idea of an "optical view" applies to the entire apprenticeship to signs. This apprenticeship, in fact, is shot through with optical errors, which retrospectively take on the sense of a misunderstanding. In this respect, the sort of dance of death—the death's heads at the Guermantes dinner party—which follows the great meditation, is not marked simply by the sign of death but also by that of non-recognition (III, pp.971, 990, etc.). The hero even fails to recognize Gilberte. This is a crucial scene, for it places the entire foregoing quest retrospectively at once under the sign of a comedy of errors (optical errors) and on the path of a project of integral recognition. This overall interpretation of Remembrance in terms of recognition authorizes us to consider the meeting between the hero and Gilberte's daughter as an ultimate recognition scene, to the extent that, as I said above, the young girl incarnates the reconciliation between the two ways, that of Swann and that of the Guermantes.
The two trails we have just followed intersect at some point. Metaphor and recognition share the common role of elevating two impressions to the level of essence, without abolishing their difference. "For to recognize someone, and, a fortiori, to learn someone's identity after having failed to recognize him, is to predicate two contradictory things of a single subject" (III, p. 982). This crucial text establishes the equivalence between metaphor and recognition, making the first the logical equivalent of the second ("to predicate two contradictory things of a single subject"), and the second the temporal equivalent of the (ist ("it is to admit that what was here, the person whom one remembers, no longer exists, and also that what is now here is a person whom one did not know to exist" [ibid]). Thus metaphor we may say is in the order of style while resemblance is in the order of stereoscopic vision.

The difficulty, however, reappears at this very point. Just what is the relation between style and vision? By this question we touch on the problem that predominates throughout Remembrance, that of the relation between writing and impressions, that is to say, in an ultimate sense, between literature and life.

A third sense of the notion of time regained will be discovered along this new trail. Time regained, I will now say, is the impression regained. But what is the impression regained? Once again, we must start from the exegesis of happy moments, and extend this to the entire apprenticeship to signs pursued throughout Remembrance. In order to be regained, the impression must first have been lost as an immediate pleasure, prisoner to its external object. The initial stage of the rediscovery is that of the complete internalization of the impression. A second stage is the transposition of the impression into a law, into an idea. A third stage is the inscription of this spiritual equivalent in a work of art. There is supposed to be a fourth stage, which is alluded to only once in Remembrance, when the narrator mentions his future readers. "For it seemed to me that they would not be 'my' readers but the readers of their own selves, my book being merely a sort of magnifying glass like those which the optician at Combray used to offer his customers—it would be my book, but with its help I would furnish them with the means of reading what lay inside themselves" (III, p. 1089.")

This alchemy of the impression regained perfectly presents the difficulty that the narrator perceives as he crosses the threshold of the work: How to prevent substituting literature for life, or again, under the patronage of laws and ideas, how to keep from dissolving the impression in a psychology or an abstract sociology, divested of all narrative character? The narrator replies to this danger by his concern for preserving an unsteady balance between impressions, of which he says, "their essential character was that I was not free to choose them, that such as they were they were given to me" (III, p. 913), and, on the other side, the deciphering of signs, guided by the conversion of the impression into a work of art. Literary creation therefore seems to go in two opposite directions at once.

On the one hand, the impression must act as "the very proof of the trueness of the whole picture" (ibid.). Along this same line, the narrator comes to speak of life as an "inner book of unknown symbols" (ibid.). This book, we have not written, and yet "the book whose hieroglyphs are patterns not traced by us is the only book that really belongs to us" (111, p. 914.). Better, it is "our true life, . . . reality as we have felt it to be, which differs so greatly from what we think it is that when a chance happening brings us an authentic memory of it we are filled with an immense happiness" (III, p. 915). Writing the work to be realized is thus based on "the faculty of submitting to the reality within" (III, p. 917.).

On the other hand, reading the book of life is "an act of creation in which no one can do our work for us or even collaborate with us" (III, p. 913). Everything now seems to swing to the side of literature. The following text is well known. "Real life, life at last laid bare and illuminated—the only life in consequence which can be said to be really lived—is literature, and life thus defined is in a sense all the time immanent in ordinary man no less than in the artist. But most men do not see it because they do not seek to shed light upon it" (III, p. 931). This statement should not mislead us. It in no way leads to an apology for "The Book" as Mallarme conceived it. Rather it posits an equation which, at the end of the work, should be completely reversible between life and literature, which is to say, finally, between the impression preserved in its trace and the work of art that states the meaning of the impression. This reversibility, however, is nowhere simply given. It must be the fruit of the labor of writing. In this sense Remembrance could be entitled the search for the lost impression, literature being nothing other than the impression regained—"the joy of rediscovering what is real" (III, p. 913).

A third version of time regained thus offers itself to our meditation. It is not so much added to the two preceding versions as it includes them both. In the impression regained, the two paths we have followed cross and reconcile what might be called the two "ways of Remembrance: on the level of style, the way of metaphor; on the level of vision, the way of recognition." In return, metaphor and recognition make explicit the relation upon which the impression regained is itself constructed, the relation between life and literature. And in every instance this relation includes forgetfulness and death.

Such is the wealth of meaning of time regained, or rather of the operation of rediscovering lost time. This meaning embraces the three versions that we have just explored. Time regained, we might say, is the metaphor that encloses differences in the necessary links of a well-wrought style." It is also the recognition, which crowns stereoscopic vision. Finally, it is the impression regained, which reconciles life and literature. Indeed, inasmuch as life is the figure of the way of time lost, and literature the way of the extratemporal, we have the right to say that time regained expresses the recovery of lost time in the extratemporal, just as the impression regained expresses the recovery of life.
in the work of art.
The two foci of the ellipse formed by *Remembrance of Things Past* do not merge into one another—a distance remains between the lost time of the apprenticeship to signs and the contemplation of the extratemporal. But this will be a distance that is traversed.

And it is with this final expression, "traversal," that I shall conclude, for it marks the transition from the extratemporal, glimpsed in contemplation, to what the narrator calls "Time embodied" (III, p. 1105). The extratemporal is only a point of passage; its virtue is to transform into a continuous duration the "retorts of discontinuous periods." *Remembrance*, then, is far from a Bergsonian vision of a duration free of all extension; instead, it confirms the *dimensional* character of time. The itinerary of *Remembrance* moves from the idea of a distance that separates to that of a distance that joins together. This is confirmed by the final figure of time proposed in *Remembrance*, that of an accumulated duration that is, in a sense, beneath us. Thus the narrator-hero sees people "perched upon living stilts which never cease to grow until sometimes they become taller than church steeples, making it in the end both difficult and perilous for them to walk and raising them to an eminence from which suddenly they fall" (III, p. 1107). As for himself, having incorporated into his present "all this length of Time," he sees himself "perched on its giddy summit" (111, p. 1106). This final figure of time regained says two things: that time lost is contained in time regained but also that it is finally Time that carries us within it. *Remembrance*, in fact, closes not with a cry of triumph but with "a sensation of weariness and almost of terror" (ibid.). For time regained is also death regained. *Remembrance* has generated, in the phrase of Hans Robert Jauss, only an interim time, that of a work yet to be accomplished, one that may be destroyed by death.

The fact, in the final analysis, that time envelops us, as we are told in the old myths, we have known from the start—the beginning of the narrative possessed the strange feature of referring us back to an indefinite earlier period. The narrative closure is not different. The narrative stops when the writer sets to work. All the tenses then pass from the future to the conditional. "But my task was longer . . . , my words had to reach more than a single person. My task was long. By day, the most I could hope for was to try to sleep. If I worked, it would only be at night. But I should need many nights, a hundred perhaps, or even a thousand. And I should live in the anxiety of not knowing whether the master of my destiny might not prove less indulgent than the Sultan Shahriyar, whether in the morning, when I broke off my story, he would consent to a further reprieve and permit me to resume my narrative the following evening" (III, p. 1101)."

Is it for this reason that the final words place the self and all other people back in Time? This is certainly "a very considerable place compared with the restricted one which is allotted to them in space" (ibid.) but nonetheless a place "in the dimension of Time" (II, p. 1107).

Conclusion

At the end of this second volume of my study of time and narrative. I should like to make an overall assessment as I did at the end of volume 1 (pp. 226-30). The first conclusion to be drawn concerns the narrative model worked out in Part I of *Time and Narrative* under the title of "threefold mimesis." The study you have just read has claimed to remain strictly within the limits of mimesis, that is, within the confines of the mimetic relation that Aristotle identified with the rule-governed composition of a tale. Have I truly remained faithful to this important equation between mimesis and muthos? I should like openly to express certain scruples that have been continually present throughout the writing of this volume.

The one that is easiest to formulate finds its answer in Aristotle's *Poetics*. Does not my use of the substantive "narrative," the adjective form "narrative," and the verb "to narrate" (or sometimes in English, "to recount." "to tell"), which I hold to be rigorously interchangeable, suffer from a serious equivocation, to the extent that these terms seem to cover at times the entire field of the mimesis of action, and at times just the diegetic mode, to the exclusion of the dramatic one? What is more, due to this equivocation, do we not find that I have surreptitiously transferred to the diegetic mode categories specific to the dramatic one?

The right to use the term "narrative" in a generic sense, while respecting in appropriate contexts the specific difference between the diegetic and the dramatic modes, appears to me to be founded in (he very choice of the
Conversely, the modern novel belongs to its time only at the price of another sort of distance, the distance of a critique of the limits of contemporary culture, as James Redfield has shown with regard to the writer and the public, the general features of fiction are not abolished. Ancient epic was, no less than the modern novel, however deeply we hollow the abyss that separates epic distance and contemporaneousness between the writer and the characters, and finally the fact that I concentrate at the end on point of view and narrative voice—do not all these aspects indicate a preference for the diegetic mode? Foreseeing this objection, I have taken great pains to consider in these games with time only their contribution to the composition of the literary work, following the lesson learned from Bakhtin, Genette, Lotman, and Uspensky. In this way, I believe that I have "enriched" the notion of plot, conforming to the promise made in my introduction, and have also kept it at the same level of generality as the mimesis of action, which thus remains my guiding concept. I am prepared to admit that my reply would be more convincing if analyses like those Henri Gouhier has devoted to dramatic art were able to show that the same categories—point of view and voice among others—are also at work in the dramatic order. We would then have proof that concentrating on the novel represents simply a de facto restriction, the obverse of that practiced by Aristotle to the benefit of the tragic muthos. It is a fact that this proof is missing in the present work.

Unfortunately, this reference to the novel gives new life to my initial scruple, for a reason that has to do with the very nature of the genre. Does the novel constitute merely one example of fictional narrative among others? This is indeed what seems to be assumed in the choice of the three tales about time that are examined in the final chapter. Yet there are reasons to doubt that the novel allows itself to be neatly classified in a homogeneous taxonomy of narrative genres. Is not the novel an antigenre genre, which by this very fact makes it impossible to fit back together the diegetic mode and dramatic mode under the inclusive term of "fictional narrative"? This type of argument receives impressive reinforcement in the essays that Bakhtin devotes to the "dialogic imagination." According to Bakhtin, the novel escapes all homogeneous classification because we cannot place in the same set those genres, of which the epic is the perfect example, that have run dry and the sole genre that has been born after the institution of writing and books, the only one that continues to develop but never ceases to rethink its own identity. Before the novel, genres with fixed forms tended to act to reinforce one another and in this way to form a harmonious whole, a coherent literary ensemble, and consequently were accessible to a general theory of literary composition. By upsetting the other genres, the novel dislocates this overall cohesiveness.

According to Bakhtin, three major factors prevent us from placing the epic and the novel under a common category. First, the epic places the history of its hero in a "perfect past," to employ Hegel's expression, a past that has no ties to the time of the narrator (or the storyteller) and his public. Next, this absolute past is connected to the time of recitation only through national traditions that command respect exclusive of any criticism and hence of any upheaval. Finally, and above all, tradition isolates the epic world and its heroic characters from the sphere of the collective and the personal experience of people today. The novel is born out of the destruction of this "epic distance." And it is principally under the pressure of laughter, of ridicule, of the "car-nivalesque," and more generally out of the expressions of serious comedy—culminating in the work of Rabelais, so brilliantly celebrated by Bakhtin himself—that epic distance gave way to the contemporaneousness based on sharing the same ideological and linguistic universe that characterizes the relation between the writer, the characters, and the public in the age of the novel. In short, it is the end of epic distance that provides the definitive basis for opposing "low" literature to all the rest of "high" literature.

Does this global opposition between epic and novel render useless an analysis like my own that claims to assemble under the general title of fictional narrative all the works that, in one way or another, aim at creating a mimesis of action? I do not think so. However far we extend the opposition between "high" and "low" literature, however deeply we hollow the abyss that separates epic distance and contemporaneousness between the writer and the public, the general features of fiction are not abolished. Ancient epic was, no less than the modern novel, a critique of the limits of contemporary culture, as James Redfield has shown with regard to the Iliad. Conversely, the modern novel belongs to its time only at the price of another sort of distance, the distance of
fiction itself. This is why contemporary critics, without denying the originality of the novel, can continue, as did Goethe and Schiller in their famous common work, along with Hegel in his Phenomenology of Mind and his Aesthetics, to characterize the novel as a form—a "low" form, if one likes— of the epic and to divide up literature—Dichtung—into epic, drama, and lyric. The end of epic distance certainly marks a break between "high" mimetic and "low" mimetic. But we have learned, from Northrop Frye, to maintain this distinction within the universe of fiction. Whether the characters are "superior," "inferior," or "equal" to us, Aristotle noted, they nonetheless all remain the agents of an imitated-history. This is why the novel has only made infinitely more complex the problems of emplotment. We may even say, un-paradoxically, and moreover with the support of Bakhtin, that the representation of a reality in full transformation, the painting of incomplete personalities, and the reference to a present held to be in suspense, "without any conclusion"—all this requires a more rigorous formal discipline on the part of the creator of tales than on the part of the storyteller of a heroic world that carries with it its own internal completion. But I shall not limit myself to just this defensive argument. I claim that the modern novel demands of literary criticism much more than a more subtle reformulation of the principle of the synthesis of the heterogeneous, by which I formally defined emplotment. It produces in addition an enrichment of the very notion of action, proportional to that of the notion of emplotment. If my final two chapters in this volume seemed to move away from a mimesis of action in the narrow sense of the term, to the benefit of a mimesis of the character, in order to end, in Dorrit Cohn's words, at a mimesis of consciousness, this drift of my analysis is more apparent than real. For the novel contributes to a genuine enrichment of the notion of action. At the limit, the "narrated monologue" to which the "Penelope" episode at the end of Joyce's Ulysses can be reduced, is the supreme illustration of the fact that saying is still doing, even when the saying takes refuge in the voiceless discourse of a silent thought, which the novelist does not hesitate to narrate. This initial assessment has next to be completed by a confrontation of the conclusions of this study devoted to the configuration of time in fictional narrative with those I have drawn, at the end of volume 1, concerning the configuration of time by historical narrative. Allow me to say first that these two analyses, dealing respectively with configuration in the historical narrative and with configuration in the fictional narrative, strictly parallel each other and constitute the two sides of one and the same investigation into the art of composition, which I placed in Part I under the title of mimesis,. One of the restrictions on my analyses of historical narrative has thus been removed—the narrative field in its entirety is now open to reflection. With the same stroke, a serious lacuna in the studies currently dealing with narrativity is also filled. Historiography and literary criticism are both called upon and are invited together to form a grand narratology, where an equal right would be given to historical narrative and to fictional narrative. There are several reasons why we should not be surprised by this congruence between historical and fictional narrative on the level of configuration. I shall not linger over the first of these reasons, namely, the fact that both narrative modes are preceded by the use of narrative in daily life. The largest part of our information about events in the world is, in fact, owing to knowledge through hearsay. In this way the act—if not the art—of narrating or recounting is part of the symbolic mediations of action that I have related to the preunderstanding of the narrative field, which I placed under the title of mimesis,. In this sense we may say that all the arts of narration, and foremost among them those belonging to writing, are imitations of narrative as it is already practiced in the transactions of ordinary discourse.

However, this common source of historical and fictional narratives could not of itself preserve the kinship of the two narrative modes in their most elaborated forms, historiography and literature. A second reason for this persistent congruence has to be advanced. The reconstitution of the narrative field is possible only insofar as the configurating operations in both domains can be measured by the same standard. For me, this standard has been emplotment. In this respect, it is not surprising that we have rediscovered in fictional narrative the same configurating operation that historical explanation was confronted with, since the narrativist theories presented in Part II authorized the transference of literary categories of emplotment into the field of historical narrative. In this sense, we have simply returned to literature what history had borrowed from it. This second reason, in turn, only holds if the transformations of the simple model of emplotment received from Aristotle conserve a discernible kinship even in their most divergent expressions. The reader will have observed in this regard a large resemblance between my attempts undertaken separately in the two narrative fields to give the notion of emplotment a broader extension and a more fundamental understanding than that conveyed by Aristotle's muthos, dependent as it is on his interpretation of Greek tragedy. I adopted as my guideline in these two efforts the same notions of "the temporal synthesis of the heterogeneous" and "discordant concordance" that carry the formal principle of Aristotelian muthos beyond its particular instantiation in overly determined genres and literary types, allowing it to be transposed without precautions from literature to history. The deepest reason for the unity of the concept of "narrative configuration" depends finally on the kinship
between the methods of derivation I called upon in both cases to account for the specificity of the new narrative practices that have appeared as much in the field of historiography as in that of narrative fiction. As regards historiography, we ought not to forget the reservations with which I received the narrativist theses that would make history a simple species of the genre "story," nor my preference for the long way of "questioning back," borrowed from Husserl's *Krisis*. In this way, I could do justice to the birth of a new form of rationality within the field of historical explanation, while at the same time preserving, through this genesis of meaning, the subordination of historical rationality to narrative understanding. Recall the notions of quasi-plot, quasi-character, and quasi-event, by means of which I tried to fit these new modes of historical configuration to the formal concept of emplotment, taken in the broad sense of a synthesis of the heterogeneous.

The first and second chapters of this volume lead to the same generalization of the concept of plot under the control of the idea of a temporal synthesis of the heterogeneous. By first interrogating the realm of traditionality that characterizes the development of literary genres as related to narrativity, we were able to explore the resources for deviance that the formal principle of narrative configuration can tolerate, and we ended with the wager that despite the warning signs of a schism threatening the very principle of narrative emplot-ment, this principle always succeeds in incarnating itself in new literary genres capable of assuming the perenni-ality of the age-old act of narrating. But it was in my examination of the attempts made by narrative semiotics to reformulate the surface structures of narratives as a function of their deep structures that we could observe the closest parallel between the epistemology of historical explanation and that of narrative grammar. My thesis was the same in both cases. It was a plea for the precedence of narrative understanding over narratological rationality. The universal character of the formal principle of narrative configuration was thereby confirmed, to the extent that what this understanding confronts is the emplotment, taken in its most extreme formality, namely, the temporal synthesis of the heterogeneous.

I have just emphasized the homology, from an epistemological point of view, between my analyses of the configurative operations on the planes of historical and fictional narrative. We may now place the accent on the dissymmetries that will only attain a complete elucidation in my next volume, when I remove the parentheses I have imposed on the question of truth. If it is indeed this question, ultimately, that distinguishes history, as a true narrative, from fiction, the dissymmetry that affects a narrative's power to refigure time—that is, following my convention regarding vocabulary, the third mimetic relation of narrative to action—anounces itself already at the level where, as we have just been discussing, fictional narrative and historical narrative offer the greatest symmetry, the plane of configuration.

We could ignore this dissymmetry by recalling the most striking results of my parallel studies of historical and fictional narrative, insofar as, in speaking of the configuration of time by narrative, the principal accent was on the mode of intelligibility the configurating power of narrative could claim rather than on the time that was at stake in it.

For reasons that will appear only in the next volume, fictional narrative is richer in information about time, on this very plane of composition, than is historical narrative. It is not that historical narrative is completely impoverished in this regard. My discussion about the event and more precisely my observations regarding the return of the event by the detour of the long time-span made the time of history appear as a sufficiently wide field of variations to constrain us to formulate the notion of a quasi-event. Nevertheless other constraints, which I shall be able to account for only in volume 3, result in the fact that the various time-spans considered by historians obey laws relating to their placement within ever vaster currents, which despite undeniable qualitative differences relating to the rhythm, the tempo of events, make these time-spans and their corresponding speeds extremely homogeneous. This is why the order of chapters in Part II did not correspond to any notable progression in the apprehension of time. The same thing is not true with regard to the configuration of time by fictional narratives. The four chapters presented in this volume could be organized on the basis of an increasingly more detailed apprehension of narrative temporality.

In the first chapter, it was still simply a question of temporal aspects connected to the style of traditionality in the history of literary genres related to the narrative. I was thus able to define a sort of transhistorical, but not atemporal, identity of the operation of configuration, by linking together the three notions of innovation, perenniality, and decline, whose temporal implications are obvious. The second chapter went further into the problematic of time, during the debate between narrative understanding and narratological rationality, inasmuch as the latter requires for its models of the deep grammar of narrative an achronological status as a matter of principle, in relation to which the diachrony of transformations, displayed on the surface of a narrative, appears derived and inessential. To this I opposed the originary character of the temporal process inherent in emplotment as related to narrative understanding, which we see simulated by narratological rationality. But it was with the study of "games with time," in Chapter 3, that the fictional narrative appeared for the first time to develop the resources
that the historical narrative seemed prevented from exploiting, for reasons which, once again, could not be clarified at this stage of my investigation. It is only with the fictional narrative that the maker of plots multiplies the distortions authorizing the division between the time taken to narrate and the time of the things narrated, a division that itself is initiated by the interplay between utterance and statement in the course of the narration. Everything occurs as though fiction, by creating imaginary worlds, opened up an unlimited career to the manifestation of time.

We took the last step in the direction of the specificity of fictive time in the final chapter, devoted to the notion of the fictive experience of time. By fictive experience, I mean a virtual manner of living in the world projected by the literary work as a result of its capacity for self-transcendence. This chapter is the exact counterpart of that devoted to historical intentionality in Part II. The dissymmetry I am speaking about now, therefore, parallels very precisely the symmetry between historical narrative and fictional narrative on the level of narrative structure.

Is this to say that we have crossed, on the side of fiction as well as on that of history, the boundary that I marked out at the beginning between the question of sense and that of reference, or better as I prefer to say, between the question of configuration and that of refiguration? I do not think so. Liven if I have to admit that at this stage the problematic of configuration is open to a very strong attraction exerted by the problematic of refiguration—and this is so by reason of the general law of language that what we say is governed by that about which we are speaking—I still affirm with equal force that the boundary between configuration and refiguration has not yet been crossed, as long as the world of the work remains a transcendence immanent in the text.

This asceticism in my analysis has its counterpart in a comparable asceticism practiced in Part II, where I dissociated the epistemological characteristics of the historical event from its ontological characteristics, which will be examined only in volume 3, with respect to the "reality" of the historical past. So, just as I abstained from deciding the question of the reference of the historical event to the actual past, I am also suspending any decision concerning the capacity of a fictional narrative to disclose and to transform the actual; world of action. In this sense, the studies I devoted to the three tales about time prepare the way for—without actually realizing—the transition from the problems of narrative configuration to the problems of the refiguration of time by narrative, which will be the subject of Part IV. The threshold separating these problematic is, in fact, crossed only when the world of the text is confronted with the world of the reader. Only then does the literary work acquire a meaning in the full sense of the term, at the intersection of the world projected by the text and the life-world of the reader. This confrontation requires, in turn, that we pass by way of a theory of reading, inasmuch as the latter constitutes the privileged place for the intersection of an imaginary world and an actual one. Only after a theory of reading has been proposed in one of the concluding chapters of volume 3 will fictional narrative be able to assert its claims to truth, at the cost of a radical reformulation of the problem of truth. This will involve the capacity of the work of art to indicate and to transform human action. In the same way, only once the theory of reading has been presented will the contribution of the fictional narrative to the refiguration of time enter into opposition to and into composition with the capacity of historical narrative to speak of the actual past. If my thesis about the highly controversial problem of reference in the order of fiction possesses any originality, it is to the extent that it does not separate the claim to truth asserted by fictional narrative from that made by historical narrative but attempts to understand each in relation to the other.

The problem of the refiguration of time by narrative will, therefore, be brought to its conclusion only when we shall be in a position to make the respective referential intentions of the historical narrative and the fictional narrative interweave. Our analysis of the fictive experience of time will at least have marked a decisive turning point in the direction of the solution to this problem that forms the horizon of my investigation, by providing something like a world of the text for us to think about, while awaiting its complement, the life-world of the reader, without which the signification of the literary work is incomplete.

Notes


2. Tzvetan Todorov defines the three notions of literature, discourse, and genre in terms of one another. Cf. "La Notion de littérature" in *Les Genres du discours* (Paris: Scull, 1978), pp. 13-26. If it is objected that individual works transgress all categorization, it nonetheless remains true that "transgression, to exist as such, requires a law that would be, precisely, transgressed" (ibid., p. 45). This law depends upon a certain codification of preexisting discursive properties, that is, in the institutionalizing of certain "transformations that certain speech acts undergo in order to produce a certain literary genre" (ibid., p. 54). The filiation between literary genres and ordinary discourse, as well as the autonomy of literature, are thus preserved, Todorov's initial analyses of the notion of literary genres can be found in his *The Fictive Man: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre*, trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).
4. Strictly speaking, narratology should be termed the science of narrative structures, without considering the distinction between historical narrative and fictional narrative. However, according to the contemporary use of the term, "narratology" is centered on the fictional narrative, without excluding a few incursions into the domain of historiography. It is in view of this de facto division of roles that I am contrasting narratology and historiography.
5. I have chosen to devote studies of three literary texts to this question: Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*, Thomas Mann's *Der Zauberberg*, and Marcel Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu*. See below, chapter 4.
6. My interpretation of the role of reading in literary experience is close to that proposed by Mario Valdés in *Shadows in the Cave: A Phenomenological Approach to Literary Criticism Based on Hispanic Texts* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982). "In this theory, structure is completely subordinated to the function and . . . the discussion of function shall lead us back ultimately into the reintegration of expression and experience in the inlorsuhjective participation of leaders across time and space" (ibid., p. 15). I also concur with the central thesis of Jacques Garelli. /:<· Kertel ri In Dispersion: A'.v.v'/ xnr le champ <lc lecture poeti/jte (Paris: Ciallimaid, f>78),
9. Exploring the character of each protagonist is the main interest of the third chapter. They are brought together through the character of Dr. Bradshaw, who belongs to two subplots. The news of Septimus's death, Clarissa essentially communicate through the closeness of the subterranean "caves" visited by the narrator. On the surface, and remembering thus become an alternation between the superficial and the profound. The two fates of Septimus and think that gives exactly what I want; humanity, humour, depth. The idea is that the caves shall connect and each comes to diary: "I should say a good deal about
by installments, as I have need of it"
"the tunnelling process." "It took me a year's groping to discover what I call my tunnelling process, by which I tell the past
process that makes it "a finite model of an infinite universe"
overcoming time in time" (ibid., p. 24).
89. On the notion of "subsequent" narration, cf. Genette's Narrative Discourse, pp. 35, 223, Nouveau Discours du recit adds the following: a narrator who announces ahead of time a subsequent development of the action that is being narrated "thereby posits without any possible ambiguity that this narrative act is posterior to the story told, or at least with respect to the part of the story that he anticipates in this way" (ibid., p. 54). We shall see in the final chapter of volume 3 in what way this posterior position of the narrative voice in the fictional narrative favors the historization of fiction, which compensates for the fictionalization of history.
90. I shall return at the end of volume 3 to the role of this quasi-intuition in the fictionalization of history.
91. On reading as the response to the narrative voice of the text, cf. Valdes, Shadows in the Cave, p. 23. The text is trustworthy to the extent that the fictional voice itself is (ibid., p. 25). This question is particularly urgent in the case of parody. The characteristic parody found in Don Quijote. for example, must finally be able to be identified by unmistakable signs. This "address" of the text, uttered by the narrative voice, constitutes the intentionality of the text as such (cf. ibid., pp. 26-32; see also ValdeVs interpretation of Don Quijote, pp. 141-62).

CHAPTER FOUR
1. Cf. above, p. 5.
2. Cf the work by Fink referred to above. Chap. 3. n. 21. In a similar sense, Lot-man places inside the "frame" that marks: just every work of "art, the compositional process that makes it "a finite model of an infinite universe" (The Structure of the Artistic Text, p. 210).
3. This notion of immanent transcendence exactly overlaps that of intentionality as it is applied by Mario Valdés to the text as a whole. It is in the act of reading that the intentionality of the text is actualized (Shadows in the Cave, pp. 45-76). This analysis should be combined with that of narrative voice considered as that which presents the text. The narrative voice is the bearer of the intentionality belonging to the text, which is actualized only in the intersubjective relationship that unfolds between the solicitation coming from the narrative voice and the response of reading. This analysis will be taken up again in a systematic way in volume 3.
5. The expression "imaginative variations" will take on its full meaning only when we are in a position to confront the range of solutions it offers to the aorism of time with the resolution provided by the constitution of historical time, in the next volume of Time and Narrative.
7. James Hafley, contrasting Mrs. Dalloway with Joyce's Ulysses, writes, "[Virginia Woolf] used the single day as a unity ... to show that there is no such thing as a single day" (The Glass Roof, p. 73, quoted by Jean Guiguet, Virginia Woolf and Her Works: trans. Jean Stewart [London: The Hogarth Press, 1965], p. 389).
8. Virginia Woolf was quite proud of discovering this narrative technique and of putting it to use. In her diary she called it "the tunnelling process." "It took me a year's groping to discover what I call my tunnelling process, by which I tell the past by installments, as I have need of it" (A Writer's Diary, ed. Leonard Woolf [London: The Hogarth Press, 1959], p. 60, quoted by Guiguet, p. 229). During the period when the first draft of Mrs. Dalloway was still called The Hours, she wrote in her diary: "I should say a good deal about The Hours and my discovery: How I dig out beautiful caves behind my characters: I think that gives exactly what I want; humanity, humour, depth. The idea is that the caves shall connect and each comes to daylight at the present moment" (A Writer's Diary, p. 60, quoted by Guiguet, pp. 233-34). The alternations between action and remembering thus become an alternation between the superficial and the profound. The two fates of Septimus and Clarissa essentially communicate through the closeness of the subterranean "caves" visited by the narrator. On the surface, they are brought together through the character of Dr. Bradshaw, who belongs to two subplots. The news of Septimus's death, brought by the doctor, thus assumes, on the surface, the unity of the plot.
9. Exploring the character of each protagonist is the main interest of the third chapter ("Our Lighthouse and To the Lighthouse") of Jean Alexander's The Venture in the Novels of Virginia Woolf (New York: Fort Washington, New York: coast).
Kennikat Press, 1974), pp. 85—104. *Mrs. Dalloway* is judged to be the only one of Virginia Woolf's novels that "evolves from a character" (ibid., p. 85). By isolating the character of Clarissa in this way, Jean Alexander can point out the tinsel that is mixed with the brilliance, the compromises with a social world that, for Clarissa, never loses its solidity and its glory. Clarissa thus becomes a "class symbol," which Peter Walsh has perceived as being hard as wood and yet hollow. But the hidden relation with Septimus Warren Smith shifts the perspective by bringing to light the dangers that Clarissa's life is thought to disarm, namely, the possible destruction of the personality through the interplay of human relationships. This psychological approach gives rise to an apt analysis of the range of sentiments of fear and terror that the novel explores. Alexander's comparison with Sartre's *Nausea* (ibid., p. 97) seems completely justified to me in this regard.

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1cago Press, 1939, rev. ed. 1960), considers this process to be the most advanced element in the art of fiction in Virginia Woolf. It allows the interleaving of the modes of action and introspection. This conjunction induces a "twilight mood of receptive reverie" (ibid., p. 189), which the reader is invited to share. Virginia Woolf herself also referred to this "mood" so characteristic of her entire work in her essay "On Modern Fiction": "life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end" (*The Common Reader* [London: The Hogarth Press, 1925-32, 2 vols.], quoted by Daiches, p. 192). Daiches propounds, rejoining his father, that accounts for this subtle, yet easy-to-analyze technique. Either we keep ourselves immobile and take in with our gaze the various events occurring simultaneously in space, or we fix ourselves in space, or better in a character, considered a fixed "place," and let ourselves follow back or move along with the time-consciousness of this same character. The narrative technique thus consists in alternating the dispersion of characters in a single point in time with the dispersion of memories within one character. Cf. the diagram given by Daiches. ibid., pp. 204-5. In this regard, Virginia Woolf is much more careful than Joyce is to set out unequivocal guideposts to direct the course of this alternation. For a comparison with *Ulysses*, which also keeps the infinitely complex skein of its excursions and incursions within the span of a single day, cf. ibid., pp. 190, 193, 198-99. Daiches relates the difference in technique of these two authors to the difference in their intentions. "Joyce's aim was to isolate reality from all human attitudes— an attempt to remove the normative element from fiction completely, to create a self-contained world independent of all values in the observer, independent even (as though it is possible) of all values in the creator. But Virginia Woolf refines on values rather than eliminates them. Her reaction to crumbling norms is hoi agnosticism but sophistication" (ibid., p. 199). Daiches has returned to and furthered his interpretation of *Mrs. Dalloway* in *Virginia Woolf* (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1942; London: Nicholson and Watson, 1945, pp. 61-78; revised edition. New Directions, 1963, pp. 187-217), to which I shall refer. Jean Guiguet in the work already referred to, based principally on Virginia Woolf's diary published only in 1953, returns to the question of the relationship between Joyce's *Ulysses* and Mm. *Dalloway*, pp. 241-45.

11. Clarissa reads this refrain while stopping at the window of a bookshop. It constitutes at the same time one of the bridges built by the narrative technique between Clarissa's fate and that of Septimus, so taken, as we shall sec. with Shakespeare. 12. Furtive figure of authority: the glimpse of the Prince of Wales' cur (and is not the Queen, if it is she, "the enduring symbol of the State"?) [*Mrs. Pathway*, p. 23]). Even the shop windows of the antique dealers recall their role: "sifting the ruins of time" (ibid.). Also there is the airplane and its trail of advertising in the form of imposing capital letters. Figures of authority: the lords and ladies of the semipartially and even honest Richard Dalloway. faithful servant of the state.
13. "Here is my Elizabeth," says Clarissa, with all that the possessive form implies. This will receive a reply in Elizabeth's final appearance, rejoining her father, just when the curtain is about to fall on Mrs. Dalloway's party. "And suddenly he realised that it was his Eli/abeth" (ibid., p. 295).
14. Could Virginia Woolf here not help but be thinking of Shakespeare's words in *As You Like It*. Rosalind: "I pray you, what is't o'clock?" Orlando: "You should ask me, what time o'day. There's no clock in the forest." Rosalind: "Then there is no true lover in the forest; else sighing every minute and groaning every hour would detect the lazy foot of Time as well as a clock." Orlando: "And why not the swift foot of Time? Had not that been as proper?" Rosalind: "By no means, sir. Time travels in divers paces with divers persons. I'll tell you who Time ambles withal, who Time trots withal, who Time gallops withal, who and he stands still withal" (act 3, scene 2, 11. 30ff).
15. Cf. John Graham, "Time in the Novels of Virginia Woolf," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 18 (1949): 186-201; reprinted in *Critics on Virginia Woolf*; ed. Jacqueline E. M. Latham (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1970), pp. 28-35. This critic pushes the interpretation of Septimus's suicide quite far indeed. It is the "complete vision" of Septimus (ibid., p. 32) that gives Clarissa "the power to transfigure time." This conjunction induces a "twilight mood of receptive reverie" (ibid.). Clarissa's reflections on the young man, which I shall refer to below, support this. Clarissa intuitively understands, John Graham says, the meaning of Septimus's vision, which he can communicate only through death. Consequently, returning to her party symbolizes for Clarissa "the transfiguration of time" (ibid., p. 33). I hesitate to follow this interpretation of Septimus's death all the way: "In order to penetrate to the center like Septimus, one must either die, or go mad, or in some other way lose one's humanity in order to exist independently of time" (ibid., p. 31). On the other hand, this critic well notes that "the true terror of his vision is that it destroys him as a creature of the time-world" (ibid., p. 30). It is then no longer time that is mortal, it is eternity that is the bringer of death. But how can one separate this "complete vision"—this gnosti— from Septimus's madness that has all the aspects of paranoia? Let me add that John Graham's interpretation of Septimus's revelations does give us an opportunity to build a bridge between the interpretation of Mrs. Dalloway and that of *Der Zauberberg* that I shall attempt below, when the theme of eternity and its relation to time comes to the forefront.
16. A note by Virginia Woolf in her diary warns against a clearly defined separation between madness and health: "I daubmarte here a study of insanity and suicide; the world seen by the sane and the insane stay side by side—something like that" (*A Writer's Diary*, p. 52). The madman's vision is not disqualified because of his "insanity." It is its reverberation in Clarissa's soul that finally is important.

18. A. D. Moody sees in Mrs. Dalloway the living image of the superficial life led by the "British ruling class," as London society is called in the book itself ("Mrs. Dalloway as Comedy," in *Critics on Virginia Woolf*, pp. 48-58). It is true that she incarnates at the same time criticism of her society but without possessing the power to dissociate herself from it. This is why the "comic" aspect, nourished by the narrator's ferocious irony, predominates up to the linal scene at the party, marked by the presence of the Prime Minister. This interpretation seems to me to suffer from an oversimplification that is the inverse of that which, above, saw in Septimus's death, transposed by Clarissa, the power to transfigure time. The tale about time in *Mrs. Dalloway* is situated halfway
between comedy and gnosis. As Jean Guiguet justly notes, "the social criticism intendted by the author is grafted onto the psycho-
metaphysical theme of the novel" (p. 235). Guiguet is alluding here to an observation made by Virginia Woolf in her diary: "I want
to give life and death, sanity and insanity; I want to criticize the social system, and show it at work at its most intense" (A Writer's
Diary, p. 57, quoted by Guiguet, p. 228). This priority of the psychological investigation over the social criticism is demonstrated by
Jean O. Love in her Worlds in Consciousness: Mytho-poetic Thought in the Novels of Virginia Woolf (Berkeley: University of

19. This expression comes from Virginia Woolf herself in her Preface to the Amen can edition of Mrs. Dalloway. Septimus "is
intended to be her double" (cf. Isaak: Gamble, "Clarissa Dalloway's Double," in Critics on Virginia Woolf, pp. 52-55). Clarissa
becomes Septimus's "double" when she realizes "that there is a core of integrity in the ego that must he kept intact at all costs" (ibid.,
p. 55).

20. We know, from her Preface, that in an initial version Clarissa was to commit suicide. My adding the character of Septimus and
by having him commit suicide, the author allowed the narrator—the narrative voice that tells the story to the reader- to
draw Mrs. Dalloway's line of destiny as close to suicide as possible but to extend it beyond the temptation of death.


22. We must, no doubt, refrain from giving this gift of presence the dimension of a message of redemption. Clarissa will
continue to be a woman of the world, for whom monumental time is a magnitude with which one must have the courage to
deal. In this sense, Clarissa remains a figure of compromise. The concluding sentence "For there she was," notes Jean
Guiguet, "contains everything and states nothing precisely" (Virginia Woolf and Her Works, p. 240). This somewhat harsh
judgment is justified if we leave Clarissa alone confronting the prestige of the social order. It is the kinship between the
destinies of Septimus and Clarissa, at another depth—that of the "caves" that the narrator "connects"—that governs not only the
plot but the psycho-metaphysical theme of the novel. The self-assured tone of this claim resonates louder than the striking of
Big Ben and all the clocks, stronger than the terror and the ecstasy that from the beginning of the story struggle to. capture
Clarissa's soul. If Septimus's refusal of monumental time was able to direct Mrs. Dalloway back toward transitory life and its
precarious joys, this is because it set her on the path to a mortal time that is fully assumed.

23. It would be a serious mistake to consider this experience, however puzzling it may be, as the illustration of a philosophy
constituted outside the novel, even if it be-that of Bergson. The monumental time that both Septimus and Clarissa confront
has nothing to do with Bergson's spatialized time. It exists, so to speak, in its own right and is not the result of a confusion
between space and duration. This is why 1 compared it instead to Nietzsche's monumental history. As for the internal time,
brought to light by the narrator's excursions into underground caves, it has more in common with the upsurge of the moment
than with the melodramatic continuity of time in Bergson. The very resonance of the hour is one of those moments that is
defined differently every time depending on the present mood (cf. Guiguet, pp. 388-92). Regardless of the similarities and
differences between time in Virginia Woolf and time in Bergson, the major shortcoming here is not giving fiction per se the
power to explore the modes of temporal experience that escape philosophical conceptualization, due to its aporic character.
This will be the central theme in my concluding volume.

1969).


27. The narrator returns to this theme of the reading time at several points. He does so in the decisive episode. "Soup-
Everlasting" (Kwigkeitssuppe) (Magic Mountain, pp. 183-203). At the beginning of Chapter 7, he wonders, more precisely, if
one can tell, that is narrate, time itself (ibid., p. 5411. If, the narrator says, one cannot narrate time, at least one can "von dcr
Zetl er/ahlen /u wollen" (one can "desire to tell a tale u/wu/time," says the English translator [ibid., p. 542. her emphasis]).
The expression Zeitromanz then takes on its twofold sense of a novel that is spread out in time, and thereby requires time to be
told, and of a novel about time. The narrator returns to this same ambiguity in one of the Mynheer Peeperkorn episodes, and
at the beginning of "The Great God Dumps" (ibid., p. 624).

28. This calculated ambiguity serves as a warning. The Magic Mountain will not simply be the symbolic history that runs
from the sickness unto death of European culture, before the thunderbolt of 1914; nor will it be simply the tale of a spiritual
quest. Between the sociological symbolism and the hermetic symbolism, we do not have to choose.

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29. A positive evaluation of the hero's apprenticeship was proposed in 1933 by Hermann J. Weigand in the work referred to
above. Weigand was the first to characterize The Magic Mountain as a "pedagogical novel." But he sees in this "novel of self-
development" (ibid., p. 4) "a quest for Bildung that transcends any specific practical aims" (ibid.), where the main emphasis is
placed on the progressive integration of a total experience from which emerges an affirmative attitude regarding life as a
whole. Even in the major crises reported in the first part (the temptation to run away, Dr. Behrens's summons making Hans a
patient at the Berghof, Walpurgis-Night), the hero is found to be capable of choice and of "elevation"
(Steigerung). Of course, Weigand freely admits that the end of the first part marks the culminating point of the sympathy with
death. He calls Der Zauberberg "the epic of disease" (ibid., p. 39). But the second part will show the subordination of the fascination exerted
by death to the fascination exerted by life (ibid., p. 49). The "Snow" episode bears witness to the "spiritual climax of clarity
that marks the acme of his capacity to span the poles of cosmic experience . . . that he owes to the resource which enables
him ultimately to sublimate even his passion for Clavdia into this interested friendship." In the spiritualism seance, Weigand
sees the experience of the hero confined to mysticism (the final chapter of his book is devoted expressly to mysticism) but,
according to the author, the occult seance never leads Hans Castorp to lose control of his will to live. Moreover, the
exploration of the unknown, of the forbidden, extends to the revelation of "the essential ethos of sin for Thomas Mann" (ibid.,
p. 154); this is the "Russian" side of Castorp, the Clavdia side. From her he learns that there is no curiosity without a certain
amount of perversity. The question is nevertheless to know whether the hero has integrated, as Weigand claims, this chaos of
experiences ("synthesis is the principle that governs the pattern of the Zauberberg from first to last" [ibid., p. 157]). The
Hans Castorp's enterprising spirit (UnierHehmungsgeist), had to be conned, new ones to be observed with youth's receptivity" (ibid., p. 106). In the same sense the narrator speaks of Castorp had something like them in mind" (ibid., p. 105).

37. The narrator, intervening shamelessly, says. "We have introduced these remarks here only because our young Hans Castorp, 'the whole "complex." I've lost all the clear-headedness I had—it's gone'" (ibid., p. 82). " 'And yet, in another way, it said Joachim. 'You had me perfectly bewildered this morning.' 'No, don't worry, I've forgotten all of it,' answered Hans.

36. "I've still a great many ideas in my head about time—a whole complex, if I may say so" (ibid., p. 67). " 'Good Lord, is it our hero's parody of Augustine, of whom he is supposed to be unaware. But this certainly docs not apply to the narrator!" (ibid., p. 137).

35. " 'Keep quiet! I'm very clear-headed today. Well, then, what

Chapter 2 plunges into the past. This flashback—moreover quite common in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century novels—is not unrelated to the construction of the perspectival effect which I referred to above. The chapter does indeed set up the Urerlebnisse, as Weigand puts it (Weigand, pp. 25-39), that will act as underground guides for the spiritual growth that parallels the diminishing interest in measured time. The sense of the continuity of generations, symbolized by the transmission of the baptismal basin; the double sense of death, at once sacred and indecent, felt for the first time before the mortal remains of his grandfather; the irrepressible sense of freedom, depicted by the taste for experimentation, for adventure; the erotic penchant, subtly evoked by the episode of borrowing the pencil from Pribislav Hippe, the same pencil in the Walpurgisnacht scene Clavdia Chauchat will ask Hans to return to her. In addition to the fact that these Urerlebnisse contain tenacious energies that will make the negative experience of time an experience of internal Seigergun>: the fact of evoking them after the "arrival" scene and before the agitated narrative of the first day serves the specific function of getting the major experience of the effacement of time underway. It was first necessary to have given time this antiquity, this thickness, and this density in order to give the full measure of the loss that is experienced when the measurements of time fade away.

32. " 'O dio! Three weeks! Do you hear. Lieutenant? Does it not sound to you impertinent to hear a person say: 'I am slopping for three weeks and then I am going away again'?' We up here are not acquainted with such a unit of time as the week—if I may be permitted to instruct you. my dear sir. Our smallest unit is the month. We reckon in the grand style not unrelated to the construction of the perspectival effect which I referred to above. The chapter does indeed set up the Urerlebnisse, as Weigand puts it (Weigand, pp. 25-39), that will act as underground guides for the spiritual growth that parallels the diminishing interest in measured time. The sense of the continuity of generations, symbolized by the transmission of the baptismal basin; the double sense of death, at once sacred and indecent, felt for the first time before the mortal remains of his grandfather; the irrepressible sense of freedom, depicted by the taste for experimentation, for adventure; the erotic penchant, subtly evoked by the episode of borrowing the pencil from Pribislav Hippe, the same pencil in the Walpurgisnacht scene Clavdia Chauchat will ask Hans to return to her. In addition to the fact that these Urerlebnisse contain tenacious energies that will make the negative experience of time an experience of internal Seigergun>: the fact of evoking them after the "arrival" scene and before the agitated narrative of the first day serves the specific function of getting the major experience of the effacement of time underway. It was first necessary to have given time this antiquity, this thickness, and this density in order to give the full measure of the loss that is experienced when the measurements of time fade away.

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30. Richard Thieberger in Der Begriff tier Zeit hei Thomas Mann von Zauberberg zum Joseph (Baden-Baden: Verlag fur Kunst und Wissenschaft, 1962), pp. 25-65 ("Die Zeitaspekte im Zauberberg"). has attempted to gather together all the considerations on time that occur either in conversations, in thoughts (in other words, in the internal discourse) attributed to the characters in the narrative, or in the narrator's commentary. I am indebted to him for the selection of the most typical remarks on this subject.

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32. " 'But lately (neulich)—let me sec. wait a minute, it might be possibly eight weeks ago—' 'Then you can hardly say lately,' Hans Castorp pounced on him crisply. 'What! Well, not lately, then, since you're so precise. I was just trying to reckon. Well, then, some time ago'" (The Magic Mountain, p. 53).

33. " 'O dio! Three weeks! Do you hear. Lieutenant? Does it not sound to you impertinent to hear a person say: 'I am slopping for three weeks and then I am going away again'?' We up here are not acquainted with such a unit of time as the week—if I may be permitted to instruct you. my dear sir. Our smallest unit is the month. We reckon in the grand style not unrelated to the construction of the perspectival effect which I referred to above. The chapter does indeed set up the Urerlebnisse, as Weigand puts it (Weigand, pp. 25-39), that will act as underground guides for the spiritual growth that parallels the diminishing interest in measured time. The sense of the continuity of generations, symbolized by the transmission of the baptismal basin; the double sense of death, at once sacred and indecent, felt for the first time before the mortal remains of his grandfather; the irrepressible sense of freedom, depicted by the taste for experimentation, for adventure; the erotic penchant, subtly evoked by the episode of borrowing the pencil from Pribislav Hippe, the same pencil in the Walpurgisnacht scene Clavdia Chauchat will ask Hans to return to her. In addition to the fact that these Urerlebnisse contain tenacious energies that will make the negative experience of time an experience of internal Seigergun>: the fact of evoking them after the "arrival" scene and before the agitated narrative of the first day serves the specific function of getting the major experience of the effacement of time underway. It was first necessary to have given time this antiquity, this thickness, and this density in order to give the full measure of the loss that is experienced when the measurements of time fade away.

34. Joachim himself, by the headstart he still has over Hans, helps to sharpen the perplexity of his cousin. "Yes, when you watch it, the time, it goes slowly. I quite like measuring, four times a day; for then you know what a minute—or seven of them—actually amounts to. up here in (his place, where the seven days of the week whisk by the way they do!" (ibid., pp. 65-66). The narrator adds, referring to Hans, "He was unaccustomed to philosophize, yet somehow felt an impulse to do so" (ibid., p. 66).

35. "'Keep quiet! I'm very clear-headed today. Well, then, what is time?' asked Hans Castorp" (ibid.). It is amusing to follow our hero's parody of Augustine, of whom he is supposed to be unaware. But this certainly does not apply to the narrator! "'I've still a great many ideas in my head about time—a whole complex, if I may say so'" (ibid., p. 67). "'Good Lord, is it still only the first day? It seems to me I've been up here a long time—ages.' 'Don't begin to philosophize again about time,' said Joachim. 'You had me perfectly bewildered this morning.' 'No, don't worry, I've forgotten all of it,' answered Hans Castorp, 'the whole "complex." I've lost all the clear-headedness I had—it's gone'" (ibid., p. 82). "And yet, in another way, it seems as though I had been here a long time, instead of just a single day—as if I had got older and wiser since I came—that is the way I feel.' 'Wiser, too?' Settembrini asked" (ibid., p. 85).

37. The narrator, intervening shamelessly, says. "We have introduced these remarks here only because our young Hans Castorp had something like them in mind" (ibid., p. 105). "But even the phenomena of everyday life held much that Hans Castorp had still to learn: faces and facts already noted had to be conned, new ones to be observed with youth's receptivity" (ibid., p. 106). In the same sense the narrator speaks of Hans Castorp's enterprising spirit (UnierHehmungsgeist), Thieberger compares this Exkurs to Joachim's apology for music,
which, at least, preserves an order and precise divisions. Settembrini goes even further. "Music quickens time, she quickens us to the finest enjoyment of time; she quickens—and in so far she has moral value. Art has moral value, in so far as it quickens" (ibid., p. 114). But Hans Castorp receives this moralizing diatribe, which remains that of a schoolmaster, with disinterest.

39. Among the Leitmotive, let us recall the christening basin—"that symbol of the passing and the abiding, of continuity through change" (ibid., p. 154), and also the grandfather's trembling head (during Walpurgis-Night).

40. The two voices of the narrator and the hero join together to exclaim, "Ah, time is a riddling thing, and hard it is to expound its essence!" (ibid., p. 141). Lucidity hangs upon this question.

41. After two weeks, the daily routine of 'house up here' had begun to take on, in his eyes, a character of sanctity. When, from the point of view of 'those up here,' he considered life as lived down in the Hat-land, it seemed somehow quieter and unnatural" (ibid., p. 148).

42. It is noteworthy that, in his disdain for the Russians and their prodigious negligence with respect to time, the Italian tutor praises Time. "Time is a gift of God, given to man that he might use it—use it. Engineer, to serve the advancement of humanity" (p. 243). Weigand stresses here the subtle play between the German, the Italian, and the Slavic mind. This constitutes one of the numerous overdeterminations of this tale about time.

43. The author once again takes his reader by the hand. "We have as much right as the next person to our private thoughts about the story we are relating; and we would here hazard the surmise that young Hans Castorp would never have overstepped so far the limits originally fixed for his stay if to his simple soul there might have been vouchsafed, out of the depth of his time, any reasonably satisfying explanation of the meaning and purpose of man's life" (ibid., pp. 229-30).

44. Does this not irresistibly call to mind the dinner among the death's-heads in Remembrance of Things Past, after the crucial vision in the Duke of Guerneantes' library?

45. The irony of the final words, "And went out" leaves the reader not knowing what Clavdia and I lans did I tur rest of this carnival night, Laler, the Confidence made to poor Wchsal will excite our curiosity without satisfying it. The ironic author then notes, "there seems every reason, on our part and on his, not to go into it very much" (ibid., p. 428). Later, upon her return, he will say to Clavdia, "I have told you I regard

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it as a dream, what we had together" (ibid., pp. 597-97). Mynheer Peeperkorn's curiosity will not succeed in lifting the veil.

46. "Hans Castorp revolved these queries and their like in his brain. . . . For himself, it was precisely because he did not know the answers that he put the question" (ibid., pp. 244-45).

47. Thieberger is certainly correct in mentioning Mann's Joseph novels here, Joseph in whom the passion for observing the heavens was bound up with the arcahism of myths as much as with ancient wisdom.

48. "The more I think of it, the surer I am that the bed of repose—by which I mean my deck-chair, of course—has given me more food for thought in these ten months than the mill down in the flat-land in all the years before. There's simply no denying it" (ibid., p. 376).

49. The long ski escapades arc not unrelated to this conquest of freedom. They even provide him with an active use of time, which sets the stage for the critical "Snow" episode.

50. His ramblings sometimes do have time as a theme. N'apthia decries "the exploitation of time," a "universal God-given dispensation" (ibid., p. 403). Cf. also his apology for communist time, "when no one would be allowed to receive interest" (ibid., p. 408).

51. "In a word, Hans Castorp was valorous up here—if by valour we mean not mere dull matter-of-factness in the face of nature, but conscious submission to her, the fear of death cast out by irresistible oneness" (ibid., p. 477).

52. Note the irony of the title Als Soldat uml-brav (ibid., p. 498). Joachim has been forced to leave the profession of soldier in order to return to die in a sanatorium. His interment, however, is that of a soldier: a premonition of all the interments marking the Great War, the same war that, at the end of Chapter 7, will roll over the Berghof like a thunderbolt.

53. Does the kiss on the mouth, in the Russian manner, which the narrator compares with Dr. Krokowski's manner of treating the subject of life "in that slightly fluctuating sense" (ibid., p. 599), mark a victory or a defeat? Or, more subtly, is it not the ironic reminder of the fluctuating sense of the word "love." oscillating between piety and voluptuousness?

54. "He saw on every side the uncanny and the malign, and he knew what it was he saw: life without time, life without care or hope, life as depravity, assiduous stagnation; life as dead" (ibid., p. 627).

55. "Augenblicke kamen, wo dir aus Tode und Korperunzucht ahnugsvoll und rc-gierungsweise ein Traum von Liebe

44. Does this not irresistibly call to mind the dinner among the death's-heads in


58. The quasi-synchronic table of signs in Deleuze's work and the hierarchy of temporal configurations that correspond to this grand paradigm of signs must not make us forget either the historicity of this apprenticeship or, especially, the singular historicity that marks the event of the Visitation itself, which changes after-the-fact the meaning of the earlier apprenticeship, and first and foremost its temporal signification. It is the eccentric character of the signs of art in relation to all the others that engenders this singular historicity.


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60. Henry (ibid., pp. 33 and 40) gives two significant extracts from Part VI of The System of Transcendental Idealism. Cf. R
The problem of the relations between the orientation toward the future and the nostalgic desire for the past is at the center of the beginning of the hero's journey forward. And by virtue of this, to the end of the novel, the style of "the future in the past" is preserved. 

The self remembering what preceded it. By narrating backwards, however, the narrative offers the hero the possibility of gaining access to the door to the hero's forward progress. A double paradox, therefore: from the start of the narrative the self that narrates is a narrated self. In addition, he sees in this the primary coincidence between the narrating self and the spaces traversed as we shall see, our final word.

"I ought to have been happy; I was not" (I, p. 41).

The trap lies in the transitional question. "Will it ultimately reach the clear surface of my consciousness, this memory, this old, dead moment, which the magnetism of an identical moment has travelled so far as to become a psychology of lost time" (ibid., p. 24). A second pivot is provided by the association of one bedroom with another: "my memory had been set in motion" (I, p. 9). A second pivot is provided by the association of one bedroom with another: "my memory had been set in motion" (I, p. 9). A second pivot is provided by the association of one bedroom with another: "my memory had been set in motion" (I, p. 9). A second pivot is provided by the association of one bedroom with another: "my memory had been set in motion" (I, p. 9).

"And so it was that, for a long time afterwards, when I lay awake at night and revived old memories of Combray, the narrator does not fail to recall, at the appropriate moment, this inset structure. "And so it was that, for a long time afterwards, when I lay awake at night and revived old memories of Combray, the narrator does not fail to recall, at the appropriate moment, this inset structure. "And so it was that, for a long time afterwards, when I lay awake at night and revived old memories of Combray, the narrator does not fail to recall, at the appropriate moment, this inset structure. "And so it was that, for a long time afterwards, when I lay awake at night and revived old memories of Combray, the narrator does not fail to recall, at the appropriate moment, this inset structure."

"The realization of Identity did foresee its place of accomplishment as the artist's consciousness, but it was a metaphysical essence, not a psychological subject—a feature that the novel will inevitably end up concretizing" (Henry, p. 44).

And further along: "Proust thought only about placing himself in the intermediary zone between the system and concrete reality which the genre, novel, permits" (ibid., p. 55).

65. Nevertheless, this voice can be easily recognized in the aphorisms and maxims that allow us to see the exemplary character of the experience recounted. It is also readily apparent in the latent irony that prevails throughout the narrative of the hero's discoveries in the world of society. Norpois, Brichot, Madame Verdurin, and, one after the other, bourgeois and aristocrats fall victim to the cruelty of a cutting remark, perceptible to an ear with a moderate amount of experience. On the other hand, it is only on the second reading that the reader who knows the outcome of the work perceives what, in deciphering the signs of love, would be the equivalent of irony in deciphering worldly signs: a tone of disillusionment, which forces the day of disappointment and thus ascribes meaning without expressly stating it—the meaning of time lost that comes out of every amorous experience. In other words, it is the narrative voice that is responsible for the overall pejorative tone that predominates in deciphering the signs of love. The narrative voice is more restrained in deciphering sensory signs, and yet their voice insinuates a questioning tone, an interrogation, a request for meaning at the heart of impressions, to the point of breaking this charm and dissolving their spell. The narrator thus constantly makes the hero a consciousness who is awakening to underlying reality. 

66. These moments between waking and sleeping serve as an initial pivot for the inset memories, one within the other: "my eye the still recent taste of that first mouthful, and I feel something start within me, something that leaves its resting-place and raises me, I am aware of the resistance. I can hear the echo of great spaces traversed" (I, p. 49). The expression "great spaces traversed" will be. as we shall see, our final word.

72. "An edifice occupying, so to speak, a four-dimensional space—the name of the Fourth Being—extending through the centuries its ancient nave, which, bay after bay. chapel after chapel, seemed to stretch across and conquer not merely a few yards of soil, but each successive epoch from which it emerged triumphant" (l, p. 66). It is not by chance that, closing the circle. *Time Regained ends* with a final evocation of the Combray church. The steeple of Saint Hilaire is already one of the symbols of time; in Jauss's expression, one of its symbolical figures.

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74. The different epochs are never dated: "That year" (I, p. 158); "that autumn" (I, pp. 167, 169); "at that moment, too" (I, p. 170).

75. "It is perhaps from another impression which I received at Montjouvin, some years later, an impression which at the time remained obscure to me, that there arose, long afterwards, the notion I was to form of sadism. We shall see, in due course, that for quite other reasons the memory of this impression was to play an important part in my life" (I, p. 173). This "we shall see, in due course" followed by "was to" helps to rebalance in a forward direction the overall backward orientation of the work. The scene is at once recollected and projected toward its own future, and so placed at a distance. On the relation between temporality and desire in Proust, cf. Ghislaine Florival, *Le Desir chez Proust* (Louvain/Paris: Nauwelaerts, 1971), pp. 107-73.

76. "And these dreams reminded me that, since I wished some day to become a writer, it was high time to decide what sort of books I was going to write. But as soon as I asked myself the question, and tried to discover some subject to which I could impart a philosophical significance of infinite value, my mind would stop like a clock, my consciousness would be faced with a blank. I would feel either that I was wholly devoid of talent or that perhaps some malady of the brain was hindering its development" (l, pp. 188-89). And a bit further on: "And so, utterly despondent, I renounced literature for ever, despite the encouragement Bloch had given me" (I, pp. 189-90).

77. "Without admitting to myself that what lay hidden behind the steeples of Martinville must be something analogous to a pretty phrase, since it was in the form of words which gave me pleasure, that it had appeared to me, I borrowed a pencil and some paper from the doctor, and in spite of the jolting of the carriage, to appease my conscience and to satisfy my enthusiasm, composed the following little fragment, which I have since discovered and now reproduce with only a slight revision here and there" (I, p. 197).

78. "But by the same token, and by their persistence in those of my present-day impressions to which they can still be linked, they give those impressions a foundation, a depth, a dimension lacking from the rest" (I, p. 197).

79. "Thus would I often lie until morning, dreaming of the old days at Combray . . . and, by an association of memories, of a story which, many years after I had left the little place, had been told me of a love affair in which Swann had been involved before I was born . . . " (I, p. 203).

80. For the reader, a passage such as the following speaks clearly and distinctly: "Swann found in himself, in the memory of the phrase that he had heard, in certain other sonatas which he had made people play to him to see whether he might not perhaps discover his phrase therein, the presence of one of those invisible realities which he had ceased to believe and to which, as though the music had had upon the moral barrenness from which he was suffering a sort of recreative influence, he was conscious once again of (he desire and almost the strength to consecrate his life" (l, p. 230). And again: "In its airy grace there was (he sense of something over and done with, like (he mood of philosophic detachment which follows an outburst of vain regret" (l, p. 238).

81. It is not without importance (hat Swann is a failure as a writer. He will never write his study on Vermeer. As is already suggested, in his relation to the phrase of (he Vinteuil sonata, he will die without ever having known the revelation of art.

82. In order to anchor his narrative of "Swann in Love" in the main narrative, the narrator common to the third- and first-person narratives is careful to have Odette appear for the last time (at least the first Odette, who the reader is unable to guess will

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later be Gilberte's mother in the hero's licitive autobiography) "in the twilight of a dream" (I, p. 411), and then in his thoughts as he awakes. In this way, "Swann in Love" ends in the same semi-dreamlike region as the "Combray" narrative.

83. The author—and no longer the narrator—is in no way bothered by having the young Marcel and the Gilberte encountered on the little footpath in Combray meet on the Champs-Elyse'es (her indelicate gesture in those early days [I, p. 154] will remain an enigma until *Time Regained* [III, pp. 71 - 12]). Novelistic coincidences do not disturb Proust. For it is the narrator who, transforming them first into the peripeteia of his story, then ascribing an almost supernatural sense to chance encounters, succeeds in transforming all coincidences into destiny. *Remembrance* is full of these unlikely encounters that the narrative makes productive. The tinal, and most meaningful, will be, as we shall see below, the joining together of *Swann's Way* and *The Guermantes Way* in the appearance of the daughter of Gilberte and Saint-Loup in the final pages of the book.

84. "When I found how incurious I was about Combray" (III, p. 709). "But, separated as I was by a whole lifetime from

85. Even the famous pastiche of the Goncourts (III, pp. 728-36), which serves as a pretext for the narrator to thrash out at a memorialist type of literature, based on the immediate capacity for "looking and listening" (111. p. 737) helps to reinforce the general tone of the narrative in which it is interpolated, through the disgust that the reading of the pages, fictitiously attributed to the Goncourts, inspires in the hero with respect to literature and by the obstacles it sets up to the advancement of his vocation (III, pp. 728, 737-38)."
86. It is true that the transfiguration of the Parian sky by the light of the searchlights and the way the airmen are taken for Wagnerian Valkyries (III, p. 781. 785-86) adds to the spectacle of Paris at war a touch of aestheticism, with respect to which it is hard to say whether it contributes to the spectral character of all the surrounding scene, or whether it already partakes of the literary transposition consubstantial with time regained. In any case, frivolity continues alongside the danger of death. "Social amusements fill what may prove, if the Germans continue to advance, to be the last days of our Pompeii. And if the city is indeed doomed, that in itself will save it from frivolity" (III. p. 834).
87. "And then it had turned out that their two lives had each of them a parallel secret, which I had not suspected" (III. p. 879). The rapprochement between these two disappearances gives the narrator the opportunity to engage in a meditation on death, which will later be incorporated into the perspective of time regained. "Yet death appears to be obedient to certain laws" (III, p. 881); more precisely, accidental death, which, in its own way, combines chance and destiny, if not predestination (ibid.).
88. "But it is sometimes just at the moment when we think that everything is lost that the intimation arrives which may save us; one has knocked at all the doors which lead nowhere, and then one stumbles without knowing it on the only door through which one can enter—which one might have sought in vain for a hundred years—and it opens of its own accord" (III. p. 89H).
89. Note that this narrativized speculation is related loo (lie imparfait, the background tense according to Harald Weinrich. In contrast to the preterite, the (ense of occurrence, from the point of view of what in the narrative is put into relief (cf. above. p. 71). The meditation on time indeed constitutes the background against which the decision to write stands out. A new preterite of anecdotal occurrence is required in order to interrupt this meditation. "At this moment the Butler came in to tell me that the 198 Notes to Pages 144-48 first piece of music was finished, so that I could leave the library and go into the rooms where the party was taking place. And thereupon I remembered where I was" (III. p. 957).
90. "A minute freed from-the order of time has re-created in us, to feel it, the man freed from the order of time" (III, p. 906).
91. Speaking of this extratemporal being that the hero had been without knowing it in the episode of the maedalene, the narrator specifies, "And only this being had the power to perform that task which had always defeated the efforts of my memory and my intellect" (III. p. 904).
92. The narrator anticipates this role of mediator between the two valences of time regained, when he admits, "And I observed in passing that for the work of art which I now, though I had not yet reached a conscious resolution, felt myself ready to undertake, this distinctness of different events would entail very considerable difficulties" (III, p. 903). It should be noted, as Georges Poulet points out, that the fusion in time is also a fusion in space: "Always, when these resurrections took place, the distant scene engendered around the common sensation had for a moment grappled, like a wrestler, with the present scene" (III, p. 908).
93. The "universal language" (III, p. 941) into which impressions must be translated is also not unrelated to death. Like history for Thucydides, the work of art. for the narrator of Remembrance, may "make out of those who are no more, in their truest essence, a lasting acquisition for the minds of all mankind" (III, p. 941). Lasting? Under this ambition is hidden the relation to death: "Sorrows are servants, obscure and detested, against whom one struggles, beneath whose dominion one more and more completely falls, dire and dreadful servants whom it is impossible to replace and who by subterranean paths lead us towards truth and death. Happy are those who have first come face to face with truth, those for whom near though the one may be to the other, the hour of truth has struck before (he hour of death)!" (III. p. 94K).
94. I shall return in my ( inclusion to this visibility of "exlentiae/ed" time, which illuminates mortals by the light of itsWalhalla. Lacron, in the same sense, we also read, "now it was not merely what had become of the young men of my own youth but would one day become of those of that instant who impressed upon me with such force the sensation of Time" (III. p. 987). It is still a question of "the sensation of time having slipped away" (III. p. 1000) and of the alteration of beings as "an effect operative not so much upon a whole social stratum as within individuals—of Time" (III, p. 1010). This figuration of time, in the dance of death, is to be included in the "gallery of symbolic figures" (Jauss, pp. 152-66) which, throughout Remembrance, constitute the many figurations of invisible time: Habit, Sorrow. Jealousy. Forgetfulness, and now Age. This system of emblems, I would say makes visible to "the artist, Time,"
95. "Time, colourless and inapprehensible Time, so that I was almost able to see it and touch it, had materialised itself in this girl, moulding her into a masterpiece, while correspondingly, on me alas! it had merely done its work" (III, p. 1088).
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situated in the distorting perspective of time” (III, p. 965).

98. Shattuck points this out very nicely. The high point of Proust's work is not a happy moment but one of recognition (Proust's Binoculars, p. 37): "After the supreme rite of Proust's work is not a happy moment but one of recognition (Proust's Binoculars, p. 37): "After the supreme rite of recognition at the end, the provisional nature of life disappears in the discovery of the straight path of art” (ibid., p. 38).

99. "Since every impression is double and the one half which is sheathed in the object is prolonged in ourselves by another half which we alone can know, we speedily find means to neglect this second half, which is the one on which we ought to concentrate” (III, p. 927).

100. "In fact, both in one case and in the other, whether 1 was concerned with impressions like the one which I had received from the sight of the steeples of Martinville or with reminiscences like that of the unevenness of the two steps or the taste of the madeline, the task was to interpret the given sensations as signs of so many laws and ideas, by trying to think—that is to say, to draw forth from the shadow—what I had merely felt, by trying to convert it into its spiritual equivalent" (III, p. 912).

101. We shall return to this final phase of the alchemy of writing in the course of Part IV in my next volume, within the framework of my reflections on the way the work finds its completion in the act of reading.

102. "I had not gone in search of the two uneven paving-stones of the courtyard upon which I had stumbled. But it was precisely the fortuous and inevitable fashion in which this and the other sensations had been encountered that proved the trucent of the past which they brought back to life, of the images which they released, since we feel, with these sensations, the effort that they make to climb back towards the light, feel in ourselves the joy of rediscovering what is real” (III, p. 913).

103. The entire problematic of the trace, to be taken up again in volume 3, is contained here. "This book, more laborious to decipher than any other, is also the only one which has been dictated to us by reality, the only one of which the 'impression' has been printed in us by reality itself. When an idea—an idea of any? kind—is left in us by life, its material pattern, the outline of the impression that it made upon us, remains behind as the token of its necessary truth" (III, p. 914).

104 In this respect, artists no less than historians owe a debt to something that precedes them. This is another topic 1 shall take up in volume 3. But here is another passage indicative of it: "the essential, the only true book, though, in the ordinary sense of the word it does not have to be 'invented' by a great writer—for it exists already in each of us—has to be translated by him. The function and the (ask of a writer are those of a translator” (111, p. 926).

105. Meditating on the outcome in the person of Mademoiselle de Saint-Loup of the two "ways" along which the hero had taken so many walks and engaged in so many reveries, the narrator tells himself that his entire work will be made of all the "cross-sections” reuniting impressions, epochs, and sites; as many ways as cross-sections, as distances traversed.

106. The figuration corresponding to this embodied time is the repetition, at the beginning and the end of Remembrance, of the same memory of the church in Combray. Saint Hilaire: "it occurred to me suddenly that, if I still had the strength to accomplish my work, this afternoon—like certain days long ago at Combray which had influenced me—which in its brief compass had given me both the idea of my work and the fear of being unable to bring it to fruition, would certainly impress upon it that form of which as a child I had had a presentiment in the church at Combray but which ordinarily, throughout our lives, is invisible to us: the form of Time” (III, p. 1103). (To relate this final illumination, the narrator uses the preterite joined to the adverb "suddenly.") One last time the church at Combray restores proximity in the distance that, from the beginning of Remembrance, has marked the evocation of Combray-Time?!!—gained is, then, a repetition. "This notion of Time embodied, of years past but not separated from us, it was now my intention to emphasize as strongly as possible in my work. And at this very moment, in the house of the Prince de Guermantes, as though to strengthen me in my resolve, the noise of my parents' footsteps as they accompanied M. Swann to the door and the peal--resilient, ferruginous, interminable, fresh and shrill—of the bell on the garden gate which informed me that at last he had gone and that Mamma would presently come upstairs, these sounds rang again in my ears, yes. unmistakably I heard these very sounds, situated though they were in a remote past” (III, p. 1105).


CONCLUSION
Time and Narrative

VOLUME 3

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Translated by Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer

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2. Intuitive Time or Invisible Time? Husserl Confronts Kant
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This fourth part of *Time and Narrative* is aimed at as complete an explication as possible of the hypothesis that governs our inquiry, namely, that the effort of thinking which is at work in every narrative configuration is completed in a configuration of temporal experience. Following our schematism of the three-ibid mimetic relation between the order of narrative, the order of action, and the order of life, this power of refixuration corresponds to the third and last ‘moment of mimesis.

This fourth part consists of two sections. The first is aimed at presenting an aporetics of temporality as what stands over against this power of refixuration. This aporetics generalizes the affirmation made in passing, in the course of our reading of Augustine, that there has never been a phenomenology of temporality free of every aporia and that in principle there can never be one. This entry into the problem of refixuration by way of an aporetics of temporality calls for some justification. Others, desiring to attack directly what we might call the secondary narrativity of human experience, have legitimately approached the problem of refixuration by means of the resources of psychology, sociology, genetic anthropology, or the resources of an empirical inquiry aimed at detecting the influences of historical and cultural factors on everyday life, on self-knowledge and knowledge of others, and on individual and collective action. But, if it were to be something more than banal observations, such an inquiry would have required means of psycho-sociological inquiry and analysis that I do not possess. Aside from this incompetence, I would justify the order I follow in this volume by the philosophical consideration that actually motivated it. If the notion of temporal experience is to be worthy of its name, we must not confine ourselves to describing the implicitly temporal aspects of the remolding of behavior by narrativity. We need to be more radical and bring to light those experiences where time as such is thematized, something that cannot be done unless we introduce a third partner into the discussion between historiography and narratology, the phenomenology of time-consciousness. In fact, it is this consideration that has guided me ever since Part 1, where I preceded my study of Aristotle's *Poetics* by an interpretation of the Augustinian conception of time. From that moment on, the course of the analyses in this fourth part was determined. The problem of the refixuration of temporal experience can no longer be confined within the limits of a psycho-sociology of the influences of narrativity on human behavior. We must assume the much greater risks of a specifically philosophical discussion, whose stake is whether—and how—the narrative operation, taken in its full scope, offers a “solution”—not a speculative one, but a poetic one—to the aporias that seemed inseparable from the Augustinian analysis of time. In this way, the problem of the refixuration of time by narrative finds itself brought to the level of a broad confrontation between an aporetics of temporality and a poetics of narrativity.

This formulation makes sense only if, as a prior question, we do not confine ourselves to what we learn from Book XI of Augustine's *Confessions*, but try to verify our thesis of the aporicity in principle of the phenomenology of time in terms of two canonical examples, Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology of temporality. This is why an initial section will be entirely devoted to the aporetics of temporality. It is not that this aporetics must, as such, be assigned to one or the other of the phases of the mimesis of action (along with its temporal dimension). Such an aporetics is the work of a reflective and speculative form of thinking that, in fact, was developed without any regard for a specific theory of narrative. Only the reply of a poetics of narrative—as much historical as fictional—to the aporetics of time draws this aporetics into the gravitational space of the mimesis of action, and the moment when this mimesis crosses the ‘threshold between the conflation of time in narrativity and its religiosity in narrative. In this sense, it constitutes a use of the expression I deliberately introduced earlier, an cmv mlo the problem of refixuration. From this opening, as one says in playing chess, results the whole subsequent orientation of the problem of the refixuration of time by narrative. This determines the philosophical status of (his refixuration requires an examination of the creative resources by which narrative activity responds to and corresponds to the aporetics of temporality. The second section of this volume will be devoted to such an exploration.

The five chapters of section 1 focus upon the main difficulty that the aporetics of temporality will reveal, namely, the
irreducibility of one to the other, even the occultation of one by the other, of a purely phenomenological perspective on time and an opposed perspective that, to be brief. I will call the cosmo-logical one. My aim will be to discover what resources a poetics of narratime possesses for, if not resolving, at least making this aporia work for us. We

Introduction shall be guided by the dissymmetry that occurs between historical narrative and fictional narrative when we consider their referential implications, along with the truth-claim made by each of these two great narrative modes. Only historical narrative claims to refer to a "rei.i" past, that is, one that actually happened. Fiction, on the contrary, is characterized by a kind of referring and a truth claim close to those I explored in my Rule of Metaphor. This problem of relatedness to the real is unavoidable. History can no more forbid itself to inquire into its relationship to an actually occurring past than it can neglect considering, as was established in Part II of Time and Narrative, the relationship of explanation in history to narrative in narrative form. But if this problem is unavoidable, it may be reformulated in different terms than those pf refer-ence, which stem from a kind of investigation whose contours were established by Frege. The advantage of an approach that pairs history and fiction to confront the aporias of temporality is that it leads us to reformulate the classical problem of referring to a past that was "real" (as opposed to the "unreal" entities of fiction) in terms of refuguration, and not vice versa. This reformulation is not limited to a change in vocabulary, inasmuch as it marks the subordination of the epistemological dimension of reference to the hermncnu-tical dimension of refuguration. The question of the relation of history to the past no longer appears, then, on the same level of investigation as does the question of its relation to narrative, even when the epistemology of historical knowledge includes within its field the relation of explanation to eyewitness testimony, documents, and archives, and when it derives from (his relation Francois Simiand's well-known definition of history as knowledge in terms of traces. The question of the meaning of this definition is posed by a second-order kind of reflection. History as a form of inquiry stops with the document as a given, even when it raises to the rank of document traces of the past that were not nic;in(lo servo as the basis fora historical narrative. The invention of documents, therefore, is still an epistemological question. What is no longer an epi.sicinioi.gic.at question is the question about the meaning of the intention by which, in inventing documents (in the double sense of the word "invent"), history is conscious that it is related to events that "really" happened. The document becomes a trace for this consciousness, that is, as I shall make more explicit at the proper lime, il is both a remains and a sign of what was bill no longer i.s. It belongs to one form of hermcnculics to interpret the meaning of this ontological intention by which the historian, by taking a stand on documents, seeks to reach what was but no longer is. To put this question in more familiar terms, how are we to interpret history's claim, when it constructs a narrative, to reconstruct something from the past? What authorizes us to think of this construction as a reconstruction? It is by joining this question with that of the "unreality" of fictive entities that we hope to make progress simultaneously in the two problems of "reality" and "unreality" in narration. Let me immediately say that it is in terms of this framework that we shall examine the

Narrated Time mediation brought about by reading between the world of the text and the world of the reader, announced at the end of Part I. It is along this path that we shall seek in particular for the true parallel to be given, on the side of fiction, to what we call historical "reality." At this stage of reflection, the language of reference, still preserved in The Rule of Metaphor, will have been definitively surpassed. The hermeneutic of the "real" and the "unreal" goes beyond the framework assigned by analytic philosophy to the question of reference. The task of the following five chapters will be to reduce the gap between the respective ontological intentions of history and fiction in order to make sense of what, in volume 1, I was still calling the interweaving reference of history and fiction, an operation that I take to be a major stake, although not the drily one, in the refuguration of time by narrative. In my introduction to the second section of this volume I shall justify the strategy followed for bringing-the largest gap between the respective ontological intentions of the two great narrative modes into fusion in the concrete work of the refuguration of time. Here I will confine myself to indicating that it will be by interweaving the chapters devoted respectively to history (chapters 4 and 6) and to fiction (chapters 5 and 7) that step-by-step I shall construct the solution to the stated problem of interweaving reference (chapter X).

The final two chapters will be devoted lo a broadening of the problem Arising from a more intractable aporia than that of the discordance between the phenomenological and the cosmological perspectives on time, namely, the aporia of the oneness of time. Every phenomenology admits, along with Kant, that time is a collective singular, without XMaps really succeeding in giving a phenomenological interpretation of this axiom. So the question will be whether the problem, coming from Hegel, of a totalai/ation of history docs not respond, on (he side of narrative, to the aporia of the oneness of time. At this stage of our investigation, (lie term "history" will own noi only ivvounced "history," wlu-her in (lie mode of history or in thal of fiction. but also history as fluid: >aud undergone by human beings. With (his question, (he henuncni-hes applied lo the ouiological intention of historical consciousness will take on its fullest sc'o>ce. It will definitively surpass, while prolonging, our analysis of historical intentionality in Part II of this work. That analysis still had lo do will) the amis of historical "research" as a procedure for acquiring knowledge. The question of the totalai/ation of history has lo do with historical consciousness, in (he twofold sense of our consciousness of making history and our consciousness of belonging to history. The refuguration of time by narrative will not have reached its end until this question of the totalization of history, in the broad sense of the term, will have been joined to that of the refuguration of time brought about conjointly by historiography and fiction.

Rereading the analyses carried out in the three volumes of Time and Narrative leads me to express one final
reservation. Have we exhausted the aporetics of time by examining the conflict between the phenomenological and the cosmological perspectives on time, and with the complementary examination of phenomenological interpretations of the axiom of the oneness of time? Have we not on several occasions come close to another aporia of time, more deeply rooted than the preceding ones, without having made it the object of any direct treatment? And is not this aporia a sign pointing toward the internal and external limits of narrativity, which would not be recognized without a final confrontation between the aporetics of time and the poetics of narrative? I have added a conclusion in the form of a postscript dealing with this reservation.

Section I

The Aporetics of Temporality

I begin this last part by taking a position as regards the phenomenology of time, our third partner, along with historiography and fiction, in the three-way conversation concerning mimesis. We cannot avoid this requirement since our study rests on the thesis that narrative composition, taken in its broadest sense, constitutes a riposte to the aporetic character of speculation on time. This was not sufficiently established by the single example of Book XI of Augustine's Confessions. What is more, our concern to reap the benefits of the central argument of the initial part of Augustine's valuable insight—that is, the discordant-concordant structure of time—did not permit us to take into account the aporias that are the price of this discovery.

To underscore the aporias of the Augustinian conception of time, before turning to those that arise in some of his successors, is not to deny the greatness of his discovery. On the contrary, it is meant to indicate, in terms of an initial example, the striking fact about the theory of time that any progress obtained by the phenomenology of temporality has to pay for its advance in each instance by the ever higher price of an even greater aporicity. Husserl's phenomenology, which is the only one with good reason to claim the title of being a "pure" phenomenology, will more than verify this disconcerting law. Icidggs's hermicseuic phenomenology, despite its radical break with the internal consciousness of time, will not escape this rule either, but instead will add its own difficulties to those of its two illustrious predecessors.

The Time of the Soul and the Time of the World

The major failure of the Augustinian theory is that it is unsuccessful in substituting a psychological conception of time for a cosmological one, despite the undeniable progress this psychology represents in relation to any cosmology of time. The aporia lies precisely in the fact that while this psychology can legitimately be added to the cosmology, it is unable to replace cosmology, as well as in the further fact that neither concept, considered separately, proposes a satisfying solution to their unsolvable disagreement.

Augustine did not refute Aristotle's basic theory of the primacy of movement over time, although he did contribute a lasting solution to the problem Aristotle left in abeyance concerning the relation between the soul and time. Behind Aristotle stands an entire cosmological tradition, according to which time surrounds us, envelops us, and dominates us, without the soul having the power to produce it. I am convinced that the dialectic of intellio and distentio inimis is powerless to produce this imperious character of time and that, paradoxically, it helps conceal it.

Where Augustine fails is precisely where he attempts to derive from the distension of the mind alone the very principle of the extension and the measurement of time. We must, in this respect, pay homage to him for never having waivered in his conviction that measurement is a genuine property of time, as well as for refusing to lend any credence to what will later become Bergson's major doctrine in his Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, namely, that time becomes measurable through its strange and incomprehensible contamination by space. For Augustine, our division of time into days and years, as well as our ability to compare long and short syllables, familiar to the rhetoricians of antiquity, designate properties of time itself. Distenlio animis is the very possibility of so measuring time. Consequently, the refutation of the cosmological thesis is far from being a digression in Augustine's closely knit argument. Instead it constitutes one indispensable link in this argument. Yet this refutation is, from the start, misdirected. "I once heard a learned man say that time is nothing but the movement of the sun and the moon and the stars, but I did not agree." By this overly simple identification of time with the circular movement of the two principal heavenly bodies, Augustine overlooks Aristotle's infinitely more subtle thesis that, without
being movement itself, time is something that "has to do with movement" (τί τε κίνεσος). In so doing, he is forced to see in the distension of the mind the principle for the extension of time. But the arguments by which he thinks he succeeds in doing so do not hold up. The hypothesis that all movement—that of the sun, just like that of the potter's wheel or the human voice—may vary, hence accelerate, slow down, even stop altogether, without the intervals of time being altered in any way, is unthinkable, not only for a Greek, for whom sidereal movements are absolutely invariable, but for us today, even though we know that the movement of the earth around the sun is not absolutely regular and even though we must continually extend our search for the absolute clock. Even the corrections that science continues to make in defining the notion of a "day"—as a fixed unit for computing months and years—attests that the search for an absolutely regular movement remains the guiding idea for any measurement of time. This is why it is simply not true that a day would remain what we call a "day" if it were not measured by the movement of the sun.

It is true that Augustine was unable to abstain entirely from referring to movement in order to measure the intervals of time. But he tried to strip this reference of any constitutive role and to reduce it to a purely pragmatic function. As in Genesis, the stars are only lights in the sky that mark times, days, and years (Confessions, XI, 23:29). Of course, we cannot say when a movement begins and when it ends if we have not marked (notare) the place where a moving body starts from and the place where it arrives. However, Augustine notes, the question concerning "how much time is needed" for a body to complete its movement between two points cannot find a reply in the consideration of the movement itself. So the recourse to the "marks" that time borrows from movement leads nowhere. The lesson Augustine draws from this is that time is something other than movement. "Time, therefore, is not the movement of a body" (24:31). Aristotle would have come to the same conclusion, but this would have constituted no more than the negative side of his main argument, namely, that time has something to do with movement, although it is not movement. But Augustine was unable to perceive the other side of his own argument, having limited himself to refuting the less refined thesis, the one where time is purely and simply identified with the movement of the sun, moon, and stars.

As a result he was forced to make the impossible wager that the principle of their measurement could be found in expectation and memory. Hence, according to him, we have to say expectation is shortened when what we are waiting for approaches and memory is extended when what we remember recedes. In the same way, when I recite a poem, as I move along through the

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present, the past increases by the same amount as the future diminishes. We must ask therefore what increases and what diminishes, and what fixed unit allows us to compare these variable durations. Unfortunately, the problem of comparing successive durations is only pushed back one step. It is not clear what direct access we can have to these impressions that are assumed to remain in the mind, nor how they could provide the fixed measure of comparison that he has refused to accord to the movement of the stars.

Augustine's failure to derive the principle for the measurement of time from the distension of the mind alone invites us to approach the problem of time from the other side, from that of nature, the universe, the world—expressions that we are temporarily taking as synonymous, knowing that we will subsequently have to distinguish them, as we shall also do for their antonyms, which for the moment we are terming indifferently soul, mind, consciousness. We shall later show how important it is for a theory of narrative that both approaches to the problem of time remain open, by way of the mind as well as by way of the world. The aporia of temporality, to which the narrative operation replies in a variety of ways, lies precisely in the difficulty in holding on to both ends of this chain, the time of the soul and that of the world. This is why we must go to the very end of the impasse and admit that a psychological theory and a cosmological theory mutually occlude each other to the very extent they imply each other.

In order to make apparent the time of the world, which the Augustinian analysis fails to recognize, let us listen to Aristotle, and also hear, behind him, the echoes of more ancient words, words whose meaning the Stagirite himself did not master.

The three-stage argument leading to the Aristotelian definition of time in Book IV of (he Physics (219a34-35) needs to be followed through step by step. This argument holds that time is related to movement without being identical with it. In this, the treatise on time remains anchored in (lie Physics in such a way that the originality belonging to time does not elevate it to the level of a "principle," an honor reserved for change alone, which includes local movement. This concern not to tamper with the primacy of movement over time is evident in the very definition of nature at the beginning of Book II of the Physics: "nature is a principle [ἀρχή] or cause [ἀίτια] of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidentally" (192b21-23). The fact that time, nevertheless, is not movement (218b21 — 219a10) was stated by Aristotle before Augustine. Change (movement) is in every case in the thing that changes (moves), whereas time is everywhere in everything equally. Change can be rapid or slow, whereas time cannot include speed,
under the threat of having to be defined in terms of itself since speed implies time.

In return, the argument holding that time is not without movement, which destroys Augustine's attempt to found the measurement of time in the distension of the mind alone, deserves our attention. "Now we perceive movement [more accurately: in (hamd) perceiving movement] and time together . . . and not only that but also, when some time is thought to have passed, some movement also along with it seems to have taken place" (219a3-7).

This argument does not place particular stress on the mind's activity of perception and discrimination, or, more generally, on the subjective conditions of time-consciousness. The term that is stressed is "movement." If there is no perception of time without the perception of movement, there is no possible existence of time itself without that of movement. The conclusion to this first phase of the overall argument confirms this. "It is evident, then, that time is neither movement nor independent of movement" (219a2). This dependence of time with regard to change (movement) is a sort of primitive fact, and the task later will be to graft the distension of the soul in some way to this something that "belongs to movement." The central difficulty of the problem of time results from this. For we do not at first see how the distension of the soul will be able to be reconciled with a time that is defined essentially as something that "belongs to movement" (219a9-10).

The second phase in constructing the definition of time follows, namely, applying to time the relation of before and after, through the transfer of magnitude in general, passing by way of space and movement." In order to lay the groundwork for this argument, Aristotle first posits the analogical relation that holds between the three continuous entities: magnitude, movement, and time. On the one hand, "the movement goes with [or better, obeys, akolouthie/] the magnitude" (219a10), and on the other, the analogy extends from movement to time "for time and movement always correspond with each other" (219a7)." Now, what is continuity if not the possibility of dividing a magnitude an infinite number of times?" As for the relation between before and after, it consists in a relation of order resulting from a continuous division such as this. Thus the relation between before and after is in time only because it is in movement and it is in movement only because it is in magnitude. "Since then before and after hold in magnitude, they must also hold in movement, these corresponding to those. But also in time the distinction of before and after must hold, for time and movement always correspond with each other" (219a5-18). The second phase of the argument is completed. Time, we said above, has something to do with movement, but with what aspect of movement? With the before and after in movement. Whatever the difficulties in founding the before and after on a relation or order based on magnitude as such, and on the transfer by analogy from magnitude to movement and from movement to time, the point of the argument is not in doubt: succession, 15

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which is nothing other than the before and after in time, is not an absolutely primary relation. It proceeds by analogy from an ordering relation that is in the world before being in the soul." Once again we here come up against something irreducible. Whatever the mind contributes to the grasping of before and after—and we might add, whatever the mind constructs on this basis through its narrative activity—it finds succession in things before taking it up again in itself. The mind begins by submitting to succession and even suffering it, before constructing it.

The third phase of the Aristotelian definition of time is what is decisive for our purposes. It completes the relation between before and after by adding a numerical relation to it. And with the introduction of number the definition of time is complete: "For time is just this—number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after'" (219b). The argument, once again, rests on a feature of the perception of time, namely, the mind's ability to distinguish two end points and an interval. The soul, then, notes that there are two instants, and the intervals marked out by these instants can be counted. In a sense, the break formed by the instant, considered as an act of the intelligence, is decisive. "For what is bounded by the 'now' is thought to be time—we may assume this" (219a-29). But the privilege accorded movement is not weakened in any way by this. If the soul is necessary in order to determine an instant—more exactly, to distinguish and count two instants—and to compare intervals on the basis of a fixed unit, this perception of differences is founded on the perception of the continuities of magnitude and movement, and on the relation of order between the before and after, which "follows" from the order of derivation between the three analogous continua. Hence Aristotle can specify that what is important for the definition of time is not counted but countable numbers, and this is said about movement before being said about time." The result is that the Aristotelian definition of time—the "number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after'" (219b2)—does not contain an explicit reference to the soul, despite drawing upon, at each phase of the definition, the operations of perception, discrimination, and comparison, which can only be those of the soul.

Below we shall discuss at what cost the phenomenology of "time-consciousness" that is implicit, if not in the Aristotelian definition of time, at least in the argumentation that leads up to it, can be brought to light, without thereby simply tipping the balance from Aristotle back to Augustine again. In truth, in one of the subsidiary treatises appended to his definition of time, Aristotle is the first to grant that the question of deciding whether "if the soul did not exist time would exist or not is a question that may fairly be asked" (223a21-22). Is not a soul, or better an intelligence, necessary in order to count, and first of all to perceive, discriminate, and compare?" To understand Aristotle's refusal to include any noetic determination in the definition of time, we must follow to the very end the requirements whereby the phenomenology of time, suggested by such noetic activity of the soul, is
psychology is of blinding us to cosmology? This is the unsettling conclusion we are forced to draw despite our cosmology for psychology? Or must we say that cosmology is just as much in danger of blinding us to psychology as psychology is of blinding us to cosmology? This is the unsettling conclusion we are forced to draw despite our efforts to construct a phenomenology of time-consciousness, teaches that we do not produce time but that it surrounds us, envelops us, and overpowers us with its awesome strength. In this connection, how can we fail not to think of Anaximander's famous fragment on the power of time, where the alteration of generation and corruption is seen to be subject to the "arrangement of Time"? An echo of this word coming from antiquity can still be heard in Aristotle in some of the minor treatises that the redactor of the Physics joined to the major treatise on time. In two of these appended treatises, Aristotle asks what it means "to be in time" (220b32-222a9) and what things "are in time" (222bl6-223a15). He strives to interpret these expressions of everyday language in a sense that is compatible with his own definition. But we cannot say that he is completely successful in doing this. Certainly, he says, being in time means more than existing when time exists. It means "being in number." And being in number means being "contained" (periekhe-icii) by number, "as things in place are contained by place" (221a17). At first sight, this philosophical exegesis of everyday expressions does not go beyond the theoretical resources of the previous analysis. However the expression itself does go beyond the proposed exegesis. And what is at issue reappears, even more forcefully, a few lines farther on in the following form: "being contained by time," which seems to give time an independent existence, superior to the things that are contained "in" it (221a28). As if carried along by the power of the words themselves, Aristotle admits that we can say that "a thing, then, will be affected by time" (22la30) and he accepts the saying that "time wastes things away, that all things grow old through time, and that people forget owing to the lapse of time" (221a31-32).

Once again, he sets himself to solving the enigma. "For time is by its nature the cause rather of decay, since it is the number of change, and change removes what is" (22lb2). But does he succeed? It is strange that he returns to the same enigma a few pages later, under another heading: "it is the nature of all change to alter things from their former condition" (ekstatikori). In time all things come into being and pass away; for which reason some called it the wisest of all things, but the Pythagorean Paron called it the most stupid, because in it we also forget; and his was the truer view" (222bl6-20). In one sense, there is nothing mysterious in this. Indeed, it is necessary to do something for things to happen and develop. If nothing is done, things fall to pieces, and we then willingly attribute this destruction to time itself. All that is left of the enigma is a manner of speaking. "Still, time does not work even this change; but this sort of change too happens to occur in time" (222b25-26). But has this explanation removed time's sting? Only up to a point; for what docs it mean (o say (hat if an agent ceases to act, things fall apart? The philosopher may well deny that time as such is the cause of this decline, but immemorial wisdom seems to perceive a hidden collusion between change that destroys—forgetting, aging, death—and time that simply passes. The resistance of this immemorial wisdom to philosophical clarity should make us attentive to two "inconceivable" elements that undermine the entire Aristotelian analysis of time. The first thing difficult to conceive is the unstable and ambiguous status of time itself, caught between movement, of which it is an aspect, and the soul that discerns it. Even more difficult to conceive is movement itself, as Aristotle himself confesses in Book III of the Physics (20lb33). Does it not appear to be "something indefinite" (21blb24) with respect to the available meanings of Being and Nonbeing? And is it not in fact (indefinable, since it is neither power nor act? What do we understand when we characterize it as "the fulfillment of what is potentially, as such" (20la50))"? These aporias that conclude our brief incursion into the Aristotelian philosophy of time are not intended to serve as an indirect apology on behalf of Augustinian "psychology." I maintain, on the contrary, that Augustine did not refute Aristotle and that his psychology cannot be substituted for, but can only be added to, a cosmology. Invoking the aporias proper to Aristotle is intended to show that he does not hold fast against Augustine owing to the strength of his arguments alone, but rather as a result of the force of the aporias undercutting his own arguments. For, over and above the anchoring of time in movement established by his arguments, the aporias these arguments run into indicate something about the anchoring of movement itself in physis, whose mode of being escapes the argumentative mastery that is so magnificently displayed in Book IV of the Physics.

Does this descent into the abyss, spurning the phenomenology of temporality, offer the advantage of substituting cosmology for psychology? Or must we say that cosmology is just as much in danger of blinding us to psychology as psychology is of blinding us to cosmology? This is the unsettling conclusion we are forced to draw despite our
relinquish the task of the system-building approach.

If, indeed, the extension of physical time cannot be derived from the distension of the soul, the inverse derivation is just as impossible. What prevents it

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The Dispute between Augustine and Aristotle

is quite simply the conceptually unbridgeable gap between the notion of the "instant" in Aristotle's sense and that of the "present" as it is understood by Augustine. To be thinkable, the Aristotelian "instant" only requires that the mind make a break in the continuity of movement, insofar as the latter is countable. This break can be made anywhere. Any instant at all is equally worthy of being the present. The Augustinian present, however, as we can see today following Benvenciste, is any instant designated by a speaker as the "now" of his utterance. It does not matter which instant is chosen, the present is as singular and as determined as the utterance that contains it. This differential feature has two consequences for our own investigation. On the one hand, from an Aristotelian point of view, the breaks by means of which the mind is able to distinguish two "instants" are enough to determine a before and an after solely by reason of the orientation of movement from its cause to its effect. In this way, I can say that event A precedes event B and that event B follows event A, but I cannot for all this affirm that event A is past and event B future. On the other hand, from an Augustinian point of view, the future and the past exist only in relation to a present, that is, to an instant indicated by the utterance designating it. The past is before and the future after only with respect to this present possessing the relation of self-reference, attested to by the very act of uttering something. It follows from this Augustinian point of view (that the before-and-after—that is, the relation of succession—is foreign to the notions of present, past, and future, and hence to the dialectic of intention and distension that is grafted to these notions.

This is the great aporia of the problem of time—at least before Kant. This aporia lies entirely within the duality of the instant and the present. Later we shall say in what way the narrative operation both confirms this aporia and brings it to the sort of resolution that we term "poetic." It would be useless to search in the solutions Aristotle contributes to the aporias of the instant for an indication of a reconciliation between the cosmological instant and the lived present. For Aristotle, these solutions remain within the sphere of a thought shaped by the definition of time as something having to do with movement. If they underscore the relative autonomy of time with respect to movement, they never lead to its independence.

The fact that the instant, the "now," constitutes a basic component of the Aristotelian theory of time is clearly stated in the passage cited above. "For what is bounded by the 'now' is thought to be time—we may assume this." For it is indeed the "now," the instant, that is the end of the before and the beginning of the after. And it is the interval between the two instants that is measurable and countable. In this respect, the notion of "instant" is perfectly assimilable to the definition of time as dependent on movement as regards its substratum. It expresses a potential break in the continuity that time shares with movement and with magnitude in virtue of the analogy between the three continua.

The autonomy of time, with respect to its essence, as this is confirmed by f')

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the aporias of the instant, never calls this basic dependence into question, and this is echoed in the minor appended treatises dealing with the instant.

How is it possible, we ask, that the instant is always in a sense the same and in a sense always other (219bl2-22)? The solution draws upon the analogy between the three continua: time, movement, and magnitude. Thanks to this analogy, the fate of the instant "corresponds to" that of what "is carried along." This remains identical in its being, although it "is different in definition." In this way, Coriscus is the same insofar as carried, but different when he is in the Lyceum and when he is in the marketplace. "And the body which is carried along is different, in so far as it is at one time here and another there. But the 'now' corresponds to the body that is carried along, as time corresponds to the motion" (219b22-23). The aporia thus contains a sophism only accidentally. Nevertheless, the price to be paid is the absence of any reflection on the features that distinguish the instant from a point.22

However Aristotle's meditation on movement, as an act of that which exists potentially, does lead to an apprehension of the "instant" that, without announcing the Augustinian present, does introduce a certain notion of the present related to the becoming that constitutes the actualization of potentiality. A certain "primacy of the present instant glimpsed in that of the moving body in act" does appear to make the difference between the dynamism of the "now" and the purely static character of the point, obliging us to speak of the present instant and, by implication, of the past and the future.23 We shall see more of this below.

The second aporia concerning the instant raises an analogous problem. In what sense can we say that time "is both made continuous by the 'now' and divided at it"? (220a5)? The answer, according to Aristotle, requires nothing more than the simple relation of before and after—any break in a continuum distinguishes and unites. Thus the twofold function of the instant as break and as connection owes nothing to the experience of the present and derives wholly from the definition of the continuum by its endless divisibility. Nevertheless, Aristotle was not unaware of (he difficulty of maintaining here once again the correspondence between magnitude, movement, and time. Move men can slip, but time cannot. In (his the insurmount "corresponds" to (he point, but there is only a kind (w.v.) of correspondence (220ulO). Indeed, il is only as potential that the instant divides. Bui what is a potential division that can never move into act? It is only when we consider lime as a line, at rest by definition, that the possibility of dividing time becomes conceivable. There must therefore be something specific
in the division of lime by the instant; even if once, in its power to assure the continuity of time. In a perspective such as Aristotle's, where the main accent is placed on the dependence of time with respect to movement, the unifying power of the instant rests on a dynamic unity of the body in motion that, although passing through a number of fixed points, remains one and the same moving body. But the dynamic instant that corresponds to the moving body's unity of movement calls for a specific

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cally temporal analysis that goes beyond the simple analogy by virtue of which the instant in some way corresponds to a point. Is it not here that Augustine's analysis comes to the aid of Aristotle's? Must we not seek in the threefold present the principle of specifically temporal continuity and discontinuity? In fact, the terms "present," "past," and "future" are not foreign to Aristotle's vocabulary, but he wants to see in them just a determination of the instant and of the relation of before and after. The present, for him, is only an instant that is situated. This is the sort of present instant that the expressions used in ordinary language, as discussed in chapter 13 of Book IV of the Physics, refer to. These expressions can be easily reduced to the logical structure of the argument that claims to resolve the aporias of the instant. The difference between the undifferentiated instant and the instant as situated or present is, for Aristotle, of no more relevance, in this respect, than the reference of time to the soul. Just as only an enumerated time really requires a soul to distinguish and actually to count the instants, so, too, only a determined instant can be designated as a present one. The same reasoning, which recognizes only what is countable in movement, which can exist without the soul, also recognizes only the undifferentiated instant, that is, precisely insofar as its "before and after" is countable (219b26-28).

Nothing, therefore, in Aristotle requires a dialectic between the instant and the present, unless it is the difficulty, which he admits, of maintaining to the end the correspondence between the instant and the point, in its twofold function of division and unification. It is on this very difficulty that an Augustinian style of analysis of the threefold present could be grafted. Indeed, for such an analysis only a present heavy with the recent past and the near future can unify the past and the future, which at the same time it distinguishes. For Aristotle, however, to distinguish the present from the instant and the past-future relation from the relation of before and after would be to threaten the dependence of time on movement, the single, ultimate principle of physics.

It is in this sense that we were able to say that there is no conceivable transition between an Augustinian conception and an Aristotelian one. We must make a jump if we are to pass from a conception in which the present instant is simply a variant, in ordinary language, of the "now," which belongs wholly to the Physics, (a conception in which the present of attention refers first and foremost to the past of memory and the future of expectation. Not only must we make a jump to pass from one perspective on time to the other, it seems as though each is doomed to occlude the other."

And yet the difficulties peculiar to each perspective demand that these two perspectives be reconciled. In this respect, the conclusion to be drawn from our confrontation between Augustine and Aristotle is clear: the problem of time cannot be attacked from a single side only, whether of the soul or of movement. The distension of the soul alone cannot produce the extension of time; the dynamism of movement alone cannot generate the dialectic of the threefold present.

Narrative Poetics

Our ambition will be to show below how the poetics of narrative contributes to joining what speculation separates. Our narrative poetics needs the complicity as well as the contrast between internal time-consciousness and objective succession, making all the more urgent the search for narrative mediations between the discordant concordance of phenomenological time and the simple succession of physical time.

Intuitive Time or Invisible Time? Husserl Confronts Kant

The confrontation between the time of the soul in Augustine and the Jtrne of physics in Aristotle has not exhausted the whole aporetics of time. All the difficulties inherent in the Augustinian conception of time have not yet been brought to light. Our interpretation of Book XI of the Confessions has continually moved back and forth between bursts of insight and shadows of uncertainty. At times, Augustine exclaims, "I believe! At other times he asks, Did I actually just think I saw something? Do I really understand what I think I know? Is there some fundamental reason why time-consciousness cannot go beyond this oscillation between certainty and doubt? If I have chosen to question Husserl at this stage of our inquiry into the aporetics of time, it is because of the principal ambition that appears to me to characterize his phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, namely, making time itself appear by means of an appropriate method and, in this way, freeing phenomenology of every aporia. This ambition of making time as such appear, however, runs up against the essentially Kantian thesis of the invisibility of lime that, in the preceding chapter, appeared under the name of physical lime and Ilia! returns in (he Critique of Care Reason under the name of objective lime, that is, the lime
implied in the determination of objects. For Kant, objective time lies new figure of physical time in a transcendental philosophy never appears as such but always remains a presupposition.

The Introduction to Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, along with subsections 1 and 2, clearly states his ambition of submitting the appearance of time as such to a direct description. Time-consciousness must thus be understood in the sense of "internal" (innere) consciousness. And in this single adjective are conjoined the discovery and the aporia of the entire phenomenology of time-consciousness. The function of excluding (Aus-)

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*schaltung* objective time is to produce this internal consciousness, which will be directly a time-consciousness (the German language clearly expresses, by means of the compound noun, *Zeithabewusstsein*, the absence of any gap between consciousness and time). But what is actually excluded from the field of appearing under the name of objective time? Precisely world time, which Kant showed is a presupposition of any determination of an object. If the exclusion of objective time is pushed by Husserl! to the very heart of psychology as the science of psychic objects, this is in order to lay bare time and duration (this term being taken in the sense of interval, or lapse of time), appearing as such. Far from limiting himself to collecting first impressions, ordinary experience, Husserl is critical of the testimony they

He may well call datum "the immanent time of the flow of consciousness" (p. 23), but this datum by no means constitutes anything immediate; rather, the immediate is not given immediately. Instead, what is immediate must be conquered at great cost, at the cost of suspending "all transcendent presuppositions concerning existents" (p. 22). Is Husserl capable of paying this price? We can answer this question only when we come to the end of Section 3 of the *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, which calls for an ultimate radicalization of the method of exclusion. It may be observed, nevertheless, that the phenomenologist cannot avoid admitting, at least at the start of his undertaking, a certain homonymy between the "How of consciousness" and the "Objective (low of time"; or, again, between the "one after the other" of immanent time and the succession of objective time; or, yet again, between the continuum of the one and that of the other, as well as between their respective multiplicities. In what follows, we shall continually encounter comparable homonyms, as though the analysis of immanent time could not be constituted without repeated borrowings from the objective time that has been excluded.

The necessity for these borrowings can be understood if we consider that Husserl's aim is nothing less than to work out a "hyletics" of consciousness. If (his hyletics is not to be condemned (o silence, among phenomenological data must be counted "the apprehension (Auffindung) of time, the lived experiences in which the temporal in the Objective sense appears" (p. 24). These apprehensions are what allows discourse about (he hylcetic, the supreme wager of the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. Concerning these apprehensions, Husserl holds that they express features of order in sensed time and that they serve as a basis for the constitution of objective time itself. We may wonder, however, whether, in order to bring the hylcetic out of silence, these apprehensions do not have to borrow from the determinations of objective time that are known before its exclusion. "Would we use the expression "sensed at the same time" if we knew nothing of objective simultaneity, of temporal distance, if we knew nothing of the objective equality between intervals of time?"

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This question becomes particularly pressing when we consider the laws that, according to Husserl, govern the sensed temporal series. He in no way doubts that "a priori truths" (p. 29) belong to these apprehensions, which are themselves inherent in sensed time. And from these a priori truths derives the a priori of time, namely, "(1) that the fixed temporal order is that of an infinite, two-dimensional series; (2) that two different times can never be conjoint; (3) that their relation is a non-simultaneous one; (4) that there is transitivity, that to every time belongs an earlier and a later, etc. So much for the general introduction" (ibid.). Husserl's wager, therefore, is that the temporal a priori is capable of being clarified "by investigating time-consciousness, by bringing its essential constitution to light and, possibly, by setting forth the content of apprehension and act-characters pertaining specifically to time, to which content and characters the a priori laws of time are essentially due" (ibid., his emphasis).

The fact that the perception of duration never ceases to presuppose the duration of perception did not seem to trouble Husserl any more than did the general condition for all phenomenology, including that of perception; namely, that, without some prior familiarity with the objective world, the reduction of this world would itself lose its very basis. What is in question here is the general sense of this bracketing. It does not suppress anything at all; it is confined to the redirecting of our gaze, without losing sight of what is bracketed. The conversion to immanence, in (his sense, consists in a change of sign, as is stated in *Ideen*, I, §32. This change of sign does not exclude our using the same words—unity of sound, apprehension, etc.—when our gaze moves from the sound that continues to its "how." Nevertheless, the difficulty is compounded in the case of internal time-consciousness inasmuch as phenomenology performs its reduction on a perception that has already been reduced from the perceived to the sensed, in order to dig ever deeper into the innermost layers of a hylcatics from which the yoke of the noetic has been removed. And yet we see no other way to develop a hylcetic investigation except by way of such a reduction within the reduction. The reverse side of this strategy, however, is the proliferation of homonymies, ambiguities in terminology, maintained by the persistence of the problematic of the perceived object under the erasure of intentionality *ml extra*. Whence the paradox of an enterprise based upon the very experience it subverts.
This equivocal character seems to be the result not of an out-and-out failure of the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness but of the aporias that are the ever greater price to pay for an increasingly more refined phenomenological analysis.

Keeping these perplexities in mind, we now turn to the two great discoveries of the Husserlian phenomenology of time, the description of the phenomenon of retention and its symmetrical counterpart, protention, and the distinction between retention (or primary remembrance) and recollection (or secondary remembrance).

In order to begin his analysis of retention, Husserl provides himself with the support of the perception of an object that is as insignificant as possible, a sound—hence, something that can be designated by an identical name and that can be held to be actually the same: a sound, a sound.” This is something, therefore, that Husserl would like to consider not as a perceived object, placed before me, but as a sensed object. By reason of its temporal nature, the sound is no more than its own occurrence, its own succession, its own continuation, its own cessation. In this respect, the Augustinian example of reciting a verse of the hymn Deus creator omnium, with its eight syllables alternating between long and short, would present, if we understand Husserl correctly, an object too complex to be held within the immanent sphere. The same thing can be said, with regard to Husserl himself, about the example of a melody, which he wastes no time in setting outside the scope of the analysis. To this minimal object—a sound that continues—Husserl gives the strange name Zeitobjekt, which Gerard Granel correctly translates as "tempo-object" in order to stress its unusual character.

So the situation is as follows. On the one hand, objective time is assumed to have undergone reduction and time itself is to appear as lived experience; on the other hand, if the discourse on the hylactic is not to be reduced to silence, the support of something perceived is necessary. The third section will say, whether, in order to go to the very end of this process of exclusion, the residual objective side of the tempo-object has to be bracketed. Until then, it is the tempo-object as a reduced object that provides its telos to the investigation. And it is this tempo-object that indicates what has to be constituted in the sphere of pure immanence, namely, duration, in the sense of the continuation of the same throughout the succession of other phases. We may deplore the ambiguity of this strange entity, yet we owe it an analysis of time that is straightway an analysis of duration in the sense of continuation, of "continuance considered as such" (Verharrzen tils notches) (p. 43) and not simply of succession.

Husserl's discovery here is (hal (he "now" is not contracted into a point-like instant but includes a transverse or longitudinal intensionality (in order to contrast it with the transcendent intentionality (hat, in perception, places the accent on the unity of the object), by reason of which it is at once itself and the retention of the tonal phase that has "just" (sochen) passed, as well as (he protention of the imminent phase. It is this discovery that allows him to do away with any kind of synthetic function (even imagination, according to Brentano) added to a manifold. The "one after the other," which, as we shall see below, is formulated in Kant, is of course essential for the appearing of tempo-objects. By continuance, however, we arc to understand the unity of duration (Dauereinheit) of the sound, assumed to be reduced to-the status of a \ pure hylactic datum (beginning of §8). "It begins and stops, and the whole Husserl Confronts Kant unity of its duration, the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends, 'proceeds' to the end in the ever more distant past" (p. 44). There can be no doubt—the problem is that of duration as such. And retention, merely mentioned here, is the name of the solution that is sought. Hereafter, the art of phenomenological description resides in shifting attention from the sound that endures to the mode of its continuance. Once again, the attempt would be in vain if the pure hylactic datum were amorphous and ineffable. In fact, I can call the consciousness of the sound at its beginning "now," can speak of "a continuity of phases as 'before' [vorhin]," and can speak of the whole duration "as an 'expired duration'" (als abgelaufene Dauer) (ibid.). If the hylactic is not to remain mute, we must take as a base, as does Augustine whenever he is combating the skeptics, the comprehension and communication of ordinary language, hence the received sense of words such as "begin," "continue," "end," and "remain," as well as the semantics of the verb tenses and the innumerable adverbs and conjunctions of time ("still," "as long as," "now," "before," "after," "during," and so forth). Unfortunately, Husserl docs not stop to consider the irreducibly metaphorical character of the most important terms upon which his description is based: "flow" (Fluss), "phase," "expire" (ablaufen), "proceed" (ricken), "sink back" (zurucksinken), "interval" (Strecke), and in particular the pair "living-dead" applied as oppositional terms to the "productive point of the now" (p. 45) and to the expired duration, once it has sunk back into emptiness. The very term "retention" is metaphorical in that it signifies holding fast: "In this sinking back, I still 'hold' [halten] it fast, have it in a 'retention,' and as long as the retention persists the sound has its own temporality. It is the same and its duration is the same" (p. 44). Despite Husserl's silence on this point, we can perfectly well admit, as concerns the rich vocabulary applied to the very mode of duration, that ordinary language offers unsuspected resources for hylactic analysis, for the simple reason that people have never been limited to speaking only about objects but have always paid some attention, even if marginal and confused, to the modification of the appearing of objects while they are changing. Words are not always lacking. And when literal terms are missing, metaphor serves as a relay station, bringing with it the resources of semantic innovation. In this way, language offers apt metaphors for designating continuance in expiring duration. The very word "retention" is an unexcelled example of (he relevance of ordinary language in its metaphorical usage.

This mixture of boldness and timidity in the process of excluding calls for an appropriate discussion, which we shall pursue in our detour by way of Kant. The homonymics and the ambiguities it tolerates—and perhaps even requires—are the price to be paid for the inestimable discovery of retention. Indeed, this discovery proceeds from a reflection on
In addition, the vocabulary Husserl uses to describe retention is no less inadequate than the diagram, which we should look to mediation it performs between the instant and the duration. The feature that this otherness presents, which is discussed at length in §9, concerns the twofold phenomenon of the diminishing clarity of the perception of expired phases and the fading or increasing piling up of the retained contents. "As the temporal Object moves into the past, it is drawn together on itself and thereby also becomes obscure" (p. 47). But what Husserl wants at all cost to preserve is the identity in the phenomenon of passing away, of being drawn together, and of becoming obscure. The otherness characteristic of the change that affects the object in its mode of passing away is not a difference that excludes identity. It is an absolutely specific kind of alteration. Husserl's improbable wager is to have sought in the "now" a particular type of intentional unity that is not directed toward a transcendent correlate but toward the now that has "just" expired. The entire advantage of this "now" is that it retains the now in such a way as to engender out of the now-point of the phase presently passing away what Granel calls "the big now" (Lc sens du temps, p. 55) of the sound in its whole duration.

It is this longitudinal and nonobjectifying intentional unity that secures the very continuity of the duration and preserves the same in the other. Even if it is true that I could not become aware of this longitudinal intentional unity, generating continuity, without the guideline of some unitary object, it is indeed this intentional unity, and not the objectifying intentional unity surreptitiously introduced in hylactic constitution, that ensures the continuation of the now-point in the extended present of the unitary duration. If this were not the case, retention would not constitute a specific phenomenon worthy of analysis. Retention is precisely what holds together the now-point (leir. /ri>tilik) and the series of retentions that are connected to it. In relation to the now-point, "the Object in its mode of appearing" is always other. The function of retent ion is to as-1abish the ideality of the now-point and the immanent non-point-like object. And retention poses a challenge to the very logic of the same and (lie other; this challenge is time, "lively temporal being 'appears' in one or another continually changing mode of running-off, and (lie 'object in the mode of running-off' is in this change always something other, even (hough we still say that the Object anil every point of its lime and this time itself are one and the same" (I'ltenoincuiov'v <x> Internal r'iviw-(lonsf/insinxx. p. '17). The paradox is not only in language—"even though we still say..." The paradox is broader in the double sense that it is henceforth necessary to ascribe it to intentional-1ially itself, depending on whether it designates the relation of consciousness to "what appears in its modal setting" or whether it designates the relation o what appears as such, the transcendent perceptual object (pp. 47-48).

This longitudinal intentional unity makes the swallowing up of the serial aspect

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of the succession of nows, which Husserl calls "phases" (or "points"), in the continuity of the duration. We do know one thing about this longitudinal intentional unity. "With regard to the running-off phenomenon, we know that it is a continuity of constant transformations which form an inseparable unity, not securable into parts which could be by themselves nor divisible into phases, points of the continuity, which could be by themselves" (p. 48). What gets emphasized is the continuity of the whole or the totality of the continuous, which the term duration (Dauer) itself designates. That something persists in change—this is what enduring means. The identity that results from this is therefore no longer a logical identity but precisely that of a temporal totality.

The diagram included in §10 is intended only to help us visualize by means of a linear representation the synthesis of the otherness characteristic of simple succession and the identity of the continuance resulting from retention. What is important in this diagram is not that the advance in time is illustrated by a line (OE) but that to this line—the only one Kant considers—must be added the diagonal line OE', which represents the movement "downward into the depths of the past," and especially the vertical line EE', which, in each point of the duration, joins the series of present instants to the downward movement. This vertical line represents the fusion of the present with its horizon of the past in the continuity of the phases. No line in itself represents retention; only the whole formed by these three lines presents a visual representation of retention. Husserl can thus state at the end of §10, "The figure thus provides a complete picture of the double continuity of modes of running-off" (p. 50). The major drawback of this diagram is that it claims to give a linear representation of a nonlinear constitution. What is more, there is no way to draw the line of the advance of time while, simultaneously, presenting the successive nature of lime and lhe position of this every point of time on the line. To be sure, the diagram does enrich lhe linear representation by adding to it the slanted line of sinking down and the vertical line of the depth of each instant. In this way, the diagram as a whole, by completing the schema of succession, undercuts lhe privilege and the monopoly of succession in the figuration of phenomenological time. It remains true, however, that, by depicting a series of limitations, the diagram fails to provide a figure of the retentional implication of source-points. In short, it fails lo picture the identity of what is far away and what lies deep, through which lhe instants lhal have become other are included in a unique way in the thickness of the present instant. In truth, there is no adequate diagram of retention or of the mediation it performs between the instant and the duration."

In addition, the vocabulary Husserl uses to describe retention is no less inadequate than the diagram, which we should...
perhaps quickly put out of our minds. Husserl, in fact, attempts to characterize retention in relation to the originary impression by use of the term "modification." The choice of this term is meant to indicate that the privileged status of the originary character of each new now extends to the series of instants that it retains in its depth despite their moving away. It follows that the line of difference is no longer to be drawn between the now-point and all that has already run off and expired, but between the recent present and the past properly speaking. This will have its full impact when the distinction between retention and recollection is made, which is the necessary counterpart to the continuity between initial impression and retentional modification. But even now it can be asserted that the present and the recent past mutually belong to each other, and that retention is an enlarged present that ensures not only the continuity of time but the progressively attenuated diffusion of the intuitive character of the source-point to all that the present instant retains in itself or under itself. The present is called a source-point (Quellpunkt) precisely because what runs off from it "still" belongs to it. Beginning expresses in its own way the adhering of the "just past" to consciousness of the present. The notions of negation, at least in the constitution of primary remembrance.” The same thing is true of the adverb "still." Its use expresses in its own way the adhering of the "just past" to consciousness of the present. The notions of retention and intentional modification mean the same thing. Primary remembrance is a positive modification of the impression, not something different from it. In contrast to the representation of the past by images, primary remembrance shares with the living present the privilege of the originary, although in a continually weakening mode. "The intuition of the past itself cannot be a symbolization [Verbildlichung], it is an originary consciousness" (p. 53).

This does not exclude the fact that if in our thinking we stop the retentional (low, and if we isolate the present, the past and the present appear to exclude each other. It is then legitimate to say that the past is no longer and that "past" and "now" exclude each other. "Something past and something now can indeed be identically the same but only because it has endured between the past and now" (p. 57). This passage from "was" to "is no longer," and the way in which one overlaps the other, expresses the twofold meaning of the present, on the one hand as source-point, as initiating a retentional continuity, and on the other hand as a limit-point, abstracted from the infinite division of the temporal continuum. The theory of retention contributes to showing that the "no longer" proceeds from (he "was" and not (he contrary, and that modification precedes difference. The instant, considered apart from its power to begin a retentional series, is merely (he result of abstracting from the
continuity of this process."

The distinction between primary remembrance and secondary remembrance, also called recollection (Wiederinnerung), is the second properly phenomenological advance of the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. This distinction is the counterpart required by the essential characterization of retention, namely, the adhering of the retained past to the now-point within a present that continues even while fading away. All that we understand by memory is not contained in this basic experience of retention. To speak in Augustinian terms, the present of the past means something other than the "just passed" past. What about that past that can no longer be described as the comet's tail of the present—that is, all our memories that no longer have a foothold, so to speak, in the present?

To resolve the problem, Husserl once again gives a paradigmatic example

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that, without having the bare-bones simplicity of the single continuing sound, presents, at first sight anyway, an extreme simplicity. We remember a melody that we have heard recently (jüngst) at a concert. This example is simple in the sense that, since the event recalled is recent, our memory aims to do no more than to reproduce a tempo-object. By this, Husserl no doubt thinks, all the complications connected to reconstructing the past, as would be the case for the historical past or even for far distant memories, are avoided. The example, however, is not entirely simple, since this time it concerns not a single sound but a melody that we can go over in our imagination by following the order of the first sound, then the second, and so on. No doubt, Husserl thought that his analysis of retention, applied to a single sound, could be transposed without major changes to the case of a melody, even though the composition of the latter was not taken into consideration in the discussion but only its manner of connecting up with the now-point. In this way, he allows himself the possibility of starting directly from the case of melody in this new stage of his description in order to focus attention on another feature of such a melody, the fact that such a melody is no longer "produced" but "reproduced," no longer presented (in the sense of the extended present) but "re-presented" (Reprasentation or Vergegenwärtigung). The presumed simplicity of the imagined example therefore concerns the "re-" (wieder) implied in the expression "re-collection" and in other related expressions that we shall come to below, in particular that of "re-petition" (Wiederholung), which will occupy an important place in the Heideggerian analysis, and concerning which I shall later show its importance for a theory of narrated time. This "re-" is thus described as a phenomenon of term-by-term "correspondence" in which, by hypothesis, difference lies not in the content—it is the same melody produced and then reproduced—but in the mode of accomplishment. The difference then falls between the melody perceived and (he melody quasi-perceived, between hearing and quasi-hearing. This difference signifies that corresponding to the now-point is a quasi-present which, outside of its status "as if," presents the same features of retention and protention, hence the same identity between the now-point and its retentional train. The choice of a simplified example—the same melody re-collected—has no other purpose than to permit this transfer into the order of "as if" of this continuity between impressional consciousness and retentional consciousness, and all of the analyses relating to it. The result is that any moment in the series of present instants can be re-presented in imagination as a source-point in the mode of "as if." This quasi-source-present will therefore possess a temporal halo (Zeithof) that will make it in each case the center of perspective for its own retentions and protensions. (Below, I shall show that this phenomenon is the basis of historical consciousness, for which every past that is retained can be set up as a quasi-present endowed with its own retrospections and anticipations, some of which belong to the [retained] past of the actual present.)

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The first implication of the analysis of secondary remembrance is to reinforce, by contrast, the continuity, within a broadened perception, between retention and impression, at the expense of the difference between the now-point and the recent past. This struggle between the threat of rupture contained in the distinction, opposition, difference, and continuity between retention and impression is found in the earliest version of this subsection, dating from 1905. The meaning of this struggle is clear. If the difference were not included in the continuity, there would be no temporal constitution, properly speaking. The continuous passage from perception to nonperception (in the strict sense of these terms) is temporal constitution, and this continuous passage is the work of the apprehensions, which we said above belonged to the same stratum as the hylestic data. The oneness of the continuum is so essential • to grasping tempo-objects that it can be said that the true "now" of a melody comes only when the final note has sounded. It is then the ideal limit of the; "continuum of gradations" constituting the tempo-object taken as a whole. In this sense, the differences that Husserl calls the differences of time (die Un-terschiede der Zeit, p. 62) are themselves constituted in and through the continuity unfolded by tempo-objects in a lapse of time. There is no better way to stress the primacy of continuity with respect to difference, without which there would be no sense in speaking of either tempo-object or lapse of time. It is precisely this continuous passage from the present to the past that is missing in the global opposition between
presentation and representation. The "as if" is in no way assimilated to the continuous passage constituting presentation through the modification of the present into the recent past."

Thus the before and the after must be constituted in primary remembrance, that is, in broadened perception. The "quasi" character of re-presentation can only reproduce its sense but cannot produce it in an original manner. The union of impression and retention alone, prior to any "quasi," holds the key for what Husserl, challenging Aristotle and Kant, calls "the temporally creative acts of the now and the past" (der zeitschaffende Jetztakt und Vergangen-heitsakt) (p. 64). Here we are indeed at the heart of the constitution of internal time-consciousness.

This primacy of retention finds further confirmation in the unbridgeable aspect of the break that separates representation from presentation. Only the latter is an original self-giving act. "Not to be self-giving is precisely the essence of phantasy" (p. 68). The "once again" has nothing in common with the "still." What might mask this phenomenological difference is that major feature of retentional modification that, in fact, transforms the original or reproduced "now" into a past. But the continuous fading-away characteristic of retention must not be confused with the passage from perception to imagination that constitutes a discontinuous difference. Nor is the decreasing clarity of representation to be confused with the progressive fading-away of primary remembrance. These are two different types of lack of clarity and they must not be mistaken for each other (§21). It is the deep-rooted prejudice of the point-like present that continually gives rise to the illusion that the extension of the present is the work of the imagination. The gradual fading away of the present in retention is never the equivalent of a phantasy. The phenomenological gap is unbridgeable.

Is this to say that recollection is called upon only to reinforce the primacy of retention in the constitution of time? It is not inconsequential that I can represent to myself an earlier lived experience. Our freedom of representation is not a negligible component in the constitution of time; representation alone, according to Kant, can be compared to Selbststaffektion. Recollection, with its free mobility and its power of recapitulation, provides the stepping back of free reflection. Reproduction then becomes "a free running-through" (Durchlauf) that can give the representation of the past a variable tempo, articulation, and clarity. It is the deep-rooted prejudice of the point-like present that continually gives rise to the illusion that the extension of the present is the work of the imagination. The gradual fading away of the present in retention is never the equivalent of a phantasy. The phenomenological gap is unbridgeable.

This faithfulness must be that of an adequate correspondence between a present now and a past one. This new problematic is opened up by the distinction between imagination, and recollection. This distinction had to be bracketed in the earlier analyses, which were centered on the difference between the retained past and the represented past. We even, unconcernedly, took as synonymous "represented" and "imagined," as mentioned above. However, this question arises "How does the reproduced now come to represent something past?" but in another sense of the word "represent" that corresponds to what today we would call a truth claim. What is important is no longer the difference between recollection and retention but the relation to the past that passes through this difference. Recollection must now be distinguished from imagination by the positional value (Setzung) attached to recollection but absent from imagination. In truth, the notion of the coincidence between the reproduced past and the retained past foreshadows that of the positing of the reproduced now. However the identity of the same content, despite the difference between "once again" and "still," involved more than the
intention directed at the current now that makes remembrance represent this content, in the sense that it posits it as having been. It is not enough to say that the flow of representations is constituted in just the same way as the flow of retentions, with the same play of modifications, retentions, and pretentious. We must arrive at the idea of a "second intentionality" (p. 75) that makes it a representation of: second, in the sense that it is the equivalent of a replica (Gegenbild) of the transverse intentionality constituting retentions and generating the tempo-object. In its form of a flow of lived experience, recollection does present the same features of retentional intentionality as docs primary resemblance. In addition, it intentionally aims at this primary intentionality. This intentional reduplication of the intentionality characteristic of retention ensures the integration of recollection into the constitution of internal time-consciousness, which might have been lost from sight as a result of our concern with distinguishing recollection from retention. Recollection is not only a present "as if"; it intends the present and, in this way, posits it as having been. (Like the operation of coinciding, the operation of positing is essential to the understanding of the historical past, something we shall return to again below.)

To complete the insertion of recollection into the unity of the current of lived experience, we must also consider that memory contains intentions of expectation, the fulfillment of which leads to the present. In other words, the present is both what we are living and what realizes the expectations of a remembered past. In turn, this realization is inscribed in memory; I remember having expected what is now realized. This realization is henceforth part of the remembered expectation. (This feature is of great value to an analysis of the historical past. In this sense, the present is the actualization of the future of what is remembered. The realization, or lack of realization, of an expectation related to a remembered event acts upon the memory itself and retroactively gives a particular coloring to the reproduction.)

We shall return to and develop this theme at the appropriate moment. For now, let us simply say this: the possibility of turning to a memory and of sighting in it the expectations that were or were not realized later, contributes to inserting the memory within the unitary flow of lived experience. We can now speak of a "temporal series" in which each event receives a different place. The sort of weaving together that we have described between retention and recollection indeed allows us to join them together in a single temporal course. Intending the place of a remembered event in terms of this single series constitutes a supplementary intentionality that is added to the internal order of recollection, held to reproduce that of retention. This intending of a "place" in the temporal series is what allows us to characterize, as past, present, or future, durations presenting different contents but occupying the same place in the temporal series—and hence of giving a formal sense to the characteristic: past, present, or future. But this formal sense is not an immediate datum of consciousness. We do not deal with events as specifically past, future, and present except in relation to the second intentionality of recollection, in intending an event's place independently of its content and duration. This second intention is inseparable from the retroaction by which a recollection receives a new meaning from the fact that its expectations have found their actualization in the present. The abyss separating recollection and retentional consciousness is thus bridged through the intertwining of their intentions, without thereby doing away with the difference between re-production and retention. There has to be a split in the intentionality of recollection that separates the place from the content. This is why Illusserl calls (he intending of place a "place" intention. The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness strives here, through a complex interplay of superimposed intenationalitics, to account lor (he pure form of succession. This form is no longer a presupposition of experience, as for Kant, but the correlate of the intentions directed toward the temporal series apart from the remembered contents. This series is thus intended as (he obscure "surroundings" of what is currently remembered, comparable to the spatial background of perceived things. Henceforth, every temporal thing seems to stand out against the background of the temporal form in which it is inserted by the interplay of inten- tionalities we have described.

We may be surprised that Illusserl favored memory to such an extent at the expense of expectation. Several reasons seem to have contributed to (his apparent imbalance. The first one has to do with Husserl's major preoccupation, which is to resolve (he problem of (he continuity of time without resorting to a synthetic operation like that of Kant or Brentano. The distinction between re-
of dealing directly with expectation. It cannot be the counterpart of memory, which "reproduces" a present experience, both intentional and retentional. In this sense, expectation is "productive" in its own way. In the face of this "production" Husserl seems helpless, no doubt owing to the primacy of the phenomenology of perception, which the exclusion of objective time suspends without abolishing. Only Heidegger's philosophy, anchored directly in care and not in perception, will be able to do away with the inhibitions that paralyze the Husserlian analysis of expectation. Husserl conceives of expectation as little more than an anticipation of perception. "It pertains to the essence of the expected that it is an about-to-be-perceived" (p. 80). And when the expected perception occurs, hence becomes present, the present of the expectation has become (he past of this present. From this angle, the question of expectation leads back to that of primary memory, which remains the major guideline of the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness"

The insertion (Einordnung) of reproduction in the series of internal time thus adds a decisive rectification to the opposition between the "quasi" character of reproduction and the originary character of the unity constituted by perception and retention. The more we stress the Heliic nature of memory in order to oppose it to figurative consciousness (§28), the more we insert it into (he same temporal current as retention. "In contrast to this figurative consciousness, reproductions have the character of self-presentation (Selbstver-fertigung) in the sense of what is past" (p. K2), even if we do not lose sight of (he formal nature of this insertion, the characteristic of "past," henceforth common to reproduction and retention, is inseparable from the constitution of internal time, as the unitary series of all lived experience. The thetic character of the reproduction of the past is (he most effective agent of this aligning of secondary remembrance and primary remembrance under the aegis of the past.

This is perhaps why reproduction is itself also called a modification, in the same way as retention. In this sense, the opposition between "quasi" and "originary" is far from being the last word concerning the relation between secondary and primary remembrance. It was first necessary to oppose them in order better to tie together retentino-consciousness and impressional consciousness against Kant and Brentano. It was then necessary to bring them back together in order better to ensure their common insertion in the single temporal flow, however formal this unitary series might be. Nor should we forget that this formal character itself derives from the second intentionality of recollection which preserves the concrete character of "environmental intention" (Umgebungsintention) (p. 84) belonging to this formal series. The final question raised here concerns whether, as a counterpart to the bracketing of objective time, the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness has contributed anything to the constitution of objective time. The success of this constitution would be the only verification of the well-foundedness of the initial procedure of reduction. We find in the Phenomenology—at least in the final subsections (§§30-33) of Section Two—no more than the beginning steps of this demonstration. Below, when we examine the third section of this work, we shall say why Husserl did not continue on in this direction.

Inserting retention and re-production (when the latter adds a thetic character to the pure "as if") in the series of internal time is the basis upon which time, in the objective sense of the word, is constructed as a serial order indifferent to the contents that (ill it. The notion of a temporal position (Zeitposition) is the key concept in this passing from the subjective to the objective or, to put it a better way, from the "material" of lived experience to its temporal "form." This "temporal position" is what permits us to apply the characteristic of present, past, or future to materially different "lived experiences." But if Mussed performs the reduction of time in one fell swoop, he nevertheless proceeds prudently in objectifying the formal aspects of temporality. Ite begins by opposing the formal objectivity of temporal positions to the material objectivity of the contents of experience. The two phenomena are actually (he inverse of each other and their contrast constitutes a good introduction to (he problem that is posed. On one side, (lie same objective intention aiming', (ii an identical object -is preserved despite the modification that causes the impression, shoved aside by the newness of a new present, (o lose its now character and to lade away into the past. On the other side, (he same temporal position is attributed to the contents of lived experience, despite (heir material differences. It is in this sense that the extra-temporal identity of (he contents, in one case, and the identity of (he temporal position of materially different contents, in (he other, work to opposite effect. On (he one hand, the same lit-stituat but a temporal "sinking away"; on (he other hand, the same temporal position but a different Kestlind. Husserl even speaks in this regard of an apparent antinomy (at the beginning of §31). It is in fact a question here of a contrasted individuation, by the identity of the object and by the identity of temporal position.

It is by disentangling the identity of the temporal position from (he identity of the object that we reach the problematic of objective time. This consists, in effect, in the devolution of "a fixed position in time" (p. 88). This operation poses a problem to the extent that it stands in contrast to the descent by which the present tone sinks back into the past. By this detour of the question of the identity of temporal position, we encounter an eminently Kantian problem. "Time is motionless and yet it flows. In the flow of time, in the continuous sinking away into the past, there is constituted a non-flowing, absolutely fixed, identical Objective time. This is the problem" (p. 89). Retentional modification, it seems, allows us to understand the
sinking back into the past but not the fixedness of the position in time. It does not seem that the identity of sense, in the flow of temporal phases, can supply the answer we are seeking, since it has been shown that the identity of content and the identity of place themselves form a contrast, and since we have admitted that the second is the key to the first. It seems that Husserl holds as an essential law that the sinking back of one and the same sound into the past implies a reference to a fixed temporal position. "It is part of the essence of the modifying flux that this temporal position stands forth as identical and necessarily identical" (p. 90). Of course, unlike what has to do with an a priori of intuition in Kant, the form of time is not superimposed on pure diversity, since the interplay of retentions and representations constitutes a highly structured temporal fabric. It remains nonetheless that this very interplay requires a formal moment that it does not seem capable of generating. In the final pages of Section Two, Husserl strives to bridge this gap.

He tries to demonstrate that the temporal position of an impression, one present then become past, is not extrinsic to the very movement of fading back into the past. It is by modifying its distance with respect to the present (hat event takes its place in time. I husserl himself is not entirely satisfied by his attempt to connect the temporal position to the sinking back as such, that is, to lie increasing distance from the source-point. "With the preservation of (lie individuality of the temporal points in (heir sinking back into the past, we still do not have, however, consciousness of unitary, homogeneous Objective time" (p. 100). The preceeding explanation is based upon retention alone, which involves only a limited temporal field. Instead it is recollection that must be appealed to and, more precisely, the power to transpose every instant, shoved back in (he retention process, into a /re point, into a quasi-present, and to do this repeatedly. What is reproduced in this way is the positio of the zero point as the source-point for new cases of (his sinking back, by a second-order dis-lancing. "Theoretically, (his process is (o be (hought of as capable of being continued without limit, although in practice actual memory soon breaks down" (p. 95). This statement is of the highest interest for the shift from the time of remembrance to historical time, which goes beyond the memory of each individual. A transition is assured by recollection, thanks to the transposition of any given point in the past into a quasi-present; and this is an end-

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less process. The question remains, it seems to me, however, whether this imaginary extension of the temporal field, through the mediation of an endless series of quasi-instants, can take the place of a genesis of "the one Objective time with the one fixed order" (ibid.). The same requirement increases in strength, that is, the requirement for a linear order in which "every temporal interval, no matter which—even the external continuity with the actual temporal field reproduced—must be a part of a unique chain, continuing to the point of the actual now" (p. 96). Whenever we attempt to derive objective time from internal time-consciousness, the relation of priority is inverted. "Even every arbitrarily phantasied time is subject to the requirement that if one is able to think of it as real time (i.e., as the time of any temporal Object) it must subsist as an interval within the one and unique Objective time" (ibid.). Husserl takes refuge here behind "some a priori temporal laws" (the title of §33) that make the datum of temporal position something immediately evident; for example, the fact that two impressions have "identically the same temporal position" (ibid.). It is part of the a priori essence of this state of affairs that these two impressions are simultaneous and involve one and the same now.

It seems that Husserl hoped to obtain from the notion of temporal position, closely related (o the phenomena of retention and recollection, the assurance of the construction of objective time that would not presuppose in every case the result of the constituting operation."\^16

The true sense of the H0sscrsian enterprise appears only in Section Three. Here it is a matter of attaining, by going through the different degrees of constitution, the third level, that of absolute flux. The first level included the things experienced in objective time; this is what was brackled at (he start of the work and what lie attempted lo constitute a lhe end of Seel ion Two. The second level was Ihn of lhe immiennent unities, lhe order of tempo objects; and the subsequent analysis look place on this level. In relation lo lhe third level, lhe unities thai stand out here are Mill consiliilled unities. The lhird level is thai of 11 ic "absolute. temporally constitutive flux of consciousness" (p. 14-K). " Sailing that all (einpo-objeels should be considered as consiliilled unities is the consequence of the numerous presuppositions that the earlier analysis had temporarily to accept as given: that tempo-objects endure, that is, preserve a specific unity throughout the continuous process of temporal modification; that changes in objects are more or less rapid with reference to the same duration. In contrast, if the absolute flux of consciousness has some sense, we must give up the attempt lo base our construction on any sort of identity whatsoever, even that of tempo-objects, and so must stop speaking as well of relative speed. Here we no longer have "something" that endures. We begin to see the audacity of this undertaking: taking as a basis only the modifications as such Itrough which lhe "continuity of shading" (p. 90) constitutes a flux. We

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can also see the great difficulty in this. "For all this, names are lacking" (p. 100). Either we name the constituting—the flux—after what is constituted (the present phase, the continuity of pasts in retention, etc.), or we rely on metaphors; flux, source-point, springing up, sinking back, and so on. It was already difficult enough
to go beneath the transcendent object and to remain on the level of appearing, that of the immanent object or the tempo-object. The task is now to go beneath the immanent object and to place ourselves on the level where consciousness is flux, where all "consciousness of ..." is a "moment of the flux." The question is whether we are not simply reduced to a mere shift in vocabulary, in which the same analyses, carried out once in terms of appearing, would be done a second time in terms of consciousness: perceptual consciousness, retentional consciousness, reproductive consciousness, etc. Otherwise, how would we know that immanent time is one, that it implies simultaneity, durations of unequal length, and a determinability according to before and after (p. 101)? Three problems are posed: the form of the unity that connects the various fluxes into a single flux; the common form of the now (the origin of simultaneity); and the continuity of the modes of running-off (the origin of succession). Concerning the unity of the flux, all we can say is that "immanent time is constituted as one for all immanent Objects and processes. Correlatively, the consciousness of time of immanent things is single [eine Alleinheit]" (p. 102). But what distinct access do we have to this "all-loggelher (Zusammen), this "all-atonce" (Zu'eich), this "all-embracing," by which the running-off of any object and of any process constitutes "a homogeneous, identical form of running-off for the entire all-together" (p. 103)? The question is the same concerning the form of the now, identical for a group of primal sensations, and concerning the identical form of running-off that transforms, without difference or distinction, any now-consciousness into a consciousness of a before. Husserl limits himself to saying, "Hilul wliiul does this iiciiin? Here, one can say noiliii?, fnrilKT thiiti: "See" (p. 103). It seems that the formal conditions of experience that Kaul held to be presuppositions are considered simply as intu-lions. The originality of the third level flux lies in bracketing the tempo-objects and formal/ing the relations among point-source, retention, and proleclion, without regard for (he identities, even the immanent ones, constituted here; in short, in formal/ing the relation between the originary "now" and its modifications. Can this occur without appealing to some constituted objectivity? Husserl was not unaware of this problem: "how [is it] possible to have knowledge [wirwij of a unity of the ultimate constitutive flux of consciousness?" (pp. 105-6). The answer is to be sought in a split in intentionality at the very heart of the phenomenon of retention. An initial intentionality is turned toward the tempo-object, which, although immanent, is already a constituted unity; the second is turned toward the modes of originarity, retention, and recollection. We are therefore dealing with two analogous and contempo-

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taneous processes. ("It is the one unique flux of consciousness in which the immanent temporal unity of the sound and also the unity of the flux of consciousness itself are constituted" [p. 106].) Husserl is not insensitive to the paradoxical character of this statement. "As startling (if not at first sight even contradictory) as it may appear to assert that the flux of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is still true, nevertheless" (ibid.). It is still within an eidetics that we can perceive the difference between a gaze directed toward what is constituted throughout the phases of running-off, and a gaze that has shifted to the flux. All of the earlier analyses of retention, of the retention of retentions, etc., can then be reexamined in terms of this flux rather than in terms of some tempo-object. In this, the intentionality of the self-construction of the flux itself is distinguished from the intentionality that, through the coinciding of phases, constitutes the sound as a tempo-object. This double inten-
tionality had, in fact, been foreseen as early as Section Two, when the identity of the temporal position was distinguished from the identity of the content and, more fundamentally, when the mode of running-off of the duration was distinguished from the unity of the tempo-object that is constituted there.

At the same time, we may wonder what real progress is made by passing to this third stage, if the two intentionalities are inseparable. Passing from the one to the other lies in a shift in our regard rather than in a clear bracketing as when we pass from the first stage to the second one. In this shift in regard, the two intentionalities continually refer back and forth to each other. "Consequently, like two aspects of one and the same thing, there are in the unique flux of consciousness two inseparable, homogeneous intentionalitics which require one another and arc interwoven with one another" (p. 109; his emphases); in other words, in order to have something that endures, there must be a (lux that constitutes itself. To do this, the flux must appear in person, Illuscr well perceived the aporia that is dawning on the horizon here, that of an infinite regress. Does not the (lux's appearing in person require a second flux in which it appears? No, he says, reflection does not require this sort of doubling up, "qua phenomenon it [the dux] constitutes itself" (p. 109; translation modified). The enterprise of a pure phenomenology is completed with this self-constitution, Illuscr claims the same self-evidence in its regard as his phenomenology grants to internal perception. There is even a "self-evident consciousness of duration" (p. 112), just as indubitable as that of immanent contents. The question remains, however, whether the self-evident consciousness of duration can be sufficient to itself without relying in any way on that of a perceptual consciousness.

Two points in Husserl's argument concerning the self-evidence of the duration deserve to be emphasized. The first concerns the self-evidence of the major feature of the flux—its continuity. In one and (he same breath Illuscr asserts the self-evidence of the unity of (he (ux and that of its continuity. The unity of the (ux is an unbroken unity; the difference between two lapses of time is precisely a distinction, not a separation (ver-schieden, not ge-schiedeni) (ibid.). "Discontinuity
presupposes continuity, be it in the form of changeless duration or of continuous alteration" (p. 113). This assertion deserves to be noted because of the way it echoes in the contemporary discussion about the discontinuity of paradigms or epistemes. For Husserl, there can be no doubt, discontinuity can be thought only against the background of continuity, which is time itself. But the question recurs, how do we know it, outside of the mixture of transcendent intentionality (toward the object) and longitudinal intentionality (toward the flux)? It is not by chance that he is forced to draw support once again from the continuity of the unfolding of a tempo-object, such as a sound. The argument must thus be understood in the following way. Discontinuity cannot be distinguished at one point in experience unless the continuity of time is attested to by some other experience that has no break. Difference can only be, so to speak, local, situated where the coincidence between originary consciousness and intentional consciousness is lacking. At the very most we can say that continuity and discontinuity are interwoven in the consciousness of the unity of the flux, as if the split arose out of continuity and vice versa. However, for Husserl, continuity encompasses the differences. "In every case, however, not merely in that of continuous acceleration, the consciousness of otherness, of difference, presupposes a unity" (p. 114).

The second point that must now draw our attention concerns the self-evidence of another major feature of the flux: the primacy of the present impression in relation to reproduction in the order of the originary. In a sense we already know this. The entire theory of reproduction rests on the difference between the "as if" and the originarily present. Taking up the same problem once again on a more fundamental level is not without significance. At the price of a certain contradiction with the earlier analysis, which stressed the spontaneity and the freedom of reproduction, what is underscored now is its receptive and passive character. This comparison on the receptive level, adding to the term-by-term correspondence between re-production and production, opens the way for an assertion carrying a much weightier implication, that re-presentation is in its own way an impression and a present impression. "In a certain sense, then, all lived experiences are known through impressions or are impressed" (p. 116). It is the conversion of the entire analysis from (the second level to the fundamental level of consciousness that allows us to say (hat the return of a memory to the surface is a present return and, in this sense, an impression. The difference between re-production and production is not abolished, but it loses its aspect of being a break. Re-presentation "presupposes primary consciousness in which we are impressionally aware of it" (p. 117).

The thesis of the continuity of the (lux is at the same lime reinforced by the omnipresence of impressional consciousness. The unity of the transcendent thing (level one) is built upon that of thing-appearances and immanent ap-

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prehensions (level two); this, in tum, is founded upon the unity of impressional consciousness (level three). "An impression . . . is to be grasped as a primary consciousness which has no further consciousnessness behind it in which we are aware of it" (ibid.). The hierarchy of object (level one), thing-appearance (level two), and impression (level three) refers to what is ultimate: the absolute flux. The "immanent unities are constituted in the flux of multiplicities of temporal shading" (p. 119).

Time itself has finally to be considered on three levels: objective time (level one), the objectified time of tempo-objects (level two), and immanent time (level three). "The primal succession of moments of appearance, by virtue of the time-founding retentions, and the like, constitutes appearance (altered or unaltered) as phenomenological-temporal unity" (p. 122).

The question is whether "the analogy between the constitution of immanent and transcendent unities" reasserted in concluding (p. 121) does not condemn the entire enterprise to circularity. The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness ultimately concerns immanent intentionality interwoven with objectifying intentionality. And the former, in fact, rests on the recognition of something that endures, which the latter alone can provide for it. This is, as we shall see, the very presupposition that Kant articulates in the scries of his three "Analyses of Experience" under the titles of permanence, ordered succession, and reciprocal action.

THE INVISIBILITY OF TIME: KANT

I do not expect that a return to Kant will provide a refutation of Husserl, any more than I demanded from Aristotle that he take the place of Augustine. To begin with, I want to find in Kant the reason for the repeated borrowings made by the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness with respect to the structure of objective time, which this phenomenology claims not only to bracket but actually to constitute. In this regard, what the Kantian method refutes are not Husserl's phenomenological analyses themselves but their claim to be free of any reference to an objective time and to attain, through direct reflection, a temporality purified of any transcendent intention. In return, I intend to show that Kant himself is unable to construct the presuppositions concerning a time which itself never appears as such, without borrowing I com an implicit phenomenology of lime, which is never expressed as such because it is hidden by his transcendental mode of reflection. This twofold demonstration repeals on a different level what we observed above using the resources of Augustinian psychology and Aristotelian physics. In conclusion, we shall say what a modern dialectic, which sets into action the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, adds to the ancient dialectic, which sets into opposition to each
oilier a time of the soul and a lime of motion.

What most obviously opposes Kant to Husserl is the assertion of the indi-

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real nature of all assertions about time. Time does not appear. It is a condition of appearing. This style of
reasoning, diametrically opposed to the Husserlian ambition to make time per se appear, is complete only in the
"Analytic of Judgment," and particularly in the "Analogies of Experience." Nevertheless, the outlines of this
argument can be found in the "Transcendental Aesthetic."

We would be mistaken to believe that, by assigning the status of a priori intuitions to space and time, Kant also
conferred upon his assertion of this status an intuitive character. In this respect, ascribing time to inner sense
must not lead us astray; throughout the first edition of the Critic/lie of Pure Reason, and to an even greater extent
in the second edition, inner sense always falls short of the ability to constitute itself as a source of self-
knowledge." If some phenomenological implication can be made out here, it is to be found in the reference,
which itself is never thematized, to the Gernut.44 The very first definition of intuition as an immanent relation to
objects as given is linked up with the notion that the mind (Gemtil) "is affected in a certain way" (A19, B33).

The definition that follows—"The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations [Vorstellungen], through
the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility [Sinnlichkeit]"—is not without
phenomenological overtones. In the same way, both external sense and inner sense rest on an Eigenschwfl
unseres Gemitl (A22, B37). However, the phenomenological core of the initial definitions in the "Aesthetic" is
quickly introduced in the distinction—an ancient one, to be sure—between matter, which becomes the
"manifold," and form, of which it is merely said that it "must lie ready for the sensations a priori in (he mind
[Gemtil])" (A20, 1334). The method of double abstraction by which sensibility is first isolated from thought by
means of the concept and, a second time, on the level of sensibility itself, when the form is separated from the
manifold, makes no appeal to self-evidence but instead receives its indirect justification from the Critique
as a whole.

In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" this justification takes the form of an argument that is essentially a refutation.
In this way, the question that opens the "Aesthetic," an eminently ontological one—"What, then, are space and
time?" (A23, 1337)—allows for just four possibilities: substances, accidents, real relations, or relations involving
the subjective constitution of our Gemlil. The fourth solution follows from the elimination of the first three, on
the basis of arguments taken from the ancients or from Leibniz.45 This refutational style explains (lie form of
reducio ad absurdum thai the argument lakes in favor of (he fourth solution, (hat of Kanl. "11 we depart from
the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by
objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever" (A26, B42). And further on, concerning time:
"If we abstract from our mode of inwardly intuiting ourselves—the mode of intuition in terms of which we like-
wise take up into our faculty of representation all outer intuitions—. . . then lime is nothing" (A34).

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The nonintuitive character of the properties of time considered as an a priori intuition is particularly underscored
by the priority given in the "Aesthetic" to the study of space in relation to time. We can see why. Space affords a
"transcendental exposition" that has no equal on the side of time, by reason of the weight of geometry, for which
space constitutes a setting for possible constructions. It is because geometry is a science of relations that space
can be neither a substance nor an accident, but rather a relation of externality. What is more, it is because
gometry rests on properties that are not demonstrable analytically that propositions about space (and by analogy
about time) must consist of synthetic and not analytic judgments. The constructive character of geometry and its
axiomatic nature go hand in hand and tend to constitute a single argument. On the other hand, the intuitive nature
of space is inseparable from arguments concerning proof by construction in geometry.™

This is the core of the transcendental exposition of the concept of space, which is indisputably nonintuitive. "I
understand by a transcendental exposition [Erörterung] the explanation of a concept as a principle from which
the possibility of other a priori synthetic knowledge can be understood" (A25, B40). The transcendental
exposition of time is constructed exactly on the model of that of space, as this is summed up in this simple
sentence from the second edition: "Thus our concept of time explains the possibility of that body of a priori
synthetic knowledge which is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, and which is by no means unfruitful"
(B49).

The metaphysical exposition that precedes the transcendental exposition rests on the rigorous parallel between
the properties of space and time, and the argument offers, in both cases, a strictly refutational style. The first two
arguments establish the nonempirical status of time and space. The first argument, which G. Martin has called
"Platoni/ing," establishes the nonempirical character of both time and space. We would not perceive two events
as simultaneous or successive if the representation of time did not serve as the ground for the apprehension of
these temporal predicates of perceptual experience. A new argument, more "Aristotelian" this time, owing to the
fact that it establishes an order of preference, posits that time could be emptied of all its events, just as space can
be emptied of all its contents, without for all that eliminating time itself. Its preeminence with respect to events is
justified by this thought-experiment. According to the third argument, space and time cannot be discursive
concepts, (hat is, generic concepts. Just as we can represent to ourselves only a single space of which diverse
spaces are no more than parts (not different kinds assembled under one concept), in the same way different times
can only be successive. This axiom, positing the unidimensional-ity of time, is not produced by experience but
instead is presupposed by it. The intuitive and nondiscursive character of time results from this. If indeed
different times are only parts of the same time, time docs not behave as a genus in relation to different species—it
is a collective singular. In the fourth
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argument time, like space, is a given, infinite magnitude. Its infinity implies nothing other than the necessity of
considering every determined time, every lapse of time, as a limitation of the one, unique time.
Regardless of what we may say about the phenomenology implicit in this reasoning—and we shall return to this
point in a moment—the main accent is placed on the presuppositional character of any assertion about time. This
character is inseparable from the relational and purely formal status of time and space. More specifically, "time
is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever." It is immediate with respect to all internal
phenomena and mediate for all external phenomena. This is why the discourse of the "Aesthetic" is that of
presupposition and not that of lived experience. The regressive argument always wins out over direct vision.
This regressive argument, in turn, assumes the privileged form of an argument from absurdity. Time "is nothing
but the form of our inner intuition. If we take away from our inner intuition the peculiar condition of our
sensibility, the concept of time likewise vanishes; it docs not inhere in the objects, but merely in the subject
which intuits them" (A37). That an inchoative phenomenology is both implied and repressed by the transcendental reasoning is attested to
by a few remarks in the 1770 Dissertation, remarks that are not mere replicas of the analysis of space. It is not an
accident, in this regard, if in the Dissertation the discussion of time (§14) precedes that of space.
Even if the mode of argumentation by presupposition already prevails here, as will also be the case in the
"Transcendental Aesthetic," it retains a phenomenological cast, which our passage by way of Husserl makes all
the more evident. Thus the presupposition of a temporal order defined by the perception of all things as either
simultaneous or successive is accompanied by the following comment. Succession docs not "engender" (gignit)
the notion of time but rather "appeals to it" (sedaddilamprovocat). We understand what is • meant by the word
"after" (post) through the prior (praevio) concept of time. This idea of an "appeal" addressed by experience to a
prior concept deserves more thorough examination. It implies, according to J. N. Findlay, a "vague vision of the
indefinably temporal order" (p. 88). As for the second thesis of the Dissertation, concerning the singularity of
time (which will become the fourth and fifth arguments of the "Aesthetic"), it too possesses a certain pheno-
nomenological cast. Do we not understand without any further argument that it is one thing for sensuous
contents to be "posited in time" (in lemniore /w
cald), and another thing again to be contained under a general
notion "in the manner of a common mark" (kitkiitiili twin communin)! We are thus inclined to say that this
"common mark," which is prior to all sensation, is itself intuitively apprehended insofar as this form of
coordination is integrated into all sensuous contents and has to be filled with sensorial contents without being
dependent on them." And this experience of a horizon, which seems to sup-
port the argument for the pure nature of the intuition of time, is, in fact, ph-nomenologically speaking, neither a
conceptual generality nor a determined sensuous content.41
Taking this latent, or inchoative, phenomenology in the Dissertation for our guide, let us return to the arguments
concerning time presented in the "Transcendental Aesthetic." Above we stressed only the symmetry between the
transcendental properties of time and space. What is there to say about the dissymmetry between them? Can it be
reduced to the difference between the sciences that are made possible by each of these forms? That is to say,
finally, between sciences with a one-dimensional content and sciences with a three-dimensional content? Is there
not implicit in the idea of succession the recognition of a specific feature, namely, the necessity that any progress
of thought! proceed phase by phase, fragment by fragment, without ever having the objects in its entirety before its
gaze at the same time? In order to compensate for the fragmentary character of all experience in time, is it not
necessary to introduce the experience of a temporal "horizon," underlying both the "Platonic" argument which
holds that the idea of time precedes all temporal experience and the "Aristotelian" one which rests on the
reflective experience of a time emptied of all its event-contents? Even the idea that time is singular—that there is
only one time of which all times arc merely parts, not species—is this not guided by the experience of such a
horizon? A certain preunderstanding of its inclusive character, added to the fragmentary character of our
temporal experience, seems in this way to accompany the axiomatic status of the "Transcendental Aesthetic." Its
function, according to the words of the Dissertation, is to "call for" the concept of time, without having the
power to generate it.
The paradox of the Critique, in sum, is that its particular argumentative mode has to hide the phenomenology
implicit in the thought-experiment that governs the demonstration of the ideality of space and time.
This is confirmed in the "Analytic," where the main reason for the non-phenomenality of time per se is
presented. For it is in the "Analytic" that the necessity of the detour by way of the constitution of the object for
any new determination of the notion of time is demonstrated. There is no point in expecting that the theory of the schematism will confer on time the appearing that was refused to it by the "Transcendental Aesthetic." It is certainly true that the new determinations of time are related to the use of the schematism. For example, we speak of "the time series, the time content, the time order," and lastly, the scope of time in respect of all possible objects" (A 145, B184). However, this "transcendental determination of time" acquires meaning only when it is supported by the initial a priori synthetic judgments, or "principles" (Grundbegriffe), that make the schemata explicit. These principles have no other function than to posit the conditions for the objectivity of the object. It follows from this that time cannot be perceived in itself, but that we have only an indirect representation of it through

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simultaneously intellectual and imaginative operations applied to objects in space. Time, once again does not appear but remains a condition for objective appearing, and this is the theme of the "Analytic." In this respect, giving a figure to time by means of a line, far from constituting a basis extrinsic to the representation of time, is an integral part of its indirect way of manifesting itself in the application of a concept to the object by means of the imagination.

In addition to this, the representation of time, on the level of schemata and principles, is always accompanied by a determination of time, that is, by a particular lapse of time, a determination that adds nothing to the presupposition of an infinite time of which all times are the successive parts. It is in the determination of particular successions that this indirect character of the representation of time becomes clearer.

This twofold nature of the representation of time—at once indirect and determined—is the principal reason for the nonphenomenality of time on the level of the "Analytic." Hence Kant's warning concerning the schematism is extended to all the determinations of time corresponding to the schematism. These determinations share with the latter the fact of being a universal procedure [Verfahren] of imagination in providing an image for a concept" (A 140, B179). But, for this very reason, they must, like the schema, stem from "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover and to have open to our gaze" (A 141, B180-81). Does not this solemn declaration contain a clear warning against any attempt to "lift out" new phenomenological features that these transcendental determinations of time may possess, which are part of the mediating function called, depending on the point of view, submission, application, or restriction? The paradox is that it is this very tie between time and the schema that moves us one step farther from an intuitive phenomenology of time. It is only in the operation of schematizing the categories that the corresponding temporal property is discovered. And the schematization of the categories, in turn, takes shape only through the "principles"—axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, principles of modality—for which the schemata serve in each instance as abbreviated names.

It is under this very restrictive condition that we can legitimately attempt to elicit some information concerning time as such. But let us first note that if this information enriches our notion of time as succession, it does so without ever involving the relation of a lived present to the past and the future through memory or expectation, or, as in Husserl's attempt, through retention and projection. The "Analogies of Experience" that discursively employ the schemata of substance, cause, and coexistence are the richest in observations concerning the transcendental determination of time as order. Even if, once again, these observations require a detour by way of a determined representation in a time

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which is itself determined, "the general principle," we read in the first edition, is that all "appearances arc, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules determining their relations to one another in one time" (A 127). "In one time," hence in a determined lapse of time. We must, therefore, connect these two expressions: the representation of a necessary connection in our perceptions, and their relation in one time. It is this detour by way of representation in a determined time that gives a meaning to the statement, one of the utmost importance for our principal argument, that "time cannot be perceived in it-, seir' (A183, B226), but that we perceive only objects "in" time (ibid.). This major reservation must not be lost sight of as we examine each of the analogies of experience.

The most important of the remarks on time concerns the principle of permanence (the first analogy). It is the first time, in fact, that Kant observes that the "three modes of time are duration, succession, and coexistence" (A 177, B219), to which correspond the three rules of all the relations of time in phenomena. Up to now we have spoken only of succession and coexistence (or simultaneity). Is permanence a "mode" similar to the other two? This does not seem to be the case.

What does it mean "to persist," not only for the existence of a phenomenon but for time itself? This feature is said, precisely, to designate time "in general" (A 183, B226). In order that two phenomena be held to be successive or simultaneous, they must be given "an underlying ground which exists at all times, that is, something abiding and permanent, of which all change and coexistence are only so many ways (modes of time) in which the permanent exists" (ibid.). (We can see why above Kant spoke of three modes and not of three relations.) Merc we touch on something quite profound. "For change does not affect time itself, but only
In conclusion, the three dynamic relations of inherence, consequence, and composition, by organizing existence (simultaneity) be revealed to be a relation of order: “only on this condition can these substances be reciprocally” (B257). Only by presupposing a reciprocal action of things in relation to one another can co-composition to gather, simply from things being set in the same time, that their perceptions follow each other (B258). The coexistence of things, however, is perceived only through reciprocal action. It is thus not an “the same time” (B257). And further on: “Things are coexistent so far as they exist in one and the same time” (B253). In a single move thought posits time as immutable, the schema as the permanence of the real, and the principle of substance. "To time itself non-transitory and abiding, there corresponds in the field of appearance what is non-transitory in its existence, that is, substance" (ibid.). So there is a correspondence between the determination of time (immutability), the determination of appearances in accordance with the schema (the permanence of the real in time), and the principle that concerns the first instance, the principle of the permanence of substance. This is why there is no perception of time as such.

The second analogy, called in the second edition, "Principle of the Succession of Time, in Accordance with the Law of Causality" (B233), confers on the notion of the order of time a well-known specification, tied to that of regular succession. There is no point in returning to the classic discussion concerning the synthetic character of causality.”

However it is important to separate out from this discussion the remarks that concern the very notion of the order of time. It is stated again that "time cannot be perceived in itself" (13233).” This implies that I can know the transcendental determination of time—itself resulting from "a synthetic faculty of imagination, which determines the inner sense in respect of the time-relation” (B233)—only by taking as a basis objective causal relations. I can do this only by making a distinction in my representations between two sorts of succession, one that rests on an objective relation between appearances, as in the observation of a boat sailing down a river, and another that admits of a subjective arbitrariness, as in the description of a house, a description that I can pursue in any direction. It is in this work of distinguishing between two kinds of succession—objective and subjective—that I glimpse obliquely, as an invisible presupposition, the transcendental determination of time as order. This work of distinguishing constitutes the core of the "proof" of the principle of production or of succession in time in accordance with a rule. Once again, the "proof" brings the arguments of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” to a close on the level of presuppositions. What causality sets into relief is not succession as such but the possibility of making the division between a succession that would be "a merely subjective play of my fancy [Einbildung] ... a mere dream" (A202, B247), and a succession that gives meaning to the notion of event (Begebenheit) in the sense of something "as actually happening" (A201, B246). So the second analogy in fact depends on the sense of the word "to happen" (Cescheiden) following the initial formulation of the second analogy: "Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule" (A 189). Before (his is specified, we have

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position—an "indispensable something"—of our ordinary perception and of the apprehension by science of the order of things. "The schema of substance is permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of the real as a substrate of empirical determination of time in general, and so as abiding while all else changes" (A143, B183). In a single move thought posits time as immutable, the schema as the permanence of the real, and the principle of substance. "To time itself non-transitory and abiding, there corresponds in the field of appearance what is non-transitory in its existence, that is, substance" (ibid.). So there is a correspondence between the determination of time (immutability), the determination of appearances in accordance with the schema (the permanence of the real in time), and the principle that concerns the first instance, the principle of the permanence of substance. This is why there is no perception of time as such.

The principle of permanence thus contributes a preciseness to the axiom in the "Aesthetic" that there is just one time of which all other times are merely parts. To the oneness of time it adds the totality characteristic of time. But the permanence of substance, upon which this description is based, takes nothing away from the invisibility essential (o time. ‘I’ermance remains a pros(p
appears in time, determine, by implication, the three relations of temporal order that define duration as a quantity of existence, regularity in succession, and simultaneity in existence. It is not surprising therefore that time which, already in the "Aesthetic," was attained only by argument and not by intuition (to which must be added the antinomies and the mutual reductio ad absurdum of thesis and antithesis) can receive further determination only by the detour of the Grundstz, accompanied by their "proofs" or their "clarifications."

We may say that, through its transcendental determinations, time determines the system of nature. But time, in turn, is determined by the construction of the axiomatic system of nature. In this sense we can speak of a reciprocal determination of the axiomatic system constitutive of the ontology of nature and of the determination of time. This reciprocity between the process of constituting the objectivity of the object and the emergence of new determinations of time explains why the phenomenological description that these determinations could give rise to is systematically repressed by the critical argument. For example, the permanence of time, following the first analogy, tacitly appeals to the conviction that our power of pursuing ever further our exploration of time has as its counterpart, to use Findlay's expression, the integration of all the phases of this movement "into a vast space-like map" (p. 165), without which, as Kant himself notes, time would unceasingly vanish and begin anew at every instant. Does not the argument by reductio ad absurdum—as is always the case in Kant—also point to the empty place reserved for a phenomenology of retention and protention based, not on the notion of an instant, but on the experience of the lived present?

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The second analogy of experience poses an identical problem. What is ultimately at stake here is the irreversibility of time. Yet the meaning that we ascribe to the orientation of time is far from being exhausted by the transcendental "proof" given by Kant, to wit, the distinction in our imagination between two kinds of succession, one whose organization would be arbitrary because it would be purely subjective, the other whose orientation would be necessary because 1 could oppose to "the representations of my apprehension," "an object distinct from them" (A 191, B236). In order to distinguish between an arbitrarily reversible succession and a necessarily irreversible succession, have we available to us no more than the formal criterion of the causal relation, itself held to be a priori? Without going into the new problems posed by modern physics concerning the "arrow of time," or into the crisis of the principle of causality, connected to that of the Kantian a priori as a whole, we may wonder whether the transcendental argument does not betray an un-awareness of a distinction that was highlighted in our confrontation between Augustine and Aristotle, namely, the distinction between a succession of instants and the relation between past and future connected to a present that is the instant of its own utterance. In a theory of time in which succession has no point of reference other than the instant, the distinction between subjective succession and objective succession must, in fact, be based on a criterion external to succession as such, which Kant sums up in the opposition between the object of successive apprehensions and these apprehensions themselves as simply represented. However it is only in relation to a present, irreducible to an instant that is indistinguishable from any other that the dissymmetry between past and future is itself revealed to be irreducible to the principle of order provided by causal regularity alone. In this sense, the notion of an event, that is, of something that happens, as this figures in the statement of the second analogy (also called a "principle of production" [Erzeugung]), is also not exhausted by the notion of ordered succession. It can have two meanings depending on whether time is reduced to simple succession, that is, the relation of before and after of indistinguishable instants, or whether it rests on the reversible relation between the before of the present—or the past—and the after of the present—or the future.

In this regard, the third analogy merely reinforces the duality of these two approaches. The simultaneity of indistinguishable instants based on reciprocal action, according to the Kantian principle of reciprocity or coexistence, is one thing; the contemporaneousness of two or several courses of experience, created by a reciprocity of an existential order, according to the innumerable modes of "living together," is something else again.

Widening the debate beyond the discussion of the analogies of experience, the phenomenologist willingly asserts that the determinations of time would not maintain their role of "restriction" in the use of the categories if they did not display their own specific phenomenological properties. Must not the determinations of time be comprehensible in themselves, at least implicitly, if

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they are to serve as means of discrimination with respect to the meaning of the categories; that is, with respect to their use value? The phenomenologist may draw some comfort from the following consideration. In the order of exposition, Kant goes from the category to the schema, then to the principle. In the order of discovery, is there not first the schematization of the category with its temporal determination, then, by abstraction, the category? Heidegger's reading of Kant follows this line. But this reversal of priority between the category and the schema/time pair changes nothing with respect to the more fundamental question that Kant poses to all phenomenology. In the pair schema/time, the correspondence between temporal determination and the development of the schema in its principle is what prevents the constitution of a pure phenomenology of this
temporal determination. At the very most we can assert that the notion of the determination of time must contain the lineaments of an implied phenomenology, if in the reciprocity between temporalization and schematization the former is to contribute something to the latter. But this phenomenology cannot be disentangled without breaking the reciprocal connection between the constitution of time and the constitution of the object, a break that is consummated, precisely, by the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness.

Two important texts in the second edition of the Critique bring to light the ultimate reasons why a critical perspective and a phenomenological one cannot help but occlude each other. The first text seems, at first sight, to give the most support to a phenomenology freed from the tutelage of the critique. It is the famous text on Selbstaffektion that Kant placed in an appendix to the theory of figurative synthesis in §24 of the Second Transcendental Deduction (B152-57). If we recall the framework of this discussion, Kant has just said that the application of categories to objects in general requires that the understanding "as spontaneity, is able to determine its inner sense" (B150). He takes this opportunity to settle definitively the problem of the relations between time and our inner sense. He does not hesitate to present the problem as a "paradox," left in abeyance since §6 of the "Aesthetic." The paradox is the following. If our inner sense in no way constitutes an intuition of what we are as a soul, hence as a subject in itself, but "represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves" (B 152-53), then we must say that we have no intuition of our acts themselves but only of the way in which we are internally affected by our acts. Only in this way do we appear to ourselves as an empirical object, just as external objects result from our being affected by things unknown in themselves. These two affections are strictly parallel, and the inner sense has nothing more to do with the power of apperception, which it has entirely dethroned. Whence the paradox resulting from this drastic solution: how can we behave passively (leidend) in relation to ourselves? 54

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The answer is ready—"affecting" is still "determining." By affecting myself, I determine myself, I produce mental configurations capable of being described and named. But how can I so affect myself by my own activity, if not by producing determined configurations in space? It is here that the detour by way of figurative synthesis is shown to be the necessary mediation between myself as affecting (unknown) and myself as affected (known). It is therefore not surprising that the example of "drawing the line" returns precisely here, in the explanation of the paradox of Selbstaffektion. The act of drawing a line—along with that of describing a circle, or that of constructing a triangular figure—is first of all an example among others of the determination of the inner sense by means of the transcendental act of the imagination. But it adds to the representation of the line, the circle, the triangle, an act of attention bearing on "the act of the synthesis of the manifold whereby we successively determine inner sense, and in so doing attend to the succession of this determination in inner sense" (B154). In this way, the act of drawing a line certainly does not constitute the intuition of time but does cooperate in its representation.

There is no confusion here between space and time, contrary to what Bergson thought, but the movement from the intuition (unobservables such as such) of time to the representation of a determined time, through reflection on the operation of drawing a line. Among all the determinations of space, the line has the advantage of conferring an external character of representation ("the outer figurative representation of time" [B 154]). But the core of the argument is that the synthetic activity of the imagination has to be applied to space—drawing a line, tracing out a circle, extending three perpendicular axes all starting from the same point—so that, reflecting on the operation itself, we discover that time is implied here. By constructing a determined space I am conscious of the successive character of the activity of understanding. But I know it only to the extent that I am affected by it. Thus we know ourselves as an object—and not as we arc—insofar as we represent time by a line. Time and space mutually generate one another in the work of the synthetic imagination: "we cannot obtain for ourselves a representation of time, which is not an object of outer intuition, except under the image of a line, which we draw, and that by this mode of depicting it alone could we know the singleness [Einheit] of its dimension" (B156). It is in every case a question of determination—whether of figures in space or of length of time or epoch. These are determinations that we produce together: "the determinations of inner sense have therefore to be arranged as appearances in time in precisely the same manner in which we arrange those of outer sense in space" (ibid.). Of course, what is important to Kant in this argument is that self-affection is strictly parallel to affection from outside: "so far as inner intuition is concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is by itself" (ibid.).

For us, although we are not interested here in the division into transcendental subject, absolute self, and phenomenological ego, but just in the new de-

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terminations of time that arc revealed by Selbstaffektion, this very roundabout investigation provides considerable food for thought. Not only is the unob-servable character of time as such reaffirmed, but the nature of the indirect representation of time is made more specific. Far from being a matter of the contamination of time
by space, the mediation performed by the spatial operations reveals in a single stroke the connection, at the very heart of the experience of time, between passivity and activity. We are temporally affected insofar as we act temporally. Being affected and producing constitute one and the same phenomenon. "The understanding does not, therefore, find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects the inner sense" (B155). Kant was not wrong in calling this self-affecting of the subject by its own acts a paradox.\textsuperscript{52}

The ultimate warning against any attempt to make time as such appear can be read in the text Kant added to the second edition of the \textit{Critique} following the second postulate of the theory of modality—the postulate of reality—under the title "Refutation of Idealism" (B274-79). Regardless of the polemical reasons that motivated the urgency of this addition,\textsuperscript{51} the point of the argument is evident: "our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience" (B275). It is noteworthy that Kant's thesis takes the form first of a theorem, then of a proof. The theorem states, "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside of me" (ibid.). Let us be clear about what is at stake. It is a question of existence and of consciousness of my existence, in a noncategorical sense of existence, the opposite of that given in the transcendental deduction. Whereas the latter grants the "I am" of the "I think" only the status of an empirically undetermined existence (§24), here it is a matter of the empirically determined consciousness of my own existence. It is this determination that, as in the rest of the "Analytic," requires that we cease to juxtapose, as was the case in the "Aesthetic," time and space and that we even abandon the effort to base the nominal definition of the schemata on the determinations of time alone. This determination requires, instead, that we closely connect determination in time and determination in space. This connection is no longer made, as it was in the analogies of experience, on the level of representation but on that of the "consciousness of existence" either of myself or of things (whatever the consciousness of existence can signify in a transcendental philosophy [hat nevertheless continues in its own way to be an idealism]).

The connection between space and time is [hereby linked to the deepest level of experience, at the level of (the consciousness of existence. The "proof" consists expressly in Inking up again on (his more radical level the argument of permanence, employed in the first analogy of experience on the level of the simple representation of things. The (is analogy of experience, in effect, laugh! us ha! the determination of lime as permanent is based on the relation that we bring about in external representation between what changes and what remains. If we transpose this argument from representation to existence, we must say that the immediate character of the consciousness of existence of other things outside me is proved by the nonimmediate nature of the consciousness that we have of our existence as determined in time.

If this argument bearing on existence can say anything distinct from the argument of the first analogy of experience bearing on representation, this can only be inasmuch as it subordinates affection by ourselves to affection by things. For, it seems to me, only our reflection on affected being is capable of being carried to the level of the consciousness of existence, both in us and outside us.

It is at this radical level, reached only by a very indirect path\textsuperscript{34} that the possibility of an intuitive phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, tacitly admitted by Augustine and explicitly claimed by Husserl, is called into question.

Our confrontation of Husserl and Kant has led us to an impasse comparable to the one revealed by our confrontation of Augustine and Aristotle. Neither the phenomenological approach nor the transcendental one is sufficient unto itself. Each refers back to the other. But this referral presents the paradoxical character of a mutual borrowing, in the condition of a mutual exclusion. On the one hand, we can enter the Husserlian problematic only by bracketing the Kantian problematic; a phenomenology of time can be articulated only by borrowing from objective time, which, in its principal determinations, remains a Kantian time. On the other hand, we can enter the Kantian problematic only on the condition of abstaining from all recourse to any inner sense that would reintroduce an ontology of the soul, which the distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself has bracketed. Yet the determinations by which time is distinguished from a mere magnitude must themselves be based on an implicit phenomenology, whose empty place is evident in every step of the transcendental argument. In this way, phenomenology and critical thought borrow from each other only on the condition of mutually excluding each other. We cannot look at both sides of a single coin at the same time. To conclude, let us say a word about the relation between the conclusion of this chapter and those of the preceding one. The polarity between phenomenology, in I Husserl's sense, and critical philosophy, in Kant's, repeats, on the level of a problematic where the categories of subject and object—or more precisely of subjective and objective \textbf{predominate}, the polarity between the time of the soul and the time of the world, on the level of a problematic introduced by Ihe question of the being or nonbeing of time.

The (illation relating Augustine and Husserl is easier to recognize. It is ad-
recollection a subtle form of the dialectic of the threefold present and of that of inteniolis distentio animi, and even the phenomenological resolution of certain paradoxes in the Augustinian analysis. A connection between Kant and Aristotle is more difficult to perceive, or to accept. By asserting the transcendental ideality of space and of time in the "Aesthetic," is Kant not closer to Augustine than to Aristotle? Does not transcendental consciousness mark the fulfillment of a philosophy of subjectivity, for which Augustine had paved the way? Given this, how can Kantian time lead us back to the time of Aristotle? But this would be to forget the meaning of the transcendental in Kant, for its entire function lies in establishing the conditions of objectivity. The Kantian subject, we may say, is wholly taken up in making the object be there. The "Aesthetic" already stresses the fact that the transcendental ideality of space and time has as its other side their empirical reality. And this reality is articulated by the sciences that are related to it. When the "Transcendental Aesthetic" proclaims that time and space inhere originarily in the subject, this cannot hide the other side of the problem and prevent us from asking the question, what sort of empirical reality corresponds to transcendental ideality? More fundamentally, what sort of object is structured by the categorial apparatus of the critique? The answer is contained in the analytic of principles. The objectivity of the object, which is guaranteed by the transcendental subject, is a nature for which physics is the corresponding empirical science. The analogies of experience provide the conceptual apparatus, whose network articulates this nature. The theory of modalities adds the principle of closure that excludes from the real any entity that falls outside this network. The representation of time is entirely conditioned by this network, by the very reason of its indirect character. It results from this that time, despite its subjective character, is (the) time of a nature whose objectivity is wholly defined by the categorial apparatus of the mind.

It is by this detour that Kant leads us back to Aristotle; not, certainly, to the pre-Galilean physicist but to the philosopher who places time on the side of nature. Nature, after Galileo and Newton, is, to be sure, no longer what it was before them. But time has not ceased to be on the side of nature rather than on that of the soul. In truth, with Kant, (he side of the soul is no more. The death of the inner sense, the assimilation of the conditions under which internal phenomena can be known objectively to the conditions to which external phenomena are themselves submitted, allows just one nature to be known. Have we, then, actually moved as far as it may seem from the subordination of Aristotelian time to physics? Here again time "has something (οίτιο with motion." Of course, a soul is required to count, but the numerable is first of all to be found in motion. 58

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This comparison suddenly places the relation between Kant and Husserl in a new light. The opposition between the intuitive character of Husserlian time and the invisible nature of Kantian time is not merely formal. It is material as well, the opposition between a time that, like the distentio animi in Augustines, time, requires a present capable of both separating and uniting a past and a future, and a time that has no point of reference in the present, because it is, in the final analysis, only the time of nature. Once again, each of the two doctrines discovers its field of application only by occluding the other. The price of the Husserlian discovery of retention and secondary remembrance is that nature is forgotten, yet succession is presupposed by the very description of the internal consciousness of time. But is not the price of critical philosophy a blindness reciprocal to that of Husserl? By tying the fate of time to a determined ontology of nature, has not Kant prevented himself from exploring properties of temporality other than those required by his Newtonian axiomatic system—succession, simultaneity (and permanence)? Has he not shut off access to other properties resulting from the relations of the past and the future to the actual present?

Temporality, Historicality, Within-Time-Ness Heidegger and the "Ordinary" Concept of Time

Now that we arc about to consider the Heideggerian interpretation of time in Being and Time, we must counter a biased objection that is leveled against any reading that would isolate Being and Time from Heidegger's later work, which, in the eyes of the majority of his disciples, constitutes at one and the same time the hermeneutic key to Being and Time, its critique, and even its denial. This objection stresses two points. On the one hand, it states that to separate the temporality of Dasein from the understanding of Being, which is truly revealed only in the works following Heidegger's reversal or turn, his Kehre, is fatally to confine Being and Time to a philosophical anthropology that ignores its real intention. Heidegger himsefl perhaps saw the inevitability of this misunderstanding when he left Being and Time unfinished and abandoned the path of the analytic of Dasein. On the other hand, if we lose sight of the theme of the destruction of metaphysics, which, as early as Being and Time, accompanies the recovery of the question of Being, we run the risk of misunderstanding the meaning of the critique aimed, on the level of phenomenology, at the primacy of the present, by failing to perceive the connection between this critique and that of the primacy accorded by metaphysics to vision and presence. We should not, I think, be intimidated by this warning. It is perfectly legitimate to treat Being and Time as a distinct work, because this is the way it was published, once
we propose a reading that respects its unfinished character, or even that stresses its problematic aspect. *Being and Time* deserves this sort of reading on its own merits and to pay proper tribute to it. Are we thereby forced into the error of an anthropological interpretation? It is, after all, the object of *Being and Time* to attempt an approach to the question of the meaning of Being by way of an existential analysis that establishes the very criteria for approaching this question. Arc we in danger of failing to apprehend the antimetaphysical point of its phenomenological critique of the present and of presence? On the contrary, a reading that is not too quick to sec

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a metaphysics of presence in a phenomenology of the present may become attentive to those features of the present that do not reflect the alleged errors of an intuitive metaphysics directed toward some intelligible world. To this apology, which is still too defensive, for a distinct reading of *Being and Time*, I would like to add an argument that is more directly related to the theme of my own investigation. If we do not allow Heidegger's later works to overpower the voice of *Being and Time*, we give ourselves an opportunity to perceive, on the level of this hermeneutic phenomenology of time, tensions and discordances that are not necessarily those that led to the incompleteness of *Being and Time*, because they do not have to do with the overall relation of the existential analytic to ontology, but have to do rather with the meticulous, extraordinarily well-articulated detail of the analytic of Dasein. These tensions and discordances, as we shall see, can be related to those that have already caused difficulty in the two preceding chapters, can shed new light on them, and perhaps, can reveal their true nature, owing, precisely, to the kind of hermeneutic phenomenology practiced in *Being and Time*, restored through our reading to the autonomy its author conferred upon it.

A HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

As regards the aporias of time in Augustinian and Husserlian thought, we might say that *Being and Time* resolves them, or rather dissolves them, inasmuch as, as early as the Introduction and Division One, the ground upon which these aporias took shape is left behind in favor of a new kind of questioning. I low then can we still oppose a time of the soul, in Augustinian terms, to a time that would essentially have "something to do with movement," hence be related to physics, after the manner of Aristotle? For one thing, the existential analytic has as its referent not the soul but Dasein, being-there; that is, the being that we are. But, at the same time, "Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it" (*Being and Time*, p. 32). The relationship of Dasein "in its Being . . . towards that Being" (ibid.), which belongs to the constitution of the Being of Dasein, is not presented as a simple ontic distinction between the psychological and the physical regions. What is more, for an existential analysis, nature cannot constitute an opposite pole, or much less an alien theme, in the consideration of Dasein, inasmuch as "the 'world' itself is something constitutive for Dasein" (p. 77). As a result, the question of time—to which the second division of Part One of *Being and Time* (the only part published) is devoted—can come, following the thematic order of this work, only after that of Being-in-the-world, which reveals the fundamental constitution of Dasein. The determinations related to the concept of existence (of my own existence) and to the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity contained in the notion of mineness "must be

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seen and understood a priori as grounded upon that state of Being which we have called "Being-in-the-world." An interpretation of this constitutive state is needed if we are to set up our analytic of Dasein correctly" (p. 78).

In fact, almost two hundred pages are devoted to Being-in-the-world, to the world-hood of the world in general, as though it were first necessary to allow ourselves to be permeated by the sense of the surrounding world, before having the right—before being entitled—to confront the structures of "Dasein . . . as such": situation, understanding, explication, discourse. It is not without importance that, in the thematic order followed by *Being and Time*, the question of the spatiality of Being-in-the-world is posed not only before that of temporality but as an aspect of "environmentality," hence of worldliness as such. How then could anything remain of the Augustinian aporia of a disten-tio animi robbed of cosmological support?

The opposition between Augustine and Aristotle seems therefore to have been superseded by the new problematic of Dasein, which overturns the received notions coming from physics and psychology.

Must not the same thing be said with respect to the Husserlian aporia of internal time-consciousness? How could the slightest trace remain of the antinomy between internal time-consciousness and objective time in an analytic of Dasein? Does not the structure of Being-in-the-world destroy the problematic of subject and object just as surely as it destroys that of the soul and nature?

What is more, the Husserlian ambition of making time itself appear is discounted from the first pages of *Being and Time* by the assertion that Being has been forgotten. If it is true that "only as phenomenology is ontology possible" (p. 60), phenomenology itself is possible only as hermeneutics, inasmuch as, owing to this forget fulness, hiddenness is the first condition of any effort at finally showing something. Released from its lie to direct vision, phenomenology becomes part of the struggle against dissimulation. "Covered-iip-ness is the
counter-concept to "phenomenon" (p. 60). Beyond the dilemma of the visibility or invisibility of time, the path of a hermeneutical phenomenology opens up where seeing steps aside in favor of understanding or, to use another expression, in favor of a "discovering interpretation," guided by the anticipation of the meaning of the Being that we are, and bent on exposing (treleigen) this meaning, that is, on freeing it from forgetfulness and hiddenness. This mistrust as regards any shortcut that would allow time itself to emerge within the field of appearing is evident in the strategy of postponement that marks the thematic treatment of the question of time. We must first pass through the long Division One—termed "preparatory" (vorbereitende)—before we can reach the problematic of Division Two, "Dasein and Temporality." And in Division Two, the various stages that will be discussed below must be traversed before we reach, in §65, the first definition of time. "This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as 'katakoralitiiv" (p. 374). We can, in this respect, speak of a retreat of the question of time in Heidegger.

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Is this to say that the attempt to escape the dilemma of direct intuition or indirect presupposition can lead only to a kind of hermeneuticism, considered as a form of mystification? This would be to neglect the labor of language that gives Being and Time a greatness that no subsequent work will eclipse. By a labor of language, I mean, first and foremost, the effort to articulate in an appropriate manner the hermeneutical phenomenology that ontology enlists in its own behalf. This is attested to by the frequent use of the term "structure." In addition, I mean the search for basic concepts that can be used to support the proposed structuring. Being and Time, in this respect, represents an immense construction site where the existentials that arc to Dasein what categories are to other entities are formed. If hermeneutical phenomenology can claim to escape the alternative of a direct, but silent, intuition of time or an indirect, but blind, presupposition of it, this is indeed thanks to the labor of language that makes the difference between interpreting (auslegen, §32) and understanding. Interpreting is, in fact, developing understanding, explicating the structure of a phenomenon as (als) this or that. In this way, we can bring to language, and hence to the level of assertion (Aussagc, §33) the understanding that we always already possess of the temporal structure of Dasein.

I would like to summarize a few pages the breakthrough this hermeneutical phenomenology brings about in the understanding of time, in relation to the discoveries that must be credited to Augustine and Mussed. Below, we shall have to admit how much greater a price must be paid for this audacious interpretation.

To Heidegger, we owe three admirable discoveries. The first one says that the question of time as a whole is enveloped, in a manner that remains to be explicated, by the basic structure of "Care." The second one says that the unity of the three dimensions of time—future, past, and present—is an ecstatic unity in which the mutual exteriorization of these aspects proceeds from their very entanglement with one another. Finally, the unfolding of this ecstatic unity reveals, in turn, a constitution of time that may be said to be layered, a hierarchy of the levels of temporality, which requires distinct denominations: temporality, historicality, and within-time-ness. We shall see how these three discoveries are interrelated and how the difficulties generated by the first discovery are taken up and multiplied by the second and third discoveries.

CASK AND TIMPOKALITY

To connect the authentic structure of time to that of Care is, immediately, to remove the question of time from the theory of knowledge and to bring it to the level of a mode of being that (1) retains the scar of its relation to the question of Being; (2) has cognitive, volitional, and emotional aspects, without itself being reduced to any one of these, or even being situated on a level where the distinction between these three aspects is pertinent; (3) recapitulates the major existentials such as projection, thrownness into the world, and fallcnness; and (4) provides a structural unity for these existentials that straightaway posits the requirement of "Being-a-whole" (Ganzsein) that leads directly to the question of temporality.

Let us pause and look at this last feature, which governs all that follows.

Why is it necessary to get into the question of temporality by way of the question of the "possibility of Being-a-whole" or, as we could also say, of "Being-integral"? At first sight the notion of Care does not appear to require this; it even seems at odds with it. The very first temporal implication that is unfolded is indeed that of Being-ahead-of-itself (das Sichvorweg), which includes no closure but, on the contrary, remains incomplete due, precisely, to Dasein's potentiality-for-Being (Seinskonncii). If the question of Being-a-whole has, nonetheless, a certain privilege, this is insofar as the hermeneutical phenomenology of time has as its stakes the articulated unity of the three moments of the future, the past, and the present. Augustine made this unity arise from the present by means of triplification. But the present, according to Heidegger, cannot assume this function of articulation and dispersion because it is the temporal category least apt to receive an originary and authentic analysis, by reason of its kinship with the fallen forms of existence, namely, the propensity of Dasein to understand itself in terms of things present-at-hand (vorhrmnden) and ready-to-hand (zitiilmien) that are (he object of its present care, of its preoccupation. Here already, what seems closest in the eyes of a direct phenomenology turns out to be the most inauthentic phenomenon, while the authentic is what is most concealed.
If therefore we admit that the question of time is first of all the question of its structural wholeness, and if the present is not the modality appropriate for this search for totality, it remains for us to find in Care's Being-ahead-of-itsclf (he secret of its completeness. If is here ih:il if the idea of Being-lowinlx-lhe-end ('ziin I'hiili' \x12/i) offers ilxelf NM the existenlinit Iliil hew.1; I he mink of its own iniTim cil.ine Iteliij, llel is remmkiilhe in ili.il il "bcluij. l.s" (p. ,76) In Mini which icnmins in iheynncc and in suspension in Disen's policntiall for Being. The "end of Being-in-the-woild is death" (pp. 27(> 77); "'ending,' as dying, is constitutive for Dasein's totality" (p. 284)."

This entrance into the problem of time through the question of Being-a-whole and this alleged connection between Bcing-a-wholc and Being-towards-death pose an immediate difficulty, which will not be without effect on the other two phases of our analysis. This difficulty lies in the unavoidable interference, at the heart of the analytic of Dascin, between (he existcntial and the "existential." Let us say a word about this problem in its most general and most formal aspects. In principle, the term "existcntial" characterizes the concrete choice of a way of Being-in-lhc-world, the ethical commitment assumed by exceptional personalities, by ecclesiastical and other communities, by entire cul

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turcs. The term "existcntial," on the other hand, characterizes any analysis that aims at explicating the structures that distinguish Dasein from all other beings and, therefore, that connect the question of the meaning of the Being of the entity that we are to the question of Being as such, to the extent that, for Dasein, the meaning of its Being is an issue for it. But this distinction between the existential and the existentialcll is obscured by its interfering with the distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic, which itself is caught up in the search for the primordial (ursprunglich). This latter overlapping is inevitable as soon as the degraded and fallen state of the concepts available to a hermeneutic phenomenology reflects the state of forgetfulness in which the question of Being lies, and when this fallen state requires the labor of language referred to above. The conquest of primordial concepts is thus inseparable from a struggle against inauthenticity, which itself is practically identified with everydayness. But this search for the authentic cannot be carried out without a constant appeal to the testimony of the existcntiall. Commentators, it seems to me, have not sufficiently stressed this core of the entire hermeneuti-cal phenomenology of Being and Time. This phenomenology is continually obliged to provide an existcntiall attestation for its existential concepts.7 This is not due to the need to reply to some epistemological objection coming from the human sciences, despite the words "criterion," "assurance," "certainty," "guarantee." The need for attestation results from the very nature of that po-tentiality-for-Being in which existence lies. Existence, in fact, is free, either for the authentic or the inauthentic, or even for some undifferentiated mode. The analyses of Division One had constantly relied on average everydayness and are therefore themselves confined to this indistinct, even frankly inauthentic, sphere. This is why a new demand is imposed: "Existence' means a po-tentiality-for-Being—but also one which is authentic" (p. 276). However, since an inauthentic being can well be less than whole (ci/,v unntinzi'o), as is verified by the allitude of llecin). In the lace of the possibility of death, it must lie miiiiied linui "mir c. liitit tiitltit tillHilylt xiy'him'ln n/ tilt ihw cninol lay any claim lo i'>Tiiin<riitilis" (ibid.). In other words, withoult the guarnanteo of liu-lhenlicity, the analysis also falls short of insuring primordiality.

The necessity of basing existential analysis on existenlcll testimony has no other origin. A striking example of this can be found at the beginning of Being and Time in the relation established between Being-a-whole and Being-towards-death. Clear confirmation of this can then also be found in the testimony anticipatory resoluteness makes concerning the entire analysis. The reign of inauthenticity never ceases, in fact, to reopen the question of the criterion of authenticity. Conscience (Gewixxen) is supposed to provide this confirmation of authenticity." Chapter 2, which is devoted to this analysis, is entitled "Dasein's Attestation (Ih'zeugunf) of an Authentic Potenciality-for-Being, and Resoluteness" (p. 312). This chapter, which again seems to postpone the decisive analysis of temporality, has an irreplaceable role. Ordinary

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language, in fact, has already said everything (here is to say about death: everyone dies alone, death is certain but its hour is uncertain, etc. Hence we have not finished with the gossip, deceit, dissimulation, and covering-up that infect everyday discourse. This is why it is necessary to call upon nothing less than the attestation of conscience, and the appeal addressed, through its voice, by the self to itself, in order to establish Being-towards-death at its highest level of authenticity. lo

So the testimony given by conscience about resoluteness belongs in an organic manner to the analysis of time as the totalization of existence. It places the seal of authenticity on the primordial. This is why Heidegger does not try to move directly from the analysis of Care to that of time. Temporality is ac-cessible only at the intersection point of the primordial, reached in part by the analysis of Being-towards-death, and the authentic, established by the analysis of conscience. This is perhaps the most decisive reason for the strategy of postponement that we have opposed to the strategy of taking a shortcut adopted by Husscrl, with its exclusion of objective time and the description of objects as minute as a sound that continues to resonate. Heidegger allows himself a series of delays before approaching temporality thematically. First, there is the long "preparatory" treatise (the entire first
division of \textit{Being and Time}) dealing with the analysis of \textit{Being-in-the-world} and with the "there" of \textit{Being}-there, of \textit{Dasein}, which is crowned by the analysis of \textit{Care}. Next, there is the short treatise (the first two chapters of Division Two) that, by joining together the themes of \textit{Being-towards-death} and resoluteness in the complex notion of anticipatory resoluteness, assures the over-lapping of the primordial by the authentic. To this strategy of postponement will correspond, after the thematic analysis of temporality, a strategy of repetition, announced in the introductory section to Division Two (S45). If it will be the task of Chapter 4 of Division Two to undertake a recapitulation of all the analyses of Division One, in order to glean, after the fuel, their temporal meaning. This recapitulation is announced in the following (erns. "The existential-temporal analysis of this entity needs to be continued \textit{[Hervorhebung] concretely. . . . by thus recapitulating [Wirht<rei<>liiif>] our preparatory '
\textit{Suffixation} of \textit{Dasein}, which we will at the same time make the phenomenon of temporality itself more transparent \textit{[Lautlichkeit]}" (pp. 277–78). We can consider as an additional postponement (the long "recapitulation" (\textit{Wiederschalln}) of Division Two of \textit{Ilieix and Time} (pp. 380–81), inserted between the analysis of temporality properly speaking (Chapter 3) and that of historically (Ch; plcr4), with the clearly defined intention of finding in (the rereinterpretation in temporal terms of all the moments of \textit{Being-in-the-world} covered in Division One a "confirmation \textit{[Bewahrung] of its constitutive power \textit{[seiner konstitutiven Mitlieigkeit]}" (p. 380). Chapter 4, dealing with the "temporal interpretation" of the features of \textit{Being-in-the-world}, can thus be placed under the same heading of an attestation of authenticity as was the case in Chapter 2 with respect to the resoluteness and the "Ordinary" Concept of Time.

We can first of all ask whether the entire analysis of temporality is not tied to the personal conception that \textit{Heidegger} has of authenticity, on a level where it competes with other existentiell conceptions, those of \textit{Pascal} and \textit{Kierkegaard}—or that of \textit{Sartre}—to say nothing of that of \textit{Augustine}. It is not, in fact, within an ethical configuration, strongly marked by a certain Stoicism, that resoluteness in the face of death constitutes the supreme test of authenticity? More important, is it not within a categorial analysis, heavily influenced by the recoil-effect of the existentiell on the existential, that death is held to be our utmost possibility, even our ownmost potentiality, inherent in the essential structure of \textit{Care}? I myself consider just as legitimate an analysis such as \textit{Sartre}’s, which characterizes death as the interruption of our poten-tiality-for-\textit{Being} rather than as its most authentic possibility.

We can also ask ourselves whether this very peculiar existentiell mark, placed from the outset on the analysis of temporality, will not have extremely serious consequences on the effort to hierarchi/e temporality in the last two chapters of the division on \textit{Dasein} and \textit{time}. Despite (he desire to derive \textit{his} temporality from radical temporality, a new dispersion of \textit{his} notion of \textit{time} will, in fact, emerge from \textit{his} incommensurability of \textit{mortal} \textit{time}, which temporality is identified with by the preparatory analysis, historical \textit{time}, which historically is supposed to ground, and cosmic \textit{time}, which within-\textit{time} leads to. The perspective of a concept of time broken up in this way, which will reawaken the aporias \textit{Augustine} and \textit{Husserl} ran into, can become clearer only when the notion of "\textit{derivation}" has itself been examined as it is applied to the interconnection of the three levels of \textit{time-\textit{poral/\textit{al}on} Anil il is by this examination that we shall conclude our own presentation. If we withdraw from mortality the capacity to determine by itself alone the level of radicalness on which temporality can be thought, we do not thereby weaken the mode of questioning that guides the investigation of temporality (Chapter 3). Quite the opposite. If the potentiality of \textit{Dasein} to be a whole— or as we might say, its capacity for being integral—ceases to be governed

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solely by the consideration of \textit{Being-towards-the-end}, the potentiality-of-\textit{Being}-a-whole can once again be carried back to the power of unification, articulation, and dispersion belonging to time." And if the modality of \textit{Being-towards-death} seems instead to result from the recoil-effect of the other two levels of temporalization—historically and within-time—on the most original level, then the potentiality-for-\textit{Being} constitutive of \textit{Care} can be revealed in its purest state, as \textit{Being-ahead} of itself, as \textit{Sichvorweg}. The other features that, together, make up resolute anticipation arc not weakened either, but are strengthened by the refusal to give a preference to \textit{Being-towards-death}. In this way, the attestation provided by the silent voice of conscience, and the guilt that gives this voice its existentiell force, is addressed to our potentiality-for-\textit{Being} in its barest form and its fullest scope. In the same way, thrown-\textit{Being} is just as fully revealed by the fact of being born one day, and in a particular place, as by the necessity of having to die. Falli\textit{ness} is attested to no less by old promises that are not kept as by the fact of fleeing in the face of death. Endebtncss and responsibility, which are designated by the same word in German, \textit{Schild}, themselves constitute a powerful appeal to every person to choose according to
their ownmost possibilities, making them free for their task in the world, when Care recovers its original impetus through carefreeness with respect to death.  
So there is thus more than one existentiell way of accepting, in all its existential force, Heidegger's formula defining temporality: "Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness" (p. 351).11

**Temporalization: Coming-Towards, Having-Been, and Making-Present**

As we have said, it is only at the end of Chapter 3 of Division Two, §§65-66, that Heidegger deals with temporality thematically in its relation to Care. In this extremely dense pages, he attempts to go beyond (the Augustinian analysis of the threefold present and 'farther than the I/usserian analysis of icen-lion and protention, which, as we saw above, lakes place in the same phenomenological space. Heidegger's originality lies in his effort to seek in (arc iIsd t1 principle of His plunrl/iing of lime into Inline, past, and present, hom this shift toward what is more primordial will result the promotion of the future lo the place occupied up to now by the present, and a complete recorcenta-|ion of the relations between the three dimensions of time. This will require that the very terms "future," "past," and "present" be abandoned, terms that Augustine never felt obliged to question, out of respect for ordinary language, despite his audacity in speaking of the present of the future, the present of the past, and the present of the present.  

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What we are looking for, it is stated at the beginning of §65, is the meaning (Sinn) of Care. It is a question not of vision but of understanding and of interpretation. Taken strictly, meaning "signifies the 'upon-which' [voraufhin] of the primary projection of the understanding of Being." "Meaning' signifies the 'upon-which' [das Voraufliin] of a primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as [als] that which it is" (p. 371).41

Between the internal organization of Care and the threefold nature of time we find, therefore, a quasi-Kantian relation of conditionality. But the Heideggerian "making possible" differs from the Kantian condition of possibility in that Care "possibilizes" all human experience. These considerations on possibilization, inherent in Care, already announce the primacy of the future in the analysis of the articulated structure of time. The intermediary link in the reasoning is provided by the preceding analysis of resolute anticipation, itself resulting from the meditation on Being-towards-the-end and Being-towards-death. This is more than the primitivity of the future. It involves the reinscription of the term "future," borrowed from everyday language, in the idiom appropriate to hermeneutic phenomenology. An adverb, more than a noun, serves as a guide here, namely, the zu in sein-zum-Ende and sein-zum-Tode, which can be applied to the zu of the expression Zu-kunft (to-come, coming-towards). With this, kommen—to come—also takes on a new aspect by joining the power of the verb to that of the adverb, in place of the substantive form "the future." In Care, Dasein aims at coming toward itself in accordance with its ownmost possibilities. Coming-towards (Zukunft) is the root of the future. "This letting-itself-come-towards5-itself[sichaufsichzukommen-lassen] is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards [Zukunft]" (p. 372). This is the possibility included in resolute anticipation. "Anticipation [Vorlaitjen] makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming towards itself— that is to say, in so far as it is futural [zuikunftig] in its Being in general" (p. 373). This new signification given to the future allows us to distinguish some overlooked relations of close mutual implication among the three dimensions of time. Heidegger starts with the implication of the past by the future, thereby postponing a consideration of their relation to the present, which was at the center of both Augustine's and I lusserl's analyses. The passage from (he future to the past no longer constitutes an extrinsic transition because "having-been" appears to be called for by the future as "coming-towards," and in a sense, to be contained within it. There is no recognition in general without the recognition of debt and responsibility, once resoluteness itself implies that we ourselves assume the fault and its moment of thrownness (Geworfenheit). "But taking over thrownness signifies being  

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Dasein authentically e.v // already was [ in dcm, wie ex je schon war]" (p. 373). The important thing here is (hat the imperfect tense of the verb "to be...—"was"—and the adverb that stresses it—"already" arc not separate from Being; instead "as it already was" bears the mark of the "I am," as one can say in German 'ich bin gewesen, "'Iam-as-having-been" (ibid.). It can then be said, "As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as 'having-been" (ibid.). This summing up is in fact the turning back upon the self inherent in any act of taking responsibility. In this way, having-been stems from coming-towards. "Having-been," not "the past," if by "past" we arc to understand the past of past things that we oppose, on the level of given presence and things that are present-at-hand, to the openness of future things. Do we not take as self-evident the fact that the past is determined and the future open? This asymmetry separated from its hermeneutical context does not permit us to apprehend the intrinsic relation between the past and the future, however.
As for the present, far from engendering the past and the future by multiplying itself, as in Augustine, it is the mode of temporality possessing the most deeply concealed authenticity. There is, of course, a truth of everydayness in its dealings with things ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. In this sense, the present is indeed the lime of concern. But it must not be thought of following the model of the presence-at-hand of the things of our concern, but rather as an implication of Care. It is through the intermediary of the situation which is in each case offered to resoluteness that we can rethink the present in its existential mode. We must then speak of "en-presenting" in the sense of "making present" rather than of being present. "Only as the Present [Gegenwart] in the sense of making present, can resoluteness become what it is: namely, letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which it science upon in taking action" (p. 374).

Coming-towards and turning back upon itself are thus incorporated in resoluteness, once the latter is placed in a situation by making it present, by "en-presenting" it. Temporality is then the articulated unity of coming-towards, having-been, and making-present, which are thereby given to be thought of together. "This phenomenon has (the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as 'temporality'"", (ibid.). We see in what sense this kind of deduction of the three modes of temporality, from each other, corresponds to the concept of "making-possible" mentioned above. "Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, lacticity, and falling" (p. 376). This new status of making-possible is expressed in the substitution of the verb for the nominal form. "Temporality 'is' not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporalizes itself" (p. 377)."

If the invisibility of time as a whole is no longer an obstacle to thinking, once we think of possibility as making possible and of temporality as (temporality), what remains just as obscure in Heidegger as it was in Augustine is the triplicity internal to this structural wholeness. The adverbial expressions—the towards of coming-towards, the already of having-been, and the alongsideness of concern—indicate on the very level of language itself the dispersion that undermines the unitary articulation from within. The Augustinian problem of the threefold present is simply carried over to temporalization taken as a whole. It seems that we can only point toward this intractable phenomenon, designate it by the Greek term ekstalitein, and state that "Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' [Außer-sich] in and for itself" (p. 377)." At the same time, it is necessary to complete the idea of the structural unity of time by adding that of the differences among its ecstases. This differentiation is intrinsically implied by temporalization insofar as it is a process that gathers together in dispersing. The passage from the future to the past and to the present is at one and the same time unification and diversification. Here, all at once, we see the enigma of the dixtientio animi reintroduced, although it is no longer based on the present. And for similar reasons, we recall, Augustine was careful to account for the extensible character of time that makes us speak of a long time or a short time. For Heidegger, too, what he considers to be the ordinary conception of time—that is, the succession of "nows" external to one another—finds a secret ally in the primordial exteri/oriation with regard to which the ordinary conception is but the expression of a leveling off. This leveling off is the leveling off of this aspect of exteriority. We shall be in a position to consider this leveling off only after we have spread out before ourselves the hierarchical levels of temporality: temporality, historicality, and within-time-ness, inasmuch as much as this leveling off actually affects is the mode whose derivation makes it the furthest removed from primordial temporality, within-time-ness. Nevertheless, it is possible to perceive in the Außer-sich of primordial temporality the principle of all the subsequent forms of exteri/oriation and of the leveling off that will affect it. The question then arises whether the derivation of the least authentic modes does not conceal the circularity of the entire analysis. Is derived time not already anticipated in the Außer-sich of primordial temporality?

HISTORICALITY (GF.SCHMMLICHIKUT)

There is no way I can measure my debt as regards the ultimate contribution of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology to the theory of time. The most valuable discoveries in it give rise to the most disconcerting perplexities. The distinction between temporality, historicality, and within-time-ness (which occupies the last two chapters with which Being and Time breaks off, it can be said, more than concludes) can be added to its two other remarkable discoveries—the recourse to Care as that which makes temporality possible and the plural unity of the three ecstases of temporality.
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The question of historically is introduced by the formulation of a scruple (Bedenken), one which is now familiar to us. "Have we indeed brought the whole of Dasein, as regards it authentically Being-a-whole, into the forehaving [Vorhaben] of our existential analysis?" (p. 424). Temporality is lacking in one aspect that would make it a whole. This aspect is Erstreckung, stretching along, between birth and death. But how could this have been considered in an analysis that has up to now disregarded birth and, along with it, the between-birth-and-death? Now, this between-the-two is the very stretching-along of Dasein. If nothing has been said of this earlier, it was out of the fear of falling back into the web of ordinary thinking concerning the things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. What could be more tempting than to identify this stretching-along with a measurable interval between the "now" of the beginning and that of the end? But, have we not, at the same time, neglected to consider human existence in terms of a concept, familiar to many thinkers at the beginning of this century, including Dilthey, that of the "connectedness of life" (Zusammenhang des Lebens), conceived of as an ordered sequence of experiences (Erlebnisse) "in time"? It cannot be denied that something important is stated here, but something that is perverted by the defective categorization imposed by the ordinary representation of time. For indeed it is within the framework of simple succession that we place not only connectedness and sequence but also change and permanence (all of which, let us note, are concepts that hold the highest interest for narration). Birth then becomes an event of the past that no longer exists, just as death becomes a future event that has not yet taken place, and the connectedness of life a lapse of time framed by the rest of time. It will only be by connecting to the problematic of Care the legitimate investigations centered on the concept of the "connectedness of life" that we shall be able to restore to the notions of stretching-along, movement (tiewegheit), and self-constancy (Selbstsinthligkeit) their ontological dignity, which the ordinary representation of time places in lino with the consimly, change, and, permanence of things present-at-hand. Reconnected to Care, the between life and death "ceases to appear as an interval separating two nonexistential end-points. On the contrary, Dasein does not till up an interval of time bill, by stretching-along, which envelops its own beginning and its own end, and gives meaning to life as "between." We could not find ourselves any closer to Augustine than in this observation. It is to indicate clearly this derivation of (he stretching-along of Dasein starting from primordial temporalization that Heidegger attempts to renew the meaning of the old German word Geschehen and lo put it on an equal footing with the ontological problematic of between-life-and-death. The choice of this word is apt inasmuch as Geschheten ("histori" in the English translation of Being and Time) is a verb homologous to Zeitgieit, which indicates the lcm-poralizing operation.

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In addition, thanks to its semantic kinship with the substantive form Ge-xchichte—history—the verb gescheten leads to the threshold of the episte-mological question, so important to us, whether it is due to historiographical science that we think historically, or whether it is not because Dasein historizes itself that historical research has a meaning. Later we shall give this debate between the ontology of historically and the epistemology of historiography the attention it fully deserves. For the moment, our problem is more radical. It concerns the nature of the "derivation" by which we pass from temporality to historicality on the ontological level.

This is less of a one-way derivation than Heidegger seems to announce. On the one hand, historicality owes its ontological tenor to this derivation. Stretching along, movement, and self-constancy can be lifted out of their degraded representation only by referring the whole problematic of historicality to that of temporality. "We are even incapable of giving a satisfactory meaning to the relations between movement and self-constancy so long as we think of them in terms of the opposing categories of change and permanence.

On the other hand, historicality adds a new dimension—an original, equi-primordial dimension—to temporality, toward which all the ordinary expressions of cohesion, change, and self-constancy point despite their degraded stale. If common sense did not have a certain precondition, the question of readjusting these expressions to the ontological discourse of Dasein would not even arise. We would not even ask the question of the historical becoming of Dasein, if we had not already raised, within the framework of inappropriate categories, the questions of change and self-constancy, akin to the question of Dasein's stretching along between life and death.

The question of self-constancy, in particular, imposes itself on our reflection as soon as we ask ourselves about the "who" of Dasein. We cannot avoid this question once the question of the self returns to the foreground with the question of reloluteness, which itself goes along with the self-reference of promising and guilt. "II is therefore quite true Ihnl although il is derived, the notion of historicality adds to that of temporality, on the existential level itself, those features signified by words "stretching along," movement," and "self-constancy," We must no! forget (his enrichment of Ihe primordial by the derivative when we ask in what way historically is the ontological ground of history, and, reciprocally, in what way the epistemology of historiography is a discipline grounded on the ontology of historicality. We must now explore the resources provided by this innovative derivation—if we may call it so. Heidegger's main concern in this regard is to resist two tendencies found in all historical thinking. The first one consists in thinking of history straightforward as a public phenomenon, for is history not the history of all people? The second leads to separating the past from its relation to the future and to construing historical thought as pure
trying to understand after the fact, in the mode of retrospection, even of retrodiction.

To the first temptation, Heidegger opposes the primacy of the historicality of each "Tactical" Dasein in relation to all research concerning world history, in the sense that Hegel ascribes to this term. "Dasein factically has its 'history', and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this entity is constituted by historicality" (p. 434). And it is indeed this first sense of the word "history" that is prescribed by an investigation that takes Care as its guide and that sees in Being-towards-death—solitary and untransferable—the touchstone for any authentic attitude toward time."

As for the second temptation, Heidegger confronts it head-on with the full weight of the preceding analysis, which gives priority to the future in the mutual genesis of the three temporal ecstasies. This analysis, however, cannot simply be continued in the same way, if we are to take into consideration the new features added by historicality (stretching-along, movement, and self-constancy). This is why the movement of coming-towards in the direction of having-becn must be rethought in such a way as to account for the reversal by which the past seems to regain priority over the future. The decisive moment in the argument is as follows. There is no impetus toward the future that does not turn back toward the condition of finding itself already thrown into the world. Now this returning back upon itself is not limited to returning to the most contingent and most extrinsic circumstances of our imminent choices. In a more essential manner, it consists in grasping hold of the innermost and most permanent possibilities held in reserve in what appears to constitute no more than the contingent and extrinsic occasion for action. In order to state this close relationship between anticipation and fallenness, Heidegger ventures to introduce the kindred notions of heritage, transfer, and transmission. The term heritage—Erbe—was chosen for its particular connotations. For everyone, in fact, fallenness—being thrown—presents the singular configuration of a "lot" composed of possibilities that are neither chosen nor fettering, but that are handed down and transmitted. In addition, a heritage is what can be received, taken over, assumed by someone. The French language, unfortunately, does not have the semantic resources of German to reconstitute the network of verbs and prefixes that knit together this idea of a heritage that is handed down, carried over, and assumed. This key notion of a heritage that is handed down and assumed constitutes the pivot point of this analysis. It enables us to see how every turning backwards conies from a resoluteness that is, in its essence, turned toward the future.

The distinction between the transmission of potentialities that arc arc my own self, as having-becn, and the fortuitous transfer of a fixed set of circumstances, opens up in turn the path for an analysis that rests on the kinship between the three concepts that the semantics of German groups together: Schiksal, Geschick, and Geschiclic— which we translate by "fate," "destiny," and "history."

The first term certainly reinforces the monadic character of the analysis, at least in its beginnings. What I hand down, I hand down to myself, just as I receive myself as a heritage of potentialities. This is my fate. If indeed we construct all of our projects in light of Being-towards-death, then all that is fortuitous falls away. What remains in our lot, that share that we are, in the destitution of our mortality. Fate: "This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself Ich . . . ubertifert, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen" (p. 435). At this level, constraints and choices merge together, as do powerlessness and all-powerfulness in the overdetermined concept of fate.

Is it true, however, that a heritage is handed down from the self to itself? Is it not always received from someone else? Yet Being-towards-death, it seems, excludes everything that is transferable from one person to another. To which conscience adds the personal tone of a silent voice addressed from the self to itself. The difficulty is compounded when we pass from individual historicality to common history. It is then the notion of Geschick—common destiny—that is called upon to assure the transition, to make the leap. The abrupt passage from an individual fate to a common destiny is made intelligible by resorting to the existential category of Mitscin, Being-with, which is done only too infrequently in Being and Time. I say only too infrequently because, in the section devoted to Mitscin (§§25-27), it is for the most part the deteriorated forms of cenydayncss that are emphasized under the category of the "they." And the conquest of the self always takes place against the background of this "they," without taking into consideration the authentic forms of communion or mutual assistance. At least the recourse to Being-with at this critical point of the analysis does authorize us to link together Mitgeschehen and Geschehen, co-historicity and historicity. This is precisely what defines a common destiny. It is, in fact, noteworthy that Heidegger, continuing here his polemic against the philosophies of the subject—and also those of intersubjectivity—contests the claim that the historicity of a community, a people (Volk), can be formed on the basis of individual fates. This is a transition as unacceptable
as that which would conceive of Being-with-one-another as "the occurring together [Zusammenvorkommen] of several Subjects" (p. 436). Livelihood indicates that Heidegger here confines himself to suggesting the idea of a homology between communal destiny and individual fate, and to indicating the transfer of the same observations from one place to the other—the heritage of a ground of potentialities, resoluteness, etc. In so doing, he is prepared, if need be, to point to the empty place to

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be filled by categories more specifically suited to Being-with: struggle, combative obedience, loyalty. Setting aside these difficulties, to which we shall return in a later chapter, the central line of the entire analysis of temporality begins from the notion of stretching-along (Erstreckung), follows the chain of the three semantically related concepts—history (Geschichte), fate (Schicksal), and common destiny (Geschick)—and then culminates in the concept of repetition (or recapitulation) (Wiederholung).

I should like to stress in particular the contrast between the initial term of stretching-along and the final one of repetition. It coincides exactly with the Augustinian dialectic of distentio and intentio, which I have often transcribed into the vocabulary of discordance and concordance.

Repetition (or recapitulation) is not a concept unknown to us at this stage of our reading of Being and Time. The analysis of temporality as a whole is, as we have seen, a repetition of the entire analytic of Dasein developed in Division One. In addition, the dominant category of temporality has received, in Chapter 4 of Division Two, a specific confirmation in its ability to repeat, feature by feature, each of the moments of the analytic of Dasein.

Now we find that repetition is the name given to the process by which, on the derived level of historically, the anticipation of (be future, the recovery of falliness, and the moment of vision (augenblicklich) in tune with "its time" reconstitute their unity. In one sense, the reciprocal engendering of the three ecstasies of temporality, beginning with the future, contained an outline of repetition. However, inasmuch as historically brought with it new categories stemming from Geschichten, and especially inasmuch as the entire analysis is shifted from the anticipation of the future toward the recovery of the past, a new concept for relating the three ecstasies is required, based on the explicit theme of historicality, namely, the handing down of possibilities that are inherited and nevertheless chosen. "Repeating ix handing down explicitly—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there" (p. 437). The cardinal function of the concept of repetition is to reestablish the balance that the idea of a handed-down heritage tipped to the side of having-been, to recover the primacy of anticipatory resoluteness at the very heart of what is abolished, over and done with, what is no longer. Repetition thus opens potentialities that went unnoticed, were aborted, or were repressed in the past. It opens up the past again in the direction of coming-towards. By scaling the tie between handing-down and resoluteness, the concept of repetition succeeds at once in preserving the primacy of the future and in making the shift toward having-becn. This secret polarization between (he heritage handed down and anticipatory resoluteness can even make repetition into a rejoinder (erwidern), which can go so far as to be a disavowal (Widerruf) of the grip of the past on the present. Repetition does even more. It puts the seal

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of temporality on the entire chain of concepts constitutive of historicality—heritage, handing down, taking over, history, co-historicizing, fate, and destiny—and brings historicality back to its origin in temporality. *

* The time seems to have come to pass from the theme of historicality to that of within-time-ness, which, in fact, has been continually anticipated in the preceding analyses. We must, however, pause here and take into account a quarrel that is far from marginal in relation to the overall project of Being and Time. This quarrel concerns the status of historiography, and more generally of the Geisteswissenschaften—in other words, the human sciences—in relation to the existential analytic of historicality. The place this debate occupies in German thought, principally under the influence of Dilthey, is well known. It is also well known that this problem preoccupied Heidegger before he wrote Being and Time. In this sense, we could say that the refutation of the claim made by the human sciences to be constituted on an autonomous basis, equal to the natural sciences, belongs to the formative core of Being and Time, even though the thesis that the epistemology of the human sciences is wholly subordinated to the existential analytic seems to constitute only a sort of enclave (cf. §§72, 75-77) within the general problematic of the derivation of the levels of temporalization. Rapidly stated, the reproach leveled at a simple epistemology of the human sciences (Dilthey being the most noteworthy craftsman in this regard) is that such an epistemology grants itself an unfounded concept of pastness, by failing to ground this concept in the having-becn of historicality, which makes intelligible its relation to coming-towards and making-present.

Whoever does not understand "histori/ing," in the hermeneutical sense, does not understand "historical," in the sense of the human sciences. In particular, scholars do not understand what should be an enigma to them: that the past, which is no longer, has effects, exerts an influence, an action (Wirkung) on the present. This after-effect (Nachwirkende), which may be said to be declared only subsequently or after the fact, ought to surprise us. More precisely, our puzzlement
should be directed to the notion of the remains of the past. Do we not say, of what remains of a Greek temple, that it is a "fragment of the past," that it is "still present"? The paradox of the historical past in its entirety lies here. On the one hand, it is no longer; on the other, the remains of the past hold it still present-at-hand \textit{(Vorhanden)}. The paradox of the "no longer" and the "not yet" returns with a vengeance.

It is clear that the understanding of what is meant by remains, ruins, antiquities, old equipment, and so on escapes an episemology that has no basis in Dasein. Its past character is not written on the face of a remainder, even when it has deteriorated. Quite the opposite; however transitory it may be, it has not yet passed away, it is not yet past. This paradox attests to the fact that there is

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<td>no historical object except for a being that already possesses the sense of his-torizing. We then come back to the question: what were, at another time, the things that we now see before us, deteriorated and yet still visible?</td>
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"There is but a single solution. What is no longer is the world to which these i remains belonged. But the difficulty seems only to be pushed farther back. For what does being-no-longer signify for the world? It is not stated that the "world is only in the manner of existing Dasein, which factically is as Being-in-the-world" \textit{(p. 432)? In other words, how can Being-in-the-world be conjugated in the past tense?} Heidegger's reply leaves me puzzled. According to him, the paradox strikes only those beings that fall under the category of the \textit{vorhanden} and the \textit{zu-handen}, concerning which we cannot understand how they can be "past," that is, no longer yet still present. However the paradox does not strike what involves Dasein because Dasein escapes the only categorization for which the past poses a problem. "A Dasein which no longer exists, however, is not past \textit{vergangen}, in the ontologically strict sense; it is rather 'having-been-there' \textit{[da-gewesen]}" \textit{(ibid.)}. The remains of the past are remains of the past because they were equipment that belonged "to a world that has been \textit{da-gewesen}— the world of a Dasein that has been there" \textit{(ibid.)}. Once this distinction has been made between "past" and "having-been," and once the past has been ascribed to the order of equipment, given and ready-to-hand, the path is clear for the well-known analysis of historically, which we discussed above.

We may nevertheless wonder whether historiography has found a grounding in historically, or whether, instead, its own problems have been simply avoided. Certainly, Heidegger was not unaware of this difficulty, and we can agree with him when he says that what is past in historical remains is the world to which they belonged. But as a result, he was forced to shift his emphasis to the term "world." It is the world of a Dasein thai is said lo have been there. By this shift of emphasis, (be equipment we encounter in (be world itself becomes historical, in a derivative sense." In \textit{(his} way, Heidegger is led to forge the expression \textit{weltgeschichtlich}, world-historical, to designate those beings other than Dasein that are called "historical," in the sense of historiz-ing, due to their belonging to the world of Care. Heidegger thinks that by this he has done away with the claims of Diltheyian epistemology. "World-historical entities do not first get their historical character, let us say, by reason of a historiological Objectification; they get it rather as \textit{those entities which they are in themselves when they are encountered within-the-world}" \textit{(p. 433)}. What appears to me to be shunted aside here is precisely the problematic of the trace, in which the very characterization as historical—in the existential sense of the term—is based upon the persistence of a thing that is given and ready to hand, that is, of a physical "mark" capable of guiding a return toward the past. \textit{15} Along with the trace, Heidegger also challenges the idea that increasing distance in time is a specific feature of history, making oldncss per se

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the criterion of history. The notion of temporal distance too is set aside as having no primordial significance. According to Heidegger, every characterization as historical proceeds exclusively from the temporalizing of Dasein, with the reservation that the emphasis be placed on the side of the world in Being-in-the-world and that the encounter with equipment be incorporated into such Being-in-the-world.

The only way of justifying the ontological priority of historicality over historiography would be, it seems to me, to show convincingly how the latter proceeds from the former. Here we run into the greatest difficulty for any thinking about time that refers every derivative form of temporality to one primordial form, the mortal temporality of Care. This poses a major obstacle to any historical thinking. I cannot see how the repetition of possibilities inherited by each of us as a result of being thrown into the world can measure up to the scope of the historical past. Extending the notion of historizing to co-historizing, what Heidegger calls destiny \textit{(Geschick)} provides, of course, a wider basis for having-been. But the gap between having-been and the past remains, insofar as what, in fact, opens the way for an inquiry into the past are visible remains. Everything still has to be done if this past indicated by the trace is to be integrated with the having-been of a community with a destiny. Heidegger lessens the difficulty only by attributing to the idea of the source or origin \textit{(Ihrkunft)} of the derivative forms the value, not of a gradual loss of meaning, but of an increase of meaning. This enrichment, as we shall see, owes a debt to what the analysis of temporality—which is nevertheless overly marked by its reference to the most intimate feature of existence, namely, our own mortality—has borrowed from the analyses made in
Division One of *Being and Time*, where the emphasis was placed on the world-pole of Being-in-the-world. This return in force of worldliness at the end of the work is not the leasl of the surprises (o be found in the Heideggerian analytic of temporality.

This is confirmed by what follows in the text in the passage from historicality to within-time-ness. The final sections (§§75-77) of the chapter on historicality, directed against Dilthey, are too ostensibly concerned with stressing the subordination of historiography to historicity to shed any new light on the inverse problem of the passage from having-been to the historical past. The main emphasis is on the inauthenticity of the preoccupation that inclines us to understand ourselves in relation to the objects of our Care and to speak the language of the "they." To this, says Heidegger, we must obstinately reply, with all the seriousness of the hermeneutic phenomenology of Care, that the "historizing of history is the historicizing of Being-in-the-world" (p. 440) and that with "the existence of historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand already have, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world" (ibid.). That the historicizing of equipment makes such en-

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tities autonomous deepens the enigma of pastness and of the past, for lack of any support in the historicality of Being-in-the-world, which includes the being of equipment. However, this autonomy, which gives a sort of objectivity to the processes that affect equipment, works, monuments, and the like can be understood phenomenologically through the genesis of preoccupation starting from Care, "without being grasped historiologically" (p. 441). The structures of fallenness, of everydayness, of anonymity, that stem from the analytic of Dasein are sufficient, Heidegger believes, to account for this misunderstanding by which we ascribe a history to things. The call to authenticity wins out over the concern to take the step from ontology to epistemology, even though the necessity to do so is not contested."

However, can we inquire into "the existential source of historiology" (p. 444), can we assert that it is rooted in temporality, without traversing the path that connects them in both directions?

**WITHIN-TIME-NESS (INNERZEITIGKEIT)**

Let us close the parenthesis of this long-standing quarrel concerning the ground of the human sciences and again take up our guideline of the problematic dealing with the levels of temporaliation, which forms the heart of Division Two of *Being and Time*.

By unfolding the new meanings that the phenomenological concept of time has acquired by passing from the level of pure temporality to that of historicality, have we given to temporality itself the concrete fullness that it has continually lacked since the start of our analyses? Just as the analysis of temporality remains incomplete without the derivation—which itself creates new categories—that leads to the idea of historically, so too historically has not been completely thought out so long as it has not in Him been completed by the idea of within-time-ness, which is, nonetheless, derived from it."

The chapter entitled "Temporality and Within-time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time" (p. 456) is, in fact, far from constituting a pale echo of (lie existential analysis of temporality. It shows a philosopher will Inscr: llo plic wall. Two disliiu'! questions me raised: in whnl way i.s

naicd us Ihi" "in which" events occur still connected to fundamental temporality? In what way does this derivation constitute the origin of the ordinary concept of lime? As closely related as they may be, these questions are distinct. One raises (lie problem of derivation, the other lhal of leveling oil. What is at stake in both questions is whether (he duality between the lime of the soul and cosmic time (our Chapter 1) and (he duality between phenomenological time and objective time (our Chapter 2) are dually overcome in an analytic of Dasein.

Let us concentrate our attention on (he aspects of within-time-ness thai re-
way reminds analysis that the priority accorded to Being-towards-death was in danger of tipping the balance to the side of inactivity. It is to recall that if Dasein does not know itself in accordance with the categories of presence-to-hand and read-incess-to-hand, Dasein is in the world only through the commerce it maintains with these things, and their categorization must not be forgotten in turn. Dasein exists alongside (bei) the things of the world, just as it exists with (mit) others. This Being-alongside, in turn, recalls the condition of thrownness that constitutes the reverse side of every project and underscores the primordial passivity against which all understanding stands out, an understanding that is always "in a given situation." In fact, the dimension of being-affected was never sacrificed in the earlier analyses to that of being-projected, as the deduction of the three ecstases of time amply demonstrated. The present analysis underscores the legitimacy of this demonstration, Shifting the emphasis to "thrownness alongside" has as its corollary the importance attributed to the third temporal ecstasis, upon which the analysis of time as the time of a project, hence as Inline, is a soil of suspension, lie in) alongside the III ings of our concern, is to live Care as "preoccupation" (begehen). With preoccupation, what predominates is the ecstasis of the present or rather of en-present-ing, in the sense of making present (Gegenwerden). With preoccupation, the present is finally given its due. Augustine and I Iusserl started from it, Heidegger ends up there. At this point, consequently, their analyses intersect. Heidegger by no means denies that, on (his) level, it is legitimate to reorganize the relations among the three ecstases of time around the pivot point of the present. Only someone who says "today" can also speak of what will happen "then" and of what has lo be done "before," whether it is a matter of plans, of

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impediments, or of precautions; only this being can speak of what, having failed or escaped attention, took place "before" and must succeed "now."

Simplifying a great deal, we can say that preoccupation places the accent on the present, just as primordial temporality placed it on the future and his-toricity on the past. However, as the deduction of each of the ecstases of temporality from the others has shown, the present is understood existentially only last of all. We know why. By restoring the legitimacy of the within-the-world surroundings of Dasein, we risk yoking the understanding of Dasein once again to the categories of what is present-at-hand and what is ready-to-hand, categories under which, according to Heidegger, metaphysics has always tried to classify things, up to the distinction between the psychical and the physical. We are all the more in danger of doing just this when the swing of the scale that shifts the emphasis to the "world" of Being-in-the-world makes the things of our concern outweigh Being-in-Carc. This is where the leveling off, which we shall discuss below, begins. After this group of descriptive features, whose "source" is relatively easy to uncover, the analysis moves to a group of three characteristics that are precisely those that the ordinary conception of time has leveled off. They therefore occupy a key position in the analysis, at the intersection point of the problematic of the source and the problematic of derivation (§80).

Given the framework of the discussion that will follow, we cannot be too attentive to the innovation in meaning that gives this derivation a productive character. The three characteristics in question are named: datability, lapse of time, and publicness. Datability is connected to "reckoning with time," which is said to precede actual calculation, I is likewise affirmed here that disability precedes the assigning of dates; in other words, actual calendar dating. The liability proceeds from the relational structure of primordial time, when it is referred to the present, forgetting the primacy of Ile reference In the Inline. Ivery even! is datable, once it is located in relation to a "now. We can then say either that it has "not yet" occurred and that it will occur "later," "lien," or that it exists "no longer" and occurred "earlier." In contrast to what we may believe, this relational structure—in the same one on which the Augustinian analysis of the threefold present and Ile Iusserlian analysis of retention-prolension are based—is not understandable in and of itself. We must move from the "now" as absolute in some sense to the "now that . . . ," to wlu'ch are added the "when" and the "before," in order to Iiul the phenomenological meaning of this interplay of relations. In short, we must return to the Bcing-alongside that connects preoccupation to the things of the world. When we speak of lime as a system of dates organized in relation to a point of time taken as an origin, we quite simply forget the work of interpretation by which we moved from making-present, including all that il awaits and all that il retains, lo the idea of an indifferent "now." The task of hermeneutic phenomenology, in speaking of

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datability rather than of dates, consists in reactivating this work of interpretation that is concealed and is itself annihilated in the representation of time as a system of dates. By reactivating this work, the existential analytic restores both the ecstatic character of the "now," that is, its belonging to the network of coming-towards, having-been, and making-present, and its character of having a horizon, (hat is, the reference of "now that . . . ," to the entities encountered in the world by reason of the constitution of being-alongside, which is characteristic of
preoccupation. Dating "always" occurs in relation to the beings encountered by reason of the opening of the
"there."
The second original feature of within-time-ness is the consideration of the laspe of time, of the interval between a
"since then" and an "until," generated by the relations between "now," "then," and "before" (an interval that, in
turn, produces a second-order datability: "while . . ."). "During" this lapse of time, things have their time, do
their time, what we ordinarily call "lasting" or "enduring." What we find again here is the stretching-along (Erst-
recklheit) characteristic of historicality, but interpreted in the idiom of preoccupation. By being connected to
datability, stretching-along becomes a lapse of time. In turn, the notion of an interval, referred back to that of a
date, produces the idea that we can assign a temporal extension to every "now," to every "then," to every
"before," as when we say "during the meal" (now), "last spring" (before), "next fall" (then). The question of the
extension of the present, which is so troublesome for psychologists, finds its origin, and the origin of its
obscurity, here.
It is in terms of a lapse of time that we "allow" an amount of time, that we "employ" our day well or poorly,
forgetting that it is not time that is used up, but our preoccupation itself, which, by losing itself among the things
of its concern, loses its time as well. Anticipatory resoluteness alone escapes the dilemma: always having time
or not having time. If alone makes the isolated now an authentic instant, a moment of vision (An>\'<i'il>\'liffk),
which does not claim to control things but contents itself with "constancy" (Stilindigkeit). From this constancy
comes the self-constancy (Selhut-Ständigkeit) that embraces future, past, and present, and fuses (he activity
expended by Care with the original passivity of a Being-thrown-in-the-world." The final original feature is that
the time of preoccupation is a public time. Here again we are misled by false appearances. In itself, time has
nothing public about it; behind this feature is concealed everyday understanding—the average understanding
of being-will-one-another. Public time results then from an interpretation that is grafted on this everyday
understanding which, in a sense, "publicizes" time, "makes it public," to the extent that the everyday condition
no longer reaches making-present except through an anonymous and commonplace "now."
It is on the basis of these three features of within-time-ness—datability, lapse of time, and public time—that I
leidigger attempts to rejoin what we call time and to lay the groundwork for his final thesis concerning the
leveling off of the

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existential analysis in the ordinary conception of time.\(^{41}\) This is the time of preoccupation, but interpreted in
terms of the things alongside which our concern makes us reside. In this way, reckoning and measuring, valid for
things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand, come to be applied to this datable, extended, public time. For example,
reckoning astronomical and calendar time arises from dating in relation to repeated occurrences of our
environment. The anteriority that this reckoning appears to have in relation to the public datability of within-
time-ness can be explained once again by the thrownness that permeates Care.\(^{42}\) It is therefore insofar as we are
affected that astronomical and calendar time appear autonomous and primary. Time then swings back to the side
of beings other than the one that we are, and we begin to wonder, as did ancient thinkers, whether time is, or, as
do modern ones, whether it is subjective or objective.
The reversal that appears to give an anteriority to time in relation to Care itself is the final link in a chain of
interpretations that arc but so many misinterpretations. First, the prevalence of preoccupation in the structure of
Care; next, the interpretation of the temporal features of preoccupation in terms of the things alongside which
Care stands; finally, forgetting this interpretation itself, which makes the measurement of time appear to belong
to things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand themselves. The quantifying of time then appears to be independent of
the temporality of Care. The time "in" which we ourselves arc is understood as the receptacle of things
present-to-hand and ready-to-hand. What is particularly forgotten is the condition of thrownness, as a structure of
Being-in-the-world.
It is possible to catch sight of the moment when this is first forgotten, and of the reversal that results from it, in
the relation that circumspection (another name for preoccupation) maintains with visibility and that visibility
maintains with the light of day.\(^{43}\) In this way, a sort of secret pact is concluded between the sun and Care, in
which light serves as the intermediary. We say, "As long as daylight remains," "for two days," "for the past three
days," "in four days."
If the calendar is the computation of days, the clock is that of hours and their subdivisions. But the hour is not
tied in such a visible way to our preoccupation as the day is, and through this preoccupation to our thrownness.
The sun docs in fact appear on the horizon of things present-at-hand. The derivation of the hour is thus more
indirect. Yet it is not impossible, if we keep in mind that the things of our concern are in part things ready-to-
hand. The clock is the thing ready-to-hand that permits us to add a precise measurement to exact dating. In
addition, this measurement completes the process of making time public. The need for such precision in
measuring is inscribed in the dependence of preoccupation with respect to what is ready-to-hand in general. The analyses at the beginning of Being and Time devoted to the worldhood of the world have prepared us to seek in the structure of significa statistics that connects our instruments together, and that connects all of them to our preoccupation, a reason for the proliferation of artificial clocks on the basis of natural

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ones. In this way, the connection between scientific time and the time of preoccupation becomes ever more tenuous and more deeply concealed, until the apparently complete autonomy of the measurement of time in relation to the fundamental structure of Being-in-the-world constitutive of Care is affirmed. If hermeneutic phenomenology has nothing to say about the epistemological aspects of the history of the measurement of time, it does take an interest in the direction this history has taken in loosening the ties between this measurement and the process of temporalization in which Dasein is the pivot point. At the end of this emancipation, there is no longer any difference between the course of time and following the movement of the hands on the face of a clock. "Reading the hour" on clocks that are more and more precise seems no longer to have any connection with the act of "saying now"—an act itself rooted in the phenomenon of reckoning with time. The history of the measurement of time is that of forgetting all the interpretations traversed by making-present. At the end of this forgetting, time itself is identified with a series of ordinary and anonymous nows.

In this way, we have followed the derivation of within-time-ness—in other words, we have brought to light its origin (Herkunft)—up to the point where the successive interpretations, quickly changed into misinterpretations, give time a transcendency equal to that of the world.

Before taking up the polemic leveled by the existential interpretation of within-time-ness against the ordinary representation of time, I want to acknowledge the advance that Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology has made over those of Augustine and Husserl.

In one sense, the debate between Husserl and Kant is rendered obsolete—in the same sense that the opposition between subject and object is. On the one hand, world-time is more "objective" than any object, in that it accompanies the revelation of the world as world. As a result, it is no more tied to psychical beings than to physical ones. "Time' first shows itself in the sky" (p. 471). On the other hand, it is more "subjective" than any subject because of its being rooted in Care.

The debate between Augustine and Aristotle appears even more obsolete. On the one hand, in contrast to Augustine, the time of the soul is also a world-time, and its interpretation requires no refutation of cosmology. On the other hand, in contrast to Aristotle, it is no longer a troublesome question to ask whether time can exist if there is no soul to distinguish between two instants and to count the intervals.

Whatever new aporias are born from this very advance in hermeneutic phenomenology. They are revealed by the failure of the polemic against the ordinary concept of time, a failure that, by a recoil-effect, helps to bring to light the aporetic character of this hermeneutic phenomenology itself, stage by stage, and as a whole.

Narrative Time

THE ORDINARY CONCEPT OF TIME

Heidegger places his polemic against the ordinary concept of time under the heading of "leveling off," never to be confused with the discussion of the "source," even if this leveling off is induced by forgetting the source. This polemic constitutes a critical point, much more dangerous than Heidegger might have thought, preoccupied as he was during this period with another polemic over the human sciences. In this way, he can claim, without qualms, not to distinguish the scientific concept of universal time from the ordinary concept of time that he is criticizing. His argumentation directed against ordinary time makes no concessions. Its ambition is no less than a genesis without remainder of the concept of time as it is employed in all the sciences starting from fundamental temporality. This genesis is a genesis progressing by leveling off, taking its point of departure in within-time-ness, but one whose far-off origin lies in the failure to recognize the tie between temporality and Being-towards-death. Starting from within-time-ness has the obvious advantage of making the ordinary concept of time first appear in greatest proximity to the last decipherable figure of phenomenonological time. But, more importantly, it has the advantage of organizing the ordinary concept of time around the pivotal notion whose kinship with the principal characteristic of within-time-ness is still apparent. This pivotal notion is the point-like "now." As a consequence, ordinary time can be characterized as a series of point-like "nows," whose intervals are measured by our clocks. Like the hand moving across the face of the clock, time runs from one now to another. Defined in this way, time deserves to be called "now-time." "The world-time which is 'sighted' in this manner in the use of clocks, we call the 'now-time' \"Jetzt-Zeit\"" (p. 474).

The genesis of the point-like "now" is clear, It is merely a disguise of the making-present that awaits and withholds, that is, the third eclipse of (cm-porality, which preoccupation brought to the fore. In this disguise, the instrument of measurement, which is one of the things ready-to-hand upon which we fix our circumspection, has eclipsed the process of making-present that had made measurement desirable.
Starting from here, the three major features of within-time-icss are subjected to an identical leveling off. Datability no longer precedes the assigning of dates but rather follows it; the lapse of time, which itself arises from the stretching out characteristic of historically, no longer precedes (be measurable interval but rather is governed by it; and, above all else, the character of making-public, founded in the "being-with" relating mortals to one another, gives way to the allegedly irreducible characteristic of time, its universality. Time is held to be public because it is declared to be universal. In short, time is defined as a system of dates only because dating takes place on the basis of an origin that is an indistinguishable "now." It is defined as a series of inter-

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vals. Universal time, in the end, is only the sequence (Folge) of these point-like "nows" (Jetztfolge).

Other features of the ordinary concept of time only appear, however, if we retrace the genesis of a contemporary failure to recognize the most original temporality. As we know, phenomenology must be hermeneutic because what is closest to us is also what is most covered over. The features we arc going to look at all have in common the fact that they serve as symptoms, in the sense that they allow us to glimpse an origin at the same time that they attest to the failure to recognize this origin. Consider the infinity of time. It is because we have erased from our thoughts originary finiteness, imprinted on time to come by Bcing-towards-death, that we hold time to be infinite. In this sense, infinity is but a fallen state of the finiteness of the future attested to by anticipatory resoluteness. Infinity is non-mortality; but what does not die is the "they." Thanks to this immortality of the "they," our throwness among things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is perverted by the idea that our life span is only a fragment of this time.

One indication that this is how things arc is that we say of time that it "dies." Is this not because we fly from ourselves, in the face of death, because the state of loss in which we sink, when we no longer perceive the relation between throwness, fallencnss, and preoccupation, makes time appear as a flight and makes us say that it passes away (verge/lf)? Otherwise, why would we notice the fleeing of time rather than its blossoming forth? Is this not something like a return of the repressed, by which our fleeing in the face of death is disguised as the fleeing of time? And why do we say that we cannot stop time? Is this not because our fleeing in the face of death makes us want to suspend the course of time, by an understandable perversion of our anticipation in its least authentic form? "Dasein knows fugitive time in terms of its fugitive knowledge about its death" (p. 478). And why do we consider time to be irreversible? Here again leveling off docs not prevent some aspect of the originary from showing through. Would not a neutral stream of "nows" be able to be reversed? "The impossibility of this reversal has its basis in the way public time originates in temporality, the temporalizing of which is primarily futural and 'goes' (o its end ecstatically in such a way that it 'is' already towards its end" (p. 478).

Heidegger by no means denies that this ordinary representation is valid in its own right, to the very extent that it proceeds by leveling off the temporality of a thrown and fallen Dasein. This representation belongs, in its own way, to the everyday mode of Dasein and to the understanding that is appropriate to it. The only thing unacceptable is the claim that this representation be held to be the true concept of time. We can retrace the process of interpretation and of misunderstanding that leads from temporality to this ordinary concept. The opposite route, however, cannot be traveled.

Narrated Time
My doubts begin precisely at this point. If, as I believe, human temporality cannot be constituted on the basis of a concept of time considered as a series of "nows," is not the opposite path, from temporality and Dasein to cosmic time, in accordance with the preceding discussion, just as impracticable?

In the preceding analysis, one hypothesis was excluded from the outset by Heidegger: that the process held to be a phenomenon of the leveling off of temporality was also, and simultaneously, the separating out of an autonomous concept of time—cosmic time—that hermeneutic phenomenology never completely follows through on and with which it never manages to come to terms.

If Heidegger excludes this hypothesis from the beginning, it is because he never tries to vie with contemporary science in its own debate over time, and because he takes it for granted that science has nothing original to say that has not been tacitly borrowed from metaphysics, from Plato to Hegel. The role assigned to Aristotle in the genesis of the ordinary concept of time (p. 473) bears witness to this. Aristotle is supposed to be the lirst one guilty of this leveling off, confirmed by the entire subsequent history of the problem of time, through the definition given in Physics IV, II, 218b29-219a6, which we examined above. His assertion that the instant determines time is said to have begun the series of definitions of time as a sequence of "nows," in the sense of indistinguishable instants.

Even given the—highly debatable—hypothesis that the entire metaphysics of time might be contained in mice in the Aristotelian conception of it, the lesson we have drawn from our reading of the famous passage in Aristotle's Physics is that there is no conceivable transition—either in one direction or the other—between indistinguishable, anonymous instants and the lived-through present. Aristotle's strength lies precisely in the fact
that he describes the instant as any instant whatsoever. And the instant is anonymous precisely in that it precedes from an arbitrary biva of the continuum of local motion, and more generally of change, and indicates (is ocnumov (lackin', lile qual ily of the present) in each movement of I he in牝ritivl art const uld by I k- act of power. Movement (change) belongs, as we have seen, to the principles of physics, which do not include in their definition a reference to a soul that discriminates and counts. What is essential, therefore, is, first, that time have "something to do with movement," without ever measuring up (to the constitutive principles of nature; next, that the continuity of time "accompanies" that of movement and of magnitude, without ever freeing itself entirely from them. The result is that, if the noetic operation of discrimination by which the mind distinguishes two "naws" is sufficient to distinguish time from movement, this operation is grafted onto the sheer unfolding of movement whose measurable character precedes the distinctions relative to time. The logical and ontological anteriority that Aristotle assigns to movement in relation to time seems to me to be incompatible with any attempt at derivation through the

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leveling off of so-called ordinary time, starting from the time of concern. Having something to do with movement and something to do with Care seem to me to constitute two irreconcilable determinations in principle. "World-historicizing" merely hides the gap between the present and the instant. I fail to understand either how or why the historicality of the things of our concern should free itself from that of our Care, unless the world-pole of our Being-in-the-world developed a time that was itself the polar opposite of the time of our Care, and unless the rivalry between these two perspectives on time, the one rooted in the worldhood of the world, the other in the there of our way of Being-in-the-world, gave rise to the ultimate aporia of the question of time for thinking.

This equal legitimacy of ordinary time and phenomenological time at the heart of their confrontation is confirmed with particular emphasis if, instead of just confining ourselves to what philosophers have said about time—following Aristotle or not—we lend an ear to what the scientists and episte-mologists most attentive to modern developments in the theory of time have to say.\textsuperscript{31} The very expression "ordinary time" then appears ridiculous compared to the scope of problems posed to science by the orientation, continuity, and measurability of time.\textsuperscript{31} In light of this increasingly more technical work, I am led to wonder whether a single scientific concept can be opposed to the phenomenological analyses, which are themselves multiple, received from Augustine, Husserl, and Heidegger.

If, first of all, following Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield, we limit ourselves to classifying sciences according to the order of the discovery of the "historical" dimension of the natural world, we find that it is not only a progressive extension of the scale of time beyond the barrier of six thousand years, assigned by a petrified Judeo-Christian tradition, that the natural sciences have imposed on our consideration, but also an increasing differentiation of the temporal properties characteristic of each of the regions of nature.

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Narrated Time

vented at the beginning of the nineteenth century, decisively transformed geology into a "historical" science, on the basis of inferences made from the witness of things. This "historical" revolution, in turn, opened the way, through the intermediary of paleontology, for a similar transformation in zoology, crowned in 1859 by Darwin's great work \textit{Origin of Species}. We can only dimly imagine the enormous mass of received ideas that was to be dislodged by the simple hypothesis of an evolution of species, to say nothing of the degree of probability of the theory as such, whether we consider the mode of acquisition, or of transmission, or of accumulation of specific variations. What is important for our discussion is that, with Darwin, \textit{"life acquires a genealogy."}\textsuperscript{57} For the Darwinian or neo-Darwinian biologist, time is indistinguishable from the very process of descent, marked by the occurrence of favorable variations and sealed by natural selection. The whole of modern genetics is inscribed within the major assumption of a history of life. This idea of a natural history was further to be enriched by the discoveries of thermodynamics, and, above all, by the discovery of subatomic processes—in particular, quantum processes—on the other end of the great chain of beings. To the extent that these phenomena arc in turn
responsible for the formation of heavenly bodies, we can speak of "stellar evolution" to account for the life cycle assigned to individual stars and galaxies. A genuine temporal dimension was thereby introduced into astronomy, one that authorizes us to speak of the age of the universe counted in light-years.

However this first feature—the breaking of the temporal barrier accepted for thousands of years and the fabulous extension of the scale of time—must not mask a second feature, one of even greater philosophical significance, namely, the diversification in the meanings attached to the term "time" in the regions of nature we have just referred to and in the sciences (that correspond to them). This phenomenon is masked by (he previous one (he exteml thai the notion of a scale of lime introduces an abstract factor of commensurability that takes into account only (he comparative chronology of (he processes considered. The fact that (his alignment along a single scale of time is ultimately misleading is attested to by (he following paradox. The length of lime of a > human life, compared to (he range of cosmic lime-spans, appears insignificant, whereas it is the very place from which every question of significance arises." This paradox suffices to call into question the presumed homogeneous of lime-spans projected along a single notion of a natural "history" (whence our constant use of quotation marks in (his context). livelything occurs as if, through a phenomenon of mutual contamination, the notion of history had been extrapolated from (he human sphere lo (he natural sphere, while, in return, the notion of change, specified on the zoological level by that of evolution, had included human history within its perimeter of meaning. Yet, before any ontological argument, we have an epistemological reason for refusing (his reciprocal overlapping of (he notions of change (or evolution) and history.

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This criterion is the one we expressed in Part II of this study, namely, the narrative criterion, itself patterned on that of praxis, every narrative being ultimately a mimesis of action. On this point, I unreservedly ascribe to Collingwood's thesis drawing a line between the notions of change and evolution on the one hand, and history on the other. In this respect, the notion of the "testimony" of human beings concerning events of the past and the "testimony" of the vestiges of the geological past does not go beyond the mode of proof; that is, the use of inferences in the form of retrodiction. Misuse begins as soon as the notion of "testimony" is severed from the narrative context that supports it as documentary proof in service of the explanatory comprehension of a course of action. It is finally the concepts of action and narrative that cannot be transferred from the human sphere to the sphere of nature.

This epistemological hiatus is, in turn, but the symptom of a discontinuity on the level that interests us here, that of the time of the phenomena considered. Just as it seemed impossible to generate the time of nature on the basis of phenomenological time, so too it now seems impossible to proceed in the opposite direction and to include phenomenological time in the time of nature, whether it is a question of quantum time, thermodynamic time, the time of galactic transformations, or that of the evolution of species. Without deciding anything about the plurality of temporalities appropriate to the variety of epistemological regions considered, a single distinction—an altogether negative one—is sufficient, that between a time without a present and a time with a present.

Regardless of the positive aspects included in the notion of a time without a present, one discontinuity is of the utmost importance to our discussion of phenomenological time, the very one that Heidegger tried to overcome by gathering together under the heading of "ordinary time" all the temporal varieties previously aligned under the neutral concept of the scale of time. Whatever (he interferences between (he time will), a present and the time without a present, (hey presuppose the fundamental distinction between an anonymous instant and a present defined by (he instance of discourse that designates (his present rellexively. This fundamental distinction between the anonymous instant and (he self-referential present entails that between the pair before/after and (he pair past/future, the latter designating the before/after relation as it is marked by the instance of the present.

The outcome of this discussion is that the autonomy of time with respect to movement (to employ a vocabulary that is Kantian as well as Aristotelian) constitutes the ultimate aporia for (he phenomenology of time—an aporia that (he demarcation of phenomenology could reveal in its radicality. For it is when the phenomenology of time reaches those aspects of temporality that are most deeply hidden, even though they are closest to us, that it discovers its external limit.

For someone who is attracted wholly to the polemic that Heidegger has undertaken, by designating ordinary time the universal time of astronomy, the physical sciences, biology, and, finally, the human sciences, and by attributing the genesis of this alleged ordinary time to the leveling off of the aspects of phenomenological time, for this sort of reader Being and Time appears to end in failure—the failure of the genesis of the ordinary concept of time. This is not, however, how I should like to conclude. This "failure," in my opinion, is what brings the aporetic character of temporality to its peak. It sums up the failure of all our thinking about time, and first and foremost that of phenomenology and of science. But this failure is not without value, as the rest of this work will attempt to show. And even before it refuels our own meditation, it reveals something of its fruitfulness insofar as it serves to uncover what I will call the work of the aporia active within the existential analysis itself. I will group my remarks on this work of the aporia around four poles.

1. It is first of all the "ordinary" concept of time that, from the outset, exerts a sort of attraction-repulsion on the whole existential analysis, forcing it to unfold, to distend itself, to stretch itself out until it corresponds, by an ever-increasing
approximation, to its other which it cannot generate. In this sense, as it were, the external aporia that develops in the concept of time, due to the disparity among perspectives on time, is what provokes, at the very heart of the existential analysis, (the greatest effort at internal diversification, lo which we owe the distinction between temporality, historically, and within-time-ness. Without being the origin of this diversification, the scientific concept acts as a sort of catalyst for it. The admirable analyses of historically and within-time-ness then appear as an almost desperate effort to enrich the temporality of Care, centered first on Being-for-death, with ever more worldly features, so as to offer an approximate equivalence of sequential time within the limits of existential interpretation.

2. In addition to the constraint exerted from outside by (the ordinary concept of time on (the existential analysis, we can speak of a mutual overlapping between one mode of discourse and the other. This borderline exchange takes place in the extreme forms of contamination and conflict, with 'in- whole parade <=| in lectional and emotional nuance: that can be produced by those incipient scenarios of meaning.

Contamination has more particularly to do with the overlapping* on the level of within-time-ness. These phenomena of contamination are what served to legitimate the idea that the border was crossed as a result of leveling off alone. We anticipated this problem when we discussed the relations between the three major phenomena of dilabilty, lapse of time, publicness, and the three conceptual features of actual dating, the measurement of intervals by fixed units of duration, and simultaneity, which serves as a criterion for all co-historically. In all these cases, we may speak of an overlapping of the existential and the empirical. Between throwness and faience, which constitute our fundamental passivity with regard to time, and the contemplation of the stars, whose sovereign revolution is not subject to our mastery, a complicity is established, one so close that the two approaches become indiscernible to feeling. This is attested to by the expressions "world-time" and "Being-in-time," which compound the strength of both discourses on time.

In return, the effect of conflict, stemming from the interference between our two modes of thinking, can be more easily distinguished at the other end of the scale of temporality; it is the conflict between the finitude of mortal time and the infinity of cosmic time. In truth, it was to this aspect that ancient wisdom was most attentive. Elegies on the human condition, ranging in their modulations from lamentation to resignation, have never ceased to sing of the contrast between the time that remains and we who are merely passing. It is only the "they" that never dies? If we hold time to be infinite, is this only because we are concealing our own finitude from ourselves? And if we say that time flies, is this simply because we are fleeing the idea of our Being-towards-the-end? Is it not also because we observe in the course of things a passage that flees us, in the sense that it escapes our hold, to the point of being unaware, as it were, even of our resolution to pay no attention to the fact that we have to die? Would we speak of the shortness of life, if it did not stand out against the immensity of time? This contrast is the most eloquent form that can be taken by the twofold movement of detachment whereby the time of Care, on the one hand, tears itself away from the fascination with the carefree time of the world and, on the other hand, astronomical and calendar time frees itself from the goad of immediate concern and even from the thought of death. Forgetting the relation between the ready-to-hand and concern, and forgetting death, we contemplate the sky and we construct calendars and clocks. And suddenly, on the face of one of them, the words memento mori stand out in mournful letters. One forgetfulness erases another. And the anguish of death returns once more, moored on by the eternal silence of infinite spaces. We can thus swing from one feeling to the other: from the consolation that we may expect in discovering a kinship between the feeling of Being-thrown-into-lilr win lid and in- spectacle <=| die heavens where time shows itself, tellie desolation dial ultravisum":ly KTmery.es from die contrast between die fragility of life and (ie. power of lime, which is more destructive than anything else. 3. In turn, the difference between these two extreme forms of a borderline exchange between (he (wo perspectives on time makes us attentive to the polarities, the tensions, even the breaks inside the domain explored by hermeneutic phenomenology. If (lie derivation of the ordinary concept of time by means of leveling off appeared problematical, the derivation by means of their source, which lies together the three figures of temporality, also deserves to be questioned. We have not failed to emphasize, at the transition from one stage to the next, (he complexity of this relation to the "source," which is not con-lined to a gradual loss of authenticity. By their supplement of meaning, historically and within-time-ness add what was lacking in the meaning of fundamen-
in primordiality, could not the order in which these three figures are examined be reversed? In fact, within-time-ness is continually presupposed by historicality. Without the notions of datability, lapse of time, and public manifestation, historicality could not be said to unfold between a beginning and an end, to stretch along in this in-between, and to become the co-historizing of a common destiny. The calendar and the clock bear witness to this. And if we follow historicality back to primordial temporality, how could the public character of the historizing fail to precede in its own manner the most radical temporality, inasmuch as its interpretation itself comes out of language, which has always preceded the forms of Being-towards-death reputed to be untransferable? Even more radically, does not the *Ausser-sich* of originary temporality indicate the recoil-effect of the structures of world-time on those of originary temporality through the intermediary of the stretching-along characteristic of historicality?²⁴

Final consequence: if we are attentive to the discontinuities that mark the process of the genesis of meaning throughout the section on time in *Being and Time*, we may ask whether hermeneutic phenomenology does not give rise to a deep-rooted dispersion of the figures of temporality. By adding to the break, on the level of epistemology, between phenomenological time on the one hand and astronomical, physical, and biological time on (he other, the split between mortal time, historical time, and cosmic time attests in an unexpected way to the plural, or rather pluralizing, vocation of this hermeneutic phenomenology. Heidegger himself paves the way for this interrogation when he states that the three degrees of temporalization are equiprimordial, expressly taking up again an expression he had earlier applied to the three ecstases of time. But if they are equiprimordial, the future does not necessarily have the priority that Heidegger and the "Ordinary" Concept of Time the existential analysis of Care confers on it. The future, the past, and the present each has a turn to predominate when we pass from one level to another. In this sense, the debate between Augustine, who starts from the present, and Heidegger, who starts from the future, loses much of its sharpness. What is more, the variety of functions assumed by our experience of the present warns us against the arbitrary restrictions of a too one-sided concept of the present. Despite the one-way filiation that Heidegger proposes, moving from the future toward the past and toward the present, and also despite the apparently univocal descending order governing the source of the least authentic figures of temporality, the process of temporalization appears at the end of the section on time to be more radically differentiated than it seemed to be at the start of the analysis. For it is in fact the differentiation of the three figures of temporalization—temporality, historicality, and within-time-ness—that displays and makes more explicit the secret differentiation by virtue of which the future, the past, and the present can be called the ecstases of time.

4. The attention paid to the aporias that are at work in the section on temporality in *Being and Time* warrants our casting one last look at the place of historicality in the hermeneutic phenomenology of time.

The position of the chapter on historicality between the chapter on fundamental temporality and the one on within-time-ness is the most obvious indication of a mediating function that far surpasses the convenience of a didactic exposition. The range of this mediating function is equal to that of the field of aporias opened up by the hermeneutic phenomenology of time. By following the order of the questions raised above, we may first ask ourselves whether history is not itself constructed on the fracture line between phenomenological time and astronomical, physical, and biological time—in short, whether history is not itself a fracture zone. But if, as we have also suggested, the over-lappings of meaning compensate for this epistemological break, is not history the place where the over-lappings due to the contamination and the conflict between the two orders of thinking are most clearly manifested? On the one hand, the exchanges due to contamination appeared to us to predominate on (he level of within-time-ness between the phenomena of datability, lapse of time, and publicness as they are brought out by the existential analysis, and the astronomical considerations that governed the construction of calendars and clocks. This contamination cannot help but affect history to the extent that it gathers together the characteristics of historicality and those of within-time-ness. On (he hand, exchanges due to conflict appeared to us to predominate on the level of primordial temporality, as soon as Being-towards-death is cruelly contrasted with the time that envelops us. Here again, history is indirectly involved to the extent that, in it, the memory of the dead clashes with the investigation of institutions, structures, and transformations that are stronger than death.

However, the median position of the historical between temporality and

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within-time-ness is more directly a problem when we pass from the borderline conflicts between phenomenology and cosmology to the discordances within phenomenological hermeneutics itself. What are we to say, finally, about the position of historical time, set between mortal time and cosmological time? It is in fact when the continuity of the existential analysis is questioned that his-toricity becomes the critical point of the entire undertaking. The greater the distance between the compass points marking the two poles of temporalization, the
more the place and role of historicity become problematical. The more we inquire into the differentiation that disperses, not just the three major figures of temporalization, but the three ectases of time, the more the site of historicality becomes problematical. From this perplexity springs a hypothesis: if *within-time-ness* is the point of contact between our passivity and the order of things, then might historicity not be the bridge that is erected within the phenomenological field itself between Being-towards-death and world-time? It will be the task of the chapters that follow to clarify this mediating function by taking up once more the three-cornered conversation among historiography, narratology, and phenomenology.

At the end of these three confrontations I would like to draw two conclusions. The first one has been anticipated a number of times; the second may have remained unperceived.

Let us first say that, if the phenomenology of time can become one privileged interlocutor in the three-way conversation we are about to undertake among phenomenology, historiography, and literary narratology, this is a result not just of its discoveries but also of the aporias it gives rise to, which increase in proportion to its advances.

Let us next say that in opposing Aristotle to Augustine, Kant to Ilusscr, and everything scholarship lies to the "ordinary" concept of time to Heidegger, we have undertaken a process that is no longer that of phenomenology, the process the reader may have expected to find here, but rather a process that is one of reflective, speculative thought as a whole in its search for a coherent answer to the question: what is time? If, in stating an aporia, we emphasized the phenomenology of time, what emerges at the end of this chapter is a broader and more balanced insight—namely, that we cannot think about cosmological time (the instant) without surreptitiously appealing to phenomenological time and vice versa. If the statement of this aporia outruns phenomenology, this aporia thereby has the great merit of resituating phenomenology within the great current of reflective and speculative thought. This is why I did not title this first section of this volume "The Aporias of the Phenomenology of Time," but rather "The Aporias of Temporality."

### Section 2

**Poetics of Narrative**

**History, Fiction, Time**

The time has come to test out the major hypothesis of Part IV, namely, that the key to the problem of refiguration lies in the way history and fiction, taken together, offer the reply of a poetics of narrative to the aporias of time brought to light by phenomenology.

In our sketch of the problems placed under the aegis of mimesis, we identified the problem of refiguration with that of the interweaving reference between history and fiction, and said that human time stems from this interweaving in the milieu of acting and suffering.

In order to respect the dissymmetries between the respective intentions of history and fiction, we shall take up these intentions in terms of a resolutely dichotomous apprehension of them. Therefore it is first to the specificity of the reference of historical narrative, then to that of fictional narrative, that we shall attempt to do justice in the first two chapters of this second section of Part IV. It is necessary to proceed in this way so the conjunction between history and fiction in the work of the refiguration of time will preserve its paradoxical aspect to the very end. My thesis here is that the unique way in which history responds to the aporias of the phenomenology of time consists in the elaboration of a third time—properly historical time—which mediates between lived time and cosmic time. To demonstrate this thesis, we shall call on procedures of connection, borrowed from historical practice itself, that assure the resinscription of lived time on cosmic time: the calendar, the succession of generations, archives, documents, and traces. For historical practice, these procedures raise no problem. Only their being brought into relation with the aporias of time, by reflection on history, makes the poetical character of history appear in relation to the difficulties of speculation.

To this reinscription of lived time on cosmic time, on the side of history, corresponds, on the side of fiction, a solution opposed to the same aporias in the phenomenology of time, namely, the imaginative variations that fiction brings about as regards the major themes of this phenomenology. So, in chapters 4 and 5, the relation between history and fiction, as regards their respective intentions of history and fiction, will be marked by an opposition between them. However, the phenomenology of time will be the common standard of measure without which the relation between fiction and history would remain absolutely undecidable.

Next, in chapters 6 and 7, we shall take a step in the direction of the relation of complementarity between history and fiction, by taking as our touchstone the classical problem of the relation of narrative, be it historical or fictional, to reality. Restating this problem and its solution will justify the change in terminology which has led
The question has yet to be raised concerning the nature of the process of totalization that still allows us to...
The question will be to know what, on the side of narrative, whether fictional or historical, answers to the presupposition of the oneness of time. A new sense of the word "history" will appear at this stage, one that exceeds the distinction between historiography and fiction, and one that takes as its best synonyms the terms "historical consciousness" and "historical condition." The narrative function, taken in its full scope, covering the developments from the epic to the modern novel, as well as those running from legends to critical history, is ultimately to be defined by its ambition to refigure our historical condition and thereby to raise it to the level of historical consciousness. This new meaning of the word "history" at the end of our inquiry is attested to by the very semantics of the word, which has designated for at least two centuries, in a great many languages, both the totality of the course of events and the totality of narratives referring to this course of events. This double sense of the word "history" in no way is the result of some regrettable ambiguity of language, rather it attests to another presupposition, underlying the overall consciousness we have of our historical consciousness; namely, that, like the word "time," the term "history" also designates some collective singular reality, one that encompasses the two processes of totalization that are under way at the level of historical narrative and at that of actual history. This correlation between a unitary historical consciousness and an equally indivisible historical condition thus becomes the final issue at stake in our inquiry into the refiguration of time by narrative.

I shall reserve for the concluding chapter the question whether the correlation between narrative and time is just as adequate when narrative is taken in terms of its function of totalization in the face of the presupposition of the oneness of time as when it is considered from the point of view of the interweaving of the respective referential intentions of historiography and fiction. This question will arise out of a critical reflection on the limits encountered by my ambition of responding to the aporias of time by a poetics of narrative.

4 Between Lived Time and Universal Time Historical Time

In the current state of the discussion about a philosophy of history, it is usually taken for granted that the only choice is between speculation regarding universal history, in a Hegelian form, or an epistemology of the writing of history, as in French historiography or English-language analytic philosophy of history. A third option, arising from our rumination on the aporias of the phenomenology of time consists in reflecting upon the place of historical time between phenomenological time and the time phenomenology does not succeed in constituting, which we call the time of the world, objective time, or ordinary time.

History initially reveals its creative capacity as regards the refiguration of time through its invention and use of certain reflective instruments such as the calendar; the idea of the succession of generations—and, connected to this, the idea of the threefold realm of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors; finally, and above all, in its recourse to archives, documents, and traces. These reflective instruments are noteworthy in that they play the role of connectors between lived time and universal time. In this respect, they bear witness to the poetic function of history insofar as it contributes to solving the aporias of time. However, their contribution to the hermeneutics of historical consciousness only appears at the end of a reflective inquiry that no longer stems from the epistemology of historical knowledge.. For historians, these connectors are, as I said, just intellectual tools. They make use of them without inquiring into their conditions of possibility—or rather, their conditions of significance. These conditions are revealed only if we relate the functioning of these connectors to the aporias of time, something historians as historians need not consider. What these practical connectors of lived and universal time have in common is that they refer back to the universe the narrative structure I described in Part II of this work. This is how they contribute to the refiguration
The time of the calendar is the first bridge constructed by historical practice between lived time and universal time. It is a creation that does not stem exclusively from either of these perspectives on time. Even though it may participate in one or the other of them, its institution constitutes the invention of a third form of time. This third form of time, it is true, is in many ways only the shadow cast over historians' practice by a vastly larger entity which can no longer appropriately be designated by the name "institution," and even less by that of "invention." This entity can only be designated broadly and in an approximate fashion by the title "mythic time." Here we are bordering upon a realm that I said we would not enter when I took as the starting point of our investigation.

We rediscover this mythic time at the origin of the constraints that preside over the constituting of every calendar. We must move "X" back, therefore, before the fragmentation into mortal time, historical time, and cosmic time, a fragmentation that has already taken place when our meditation begins, in order to recall, as myth does, the idea of a "great time" that envelops, to use the word still preserved by Aristotle in his *Physics*, all reality.² The primary function of this great time is to order the time of societies and of human beings who live in society in relation to cosmic time. This mythic time, far from plunging thought into a night where all cows are black, initiates a unique, overall scansion of time, by ordering in terms of one another cycles of different duration, the great celestial cycles, biological recurrences, and the rhythms of social life. In this way, mythic representations contributed to the institution of calendar time.³ Still less should we neglect, in speaking of mythic representation, the conjunction between myth and ritual.⁴ Indeed, it is through the mediation of ritual that mythic time is revealed to be the common root of world time and human time. Through its periodicity, a ritual expresses a time whose rhythms are broader than those of ordinary action. By punctuating action in this way, it sets ordinary time and each brief human life within a broader time.³

If we must oppose myth and ritual, we may say that myth enlarges ordinary time (and space), whereas ritual brings together mythic time and the profane sphere of life and action. It is easy to see what reinforcement my analysis of the mediating function at the same time, we do not want to confuse these two approaches, taking a genetic explanation as equivalent to understanding a meaning, at the price of doing injustice to both of them. Mythic time concerns us as regards certain expressly limiting conditions. Of all its functions, which are perhaps heterogeneous ones, we shall retain only its speculative function bearing on the order of the world. And from the relay station of rituals and festivals, we shall retain only the correspondence they set up, on the practical level, between the order of the world and that of ordinary action. In short, we shall retain from myth and ritual only their contribution to the integration of ordinary time, centered upon the lived experience of active, suffering individuals, into the time of the world outlined by the visible heavens. It is the discernment of the universal conditions of the institution of the calendar that guides our use of information gathered by the sociology and the comparative history of religions, in exchange for the empirical confirmation that these disciplines bring to the slow discerning of the universal constitution of calendar time.

This universal constitution is what makes calendar time a third form of time between psychic time and cosmic time. To sort out the rules of this constitution I will take as my guideline what Emile Benveniste says in his essay "Le langage et Fexpérience humaine." The invention of calendar time seems so original to Benveniste that he gives it a special name, "chronicle time," as a way of indicating, through the barely disguised double reference to "time," that "in our view of the world, as in our personal existence, there is just one time, this one" (p. 70). (Note as well the reference to both the world and personal existence.) What is most important for a reflection that might be called transcendental in order to distinguish it from genetic inquiry is that "in every form of human culture and in every age, we find in one way or another an effort to objectify chronicle time. This is a necessary condition of the life of societies as well as of the life of individuals in a society. This socialized time v is that of the calendar" (p. 71).

There are three features common to every calendar. Together they constitute the computation of, or division into, chronicle time.
1. A founding event, which is taken as beginning a new era—the birth of Christ or of the Buddha, the Hegira, the beginning of the reign of a certain monarch—determines the axial moment in reference to which every other event is dated. This axial moment is the zero point for computing chronicle time.

2. By referring to the axis defined by the founding event, it is possible to traverse time in two directions: from the past toward the present and from the present toward the past. Our own life is part of the events our vision passes over in either direction. This is why every event can be dated.

3. Finally, we determine "a set of units of measurement that serve to designate the constant intervals between the recurrence of cosmic phenomena" from some other moment whose distance from the axial moment is known—for example, thirty years after the defined by its distance from the axial moment—a distance measured in years, months, days—or by its distance passes over in either direction. This is why every event can be dated.]

In these three distinctive features of calendar time, we can recognize both an explicit relationship to physical time, which was recognized in antiquity, and implicit borrowings from lived time, which were not very well thematized before Plotinus and Augustine.

The relationship of calendar time to physical time is not difficult to see. Calendar time borrows from physical time those properties that Kant as well as Aristotle saw in it. It is, as Benveniste "puts it, "a uniform, infinite continuum, segmentable at will" (p. 70). Drawing upon Kant's "Analogies of Experience," as well as Aristotle's Physics, I would add that insofar as physical time is segmentable at will, it is the source of the idea of an instant in general, stripped of any meaning as the present moment. And as connected to movement and causality, it includes the idea of a direction in the relations of before and after, but pays no attention to the opposition between past and future. It is this directional aspect that allows an observer to regard time in two directions. In this sense, the two-dimensional aspect of observing time presupposes the single direction of the course of events.

Finally, as a linear continuum, physical time allows for measurement, that is, it includes the possibility of establishing a correspondence between numbers and equal intervals of time, which are related to the recurrence of natural phenomena. Astronomy is the science that furnishes the laws for such recurrences, through an increasingly exact observation of the periodicity and regularity of astral movement, in particular of the sun and the moon.

But if the computation of calendar time is based upon astronomical phenomena that give meaning to the idea of physical time, the principle governing the division of calendar time is not reducible to either physics or astronomy. As Benveniste rightly says, the features common to every calendar "proceed" from the determination of the zero point of some computation.

The borrowing here is from the phenomenological notion of the present as distinct from the idea of any instant in general, which itself is derived from the segmentable character of physical time owing to its status as a uniform, infinite, linear continuum. If we did not have the phenomenological notion of the present, as the "today" in terms of which there is a "tomorrow" and a "yesterday," we would not be able to make any sense of the idea of a new event that breaks with a previous era, inaugurating a course of events wholly different from what preceded it. The same thing applies as regards the bidirectionality of calendar time. If we did not have an actual experience of retention and protention, we would not have the idea of traversing a series of events that have already occurred. What is more, if we did not have the idea of a quasi-

Narrated Time—that is, the idea that any remembered instant may be qualified as present, along with its own retentions and protentions, in such a way that recollection which Husserl distinguished from mere retention or the recent past (become a retention of retentions), and if the protentions of this quasi-present did not interweave with the .retentions of the actual present—we would not have the notion of a traversal in two directions, which Benveniste very aptly speaks of as "from the past toward the present or from the present toward the past" (p. 70). There is no present, and hence neither past nor future, in physical time as long as some instant is not determined as "now." "Today," hence as present. As for measurement, it is grafted onto the experience Augustine describes so well as the shortening of expectation and the lengthening of memory, and whose description Husserl takes up again with the help of metaphors such as falling away, flowing, and receding, which convey the qualitative differences between near and far away.

However, physical time and psychological time provide only the dual basis of chronicle time. This form of time is a genuine creation that surpasses the resources of both physical and psychological time. The axial moment—from which the other characteristics of chronicle time are derived—is not just an instant in general, nor is it a present moment, even though it does encompass both these things. It is, as Benveniste says, "such an important event that it is taken as giving rise to a new course of events" (p. 71). The cosmic and psychological aspects of time get a new significance from this axial moment. On the one hand, every event acquires a position in time, defined by its distance from the axial moment—a distance measured in years, months, days—or by its distance from some other moment whose distance from the axial moment is known—for example, thirty years after the
storming of the Bastille... On the other hand, the events of our own life receive a situation in relation to these dated events. "They tell us in the proper sense of the term where we are in the vast reaches of history, what our place is in the infinite succession of human beings who have lived and of things that have happened" (p. 72, his emphasis). We can thus situate the events of interpersonal life in relation to one another. In calendar time, physically simultaneous events become contemporary with one another, anchor points for all the meetings, the mutual efforts, the conflicts that we can say happen at the same time, that is, on the same date. It is also as a function of such dating that religious or civil gatherings can be called together ahead of time. The originality that the axial moment confers on calendar time allows us to declare this the form of time "external" to physical time as well as to lived time. On the one hand, every instant is a possible candidate for the role of axial moment. On the other hand, nothing about any particular calendar day, taken by itself, says whether it is past, present, or future. The same date may designate a future event, as in the clauses of a treaty, or a past event, as in a chronicle. To have a present, as we have also learned from Benveniste, some...

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one must speak. The present is then indicated by the coincidence between an event and the discourse that states it. To rejoin lived time starting from chronicle time, therefore, we have to pass through linguistic time, which refers to discourse. This is why any date, however complete or explicit, cannot be said to be future or past if we do not know the date of the utterance that pronounces it. The externality attributed to the calendar in relation to physical time and lived time expresses the specificity of chronicle time and its mediating role between the other two perspectives on time on the lexical plane. It cosmologizes lived time and humanizes cosmic time. This is how it contributes to reinscribing the time of narrative into the time of the world.

These are the "necessary conditions" that all known calendars satisfy. They are brought to light by a transcendental reflection that does not exclude our taking up a historical or a sociological inquiry into the social functions the calendar exercises. Furthermore, so as not to substitute a kind of transcendental positivism for a genetic empiricism, I have tried to interpret these universal constraints as creations exercising a mediating function between two heterogeneous perspectives on time. Transcendental reflection on calendar time thereby finds itself taken up into our hermeneutic of temporality.

THE SUCCESSION OF GENERATIONS CONTEMPORARIES, PREDECESSORS, AND SUCCESSORS

The second mediation suggested by historians' practice is that of the succession of generations. With it, the biological basis of the historical third-time succeeds the astronomical one. In return, the idea of a succession of generations finds its sociological projection in the anonymous relationship between contemporaries, predecessors, and successors, to use Alfred Schutz's apt formula. If the idea of a succession of generations enters the historical field only when it is put in terms of the network of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors, the same idea, conversely, indicates the basis for this anonymous relationship among individuals considered in terms of its temporal dimension. My goal is to disengage from this complex of ideas the new temporal operator that draws its significance from its relation to the major aporia of temporality, to which it replies on another level than that of the calendar. The Heideggerian analytic of Dasein gave us the opportunity to formulate this aporia in terms of an antinomy between mortal and public time. The notion of a succession of generations provides an answer to this antinomy by designating the chain of historical agents as living people who come to take the place of dead people. It is this-replacement of the dead by the living that constitutes the third-time characteristic of the notion of a succession of generations.

Recourse to the idea of a generation in the philosophy of history is not new.

It appears precisely at the turning point from the teleology of nature, which disposes human beings toward sociability, to the ethical task that requires the establishment of a civil society. "What will always seem strange," Kant says in discussing his third thesis, "is that earlier generations appear to carry out their laborious tasks only for the sake of later ones, to prepare for later generations a step from which they in turn can raise still higher the building that nature had in view—that only the most recent generations should have the good fortune to live in the building on which a long sequence of their forefathers (though certainly without any intention of their own) worked, without being able themselves to partake of the prosperity they prepared the way for" (p. 31). There is nothing surprising about this role played by the idea of a generation. It expresses how the ethico-political task is anchored to nature and it connects the notion of human history to that of the human species, which Kant takes for granted.

The enrichment that the concept of a generation brings to the concept of actual history, therefore, is greater than we might have suspected. Indeed, the replacement of the generations underlies in one way or another historical continuity and the rhythm of tradition and innovation. Hume and Comte enjoyed imagining what a society or a generation would be either as replacing another society or generation all at once, instead of doing so by continually replacing the dead with the living, or as something that would never be replaced because it was eternal. According to Karl Mannheim, these two thought experiments, implicitly or explicitly, have always served as a guide in evaluating the phenomenon of the succession of generations."
How does this phenomenon affect history and historical time? From a positivistic—point of view, the idea of a generation expresses several brute facts about human biology: birth, aging, death. One result of these is another fact, that of the average age for procreation—let us say thirty years—which, in turn, assures the replacement of the dead by the living. This measurement of the average duration of life is expressed in terms of the units of our regular calendar: days, months, years. But this positive point of view, linked to just the quantitative aspects of the notion of a generation, did not seem sufficient to the interpretative sociologists Dilthey and Mannheim, who were especially attentive to the qualitative aspects of social time. They asked what we have to add to the undeniable facts of human biology in order to incorporate the phenomenon of generations into the human sciences. We cannot derive a general law concerning the rhythms of history directly from a biological fact; for example, that youth are progressive by definition and older people conservative, or that the thirty-year figure for the replacement of generations automatically determines the tempo of progress in linear time. In this sense, the simple replacement of generations, in quantitative terms—whereby

was wiiung—D uii cquivuieiu 10 wui we mean oy a succession (roige) or generations.

Dilthey, who came first, was particularly interested in those characteristics that make the concept of a generation an intermediary phenomenon between the "external" time of the calendar and the "internal" time of our mental lives. He distinguishes two uses of the term. On the one hand, that individuals belong to the "same generation"; on the other, the "succession of generations," a phenomenon that has to be interpreted in terms of the preceding one if it is not to be reducible to the purely quantitative phenomena derived from the notion of an average life-span.

According to Dilthey, contemporaries who have been exposed to the same influences and marked by the same events and changes belong to the same generation. The circle he outlines is thus wider than that of the relationship but narrower than that of anonymous contemporaneity. This form of belonging together is a whole that combines something acquired and a common orientation. When set within time, this combination of influences received and influences exercised explains what accounts for the specificity of the concept of a "succession" of generations. This is a "chain" or a series arising out of the interfacing of the transmission of what is acquired and the opening of new possibilities.

Karl Mannheim undertook to refine this notion of belonging to the same generation by adding to its biological criteria a sociological criterion of a dis-positional kind, which included disinclinations as well as propensities to act, feel, and think in a certain way. All contemporaries, in fact, are not submitted to the same influences nor do they all exercise the same influence. In this sense, the concept of a generation requires us to distinguish the kind of belonging together that comes from the localization of belonging to an age class (verwandte Lagerung) from merely belonging to a concrete social "group," in order to designate those more subtle affinities that are undergone more than they are intentionally and actively sought. And we must characterize the connection between generations (Generationszusammenhang) by prereflective participation in a common destiny as much as by real participation in its recognized directive intentions and formative tendencies. The notion of a succession of generations, which is the real object of our interest here, ends up enriched by the precisions applied to the notion of belonging to the same generation. Already for Dilthey, this notion constitutes an intermediary structure between physical externality and the psychic inter-nality of time, and makes history a "whole bound together by continuity" (p. 38). So we rediscover on the intermediary level of the succession of generations the historical equivalent of the interconnectedness (Zusammenhang), taken in the sense of a motivational connection, that is the major concept of Dilthey's comprehensive psychology.

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Mannheim, in turn, saw how social dynamics depended upon the modes of interconnecting the generations, taken at the level of potential "localizations" in social space. Some fundamental features of this successive interconnection were the focus of his attention. First, the constant arrival of new bearers of culture and the continual departure of others; two features that, taken together, create the conditions for a compensation between rejuvenation and aging. Next, the stratification of age classes at a given moment. The compensation between rejuvenation and aging thus takes place in each temporal division of the period defined arithmetically through the average life-span. A new concept, an "endurifag" concept, of a generation follows from this combination of replacement (which is successive) and stratification (which is simultaneous). Whence the character of what Mannheim called the dialectic of the phenomena included in the term "generation"—not just the confrontation between heritage and innovation in the transmitting of the acquired culture but also the impact of the questions of youth on older people's certainties, acquired during their own youths. Upon this retroactive compensation, this remarkable reciprocal action, rest, in the final analysis, the continuity in the change of generations, along with all the degrees of conflict this change gives rise to.

The idea of the "realm of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors," introduced by Alfred Schutz, constitutes, as I have said, the sociological complement to the idea of the succession of generations, which, in return, gives the former term a biological basis. What is important about this is how it allows us to discern the significance of the anonymous time that is constituted at the turning point between phenomenological and cosmic time.
The great merit of Alfred Schutz's work is his having considered simultaneously the work of both Edmund Husserl and Max Weber and to have drawn an original sociology from social existence in its anonymous dimension.

The major interest of a phenomenology of social existence lies in exploring the transitions leading from the direct experience of the "we" to the anonymity characteristic of the everyday social world. In this sense, Schutz interweaves the genetic phenomenology and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity which were poorly tied together in the work of Husserl. Phenomenological sociology, for Schutz, is largely a genetic constitution of anonymity, instituted on the basis of an underlying instituting intersubjectivity—from the "we," as directly experienced, to the anonymous, which mostly escapes our awareness. The progressive enlargement of the sphere of direct interpersonal relationships to include anonymous relationships affects every temporal relation between past, present, and future. In fact, the direct relationship of the I to the Thou and to the We is temporarily structured from its very beginning. We are oriented, as agents and sufferers of actions, toward the remembered past, the evaluated present, and the anticipated future of other people's behavior. Applied to the temporal sphere, the genesis of the meaning of "anonymity" will therefore consist in deriving from the triad of present, past, and future, characteristic of the direct interpersonal relationship, the triad of the realm of contemporaries, the realm of predecessors, and the realm of successors. It is the anonymity of this threefold realm that provides the mediation we are seeking between private and public time.

As regards the first figure of anonymous time, the realm of contemporaries, the originary phenomenon is that of a simultaneous development of several temporal streams. The "simultaneity or quasi-simultaneity of the other self's consciousness with my own" (Schutz, p. 143) is the most basic presupposition of the genesis of meaning of the historical field. Here Schutz proposes a particularly apt expression: we share "a community of time," "we are growing old together" (p. 163). Simultaneity is not something purely instantaneous. It brings into relationship two enduring individuals (if, with Spinoza, we understand duration as "the indefinite continuance of existence"). One temporal stream accompanies another, so long as they endure together. The experience of a shared world thus depends on a community of time as well as of space. Upon this simultaneity of two distinct streams of consciousness is built up the anonymous contemporaneity characteristic of everyday social existence, a contemporaneity that extends well beyond the field of interpersonal, face-to-face relations. The genius of Schutz's phenomenology is that it traces out the transitions leading from "growing old together" to this anonymous contemporaneity. If, in the direct we-relation, the mediation symbols are weakly thematized, the passage to anonymous contemporaneity indicates an increase in them in inverse proportion to the decrease in immediacy. Interpretation thus appears as a remedy for the increasing loss of immediacy: "We make the transition from direct to indirect social experience simply by following this spectrum of decreasing vividness" (p. 177). This mediation includes Max Weber's ideal-types: "when I am They-oriented, I have 'types' for partners". (p. 185). In fact, we only reach our contemporaries through the typified roles assigned to them by institutions. The world of mere contemporaries, like that of our predecessors, is made up of a gallery of characters who are not and who never will be individuals. At best, the post-office employee, for example, reduces to a "type," a role which I respond to while expecting her to distribute the mail correctly. Contemporaneity here has lost its aspect of being a shared experience. Imagination entirely replaces the experience of mutual engagement. Inference has replaced immediacy. The contemporary is not given in a pre-predicative mode.

The conclusion as regards our own inquiry is that the very relation of contemporaneity is a mediating structure between the private time of individual fate and the public time of history, thanks to the equations encompassing contemporary ... is one whom I know coexists with me in time but whom I do not experience immediately" (p. 181).

It is regrettable that Schutz does not pay as much attention to the world of predecessors as he does to the world of contemporaries. There are a few comments, however, that do allow us to take up again what was said above concerning the succession of generations. In fact, the frontier is not so easy, to trace as it might seem between individual memory and that past before any memory which is the historical past. Absolutely speaking, my predecessors are those people none of whose experiences are contemporary with my own. In this sense, the world of predecessors is one that existed before my birth, and I cannot influence it by any form of interaction taking place in a common present. Nevertheless, there does exist a partial overlapping between memory and the historical past that contributes to the constitution of an anonymous time, halfway between private time and public time. The canonical example in this regard is that of a narrative received from the mouth of one of our ancestors. My grandfather might have told me during my youth of events concerning people whom I could never have known. Here the frontier that separates the historical past from individual memory is porous, as can be seen in the history of the recent past—a slippery genre to be sure—which blends together the testimony of surviving witnesses and documentary traces detached from their authors. An ancestor's memory partly intersects with his descendants' memories, and this intersection is produced in a common present that itself can present every possible degree, from the intimacy of a we-
relationship to the anonymity of a newspaper clipping. In this way, a bridge is constructed between the historical past and memory by the ancestral narrative that serves as a relay station for memory directed to the historical past, conceived of as the time of people now dead and the time before my own birth.

If we proceed along this chain of memories, history tends to become a we-relationship, extending in continuous fashion from the first days of humanity to the present. This chain of memories is, on the scale of the world of predecessors, what the retention of retentions is on the scale of individual memory. But it must also be said that a narrative told by an ancestor already introduces the mediation of signs and thus leans toward the side of the silent mediation of the document and the monument that makes knowledge of the historical past something completely different than a giant-sized memory, just as the world of contemporaries is distinguished from the we-relationship through the anonymity of its mediations. This feature authorizes the conclusion that "the stream of history includes anonymous events" (p. 231).

To conclude, I would like to draw two consequences from the connecting role that the idea of a succession of generations, joined to that of the network of

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The first has to do with the place of death in the writing of history. In history, death bears an eminently ambiguous signification that mixes together the intimacy of each person's death and a reference to the public character of the replacement of the dead by the living. These two references meet in the idea of anonymous death. Under the saying "they die," the historian recognizes death obliquely and only to go immediately beyond it.

Death is so intended, for example, in the sense that the replacement of generations is the euphemism by which we signify that the living take the place of the dead. Thanks to this oblique intention, the idea of a generation is the insistent reminder that history is the history of mortals. But death is also thereby superseded. For history, there are only roles always left in eschew and then assigned to new actors. In history, death, as the end of every individual life, is only dealt with by allusion, to the profit of those entities that outlast the cadavers—a people, nation, state, class, civilization. Yet death cannot be eliminated from the historian's field of attention if history is not to lose its historical quality. Thus we have the mixed, ambiguous notion of anonymous death. Is this not an unbearable concept? Yes, if we deplore the inauthenticity of the "they." No, if we discern in the anonymity of death the very mark of that anonymity, not just postulated but established by historical time at the sharpest point of the collision between mortal and public time. Anonymous death is, as it were, the central point of the whole conceptional network that includes the notions of contemporaries, predecessors, successors, and, as a background to them, a succession of generations.

The second, even more noteworthy consequence will not take on its full meaning until it is helped along by the following analysis of the trace. It has less to do with the biological side of the idea of the succession of generations than with the symbolic side of the related idea of the realm of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. Ancestors and successors are others, infused with an opaque symbolism whose figure comes to occupy the place of an Other, wholly Other, than mortals. One thing that bears witness to this is the representation of the dead, not just as absent from history, but as shadows haunting the historical present. Another thing is the representation of future humanity as immortal, as can be seen in numerous Enlightenment thinkers. For example, in Kant's "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" (1784), the commentary already partially cited earlier on the third thesis ends with the following affirmation, which we are asked to accept "no matter how puzzling this is." It is "nonetheless equally as necessary once one assumes that one species of animal should have reason and that as a class of rational beings—each member of which dies, while the species is immortal—it is destined to develop its capacities to perfection." This representation of

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an immortal humanity, which Kant here raises to the rank of a postulate, is the symptom of a deeper symbolic function through which we intend a more human Other, whose lack we fill through the figure of our ancestors, the icon of the immemorial, along with that of our successors, the icon of hope. It is this symbolic functioning that the notion of a trace has to make more clear.

ARCHIVES, DOCUMENTS, TRACES

The notion of a trace constitutes a new connector between the temporal perspectives that speculation arising out of phenomenology, especially Heideggerian phenomenology, dissociates. A new connector, perhaps the final one. In fact, the notion of a trace becomes thinkable only if we can succeed in discovering in it what is required by everyone of those productions of the historian's practice that reply to the aporias of time for speculation.

That the trace, for historical practice, is such a requirement can be shown if we examine the thought process that begins with the notion of archives, moves on to that of a document (and, among documents, eyewitness testimony), and then reaches its final epistemological presupposition: the trace. Our reflection on historical consciousness will begin its own second-order investigation from this final requirement.

What do we mean by archives?

If we open the Encyclopaedia Universalis and the Encyclopaedia Britannica to this term "archives," in the former we read, "archives are constituted by the set of documents that result from the activity of an institution or of a physical or moral person." The latter says that "the term archives designates the organized body of records produced or received by a public, semipublic, institutional, business or private entity in the transaction of its affairs and preserved by it, its successors or authorized repository through extension of its original meaning as the repository for such materials."
These two definitions and their development in these two encyclopedia articles allow us to isolate three characteristics: first, the reference to the notion of a document (or "record"). Archives are a set, an organized body of documents. Next, comes the relationship to an institution. Archives are said, in the one case, to result from institutional activity; in the other, they are said to be produced by or received by the entity for which the documents in question are the archives. Finally, putting documents produced by an institution (or its juridical equivalent) into archives has the goal of conserving or preserving them. The Encyclopaedia Universalis adds in this regard that, unlike libraries, archives constituted of gathered-together documents, "are only conserved documents," although it modifies this distinction by adding that some discrimination is unavoidable—what should be conserved, what thrown away?— even if this choice is made only in terms of the presumed usefulness of the documents, and hence of the activity they stem from. The Encyclopaedia Bri-

tannica says, in a similar sense, that conservation makes archives an "authorized deposit" through the stipulations that spell out the definition of the goals of the institution under consideration. Therefore the institutional character of archives is affirmed three times. Archives constitute the documentary stock of an institution. It is a specific activity of this institution that produces them, gathers them, and conserves them. And the deposit thereby constituted is an authorized deposit through some stipulation added to the one that sets up the entity for which the archives are "archives."

A sociological interpretation might legitimately be grafted to this institutional character, denouncing, if the need should arise, the ideological character of the choice that presides over the apparently innocent operation of conserving these documents and that betrays the stated goal of this operation. However, this is not the direction in which our investigation leads us. Instead we must turn toward the notion of a document (or record) contained in the initial definition of archives and to the notion of a trace implicitly contained in the notion of a deposit.

In the notion of a document the accent today is no longer placed on the function of teaching which is conveyed by the etymology of this word—it is derived from the Latin docere, and in French there is an easy transition from enseignement (teaching) to renseignement (information); rather the accent is placed on the support, the warrant a document provides for a history, a narrative, or an argument. This role of being a warrant constitutes material proof, what in English is called "evidence," for the relationship drawn from a course of events. If history is a true narrative, documents constitute its ultimate means of proof. They nourish its claim to be based on facts.

Criticism of this notion of a document may take place on several levels. At an elementary epistemological level, it has become banal to emphasize that any trace left by the past becomes a document for historians as soon as they know how to interrogate its remains, how to question them. In this respect, the most valuable traces are the ones that were not intended from our information. Historians' interrogations are guided by the theme chosen to guide their inquiries. This first approach to the notion of a document is a familiar one. As I said in Part II, in volume 1, the search for documents has continued to annex zones of information more and more distant from the type of documents lying in already constituted archives; that is, documents that were conserved because of their presumed usefulness. Anything that can inform a scholar, whose research is oriented by a reasonable choice of questions, can be a document. Such critical inquiry at this first level leads to the notion of involuntary testimony, Marc Bloch's "witnesses in spite of themselves." Rather than calling into question the epistemological status of documents, it enlarges their field."

A second level of criticism for the notion of a document is contemporaneous with the quantitative history discussed in volume 1. The relationship the clerisy. For history has always been a critique of social narratives and, in this sense, a rectification of our common memory. Every documentary revolution lies along this same trajectory. If therefore neither the documentary revolution nor the ideological critique of the document/monument reaches the actual basis of the function of the document as informing us about the past and enlarging the scope of our collective memory, the source of the authority of the document, as an instrument of this memory, is the significance attached to the trace. If archives can be said to be instituted, and their documents are collected and conserved, this is so on the basis of the presupposition that the past has left a trace, which has become the monuments and documents that bear witness to the past. But what does it mean "to leave a trace"? Here historians put their trust in common sense, and, we are about to see, they are not wrong in doing so. Littre gives as the first sense of the word "trace": "vestige that a human being or an animal has left on the place where it passed." Then he notes the more general usage: "any mark left by a thing." Through generalization, the vestige becomes a mark. At the same time, the origin of a trace is extended from a human being or an animal to anything whatever. On the other hand, the idea of being past has disappeared. All that remains is the remark that the trace is "left behind." Here is the heart of the paradox. On the one hand, the trace is visible here and now, as a vestige, a mark. On the other hand, there is a trace (or track) because "earlier" a human being or an animal passed this way. Something did something. Even in language as we use it, the vestige or mark "indicates" the pastness of the passage, the earlier occurrence of the streak, the groove, without "showing" or bringing to
appearance "what" passed this way. Note the apt homonymy between "passed" [etrate passe] (in the sense of having passed a certain place) and "past" [etrate passe] (in the sense of having happened). This is not surprising. Augustine's Confessions have made us familiar with the metaphor of time as a passage: the present as an active transit and a passive transition; once the passage has taken place, the past falls behind. It passed this way. And we say that time itself passes. Where then is the paradox? In the fact that the passage no longer is but the trace remains. Recall Augustine's perplexity over the idea of the vestigial image as something that remains (manet) in the mind.

Historians confine themselves to this preunderstanding familiar to ordinary language, which J. L. Austin so admired because he saw it in a storehouse for the most appropriate forms of expression. More precisely, historians stand halfway between the initial definition of a trace and its extension to a thing. People from the past left these vestiges. However they are also the products of their activities and their work, hence they are those things Heidegger speaks of as subsisting and at hand (tools, dwellings, temples, tombs, writings) that 119

cism. As Jacques Le Goff reminds us in an insightful article in the En-ciclopedia Einaudi, archives were for a long time designated by the term "monument." For example, the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, which date from 1826. The development of positivist history at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries marked the triumph of the document over the monument. What makes a monument suspect, even though it often is found in situ, is its obvious finality, its commemoration of events that its contemporaries—especially the most powerful among them—judged worthy of being integrated into the collective memory. Conversely, the document, even though it is collected and not simply inherited, seems to possess an objectivity opposed to the intention of the monument, which is meant to be edifying. The writings in archives were thus thought to be more like documents that like monuments. For criticism directed against ideology, which prolongs the criticism mentioned above concerning the setting up of archives, documents turn out to be no less instituted than monuments are, and no less edifying as regards power and those in power. A criticism is born that takes as its task to discover the monument hiding behind the document, a more radical form of criticism than the critique of authenticity that assured the victory of the document over the monument. This new form of criticism directs its attack against the conditions of historical production and its concealed or unconscious intentions. In this sense we must say with Le Goff that once its apparent meaning is demystified, "the document is a monument" (p. 46). Must we, then, give up seeing in contemporary historiography, with its data banks, its use of computers and information theory, its constituting of series (using the model of serial history), an enlargement of our collective memory? This would be to break with the notions of a trace and the testimony of the past. However difficult the notion of a collective memory may be, particularly when it does not openly carry its credentials with it, to reject it would be to announce the suicide of history. In fact, the substitution of a new science of history for our collective memory rests upon an illusion about documents that is not fundamentally different from the positivist illusion it thinks is combating. The data in a data bank are suddenly crowned with a halo of the same authority as the document cleansed by positivist criticism. The illusion is even more dangerous in this case. As soon as the idea of a debt to the dead, to people of flesh and blood to whom something really happened in the past, stops giving documentary research its highest end, history loses its meaning. In its epistemological naivete, positivism at least preserved the significance of the document, namely, that it functions as a trace left by the past. Cut off from that significance, the datum becomes truly insignificant. The scientific use of data stored in and manipulated by a computer certainly gives birth to a new kind of scholarly activity. But this activity constitutes only a long methodological detour destined to lead to an enlargement of our collective memory in 118

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have left a mark. In this sense, to have passed this way and to have made a mark are equivalent. "Passage" is a better way of speaking about the dynamics of a trace, while "mark" is a better way of indicating its static aspect. Let us explore the implications of this first sense as they profit history. Someone passed by here. The trace invites us to pursue it, to follow it back, if possible, to the person or animal who passed this way. We may lose the trail. It may even disappear or lead nowhere. The trace can be wiped out, for it is fragile and needs to be preserved intact; otherwise, the passage did occur but it did not leave a trace, it simply happened. We may know by other means that people or animals existed somewhere, but they will remain forever unknown if there is not some trace that leads to them. Hence the trace indicates "here" (in space) and "now" (in the present), the past passage of living beings. It orients the hunt, the quest, the search, the inquiry. But this is what history is. To say that it is a knowledge by traces is to appeal, in the final analysis, to the significance of a passed past that nevertheless remains preserved in its vestiges. The implications of the broader meaning—the sense of a mark—are no less suggestive. It first suggests the idea of a harder, more durable support than the transitory activity of human beings. In particular, it is because humans worked, and committed something to stone, or bone, or baked clay tablets, or papyrus, or paper, or recording tape, or a computer's memory, that their works outlive their working. People pass, their works remain. But they remain as things among other things. This "thing-like" character is important for our investigation. It introduces a
relationship of cause to effect between the marking thing and the marked thing. So the trace combines a relation of
significance, best discerned in the idea of a vestige, and a relation of causality, included in the thing-likeness of
the mark. The trace is a sign-effect. These two systems of relations are interwoven. On the one hand, to follow
a trace is to reason by means of causality about the chain of operations constitutive of the action of passing by.
On the other hand, to return from the mark to the thing that made it is to isolate, among all the possible causal
chains, the ones that also carry the significance belonging to the relationship of vestige to passage.
This double allegiance of the trace, far from betraying an ambiguity, constitutes the trace as the connection
between two areas of thought and, by implication, between two perspectives on time. To the same extent that the
trace marks the passage of an object or a quest in space, it is in calendar time and, beyond it, in astral time that
the trace marks a passage. This is the condition for the trace, as conserved and no longer in the process of being
laid down, to become a dated document.
This connection between trace and dating allows us to take up again the problem left unresolved by Heidegger of
the relationship between the fundamental time of Care, the temporality directed toward the future and toward
death, and "ordinary" time, conceived of as a succession of abstract instants.
I would like to show that the trace brings about this relationship, which
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phenomenology seeks in vain to understand and to interpret relying only on the temporality of Care.
It was not, as we have seen, that Heidegger was unaware of the problem. His criticism of Dilthey's claim to give
the human sciences an autonomous epis-temological status not grounded in the ontological structure of
historicality begins precisely from the inability of historiography to account for "pastness" as past.37
Furthermore, the phenomenon of the trace is explicitly taken by Heidegger as the touchstone for the enigma of
pastness. However, the answer he proposes to this enigma redoubles it rather than resolves it. Heidegger is
certainly correct when he states that what no longer is, is the world within which these "remains" once belonged,
as equipment. As he says, "That world is no longer. But what was formerly within-the-world with respect to that
world, that which is now still present at hand can belong nevertheless to the 'past'."38 This text defines adequately
what we mean by "remains of the past," or, in other words, by a trace. But what do we gain by refusing the
predicate "past" (vergangen) to Dasein, limiting it to those beings qualified as subsistent and manipulatable,
while reserving for the Dasein of earlier times the predicate "having-been-there" (da-gewesen)? Recall
Heidegger's unambiguous statement in this regard: "A Dasein which no longer exists, however, is not past
[vergangen], in the ontologically strict sense; it is rather 'having-been-there' [da-gewesen]'(ibid.). What, we
shall ask, are we to understand by a Dasein—a "being-there"—that had been there previously? Is it not precisely
on the basis of the "remains" of the past that we assign this qualification to the being we ourselves are?
Heidegger glimpses something of this mutual relationship when he adds an important corrective to his clear
distinction between da-gewesen and vergangen. Indeed, it is not sufficient just to distinguish these two terms, we
have to sketch the genesis of the meaning of the second beginning from the first. We must say that the historical
character of Dasein is in a way transferred to some subsisting, manipulatable things so that they count as traces.
The aspect of being an implement that is still attached to these remains of the past is then said to be historical in
a secondary sense.39 We have only to forget this filiation of the secondary sense of "historical" to form the idea
of something that would be "past" as such. "Historical" in the primary sense preserves the relation to the future
and the present. For "historical" in the secondary sense this fundamental structure of temporality is lost sight of
and we begin to pose insoluble questions concerning the "past as such." Furthermore, the restitution of this
filiation of meaning allows us to account for what Heidegger calls the "world-historical" (weltgeschichtlich). The
remains of the past, with their equipment-like character, constitute the leading example of what is world-
historical. In fact, these remains are themselves what seem to be the carriers of the signification "past." But
we can avoid anticipating the problematic of within-time-ness at the very heart of the problem of
historicality if we are to account for this derived

interpretation 01 me phenomenon 01 me trace uny n, as analysis of Being and Time, we can give the idea of the
"origin" (Herkunft) of the derived forms of temporality the value not of a decrease but of an increase in meaning. This
at least seems to be what is implied by the introduction of the notion of the world-historical at the very, heart of the
analysis of historicality.
The phenomenon of the trace—along with the phenomena of ruins, remains, and documents—thus finds itself
depleted from the historical toward the intratemporal, that which is "within-time." Would we then have a better account of the trace if we took account of the surplus of meaning "within-time-ness" brings to historicality? There can be no doubt that the notions of datable, public, and extensive time are essential to
deciphering the "traces" of the past. To follow a trace, to retrace it, is to bring into play in one way or another each of
the characteristics of within-time-ness. This is surely the stage where Heidegger would have wished to situate this
operation. However I do not think he would have succeeded in doing so without making further loans from "ordinary
time," taken as a simple leveling off of within-time-ness. Indeed, it does not seem to me that he could ever account for
the significance of the trace without associating ordinary time and within-time-ness. The time of the trace, it seems to
me, is homogeneous with calendar time.
Heidegger comes close to recognizing this when he suggests that "remains, monuments, and records that are still present-at-hand, are possible 'material' for the concrete disclosure of the Dasein which has-been-there" (p. 446; his emphasis). But nothing more is said about the status of this "material" other than the reiterated affirmation that only its world-historical character allows such material to exercise a historiographical function. We cannot make more progress in our analysis of the trace unless we show how the operations proper to the historian's practice, relative to monuments and documents, contribute to forming the notion of "the Dasein which has been there." This bringing about of the convergence of a purely phenomenological notion with historiographical procedures, all of which can be referred to the act of following or retracing a trace, can only be carried out within the framework of a historical time that is neither a fragment of stellar time nor a simple aggrandizement of the communal dimensions of the time or personal memory; this is a hybrid time, issuing from the confluence of two perspectives on time—the phenomenological perspective and that of ordinary time, to use the Heideggerian terminology.

If, however, we are to give equal rights to the time of Care and to universal time, we have to renounce seeing in the latter a "leveling off" of the least authentic forms of temporality. This composite constitution of the significance of a trace finally allows us to give a less negative twist to Heidegger's estimation of the categories of his-
relationship of cause to effect between the marking thing and the marked thing. So the trace combines a relation of significance, best discerned in the idea of a vestige, and a relation of causality, included in the thing-likeness of the mark. The trace is a sign-effect. These two systems of relations are interwoven. On the one hand, to follow a trace is to reason by means of causality about the chain of operations constitutive of the action of passing by. On the other hand, to return from the mark to the thing that made it is to isolate, among all the possible causal chains, the ones that also carry the significance belonging to the relationship of vestige to passage.

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We have only to forget this filiation of the secondary sense of "historical" to form the idea of something that would be "past" as such. "Historical" in the primary sense preserves the relation to the future and the present. For "historical" in the secondary sense this fundamental structure of temporality is lost sight of and we begin to pose unsolvable questions concerning the "past as such." Furthermore, the restitution of this filiation of meaning allows us to account for what Heidegger calls the "world-historical" (weltgeschichtlich). The remains of the past, with their equipment-like character, constitute the leading example of what is world-historical. In fact, these remaines are themselves what seem to be the carriers of the signification "past."

But can we avoid anticipating the problematic of within-time-ness at the very heart of the problem of historicality if we are to account for this derived

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phenomenon in our discussion of the three major features of within-time-ness: data-bility, the lapse of time, and its public character. Recall that I already suggested there the idea of an "overlapping" of the existential and the empirical. The trace consists in this overlapping.

In the first place, to follow a trace is one way of "reckoning with time." How could the trace left in space refer back to the passage of the sought-for object without our calculations concerning the time that passed between them, that is, between the passage and the trace it left? Immediately then, data-bility with its "now," "then," "earlier," and so on, is brought into play. However, no hunters or detectives would limit themselves to these vague references. Data-bility without a specific date is of no interest to them. Rather it is with watch in hand that they follow the trace—or with a calendar in their bag that they retrace it. Next, to follow a trace, to retrace it, is to decipher, in space, the "stretching along" of time. How can we do this, though, unless right away we calculate and measure the lapse of time? The trajectory of the passage, like the tracing of the trace, is relentlessly linear. The significance of the trace has to be reconstituted in terms of successive time, even if it is not contained in some pure succession. Finally, the trace, as visible to everyone, even if it can only be deciphered by a few, projects our preoccupation, as illustrated by our hunt, search, or inquiry, in the public time which makes our
private durations commensurate with one another. The seriousness of our preoccupation—so well expressed by the term "circumscpection"—does not betray any failure here that would further aggravate the dereliction that our thrownness has already brought us to. On the contrary, if we are willing to be guided by the trace, we must be capable of that letting-go, that abnegation that makes care about oneself efface itself before the trace of the other. However we must always take the inverse trajectory too. If the significance of the trace depends on the computations inscribed in ordinary time, just as the trace itself is inscribed in geometrical space, this significance is not exhausted by the relations of successive time. As I said above, this significance consists in the reference back from the vestige to the passage, a reference that requires the quasi-instantaneous synthesis of the print left here and now, and the event that occurred. That this significance, in turn, distances us from Heidegger's critique of ordinary time, I willingly grant—and all the more so because I have borrowed the very expression "the significance of the trace," not from Heidegger but from Emmanuel Levinas, in his noteworthy essay on this topic. However, my borrowings from Levinas can be only indirect and must appear biased to him. He speaks of the trace in the context of the epiphany of the face. His interrogation, therefore, is not directed at the historian's past but at, if I may put it this way, the past of the moralist. What, he asks, is the past before history, the past

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of the Other, for which there is no unveiling, no manifestation, not even an icon? Is the trace, the significance of the trace, what assures Entry and Visitation without revelation? This significance escapes the alternation of unveiling and concealment, the dialectic of revealing and hiding, because the trace for Levinas signifies something without making it appear. It is compelling but not revealing. Levinas's perspective, therefore, is very different from my own as regards the trace. And yet . . .

Yet I cannot overestimate how much my investigation of the role of the trace in the problematic of the role of reference in history owes to this magnificent meditation. Essentially, it owes to it the idea that a trace is distinguished from all the signs that get organized into systems, because it disarranges some "order." The trace is "this disarrangement expressing itself" (p. 63). The trace left by a wild animal disarranges the vegetation of the forest; "the relationship between signified and signification, in the trace, is not one of correlation but one of unrightness" (p. 59). I am aware that in saying this Levinas places the absent outside of any memory, assigning it to an immemorial past. The impact of his meditation on my analysis, however, is that it underlines the strangeness of the trace which "is not a sign like others" (p. 60), inasmuch as it is always a passage that it indicates, not some possible presence. His remark also holds for the historian's trace/sign: "hence taken as a sign, the trace still has this as exceptional about it in relation to other signs: it signifies beyond any intention of giving a sign and beyond every project for which it may have been the intended object" (ibid.). Is this not what Marc Bloch designated as "witnesses in spite of themselves"?

I do not wish to bring down to the level of historical immanence this meditation on the trace wholly dedicated to a "past that has absolutely taken place," "a past more distant than any past and any future which are still ordered in terms of my own time . . . toward the past of the Other where eternity is indicated, an absolute past that reunites every time" (p. 63). I would rather leave open the possibility that in the last analysis there is a relative Other, a historical Other; that in some way the remembered past is meaningful on the basis of an immemorial past. Perhaps this is the possibility that literature holds open when some "tale about time" points to some form of eternity. Who knows what underground connections may attach this literature to the infinity of the absolute Other, in Levinas's sense, an absolute Other whose trace appears in the visage of other people? However that may be, the connection between my analysis and Levinas's meditation may be summed up as follows: the trace signifies something without making it appear. The trace is thus one of the more enigmatic instruments by means of which historical narrative "refigures" time. It refigures time by constructing the junction brought about by the overlapping of the existential and the empirical traces, they stand in a relationship of usage. It is in frequenting archives and in consulting documents that historians look for the trace of the past as it actually occurred. The problem of what the trace as such signifies is not the historian's but the philosopher's.

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Our task here is to think of the world—or rather the worlds—of fiction in counterpoint to the historical world, insofar as this relates to the resolution of the aporias of temporality brought to light by phenomenology. In volume 2 I introduced the concept of imaginative variations, which will guide our analyses in this chapter, to characterize in terms of one another the diverse fictive experiences of time set forth in our discussions of Mrs. Dallo-way, Der Zauberberg, and A la recherche du temps perdu. But there we confined ourselves to using this
concept without being able to analyze it. This was so for two reasons. First, we still lacked a fixed term of comparison in relation to which the fictive experiences of time are imaginative variations, not just in relation to one another but simply as fictions. This fixed term was recognized only at the end of our analysis of the constitution of historical time through the reinscription of phenomenological time on cosmic time. This phenomenon of reinscription is the invariant with respect to which our tales about time appear as imaginative variations. In addition, this contrast lacked the background against which it could stand out, namely, the aporias of time, which provided the opening for this third volume. I want to stress the role of this third partner in our three-way conversation. It is not enough to oppose, term by term, such imaginative variations on time to the fixed constitution of historical time; we must also be able to say to what common aporias the variable constitution of fictive time and the invariable Constitution of historical time provide a different response. Without this common reference to the aporias of temporality, historical time and the imaginative variations produced by our tales about time would remain disconnected from one another and strictly speaking would be incomparable with one another.

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF HISTORICAL TIME

The most visible but not necessarily the most decisive feature in the opposition between fictive time and historical time is the emancipation of the narrator—whom we are not confusing with the author—with respect to the major obligation imposed on the historian, namely, the need to conform to the specific connectors acting to reinscribe lived time upon cosmic time. Having said this, we are still just giving a negative characterization of the freedom of the artisan of fiction and, by implication, of the unreal status of fictive temporal experience. Unreal characters, we might say, have an unreal experience of time. Unreal, in the sense that the temporal marks of this experience do not have to be connected to the single spatial-temporal network constitutive of chronological time. For the same reason, they do not have to be connected to one another like geographical maps set side by side. The temporal experience of a particular hero has no need to be referred to the one system of dating and the single chart of all possible dates for which the calendar serves as the frame of reference. In this sense, from the epic to the novel, by way of tragedy and the ancient and modern forms of comedy, the time of fictional narrative has been freed from the constraints requiring it to be referred back to the time of the universe. The search for connectors between phenomenological time and cosmological time—the institution of the calendar; the time of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors; the replacement of generations; documents and traces—thus seems, at least as a first approximation, to lose all reason for existing. Each fictive temporal experience unfolds its world, and each of these worlds is singular, incomparable, unique. Not just plots, but also the worlds of experience they unfold, are—as are Kant's segments of a unique successive time—limitations belonging to a unique imaginary world. Fictive temporal experiences cannot be totalized.

This negative characterization of the freedom of the artisan of fiction does not, however, constitute the last word. Removing the constraints of cosmological time has as its positive counterpart the independence of fiction in exploring the resources of phenomenological time that are left unexploited or are inhibited by historical narrative, owing to its constant concern to connect historical time to cosmological time through the reinscription of historical time upon cosmological time. These hidden resources of phenomenological time, and the aporias which their discovery gives rise to, form the secret bond between the two modalities of narrative. Fiction, I will say, is a treasure trove of imaginative variations applied to the theme of phenomenological time and its aporias. To show this, I propose to combine the analysis made at the end of volume 2 of our three tales about time with the principal results of our discussion of the phenomenology of time.¹

VARIATIONS ON THE SPLIT BETWEEN LIVED TIME AND WORLD TIME

In order to stress the parallel and the contrast between the imaginative variations produced by fiction and the fixed time constituted by the reinscription of lived time on world time on the level of history, I will go directly to the major

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aporia revealed—and to a certain extent produced—by phenomenology, namely, the split failure opened up by reflective thinking between phenomenological time and cosmic time. It is in their manner of relating to this split that history and fiction begin to differ.²

We find a basic indication of the way in which the fictive experience of time relates in its own way lived temporality and time perceived as a dimension of the world in the fact that the epic, the drama, and the novel never fail to mix together historical characters, dated or datable events, and known geographical sites with invented characters, events, and places.³

For example, the plot of Mrs. Dalloway is clearly situated after the First World War, more precisely in 1923, and unfolds within the monumental framework of what was still the capital of the British Empire. Likewise, the adventures of Hans Castorp in The Magic Mountain clearly belong to the prewar years and explicitly lead into the 1914 catastrophe. Finally, the episodes of Remembrance of Things Past can be divided into those that occur
before and after World War I; developments in the Dreyfus affair provide easily identifiable chronological markers, and the description of Paris during the war is inserted within an explicitly dated time. Nevertheless, we would be sorely mistaken if we were to conclude that these dated or datable events draw the time of fiction into the gravitational field of historical time. What occurs is just the opposite. From the mere fact that the narrator and the leading characters are fictional, all references to real historical events are divested of their function of standing for the historical past and are set on a par with the unreal status of the other events. More precisely, the reference to the past, and the very function of standing-for, are preserved but in a neutralized mode, similar to the one Husserl uses to characterize the imaginary. Or, to use a different vocabulary, borrowed this time from analytical philosophy, historical events are no longer denoted, they are simply mentioned. In this way, World War I, which serves in each case as a reference point for the events recounted in all three novels, loses the status of a common reference and is reduced instead to that of an identical quotation within temporal universes that cannot be superimposed upon one another, that I cannot communicate with one another. It must also be said that World War I, as a historical event, is in each case fictionalized in a different way, as are all the historical characters included in each novel. So these novels take place within heterogeneous temporal spheres. All the specific connectors set in place by history can also be neutralized and simply mentioned: not only calendar time but the succession of generations, archives, documents, and traces. The entire range of tools serving the relation of standing-for can be fictionalized in this way and considered as the work of the imaginary.

The question is to know in what way a segment of world events is incorporated within the temporal experience of the fictional characters. Fiction responds to the major apona or phenomenology. For example, the entire dynamics of Virginia Woolf's novel was derived in our analysis from the antagonism between what I called mortal time and monumental time. But what gives the novel a wealth infinitely superior to the statement of a merely speculative antinomy lies in the fact that the narrator does not bring into confrontation two entities, two categories—e ven if these be existentials in the Heideggerian sense of the term—but rather two limit-experiences, between which lies the entire range of individual experiences the "narrator has chosen to put on stage. One of these limit-experiences, that of Septimus Warren Smith, signifies, to be sure, the impossible reconciliation between the hours struck by Big Ben and the unfortunate hero's incomunicable dream of personal wholeness. However, Septimus's suicide also marks the embodiment of the existential Being-towards-death in a singular existen-tiell experience, an experience closer to the invitation to despair Gabriel Marcel sees as ineluctably following from the spectacle presented by the world than, for example, to the resolute anticipation that Heidegger holds to be the most authentic testimony to the primordial character of Being-towards-death. The same can be said as regards cosmological time. This novel points to it only through the trappings of the monumental, only as it is incarnated in figures of authority, of "proportion" and of intolerance, the accomplices of established order. Given this twofold concretization, the chimes struck by Big Ben by no means punctuate a neutral and common time but, in each case, possess a different meaning for each of the characters whose experience stretches between the two limits marking the boundaries of the space opened up by the novel. Common time does not bring together, it divides. Caught between two extremes, Clarissa's privileged experience does not constitute a mediation, in the sense of a speculative mixture, but a singular variant, marked by an essential conflict between her secret role as Septimus's "double" and her public role as the "perfect hostess." The gesture of defiance by which the heroine goes back to her party—"she must assemble"—itself expresses a singular existen-tiell modality of resolution in the face of death: that of a fragile and perhaps inauthentic compromise (but it is not the task of fiction to preach authenticity) between mortal time and monumental time. The Magic Mountain poses the problem of the confrontation between lived time and cosmic time in entirely different terms. To begin with, the concrete constellations revolving around the two poles are not the same. Those "below" enjoy no privilege with respect to the monumental; they are people caught up in everydayness; only a few of their emissaries recall the figures of authority in Mrs. Dalloway, and they remain the representatives of ordinary time. As for those "above," they differ radically from the hero of internal time found in Mrs. Dalloway. Their time is globally and unremittingly a morbid and decadent time where even eroticism is tainted with the stigmata of corrupt-
to erase the traces of cosmic time is still a way of relating to cosmic time, something like the clever doctor who gives
his uncooperative patients a thermometer with no markings on it. Like a "silent sister," ordinary time continues to
accompany the hero's spiritual adventure.
In *Remembrance of Things Past*, we find another highly unusual variation on the polarity between the time
of consciousness and the time of the world. The figure in which the time of the world appears is that of the various
domains in which there operates what we have termed, along with Gilles Deleuze, the apprenticeship to signs:
signs of the social world, signs of life, signs of sensuous impressions, signs of art. However, because these four do-
 mains are never represented except through their signs, apprenticeship to them also involves the world and
consciousness. Another cleavage results from this, opposing time lost to time regained. Lost, first of all, is past time,
prey to the universal decay of things. In this sense, *Remembrance of Things Past* is an exhausting struggle against the
effacement of traces, against forgetfulness. (I shall discuss below the remythicizing of time that is entailed by the
narrator's speculations as he reflects upon the universal erosion of all things.) Lost also is the time dissipated among
signs not yet recognized as such, destined to be reintegrated within the great work of recapitulation. Lost, finally, is
dispersed time, like the places in space, symbolized by the two "ways," Mese-glise and Guermantes. We might speak
in this regard of the intermittence of time, as one speaks of the intermittence of the heart. Actually, the meaning of the
expression "time lost" remains in suspension as long as it has not yet become the very thing that is to be regained.
Before the point of conjunction between quest and illumination, between apprenticeship and visitation, *Remembrance
of Things Past* does not know where it is headed. And it is indeed

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this disorientation, and the disenchantment it produces, that defines time as lost, as long as *Remembrance of
Things Past* has not been instilled with the great design of creating a work of art. However, the lesson that the
phenomenology of time can receive from this conjunction between the apprenticeship to signs and ecstatic
experience no longer has to do with the initial aporia we have just examined, that to which historical time
provides an answer.
In this initial retracing of the path from *Mrs. Dalloway* to *The Magic Mountain* to *Remembrance of Things Past*,
we have seen fiction propose diverse responses to one and the same aporia while varying the very manner of
posing the problem, to the point of shifting the initial place of difficulty. In doing this, fiction removes the
partitions between problems that the aporetics of time had carefully separated—beginning with the distinction,
which now appears more didactic than substantive, between the enigmas acknowledged by phenomenology as
belonging to internal time-constitution and those generated by the very gesture that inaugurates phenomenology,
the reduction of cosmic, objective, ordinary time. It is because of this shift in the problematic itself that we are
carried back from the, so to speak, peripheral aporias to the core aporias of the phenomenology of time. At the
very heart of the opposition between the imaginative variations produced by our tales about time and the fixed
term of the reinscription by history of lived time upon world time, it appears that the major contribution of
fiction to philosophy does not lie in the range of solutions it proposes for the discordance between the time of the
world and lived time but in the exploration of the nonlinear features of pheno-

1* nomenological time that historical time conceals due to the very fact that it is

1 set within the great chronology of the universe.

VARIATIONS ON THE APORIA INTERNAL TO PHENOMENOLOGY

We are now going to examine the stages of this liberation of phenomenologically time beyond the constraints of
historical time. We shall be considering, in succession, (1) the problem of unifying the temporal flow, which
Husserl sees as resulting from the phenomenon of "coincidence" in the horizontal constitution of time and which
Heidegger derives from the phenomenon of "repetition" in the hierarchical constitution of the levels of
temporalization; (2) the reawakening of the Augustinian theme of eternity in certain tightly concentrated limit-
experiences of temporality; and finally (3) the modalities of re-mythicizing time, which are no longer the
province of phenomenology but which fiction alone has the power to evoke, in the strong sense of this word.
1. Our new review of the three tales about time that have captured our attention will take as its starting point the
analyses by means of which Husserl thought he had solved the Augustinian paradox of the threefold present: the
present of the past, the present of the future, the present of the present. This

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solution is composed of two phases. It first grants a certain thickness to the lived-through present that
distinguishes it from the point-like instant by connecting it to the recent past, retained within the present, and the
imminent future, which constitutes a zone of protention corresponding to the zone of retention in the present.
However the price to pay for this extension of the present is the break between retention (or primary
remembrance), included in its own way within the living present, and recollection (or secondary remembrance),
excluded from the living present. Husserl then sees the unity of the flux of time as being constituted by the
endless coincidence of the retentions (and of retentions of retentions) that constitute the "comet's tail" of the
living present with the series of quasi-presents into which I transport myself freely through my imagination, and
which each unfold their own system of retentions and protentions. So the unification of the temporal flux stems
from the sort of "tiling" effect that results from the overlap of various systems of retentions and protentions
flowing from the living present and from any other quasi-present, the retention of one present overlapping the protension of another.

The same process of coinciding returns in another form and with another name in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, more attentive, it is true, to the internal hierarchization of the levels of temporality than to the continuity of the unitary temporal flux. This is why "repetition" appeared to us as the nodal point of all his analyses of temporality. By joining together having-been, coming-towards, and making-present on the level of historicality, repetition links together on this median plane the deep level of authentic temporality and the superficial level of within-time-ness, where the worldhood of the world wins out over the mortality of Dasein. This same overlapping structure of time is not just described, it is set into operation—in many different ways—by the imaginative variations of fiction.

For example, Virginia Woolf's novel appeared to us to be at once pulled ahead by the anticipation of Clarissa's party and pulled back by each of the protagonists' excursions into the past, billows of memories continually rising up in the midst of the action. Virginia Woolf's art here lies in interweaving the present, with its stretches of the imminent future and the recent past, and a recollected past, and so making time progress by slowing it down. Furthermore, the time-consciousness of each of the main characters is ceaselessly polarized between the lived present, leaning toward the imminence of the near future, and a variety of quasi-presents that hold a particular radiating capacity for each individual. For Peter Walsh, and to a lesser degree for Clarissa, it is the memory of unrealized love, of a refusal of marriage, of the happy days at Bourton. Septimus is no less torn out of the living present by his memories of the war, to the point of being prevented from living in the present by the vision of his dead friend, who returns to haunt his delirium. As for Rezia, her past as a small-time milliner remains for her the anchorage point.

It is Pribislav's pencil that Clavdia lends and takes back. Clavdia is Pribislav. Discordant concordance is overcome in a coincidence pushed to the point of identification. The other side of this magic indistin-guishability is that the eternity it confers on the instant is itself but the eternity of a dream, a carnival Walpurgisnacht. It is Pribislav's pencil that Clavdia lends and takes back. Clavdia is Pribislav. Discordant concordance is overcome in a coincidence pushed to the point of identification. The other side of this magic indistin-guishability is that the eternity it confers on the instant is itself but the eternity of a dream, a carnival eternity.

It is in Remembrance of Things Past that the Husserlian term "coincidence" passes over into the Heideggerian term "repetition." Let me repeat: fiction does not illustrate a pre-existing phenomenological theme; it actualizes the universal meaning of this theme in a singular figure.

To be sure, we can speak again in this connection of coincidence, in characterizing the interplay between the perspective of the hero, who advances toward his uncertain future through the apprenticeship to signs, and that of the narrator, who forgets nothing and anticipates the overall meaning of the adventure. The narrator we might say is caught up in a sort of overlapping of time spans by incorporating the reminiscences of the hero in the course of a search that moves forward, giving the narrative the form of a "future in the past." The play of narrative voices, however, reaches other depths. The nar-
admirable expression of distance traversed. In happy moments, two similar instants were miraculously brought together. Through the mediation of art, this fleeting miracle is stabilized in an enduring work. Time lost is equated with time regained.

2. By accompanying the movement by which the Husserlian problematic of coincidence passes over into the Heideggerian problematic of repetition in this way, fiction takes phenomenology at the same time into a region it had ceased to frequent after Augustine. Indeed, our three tales about time possess the remarkable character of daring to explore, with the figurative power we have recognized, what in volume 1 I termed the upper limit on the hier-archization process of temporality. For Augustine, this upper limit is eternity. And for the current in Christian tradition that incorporated the teachings of Neoplatonism, time's approximation of eternity lies in the stability of a soul at rest. Neither Husserlian phenomenology nor the Heideggerian hermeneutic of Dasein has continued this line of thinking. Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* is silent on this point, inasmuch as the discussion is limited to the passage from transverse intentionality (directed toward the unity of the noematic object) to longitudinal intentionality (directed toward the unity of the temporal flux). As for *Being and Time*, its philosophy of finitude seems to substitute thinking about Being-towards-death for meditating on eternity. I myself asked the question: "Are these two irreducible ways of guiding the most extensive duration back toward the most intensive duration? Or is this disjunction only apparent?"

The answer to this question can be sought on several levels. On the properly theological level, it is not certain that the conception of eternity is summed up in the idea of rest. We will not discuss here the Christian alternatives to the equating of eternity with rest. But on the formal level of a philosophical anthropology—the level where Heidegger still situates himself in the period of *Being and Time*—it is possible to distinguish between the existential and the existentiell components in the pair that constitutes Being-towards-death and anticipatory resoluteness in the face of death. The function of attestation of mortality leaves open a vast range of existentiell responses, including the quasi-Stoic resoluteness affirmed by the author of *Being and Time*. For my part, I have unhesitatingly held mortality to be a universal feature of the human condition. Nor have I hesitated to speak of mortal time, contrasting it with public time and cosmic time. But I left hanging the question whether the existential component of Being-towards-death, and perhaps even that of anticipatory resoluteness, leaves room for existentiell modalities other than the Stoic tone given by Heidegger to resolution, including the modalities of Christian hope stemming in one way or another from faith in the Resurrection. It is in this interval between the existential and the existentiell that a meditation on eternity and on death can be conducted.

Our tales about time make their own contributin to this meditation. And this contribution continues to lie in the imaginative variations that attest to the fact that eternity—like being, according to Aristotle—can be said in many different ways.

This theme is not absent from *Mrs. Dalloway*. Despite its extreme ambiguity, Septimus's suicide at the very least makes us see that time is an absolute obstacle to the complete vision of cosmic unity. It is no longer, we said, time that is mortal but rather eternity that brings death. The calculated ambiguity of this message lies, on the one hand, in the confused mixture of rationalizations and madness in Septimus himself and, on the other hand, in the quasi-redemptive effect of his suicide on Clarissa, who draws from it the courage to face the conflicts of life. *The Magic Mountain* is quite obviously the fiction richest in variations on the theme of eternity and death. Here it is no longer some ambiguity but rather the narrator's irony in reflecting on the spiritual experience of the hero that makes the work's message hard to decipher. In addition, this novel deploys a large number of variants on this theme. The eternity of identity in *Ewigkeitssuppe* is one thing; the dream-like eternity, the carnival eternity of *Walpurgisnacht* is something else again; still another thing is the immobile eternity of stellar revolutions; and yet another, the joyful eternity of the *Schnee* episode. Whatever affinity there may be between these disparate eternities may well be provided by the malevolent charm of the "magic mountain." In this case, an eternity that, instead of crowning the most intensive, the most concentrated temporality, is constructed upon the refuse of the most distended temporality, in the state of the greatest decomposition, might perhaps be simply a lure. For otherwise, why does the brutal arrasion of large-scale history into the secluded world of the Berghof take on the figure of a "thunderbolt"?

It is fascinating to place *The Magic Mountain*?, variations on eternity alongside those of *Remembrance of Things Past*. Attaining the "extra-temporal" realm of aesthetic essences in the great meditation on time regained might be Fiction and Its Imaginative Variations on Time

no less a source of deception and illusion than Hans Castorp's ecstasy in the *Schnee* episode, if the decision "to make a work of art" did not intervene to fix the fleeting illumination and to provide as its sequel the reconquest of time lost. There is no need for history to come to interrupt a futile experience of eternity. By sealing the writer's vocation, eternity transforms itself from a bewitchment into a gift; it confers the power of "bringing back days gone by." The relation between eternity and death is not abolished, however. The *memento mori* of the
spectacle of the death-like figures seated around the table of the prince de Guermantes at the dinner party following the great revelation introduces its funereal echo into the very core of the decision to write. Another interruption threatens this experience of eternity; it is not the irruption of great history, as in The Magic Mountain, but that of the death of the writer. The combat of eternity and death thus continues in other guises. Time regained through the grace of art is still only an armistice.

3. One final resource of fiction deserves recognition. Fiction is not restricted to the successive exploration by means of its imaginative variations, first, of the aspects of discordant concordance connected to the horizontal constitution of the temporal flux, then of the varieties of discordant concordance related to the hierarchization of the levels of temporalization, and, finally, of the limit-experiences that mark the boundaries of time and eternity. Fiction has, in addition, the capacity of exploring another boundary, the one marking the borderline between fable and myth. On this theme, even more than on the preceding one of time and eternity, our phenomenology is silent. And its sobriety is not to be held against it. Fiction alone, because it remains fiction even when it projects and depicts experience, can allow itself a little inebriation.

For example, in Mrs. Dalloway, the hours struck by Big Ben have a resonance that is more than merely physical, psychological, or social. They have an almost mystical resonance: "The leaden circles dissolved in the air," the narrative voice says repeatedly. Likewise, the refrain of Shakespeare's Cym-beline—"Fear no more the heat o' the sun/Nor the furious winter's rages"—secretly unites the twin fates of Septimus and Clarissa. But only Septimus knows how to hear, beyond the noise of life, the "immortal ode to Time." And, in death, he takes with him "his odes to Time."

Nor does the ironic tone of The Magic Mountain prevent a certain mythicizing of time, ineluctably tied to the elevation of time to the level of a distinct content of experience, which fiction makes appear as such. This remythicizing is not for the most part to be sought in the moments of speculative suspension, when the narrator does not hesitate to accompany the hero, and even leads him on in his babblings. The most significant moment in this regard is instead perhaps the moment when internal time, freed from chronological constraints, collides with cosmic time, exalted by this contrast. The effacing of measurements makes a nonmeasurable time border on an incommensurable fit whether temporal or external, except the silent spectacle of the revolutions of the heavens. The entire work, moreover, unfolds a secretly hermetic dimension, which eludes all our previous analyses. The experiments tinged with spiritualism, appearing toward the end of the novel, give free rein for a moment to this exaltation, kept in check the rest of the time.

Of the three works we have discussed, Remembrance of Things Past certainly goes the farthest in remythicizing time. The strangest thing is that in its own fashion the myth repeats fiction's imaginative variations on time and eternity, inasmuch as it presents two antithetical faces of time. There is destructive time; and there is "Time, the artist." Both are active: one moves hastily, the other "works very slowly." But, under both appearances, time needs a body in order to externalize itself, to make itself visible. In the case of destructive time, it is the "dolls" of the macabre dinner party; for "Time, the artist," it is the daughter of Gilberte and Robert de Saint-Loup, in whom are joined together the two sides, Meseglise and Guermantes. Everything happens as though the visibility that phenomenology is incapable of according to time, without falling into error, fiction is able to confer upon it at the price of a materialization, comparable to the personifications of time in ancient prosopopoeia. While time thus finds bodies "in order to cast its magic lantern upon them" (magic like The Magic Mountain or in some Other way?), these incarnations take on the phantasmatic dimension of emblematic beings.

So myth, which we wished to set outside our field of investigation, has, in spite of us, made two appearances: once at the outset of our investigation of historical time, in connection with calendar time, and a second time here at the end of our investigation of the time of fiction. However, long before Us, Aristotle had vainly tried to push this intruder outside his sphere of discourse. The murmuring of mythical language has continued to resonate under the logos of philosophy. Fiction gives it a more sonorous echo.

IMAGINATIVE VARIATIONS AND IDEAL TYPES

The first stage of our confrontation between the modalities of the refiguration of time that belong respectively to history and to fiction has upheld the dissymmetry between the two great narrative modes. This dissymmetry results essentially from the difference between the solutions contributed by each "of them to the aporias of time. In order to dissipate an important misconception, I would like to conclude this chapter with a reflection on the relation I establish between what I am calling a solution here and what, above, I called an aporia. I was able to do without this reflection in the corresponding chapter dealing with historical time because the solution contributed to these aporias by historical time consists finally in an appeasement, a reconciliation that tends to blunt their cut-
Let us attempt to clarify the meaning of this poetic resolution with the help of the preceding analyses.

We return to the Husserlian theme of the constitution of a single temporal field through the overlapping of the network of retentions and protentions of the living present with the network of the retentions and protentions stemming from the multiple quasi-presents into which recollection is transported. The imaginative variations applied to this constitution through coincidence uncover something that remains unsaid in phenomenology. What is left unsaid is precisely what we suspected when we repeatedly stated that the advances and discoveries of phenomenology carried the cost of increasingly more radical aporias. But what more is there to say about the status of these discoveries and the tie between discovery and aporia? The answer is supplied by the imaginative variations of fiction. They reveal that, under the same name, phenomenology designates both the aporia and its ideal resolution; I would even venture to say, the ideal type (in Weber's sense of the term) of its resolution. What indeed do we mean when we state that a field of consciousness constitutes its unity through coincidence, if not that coincidence is the *eidos* under which phenomenological reflection places the imaginative variations relating to the ideal type of the fusion of islands of memories, more or less well coordinated, and the effort of primary remembrance to gather together, through the retention of retentions, the entire past in the comet-tail of the living present? Our hypothesis, moreover, is strict Husserlian orthodoxy. It is by means of imaginative variations that every *eidos* is revealed as an invariant. The paradox in the case of time is that the same analysis reveals an aporia and conceals its aporetic character under the ideal type of its resolution, which is brought to light, as the *eidos* governing the analysis, only through imaginative variations on the very theme of the aporia.

We can consider as exemplary the case of the constitution of the unity of the temporal flux through the coincidence of the expansion of the living present in accordance with the force lines of retention and protention, and the recentering of scattered memories in terms of the various quasi-presents that the imagination projects behind the living present. This constitution is the model for all the discordant concordances encountered in our work. It allows us to move back to Augustine and ahead to Heidegger. What does the dialectic of *intentio/distentio* signify if not a rule for interpreting the recitation of a poem as well as the unity of a vaster story, extended to the dimensions of an entire life, even to that of universal history?

Narrating concordance was already the name of a problem to be solved and of its ideal solution. This is what I meant when I said a moment ago that the same analysis discovers the aporia and hides it under the ideal type of its resolution. The study of the interplay of imaginative variations will have the task of clarifying this relation of the aporia to the ideal type of its resolution. In fact, it is principally in fictional literature that the innumerable ways in which *intentio* and *distentio* combat each other and harmonize with each other are explored. In this, literature is the irreplaceable instrument for the exploration of the discordant concordance that constitutes the cohesiveness of a life.

This same relation between the aporia and the ideal type of its resolution can be applied to the difficulties we encountered in reading *Being and Time*, when it accounts no longer for the horizontal constitution of a temporal field but for its vertical constitution through the hierarchization of the three levels of temporalization named temporality, historicity, and within-time-ness. It is, in fact, a new sort of discordant concordance, one more subtle than the Augustinian *distentio I intentio* or the Husserlian coincidence that is revealed by this strange derivation, aimed both at respecting the "source" of the modes derived, starting from the mode held to be the most primordial and the most authentic, and at accounting for the emergence of new meanings, revealed by the very process of the derivation of historicity and within-time-ness at the heart of fundamental temporality. This kinship is confirmed by the stubborn manner in which Heidegger returns, chapter after chapter, to the lacerating question that agitates the second division of *Being and Time*: the question of Being-a-whole (*ganzein*), more precisely, the Being-a-whole of our potentiality-for-Being. This demand for Being-a-whole is threatened by the potentiality for dispersion expressed by the ecstatic structure of temporality. This is why the conditions for authentic Being-a-whole, for a truly primordial totalization, are perhaps never satisfied. Indeed, hermeneutic phenomenology distinguishes itself from Husserlian-style intuitive phenomenology in that what is most proximate remains most deeply hidden. Is it not then the function of fiction to wrest the conditions for totalization from their concealment? Even more, is it not stated that these conditions stem less from transcendental possibility than from existential making-possible? What mode of discourse is better suited to articulate this making-possible than the mode that plays on the imaginative variations of a fictive experience? The twofold character of aporia and ideal-type belonging in this way to the complex process of totalization, diversification, and hierarchization described by *Being and Time* is nowhere better expressed in concrete terms than in the imaginative variations applied by our tales about time to the oscillations of an existence torn between the sense of its mortality and the silent presence of the immensity of the time enveloping all things. The role Heidegger assigns to repetition in the economy of time seems to me to reinforce these views on the exchanges between phenomenology's quest for authenticity and fiction's exploration of the paths for making this authenticity possible. Repetition occupies a strategic position in
I shall say, following Karl Heussi, that the past is the refiguration, following the analysis of mimesis, proposed in volume 1. To do so, let us take as our starting point what was the ending point of our preceding analysis, the notion of a debt. Our problem is to articulate conceptually what is as yet only a feeling expressed through this sense of a debt.

To what once was. They owe a debt to the past, a debt of recognition to the dead, that makes them insolvent debtors.

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With this chapter we move to a new stage in our investigation of the refigura-tion of time by intersecting references. In our opening step the emphasis was on the dichotomy between the intentions of each narrative mode, a dichotomy that is summed up in the overall opposition between the reinscription of lived time on the time of the world and the imaginative variations having to do with the way these two forms of time are related to each other. Our second step is indicative of a certain convergence between, on the one hand, while we call from the beginning of this section the function of standing-for exercised by historical knowledge as regards the "real" past and, on the other hand, the function of significance that clothes fictional narrative when reading brings into relation the world of the text and the world of the reader. It is on the basis of our first determination of intersecting refigura-tion that the second one, which is the topic of this and the next chapter, can be set forth.

The question about historical knowledge "standing for" the "real" past is born from the simple question: what does the term "real" mean when it is applied to the historical past? What are we saying when we say that something happened?

This question is the most troubling of all the questions that historiography raises for thought about history. Even if the answer is difficult to find, the question is an inevitable one. Indeed, it accounts for the second difference between history and fiction, whose intersections would pose no problem if they were not grafted to a basic dissymmetry.

'Strobust conviction animates historians. Whatever may be said about the selective aspect of the gathering, conserving, and consulting of documents, or about their relationship to the questions historians put to them, or even about the ideological implications of all these maneuvers, the recourse to documents does indicate a dividing line between history and fiction. Unlike novels, histo' nans' constructions do aim at being reconstructions of the past. Through

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to what once was. They owe a debt to the past, a debt of recognition to the dead, that makes them insolvent debtors. Our problem is to articulate conceptually what is as yet only a feeling expressed through this sense of a debt. To do so, let us take as our starting point what was the ending point of our preceding analysis, the notion of a trace, and let us attempt to disengage what constitutes its mimetic function, in other words, its function of refiguration, following the analysis of mimesis, proposed in volume I. 7
"correspond in an appropriate manner." And I will adopt his distinction between representing in the sense of "standing for" (vertreten) something and representing something to oneself in the sense of giving oneself a mental image of some absent external thing (sich vorsortieren). In effect, insofar as a trace is left by the past, it stands for it. In regard to the past, the trace "exercising a function" of "taking the place of" ([lieutenance], [representance]). This function characterizes the indirect reference proper to knowledge through traces, and distinguishes it from every other referential mode; of history in relation to the past. Of course, it is only by means of an endless rectification of our configurations that we form the idea of the past as an inexhaustible resource.

This problematic of history taking the place of or standing for the past concerns thinking about history rather than historical knowledge. For historical knowledge; the notion of a trace constitutes a sort of terminus in the series of references that leads back from archives to documents to the trace. Ordinarily, such knowledge does not linger over the enigma of this historical reference with its essentially indirect character. For historical knowledge, the ontological question, implicitly contained in the notion of a trace, is immediately covered over by the epistemological question relating to the document, that is, to its value as a warrant, a basis, a proof in explaining the past.

With the notions of a Gegenüber, taking the place of, and standing for, we have merely given a name, but not yet a solution, to the problem of the mimetic value of the trace and, beyond this, to the feeling of a debt to the past. The intellectual articulation I am proposing for this enigma is transposed from the dialectic of "leading kinds" that Plato elaborates in his Sophist (254b-259d). For reasons that will become clearer as we proceed, I have chosen the ideas of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous. I am not claiming that the idea of the past is constructed through the interconnections of these three leading kinds. I only maintain that we can say something meaningful about the past in thinking about it successively in terms of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous. In order to reply to any objection that might be raised about this contrivance, I shall demonstrate that each of these moments is represented by one or more of the most respectable efforts in the philosophy of history.

The Idea of History

The passage from any one of these philosophical positions to another results from their inability to resolve the enigma of standing-for in a unilateral and exhaustive manner.

The "RE-ENACTMENT" OF THE PAST IN THE PRESENT

The first way of thinking about the pastness of the past is to dull the sting of what is at issue, namely, temporal distance. The historical operation will then appear as a de-distanciation, an identification with what once was. This conception is not without a basis in historical practice. Is not the trace, as a trace, present? Is to follow it not to render contemporary with their trace the events that it leads back to? As readers of history are we not ourselves made contemporaries of past events by a vibrant reconstruction of their intertwining? In short, is the past intelligible any other way than as persisting in the present?

To raise this suggestion to the rank of theory and formulate a conception of the past that is based exclusively on identity, we have: (1) to submit the notion of an event to a radical revision, namely, to dissociate its "inner" face, which we can call thought, from its "outer" face, namely, the physical events affecting bodies; (2) next, we have to take into consideration the historian's thought, which reconstructs a chain of events, as a way of rethinking what once was thought; (3) finally, we have to conceive of this rethinking as numerically identical with the initial thought.

This conception based on identity is illustrated in striking fashion by the conception of history as a "reenactment" of the past, to use the expression of R. G. Collingwood in his The Idea of History. We may set the three phases that Collingwood's analysis of historical thought goes through in correspondence with the three components of a conception of the pastness of the past listed above, namely, the documentary aspect of his "historical" thought, the work of the imagination in the interpretation of what is given through the documents, and, finally, the ambition that the reconstructions of the imagination bring about the reenactment of the past. The theme of re-enactment has to be kept in third place in order to indicate that it does not designate a distinct method but the result aimed at through the interpretation of the documents and the reconstructions of the imagination.

1. The notion of documentary proof, placed at the head of his investigation under the title "evidence," immediately indicates the radical difference between the history of human affairs and the study of natural changes, including those of evolution in biology. Only a historical event lends itself to the dissociation of the "inside" face of the event, which has to be called "thought," and the "outside" face, which stems from natural changes. To make this radical starting point plausible, Collingwood adds two clarifications. First, the

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outside face is far from being inessential. Action, in fact, is the unity of the putside and the inside of an event. Furthermore, the term "thought" has to be taken as having a broader extension than just rational thought. It
covers the whole field of intentions and motivations. For example; a desire is a thought, thanks to what E.
Anscombe will later call its desirability characterization, which by hypothesis is sayable and allows the
statement of a desire to figure in the major premise of a syllogism.¹

2. The second component of a conception of the pastness of the past based on identity is not far off. From the
notion of an inside of an event, conceived of as its "thought," we can pass directly to the notion of reenactment
as the act of rethinking what was once thought for the first time. Indeed, it belongs to the historian alone, to the
exclusion of the physicist and the biologist "to think himself into this action, to discern the thought of its agent"
(p. 213).¹⁰ All history, it is further stated, "is the reenactment of past thought in the historian's own mind" (p.
215). This abrupt access to reenactment has the drawback, however, of giving credit to the idea that reenactment
is a form of intuition. But to reenact does not ponsist in reliving what happened. And rethinking already contains
the critical moment that requires us to detour by way of the historical imagination.⁹

The document, in fact, is a good way of posing the question of the relation of historical thinking to the past as
past. But it can only pose this question. The answer lies in the role of the historical imagination, which indicates
the specificity of history in relation to all observation of something present and given, such as in perception:¹¹
Collingwood's section on the "historical imagination" is surprising for its audacity. Faced with the authority of
written sources, "the historian is his own authority" (p. 236). His autonomy combines the selective aspect of the
work of thinking, the audacity of "historical construction," and the suspicious tenacity of someone who,
following Bacon's adage, "puts Nature to the question" (p. 237). Collingwood does not even hesitate to speak of
an "a priori imagination" (p. 241) to indicate that the historian is the judge of his sources and not the jevse; the
criterion for his judgment is the coherence of his construction.¹²

Every intuitionist interpretation that would situate the concept of reenactment on a methodological plane is
excluded. The place supposedly assigned to intuition is occupied instead by the imagination.¹³

3. We have yet to take the decisive step, namely, to say that reenactment is numerically identical with the
initial thought. Collingwood takes this...audacious step at the moment when the historian's construction, the work
of the a priori imagination, makes its claim to truth. Detached from the context of reenactment, the historian's
imagination could be confused with that of the novelist. Unlike the novelist, however, the historian has a double
task: to construct a coherent image, one that makes sense, and "to construct a picture of things as they really
were and of events as they really happened" (The Idea of "rules of method" (ibid.) that distinguish the work of the historian from that of the novelist: localize every
historical narrative in the same space and time, be able to attach every historical narrative to a unique historical
world; and make the picture of the past agree with the documents in their known state or as historians have
uncovered them.

If we stop here, however, the truth claim of these imaginary constructions would not be satisfied. The "imaginary
picture of the past" (p. 248) would remain something other than the past. For it to be the same, it has to be
numerically identical with the past. Rethinking has to be a way of annuling temporal distance. This annihilation
constitutes the philosophical (hyper-epistemologi-cal) significance of reenactment.

This idea is initially formulated in general terms, but without equivocation, in the first section of the
"Epilogomena" ("Human Nature and Human History"). Thoughts, we are told, are in one sense events that
happen in time, but in another sense they are not at all in time (p. 217).¹⁵ That this thesis should appear during a
comparison of ideas of human nature and human history is readily comprehensible. It is in nature that the past is
separate from the present. "The past, in a natural process, is a past superseded and dead" (p. 225). In nature, each
moment dies and is replaced by another one. On the other hand, the same event, known historically, "survives in the
present" (ibid.).¹⁶

But what does "survive" mean here? Nothing apart from the act of reenactment. The only meaningful thing, in
the final analysis, is the current possession of past activity. Someone may say that the past survives by leaving a
trace, and we become its heirs so that we can reenact past thoughts. But survival and a heritage are natural
processes; historical knowledge begins with the way we come into possession of them. We might even go so far as
to say, paradoxically, that a trace only becomes a trace of the past at the moment when its character of
pastness is abolished by the atemporal act of rethinking the event in its internal thought. Reenactment, so
understood, gives the paradox of the trace a solution based on identity, the phenomenon of the mark, the imprint,
along with that of its perpetuation, being purely and simply referred to natural knowledge. The idealist thesis of
the mind's producing itself, already visible in the concept of an a priori imagination, is thus crowned by the idea
of reenactment.¹⁷

This maximal interpretation of the thesis of identity gives rise to objections that, step by step, call this very thesis
into question.

At the end of this analysis, we have to say that historians do not know the past at all but only their own thought
about the past. But history is not possible unless historians know that they reenact an act that is not their own.
Collingwood may attempt to respond to this by introducing into thought a power whereby it distanciates itself
from itself. But this self-distanciation will never
enterprise breaks down over this impossibility of passing from thought about the past as my thought to thought about the past as other than my own. The identity of reflection cannot account for the otherness of repetition. Returning from the third component of his thesis about identity to the second one, we may ask 'whether reenacting the past is to rethink it. Admitting that no consciousness is transparent to itself, can we conceive of reenactment as going so far as to include the opacity that is as much a portion of the original act in the past as it is of the present reflective act? What becomes of the notions of process, acquisition, incorporation, development, and even criticism if the event-like character of the act of reenactment is itself abolished? How can we call an act that abolishes its own difference in relation to some original act of creation, re-creation? In a multitude of ways, the "re" in the term reenactment resists the operation that seeks to wipe out temporal distance.

If we continue our path backwards even further, we have also to call into question the very decomposition of an action into an outside, which would be just physical movement, and an inside, which would be just thought. This split lies at the origin of the disarticulation of the very notion of historical time into two notions that both negate it: on the one side, change, where one occurrence comes to replace another; on the other side, the atemporality of the act of thinking. The very mediations that make historical time a mixed form of time are lost: the survival of the past that makes the trace possible, the tradition that we inherit, the preservation that makes new possession possible.

These mediations cannot be placed under the "leading kind" of the Same. Under the sign of the "other" a negative ontology of the past?

Let us now consider the dialectical reversal inherent in the following question. If the past cannot be thought in terms of the leading kind of the Same, might it not be better to do so in terms of the Other?

We may begin with a concept especially familiar to authors influenced by the German Geisteswissenschaften—including history—on the ability of one mind to transport itself into an alien psychic life on the basis of the signs that "express"—that is, make external—the intimate experience of the other person. Correlatively, the transcendence of the past has as its primary model alien psychic life made external by some "meaningful" behavior. In this way, two bridges are constructed toward each other. From the one side, expression crosses the gap between inside and outside; from the other side, the transfer in imagination to an alien life crosses the interval between the self and the self. This double externalization allows a private life to be open to an alien life before the most important form of objectification is grafted to this movement toward the outside, the one that results from the inscription of expression in enduring signs, especially those that come about through writing.

A model based on others is certainly a strong one in that it brings into play not just otherness but also joins the Same to the Other. But its paradox is that in abolishing the difference between other people today and other people from earlier times, it obliterates the problematic of temporal distance and eludes the specific difficulty attached to the survival of the past in the present—the difficulty that brings about the difference between knowledge of others and knowledge of the past.

Another logical equivalent to the otherness of the historical past inflation to the present has been sought on the side of the notion of "difference," which, in turn, lends itself to multiple interpretations. Here we pass from the
pair same/other to the pair identical/different, with no variations in meaning other than contextual ones. Since the notion of difference does lend itself to quite different uses, I will consider two cases borrowed from professional historians concerned to reflect deeply on their work.

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An initial way of making use of the notion of difference, in a historical context, is to couple it to the notion of individuality, or better, individualization, a notion that the historian necessarily encounters in correlation with that of historical "conceptualization," whose opposite pole it constitutes. Individualization, in effect, tends to lean on proper names (of persons, places, singular events), whereas conceptualization tends to emphasize ever broader abstractions (war, revolution, crisis, etc.). It is this use of the term difference, correlated with individuality, that Paul Veyne stresses in his L'Inventaire des differences. For individuality to appear as difference, historical conceptualization itself has to be conceived of as the search for and the positing of invariants, where this latter term is understood to mean a stable correlation between a small number of variables capable of engendering their own modifications. The historical fact will then be circumscribed as one variant engendered by the individualization of these invariants.

But is a logical difference a temporal one? Paul Veyne seems, at first, to admit it is not, in that he substitutes for the investigation of the distant, as temporal, an investigation of the event characterized in as atemporal a fashion as possible by its individuality. So the epistemology of the individual seems to eclipse the ontology of the past. If explanation in terms of invariants is the contrary of narrating, it is because events have been detemporalized to the point of no longer being either near or far away.

But, in fact, individualization through the variation of an invariant and individualization by time do not completely overlap. The former is relative to the scale specifying the chosen invariants. In this logical sense, it is true to say that in history the notion of individuality rarely is identified with an individual in the ultimate sense of this term. Marriage in the peasant class under Louis XIV is an individual topic relative to some chosen problematic without it being a question of narrating the lives of the peasants under Louis XIV one by one. Individualization in terms of time is another thing. It is what makes the inventory of differences not an atemporal classification but something presented in narratives.

So we are brought back again to the enigma of temporal distance, an over-determined enigma owing to the axiological shift that has made us strangers to the customs" of past times, to the point that the otherness of the past in relation to the present is more important than the survival of the past in the present. When curiosity gains the upper hand over sympathy, the stranger becomes alien. The difference that separates gets substituted for the difference that binds together. With this, the notion of difference loses its transcendental purity as a "leading kind," through being overdetermined. Along with its transcendental purity, it also loses its univocity, to the extent that temporal distance can be evaluated in opposite ways, depending upon whether the ethic of friendship (Marroy or the poetry of distance (Veyne) predominates.

I will conclude this review of figures of otherness with The contribution of Michel de Certeau, who seems to me to have gone the furthest in the direction

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Due in a comexi or inougni mai taxes n in a urecuon aiinosi uiameircany opposed to that of Paul Veyne in L'Inventaire des differences. Here the context is that of a "sociology of history writing," in which it is not the object or the method of history that is made problematic, but historians themselves in terms of how they work. To do history is to make something. So the question of the social setting of the historical operation arises.

This place or setting, according to de Certeau, is what, above all else, is not spoken of in historiography. Indeed, in its claim to be scientific, history believes—or claims to be—produced nowhere. Not that the argument holds as much for the critical school as for the positivist one. Where, indeed, does the tribunal of historical judgment hold court?

This is the context of questions in which a new interpretation of the event as a difference comes to light. Once the false claim of historians to produce history in a sort of state of sociocultural weightlessness is unmasked, the suspicion arises that all history with a scientific pretension is vitiated by a desire for mastery that sets up the investigation of the distant, as temporal, an investigation of the event characterized in as atemporal a fashion as possible by its individuality, that Paul Veyne stresses in his L'Inventaire des differences. Here the context is that of a "sociology of history writing," in which it is not the object or the method of history that is made problematic, but historians themselves in terms of how they work. To do history is to make something. So the question of the social setting of the historical operation arises.

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This is the context of questions in which a new interpretation of the event as a difference comes to light. Once the false claim of historians to produce history in a sort of state of sociocultural weightlessness is unmasked, the suspicion arises that all history with a scientific pretension is vitiated by a desire for mastery that sets up the arbitrator of meaning. This desire for mastery constitutes the implicit ideology of history. How does this type of ideological criticism lead to a theory of the event as a difference? If it is true that a dream of mastery inhabits scientific historiography, the construction of models and research into invariants—as well as, by implication, the conception of difference as the individualized variant of an invariant—falls under the same ideological criticism. So the question arises about the status of a history that would be less ideological. This would be a history that would not be confined to constructing models, but that would instead indicate the differences in the deviations that exist in relation to these models. A new version of difference is born here from its being identified with the idea of alleviation, which comes from structural linguistics and semiology (from Ferdinand de Saussure to Roland Barthes), assisted by some contemporary philosophers (from Deleuze to Derrida). However, for de Certeau, difference understood as a deviation preserves a solid anchorage point in the contemporary epistemology of history inasmuch as it is the very progress of model-building that calls for the spotting of deviations: deviations, like variants for Veyne, are "relative to models" (p. 25). But while differences
conceived of as variants are homogeneous with invariants, differences as deviations are heterogeneous with them. Coherence comes first, "difference occurs at the limits" (p. 27).  

Does this version of the notion of difference as a deviation offer a better approximation of the event as "having been"? Yes, to a point. What de Certeau calls labor at the limit puts the event itself in the position of being a deviation in relation to historical discourse. It is in this sense that the difference/deviation contributes to a negative ontology of the past. For a philosophy of history faithful to the idea of difference as a deviation, the past is what is missing, a "pertinent absence."

than is the modification of an invariant. The deviation, of course, is excluded from the model while the modification is inscribed on the periphery of the model. But the notion of a deviation remains just as atemporal as that of a modification inssofar as it remains relative to some model. What is more, I do not see how difference as a deviation is more apt for signifying the "having been" of the past than is difference as variant. The real in the past remains the enigma for which the notion of the difference/deviation, as the fruit of labor at the limit, provides only a kind of negative image, one, moreover, divested of its properly temporal intention.

Of course, a critique of the totalizing intentions of history, joined to an exorcism of History substantial past and, even more, the abandonment of the idea of representation, in the sense of a mental reduplication of presence, do constitute cleansing operations that must be taken up again and again. And the notion of a difference/deviation is a good one to preside over them. But these are preliminary maneuvers. In the last analysis, the notion of difference does not do justice to what seems to be positive in the persistence of the past in the present. This is why, paradoxically, the enigma of temporal distance seems more opaque at the end of this cleansing labor. For how can a difference, always relative to some abstract system and itself as detemporalized as possible, take the place of what, although today absent and dead, was once real and alive?

UNDER THE SIGN OF THE ANALOGOUS A TROPOLOGICAL APPROACH?

The two groups of attempts examined above are not for naught, even given their unilateral character. One way of "saving" their respective contributions to the question of the ultimate referent of history is to conjoin their efforts in terms of the leading kind that itself associates the Same and the Other. The "similar" is one such form. Or to put it a better way: the Analogous, which is a resemblance between relations rather than between terms per se.

This is the only dialectical or even didactic virtue of the series Same, Other, Similar that spurred me on in seeking a solution to the problem 1 have posed. What first alerted me to the possibilities of the Analogous were the hidden anticipations of this categorization of the relationship of "taking the place of" or "standing-for" in the preceding analyses, where expressions of the form "such that" (such that it was) continually reappeared. In this respect, Ranke's formula—wie es eigentlich war—immediately comes to mind.  

When we want to indicate the difference between fiction and history, we inevitably refer to the idea of a certain correspondence between our narrative and what really happened. At the same time, we are well aware that this recon-

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struction is a different construction of the course of events narrated. This is why so many authors rightly reject the term "representation" which seems to them to be tainted by the myth of a term-by-term reduplication of reality in the image that we construct. However, the problem of correspondence to the past is not eliminated by this change in vocabulary. If history is a construction, historians, by instinct, would like this construction to be a reconstruction. Indeed, it seems as though this plan to reconstruct something in constructing it is a necessary part of the balance sheet of good historians. Whether they put their work under the sign of friendship or that of curiosity, they are all moved by the desire to do justice to the past. And their relationship to the past is first of all that of someone with an unpaid debt, in which they represent each of us who are the readers of their work. This idea of a debt, which may appear strange at first sight, seems to me to stand out against the background of an expression common both to painters and historians: They all seek to "render" something, a landscape or a course of events. In this term "to render," I see the desire to "render its due" to what is and to what once was. It is this intention that gives soul to the sometimes abstract following reflections.

A second motif also oriented my thinking here. While it is true that the Analogous does not appear in any of Plato's lists of the "leading kinds," it does find a place in Aristotle's Rhetoric under the title of "proportional metaphor," which is in fact called *analogia*. Therefore the question comes to mind whether a theory of tropes, a tropology, might not serve as a relay station at this critical moment we have come to with our two preceding analyses. It was at this stage of my reflections that I encountered Hayden White's attempt, in his *Metahistory* and *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, to complete a theory of emplotment with a theory of tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony).  

This recourse to tropology is imposed by the unique structure of historical discourse, as contrasted with mere fiction. Indeed, this discourse seems to call for a double allegiance: on the one hand, to the constraints attached to the privileged plot type; on the other hand, to the past itself, by way of the documentary information available a.la. given.jno-ment. The work of the historian thus consists in making narrative structure into a "model,J*an_\_jcn" of the past, capable of "representing" it.  

How does tropology respond to the second challenge? As follows: "before a given domain can be interpreted, it
must first be construed as a ground inhabited by discernible figures" (Metahistory, p. 30). "In order to figure out 'what really happened' in the past, therefore, the historian must first prefigure as a possible object of knowledge the whole set of events reported in the documents" (ibid.; his emphasis). The function of this poetic operation is to outline possible itineraries within the "historical field" and thus to give an initial shape to possible objects of knowledge. The intention -here is certainly directed toward what really happened in the past, but the paradox is that we can only designate what happened prior to any narrative prior to first prefiguring it.\footnote{31}

The Reality of the Past

The prerogative of the four basic tropes of classical rhetoric is that they offer a variety of figures of discourse for this work of prefiguration and hence preserve the richness of the historical object both by the equivocity proper to each trope and by the multiplicity of figures available.\footnote{33} In truth, however, of the four tropes considered—metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony—it is the first one that has an explicitly representative 'vocation. White, moreover, seems to want to say that all the other tropes, even though they are distinct from each other, are variants of metaphor\footnote{34} and that their function is to correct the naivete of metaphor when it comes to hold the stated resemblance as adequate ("my love, a rose").

Thus metonymy, by reducing the part and the whole to one another, tends to make one historical factor the mere manifestation of another one. Synecdoche, by turning the extrinsic relation between two orders of phenomena into an intrinsic relation between shared qualities, presents the figure of an integration without reduction. It remains for irony to introduce a negative note in this work of prefiguration—almost as a second thought—as a suspension of belief. In contrast to metaphor, which inaugurates and in a sense pulls together the tropo-logical domain, irony, White says, is "metatropological" (Metahistory, p. 37) insofar as it gives rise to an awareness of the possible misuse of figurative language and constantly recalls the problematic nature of language as a whole. None of these initiatives toward structuration expresses a logical constraint, and the figurative operation may stop at this first stage, the one of metaphorical characterization. However, only the complete course from the most naive apprehension (metaphor) to the most reflective one (irony) allows us to speak of a tropological structure of consciousness.\footnote{35} In \textit{jy\textsuperscript{iri}}, the theory of tropes, through its deliberately linguistic character, may be integrated into the table of modes of historical imagination without thereby being integrated into its properly explanatory modes. In this sense, it constitutes the deep structure of the historical imagination.\footnote{36}

The benefit expected of this tropological map of consciousness, with respect to history's representative intention, is enormous. Rhetoric governs the description of the historical field just as logic governs argument that has an explanatory value: "for it is by figurating that the historian virtually constitutes the subject of discourse" (\textit{Tropics}, p. 106; his emphasis). In this sense, identification of the plot type stems from logic, but the intending of the set of events that history, as a system of signs, undertakes to describe, stems from the tropology. So theropiaprefiguration turns out to be what is more specific, in that explanation by emplotment is taken as the more generic form.\footnote{37} We must not therefore confuse the iconic value of a representation of the past with a model, in the sense of a scale model, such as a map, for there is no original with which to compare this model. It is precisely the strangeness of the original, as the documents make it appear to us, that gives rise to history's effort to prefigure it in terms of a style.\footnote{38} This is why, between a narrative and a course of events, there is not a relation of reproduction, reduplication, or of figure that likens the narrated events to a narrative form that our culture has made us familiar with.

I would like at this point to indicate in a few words where I situate myself in relation to White's subtle but often obscure analyses. I will not hesitate to say that, to my mind, they constitute a decisive contribution to the exploration of the third dialectical moment of the idea of "taking the place of" or "standing-for" by which I am trying to express the relationship of historical narrative to the "real" past. By giving support to the tropological resources for matching up this or that narrative and this or that course of events, these analyses give valuable credibility to our suggestion that our relation to the reality of the past has to pass successively through the filters of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous. White's tropological analysis is the sought-for explication of the category of the Analogous. It tells us but one thing: things must have happened as they are told in a narrative such as this one. Thanks to this tropological filter, the being-as of the past event is brought to language.

Having said this, I willingly grant that, when isolated from the context of the two other leading kinds—the Same and the Other—and when, above all, detached from the constraint that the \textit{Gegeniiber} exercises on discourse—\textlongrightarrow{} wherein lies the past event's aspect of having-been—White's recourse to tropology runs the risk of wiping out the boundary between fiction and history.\footnote{39}

By putting the accent almost exclusively on rhetorical procedures, White risks covering over the intentionality that runs across the "tropics of discourse" in the direction of past events. If we cannot reestablish the primacy of this referential intention, we may not say, with White himself, that the competition between configurations is at the same time "a contest between contending poetic figurations of what the past might consist of" (p. 98; his emphasis). I do like his statement that "we only can know the actual by contrasting it with or likening it to the imaginable" (ibid.; his emphasis). If this saying is to keep its full weight, however, the concern for "returning history to its origins in the literary imagination" must not lead to giving more weight to the verbal force invested in our redescriptions than to the incitations to redescription that arise from the past itself. In other words, a sort
of tropological arbitrariness must not make us forget the kind of constraint that the past event exercise on historical discourse by way of the known documents, by requiring of this discourse an endless rectification. The relation between fiction and history is as-suredly—more complex than we will ever be able to put into words. And, of course, we have to combat the prejudice that the historian's language can be made entirely transparent, to the point of allowing the things themselves to speak; as if it sufficed to eliminate the ornaments of prose to be done with the figures of poetry. But we cannot combat this initial prejudice without also struggling against a second one, which holds that the literature of imagina-

two prejudices both have to be fought against. To clarify this role assigned to tropology in the inmost articulation of the notion of "standing-for," it seems to me that we have to return to the "as" in Ranke's expression, which has continued to prod us on our way: the facts as they really happened. In the analogical interpretation of the relationship of "taking the place of" or "standing-for," the "really" is signified only through the "as." How is this possible? It seems to me that the key to the problem lies in the functioning, which is not merely rhetorical but also ontological, of the "as," as I analyzed it in the seventh and eighth studies of my Rule of Metaphor. What gives metaphor a referential import, I said, itself has an ontological claim, and this is the intending of a "being-as . . ." correlative to the "seeing-as. . ." in which the work of metaphor on the plane of language may be summed up. In other words, being itself has to be metaphorized in terms of the kinds of being-as, if we are to be able to attribute to metaphor an on-to-logical function that does not contradict the vivid character of metaphor on the linguistic plane. And in saying this, we may have believed for an instant that we had exhausted the phenomenon of the trace. Under the physical plane, and a relation of significance, on the semiological plane. Hence we could speak of it as a sign-effect. Thanks to this power, which I spoke of as redescription, we may legitimately demand of tropology that it prolong the dialectic of the leading kinds through a rhetoric of the "major-tropes." In the same way, our concept of the refiguration of time by narrative—which is the heir of this metaphorical redescription—alludes to the notion of "figure," which is the core of any tropology. But, to the extent that we have been able to accord to the rhetorical and ontological functioning of poetic language a complete autonomy, in order to account for poetic language, illustrated in the first place by lyrical poetry, to the same extent we have to reattach the analogous to the complex interplay of the Same and the Other, in order to account for the essentially temporализing function of "standing-for." In the hunt for what has been, analogy does not operate alone but in connection with identity and otherness. The past is indeed what, in the first place, has to be reenacted in the mode of identity, but it is no less true, for all that, that it is also what is absent from all our constructions. The Analogous, precisely, is what retains in itself the force of reenactment and of taking a distance, to the extent that being-as is both to be and not to be. It is not just with the Same and the Other that the Analogous has to be placed in relation, as it was in this chapter, but also with the problematic of the preceding chapter, as well as with that of those that follow. Looking back, we have to make apparent the tight connection between the problematic of the trace and that of standing-for. It is by the twist of the "as" of analogy that the analysis of standing-for continues that of the trace. In the preceding chapter, the trace was interpreted from the point of view of the re-

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inscription of phenomenological time on cosmic time. And we saw in it the conjunction of a causal relation, on the physical plane, and a relation of significance, on the semiological plane. Hence we could speak of it as a sign-effect. And in saying this, we may have believed for an instant that we had exhausted the phenomenon of the trace. Under the impetus of a text from Levinas, we were able to conclude our meditation on a deliberately enigmatic note. The trace, we said, signifies without making anything appear. Here is where our analysis of standing-for takes over. The aporia of the trace as "counting-as" the past finds some outcome in "seeing-as." This assertion stems from what our analysis of standing-for, taken in the overall sense of its three moments—the Same, the Other, the Analogous—adds to the problematic of the reinscription of phenomenological time on cosmic time: the problematic of temporal distance. But it does not add this from the outside, for, in the final analysis, temporal distance is what the trace unfolds, runs along, and crosses. The relation of standing-for just makes explicit this crossing of time by the trace. More exactly, it makes explicit the dialectical structure of this crossing that converts this interval into a form of mediation. If, to conclude, we turn our gaze ahead, toward the process of totalization to which the following analyses will be devoted, we may suspect why our exploration must remain incomplete—incomplete because abstract. As phenomenonology, particularly Heidegger's, has taught us, the past separated from the dialectic of future, past, and present remains an abstraction. This is why this chapter at its end only constitutes an attempt to think somewhat better about what remains enigmatic in the pastness of the past as such. By placing it successively under the leading kinds of the same, the Other, and the Analogous, we have at least preserved the mysterious aspect of the debt that makes the master of the plot a servant of the memory of past human beings. 

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The World of the Text and the World of the Reader

We shall take a new step in the direction of the intersection of the time of fiction and the time of history if we ask
what, on the side of fiction, can be considered as the counterpoint to what, on the side of history, is given as the "real" past. The problem would be not merely insoluble but senseless, if we continued to pose it in the traditional terms of reference. Indeed, only historians can, absolutely speaking, be said to refer to something "real," in the sense that that about which they speak was observable to witnesses in the past. In comparison, the characters of the novelist are themselves quite simply "unreal"; "unreal," too, is the experience described by fiction. Between the "reality of the past" and the "unreality of fiction," the dissymmetry is total.

We have already made a first break with this manner of posing the problem by questioning the concept of "reality" that is applied to the past. To say that a given event reported by a historian was observable by witnesses in the past solves nothing. The enigma of pastness is simply shifted from the event reported to the testimony that reports it. Having-been poses a problem in the very fact that it is not observable, whether it be a question of the having-been of events or the having-been of testimony. The pastness of an observation in the past is not itself observable but it is memorable. To resolve this enigma, I elaborated the concept of standing-for or taking-the-place-of, signifying by this that the constructions of history are intended to be reconstructions answering to the need for a Gegenuber. What is more, I discerned between the function of standing-for and the Gegenuber that is its correlate a relation of indebtedness which assigns to the people of the present the task of repaying their due to people of the past—to the dead. The fact that this category of standing-for or of taking-the-place-of—reinforced by the feeling of a debt—is ultimately irreducible to the category of reference, as it functions in an observational language and in an extensional logic, is confirmed by the fundamentally dialectical structure of the category of standing-for. Standing-for, we said, means by turns the reduction to the Same, the recognition of Otherness, and the analogizing of apprehension.

In moving away from the vocabulary of reference, I am adopting instead that of "application," handed down by the hermeneutical tradition and awarded a new place of honor by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his Truth and Method. From Gadamer we have learned that application is not a contingent appendix added onto understanding and explanation but an organic part of every hermeneutic project. But the problem of application—to which elsewhere I have given the name "appropriation"—is far from being a simple one. It can no more receive a direct solution than can the problem of standing for the past, whose counterpart it is in the realm of fiction. It has its own dialectic, which, without resembling in any exact way that of the Gegenuber characteristic of the relation of standing-for, does generate comparable difficulties. Indeed, it is only through the mediation of reading that the literary work attains complete significance, which would be to fiction what standing-for is to history.

Why is this mediation of reading required? Because, at the end of Part III, where the notion of the world of the text, implied in every fictive temporal experience, was introduced, we had covered only half of the distance along the road to application. To be sure, in adopting in this way, as I also did in The Rule of Metaphor, the thesis that the literary text transcends itself in the direction of a world, I removed the literary text from the closure imposed upon it—legitimately, moreover—by the analysis of its immanent structures. At that time I said that the world of the text marked the opening of the text to its "outside," to its "other," that the world of the text constitutes an absolutely original intentional object in relation to its "internal" structure. It must be admitted, however, that considered apart from reading, the world of the text remains a transcendence in immanence. Its ontological status remains in suspense. In this way, we link up once again with the formulation whereby I defined mimesis, in volume 1. Mimesis, I said, marks the intersection between the world of the text and the world of the listener or the reader, the intersection, therefore, between the world configured by the poem a"nd the world within which effective action is unfolded and itself unfolds its specific temporality. The significance of the work of fiction stems from this intersection. This recourse to the mediation of reading marks the most obvious difference between the present work and The Rule of Metaphor. In addition to the fact that, in the previous work, I thought I could retain reading.
the vocabulary of reference, characterized as the redescription of the poetic work at the heart of everyday experience, I also ascribed to the poem itself the power of transforming life by means of a kind of short-circuit operating between the "seeing-as," characteristic of the metaphorical utterance, and "being-as," as its ontological correlate. And, since fictional narrative can legitimately be held to be a special case of poetical discourse, we might be tempted to employ the same short-circuit between "seeing-as" and "being-as" on the level of narrativity. This simple "solution to the old problem of reference on the plane of fiction would seem to be encouraged by the fact that action already possesses a first-order readability due to the symbolic mediations articulating it on the primary level of mimesis. We might believe that the only mediation required between the pre-signification of mimesis, and the over-signification of mimesis, is the one that is brought about by the narrative configuration itself through its internal dynamics. A more precise reflection on the notion of the world of the text and a more exact description of its status of transcendence within immanence have, however, convinced me that the passage from configuration to refiguration required the confrontation between two worlds, the fictive world of the text and the real world of the reader. With this, the phenomenon of reading became the necessary mediator of refiguration.

What is important now is to elucidate the dialectical structure—which replies, mutatis mutandis, to that of the function of standing-for exercised by a historical narrative with respect to the "real" past—of this phenomenon of reading, which plays, as we have just seen, a strategic role in the operation of refiguration. To what discipline does a theory of reading belong? To poetics? Yes, insofar as the composition of the work governs its reading; no, insofar as other factors enter into play, factors that concern the sort of communication that finds its starting point in the author, crosses through the work, and finds its end-point in the reader. For it is, indeed, from the author that the strategy of persuasion that has the reader as its target starts out. And it is to this strategy of persuasion that the reader replies by accompanying the configuration and in appropriating the world proposed by the text.

Three moments need to be considered then, to which correspond three neighboring, yet distinct, disciplines: (1) the strategy as concocted by the author and directed toward the reader; (2) the inscription of this strategy within a literary configuration; and (3) the response of the reader considered either as a reading subject or as the receiving public.

This schema allows us to take a brief look at several theories of reading that I have expressly arranged starting from the pole of the author and moving toward that of the reader, who is the ultimate mediator between configuration and refiguration.

FROM POETICS TO RHETORIC

At the first stage of our itinerary, we are considering a strategy from the point of view of the author who carries it through. The theory of reading then falls within the field of rhetoric, inasmuch as rhetoric governs the art by means of which orators aim at persuading their listeners. More precisely, in his well-known work The Rhetoric of Fiction, 1 An objection, however, immediately comes to mind: in bringing the author back into the field of literary theory, are we not denying the thesis of the semantic autonomy of the text, and are we not slipping back into an outmoded psychological analysis of the written text? By no means. First, the thesis of the semantic autonomy of the text holds only for a structural analysis that brackets the strategy of persuasion running through the operations belonging to a poetics as such; removing these brackets necessarily involves taking into account the one who concocts the strategy of persuasion, namely, the author. Next, rhetoric can escape the objection of falling back into the "intentional fallacy" and, more generally, of being no more than a psychology of the author inasmuch as what it emphasizes is not the alleged creation process of the work but the techniques by means of which a work is made communicable. These techniques can be discerned in the work itself. The result is that the only type of author whose authority is in question here is not the real author, the object of biography, but the implied author. It is this implied author who takes the initiative in the show of strength underlying the relation between writing and reading.

Before entering this arena, I should like to recall the terminological convention I adopted in introducing the notions of point of view and narrative voice in the preceding volume, at the end of the analyses devoted to "Games with Time." There I considered these notions only to the extent that they contributed to the understanding of the narrative composition as such, apart from their effect on the communication of the work.

But the notion of implied au-
voice, but instead to emphasize at this time the ties between this implied author and the strategies of persuasion stemming from a rhetoric of fiction, without making any further allusions to the notions of narrative voice and point of view, from which this notion of implied author obviously cannot be dissociated.

Set back within the framework of communication to which it belongs, the category of implied author has the important advantage of sidestepping a number of futile disputes that conceal the primary meaning of a rhetoric of fiction. For example, we shall not attach an exaggerated originality to the efforts of modern novelists to make themselves invisible—unlike previous authors, inclined to intervene unscrupulously in their narratives—as if the novel were suddenly to have emerged authorless. Effacement of the author is one rhetorical technique among others; it belongs to the panoply of disguises and masks the real author uses to transform himself or herself into the implied author.\(^7\) The same can be said of the author's right to describe minds from the inside, which in so-called real life is something that can only be inferred with great difficulty. This right is part of the pact of trust concluded with the reader, which we shall discuss below.\(^8\) Also, whatever the angle of vision chosen by the author, this is in every instance an artifice to be attributed to the exorbitant rights the reader grants the author. Nor does the author disappear simply because the novelist has attempted to "show" rather than to "inform and instruct." We discussed this in volume 2 in connection with the search for verisimilitude in the realistic novel, and even more so in the naturalistic novel.\(^9\) Far from being abolished, the artifice proper to the narrative operation is augmented by the task of simulating real presence through writing. However much this simulation may be opposed to the omniscience of the narrator, it conveys no less a mastery of rhetorical techniques. The alleged faithfulness to life merely hides the subtlety of the maneuvers by which the work governs, on the one side of the author, the "intensity of the illusion" desired by Henry James. The rhetoric of dissimulation, the summit of the rhetoric of fiction, must not fool the critic, even if it may fool the reader. The height of such dissimulation would be that the fiction appear never to have been written.\(^10\) The rhetorical procedures by which the author sacrifices his presumed intention of disguise to means of the verisimilitude of a story that appears to narrate itself and let life speak, whether this be called social reality, individual behavior, or the stream of consciousness.\(^12\)

The related notion of a reliable or unreliable narrator, to which we now turn, is far from constituting a marginal notion. Spontaneously, the reader does not ascribe this unification to the rules of composition alone but extends it to the choices and to the norms that make the text, precisely, the work produced by someone and not by nature.

I would readily compare this unifying role intuitively assigned by the reader to the implied author with the notion of style, proposed by G. Granger in his *Essai d'une philosophic du style.* If a work is considered as the resolution of a problem, itself arising out of prior successes in the field of science as well as in the field of art, then style may be termed the adequation between the singularity of this solution, which the work constitutes by itself, and the singularity of the crisis situation as this was apprehended by the thinker or artist. This singularity of the solution, replying to the singularity of the problem, can take on a proper name, that of the author. Thus we speak of Boole's theorem just as we speak of a painting by Cezanne. Naming the work in terms of its author implies no conjecture about the psychology of invention or of discovery, therefore no assertion concerning the presumed intention of the inventor; it implies only the singularity of a solution to a problem. This comparison reinforces the right of the category of implied author to figure in a rhetoric of fiction. The implied author is able to dissipate underscores the rightful place of this category in a comprehensive theory of reading. The reader has an intimation of the role it plays inasmuch as this reader intuitively apprehends the work as a unified totality.

Spontaneously, the reader does not ascribe this unification to the rules of composition alone but extends it to the choices and to the norms that make the text, precisely, the work produced by someone and not by nature.

The question of reliability is to the fictional narrative what documentary proof is to historiography. It is precisely because novelists have no material proof that they ask readers to grant them not only the right to know what they are recounting or showing but to allow them to suggest an assessment, an evaluation of the main characters. Was it not just such an evaluation that allowed Aristotle to classify tragedy and comedy in terms of characters who are "better" or "worse" than we are, and, in particular, to give the *hamartia*—the terrible flaw—of the hero its full emotional power, inasmuch as the tragic flaw must be that of a superior individual and not of an individual who is mediocre, evil, or perverse?

Why is this category not applied to the narrator rather than to the implied author? In the rich repertory of forms adopted by the author's voice, the narrator is distinguished from the implied author whenever the narrator is dramatized as narrator. In this way, it is the unknown wise man who says that Job is a "just" man; it is the tragic chorus that utters the sublime words of horror and pity; it is the fool who says aloud what the author thinks deep down; it is a point of view of the narrator on his own narrative. There is always an implied author. —The story is told by someone. There is not always a distinct narrator. But when there is one, the narrator shares the privilege of the implied author, who, without always being omniscient, does always have the power to reach knowledge of others.
from the inside. This privilege is one of the rhetorical powers invested in the implied author by reason of the tacit pact between the author and the reader. The degree to which the narrator is reliable is one of the clauses of this reading pact. As for the reader's responsibility, it is another clause of the same pact. Indeed, inasmuch as the creation of a dramatized narrator, whether reliable or unreliable, permits variation in the distance between the implied author and his characters, a degree of complexity is induced, at the same time, in the reader, a complexity that is the source of the reader's freedom in the face of the authority that the fiction receives from its author.

The case of the unreliable narrator is particularly interesting from the point of view of an appeal to the reader's freedom and responsibility. The narrator's role here may perhaps be less perverse than Wayne Booth depicts it. Unlike the reliable narrator, who assures readers that in the journey they are embarking upon they need not bother about false hopes or groundless fears concerning either the facts reported or the implicit or explicit evaluations of the characters, the unreliable narrator foils these expectations by leaving readers uncertain about where this is all meant to lead. In this way, the modern novel will fulfill all the better its function of criticizing conventional morality, and possibly even its function of provocation and insult, as the narrator will be increasingly suspect and the author ever more invisible, the two resources of the rhetoric of concealment mutually reinforcing each other. In this regard, I do not share Wayne Booth's severity concerning the equivocal narrator cultivated by contemporary literature. Does not an entirely reliable narrator, such as the eighteenth-century novelist, so quick to intervene and lead the reader by the hand, thereby dispense the reader from taking any emotional distance from the characters and their adventures? And is not a disoriented reader, such as the reader of The Magic Mountain, led astray by an ironic narrator, summoned, on the contrary, to greater reflection?

May we not make a plea on behalf of what Henry James, in The Art of the Novel, called the "troubled vision" of a character, "reflected in the equally troubled vision of an observer"? Cannot the argument that impersonal narration is more clever than another type of narration lead to the conclusion that such narration calls for the active deciphering of "unreliability" itself? There is no denying that modern literature is dangerous. The sole response worthy of the criticism it provokes, of which Wayne Booth is one of the most highly esteemed representatives, is that this poisonous literature requires a new type of reader: a reader who responds.

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It is at this point that a rhetoric of fiction centered on the author reveals its limits. It recognizes just a single initiative, that of an author eager to communicate his vision of things. In this regard, the affirmation that the author creates his readers appears to lack a dialectical counterpart. Yet it may be the function of the most corrosive literature to contribute to making a new kind of reader appear, a reader who is himself suspicious, because reading ceases to be a trusting voyage made in the company of a reliable narrator, becoming instead a struggle with the implied author, a struggle leading the reader back to himself.

THE RHETORIC BETWEEN THE TEXT AND ITS READER
The image of a combat between a reader and an unreliable narrator, with which we concluded the preceding discussion, might easily lead us to believe that reading is added onto the text as a complement it can do without. After all, libraries are full of unread books, whose configuration is, nonetheless, well laid out and yet they refigure nothing at all. Our earlier analyses should suffice to dispel this illusion. Without the reader who accompanies it, there is no configuring act at work in the text; and without a reader to appropriate it, there is no world unfolded before the text.

Yet the illusion is endlessly reborn that the text is a structure in itself and for itself and that reading happens to the text as some extrinsic and contingent event. In order to defeat this tenacious suggestion, it may be a good stratagem to turn to a few exemplary texts that theorize about their being read. This is the path chosen by Michel Charles in his Rhetorique de la lecture. Charles's choice of this title is itself significant. It is no longer a question of a rhetoric of fiction, carried out by an implied author, but of a rhetoric of reading, oscillating between the text and its reader. This is still a rhetoric, inasmuch as its strategems are inscribed within the text and inasmuch as even the reader is in a way constructed in and through the work.

It is not without import, however, that Charles's work begins with an interpretation of the first strophe of Lautreamont's Les Chants de Maldoror. The choices with which the reader is confronted by the author himself in this case—whether to turn back or to continue on through the book, whether or not to lose himself in reading, whether to be devoured by the text or to savour it—are themselves prescribed by the text. The reader is set free but what reading choices there are have already been encoded. The violence of Lautreamont, we are told, consists in reading in place of the reader. Better, a particular reading situation is established in which the abolition of the distinction between reading and being read amounts to prescribing the "unreadable" (p. 13).

The second text selected, the Prologue to Rabelais' Gargantua, is in turn treated as a "mechanism for producing meanings" (p. 33). By this, Michel

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Charles means the sort of logic by which this text "constructs" the reader's freedom, but also limits it (p. 33). The Prologue does possess the remarkable feature that the relation of the book to the reader is built upon the same metaphorical network as is the relation of the writer to his own work: "the drug contained within," "the outside form of
Silenus,” taken from the Socratic dialogues, "the bone and the marrow," which the book holds within itself and allows to be discovered and savored. The same "metaphorical rhapsody" (pp. 33f.) in which we can discern a recovery of the medieval theory of the multiple senses of Scripture and a recapitulation of Platonic imagery, Eras-mian parable, and patrictic metaphor, governs the text's reference to itself and the reader's relation to the text. In this way, the Rabelaisian text attempts to interpret its own references. Nevertheless, the hermeneutic woven in the Prologue is so rhapsodic that the author's designs become impenetrable and the reader's responsibility overwhelming. We might say as regards the first two examples chosen by Michel Charles that the prescriptions for reading already inscribed in these texts are so ambiguous that, by disorienting the reader, they free him. Charles admits as much. The task of revealing the text's incompleteness falls to reading, through the interplay of transformations it involves. The efficacy of the text is, as a consequence, no different from its fragility (p. 91). And there is no longer any incompatibility between a poetics that, in Jakobson's definition, places the accent on orienting the message back toward itself and a rhetoric of effective discourse, oriented toward a receiver, once "the message which is itself its own end, continues its questioning" (p. 78; his emphasis). As with the image of a poetics of an open work, the rhetoric of reading renounces setting itself up as a normative system, in order to become a "system of possible questions" (p. 118).

The final texts chosen by Michel Charles open a new perspective. By seeing the "reading in the text" (the title of part three of Rhetorique de la lecture), what we find is a style of writing that allows itself to be interpreted only in terms of the interpretations it opens up. At the same time, the "reading-to-come" is the unknown that the writing puts into perspective. Ultimately, the very structure of the text is but an effect of reading. After all, is not structural analysis itself the result of a work of reading? But then the initial formulation—"reading is part of the text"—is inscribed in the Elakeson a new meaning: reading is no longer that which the text prescribes; it is, that which brings the structure of the text to light through interpretation. Charles's analysis of Benjamin Constant's Adolphe is particularly well-suited for demonstrating this, in that the author feigns to be merely the reader of a manuscript that has been found and in that, moreover, the interpretations internal to the work constitute so many virtual readings. Narrative, interpretation, and reading thus tend to overlap. Here Charles's thesis reaches its full strength, at the very moment when it is turned upside down. The reading is in the text, but the writing of the text anticipates the readings to come. With this, the text is supposed to prescribe its reading is struck by the same indeterminacy and the same uncertainty as the readings to come. A similar paradox results from the study of one of Baudelaire's Petit Poemes en prose: "Le chien et le flacon." On the one hand, the text restrains its indirect receiver, the reader, by way of its direct receiver, the dog. The reader is really in the text and, to this extent, "this text has no response" (p. 251). But, just when the text seems to close itself up upon the reader in a terrorist act, by splitting its receivers in two it reopens a play space that rereading can turn into a space of freedom. "This reflexivity of reading"—in which I perceive an echo of what I shall below call, following Hans Robert Jauss, reflective reading—is what allows the act of reading to free itself from the reading inscribed within the text and to provide a response to the text. The final text chosen by Michel Charles—Rabelais' Quart Livre—reinforces this paradox. Once again, we see an author take a stand in relation to his text and, in doing this, set in place the variability of interpretations. "Everything happens as if the Rabelaisian text had foreseen the long parade of commentaries, glosses, and interpretations that have followed it" (p. 287; his emphasis). But, as a repercussion, this long parade makes the text a "machine for defying interpretations" (ibid.).

Rhetorique de la lecture appears to me to culminate in this paradox. On the one hand, the thesis of the "reading contained in the text," taken absolutely, as Charles asks us to do time and time again, gives the image not of manipulated readers, as the readers seduced and perverted by the unreliable narrator described by Wayne Booth appeared to be, but of readers terrorized by the decree of predestination striking their reading. On the other hand, the perspective of an infinite reading that, interminably, structures the very text prescribing it, restores to reading a disturbing indeterminacy. So we can say, after the fact, why Michel Charles, from the opening pages of his work, gives equal measure to constraint and to freedom. In the field of theories of reading, this paradox places Rhetorique de la lecture in a median position, halfway between an analysis that emphasizes the place of origin of the strategy of persuasion—the implied author—and an analysis that sets up the act of reading as the supreme authority. The theory of reading, at this point, ceases to belong to rhetoric and slips over into a phenomenology or a hermeneutics.

A PHENOMENOLOGY AND AN AESTHETIC OF READING

From a purely rhetorical perspective, the reader is, finally, the prey and the victim of the strategy worked out by the implied author, and is so to the very extent this strategy is more deeply concealed. Another theory of reading is required, one that places an emphasis on the reader's response—the reader's response to the strategies of the implied author. A new epimene conuring poetics arises here out of an "aesthetic" rather than a "rhetoric," if we restore to the term "aesthetic" the full range of meaning of the Greek word aisthesis, and if we grant to it the task of exploring the multiple ways in which a work, in acting on a reader, affects that reader. This being-affected has the noteworthy quality of combining in an experience of a particular type passivity and activity, which allows us to consider as the "reception" of a text the very "action" of reading it. As I announced in Part I, this aesthetic, as it complements poetics, encompasses in turn two different forms, depending on whether the emphasis is placed on the effect produced on the individual reader and his response in the reading process, as in the work of Wolfgang Iser, or on the response of the public on the level of its collective expectations, as in the work of RistofTansP Robert Jauss. These two aesthetics may appear to be opposed to each other,
inasmuch as the one tends toward a phenomenological psychology while the other aims at reshaping literary history, but in fact they mutually presuppose each other. On the one hand, it is through the individual process of reading that the text reveals its "structure of appeal"; on the other hand, it is inasmuch as readers participate in the sedimented expectations of the general reading public that they are constituted as competent readers. The act of reading thus becomes one link in the chain of the history of the reception of a work by the public. Literary history, renovated by the aesthetic of reception, may thus claim to include the phenomenology of the act of reading.

It is, nevertheless, legitimate to begin with this phenomenology, for it is here that the rhetoric of persuasion encounters its first limit, by encountering its first reply. If the rhetoric of persuasion is supported by the coherence, not of the work to be sure, but of the strategy—evident or concealed—of the implied author, phenomenology has its starting point in the incomplete aspect of the literary text, which Roman Ingarden was the first to develop, in two important works. For Ingarden, a text is incomplete, first, in the sense that it offers different "schematic views" that readers are asked to "concretize." They strive to picture the characters and the events reported in the text. It is in relation to this image-building concretization that the work presents lacunae, "places of indeterminacy." However well-articulated the "schematic views" proposed for our execution may be, the text resembles a musical score lending itself to different realizations.

A text is incomplete, second, in the sense that the world it proposes is defined as the intentional correlate of a sequence of sentences (intentionale Satz-korrelate), which remains to be made into a whole for such a world to be intended. Turning to advantage the Husserlian theory of time and applying it to the sequential chain of sentences in the text, Ingarden shows how each sen-

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tence points beyond itself, indicates something to be done, opens up a perspective. We recognize Husserlian protention in this anticipation of the sequence, as the sentences follow one another. This play of retentions and protentions functions in the text only if it is taken in hand by readers who welcome it into the play of their own expectations. Unlike the perceived object, however, the literary object does not intuitively "fulfill" these expectations; it can only modify them. This shifting process of the modification of expectations constitutes the image-building concretization mentioned above. It consists in traveling the length of the text, in allowing all the modifications performed to "sink" into memory, while compacting them, and in opening ourselves up to new expectations entailing new modifications. This process * alone makes the text a work. So this work may be said to result from the interaction between the text and the reader.

Taken up again by Wolfgang Iser, these observations borrowed from Husserl by way of Ingarden undergo a remarkable development in the phenomenology of the act of reading. The most original concept here is that of the "wandering viewpoint" (The Act of Reading, p. 108). It expresses the twofold fact that the whole of the text can n'ever be perceived at once and that, placing ourselves within the literary text, we travel with it as our reading progresses. "This mode of grasping an object is unique to literature" (p. 109). This concept of a wandering viewpoint fits perfectly with the Husserlian description of the interplay of protentions and retentions. Throughout the reading process there is a continual interplay between modified expectations and transformed memories (p. 111). In addition, this concept incorporates into the phenomenology of reading the synthetic process by which a text constitutes itself sentence by sentence, through what might be called an interplay of sentential retentions and protentions. I am also retaining here the concept of the depragmatizing of objects, borrowed from the description of the empirical world. Literary texts "depragmatize [objects], for these objects are not to be denoted [Bezeichnung] but are to be transformed" (p. 109).

Leaving aside the other riches of this phenomenology of reading, I shall concentrate on those features that characterize the reader's response, or even retort, to the rhetoric of persuasion. These features stress the dialectical character of the act of reading and lead us to speak of the work of reading in the same way we speak of the dream-work. Reading works on the text thanks to these dialectical features.

First, the act of reading tends to become, with the modern novel, a response to the strategy of deception so well illustrated by Joyce's Ulysses. This strategy consists in frustrating the expectation of an immediately intelligible configuration and in placing on the reader's shoulders the burden of configuring the work. The presupposition of this strategy, without which it would have no object, is that the reader expects a configuration, that reading is a search for coherence. In my own terms, I would say that reading itself becomes a drama

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of discordant concordance, inasmuch as the "places of indeterminacy" (Un-bestimmtheitsstelleri)—to borrow Ingarden's expression—not only designate the lacunae of the text with respect to image-building concretization, but are themselves the result of the strategy of frustration incorporated in the text as such on its rhetorical level. What is at issue is therefore something quite different than providing ourselves with a figure, an image, of the work; the work has also to be given a form. At quite the other extreme from readers on the edge of boredom following a work that is too didactic, whose instructions leave no room for creative activity, modern readers risk buckling under the load of an impossible task when they are asked to make up for this lack of readability fabricated by the author. Reading then becomes a picnic where the author brings the words and the
readers the meaning.
The first dialectic, by which reading coalesces close to being a battle, gives rise to a second one. What the work of reading reveals is not only a lack of determinacy but **also an excess** of meaning. Evil, text, even a systematically fragmentary one, is revealed to be inexhaustible in terms of reading, as though, through *its unavoidably* selective character, reading revealed an unwritten aspect in the text. It is the perogative of reading to strive to provide a figure for this unwritten side of the text.

The advantage of this theory of response-effect is clear. A balance is sought between the signals provided by the text and the synthetic activity of reading. This balance is the unstable effect of the dynamism by which, I would say, the configuration of the text in terms of structure becomes equal to the reader's reconfiguration in terms of experience. This vital experience, in turn, is a genuine dialectic by virtue of the negativity it implies: de-pragmatization and de-familiarization—inversion of the given in image-building consciousness, illusion-breaking.16; 1

Is the phenomenology of reading thereby entitled to make the category of "implied reader" the exact counterpart to that of the "implied author" introduced by the rhetoric of fiction? At first sight, a symmetry does appear to be established between the implied author and the implied reader, each represented by its corresponding mark in the text. By implied we must then understand "the" role assigned to the real reader by the instructions in the text. The implied author and the implied reader thus become literary categories compatible with the semantic autonomy of the text. Inasmuch as they are constructed in the text, they are both fictional correlates of real beings. The implied author is identified with the unique style of the work, the implied reader with the receiver to whom the sender of the work addresses himself. This symmetry, however, proves finally misleading. On the one hand, the implied author is a disguise of the real author, who disappears by making himself the narrator immanent in the work—the narrative voice. On the other hand, the real reader is a co-creation of the implied reader, intended by the narrator's strategy of persuasion. In relation to the narrator, the implied reader remains virtual as long as this role has not been actualized.35 Thus, whereas the real author effaces himself in the implied author, the implied reader takes on substance in the real reader. This real reader is the pole opposite the text in the process of interac-
distinctions are groundless, but various figures of the reader do not take us even a single step outside the structure of the text, of which the implied reader continues to be a variable. To give full scope to the theme of interaction, the, phenomenology of the act of reading requires a flesh-and-blood reader, who, in actualizing the role of the reader prestructured in and through the text, transforms it.38

The aesthetic of reception, as we stated above, can be taken in two senses: either in the sense of a phenomenology of the individual act of reading in the "theory of aesthetic response" of Wolfgang Iser, or in the sense of a hermeneutic of the public reception of a work as in Hans Robert Jauss's Toward an Aesthetic of Reception.39 However, as we have already hinted, these two approaches intersect at some point—precisely, in aisthesis.

Let us therefore follow the movement by which the aesthetic of reception leads back to this point of intersection. In its initial formulation,40 Jauss's aesthetic of reception was not intended to complete a phenomenological theory of the act of reading but rather to renew the history of literature, which is said at the start of this essay to have "fallen into disrepute, and not at all without reason" (p. 3).41 Several major theses make up the program for this aesthetic of reception.

The basic thesis from which all the others are derived holds that the meaning of a literary work rests upon the dialogical (dialogisch)42 relation established between the work and its public in each age. This thesis, similar to Col-lingwood's notion that history is but a re-enactment of the past in the mind of the historian, amounts to including the effect produced (Wirkung) by a work—in other words, the meaning a public attributes to it—within the various boundaries of the work itself. The challenge, as it is announced in the title of 43 11 Jauss's essay consists in equating actual meaning with reception. It is not simply the actual effect but the "history of effects"—to use an expression from Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics—that has to be taken into account, which requires restoring the horizon of expectation43 of the literary work considered; that is, the system of references shaped by earlier traditions concerning the genre, the theme, and the degree of contrast for the first receivers between the poetic language and everyday practical language (we shall return to this important opposition).44 In this way, we understand the sense of parody in Don Quixote only if we are capable of reconstructing its initial public's feeling of familiarity with chivalrous romances and, consequently, if we are capable of understanding the shock produced by a work that, after feigning

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to satisfy the public's expectation, runs directly counter to it. The case of new works is in this respect the most favorable for discerning the change of horizon that constitutes the major effect that occurs here. Hence the critical factor for establishing a literary history is the identification of successive aesthetic distances between the preexisting horizon of expectation and the new work, distances that mark out the work's reception. These distances constitute the moments of negativity in this reception. But what is it to reconstitute the horizon of expectation of a yet unknown experience, if not to discover the interplay of questions to which the work suggests an answer? To the ideas of effect, history of effects, and horizon of expectations must be added, following once again Collingwood and Gadamer, the logic of question and answer; a logic whereby we can understand a work only if we have understood that to which it responds.45 This logic of question and answer, in turn, allows us to correct the idea that history would be no more than a history of gaps or deviations, hence a history of negativity. As a response, the reception of a work performs a certain mediation between the past and the present or, better, between the horizon of expectation coming from the past and the horizon of expectation belonging to the present. The thematic concern of literary history lies in this "historical mediation."

Having arrived at this point, we may ask whether the horizons stemming from this mediation can stabilize in any lasting way the meaning of a work, to the point of conferring a transhistorical authority on it. In opposition to Gadamer's thesis concerning "the classical,"46 Jauss refuses to see in the enduring character of great works anything other than a temporary stabilization of the dynamic of reception; any Platonic hypostasizing of a prototype offered to our recognition would, according to him, violate the rule of questions and answers. For what, to us, is classical was not first perceived as something outside of time but rather as opening up a new horizon. If we admit that the cognitive value of a work lies in its power to prefigure an experience to come, then there must be no question of freezing the dialogical relation into an aternal truth. This open character of the history of effects leads us to say that every work is not only an answer provided to an earlier question but a source of new questions, in turn. Jauss refers to Hans Blumenberg, for whom "each work of art poses and leaves behind, as a kind of including horizon, the 'solutions' which are possible after it."47 These new questions are opened not only in front of the work but behind it as well. For example, it is after the fact, by a recoil-effect of Mallarme's lyrical hermeticism, that we are able to release virtual meanings in baroque poetry that had hitherto remained unnoticed. But it is not only before and behind, in diachrony, that the work opens up distances, this also occurs in the present, as a synchronic cross-section of a phase of literary evolution will show. We may hesitate here between a conception that underscores the total heterogeneity of culture at any given moment, to
the point of proclaiming the pure "coexistence of the simultaneous and the non-

simultaneous,"54 and a conception where the emphasis is placed on the effect of totalization resulting from the redistribution of horizons through the interplay of question and answer. We thus find on the synchronic plane a problem comparable to that posed by "the classical" on the diachronic plane; the history of literature must break a path through the same paradoxes and the same extremes.51 Just as it is true that at any given moment, a particular work may have been perceived as out of step, not current, premature, or outmoded (Nietzsche would say "untirriely"), so too it must also be admitted that, owing to the history of reception itself, the multiplicity of works tends to form one great tableau that the public perceives as the production of its time. Literary history would not be possible without a few great works serving as reference points, relatively enduring in the diachronic process, and acting as powerful forces of integration in the synchronic dimension.52

We can see the fruitfulness of these theses with respect to the old problem of the social influence of the work of art. We must challenge with equal force the thesis of a narrow structuralism which forbids "moving outside the text" and that of a dogmatic Marxism which merely shifts onto the social plane the worn-out topos of imitatio naturae. It is on the level of a public's horizon of expectations that a work exercises what Jauss terms the "creative function of the work of art." 53 The horizon of expectation peculiar to literature does not coincide with that of everyday life. If a new work is able to create an aesthetic distance, it is because a prior distance exists between the whole of literary life and everyday practice. It is a basic characteristic of the horizon of expectation against the background of which new reception stands out that it is itself the expression of an even more basic noncoincidence, namely, the opposition in a given culture "between poetic language and practical language, imaginary world and social reality" (p. 24).55 What we have just indicated as literature's function of social creation arises quite precisely at this point of articulation between the expectations turned toward art and literature and the expectations constitutive of everyday experience.55

The moment when literature attains its highest degree of efficacity is perhaps the moment when it places its readers in the position of finding a solution for which they themselves must find the appropriate questions, those that constitute the aesthetic and moral problem posed by a work.

If Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, whose basic theses we have just summarized, could link up with and complete the phenomenology of the act of reading, this was through an expansion of its initial undertaking, which was to renew literary history, and from its insertion within a more ambitious project, that of constituting a literary hermeneutics.54 This hermeneutics is assigned the task of equaling the other two regional hermeneutics, theological and juridical, under the auspices of a philosophical hermeneutics akin to that of Gadamer. Literary hermeneutics, as Jauss admits, continues to be the poor re-

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sume the threefold task, referred to above, of understanding (subtilitas intel-ligendi), explanation (subtilitas interpre tandi), and application (subtilitas applicandi). In contrast to a superficial view, reading must not be confined to the field of application, even if this field does reveal the end of the hermeneutical process; instead, reading must pass through all three stages. A literary hermeneutics will, therefore, reply to these three questions: in what sense is the primary undertaking of understanding entitled to characterize the object of literary hermeneutics as an aesthetic one? What does reflective exegesis add to understanding? What equivalent to a sermon in biblical exegesis and to a verdict in juridical exegesis does literature offer on the level of application? In this triadic structure, application orients the entire process teleologically, but primary understanding guides the process from one stage to the next by virtue of the horizon of expectation it already contains. Literary hermeneutics is thus oriented both toward application and by understanding. And it is the logic of question and answer that ensures the transition to explanation.

The primacy accorded to understanding explains why literary hermeneutics, unlike Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, is not directly produced by the logic of question and answer. Finding the question to which a text offers a reply, reconstructing the expectations of a text's first receivers in order to restore to the text its original otherwise—these are already steps in rereading, standing second in relation to a primary understanding that allows the text to develop its own expectations.

This primacy ascribed to understanding is explained by the wholly original relation between knowledge and enjoyment (Genuss) that ensures the aesthetic quality of literary hermeneutics. This relation parallels that between the call and promise, committing a whole life, characterizing theological understanding. If the specific nature of literary understanding in terms of enjoyment has been neglected, this is due to the curious convergence between the interdiction uttered by structural poetics, forbidding us to step outside the text or to move beyond the reading instructions it contains,55 and the disfavor cast on enjoyment by Adorno's negative aesthetic, which sees in it merely a "bourgeois" compensation for the asceticism of labor.56

Contrary to the common idea that pleasure is ignorant and mute, Jauss asserts that it possesses the power to open a space of meaning in which the logic of question and answer will subsequently unfold. It gives rise to
understanding—*il donne a comprendre*. Pleasure is a perceptive reception, attentive to the prescriptions of the musical score that the text is, one that opens up by virtue of the horizontal aspect that Husserl attributed to all perception. By all these features, aesthetic perception is distinguished from everyday perception and thus establishes a distance in relation to ordinary experience, as this was underscored above in Jauss's theses on the renewal of literary history. The text asks its readers, first of all, to entrust themselves to this perceptive under-

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The passage from the first reading, the innocent reading — if there is one — to the second reading, a reading at a distance, is governed, as we stated above, by the horizontal structure of immediate understanding. This structure is not simply staked out by the expectations stemming from the dominant tendencies in taste of the epoch when a text is read or from the reader's familiarity with earlier works. This horizontal structure gives rise, in turn, to expectations of meaning that are not satisfied, which reading reinscribes within the logic of question and answer. So reading and rereading have their respective advantages and weaknesses. Reading includes both richness and opacity; rereading clarifies but in so doing makes choices. It is based on the questions that remained open after the first passage through the text but offers only one interpretation among others. So a dialectic of expectations and of questions governs the relation between reading and rereading. Expectations are open but more undetermined; questions are determined but more closed-in upon themselves. Literary criticism must take its stand on the basis of this hermeneutical precondition of partiality.

The elucidation of this partiality gives rise to a third reading. This emerges from the question: what historical horizon has conditioned the genesis and the effect of the work and limits, in turn, the interpretation of the present reader? Literary hermeneutics delimits in this way the legitimate space for the historico-philological methods that predominated in the prestructuralist era and that were dethroned in the age of structuralism. Their proper place is defined by their function of verification which, in a certain sense, makes immediate reading, and even reflective reading, dependent on the reading based on historical reconstruction. By a recoil-effect the reading of verification helps to disentangle aesthetic pleasure from the mere satisfaction of contemporary prejudices and interests, by tying it to the perception of the difference between the past horizon of the work and the present horizon of reading. A strange feeling of distancing is thus inserted at the heart of present pleasure. The third reading brings about this effect by redoubling the logic of question and answer that governed the second reading. What, it asks, were the questions to which the work was the answer? Yet this third "historical" reading continues to be guided by the expectations of the first reading and by the questions of the second reading. The merely historicizing question — what did the text say? — remains under the control of the properly hermeneutical question — what does the text say to me and what do I say to the text?

What becomes of application in this schema? At first sight, the application proper to this hermeneutics does not appear to produce any effect comparable to preaching in theological hermeneutics or to a verdict in juridical hermeneutics. The recognition of the text's otherness in scholarly reading seems to be the final word of literary aesthetics. This hesitation is understandable. If it is
Another remarkable property of the phenomenon of reading, one which also generates a dialectic, has to do with the relation between communicability and referentiality (if it is still legitimate to employ this term, with the appropriate reservations) in the operation of refiguration. We can enter this problem from either end. We can say, as in our sketch of mimesis, in volume 1, that an aesthetics of reception cannot take up the problem of communication without taking up that of reference, inasmuch as what is communicated is, in the final analysis, beyond the sense of the work, the world the work projects, the world that constitutes the horizon of the work. But, from the opposite direction, we

likes to call the "issue" of the text are extracted from the sheer subjectivity of the act of reading only on the condition of being inscribed within a chain of readings, which gives a historical dimension to this reception and to this welcome. The act of reading is thereby included within a reading community, which, under certain favorable conditions, develops the sort of normativity and canonical status that we acknowledge in great works, those that never cease decontextualizing and recontextualizing themselves in the most diverse cultural circumstances. From this angle we return to a central theme in Kantian aesthetics, namely, that communicability constitutes an intrinsic component of the judgment of taste. To be sure, it is not to reflective judgment that we ascribe this sort of universality which Kant held to be a priori but, quite the contrary, to the "thing itself" that summons us in the text. However, between this "appeal structure," to speak as Iser does, and the communicability characteristic of a reading-in-common, a reciprocal relation is established, intrinsically constitutive of the power of refiguration belonging to works of fiction.

A final dialectic brings us to the threshold of our next chapter. It concerns the two, if not antithetical at least divergent, roles assumed by reading. Reading appears by turns as an interruption in the course of action and as a new impetus to action. These two perspectives on reading result directly from its functions of confrontation and connection between the imaginary world of the text and the actual world of readers. To the extent that readers subordinate their expectations to those developed by the text, they themselves become unreal to a degree comparable to the unreality of the fictive world toward which they emigrate. Reading then becomes a place, itself unreal, where reflection takes a pause. On the other hand, inasmuch as readers incorporate—little matter whether consciously or unconsciously—into their vision of the world the lessons of their readings, in order to increase the prior readability of this vision, then reading is for them something other than a place where they come to rest; it is a medium they cross through.

This twofold status of reading makes the confrontation between the world of the text and the world of the reader at once a stasis and an impetus. The ideal type of reading, figured by the fusion but not confusion of the horizons of expectation of the text and those of the reader, unites these two moments of refiguration in the fragile unity of stasis and impetus. This fragile union can be expressed in the following paradox: the more readers become unreal in their reading, the more profound and far-reaching will be the work's influence on social reality. Is it not the least figurative style of painting that has the greatest chance of changing our vision of the world? From this final dialectic comes the result that, if the problem of the re-figuration of time by narrative comes together in the narrative, it does not find its outcome there.

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ture that aesthesis and enjoyment are not restricted to the level of immediate understanding but carry through all the levels of hermeneutical "subtlety," we may be tempted to consider the aesthetic dimension that accompanies pleasure in its traversal of the three hermeneutical stages as the final criterion for literary hermeneutics. If so, then application does not constitute a genuinely distinct stage. Aisthesis itself already reveals and transforms. Aesthetic experience draws this power from the contrast it establishes from the outset in relation to everyday experience. Because it is "refractory" to anything other than itself, it asserts its ability to transfigure the everyday and to transgress accepted standards. Before any reflective distanciation, aesthetic understanding as such appears to be application. Attesting to this is the range of effects it deploys: from the seduction and illusion so dear to popular literature, to the appeasement of suffering and the aestheticizing of the experience of the past, to the subversion and Utopia characteristic of so many contemporary works. Through this variety of effects, aesthetic experience as it is invested in reading directly corroborates Erasmus's aphorism: lectio transit in mores.

It is possible, however, to discern a more distinct contour for application if it is set at the end of another triad, which Jauss interweaves with that of the three subtleties without establishing a term-by-term correspondence between the two series—the triad here is poiesis, aisthesis, catharsis. A complex set of effects is attached to catharsis. It designates first of all the effect of the work that is more moral than aesthetic: new evaluations, hitherto unheard of norms, are proposed by the work, confronting or shaking current customs. This first effect is closely bound up with readers' tendency to identify with the hero, and to allow themselves to be guided by the reliable or unreliable narrator. Catharsis, however, has this moral effect only because, first of all, it displays the power of clarifying, examining, and instructing exerted by the work in virtue of the distanciation that takes place in relation to our own affects. It is an easy passage from this sense to the one most strongly emphasized by Jauss, namely, the work's communicative efficacy. A clarification is, indeed, essentially communicative; through it, the work "teaches." What we find here is not simply a notation from Aristotle but a major feature of
Kantian aesthetics—the contention that the universal nature of the beautiful consists in nothing else than in its a priori communicability. Catharsis thus constitutes a distinct moment from aisthesis, conceived of as pure receptivity; namely, the moment of communicability of perceptive understanding. Aisthesis frees the reader from everyday concerns, catharsis sets the reader free for new evaluations of reality that will take shape in rereading. An even more subtle effect results from catharsis. Thanks to the clarification it brings about, catharsis sets in motion a process of transposition, one that is not only affective but cognitive as well, something like allegorise, whose history can be traced back to Christian and pagan exegesis. Allegorization occurs whenever we attempt "to translate the meaning of a text in its first context into another context, which amounts to saying: to give it a new signification which goes beyond the horizon of meaning delimited by the intentionality of the text in its original context." It is ultimately this allegorizing power, related to catharsis, that makes literary application the response most similar to the allegorizing apprehension of the past in the dialectic of the Gegenüber and of indebtedness.

This is the distinct problematic arising from application, which, however, never entirely escapes the horizon of perceptive understanding and the attitude of enjoyment. At the end of our perusal of several theories of reading, chosen in view of their contribution to our problem of refuguration, several major features stand out that underscore, each in its own way, the dialectical structure of the operation of refuguration. The first dialectical tension arose from the comparison we could not help but make between the feeling of a debt, which appeared to us to accompany the relation of standing-for the past, and the freedom of the imaginative variations performed by fiction on the theme of the aporias of time, as we de-scribed them in the preceding section of this volume. The analyses we have just made of the phenomenon of reading lead us to nuance this overly simple opposition. It must be stated, first of all, that that the projection of a fictive world consists in a complex creative process, which may be no less marked by an internal constraint than is the historian's work of reconstruction. The question of creative freedom is not a simple one. The liberation of fiction as regards the constraints of history summd" up in documentary proof—does not constitute the final word concerning the freedom of fiction. It constitutes only the Cartesian moment: free.choice in the realm of the imaginary. But its service to the worldview that the implied author strives to communicate to the reader is for fiction the source of more subtle constraints, which express the Spinozist moment of freedom: namely, internal necessity. Free from the external constraint of documentary proof, fiction is bound internally by the very thing that it projects-outside itself. Free from . . . , artists must still make themselves free for . . . . If this were not the case, how could we explain the anguish and suffering of artistic creation as they are attested to by the correspondence and diaries of a van Gogh or a Cezanne? Thus, the stringent law of creation, which is to render as perfectly as possible the vision of (the wbrjd • that inspires the artist, corresponds feature by feature to the debt of the histo- rian and of the reader of history with respect to the dead. What the strategy of persuasion, wrought by the implied author, seeks to impose on the reader is, precisely, the force of conviction—the illocutionary force, we might say in the vocabulary of speech-act theory—that upholds the narrator's vision of the world. The paradox here is that the freedom of the imaginative variations is communicated only by being cloaked in the constraining power of a vision of the world. The dialectic between freedom and constraint, internal to the creative process, is thus transmitted throughout the hermeneutical process that constrains readers and sets them free, in order, finally, to reach an aesthetic of reception, which places the work in a synergetic relation. This dialectic should be compared with the one that appeared to us to mark the relation of standing-for.resulting from the enigma of the pastness of the past. To be sure, it is not a matter of seeking a term-by-term resemblance between the moments of the theory of standing-for and those of the theory of reading. Nonetheless, the dialectical constitution of reading is not foreign to the dialectic of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous. For example, the rhetoric of fiction brings on stage an implied author who, through the ploy of seduction, attempts to make the reader identical with himself. But, when readers, discovering the place prescribed for them in the text, no longer feel seduced but terrorized, their only recourse is to set themselves at a distance from the text and to become fully conscious of the distance between the expectations developed by the text and their own expectations, as individuals caught up in everyday concerns.
arid as members of a cultured public formed by an entire tradition of readings. This oscillation between Same and Other is overcome only in the operation characterized by Gadamer and Jauss as the fusion of horizons and that may be held to be the ideal type of reading. Beyond the alternatives of confusion and alienation, the convergence of writing and reading tends to establish, between the expectations created by the text and those contributed by reading, an analogizing relation, not without resemblance to that in which the relation of standing-for the historical past culminates.

Another remarkable property of the phenomenon of reading, one which also generates a dialectic, has to do with the relation between communicability and referentiality (if it is still legitimate to employ this term, with the appropriate reservations) in the operation of refiguration. We can enter this problem from either end. We can say, as in our sketch of mimesis, in volume 1, that an aesthetics of reception cannot take up the problem of communication without taking up that of reference, inasmuch as what is communicated is, in the final analysis, beyond the sense of the work, the world the work projects, the world that constitutes the horizon of the work. But, from the opposite direction, we

likes to call the "issue" of the text are extracted from the mimesis with the act of reading only on the condition of being inscribed within a chain of readings, which gives a historical dimension to this reception and to this welcome. The act of reading is thereby included within a reading community, which, under certain favorable conditions, develops the sort of normativity and canonical status that we acknowledge in great works, those that never cease decontextualizing and recontextualizing themselves in the most diverse cultural circumstances. From this angle we return to a central theme in Kantian aesthetics, namely, that communicability constitutes an intrinsic component of the judgment of taste. To be sure, it is not to reflective judgment that we ascribe this sort of universality which Kant held to be a priori but, quite the contrary, to the "thing itself" that summons us in the text. However, between this "appeal structure," to speak as Iser does, and the communicability characteristic of a reading-in-common, a reciprocal relation is established, intrinsically constitutive of the power of refiguration belonging to works of fiction. A final dialectic brings us to the threshold of our text chapter. It concerns the two, if not antithetical at least divergent, roles assumed by reading. Reading appears by turns as an interruption in the course of action and as a new impetus to action. These two perspectives on reading result directly from its functions of confrontation and connection between the imaginary world of the text and the actual world of readers. To the extent that readers subordinate their expectations to those developed by the text, they themselves become unreal to a degree comparable to the unreality of the fictive world toward which they emigrate. Reading then becomes a place, itself unreal, where reflection takes a pause. On the other hand, inasmuch as readers incorporate—little matter whether consciously or unconsciously—into their vision of the world the lessons of their readings, in order to increase the prior readability of this vision, then reading is for them something other than a place where they come to rest; it is a medium they cross through.

This twofold status of reading makes the confrontation between the world of the text and the world of the reader at once a stasis and an impetus. The ideal type of reading, figured by the fusion but not confusion of the horizons of expectation of the text and those of the reader, unites these two moments of refiguration in the fragile unity of stasis and impetus. This fragile union can be expressed in the following paradox: the more readers become unreal in their reading, the more profound and far-reaching will be the work's influence on social reality. Is it not the least figurative style of painting that has the greatest chance of changing our vision of the world? From this final dialectic comes the result that, if the problem of the re-figuration of time by narrative comes together in the narrative, it does not find its outcome there.
The Interweaving of History and Fiction

With this chapter we reach the goal that has never ceased to guide the progress of our investigation, namely, the actual refiguration of time, now become human time through the interweaving of history and fiction.

Whereas in the first stage the accent was on the heterogeneity of the replies brought by history and fiction to the aporias of phenomenological time, that is, on the opposition between the imaginative variations produced by fiction and the reinscription of phenomenological time onto cosmological time as stipulated by history; and whereas, in the second stage a certain parallel became apparent between standing for the historical past and the transfer from the fictive world of the text to the actual world of the reader—what will concern us now is the confluence of the two series of analyses devoted to history and to fiction, respectively, even the mutual encompassing of the two processes of refiguration.

This passage from a stage where the heterogeneity of intentional aims predominates to a stage where interaction holds sway has been carefully prepared by the preceding analyses.

First, between the time of fiction and historical time a certain commensurability was assured by phenomenology, which provided a thematics common to both narrative modes, however riddled with aporias this phenomenology may be. At the end of the first stage, there was at least the possibility of asserting that history and fiction came to grips with the same difficulties, difficulties that may, of course, be unresolved but that are recognized and brought to the level of language by phenomenology. Next, the theory of reading created a common space for exchanges between history and fiction. Here we acted as though reading concerned only the reception of literary texts. Yet we are readers of history just as much as we are readers of novels. All forms of writing, including historiography, take their place within an extended theory of reading. As a result, the operation of mutually encompassing one another, which I referred to above, is rooted in reading. In this sense, the analyses of the interweaving of history and fiction that will be sketched out here belong to an extended theory of reception, within which the act of reading is considered as the phenomenological moment. It is within such an extended theory of reading that the reversal from divergence to convergence occurs in the relation between historical narrative and fictional narrative.

What remains then is the step from convergence to interconnection or jinterweaving.

; By the interweaving of history and fiction I mean the fundamental structure, ontological as well as epistemological, by virtue of which history and fiction each concretize their respective intentionalities only by borrowing from the intentionality of the other. In narrative theory, this concretization corresponds to the phenomenon of "seeing as . . ."by which I characterized metaphoric reference in my *Rule of Metaphor*. We have touched upon this problem of concretization at least twice: once when, following Hayden White, we attempted to elucidate the relation of historical consciousness standing for the past as such through the notion of an analogous apprehension; a second time, when in a perspective similar to that of Roman Ingarden, we described reading as an actualization of the text considered as a score to be performed. I am now going to show that this concretization is obtained only insofar as, on the one hand, history in some way makes use of fiction to refigure time and, on the other hand, fiction makes use of history for the same ends. This reciprocal concretization marks the triumph of the notion of figure in the form of "imagining that"; or more literally: "providing oneself a figure of . . ." [se figurer que . . .].

The Fictionalization of History

The first half of my thesis is easier to demonstrate. Nevertheless, we must not misconstrue its import. For one thing, it is not simply a matter of repeating what was stated in volume 1 about the role of the imagination in historical narrative on the level of configuration. Instead it is a question of the role of the imaginary in intending the past as it actually was. On the other hand, I am by no means denying the absence of symmetry between a "real" past and an "unreal" world, the object being instead to show in what unique way the imaginary is incorporated into the intended having-been, without weakening the "realist" aspect of this intention. The empty place to be filled by the imaginary is indicated by the very nature, as nonobservable, of what has been. To be convinced of this we have only to retrace our series of three successive approximations to having-been as it once was. We then see that the role of the imaginary grows as the approximation becomes increasingly precise. Consider the most realist hypothesis about the historical past, the one I began with in order to situate the analyses of the interweaving of history and fiction that will be sketched out here belong to an extended theory of reception, within which the act of reading is considered as the phenomenological moment. It is within such an extended theory of reading that the reversal from divergence to convergence occurs in the relation between historical narrative and fictional narrative.

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the trace, making it the ultimate presupposition of the reinscription of lived time (time with a present). If the assembling, consulting, and finally, reading documents and archives, which mediate and, so to speak, schematize those, at the origin of the gnomon and the calendar. These are the activities of preserving, selecting, synthetic activity, which is well expressed by the verb “to retrace,” sums up in turn operations as complex as interpretation tied to the signifying character of the trace as something present standing for something past. This synthetic activity, involving causal types of inference applied to the trace as a mark left behind and activities of structure of the trace itself, considered as a sign-effect. This mixed structure expresses in shorthand a complex connectors that mark the founding of historical time. This imaginary mediation is presupposed by the mixed potential presents, to imagined presents. In this way, all the memories accumulated by a collective memory can become dated events, due to their re-inscription in calendar time. Dating consists in allocating a lived-through present to some particular instant, in practice it consists in allocating the mark of the present and by implication that of the past or the future. Dating an event thus displays a synthetic character by which an actual present is identified with some particular instant. What is more, if the principle of allocation a particular date, that is, some particular place in the system of all possible dates, to an event that bears the mark of the present and by implication that of the past or the future. Dating an event thus displays a synthetic character by which an actual present is identified with some particular instant. What is more, if the principle of dating consists in allocating a lived-through present to some particular instant, in practice it consists in allocating a present as-if (to follow the Husserlian definition of recollection) to a particular instant. Dates are assigned to potential presents, to imagined presents. In this way, all the memories accumulated by a collective memory can become dated events, due to their re-inscription in calendar time. It would be an easy matter to apply the same argument to the other connectors between narrative time and universal time. The succession of generations is at once a biological datum and a prosthesis for recollection in the Husserlian sense. It is always possible to extend recollection through the chain of ancestral memories, to move back in time by extending this regressive movement through imagination, just as it is possible for every one of us to situate our own temporality in the series of generations, with the more or less necessary help of calendar time. In this sense, the network of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors schematizes—in the Kantian sense of the term—the relation between the more biological phenomenon of the succession of generations and the more intellectual phenomenon of the reconstruction of the realm of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. The mixed character of this threefold realm underscores its imaginary aspect. Obviously, it is in the phenomenon of the trace that we find the culmination of the imaginary character of the connectors that mark the founding of historical time. This imaginary mediation is presupposed by the mixed structure of the trace itself, considered as a sign-effect. This mixed structure expresses in shorthand a complex synthetic activity, involving causal types of inference applied to the trace as a mark left behind and activities of interpretation tied to the signifying character of the trace as something present standing for something past. This synthetic activity, which is well expressed by the verb “to retrace,” sums up in turn operations as complex as those, at the origin of the gnomon and the calendar. These are the activities of preserving, selecting, assembling, consulting, and finally, reading documents and archives, which mediate and, so to speak, schematize the trace, making it the ultimate presupposition of the reinscription of lived time (time with a present). If the
trace is a more radical phenomenon than the document or the archive, it is, nevertheless, the use of documents and archives that makes the trace an actual operator of historical time. The imaginary character of the activities that mediate and schematize the trace is evident in the intellectual work that accompanies the interpretation of remains, fossils, ruins, museum pieces, or monuments. They are attributed the value of being a trace, that is a sign-effect, only when we provide ourselves with a figure of the context of life, of the social and cultural environment, in short—to use one of Heidegger's expressions referred to above—only when we provide ourselves with a figure of the world surrounding the relic that today is missing, so to speak. Here, with the expression "to provide ourselves with a figure of," we touch upon an activity of the imagination that is easier to grasp within the framework of the following analysis.

The mediating role of fiction, in fact, increases when we move from the theme of the reinscription of lived time within cosmic time to that of the past-ness of the past. On the one hand, the historian's spontaneous "realism" found its critical expression in the difficult concept of standing-for, which we expressly distinguished from that of representation. By this we wished to convey the claim of a Gegenuber no longer in existence today on the historical discourse that intends it, its power of incitement and rectification in relation to all historical constructions, insofar as these are considered to be reconstructions. I myself have emphasized this right of the past as it once was, by placing in correspondence with it the idea of a debt we owe the dead. On the other hand, the elusive character of this Gegenuber, however imperative it may be, has led us into a logical game where the categories of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous give shape to the enigma without resolving it. At each stage of this logical game the imaginary imposes itself as the indispensable servant of standing-for, making us once again come face-to-face with the operation that consists in providing ourselves with a figure of what was. Nor have I forgotten what we found in Collingwood, taken as the spokesman for the Same, concerning the intimate union between the historical imagination and reenact-ment. Reenactment is the telos of the historical imagination, what it intends, and its crowning achievement. The historical imagination, in return, is the organon of reenactment. If we pass from the category of the Same to that of the Other in order to express the moment of what is no more in standing for the past, it is still the imaginary that keeps otherness from slipping into the unsayable. It is always through some transfer from Same to Other, in empathy and imagination, that the Other that is foreign to me is brought closer. In this respect, Husserl's analysis in his fifth Cartesian Meditation, dealing with the operation of pairing (Paarung) and the inference by analogy that is the basis for it, is here perfectly appropriate. In addition, the central theme of Dilthey's

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interpretive sociology is preserved here, namely, that all historical intelligence is rooted in the capacity of a subject to transport itself into an alien psychic life. As Gadamer notes in this regard, here mind comprehends mind. It is this transfer by analogy, to combine the themes of Husserl and Dilthey, that justifies our passage to the Analogous and our recourse, with Hay den White, to tropology in an effort to provide an acceptable sense for the expression handed down to us by Ranke, one that takes its distance from every form of positivism: knowing the past wie es eigentlich gewesen (the past as it actually happened). The wie—which, paradoxically, acts to balance the eigentlich—thus assumes the tropological value of "such as . . ." interpreted as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. What Hayden White terms the "representative" function of the historical imagination once again borders on the act of providing "ourselves a figure of . . ." by which the imagination manifests its ocular dimension. The past is what I would have seen, what I would have witnessed if I had been there, just as the other side of things is what I would see if I were looking at them from the side from which you are looking at them. In this way, tropology becomes the imaginary aspect of standing-for.

One more step is left to be taken; it consists in moving from the dated past and the reconstructed past to the refigured past, and in specifying the modality of the ~ imaginary that corresponds to this requirement for figurativeness. In this respect, up to now we have merely indicated the empty place of the imaginary in the work of refiguration.

We must now say how it happens that just these features of the imaginary, made explicit by fictional narrative, come to enrich these imaginary mediations and how, by this very fact, the actual interweaving of fiction and history occurs in the refiguration of time.

I have alluded to these features by introducing the expression "to provide ourselves a figure of . . .". They all share the property of conferring on the intending of the past a quasi-intuitive fulfillment. A key modality here is borrowed directly from the metaphorical function of "seeing as." We have long been prepared to welcome the help that the split reference of metaphor contributes to the refiguration of time by history. Once we have admitted that the writing of history is not something added from outside to historical knowledge but is one witti it, nothing prevents us from admitting as well that history imitatesTnTs own writing the types of emplotment handed down by our literary tradition. In this way, we saw Hayden White borrow from Northrop Frye the categories of tragedy, comedy, romance, irony, and so on, and pair up these literary genres with the tropes of our rhetorical tradition. But what is borrows—from literature can by no means be limited to the level of com-

position, hence to the moment of configuration. What is borrowed also involves the representative function of
the historical imagination. We learn to see a given series of events as tragic, as comic, and so on. What it is, precisely, that makes for the perenniality of certain great historical works, whose

ppateness of their poetic art and their rhetoric with respect to their way of “seeing” the past. One and the same work can thus be a great book of history and a fine novel. What is surprising is that this interlacing of fiction and history in no way undercuts the project of standing-for belonging to history, but instead helps to realize it.

This fiction-effect, if we may call it so, is also found to be augmented by the various rhetorical strategies that I mentioned in my review of theories of reading. A history book can be read as a novel. In doing this, we enter into an implicit pact of reading and share in the complicity it establishes between the narrative voice and the implied reader. By virtue of this pact, the reader’s guard is lowered. Mistrust is willingly suspended. Confidence reigns. The reader is prepared to accord the historian the exorbitant right to know other minds. In the name of this right, ancient historians did not hesitate to place in the mouths of their heroes invented discourses, which the documents did not guarantee but only made plausible. Modern historians no longer permit themselves these fanciful incursions, fanciful in the strict sense of the term. They do, however, still appeal in more subtle ways to the novelistic genius when they strive to reenact, that is, to rethink, a certain weighing of means and ends. Historians, then, are not prohibited from "depicting" a situation, from "rendering" a train of thought, or from giving it the "vividness" of an internal discourse. Through this aspect we rediscover an effect of discourse stressed—by Aristotle in his theory of *lexis*. "Locution"—or "diction"—according to his *Rhetoric*, has the virtue of "placing before our eyes" and so of "making visible." An additional step is thus taken, over and beyond seeing-as, which does not prohibit the marriage of metaphor, which assimilates, and irony, which creates a distance. We have entered into the realm of illusion that confuses, in the precise sense of the term, "seeing-as" with "believing we are seeing." Here, "holding as true," which defines belief, succumbs to the hallucination of presence.

This most peculiar effect of fiction and diction assuredly enters into conflict with the critical vigilance that historians exercise in other respects for their own purposes and that they try to communicate to the reader. But a strange complicity is sometimes created between this vigilance and the willing suspension of disbelief, out of which illusion emerges in the aesthetic order. The phrase "controlled illusion" comes to mind to characterize this happy union, which makes Michelet’s picture of the French Revolution, for example, a literary work comparable to Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*, in which the movement occurs in the opposite direction, that is, from fiction to history and no longer from history to fiction.

I now want to suggest a final modality of the fictionalizing of history, which, instead of abolishing history's intention of standing-for, gives this intention the fulfillment it is lacking and which, in the circumstances I shall

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beginnings. These events, which are said to be "epoch-making," draw their specific meaning from their capacity to found or reinforce the community's consciousness of its identity, its narrative identity, as well as the identity of its members. These events generate feelings of considerable ethical intensity, whether this be fervent commemoration or some manifestation of loathing, or indignation, or of regret or compassion, or even the call for forgiveness. Historians, as such, are supposed to set aside their own feelings. In this respect, François Furet’s critique of the commemoration and loathing that have created obstacles for a fruitful discussion of the explanations and interpretations of the French Revolution is still valid. However, when it is a question of events closer to us, like Auschwitz, it seems that the sort of ethical neutralization that may perhaps be fitting in the case of the history of a past that must be set at a distance in order better to be understood and explained, is no longer possible or desirable. In this regard, we should recall the biblical watchword (from Deuteronomy) *Zakhor, "Remember!"* which is not necessarily the same thing as a call to historiography. I readily admit that the rule of abstinence applied to reverent commemoration should more properly be respected than its application to indignation or to grief, insofar as our taste for celebrating events turns more willingly toward the great deeds of those whom Hegel called history’s great men, and arises out of the ideological function that legitimizes domination. What makes reverential commemoration suspect is its affinity with the history of conquerors, although I consider the elimination of admiration, veneration, and gratitude to be impossible, and not really desirable. If, as Rudolf Otto would have it, the *tremendum fascinosum* constitutes the emotional core of our experience of the Sacred, the meaning of the Sacred remains an inexpungible dimension of historical meaning.

The *tremendum*, however, has another side to it, the *tremendum horren-dum*, whose cause also deserves to be pleaded. And we shall see what beneficial aid fiction can bring to this plea. Horror is the negative form of admiration, as loathing is of veneration. Horror attaches to events that must never be forgotten. It constitutes the ultimate ethical motivation for the history of victims. (I prefer to say the history of victims rather than the history of the vanquished, for the vanquished are also, in part, candidates for domination who failed.) The victims of Auschwitz are, par excellence, the representatives in our memory of all history’s victims. Victimization is the other side of history that no cunning of reason can ever justify and that, instead, reveals the scandal of every theodicy of history.

The role of fiction in this memory of the horrible is a corollary to the capacity of horror, and also of admiration,
to address itself to events whose explicit uniqueness is of importance. By this I mean that horror, like admiration, exerts a specific function of individuation within our historical consciousness. An individuation that cannot be incorporated into a logic of specification or, even, into a logic of individuation like the one Paul Veyne shares with Pa-rriente. In relation to this logical individuation, and even in relation to the individuation by time that I spoke of above, I am prepared to use the phrase "uniquely unique events." Every other form of individuation is the counterpart to a work of explanation that connects things together. But horror isolates events by making them incomparable, incomparably unique, uniquely unique. If I persist in associating horror with admiration, it is because horror inverts the feeling with which we go forth to meet all that seems to us to be genera-tije"rejtj ye ...Horror is inverted veneration. It is in this sense that the Holocaust has been considered a negative revelation, an Anti-Sinai. The conflict between explanation that connects things together and horror that isolates is carried to its pinnacle here, and yet this latent conflict must not lead to a ruinous dichotomy between a history that would dissolve the event in explanation and a purely emotional retort that would dispense us from thinking the un-thinkable. It is important instead to elevate, each by means of the other, historical explanation and individuation through horror. The more we explain in historical terms, the more indignant we become; the more we are struck by the horror of events, the more we seek to understand them. This dialectic rests in the final analysis on the very nature of historical explanation that makes retro-diction a singular causal implication. The conviction expressed here rests on the singularity of genuinely historical explanation, that is, on the fact that historical explanation and the individuation of events through horror, just as through admiration or veneration, cannot remain mutually antithetical. In what way is fiction a corollary of this individuation by horror, and by admiration? Here we once again encounter fiction's capacity for provoking an illusion of presence, but one controlled by critical distance. Here again, part of the function of "standing for ..." belonging to imaginary acts is to "depict" by "making visible." The new element here is that the controlled illusion is not intended to please or to divert. It is placed in the service of the individuation produced by the horrible as well as by admiration. Individuation by means of the horrible, to which we are particularly attentive, would be blind feeling, regardless of how elevated or how profound it might be, without the quasi-intuitiveness of fiction. Fiction gives eyes to the horrified narrator. Eyes to see and to weep. The present state of literature on the Holocaust provides ample proof of this. Either one counts the cadavers or one tells the story of the victims. Between these two options lies a historical explanation, one that is difficult (if not impossible) to write, conforming to the rules of singular causal imputation. By fusing in this way with history, fiction carries history back to their common origin in the epic. More precisely, what the epic did in the sphere of the admirable, the story of victims does in the sphere of the horrible. This almost negative epic preserves the memory of suffering, on the scale of peoples, as epic and history in its beginnings transformed the ephemeral glory of heroes into a lasting fame. In both cases, fiction is placed in the service of the unforgettable. It permits historiography to live up to the task of memory. For historiography can exist without memory when it is driven by curiosity alone. It then tends toward exoticism, which is by no means reprehensible in itself, as Paul Veyne eloquently pleads with respect to the history of Rome as he teaches it. But there are perhaps crimes that must not be forgotten, victims whose suffering cries less for vengeance than for narration. The will not to forget alone can prevent these crimes from ever occurring again.

THE HISTORIZATION OF FICTION

Does fiction offer, on its side, features conducive to its historization, in the same way that history, in the manner we have just stated, calls for a certain fictionalization in the service, of its own intention of standing for the past? I shall now examine the hypothesis that fictional narrative in some way imitates historical narrative. Recounting something can then be said to be recounting it as /it were past. To what degree is this "as if past" essential to narrative meaning? The first indication that this "as if past" is part of the sense we ascribe to every narrative is of a strictly grammatical nature. Narratives are recounted in the past tense. In fairytales, the "oiTcelipbn a time ..." marks our entry into narrative. I am, of course, not unaware that this criterion is challenged by Harald Weinrich in his Tempus. According to Weinrich, the organization of tenses can be understood only if they are dissociated from the determinations related to the partitioning of time into past, present, and future. Tempus owes nothing to Zeit. Tenses are no more than signals addressed by a speaker to a listener, inviting this listener to receive and decode a verbal message in a certain way. In volume 2, I examined this interpretation of tenses in terms of communication. It is the "speech situation" that presides over the first distinction that is of interest to us here since it governs the opposition between narrating (erzdhleri) and commenting (besprechen). The tenses that govern narrating are held to have no properly temporal function; instead they act as a notice to the reader: this is a narrative. The attitude that corresponds to the narrative would then be relaxation, disengagement, in contrast to
the tension and involvement of the entry into commentary. The historical past and the imperfect are, therefore, said to be the tenses of narrative, not because the narrative relates in one way or another to past events, whether real or fictive, but because these tenses orient us toward an attitude of relaxation. The same thing is true, we recall, with regard to the marks of retrospection and prospection along the second axis of communication, the axis of locution, and with

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What can "quasi-past" mean? In Part III of this work, at the end of my analysis of "Games With Time," I ventured the hypothesis that seems to me to find its best justification in the present discussion. According to this hypothesis, the events recounted in a fictional narrative are past facts for the narrative voice, which we can consider here to be identical with the implied author; that is, with a fictive disguise of the real author. A voice speaks, recounting what for it has taken place. To enter into reading is to include in the pact between the reader and the author the belief that the events reported by the narrative voice belong to the past of that voice.

If this hypothesis stands up, we can say that fiction is quasi-historical, just as much as history is quasi-fictive. History is--quasi--fictive, once the. "quasi-- presence of event PlaceP-4)eforethe eyes of" the reader by a lively narrative supplements through its intuitiveness, its vividness, the elusive character of trie pastness of the past, which is illustrated by the paradoxes of standing-for. Fictional narrative is quasi-historical to the extent that the unreal events that it relates are past facts for the narrative voice that addresses itself to the reader. It is in this that they resemble past events and that fiction resembles history. The relationship is, moreover, circular. It is, we might say, as quasi-historical that fiction gives the past the vivid evocation that makes a great book of history a literary masterpiece.

A second reason for holding the "as if past" to be essential to narrative fiction has to do with the golden rule of employment that we read in Aristotle, namely, that a good plot must be probable or necessary. Of course, Aristotle attaches no temporal or quasi-temporal significance to the probable. He even, expressly opposes what might have happened to what actually did happen (Poetics, 1452b4-5). History takes care of the actual past, poetry takes charge of the possible. This objection, however, is no more constraining than

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The interpretation I am proposing here of the "quasi-historical" character of fiction quite clearly overlaps with the interpretation I also proposed of the "quasi-fictive" character of the historical past. If it is true that one of the functions of fiction bound up with history is to free, retrospectively, certain possibilities that were not actualized in the historical past, it is owing to its quasi-historical character that fiction itself is able, after the fact, to perform its liberating function. The quasi-past of fiction in this way becomes the detector of possibilities buried in the actual past. What "might have been"—the possible in Aristotle's terms—includes both the potentialities of the "real" past and the "unreal" possibilities of pure fiction. This deep affinity between the verisimilitude of pure fiction and the unrealized possibilities of the historical past explains perhaps, in turn, why fiction's freedom in relation to the constraints of history—constraints epitomized by documentary proof—does not constitute, as was stated above, the final word about the freedom of fiction. Free from the external constraint of documentary proof, is not fiction internally bound by its obligation to its quasi-past, which is another name for the constraint of verisimilitude? Free from . . . , artists must still render themselves free for ... If this were not the case, how could we explain the anguish and the suffering of artistic creation? Does not the quasi-past of the narrative voice exercise an internal constraint on novelistic creation, which is all the more imperative in that it does not coincide with the external constraint of documentary facts? And does not the difficult law of creation, which is "to render" in the most perfect way the vision of the world that animates the narrative voice, simulate, to the point of being indistinguishable from it, history's debt to the people of the past, to the dead? Debt for debt, who, the historian or the novelist, is the most insolvent? In conclusion, the interweaving of history and fiction in the refiguration of time rests, in the final analysis, upon this reciprocal overlapping, the quasi-historical moment of fiction changing places with the quasi-fictive moment of history. In this interweaving, this reciprocal overlapping, this exchange of places, originates what is commonly called human time, where the standing-for the past in history is united with the imaginative variations of fiction, against the background of the aporias of the phenomenology of time.

To what kind of totalization does this time, issuing from the refiguration through narrative, lend itself, if this time has to be considered as the collective singular reality that groups together all the procedures of interweaving described above? This is what still remains to be examined.

Should We Renounce Hegel?
The confrontation with Hegel that I am about to undertake has been made necessary by the emergence of a problem resulting from the very conclusion to Which the five preceding chapters have led. This problem, whose broad outlines I sketched in the introductory pages to this second section of this volume, stems from the presupposition, reiterated by every great philosophy of time, of the oneness of time. Time is always represented in these philosophies as a singular, collective. This presupposition cannot be made by the phenomenologies of time, referred to above, except at the price of great difficulties, which I shall consider once more in my concluding chapter. The question for the moment is whether a unitary historical consciousness, capable of comparing itself to this postulated oneness of time, and of making its aporias fruitful, proceeds from the interweaving referential intentions of historical and fictional narrative. As regards the legitimacy of this ultimate question, I will not turn to the argument drawn from the semantics of the word "history," at least in the modern period. That argument, however, will be taken up at the beginning of the next chapter. Here I prefer to seek a handhold for our question about the totalization of the historical consciousness in the difficulties encountered above in the course of our chapter devoted to the reality of the past as such. If, as we then admitted, the relative failure of all thought about the past as such stems from the abstraction of the past, from the breaking of its bonds with the present and the future, is not the true riposte to the aporias of time to be sought in a mode of thought that embraces past, present, and future as a whole? Ought we not to decipher from the disparity of the leading kinds, which articulate the representation of the past as such (reenactment, the positing of otherness and difference, metaphorical assimilation), the symptom of a kind of thinking that has not dared to elevate itself to grasping history as the totalization of time in the eternal present? From this question comes the Hegelian temptation.
The history that Hegelian philosophy takes as its theme is no longer a historian's history, it is a philosopher's history. Hegel speaks of "world history," not "universal history." Why? Because the idea capable of conferring a unity on history—the idea of freedom—is only understood by someone who has traversed the whole philosophy of the Spirit presented in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, that is, by someone who has thought through the conditions that make freedom both rational and real in the spirit's process of self-realization. In this sense, only the philosopher can write this history.

There is no real introduction to the "application of thought to history" (p. 25), therefore. It establishes itself without any transition or intermediary stage upon the philosophical act of faith that is consubstantial with the system: "the only thought which philosophy brings with it is the simple idea of reason—the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process" (p. 27). For the historian, this conviction remains a hypothesis, a "presupposition," and therefore an idea imposed a priori on the facts. For the
The first thing to see is that it is within the field of a theory of action that the solution is to be sought. This is actualization of Reason in history. What is more, this argument itself includes several steps, all marked with importance at this point is to note that the cunning of reason constitutes just one step on the way to the full history. It is also at this point that the overly renowned thesis of the "cunning of reason" intervenes. But what is it at this critical stage that the question arises of the means freedom gives itself in order to actualize itself in time, and the rise of others, attest to the immortality of the world spirit, of the Spirit as such? That the Spirit is one throughout its various particularizations. To attain the meaning of this passage of the Spirit introduces itself into the very posing of the question.

In any case, a meditation that does not take up the questions of means, material, and actualization will not be able to get beyond the level of "the abstract determination of spirit" (p. 47), separated from its historical "proof." In fact, the determination of the Spirit other than through its proofs can be designated only through its opposition to nature (ibid.). Freedom itself remains abstract so long as it remains opposed to external material determinations. The Spirit's power of remaining "within itself" (bei sich) then still finds its contrary "outside" itself in matter. Even the brief "presentation" (Darstellung) of the history of freedom, as the quantitative extension of freedom—in the Orient, just one person is free; with the Greeks, some are free; and with Germanic Christianity, humanity as such is free (p. 54)—remains abstract so long as we do not know its means. Certainly, we do have here the schematic of the development of the Spirit as well as that of the "phases" (Einteilung) of world history, but we lack the realization and the reality that goes with the ringing affirmation that the only goal of the Spirit is to make freedom real (pp. 55-67). The only "concrete" note given the affirmation that the Spirit produces itself as "its own product" (p. 48) is its identification with "the spirit of a nation" (Volkgeist) (p. 55). It is precisely this spirit of a nation, in its substance and its consciousness, that, in actual history, attains representation. In a general way, with this spirit of a nation, we have crossed the threshold of history and left behind the limited perspective of the individual. Nonetheless, this real advance toward what is concrete does not cross the frontiers of "abstract determination" insofar as, in the development of a national spirit, we are restricted to juxtaposing the multiple national spirits to the unique world spirit (Weltgeist), thereby leaving side by side the polytheism of such spirits and the monotheism of the Spirit. So long "Kas we have not brought to light how such a national spirit is part of the world spirit, we have not overcome the abstractness of the affirmation that "world history belongs to the realm of spirit." How does the decline of the different national spirits, taken one at a time, and the rise of others, attest to the immortality of the world spirit, of the Spirit as such? That the Spirit is engaged successively in this or that historical configuration is just a corollary of the (still abstract) affirmation that the Spirit is one throughout its various particularizations. To attain the meaning of this passage of the Spirit from one people to another is the high point of the philosophical comprehension of history. It is at this critical stage that the question arises of the means freedom gives itself in order to actualize itself in history. It is also at this point that the overly renowned thesis of the "cunning of reason" intervenes. But what is important at this point is to note that the cunning of reason constitutes just one step on the way to the full actualization of Reason in history. What is more, this argument itself includes several steps, all marked with warnings, as if to soften an expected blow (cf. pp. 68-93).
where the very first realization takes place, where an intention gets expressed in a selfish interest, for the "infinite right of the subject is the second essential moment of freedom, in that the subject must itself be satisfied by whatever activity or task it performs" (p. 70). In this way, every moralizing denunciation of the alleged egoism of interests is set aside. And it is on this same level of a theory of action that it may also be affirmed that interest gets its energy from "passion." We recall another well-known saying of Hegel's: "nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion" (p. 73). In other words, moral conviction is nothing without the total and unreserved motivation of an idea mobilized by passion. What is at stake in this saying is precisely what the judging consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* calls evil, that is, the focusing of all my forces on my own satisfaction.

How can the world spirit, born from the spirit of a nation, annex, as its "means" of realization, these convictions incarnated in interests and moved by passions that the moralist identifies as evil? Hegel's meditation calls for three new steps.

First, a decisive step is added to the analysis of passion. In the intention that goes with a passion are concealed two intentions, one that the individual is aware of and one that is unknown to him. On the first side, the individual directs himself toward determined and finite ends, on the other, he unknowingly serves interests that surpass him. Whoever does something, produces unintended effects that make his acts escape his intentions and that develop their own logic. As a rule, "an action may have implications which transcend the intention and consciousness of the agent" (p. 75). By making recourse to this second, hidden intention, Hegel believes he gets closer to his goal, which is to abolish the contingent (p. 28). For original history and reflective history, this "other than intended" would be the last word.

Should We Renounce Hegel?

The "cunning of reason" is precisely what is to take this "other than . . ."up again into the plans of the Weltgeist. How? By a second step forward, we leave the sphere of selfish interests and begin to consider the unintended effects of the individual in the sphere of the interests of a people and of the state. Therefore we must include within the theory of "means" that of the "material" of rational history. The state is the place, the historical configuration where the idea and its satisfaction come together. Outside the state, there is no reconciliation between the Spirit, seeking to actualize freedom, and individuals, passionately seeking their own satisfaction within the horizon of their own interests. Between the in-itself of this will-toward-freedom and the for-itself of passion a gap remains. Hegel does not respond to this contradiction with an easy reconciliation. The contradiction remains pointed as long as the argument remains within the bounds of the antithesis of happiness and unhappiness. Indeed, we must admit that "history is not the soil in which happiness grows" (p. 79).

Paradoxically, the periods of happiness of a people are the blank pages of history. *We must renounce consolation to attain reconciliation.* We may then link this second step to the first one. From the point of view of the individual, the disastrous fate of an Alexander, a Caesar (and maybe also a Napoleon) is the history of a failed project (and this history remains imprisoned within the same subjective circle of action that nevertheless betrays its intention). It is only from the point of view of the higher interests of freedom and its progress in the state that the failure of these individuals may appear as significant.

There remains one last step to dare, one that the preceding example anticipates. Beyond a "soil" (Boden)—that is, the State—where the higher interests of freedom, which are also the interests of the spirit, and the selfish interests of individuals can coincide, the argument also requires extraordinary / agents"cagabje of carrying out/lestmie"lwτ"/termseves-OTT of TTe'ordi-1 nary, where the _unintended_ consequences[[fjiheir_actions add to the progress \ of institutions upholding freedom. These agents of history, in which passion r and the Idea overlap, are the ones Hegel calls "the great men of history" {die 1 grossen Welthistorischen Individuen} (p. 76). They appear on the scene when conflicts and oppositions bear witness to the vitality of the spirit of a nation and when a "productive Idea" (p. 82) seeks to open the way to further development. This productive idea is known to no one. It inhabits great men without their knowing it, and their passion is entirely guided by this idea that is seeking realization. We might say, in another vocabulary, that they incarnate the kairos of an age. Men of passion, they are also men of unhappiness. Their passion gives them life, their fate kills them. This evil and this unhappiness are "the realization of the Spirit." In this way, not only the dissenting tone of the moralists but also the envy of the mean-spirited is overthrown. There is no use in lingering over the saying taken from the *Phenomenology*, which had

In contrast to these two types of ill-tempered individuals, who are often one and the same person, we must dare to affirm that "a mighty figure must trample many an innocent flower underfoot, and destroy much that lies in the path" (p. 89).

It is only now that Hegel speaks of the "cunning of reason" (List der Ver-nunft) (ibid.). He does so therefore in a context that has been made precise through the double stamp of evil and unhappiness—on the condition, first, that a particular interest animated by a great passion unknowingly serves freedom's self-production; on the condition, second, that the particular be destroyed in order that the universal may be saved. The "cunning" here consists simply in the fact that reason "sets the passions to work in its service [fur sick]" (ibid.). Along with their
apparently deceptive appearance from an external perspective, and their apparently suicidal nature internally, they bear the destiny of higher ends. Hence the thesis of the cunning of reason comes to occupy exactly the place that theodicy assigns to evil when it protests that evil is not in vain. However, Hegel believes the philosophy of the Spirit succeeds where theodicy has hitherto failed, because it alone demonstrates how reason makes use of the passions, unfolds their concealed intentionality, incorporates their second intention into the political destiny of states, and finds in the great men of history the elect of this adventure of the Spirit. The ultimate end has finally found its "means," one which is not external to it, inasmuch as it is in satisfying their particular ends that these elect of the Spirit accomplish goals that transcend them, and inasmuch as the sacrifice of particularity, which is the price to be paid, is justified by the office of reason that this sacrifice fills. The critical point is thereby indicated. In a reconciliation without consolation, the particularity that suffers, for a reason unknown to itself, receives no satisfaction. Schiller is left with his sadness: "reason . . . cannot concern itself with particular and finite ends, but only with the absolute" (p. 28).

However the Introduction to Hegel's lectures is not yet complete. There is still something lacking if the concrete reality of the Spirit, its Wirklichkeit to equal its final goal, the Endzweck of history. There follows a long development devoted to the material (das Material) (pp. 93-115) of free Reason. This is nothing other than the state, whose role we anticipated in speaking of the soil in which the whole process of the actualization of freedom takes root. Around this pole gravitate all the powers that give flesh to the spirit of a nation (religion, science, art), which we shall not consider here.

What is more surprising is that the outcome of the course pursued, which goes beyond this section, seems to suggest that the project of realization, of actualization (Verwirklichung) of the Spirit is never finished. To the fourth stage, entitled actualization (pp. 124-124), marked by the establishing of the State founded on rights on the basis of the idea of a constitution, is added

where the "principle of development" must in turn be articulated in terms of a Stufengang, those "successive stages" (p. 129) which themselves call for an investigation directed not so much at the beginning as at the "course" (Verlauf) of this development (p. 138). It is only with this Verlauf that the concept of philosophical world history is complete—or rather, with it, we finally reach the basis of the work that is to follow. All that remains is to put together the philosophical history of the ancient world, "the real theatre of world history" (p. 190), where this "course" has to be organized in terms of an adequate principle of "phases" (die Einteilung der Weltgeschichte) (p. 197), for it is the carrying out of this task that constitutes the required proof.

What becomes of historical time in this process of actualization? As a first approximation, the philosophy of history seems to consecrate the irreducibly temporal character of Reason itself, to the extent that Reason gets equated with its works. It is as a "development" (Entwicklung) that we may characterize this process. But this temporalization of history, to use an expression of Reinhart Koselleck's that I shall return to in the next chapter, does not exhaust itself in the historization of Reason which seems to be the result of this process. It is the very mode of this temporalization that raises a question.

For a narrower approximation, it seems as though the process of temporalization gets sublimated into the idea of a "return upon itself" (Rückkehr in sich selber) (p. 149) of the Spirit and its concept, by means of which its reality is identical to its presence. Philosophy, it must be said, "is concerned with what is present and real [dem Gegenwartigen, Wirklichen]" (p. 151). This equating of reality and presence marks the abolition of narrativity in the thoughtful consideration of history. It is the final meaning of the passage from original and reflective history to philosophical history.

The way in which this equation is obtained merits attention. It is, in fact, a matter of something quite different than any amelioration of the idea of progress, despite the initial assertion of "an impulse of perfectibility" (p. 125), of a Treib der Perfektibilität that sets the principle of development within the space of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The harsh tone with which the conceptual negligence and the triviality of the Aufklärer are denounced leaves little doubt of this. The tragic version of development that is given, along with the effort to make the tragic and the logical correspond, leaves no doubt about Hegel's originality in treating the temporalization of history. The opposition between Spirit and nature is the didactic instrument of this conceptual breakthrough: "Development, therefore, is not just a harmless and peaceful process of growth [Hervorgehen] like that of organic life, but a hard and obstinate struggle with itself" (p. 127). This role for the negative, the work of the negative, will not surprise the reader familiar with the long Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.

What is new is the correspondence between historical

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time and the work of the negative. "The concept of the spirit is such that historical development must take place in the temporal world. But time entails the property of negativity" (ibid.). Better: "this relation to non-existence is a function of time; it is a relation which exists not only for thought, but also for our immediate perception" (ibid.). How? And where? In and through "the successive stages in the development of that principle" (Stufengang der Entwicklung des Prinzips) (p. 129) that, in marking the break between biological time and historical time, indicates the "return" of the transitory to the eternal.
This concept of the Stufengang der Entwicklung des Prinzips is truly the temporal equivalent of the cunning of reason. It is the time of the cunning of reason. What is most noteworthy here is that the Stufengang repeats, at a higher altitude of the great spiral, one major feature of organic life, with which, however, it breaks. This is the feature of the permanence of species that assures the repetition of the same and that makes change a cyclic course. Historical time breaks with organic time in that "in this case, change occurs not just on the surface but within the concept" (p. 128). "In the natural world, the species does not progress, but in the world of the spirit, each change is a form of progress" (ibid.), given the reservation of the change in meaning that henceforth affects the notion of progress. In the transformation from one spiritual configuration to another occurs the transfiguration (Verkldrung) of the preceding one. This explains why "spiritual phenomena occur within the medium of time" (ibid.). And the history of the world, therefore, is in essence "the expression [die Auslegung] of spirit in time, just as nature is the expression of the Idea in space" (ibid.). However, an analogy between Spirit and nature then turns this simple opposition into a dialectic. Spiritual configurations have a perenniality analogous to the permanence of the species. At first sight, this permanence seems to be impervious to the work of the negative. "If non-existence does not encroach upon something, we describe it as permanent" (pp. 127-28).

In fact, this perenniality integrates the work of the negative thanks to the cumulative character of historical change. The "stages" in world history in this sense are the analogue, on the plane of history, of the permanence of the natural species, but their temporal structure differs in that, while nations pass away, their creations "endure" (fortbestehen) (p. 129). This sequence of configurations can, in turn, elevate itself to eternity because the perenniality attained by each step, in spite of—and thanks to—the iniquity of life, is taken up in a higher perenniality that is the present depth of the Spirit. We cannot overemphasize the qualitative aspect of this perenniality in opposition to the quantitative aspect of chronological time (ibid.). The lapidary formulation of the first version of the lectures—"The history of the world accordingly represents [darstellt] the successive stages [Stufengang] in the development of that principle whose substantial content is the consciousness of freedom" (pp. 129-30)—sums up well the differences and the analogies between the course of nature and the course of world history. The Stufengang is not a chronological sequence but a winding up that is at the same time an unfolding, a process of making explicit, and a return upon itself of the spirit. The identity between the becoming explicit (Auslegung) and the return is the eternal present. It is only for a purely quantitative interpretation of the sequence of historical stages that the process appears to be infinite and progress looks as though it will never rejoin its eternally postponed end. For the qualitative interpretation of the perenniality of the stages and their course, the return upon itself does not allow itself to become dissipated into the bad infinity of endless progress.

It is in this spirit that we should read the final paragraph of Hoffmeister's edition of Reason in History: "But what the spirit is now, it has always been. . . . The spirit has all the stages of the past still adhering to it, and the life of the spirit in history consists of a cycle of different states, of which some belong to the present and others have appeared in forms of the past. . . . Those moments which the spirit appears to have outgrown still belong to it in the depths of its present. Just as it has passed through all its moments in history, so also must it pass through them again in the present—in the concept it has formed of itself" (p. 151).

This is why the opposition between the past as no longer being and the future as open is inessential. The difference is between the dead past and the living past, this latter being related to what is essential. If our concern as historians carries us toward a past that is gone and a transitory present, our concern as philosophers turns us toward what is neither past nor future, toward what is, toward what has an eternal existence. Therefore, if Hegel limits himself to the past, like the nonphilosophical historian, and rejects all prediction and prophecy, it is because he abolishes the verbal tenses, just as Parmenides did in his poem and Plato did in his Timaeus, into the philosophical "is." It is true that freedom's realization of itself does require a "development" and cannot ignore the historian's "was" and "is," but only because we are to discern in them the signs of the philosophical "is." It is to this degree, and given this reservation, that philosophical history does bear the features of a form of retroduction. It is true that in the philosophy of history, as in the philosophy of right, philosophy comes on the scene too late. But for the philosopher, what counts about the past are those signs of maturity from which shine a sufficient clarity concerning what is essential. Hegel's wager is that enough meaning has been accumulated for us to decipher in them the ultimate end of the world in its relation to the ends and the material that assure its realization.

Before submitting the Hegelian thesis about historical time to criticism, let us take stock of what is at stake in this discussion as regards our analyses in preceding chapters.' Hegelian philosophy seems at first able to do justice to the significance of the past, i.e., the assumption of historical time into the eternal present abolishes rather than challenges the unsurpassable character of the significance of the trace. This significance, it will be recalled, lay in the fact that the trace signified without making something appear. With Hegel, this restriction is abolished. To persist in the present, for the past, is to remain. And to remain is to have repose in the eternal present of speculative thought.
The same may be said of the problem posed by the pastness of the past. Hegelian philosophy is no doubt fully justified in denouncing the abstraction of the notion of the past as such. But it dissolves rather than resolves the problem of the relation of the historical past to the present. After all, is it not a question, even while conserving as much as possible of the Other, of affirming the final victory of the Same? As a result, any reason for having recourse of the leading kind of the analogous disappears, for it is the very relation of "standing-for" that has lost all its raison d'être, just as did the notion of the trace that is linked to it.

**THE IMPOSSIBLE TOTAL MEDIATION**

We must admit that a critique of Hegel is impossible that would not include the simple expression of our incredulity as regards his major proposition, to wit, that "the only thought which philosophy brings with it is the simple idea of reason— the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process." This is his philosophical credo, for which the cunning of reason is an apologetic doublet, and the *Stufengang* the temporal projection. Yes, intellectual honesty demands the confession that, for us, the loss of credibility the Hegelian philosophy of history has undergone has the significance of an event in thinking, concerning which we may say neither that we brought it about nor that it simply happened, and concerning which we do not know if it is indicative of a catastrophe that still is crippling us or a deliverance whose glory we dare not celebrate. The leaving behind of Hegelian-ism, whether from the point of view of Kierkegaard, or Feuerbach, or Marx, or the German school of history—to say nothing of Nietzsche, whom I shall refer to in the next chapter—appears to us, after the fact, as a kind of beginning, or even an origin. I mean, this exodus is so intimately linked to our way of asking questions that we can no longer warrant it by some form of reason higher than that referred to in Hegel's title: *Reason in History*— no more than we can jump over our own shadow.

For the history of ideas, the incredibly rapid collapse of Hegelianism, as the dominant mode of thought, is a fact that stands out like an earthquake. But that it happened and happened so quickly is clearly not a proof of anything. This is all the more true in that the reasons for this downfall alleged by Hegel's adversaries, those who in fact replaced his philosophy, appear today as a reading of the Hegelian texts. Thus the paradox is that we should become aware of the unique character of this event in, thinking only when we come to denounce the distortions of meaning that facilitated the elimination of Hegel's philosophy.9

A critique worthy of Hegel must measure itself against his central affirmation that philosophy can attain not only the present, by summing up the known past, taken as the seed of the anticipated future, but also the eternal present, which assures the underlying unity of the surpassed past and the coming manifestations of life that already announce themselves by means of what we understand, because what we understand has already grown old.

It is this passage, this step by which the surpassed past is retained in the present of each age, and equated with the eternal present of the Spirit, that seemed impossible to carry out to those successors of Hegel who had already taken their distance with regard to his work. What, in fact, is the Spirit that holds together the spirits of nations and the spirit of the world? Is it the same Spirit as the one that, in the philosophy of religion, both required and refused the narratives and the symbols of figurative thought?10 Once transposed into the field of history, could the Spirit of cunning Reason appear otherwise than as the spirit of a shameful theology, even though Hegel no doubt did try to make philosophy a secularized form of theology? The fact is that the spirit of the century, at least from the end of the first third of the nineteenth century on, everywhere substituted the word "man"—or humanity, or the human spirit, or human culture—for Hegel's Spirit, concerning which we do not really know whether it is man or God.

Perhaps the Hegelian equivocation can only be denounced at the price of another equivocation of equal scale. Must not the human spirit avail itself of all the attributes of the Hegelian Spirit if it is to claim to have drawn the gods from the crucible of its own imagination? Is not theology all the more rampant and all the more shameful in Feuerbach's humanism with its "species being" ([*Gattungswesen*]? These questions attest to why we are not capable of recognizing our reasons for not being Hegelian in the reasons given by those who, carried the day against him.

What, too, are we to say of the transformation that has occurred in historical consciousness itself when it brings about an encounter with the grandeur of humanity, for its own reasons, by way of the humanistic conversion of the Hegelian Spirit? It is a fact that the emancipation of German historiography, stemming from even further afield than Ranke, and which Hegel battled in vain, could only reject all the directive concepts of Hegel's philosophy of history, from the idea of freedom to that of the *Stufengang* of development, as an arbitrary intrusion of the a priori into the field of historical inquiry. Hegel's argument that what is a presupposition for the historian is a truth for the philosopher was no longer understood or even paid any attention. The more his-

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the concepts of the spirit of a nation, of a culture, of an age?"
If these anti-Hegelian arguments no longer speak to us today, what then has that event in thought that is the loss of credibility of the Hegelian philosophical credo become? We must risk posing this issue for ourselves in a second reading of Hegel's text in which all the transitions appear to us to be errors and all the overlappings dissimulations.

Starting from the end and returning toward the beginning, in a backward reading, our suspicion finds an initial handhold in the final equating of the Stufengang der Entwicklung and the eternal present. The step we can no longer take is this one that equates with the eternal present the capacity of the actual present to retain the known past and anticipate the future indicated in the tendencies of this past. The very notion of history is abolished by philosophy as soon as the present, equated with what is real, abolishes its difference from the past. The self-understanding that goes with historical awareness is born precisely from the unescapable fact of this difference.

What stands out, for us, is the mutual overlapping of the three terms, Spirit in itself, development, and difference, that, taken together, make up the concept of the Stufengang der Entwicklung.

However, if this equating of development and present no longer holds, all the other equations also fall apart in a chain reaction. How can we bring together—totalize—all the national spirits in a single world spirit? In fact, the more we think in terms of a **Volksgeist** the less we think of a **Weltgeist**. This is a gap that Romanticism continued to widen, drawing from the Hegelian concept of a **Volksgeist** a powerful plea for differences.

And how could the suture hold against the analyses devoted to the "material" of the realization of the Spirit, especially the State, whose absence on a worldwide level motivated the passage from the philosophy of right to the philosophy of history? Indeed, contemporary history, far from filling this lack in the philosophy of right, has accentuated it. In the twentieth century, we have seen Europe's claim to totalize the history of the world come undone. We have even seen the heritages it tried to integrate in terms of one guiding idea come undone. Eurocentrism died with the political suicide of Europe in the First World War, with the ideological rending produced by the October Revolution, and with the withdrawal of Europe from the world scene, along with the fact of decolonization and the unequal—and probably antagonistic—development that opposes the industrialized nations to the rest of the world. It now seems to us as though Hegel, seizing a favorable moment, a *kairos*, which has been revealed for what it was to our perspective and our experience, only totalized a few leading aspects of the spiritual history of Europe and of its geographical and historical environment, ones that, since that time, have come undone. What has come undone is the very substance of what Hegel sought to make into a concept. Difference has turned against development, conceived of as a **Stufengang**. The victim of this chain reaction is the conceptual conglomeration Hegel gave the title "realization of the Spirit."

Here too, what was made has become undone. On the one hand, the interest of individuals no longer seems to us to be satisfied, if this satisfaction does not take into account the conscious intentions of their action, but only retains a second intention that goes unknown to them. Before so many victims and so much suffering that we have seen, the dissociation Hegel introduces between consolation and reconciliation has become intolerable. On the other hand, the passion of the great men of history no longer seems capable to us of carrying, by itself, the whole weight of meaning, like Atlas. As the emphasis on political history wanes, it is the great anonymous forces of history that hold our attention, fascinate us, and make us uneasy, more than do the disastrous fates of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, and the involuntary sacrifice of their passions on the altar of history. So at the same time, all the components that come together in the concept of the cunning of reason—particular interests, the passions of great historical men, the higher interests of the state, the spirit of a nation, and the world spirit—come apart and appear to us today like the *membra disjecta* of an impossible totalization. Even the expression "cunning of reason" no longer intrigues us. Instead we find it repugnant, almost like a magician's trick that does not work.

Moving even further backward in Hegel's text, what seems to us highly problematic is the very project of composing a philosophical history of the world that would be defined in terms of the "realization of the Spirit in history." However much we may misunderstand the term "Spirit"—in itself, as the spirit of a nation, or as the world spirit; however much we may fail to recognize the self-realizing intention already contained in the "abstract determination" of reason in history; however unjust most of our criticisms may be, what we have abandoned is Hegel's very work site. We no longer seek the basis upon which the history of the world may be thought of as a completed whole, even if this realization is taken as inchoative or only present as a seed. We are no longer even sure whether the idea of freedom is or should be the focal point of this realization, especially if we put the accent on the political realization of freedom. Even if we do take it as our guideline, we are not certain that its historical incarnations form a **Stufenfolge** rather than just a branching development where difference constantly wins out over identity. Perhaps among all the aspirations of people for freedom there is just a family resemblance such as the one with which Wittgenstein wanted to credit the least discredited philosophical concepts. In fact, it is the very project of totalization that indicates the break between Hegel's philosophy of history and every...
Koselleck has introduced between the two categories of "space of experience" and "horizon of expectation." To combat this forgetfulness I propose to adopt as a guideline for the following analyses the polarity Reinhart toward the future and our interpretations oriented toward the past.

Attempts to circumscribe the reality of the past suffered from, the abstraction of the past as past. This abstraction of the historical consciousness can be so affected by events that, to repeat, we cannot say whether we produced them or they simply happened, is to admit the finitude of the philosophical act that makes up the self-understanding of the historical consciousness. This finitude in interpretation signifies that all thought about thought has presuppositions that it can never master, which in their turn become the situations beginning from which we think, without our being able to think them through in themselves. Consequently, in quitting Hegelianism, we have to dare to say that the thoughtful consideration of history attempted by Hegel was itself a hermeneutical phenomenon, even an interpretive one, submitted to the same condition of finitude.

Yet to characterize Hegelianism as a event of thought arising from the finite condition of the self-understanding of the historical consciousness does not constitute an argument against Hegel. It simply testifies to the fact that we no longer think in the same way Hegel did, but after Hegel. For what readers of Hegel, once they have been seduced by the power of Hegel's thought as I have, do not feel the abandoning of this philosophy as a wound, a wound that, unlike those that affect the absolute Spirit, will not be healed? For such readers, if they are not to give into the weaknesses of nostalgia, we must wish the courage of the work of mourning.

Towards a Hermeneutics of Historical Consciousness

Having left Hegel behind, can we still claim to think about history and the time of history? The answer would be negative if the idea of a "total mediation" were to exhaust the field of thought. But another way remains, that of an open-ended, incomplete, imperfect mediation, namely, the network of interweaving perspectives of the expectation of the future, the reception of the past, and the experience of the present, with no Aufhebung into a totality where reason in history and its reality would coincide.

The following pages are devoted to the exploration of this way. They begin from one particular strategic decision. Having renounced attacking head-on the question of the vanishing reality of the past as it really was, we have to reverse the order of problems and begin from the project of history, from history as what has to be made, in order to rediscover in it the dialectic of the past and the future and their exchanges in the present. As regards the reality of the past, no one can, I think, really go beyond, by way of any direct approach, the preceding interplay of broken-off perspectives arising from the reactualization of the Same, the recognition of Otherness, the reception of the past, pushed to the point of being-affected by the past. And this idea takes on meaning and strength Only if it is opposed to the idea of "making" history. Even the idea of tradition—which already includes a genuine tension between the perspective of the past and that of the present, and thereby increases temporal distance at the same time that it crosses it—does not give rise to thought, either by itself or as coming first, in spite of its undeniable mediating virtues, unless it is by way of the intentionality of a history to be made that refers back to it. In the end, the idea of the historical present, which, for a first approximation at least, seems to be dethroned from the inaugurating function it had for Augustine and Husserl, will receive a new luster from its terminal position in the

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Interplay of interweaving perspectives. Nothing says that the present reduces to presence. Why, in the transition from future to past, should the present not be the time of initiative—that is, the time when the weight of history that has already been made is deposited, suspended, and interrupted, and when the dream of history yet to be made is transposed into a responsible decision?

Therefore it is within the dimension of acting (and suffering, which is its corollary) that thought about history will bring together its perspectives, within the horizon of the idea of an imperfect mediation.

The Future and Its Past

The immediate benefit of this reversal of strategy is that it gets rid of the most tenacious abstraction that our attempts to circumscribe the reality of the past suffered from, the abstraction of the past as past. This abstraction is a result of forgetting the complex interplay of significations that takes place between our expectations directed toward the future and our interpretations oriented toward the past.

To combat this forgetfulness I propose to adopt as a guideline for the following analyses the polarity Reinhart Koselleck has introduced between the two categories of "space of experience" and "horizon of expectation."
The choice of these terms seems to me a judicious and particularly illuminating one, especially as regards a hermeneutics of historical time. But why speak of a space of experience rather than of the persistence of the past in the present, even if these notions are related? For one thing, the German word *Erfahrung* has a noteworthy scope. Whether it be a question of private experience or of experience transmitted by prior generations or current institutions, it is always a question of something foreign being overcome, of some acquisition that has become a *habitus*. For another thing, the term "space" evokes the idea of different possible traversals following a multitude of itineraries, and above all the idea of a stratified structure assembled like a pile of sheets of paper, an idea that gets away from the idea of the past so assembled as a simple chronology.

As for the expression "horizon of expectation," it could not have been better chosen. For one thing, the term "expectation" is broad enough to include hope and fear, what is wished for and what is chosen, rational calculations, curiosity—in short, every private or public manifestation aimed at the future. As with experience in relation to the present, expectation relative to the future is inscribed in the present. It is the future-become-present (*ver-gegenwärfige Zukunft*), turned toward the not-yet. If, for another thing, we speak here of a horizon rather than of space, this is to indicate the power of unfolding as much as of surpassing that is attached to expectation. In this way, the lack of symmetry between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation is underscored. This opposition between gathering together and unfolding implies that experience tends toward integration, expectation tends toward the breaking open of perspectives: "Gehegte Erwartungen sind über-holbar, gemachte Erfahrungen werden gesammelt," "cultivated expectations can be revised; experiences one has had are collected" (Futures Past, p. 273). In this sense, expectation cannot be derived from experience. "Put another way, the previously existing space of experience is not sufficient for the determination of the horizon of expectation" (p. 275). Conversely, there is no surprise for which the baggage of experience is too light, it could not be otherwise. Hence the space of experience and the horizon of expectation do more than stand in a polar opposition, they mutually condition each other: "This is the temporal structure of experience and without retroactive expectation it cannot be accumulated" (ibid.).

Before thematizing each of these expressions in turn, it is important first to recall, under Koselleck's guidance, some of the major changes that affected the vocabulary of history during the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany. New meanings, often attributed to old words, will later serve to identify the in-depth historical experience indicated by a new relation between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation.

The word Geschichte stands at the center of the conceptual network then in movement. For example, in German, we see the term Historie give way to the term Geschichte, with the double connotation of a sequence of events taking place and the relating of events done or undergone; in other words, in the twofold sense of actual history and told history. Geschichte signifies precisely the relationship between the series of events and the series of narratives. In history as narrative, history as event comes to know itself, in Droysen's formula. Yet for this convergence in meaning to be realized, it was necessary that both senses come together in the unity of a whole. It is a single course of events, in its universal interconnections, that is spoken of in a history that is itself elevated to the rank of a collective singular. Beyond histories, says Droysen, there is history. The word history could henceforth be used without a genitive complement. "Histories of . . ." became history *tut court*. On the level of narrative, this history presents the epic unity that corresponds to the one "epic" that human beings write. For the sum of individual histories to become "history," however, it was necessary that history itself should become *Weltgeschichte*, hence that it become a system instead of an aggregation. In return, the epic unity of narrative could bring to language an assembling of the events themselves, an interconnection between them, which conferred their own epic upon them. What the historians contemporary with philosophical Romanticism discovered was more than an internal form of coherence, it was a force—a *Macht*—that propelled history according to a more or less secret plan, all the while that it left human beings responsible for its emergence.

Freedom, justice, progress, revolution. In this sense, "revolution" served as the revealer of an earlier process which at the same time it accelerated.

There is little doubt that it was the idea of progress that served as the tie between these two connotations of history. If actual history follows an intelligible course, then the narrative we make of it may claim to equate itself with this meaning, which is the meaning of history itself. This is why the emergence of the concept of history as a collective singular is one of the conditions for the constitution of the notion of universal history, which we have already considered in the preceding chapter. I shall not take up again the problematic of totalization or of a total mediation that was grafted to the knowledge of history as a unique whole. Instead I shall turn toward two features of this collective singular that give rise to a significant variation in the relation of the future to the past. Three themes stand out among Koselleck's careful semantic analyses. First, the belief that the present age has a new perspective on the future that is without precedent. Second, the belief that changes for the better are accelerating. Third, the belief that human beings are more and more capable of making their own history. A new time, an acceleration of progress, and the availability of history—these three themes contributed to the unfolding of a new horizon of expectation that by a kind of recoil effect transformed the space of experience within which
of the future. Only a change in the relationship between the horizon of expectation and the space of experience can account for this semantic change. Outside of this relation the present is indecipherable. Its sense of newness stems from how it reflects the light of the expected future. The present is only new, in the strong sense of the word, insofar as we believe that it "opens" new times. 3. New times, and therefore also accelerated times. This theme of acceleration appears to be strongly connected to the idea of progress. Because progress is accelerating, we recognize the amelioration of the human condition. Correlatively, our space of experience noticeably contracts, burdened as it is by the acquisitions of tradition, and the authority of these acquisitions withers. It is by way of contrast with this presumed acceleration that reactions, delays, and survivals of the past can be denounced. These are all expressions that still have a place in contemporary language and they give a dramatic accent to the belief in the acceleration of time inasmuch as it is still threatened by the semipeternal rebirth of the hydra of reaction, something that gives the expected future state of paradise the aspect of a "futureless future" (p. 18), equivalent to the Hegelian bad infinity. It is undoubtedly this conjunction between the sense of the newness of modern times and the acceleration of progress that has allowed the word "revolution"—previously reserved for the circulation of the stars, as we see in the title of Copernicus's famous work of 1543, De Revolutionibus oribum caelestium—to signify something other than the disorderly reversals that afflict human affairs, whether this refers to those occasional exemplary turns of fortune or the dreary alternation of reversals and restorations. We now call revolutions those uprisings that we can no longer catalogue as civil wars, but which testify, through the way they suddenly break out, to the general revolution that the civilized world has entered into. This is what has to be accelerated and whose course has to be regulated. In other words, the word "revolution" now bears witness to the opening of a new horizon of expectation.3

3. That history is something to be made, and that it can be made, constitutes the third component of what Koselleck calls the "temporalization of history." It is already apparent in the theme of acceleration and in its corollary, revolution. We recall Kant's remark in the "Conflict of the Faculties" about the prophet who proclaims himself such and who brings about the events he predicted. In this sense, if a new future is opened by our new times, we can bend it to our plans, we can make history. And if progress can be accelerated, it is because we can speed up its course and struggle against what delays it, reaction and harmful survivals. The idea that history is submitted to human action is the newest and—as I shall say below—the most fragile of the three ideas that indicate the new way of perceiving the horizon of expectation. From being an imperative, the ability of history has become a optative, even a future indicative. This shift in meaning has been facilitated by the insistence of thinkers related to Kant, as well as by Kant himself, on discerning the "signs" that, already, authenticate the appeal of the task before us and encourage our efforts in the present. This way of justifying a duty by demonstrating the beginning of its execution is wholly characteristic of the rhetoric of progress, for which the expression "to make history" is the high point. Humanity becomes its own subject in talking about itself. Narrative and what is narrated can again coincide, and the two expressions "making history" and "doing history" overlap. Making and narrating have become the two sides of one process.

We have been interpreting the dialectic between horizon of expectation and space of experience by following the guideline of three topoi—new times, the acceleration of history, and the mastery of history—that broadly characterize the philosophy of the Enlightenment. But it seems difficult to separate the discussion about the constituents of historical thinking from a properly historical consideration about the rise and fall of particular topoi. So the question arises of how much the main categories of a horizon of expectation and a space of
experience are dependent upon these topoi, put forth by Enlightenment thinkers, that have served to illustrate them. We cannot avoid this difficulty. Let us speak, first, of their decline at the end of our twentieth century. The idea of a new time appears suspect to us in many ways. First of all, it seems to us to be linked to the illusion of an origin. But, the discords between the temporal rhythms of the various components of the overall social phenomenon make it difficult to characterize a whole epoch as both a break and an origin. Galileo, for Husserl in the *Krisis*, was such an origin, one beyond comparison with the French Revolution, because Husserl was considering only a battle between giants, that between transcendentalism and objectivism. Even more seriously, ever since the reinterpretation of the Enlightenment by Adorno and Horkheimer, we may doubt whether this epoch was always the dawn of progress it has been so celebrated for being. The beginning of the rule of instrumental reason, the power given to rationalizing hegemonies in the name of universalism, the repression of differences in the name of these Promethean claims are all stigmata, visible to all, of those times so conducive to liberation in many ways. As for the acceleration in the march of progress, we hardly believe in it any longer, even if we do rightly speak of an acceleration in historical mutations. What we really doubt, however, is that the time separating us from better days is diminishing. Too many recent disasters and disorders speak against this. Koselleck himself emphasizes that the modern age is not only characterized by a contracting of the space of experience, which makes the past seem ever more distant in that it seems ever more passed, but also by an increasing gap between our space of experience and our horizon of expectation. Do we not see our dream of a reconciled humanity withdrawing into an ever more distant future and one ever more uncertain of realization? The task that, for our predecessors, prescribed the journey by pointing the way has turned into a Utopia or, better, a uchronia, where our horizon of expectation withdraws from us faster than we can advance toward it. And when our expectation can no longer fix itself on a determined future, outlined in terms of distinct, discernible steps, our present finds itself torn between two fleeing horizons, that of the surpassed past and that of an ultimate end that gives rise to no penultimate term. So torn within itself, our present sees itself in "crisis," and this is, as I shall say below, perhaps one of the major meanings of our present.

Of the three topoi of modernity, it is undoubtedly the third one that seems the most vulnerable to us and, in many ways, also the most dangerous. First, because as I have already said a number of times, the theory of history and the theory of action never coincide, due to the perverse effects issuing from our best conceived projects, the ones most worthy of our efforts. What happens is always something other than what we expected. Even our expectations change in largely unforeseeable ways. For example, it is no longer certain that freedom, in the sense of the establishment of a civil society and a state of law, is the only hope or the major expectation of a great part of humanity. Above all, the vulnerability of the theme of mastering history is revealed even on the level where it is called for, the level of humanity taken as the sole agent of its own history. In conferring on humanity the power to produce itself, the authors of this claim forget one constraint that affects the destiny of great historical bodies as much as it affects individuals—in addition to the unintended results that action brings about, such action only takes place in circumstances that it has not produced. Marx, who was in fact one of the heralds of this topos, knew this when he wrote in his work on the eighteenth Brumaire of Louis-Napoleon that "men make their own history, but not as they please. They do not choose for themselves, but have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the material handed down by the past." The theme of mastering history thus rests on a basic misunderstanding of the other side of thinking about history, which we shall consider below, namely, the fact that we are affected by history and that we affect ourselves by the history we make. It is precisely this tie between "historical action and a received past, which we did not make, that preserves the dialectical relation between our horizon of expectation and our space of experience. It remains true that these criticisms have to do with our three topoi, and that the categories of a horizon of expectation and a space of experience are more basic than the topos in which they were instanciated by the philosophy of the Enlightenment, even if we must acknowledge that it is this philosophy that allows us to become aware of them because we live in the moment when their difference from it has itself become a major historical event.

Three arguments seem to me to speak in favor of a certain universality for these categories. Envisaged topoi, whether it be a question of the ones the Enlightenment dethroned (the last judgment, *historia magistri vitae*), or the ones it set up. Koselleck is perfectly justified in taking them as metahistorical categories, applicable at the level of a philosophical anthropology. In this sense, they govern all the ways in which human beings in every age have thought about their existence in terms of history—whether it be made history or spoken history or written history. A second reason for taking these categories of the horizon of expectation and the space of experience as genuine transcendentals in the service of thought about history lies in the variability of instantiations they authorize at different times. Their metahistorical status implies that they serve as indicators regarding the variations affecting
the temporalization of history. In this respect, the relationship between horizon of expectation and space of
time is itself a varying one. And it is because these categories are transcendental that they make possible
a conceptual history of the variations in their content. In this respect, the difference between them is not
noticeable unless they change. If, therefore, the thought of the Enlightenment has such a privileged place in our
discussion, it is because the variation in the relationship between the horizon of expectation and the space of
experience it brought about was so apparent that it could serve as revelatory of the categories in terms of which
we can think about this variation...There is an important corollary to this, by characterizing the topoi of
modernity as a variation in the relationship between the horizon of expectation and the space of experience,
conceptual history contributes to the relativizing of these topoi. We are now able to situate them in terms of the same
kind of thinking that we apply to the political eschatology that reigned until the seventeenth century, whether in
terms of its political vision governed by the relationship between virtu and Fortune, or in terms of the topoi of
the lessons of history. In this serise, formulating the concepts of a horizon of expectation and a space of
experience gives us the means to understand the dissolution of the topoi of progress as one plausible variation of
the relationship between these concepts.

To finish, and this will be my third argument, I want to say that the universal ambition of these metahistorical
categories is assured only by the permanent ethical and political implications of these categories of thought. In
saying this, we do not slip from the problematic of the transcendentental categories of historical thought to that of
politics. With Karl-Otto Apel and Jiirgen Habermas, I affirm the underlying unity of these two thematic issues.
For one thing, modernity itself may be taken, despite the decline of its particular expressions, for an "incomplete
project." For another thing, this very project requires a legitimating argumentation that stems from the kind of
truth claimed by practice in general and politics in particular. The unity of these two prob-
historical thought can be affirmed. Their description is always inseparable from a prescription. If, therefore, we
admit that there is no"history that is not constituted through the experiences and the expectations of active and
suffering human beings, or that our two categories"taken together thematize historical time, we then imply that
the tension between the horizon of expectation and the space of experience has to be preserved if there is to be
any history at all.

The transformations in their relations that Koselleck describes confirm this. If it is true that the belief in a new
time contributed to narrowing our space of experience, even to rejecting the past as forgotten shadows—the ob-
scurantism of the Middle Ages!—while our horizon of expectation tended to withdraw into an ever more distant
and indistinct future, we may ask whether this tension between expectation and experience did not begin to be
threatened from the very day when it was first recognized. This paradox is easily explained. If the newness of the
Neuzeit was only perceived thanks to the growing difference between experience and expectations—in other
words, if the belief in new times rests on expectations that distance themselves from all prior experience—then
the tension between experience and expectation could only be recognized at the moment when its breaking point
was already in sight. The idea of progress which still bound the past to a better future, one brought closer by the
acceleration of history, tends to give way to the idea of Utopia as soon as the hopes of humanity lose their
anchorage in acquired experience and are projected into an unprecedented future. With such Utopias, the tension
becomes a schism.18

The permanent ethical and political implication of these metahistorical categories of expectation and experience
is thus clear. The task is to prevent the tension between these two poles of thinking about history from becoming
a schism. This is not the place to spell out this task in more detail, so I will confine myself to two imperatives.
On the one hand, we must resist the seduction of purely Utopian expectations. They can only make us despair of
all action, for, lacking an anchorage in experience, they are incapable of formulating a practical path directed to
the ideals that they situate "elsewhere." Our expectations must be determined, hence finite and relatively
modest, if they are to be able to give rise to responsible commitments. We have to keep our horizon of
expectation from running away from us. We have to connect it to the present by means of a series of
intermediary projects that we may act upon. This first imperative leads us back, in fact, from Hegel to Kant, in
that post-Hegelian Kantian style I favor. Like Kant, I hold that every expectation must be a hope for humanity as
a whole, that humanity is not one species except insofar as it has one history, and, reciprocally, that for there to
be such a history, humanity as a whole must be its subject as a collective singular. Of course, it is not certain that
we can

without the simultaneous realization of a rule of law where individuals and collectivities other than the state remain the ultimate subjects of these rights. In this sense, the task defined above, the one that according to Kant "men's unsocial sociability" requires us to resolve, has not been surpassed today. For it has not been attained, even when it has not been lost sight of, gone astray, or been cynically scoffed at.

On the other hand, we must also resist any narrowing of the space of experience. To do this, we must struggle against the tendency to consider the past only from the angle of what is done, unchangeable, and past. We have to reopen the past, to revivify its unaccomplished, cut-off—even slaughtered—possibilities; In short, when confronted with the adage that the future is open and contingent in every respect but that the past is unequivocally closed and necessary, we have to make our expectations more determinate and our experience less so. For these are two faces of one and the same task, for only determinate expectations can have the retroactive effect on the past of revealing it as a living tradition. It is in this way that our critical meditation on the future calls for the complement of a similar meditation on the past.

**BEING-AFFECTED BY THE PAST**

It is the very proposal of "making history" that calls for the step backward from the future toward the past. Humanity, we have said with Marx, only makes its history in circumstances it has not made. The notion of circumstances thus becomes an indicator of an inverted relation to history. We are only the agents of history inasmuch as we also suffer it. The victims of history and the innumerable masses who, still today, undergo history more than they make it are the witnesses par excellence to this major structure of our historical condition. And those who are—or who believe themselves to be—the most active agents of history suffer it no less than do its—or their—victims, even if this only be in terms of the unintended effects of their most calculated enterprises. However, I do not want to deal with this theme in a way that deplores or execrates it. The sobriety that goes with thinking about history requires that we extract from the experience of submitting and suffering, in its most emo-

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tion-laden aspects, the most primitive structure of being-affected by the past, and that we reattach this to what I have called, following Reinhart Koselleck, the space of experience correlative to our horizon of expectation. In order to derive this being-affected from the past from the notion of a space of experience, I shall take as my guide the theme introduced by Gadamer, in his *Truth and Method*, of the consciousness of being exposed to the efficacy of history, of our *Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. This concept has the advantage of forcing us to apprehend our "being-affected by . . ." as the correlative of the action (Wirkten) of history upon us or, as one commentator has aptly translated it, as the "work of history." We must be careful not to allow this theme, with its great heuristic power, to collapse into an apology for tradition, as is the tendency of the regrettable polemic that opposed Habermas's critique of ideology to Gadamer's so-called hermeneutic of traditions. I shall refer to this debate only in closing.

The first way to attest to the fruitfulness of the theme of being-affected-by-history is to test it through a discussion we began above but interrupted at the moment when it turned from epistemology to ontology. What is ultimately at stake in this discussion is the apparent antinomy between discontinuity and continuity in history. We can speak of an antinomy here inasmuch as, on the one hand, it is the very reception of the historical past by present consciousness that seems to require the continuity of a common memory, and because, on the other hand, the documentary revolution brought about by the new history seems to make breaks, ruptures, crises, and the irruption of changes in thinking—in short, discontinuity—prevail. It is in Michel Foucault's *The Archaeology of Knowledge* that this antinomy receives its most rigorous formulation, while at the same time it is resolved in terms of the second alternative. On the one side, the asserted privilege of discontinuity is associated with a new discipline, the archeology of knowledge, which does not coincide with the history of ideas, in the sense that historians usually understand this. On the other side, the contested privilege of continuity is associated with the ambition of a constituting consciousness and the mastery of meaning.

Confronted with this apparent antinomy, I need to add that I have no strictly epistemological objection to raise against the first part of the argument. It is just the second part that I have to dissociate myself from entirely, in the name precisely of our theme of being-affected by history. The thesis that the archeology of knowledge does justice to the epistemological breaks that the classical history of ideas overlooks is legitimated by the very practice of this new discipline. In the first place, it starts from a stance whose originality becomes evident if we oppose it to the model of the history of ideas I borrowed from Maurice Mandelbaum at the end of the first volume of *Time and Narrative*. There the history of ideas found a place among the special histories, artificially set off by historians against the background of
authoritatively defined by historians, who decide, following their own conceptions, what is to be taken as art, science, etc.

Unlike Mandelbaum's special histories, which are abstracted from general history, Foucault's archeology of knowledge has no allegiance whatsoever to the history of actual first-order entities. This is the initial stance assumed by the archeology of knowledge. Next, this methodological choice is confirmed and legitimated by the nature of the discursive fields considered. The forms of knowledge at issue for this archeology are not "ideas" measured by their influence on the course of general history and the first-order entities that figure in it. The archeology of knowledge prefers to deal with anonymous structures within which individual works are inscribed. It is at the level of these structures that the events in thinking that mark the shift from one episteme to another are located. Whether it be a matter of the clinic, of madness, of taxonomies in natural history, economics, grammar, or linguistics, it is the forms of discourse closest to anonymity that best express the synchronic consistency of the dominant epistemes and their diachronic ruptures. This is why the leading categories of the archeology of knowledge—"discursive formations," "modes of assertion," "the historical a priori," "archives"—do not have to be brought to a level of utterance that brings into play individual speakers responsible for what they say. It is also, and particularly, why the notion of an "archive" can appear, more than any other, as diametrically opposed to that of traditionally. Now no serious epistemological objection prevents treating discontinuity as "both an instrument and an object of research," thereby effecting the passage from "the obstacle to the work itself" (p. 9).

A hermeneutics more attentive to the reception of ideas will limit itself here to recalling that the archeology of knowledge cannot completely break away from the general context wherein temporal continuity finds its legitimacy, and therefore must be articulated in terms of a history of ideas in the sense of Mandelbaum's special histories. Similarly, epistemological breaks do not prevent societies from existing in a continuous manner in other registers—whether institutional or not—than those of knowledge. This is even what allows different epistemological breaks not to coincide in every case. One branch of knowledge may continue, while another undergoes the effects of a break. In this respect, a legitimate transition between the archeology of knowledge and the history of ideas is provided by the category of a "transformation rule," which seems to me the one most favorable to continuity of all those categories brought into play by Foucault's archeology.

The notion of a transformation rule draws upon some discursive apparatus characterized not just by its structural coherence but also by unexploited potentialities that a new event in thinking will bring to light, at the price of a reorganization of the whole apparatus. Understood in this way, the passage from one episteme to another comes close to the dialectic of innovation and sedimentation by which we have more than once characterized traditional-ity—discontinuity corresponding to the moment of innovation, continuity to that of sedimentation. Apart from this dialectic, the concept of transformation, wholly thought of in terms of breaks, risks leading us back to the Eleatic conception of time which, according to Zeno, comes down to making time something composed of indivisible minima. ** And we must say that the Archeology of Knowledge runs this risk with its methodological stance.

As for the other branch of the antinomy, nothing obliges us to tie the fate of the point of view emphasizing the continuity of memory to the pretensions of a constituting consciousness. In any case, this argument holds only for thought about the Same, which we examined above. It seems to me perfectly admissible to refer to a "continuous chronology of reason," that is, "the general model of a consciousness that acquires, progresses, and remembers" (p. 8), without thereby eluding the decentering of the thinking subject brought about by Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. Nothing requires that history should become "a safer, less exposed shelter" (p. 14) for consciousness, an ideological expedient destined to "restore to man everything that has unceasingly eluded him for over a hundred years" (ibid.). On the contrary, the notion of a historical memory prey to the work of history seems to me to require the same decentering as the one Foucault refers to. What is more, "the theme of a living, continuous, open history" (ibid.) seems to me to be the only one capable of joining together vigorous political action and the "memory" of snuffed out or repressed possibilities from the past. In short, if it is a question of legitimating the assumption of a continuity to history, the notion of consciousness as exposed to the efficacy of history, which I shall now directly address, offers a viable alternative to that of the sovereign consciousness, transparent to itself and the master of meaning.

To make explicit the notion of receptivity to the efficacy of history is fundamentally to clarify the notion of tradition that is too rapidly identified with it. Instead of speaking indiscriminately of tradition, we need to distinguish several different problems that I will set under three headings: traditionality, traditions, tradition. Only the third of these lends itself to the polemic that Habermas undertook against Gadamer in the name of the critique of ideology. The term "traditionality" is already familiar to us. It designates a style of interconnecting historical succession, or, to speak as Koselleck does, a feature of the "temporalization of history." It is a transcendental for thinking about history just as are the notions of a horizon of expectation and a space of experience. Just as horizon of expectation and space of experience form a contrasting pair, traditionality stems from a subordinate dialectic, internal to the space of experience itself. This second dialectic proceeds from the tension, at the very heart of
what we call experience, between the efficacy of the past that we undergo and the reception of the past that we bring about. The term "trans-mission" (which translates the German Uberlieferung) is a good way of expressing this dialectic internal to experience. The temporal style that it designates is that of time traversed (an expression we also encountered in Proust). If there is one theme in Truth and Method that corresponds to this primordial signification of transmitted tradition, it is that of temporal distance (Abstand). This is not just a separating interval, but a process of mediation, staked out, as I shall say below, by the chain of interpretations and reinterpretations. From the formal point of view we are still occupying, the notion of a traversed distance is opposed both to the notion of the past taken as simply passed and gone, abolished, and the notion of complete contemporaneity, which was the ideal of Romantic philosophy. Uncrossable distance or annulled distance, this seems to be the dilemma. But traditionality designates the dialectic between remoteness and distanciation, and makes time, in Gadamer's words, "the supportive ground of the process [Geschehen] in which the present is rooted" (p. 264).

To think through this dialectical relation, phenomenology offers the help of two well-known and complementary notions, that of a situation and that of a horizon. We find ourselves in a situation, and from this point of view every perspective opens on a vast, but limited, horizon. However, if the situation limits us, the horizon presents itself as something to be surpassed, without ever being fully reached. To speak of a moving horizon is to conceive of a unique horizon constituted, for each historical consciousness, by the alien worlds not related to our own, into which we put ourselves by turns. This idea of a unique horizon does not lead us back to Hegel. It is only intended to set aside Nietzsche's idea of a hiatus between changing horizons that must itself continually be replaced. Between the absolute knowledge that would abolish every horizon and the idea of a multitude of incommensurable horizons we have to put the idea of a "fusion of horizons," which occurs every time we test our prejudgments in setting out to conquer some historical horizon, imposing upon ourselves -the task of overcoming our tendency to assimilate the past too quickly to our own expected meanings. This notion of a fusion of horizons leads to the theme that finally what is at stake in the hermeneutics of historical consciousness is the tension between the horizon of the past and that of the present. In this way, the problem of the relation between past and present is set in a new light. The past is revealed to us through the projection of a historical horizon that is both detached from the horizon of the present and taken up into and fused with it. This idea of a horizon towards a Hermeneutics or Historical-Consciousness

temporal horizon as something that is both projected and separate, distinguished and included, brings about the dialectizing of the idea of traditionality. At the same time, the concept of a fusion of horizons corrects what remains unilateral in the idea of being-affected by the past. It is in projecting a historical horizon that we experience, through its tension with the horizon of the present, the efficacy of the past, for which our being-affected by it is the correlate. Effective-history, we might say, is what takes place without us. The fusion of horizons is what we attempt to bring about. Here the work of history and the work of the historian mutually assist each other.

In this first respect, tradition, formally conceived of as traditionality, already constitutes a broadly significant phenomenon. It signifies that the temporal distance separating us from the past is not a dead interval but a transmission that is generative of meaning. Before being an inert deposit, tradition is an operation that can only make sense dialectically through the exchange between the interpreted past and the interpreting present. In saying this, we already cross the threshold leading to the second sense of the term "tradition," that is, from the formal concept of traditionality to the material concept of the contents of a tradition. From here on, by "tradition" we shall mean "traditions." The passage from one connotation to the other is contained in the recourse we made to the notions of meaning and interpretation that appeared at the end of our analysis of traditionality. To give a positive evaluation to traditions is not yet, however, to make tradition a hermeneutical criterion of truth. To give the notions of meaning and interpretation their full scope, we must provisionally place between parentheses the question of truth. The notion of tradition, taken in the sense of traditions, signifies that we are never in a position of being absolute innovators, but rather are always first of all in the situation of being heirs. This condition essentially stems from the language-like [langagiere] structure of communication in general and of the transmission of past contents in particular. For language is the great institution, the institution of institutions, that has preceded each and every one of us. And by language we must here understand not just the system of langue in each natural language, but the things already said, understood, and received. Through tradition, therefore, we understand the things already said, insofar as they are transmitted along the chains of interpretation and reinterpretation.

This recourse to the language-like structure of tradition-transmission is not extrinsic in any way to the thesis of Time and Narrative. In the first place, we have known since the beginning of our inquiry that the symbolic function itself is not foreign to the domain of acting and suffering. This is why the initial mimetic relation borne by narrative could be defined by its reference to the primordial aspect of action as being symbolically mediated. Next, the second mimetic relation of narrative to action, identified with the structuring operation of emplotment, taught us to treat imitated action as a text. Without
be said to coincide in large part with that of texts from the past. Finally, the partial equivalence between a
hermeneutic of texts and a hermeneutic of the historical past finds reinforcement in the fact that historiography,
as a knowledge by traces, largely depends on texts that give the past a documentary status. It is in this way that
the understanding of texts inherited from the past can be set up, with all the necessary reservations, as a kind of
exemplary experience as regards every relation to the past. The literary aspect of our heritage is, Eugen Fink
would have put it, equivalent to cutting out a "window," one that opens on the vast landscape of what is past per
se."

This partial identification between consciousness exposed to the efficacy of history and the reception of past
texts transmitted to us allowed Gadamer to move from the Heideggerian theme of understanding historicality,
which we considered in the first section of this volume, to the opposite problem of the historicality of
understanding itself.\(^{38}\) In this respect, the reading he gives of this theory shows the reception that replies to and
coincides with being-affected-by-the-past in its language-like and textual dimension.

The dialectical character of our second concept of tradition—still internal to the space of experience—cannot be
ignored. It redoubles the formal dialectic of temporal distance stemming from the tension between remoteness
and distanciation. As soon as, by traditions, we mean the things said in the past and transmitted to us by a chain
of interpretations and reinterpretations, we have to add a material dialectic of the contents to the formal dialectic
of temporal distance. The past questions us and calls us into question before we question it or call it into
question. In this struggle for a recognition of meaning, text and reader are in turn made familiar and unfamiliar.
So this second dialectic has to do with the logic of question and answer, taken up by both Collingwood and
Gadamer in succession.\(^ {39}\) The past questions us to the extent that we question it. It answers us to the extent we
answer it. This dialectic finds its material handhold in the theory of reading elaborated above.

We come at last to the third sense of the term "tradition," which we deliberately put off examining until this
point. This is the sense that has provided an opportunity for the confrontation between the so-called hermeneutic
of traditions and the critique of ideologies. This confrontation results from a shift from the consideration of
traditions to an apology for tradition.

Two preliminary remarks are called for before we take up this confrontation.

Let us first note that the slide from the question of traditions to the question of tradition per se is not entirely out
of place. There is, in fact, a problematic worthy of being placed under the heading "tradition." This is the case
because the question of meaning, posed by every transmitted content, cannot be separated from that of truth
except in abstraction. Every proposal of a meaning is at the same time a claim to truth. What we receive from the
past are, in effect,

oeines, persuasions, convictions; mai is, ways u noising lor uae, 10 use the insight of the German word \textit{Fir-wahr-halten},
which signifies belief. In my opinion, it is this tie between the language-like realm of traditions and the truth
claim bound to the order of meaning that confers a certain plausibility on the threefold plea for prejudice,
authority, and, finally, tradition through which Gadamer introduces us to his major problematic of consciousness
exposed to the efficacy of history—in a quite openly polemic spirit.\(^ {40}\) Indeed, it is in relation to the claim of
traditions to truth, a claim included in the holding-for-true of every proposal of meaning, that these three
controversial notions are to be understood. In Gadamer's vocabulary, this truth claim, insofar as it does not
proceed from us, but rather rejoins us as a voice coming from the past, gets enunciated as the self-presentation of
the "things themselves."\(^ {41}\) The prejudged is thus a structure of the preunderstanding outside of which the "thing
itself" cannot make itself heard. It is in this sense that his rehabilitation of prejudice takes on the Enlightenment's
prejudice against prejudice. As for authority, it signifies in the first place the augmentation—\textit{auctoritas} comes
from \textit{augere}—the increase that the claim to truth adds to mere meaning, in the context of "holding for true." On
the side of reception, its \textit{Gegeniiber} is not blind obedience but the recognition of superiority. Tradition, in the
end, receives a status close to that which Hegel assigned to customs—\textit{Sittlichkeit}. We are carried along by it
before we are in a position of judging it, or of condemning it. It "preserves" (bewahri) the possibility of our
hearing the extinguished voices of the past.\(^ {42}\)

My second preliminary remark is that the major participant in the argument is not critical thinking, in the sense
inherited from Kant, by way of Horkheimer and Adorno, but what Gadamer calls "methodologism." With this
title, he is aiming not so much at the concept of "methodic" research as at the pretensions of a judging
consciousness, set up as the tribunal of history and itself unencumbered with any prejudices. This judging
consciousness is, at bottom, akin to the constituting consciousness, the master of meaning, denounced by
Foucault, from which we dissociated ourselves earlier. This critique of methodologism has no other ambition
than to recall to judging consciousness the fact that tradition binds us to things already said and to their truth
claim before we submit them to research. Taking a distance, or freedom as regards transmitted contents, cannot
be our initial attitude. Through tradition, we find ourselves already situated in an order of meaning and therefore
also of possible truth. Gadamer's critique of methodologism is meant to emphasize the fundamentally antisubjectivist accent of his notion of effective history. Research, then, is the obligatory partner of tradition inasmuch as the latter presents truth claims. "At the beginning of all historical hermeneutics," writes Gadamer, "the abstract antithesis between tradition and historical research, between history and knowledge, must be discarded" (p. 251). With the idea of research, a critical moment is affirmed, one that comes second, it is true, but is unavoidable; this is what I call the relationship of distanciation, and from here on it will designate the opening for the critique of ideologies. It is essentially the vicissitudes of tradition, or, to put it a better way, rival traditions to which we belong in a pluralistic society and culture—their internal crises, their interruptions, their dramatic reinterpretations, their schisms that introduce, into our tradition, as one instance of truth, a "polarity of familiarity and strangeness on which hermeneutic work is based" (Truth and Method, p. 262).** After all, how could hermeneutics carry out its task if it did not make use of historiographical objectivity as a means for sifting through dead traditions or what we take as deviations from those traditions in which we no longer recognize ourselves? It is in fact this passage through objec-tification that distinguishes post-Heideggerian hermeneutics from Romanticist hermeneutics where understanding was conceived of "as the reproduction of an original production" (Truth and Method, p. 263). It cannot be, of course, a question of understanding better. "It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all" (p. 264). As soon as hermeneutics distances itself from its Romantic origins, it is obliged to include within itself what was good in the attitude it reproves. To do so, it has to distinguish the honest methodology of the professional historian from the alienating (Verfremutung) distanciation that turns criticism into a more basic philosophical gesture than is the humble acknowledgment of "the supportive ground of the process [Geschehen] in which the present is rooted." Hermeneutics can indeed reject the ideology of methodology as a philosophical position that is unaware of itself as philosophical, but it has to integrate "method" into itself. What is more, it is hermeneutics that, on the epistemological level, demands "a sharpening of the methodological self-consciousness of science" (p. 265). For how can interpreters allow themselves to be called by the things themselves if they do not make use of, if only negatively, the filtering action of temporal distance? We must not forget that it is the fact of understanding that gave birth to hermeneutics. The properly critical question of "distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false ones by which we misunderstand" (p. 266) thus becomes an internal question of hermeneutics itself. Gadamer himself willingly grants this. "Hence the hermeneutically trained mind will also include historical [historisch] consciousness" (ibid.). Having made these two remarks, we can at last turn to the debate between the critique of ideologies and the hermeneutic of tradition, with the single purpose in mind of better circumscribing the notion of effective history, along with its correlate, our being-affected-by this effectiveness.45 There is something to argue about to the extent that passing from "traditions" to "tradition" is, essentially, to introduce a question of legitimacy. The notion of authority, linked in this context with that of tradition, cannot fail to set itself up as a legitimating instance. It is what transforms the Gadamerian prejudice in favor of prejudice into a position of being based on right. However, what legitimacy can stem from what seems to be only an empirical condition, namely, the unavoidable finitude of all understanding? How can a necessity—miissen—convert itself into a right—sollen! The hermeneutic of tradition, it seems, cannot escape this question, which is posed by the very notion of "prejudice." As the term indicates, prejudice places itself within the orbit "of judgment. Hence it makes its plea before the tribunal of reason. And, before this tribunal, it has no other resource than to submit to the law of the better argument. It cannot, therefore, set itself up as an authority without behaving like someone accused who refuses to accept the judge without becoming its own tribunal. Does this mean that the hermeneutic of tradition has no answer here? I do not think so. Let us inquire what kind of arms are available to reason in this competition that opposes it to the authority of tradition. They are, first of all, the weapons of a critique of ideologies. These begin by setting language, which hermeneutics seems to enclose itself within, into a much broader constellation, which also includes labor and domination. Under the gaze of the materialist critique that follows from doing this, the practice of language is revealed to be the place of those systematic distortions that resist the corrective action that a generalized philology (which is what hermeneutics seems to be in the last analysis) applies to the simple misunderstandings inherent in the use of language, once separated arbitrarily from the conditions for its social use. In this way, a presumption of ideology applies to every claim to truth. However, such a critique, under the threat of undermining itself by self-reference to its own statements, has to limit itself. It does so by relating the set of all possible utterances to distinct interests. An interest in instrumental control characterizes the empirical sciences and their technological prolongations, so here we have to do with the domain of labor. The hermeneutical sciences correspond to an interest in communication, so here we have the tradition of language. Finally, we find an interest in emancipation with the critical social sciences, among which...
the critique of ideologies is, along with psychoanalysis and based upon its model, the most accomplished expression. Hermeneutics must therefore renounce its universalist claim if it is to preserve a regional legitimacy. On the other hand, the coupling of the critique of ideologies to an interest in emancipation raises a new claim to universality. Emancipation holds for everyone and always. But what is it that legitimates this new claim? This question is unavoidable. If we take seriously the idea of systematic distortions of language, connected with the dissimulated effects of domination, the question arises: before what nonideological tribunal might such perverted communication appear? This tribunal has to consist in the self-

sense of the term, would be the representation of an unfettered and unlimited communication, hence of a speech situation characterized by a consensus arising out of the very process of argumentation. Can we conceive of the conditions that determine such a speech situation? The critique based on reason has to be able to escape a still more radical critique of reason itself. Indeed, critique is itself carried along by a historical tradition, that of the Enlightenment, some of the illusions of which we referred to in passing above. The violence characteristic of the Enlightenment, resulting from the instrumental conversion of modern reason, has been unmasked by the acerbic criticism of Horkheimer and Adorno. An excess of sur-passings—and of surpassings of surpassings—is thus unleashed. Having lost itself in a "negative dialectic," which knows perfectly well how to recognize evil, as in Horkheimer and Adorno, the critique of critique projects the "principle of hope" into a Utopia with no historical handhold, as in Ernst Bloch. All that remains, then, is the solution consisting of grounding the transcendental of the ideal speech situation in a new version, drawn from Kant and Fichte, of Selbstreflexion, the seat of every right and all validity. But, in order not to return to a principle of radically monological truth, as in the Kantian transcendental deduction, it is necessary to posit the original identity of the reflective principle together with an eminently dialogical one, as with Fichte. Otherwise, Selbstreflexion will not be able to ground the Utopia of an unfettered and unlimited communication. This can be the case if the principle of truth is articulated on the basis of thinking about history, such as we have presented it in this chapter, which brings into relation a determined horizon of expectation and a specified space of experience. It is along the path that leads back from the question of a ground to that of effective history that the hermeneutic of tradition makes itself more understandable. To escape the continual withdrawal of perfect ahistorical truth, we must attempt to discern the signs of truth in the anticipations of understanding at work in every successful communication where we have the experience of a type of reciprocity of intention and recognition of this intention. In other words, the transcendence of the idea of truth, inasmuch as it is immediately a dialogical idea, has to be seen as already at work in the practice of communication. When so reinstalled in the horizon of expectation, this dialogical idea cannot fail to rejoin those anticipations buried in tradition per se. Taken as such, the pure transcendental quite legitimately assumes the negative status of a limit-idea as regards many of our determined expectations as well as our hypostatized traditions. However, at the risk of remaining alien to effedrve-history, this limit-idea has to become a regulative one, orienting the concrete dialectic between our horizon of expectation and our space of experience.

The by turns negative and positive positing of this idea therefore affects our. horizon of expectation as much as it does our space of experience. Or rather,

experience. This is the hermeneutical moment of criticism. So we may trace out the path followed by the notion of tradition as follows. 1. Traditionality designates a formal style of interconnectedness that assures the continuity of the reception of the past. In this respect, it designates the reciprocity between effective-history and our being-affected-by-the-past. 2. Traditions consist of transmitted contents insofar as they are bearers of meaning; they set every received heritage within the order of the symbolic and, virtually, within a language-like and textual tradition; in this regard, traditions are proposals of meaning. 3. Tradition, as an instance of legitimacy, designates the claim to truth (the taking-for-true) offered argumentation within the public space of discussion. In the face of criticism that devours itself, the truth claim of the contents of traditions merits being taken as a presumption of truth, so long as a stronger reason, that is, a better argument, has not been established. By a "presumption of truth," I mean that credit, that confident reception by which we respond, in an initial move preceding all criticism, to any proposition of meaning, any claim to truth, because we are never at the beginning of the process of truth and because we belong, before any critical gesture, to a domain of presumed truth. With this notion of a presumption of truth, a bridge is thrown over the abyss that, at the beginning of this argument, separated the unavoidable finitude of all understanding and the absolute validity of the idea of communicative truth. If a transition is possible between necessity and right, it is the notion of a presumption of truth that assures it. In it, the inevitable and the valuable asymptotically rejoin each other. Two groups of conclusions may be drawn from this meditation on the condition of being-affected-by-the-past. First, we must recall that this condition forms a pair with the intending of a horizon of expectation. In this regard, a hermeneutic of effective-history only illumines the dialectic internal to the space of experience, abstraction being made of the exchanges between the two great modes of thinking about history. The restoration of this enveloping dialectic has its consequences for the meaning of our relation to the past. For one thing, the
repercussion of our expectations relative to the future on the reinterpretation of the past may have as one of its
major effects opening up forgotten possibilities, aborted potentialities, repressed endeavors in the supposedly
closed past. (One of the functions of history in this respect is to lead us back to those moments of the past where
the future was not yet decided, where the past was itself a space of experience open to a horizon of expectation.)
For another thing, the potential of meaning thereby freed from the solid mass of traditions may contribute to
determining the regulative but empty idea of an unhindered and unlimited communication, in the sense of a
history yet to be made. It is through this interplay of expecta-
tion and memory that the Utopia of a reconciled humanity can come to be invested in effective-history.
Next we have to reaffirm the preeminence of the notion of effective history and its correlate, our being-affected-
by-the-past, over the constellation of significations gravitating around the term "tradition." I will not go over
again here the importance of the distinctions introduced between traditionality, understood as a formal style for
the transmission of received heritages, traditions, as contents endowed with meaning, and tradition, as a
legitimation of the claim to truth raised by every heritage that bears a meaning. Instead I would like to show in
what way this preeminence of the theme of the efficacy of the past over that of tradition allows the former to
enter into relation with various notions relative to the past that were examined in preceding chapters of this
volume.
If we move back step-by-step through the series of previous analyses, it is first of all the problematic of the
Gegeniiber from chapter 6 that takes on a new coloration. The dialectic of the Same, the Other, and the
Analogous receives a new hermeneutical significance from being submitted to thought about the efficacy of the
past. Taken in isolation, this dialectic runs the risk at each of its stages of turning into a dream of power
exercised by the knowing subject. Whether it be a question of reenacting past thoughts, of difference in relation
to the invariants posited by historical inquiry, or of the metaphoriza-tion of the historical field prior to any
empolit, in each case we perceive in the background the effort of a constituting consciousness to master the
relation of the known past to the actual past. It is precisely this search for mastery, even when it is made
dialectical in the manner we have spoken of, that the past as it was constantly escapes. The hermeneutical
approach, on the contrary, begins by acknowledging this exteriority of the past in relation to every attempt
centered upon a constituting consciousness, whether it be admitted, concealed, or simply not recognized as such.
The hermeneutical approach shifts the problematic from the sphere of knowledge into that of being-affected-by,
that is, into the sphere of what we have not made.
In return, the idea of a debt in regard to the past, which seemed to me to govern the dialectic of the Same, the
Other, and the Analogous, adds a considerable enrichment to the idea of a tradition. The idea of a "heritage,
which is one of the more appropriate expressions for the efficacy of the past, can be interpreted as the fusion of
the ideas of a debt and a tradition. Without the dialectic of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous, which
develops the seed of dialectization contained in the idea of a mediating transmission, the heart of the idea of
tradition, this fusion does not come about. This seed grows when we submit the idea of tradition itself to the
triple filter of reenact-ment, differentiation, and metaphorization. The various dialectics of the near and the far,
the familiar and the alien, of temporal distance and the fusion of the horizons of the past and the present without
confusing them bear witness
Towards u Hermeneutics of Historical Consciousness

To_ this/Finally, this inclusion of the dialectic of the Same, the Other, and the Analogous in the hermeneutics of
history is what preserves the notion of tradition from succumbing again to the charms of Romanticism.
When we move back one more step in our analyses, the idea of tradition has to be brought together with that of a
trace, where our fourth chapter ended. Between a trace left behind and followed, and transmitted and received
tradition, theYe is a deep-lying affinity. As left behind, through the materiality of the mark, the trace designates
the exteriority of the past, that is, its inscription in the time of the universe. Tradition puts the accent on another
kind of exteriority, that of our being-affected-by a past that we did not make. However, there is also a correlation
between the significance of the followed trace and the efficacy of transmitted tradition. These are two
comparable mediations between the past and us.
By means of this connection between trace and tradition, all the analyses of chapter 4 can be taken up by what
we are calling thought about history. As we move back again from our analyses of the trace toward those that
preceded it, it is first the function of the document in the constitution of a large-scale memory that is clarified.
The trace, we said, is left behind, the document collected and preserved. In this sense, it links together trace and
tradition. Through the document, the trace is already part of a tradition. Correlatively, the criticism of documents
is inseparable from the critique of traditions. But as such, this criticism is just one variant in the style of
traditionality.
At another remove, tradition has to be brought together with the succession of generations. It underscores the
hyper-biological aspect of the network of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors, namely, that this
network belongs to the symbolic order. Reciprocally, the succession of generations provides the chain of
interpretations and reinterpretations with a basis in life, as well as in the continuity of the living.
Finally, insofar as the trace, the document, and the succession of generations express the reinsertion of lived time in the time of the world, calendar time, too, comes into the range of the phenomenon of tradition. This articulation is visible on the level of the axis that defines the zero moment for computing time and that confers its bidimensionality on the system of dates. For one thing, this axial moment allows the inscription of our traditions in the time of the universe, and thanks to this inscription, effective-history, marked out by the calendar, is grasped as encompassing our own lives and the series of its vicissitudes. In return, if a founding event is to be judged worthy of constituting the axis of calendar time, we must be linked to it by way of a tradition that is a transmission. Hence it stems from the efficacity of a past that surpasses all individual memory. Calendar time thus provides our traditions with the framework of an institution based on astronomy, while the efficacity of the past provides calendar time with the continuity of a temporal distance that is traversed.

Is there a place for a distinct meditation on the historical present in an analysis that has taken as its guide the opposition between a space of experience and a horizon of expectation? I think so. If traditionality constitutes the past dimension of the space of experience, it is in the present that this space comes together, it is there that this space can, as suggested above, expand or contract. I would like to place the following philosophical meditation under the aegis of the concept of "initiative." I shall outline its contours by tracing out two concentric circles. The first circumscribes the phenomenon of initiative without regard to its insertion in thinking about history, which is the issue for us. The second makes more precise the relationship of initiative to a we-relationship that brings initiative to the level of the historical present.

To tie the fate of the present to that of initiative is to subtract the present from the prestige of presence, in the quasi-optical sense of the term. Perhaps it is because looking back toward the past tends to make retrospection prevail—therefore a view or vision, rather than our being affected by our consideration of the past—that we tend also to think of the present in terms of vision, of spectio. Thus Augustine defined the present by attentio, which he also calls contuitus. Heidegger, on the other hand, rightly characterizes circumspection as an inauthentic form of Care, as a kind of fascination for looking at the things we are preoccupied with. "Making-present" thus turns into a kind of Medusa's gaze. To restore to making-present an authenticity equal to that of anticipatory resoluteness, I propose to connect the two ideas of making-present and initiative. The present is then no longer a category of seeing but one of acting and suffering. One verb expresses this better than all the substantive forms, including that of presence: "to begin." To begin is to give a new course to things, starting from an initiative that announces a continuation and hence opens something ongoing. To begin is to begin to continue—a work has to follow. But under what conditions does initiative give rise to thought about itself? The most radical position in this respect is that by which Merleau-Ponty characterized the insertion of the acting subject in the world, namely, the experience of the "I can," the root of the "I am." This experience has the major advantage of designating the lived body as the most original mediator between the course of lived experience and the order of the world. For the mediation of the lived body precedes all the connectors on the historical level that we have considered in the first chapter of the preceding section, and to which, below, we shall link the historical present. The lived body—or better, the flesh—has to do with what Descartes, in the Sixth meditation, called the "third spb-stance," bridging the break between space and thought. In a more appropriate vocabulary, that of Merleau-Ponty himself, we should say that the flesh defies the dichotomy of the physical and the psychical, of cosmic exteriority and the "I can" can be thought. The flesh, in this sense, is the coherent ensemble of my powers and nonpowers. Around this system of carnal possibilities the world unfolds itself as a set of rebellious or docile potential utensils, a set of permissions and obstacles. The notion of circumstances, referred to above, is articulated in terms in my nonpowers, insofar as it designates what "circumscribes"—what limits and situates—my power to act.

This description of the "I can," coming from a phenomenology of existence, provides an appropriate framework for taking up again those analyses that have been done regarding the field of the theory of action, which we have referred to regarding the initial mimetic relation of narrative to the practical sphere. Recall that, following Arthur Danto, I distinguished between basic actions, which we know how to do on the basis of mere familiarity with our powers, and derived actions, which require that we do something so that we bring about some event, which is not the result of our basic actions but the consequence of a strategy of action including calculations and practical syllogisms. This adding of strategic actions to basic actions is of the greatest importance for a theory of initiative. Indeed, it extends our being-able-to-do-something well beyond the immediate sphere of the "I can." In return, it places the distant consequences of our action within the sphere of human action, removing them from the status of being mere objects of observation. So, as agents, we produce something, which, properly speaking, we do not see. This assertion is of the greatest importance for the quarrel about determinism, and it allows us to reformulate the Kantian antinomy of the free act, considered as the beginning of a causal chain. Indeed, it is not from the same attitude that we observe something that happens or that we make something happen. We cannot be observers and agents at the same time. One result is that we can only think about closed systems, partial determinisms, without being able to move on to extrapolations extending to the whole universe, except at the
price of excluding ourselves as agents capable of producing events. In other words, if the world is the totality of what is the case, doing cannot be included in this totality. Better, doing means [fait] that reality is not totalizable.

A third determination of initiative will bring us closer to our meditation on the historical present. It brings us from the theory of action to that of systems. It is anticipated in an implicit way in the preceding determination. Models of states of systems and of the transformation of systems, including tree-like structures, with branches and alternatives, have been constructed. Thus, in volume 1, with von Wright, we defined interference—a notion equivalent to that of initiative within the framework of systems theory—by the capacity agents have of conjoining the being-able-to-do-something of which they have an immediate comprehension—Danto's basic actions—with the internal relations that condition a system. Interference is what assures the closure of the system, by setting it into motion starting from an initial state determined by the symbolic dimension. Therefore it is legitimate to take into consideration linguistic mediations that make articulation possible, as, on the one hand, speech acts or acts of discourse bring language into the dimension of action (it is significant that Austin entitled his work How to Do Things with Words). And, on the other hand, human acting is intimately articulated by signs, norms, rules, and evaluations that situate it in the region of meaning, or, if you will, within the symbolic dimension. Therefore it is legitimate to take into consideration linguistic mediations that make initiative into a meaningful action.

In a broad sense, every speech act (or every act of discourse) commits the speaker and does so in the present. I cannot assert something without introducing a tacit clause of sincerity into my saying it, in virtue of which I effectively signify what I am saying, any more than I can do so without holding as true what I affirm. It is in this way that every speech initiative—Benveniste would say, every instance of discourse—makes me responsible for what is said in my saying it. However, if every speech act implicitly commits its speaker, some types do so explicitly. This is the case with "commissives," for which the promise is the model. The strong sense of speech that binds me. This constraint that I impose upon myself is noteworthy in that the obligation posited in the present engages the future. One remarkable feature of initiative is thereby underlined, which is well expressed by the adverbial phrase "from now on" (in French, by the adverb desormais). Indeed, to make my initiative have a continuation, to make this initiative truly inaugurate a new course of things; in short, to make the present not just be an incident but the beginning of a continuation.

These are the phases traversed by a general analysis of initiative. Through "the I can," initiative indicates my power; through the "I do," it becomes my act; through interference or intervention, it inscribes my act in the course of things, thereby making the lived present coincide with the particular instant; through the kept promise, it gives the present the force of persevering, in short, of enduring. By this last trait, initiative is clothed with an ethical signification that announces the more specifically political and cosmopolitan characterization of the historical present.

The wider contour of the idea of initiative having been traced out, it remains to indicate the place of initiative between the horizon of expectation and the space of experience, thanks to which initiative can be equated with...
the historical present.

To make this equivalence appear, we must show how consideration of the historical present brings to its ultimate stage the reply of thought about history to the aporias of speculation about time, nourished by phenomenology. This speculation, it will be recalled, deepened the abyss between the notion of an instant without thickness, reduced to just the mere break between two temporal extensions, and the notion of a present, thick with the imminence of the near future and the record of a just passed past. The point-like instant imposed the paradox of the nonexistence of the "now," reduced to the break between a past that is no longer and a future that is not yet. The lived-through present, on the other hand, presents itself as the incidence of a "now" solidary with the imminence of the near future and the record of the just-passed past. The first connection brought about by thought about history was, we also recall, the time of the calendar. Our meditation on the historical present finds an initial handhold in the constituting of calendar time insofar as it rests, among other things, on the choice of an axial moment in terms of which events can be dated. Our own lives as well as those of the communities to which we belong are part of those events that calendar time allows us to situate at a variable distance in relation to this axial moment. This moment can be taken as the

II!

time and phenomenological time. The historical present thus participates in the mixed character of calendar time that joins the point-like instant to the lived-through present. It builds upon this foundation of calendar time. What is more, as linked to a founding event, held to open a new era, the axial moment constitutes the model of every beginning, if not of time, at least in time; that is, of every event capable of inaugurating a new course of events.55 The historical present is also based, as are the past and the historical future with which it is in solidarity, on the phenomenon, both biological and symbolic, of the succession of generations. Here the basis of the historical present is provided by the notion of the realm of contemporaries, which we have learned, following Alfred Schutz, to intercalate between that of predecessors and that of successors. Mere physical simultaneity, with all the difficulties that its purely scientific determination gives rise to, is thus carried on by the notion of contemporaneity, which immediately confers on the historical present the dimension of a we-relation, in virtue of which several flows of consciousness are coordinated in terms of "growing old together," to use Schutz's magnificent expression. The notion of a realm of contemporaries—wherein Mitsein is directly implied—thus constitutes the second foundation of the historical present. The historical present is therefore immediately apprehended as a common space of experience.56

We have still to give this historical present all the features of an initiative that will allow it to bring about the mediation we are seeking between the reception of a past transmitted by tradition and the projection of a horizon of expectation.

What was said about promises can serve as an introduction to the development that will follow. The promise, we said, formally engages the promiser because it puts the speaker under the obligation of doing something. An ethical dimension is thereby conferred on our consideration of the present. A comparable feature of the notion of the historical present is born from the transposition of our analysis of promises on the ethical plane to the political one. This transposition takes place through consideration of the public space into which the promise is inscribed, where the transposition from one plane to another is facilitated by consideration of the dialogical character of promises, which we did not emphasize above. Indeed, there is nothing solipsistic about promises. I do not confine myself to binding just myself in making a promise. I always promise something to someone. If this someone is not the beneficiary of my promise, at least he or she is its witness. Even before the act by which I commit myself, therefore, there is a pact that binds me to other people. The rule of fidelity in virtue of which one ought to keep one's promises thus precedes any individual promise made in the ethical order. In turn, the act of one

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which discussion is preferred over violence and the claim to truth inherent in all taking-for-true submits to the rule of the better argument. The epistemology of true discourse is thus subordinated to a political—or better, cos-mological—rule about truthful discourse. So there is a circular relation between the personal responsibility of the speakers who commit themselves through promises, the dialogical dimension of the pact of fidelity in virtue of which one ought to keep one's promises, and the cosmo-political dimension of the public space engendered by the tacit or virtual social contract.

The responsibility thereby unfolded in a public space differs radically from Heideggerian resoluteness in the face of death, which we know at some point is not transferable from one Dasein to another.

It is not the task of this work to outline even the lineaments of an ethical and political philosophy in light of which individual initiative could be inserted into a project of reasonable collective action. We can, however, at least situate the present of this indivisibly historical and political action at the point of articulation between the horizon of expectation and the space of experience. We then rediscover the assertion made earlier where, with Reinhart Koselleck, we said that our age is characterized both by the withdrawal of the horizon of expectation and a narrowing of the space of experience. If submitted to passively, this rending makes the present a time of crisis, in the double sense of a time of judgment and a time of decision." In this idea of crisis is expressed the
distention of our historical condition homologous with the Augustinian *distentio animi*. The present is wholly a crisis when expectation takes refuge in Utopia and when tradition becomes only a dead deposit of the past. Faced with this threat of the historical present exploding, we have the task anticipated above: to prevent the tension between the two poles of thinking about history from turning into a schism. Therefore, on the one hand, to bring purely Utopian expectations into connection with the present by strategic action concerned to take the first steps in the direction of the desirable and the reasonable; on the other hand, to resist the narrowing of our space of experience by liberating the unused potentialities of the past. Initiative, on the historical plane, consists in nothing other than the incessant transaction between these two tasks. However if this transaction is not to express just a reactive will, but instead to confront this crisis, it has to express the "force of the present." One philosopher has had the strength to think-through this "force of the present"—Nietzsche, in the second of his "untimely" meditations, entitled "On the Advantage and the Disadvantage of History for Life." What Nietzsche dared to conceive of was the interruption the lived-through present brings about in regard to, if not the influence of the past, at least its influence over us—even by means of historiography insofar as it carries out and calls for the abstraction of the past as the past for itself.

Why is such a reflection untimely? For two related reasons. First, because it breaks immediately with the problem of knowledge (*Wissen*) in favor of that of life (*Leben*), and thereby puts the question of truth beneath that of utility (*Nutz*) and the inconvenient (*Nachteil*). What is untimely is the unmoi-vated leap into a criteriology, which we know from the remainder of this book stems from Nietzsche's genealogical method, whose legitimacy is only guaranteed by the life it itself engenders. Equally untimely is the mutation the word "history”—Nietzsche writes *Historie—*undergoes. It no longer designates either of the two terms we have attempted to reconnect after having severed them from each other, neither the res gestae nor narrative, but rather "historical culture" or "historical meaning." In Nietzsche's philosophy, these two untimely phenomena are inseparable. A genetic evaluation of anything is at the same time an evaluation of culture. This shift in meaning has as its major effect that it substitutes for every epistemological consideration on the conditions of history, in the sense of historiography, and even more so for every speculative attempt to write world history, the question of what it means to live historically. To struggle with this question is for Nietzsche the gigantic struggle with modernity that runs through all his work. Modern historical culture has transformed our ability to remember, which distinguishes us from other animals, into a burden, the burden of the past, which makes our existence (*Dasein*) into "a never to be completed imperfect tense" (p. 9). Here is where we find the most untimely point of his pamphlet. To escape from this perverse relationship to the past, we must become capable again of forgetting "or, to express it in a more learned fashion, [we must have] the capacity to live unhistorically" (ibid.; his emphasis). Forgetting is a force, a force inherent in the "plastic power of a man, a people or a culture. ... I mean the power distinctively to grow out of itself, transforming and assimilating everything past and alien, to heal wounds, replace what is lost and reshape broken forms out of itself" (p. 10). Forgetting is the work of this force, and inasmuch as it is itself willed, it delimits the "closed and whole" horizon within which alone a living being may remain healthy, strong, and fruitful. The displacement from the question of history (as historiography or world history) to that of the historical is thus brought about in Nietzsche's text by the opposition between the historical and the unhistorical, the fruit of the untimely irruption of forgetfulness within the philosophy of culture. "The unhistorical and the historical are equally necessary for the health of an individual, a people and a culture" (p. 10). This "proposition" (*Satz*) is itself untimely insofar as it turns the unhistorical state (*Zustand*) into an instance of judgment concerning the abuse, the excess, constitutive of the historical culture of modern people. Then the man of life judges the man of knowledge, for
form an idea of man. Grandeur is only revealed in the monumental. Such history builds the famous man a
mausoleum, which is nothing other than "the belief in the affinity and continuity of the great of all ages, it is a
protest against the change of generations and transitoriness" (p. 16). Nowhere else does Nietzsche come so close
to seconding Gadamer's plea in favor of the "classical." From its commerce with the classical, the monumental
consideration of history draws the conviction that "the great which once existed was at least possible once and
may well again be possible sometime" (ibid.). "And yet..."! (Und doch). The secret vice of monumental history
is that it misleads through the force of analogy, by the very fact that it equalizes differences and disperses
disparities, leaving only the "effect in itself" (p. 17), which is never imitable, ones such as are celebrated by our
great holidays. In this effacing of singularity, "the past itself suffers damage [so leidet die Vergangenheit selbst
Schaden]" (ibid.). And if this is so for the greatest of the men of action and power, what is there to say of the
mediocre who hide behind the authority of the monumental in order to thereby disguise their hatred for all
grandeur?

If monumental history may assist the strong in mastering the past in order to create grandeur, antiquarian history
helps ordinary people to persist in what a well-established tradition rooted in familiar soil offers as habitual and
worthy of reverence. Preserve and revere—this motto is instinctively understood by a household, a generation, a
city. It justifies an enduring neigh-

which is always seeking novelty. For this kind of history, to have roots is not some arbitrary accident, but to
grow out of the soil of the past, to become the heir of its flowering and its fruits. But danger is not far off. If
everything that is old and past is equally venerable, history is again injured not only by the shortsightedness of
reverence but by the mummification of a past no longer animated by the present nor inspired by it. Life does not
want to preserve itself but simply to go on.

This is why there is need of a third kind of history to serve life, critical history. Its tribunal is not that of critical
reason but the strong life. For this type of history, "every past... is worth condemning" (p. 22). For to live is to be
unjust and, even more so, unmerciful. If there is a time for forgetting, it is surely the one that condemns the
aberrations, the passions, the errors, and the crimes of which we are the descendants. This cruelty is the time of
forget-fullness, not through negligence but through deliberate misunderstanding. This is the time of a present that
is as active as is the time of promise-making.

It is clear that the reader of these awesome pages by Nietzsche has to know that all these sayings must be set
within the framework of Nietzsche's great metaphorical stance that joins philology and physiology within a
genealogy of morals, in what is also a theory of culture.

This, in fact, is why the remainder of this essay breaks away from the taxo-nomic appearances of this typology to
take up a more accusatory tone—against the science of history! Against the cult of inferiority, stemming from the
distinction between "inside" and "outside" (p. 24), in short, against modernity! This invective is not off-
target. Look at us, library rats turned into walking encyclopedias; individuals, void of any creative instinct,
reduced to wearing masks, born with gray hairs. Historians, charged to guard history, have become eunuchs and
history a harem which they oversee (p. 31). It is no longer the eternal feminine that draws us upward—as in the
closing verses of Goethe's Faust—but the eternal objective, celebrated by our historical education and culture.

Let us set aside this tone of invective, retaining from it only the important opposition it establishes between
objectivity and the virtue of justice, which is rarer even than "generosity" (Grossmut) (p. 34). Unlike the icy
demon of objectivity, justice—which a few pages before had been called injustice!—dares to take up the scales,
to judge and condemn, to set itself up as the Last Judgment. In this sense, truth itself is nothing without "that
striving . . . which has its root injustice" (p. 33). For mere justice, without the "power of judgment" (ibid.), has
inflicted the most horrible sufferings on human beings. Only "superior power can judge . . . weakness must
tolerate" (p. 34). Even

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quasi-plot, quasi-character, and quasi-event elaborated at the end of Part II, bear witness, on the side of
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Conclusions

The conclusions I propose to draw at the end of our long journey will not be limited to summing up the results
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narrated time, i.e., of a plot-tale that reactualizes the end of history. In doing this, has Nietzsche accomplished anything more than the castiga-tion of the arrogance of nineteenth-century Europe? If this were all, his pamphlet would not remain "untimely" for us as well. If it does remain so, it is because it contains within itself an enduring significance that a hermeneutic of historical time has the task of
reactualizing in ever new contexts. For my own inquiry concerning the interconnections among the three ectsastes
of time, brought about poetically by historical thought, this enduring significance concerns the status of the
present in regard to history. On the one hand, the historical present is, in each era, the final term of a completed
history, which itself completes and ends history. On the other hand, the present is, again in

every era, or at least it may become, the inaugural force of a history that is yet to be made. The present, in the
first sense, speaks of the aging of the youth of history and establishes us as "firstcomers."

In this way, Nietzsche makes the notion of the historical present shift from the negative to the positive, by
proceeding from the mere suspension of the historical—through forgetfulness and the claims of the
unhistorical—to the affirmation of the "strength of the present." At the same time, he inscribes this force of the
present in the "inspiring consolation of hope" (das hoffendes Streben) (p. 63), which allows him to set aside the
vituperation of the disadvantages of history in favor of what remains as "the advantage of history for life."

So a certain iconoclasm directed against history, as sealed up in what is past and gone, is a necessary condition
for its ability to refigure time. No doubt a time in suspension is required if our intentions directed at the future
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II

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Does the same thing apply on the ontic plane of the refiguration of time by narrative, the plane upon which the
analyses in this third volume have unfolded? There are two reasons for posing this question. For one thing, the
aporetics of time, which occupied section 1 in this volume, was considerably enriched by our adding to the
Augustinian core of our initial analyses the important developments made by phenomenology, so that we may
rightly question whether our expansion of this aporetics has been homogeneous. Secondly, it is not clear that the structure of the seven chapters in section 2 of this volume, which give the reply of the poetics of narrative to the aporetics of time, obeys the same law of derivation from the simple to the complex, illustrated by the epistemology of historiography and of narratology.

It is to answer this double interrogation that I propose here a rereading of the aporetics of time, one that will follow another order of composition than the one imposed by the history of the doctrines involved. It seems to me that three problematics have remained entangled in our analyses from author to author, even from work to work, in the first section.

1. We concentrated on the aporia resulting from the mutual occultation of the phenomenological and the cosmological perspectives. This difficulty seemed so serious to me that it governed the construction, in the form of a polemic, of section 1: Aristotle against Augustine, Kant against Husserl, the upholders of so-called "ordinary" time against Heidegger. What is more, it took no less than five chapters to elaborate the response of the narrative function to this most visible of the aporias of temporality. The first question we must pose, therefore, is to verify at what point the interweaving of the referential intentions of history and fiction constitutes an adequate response to this initial great aporia, the aporia of a double perspective in speculation on time.

2. Our mostly positive response to this first question must not, in turn, conceal a difficulty that is rebellious in another way, one that has remained bound up with the preceding one in the aporetics of time. It is the question of what meaning to give to the process of totalization of the ecstases of time, in virtue of which time is always spoken of in the singular. This second aporia is not collective singular surpasses the split into phenomenological and cosmological approaches. So it will be necessary to undertake a review of the aporias bound to this representation and lost sight of in our historical inquiry, so as to give them the preeminence due them that the privilege accorded the first cycle of aporias may have covered over. Having done this, we shall be in a position to pose the question whether our two final chapters bring as adequate a response to the aporia of the totality of time as the five preceding ones bring to the aporia of the double perspective on time. A less adequate reply to the question on the level of this second great aporia of temporality will give us a premonition of the limits ultimately encountered by our ambition of saturating the aporetics of time with the poetics of narrative.

3. Is the aporia of totalization the last word in the aporetics of time? Upon reflection, I do not think so. An even more intractable aporia is concealed behind the two preceding ones. It has to do with the ultimate unrepresentability of time, which makes even phenomenology continually turn to metaphors and to the language of myth, in order to talk about the upsurge of the present or the flowing of the unitary flux of time. No particular chapter was devoted to this aporia, which in a way circulates among the interstices of our aporetics. The corresponding question is thus whether narrativity is capable of giving an adequate reply to this failure to represent time, a reply drawn from its own resources. The response to this embarrassing question was not the object of a separate examination in the second section of this volume, any more than the question itself was. Therefore we shall have to gather up the membri disjecta of the broken discourse supposed to respond to this powerful aporia. For the moment, let us be content to formulate the problem in the briefest possible manner: can we still give a narrative equivalent to the strange temporal situation that makes us say that everything—ourselves included—is in time, not in the sense given this "in" by some "ordinary" acceptation as Heidegger would have it in Being and Time, but in the sense that myths say that time encompasses us with its vastness? To answer this question constitutes the supreme test of our ambition to reply adequately to the aporetics of time with a poetics of narrative.

The new hierarchy between the aporias of temporality that we are proposing here thus runs the risk of making the aporia of the double perspective on time. The virtue of this test of adequacy will be at least to have revealed both the aporia of temporality will give us a premonition of the limits ultimately encountered by our ambition of saturating the aporetics of time with the poetics of narrative.

The first aporia of temporality narrative identity

Most certainly it is to the first aporia that the poetics of narrative provides the least sketchy response. Narrated time is like a bridge set over the breach speculation constantly opens between phenomenological time and cosmological time.

A rereading of what has been said about this aporetics confirms to what point the progression of our analyses has accentuated the seriousness of this aporia. Augustine has no other resource when it comes to the cosmological doctrines than to oppose to them the time of a mind that distends itself. This mind has to be that of an individual soul) but by no means that of a world soul.
Yet his meditation on the beginning of Creation leads Augustine to confess that time itself had a beginning, along with the creation of thing. To be a part of every creature, therefore, in a sense that cannot be explicated within the framework of the doctrine in Book XI of the 

Confessions, a cosmological time. On the other hand, Aristotle is quite sure that time is not something that can be answered by the question, "What entity of an individual or a community is to answer the question?"

In short, the notion of an individual or a community is taken in the sense of a practical category. "To state the entity of an individual or a community is to answer the question of a specific identity that we might call the narrative identity. Here "identity" is taken in the sense of a practical category." To state the entity of an individual or a community is to answer the question of a specific identity that we might call the narrative identity. Here "identity" is taken in the sense of a practical category.

As for Husserl, he may try to set (objective time) with its already constituted determinations in parentheses, since the dialectical interweaving of phenomenological and fictional narrative constitutes an appropriate response to the mutual occultation of the phenomenological and fictional aspects of time at the very point where Heidegger sees an operation of leveling off, which must appear to lack credibility.

It is with Heidegger that this aporia stemming from the mutual occultation of phenomenological and fictional time and cosmological time seems to me to have reached its highest degree of virulence, despite the fact that the hierarchy of levels of temporalization brought to light by Husserl does assign a place to within-time within the context of Being.

As for Husserl, he may try to set (subjective time) with its already constituted determinations in parentheses, since we cannot articulate any phenomenology of this Gestalt without bringing back to life that rational psychology that the paralogisms had condemned once and for all.

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"Who did this?" "Who is the agent, the author?" We first answer this question by naming someone, that is, by designating the "who.", in the sense of permanence. But what is the basis for the permanence of the proper name? What justifies our taking the subject of an action, so designated by his, her, or its proper name, as the same throughout a life that stretches from birth to death? The answer has to be narrative. To answer the question "Who?" as Hannah Arendt has so forcefully put it, is to tell the story of the action of the "who." And the identity of this "who" therefore itself must be a narrative identity.

With the role of the narrative, the probenent of the personal identity of the object of the fact be condemned to an antinomy with the nosolog* t* *ion*. Either we must posit the subject of the symbolic wi* tr* itself through the diversity of its different states, or, following Hume and Nietzsche, we must hold that this identical subject is nothing more than a substantial illusion, whose elimination merely brings to light a pure manifold of cognitions, emotions, and volitions. This dilemma disappears if we substitute for identity under the notion of being the same (identem), identity understood in the sense of oneself as self-same (soi-meme) (ipse). The difference between identem and ipse isliohTngTnoire than the difference between substantial or formal identity and a narrative identity. Self-sameness, "self-constancy," can escape the dTEmrVovVfthE same and the Other to the extent that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. The self characterized by self-sameness may then be said to be refigured by the reflective application of such narrative configurations. Unlike the abstract identity of the Same, this narrative identity, constitutive of self-constancy, can include change, mutability, within the cohesion of one lifetime. The subject then jigrjearet* as a reader of the story of his or her own Tiresias. Proust would have it. As the literary analysis of autobiography confirms, the story of anyone continues to be refigured by all the truthful or fictive stories a subject tells about himself or herself. This is--refiguration makeHRFlTetetTCrtToTfi woven of stories told.

The same thing applies to the work of correction and rectification of one's own life. Psychoanalytic experience throws into relief the role of the narrative component in what are usually called "case histories." It is in the work of the analyses, which by the way Freud called "working-through" (Durcharbeitung), that this role can be grasped. It is further justified by the very goal of the whole process of the cure, which is to substitute for the bits and pieces of stories that are unintelligible as well as unbearable, a coherent and acceptable story, in which the analysand can recognize his or her self-constancy. In this regard, psychoanalysis constitutes a particularly instructive laboratory for a properly philosophical inquiry into the notion of narrative identity. In it, we can see how the story of a life comes to be constituted through a series of rectifications applied to previous narratives, just as the history of a people, or a collectivity, or an institution proceeds from the series of corrections that new historians bring to their predecessors' descriptions and explanations, and, step by step, to the legends that preceded this genuinely historiographical work. As has been said, history always proceeds from history. The same thing applies to the work of correction and rectification constitutive of analytic working-through. Subjects recognize themselves in the stories they tell about themselves. Our comparison between analytic working-through and the work of the historian facilitates the transition from our first to our second example. This is borrowed from the history of a particular community, biblical Israel. This example is especially applicable because no other people has been so overwhelmingly impassioned by the narratives it has told about itself. On the one hand, the delimitation of narratives subsequently taken as canonical ex-

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presses, even reflects, the character of this people who gave themselves, among other writings, the patriarchal narratives, those of the Exodus, those of the settlement in Canaan, then those of the Davidic monarchy, then those of the exile and return. But we may also say, with just as much pertinence, that it was in telling these narratives taken to be testimony about the founding events of its history that biblical Israel became the historical community that bears this name. The relation is circular—the historical community called the Jewish people has drawn its identity from the reception of those texts that it had produced.
This circular relation between what we may call a "character"—which may be that of an individual as well as that of a people—and the narratives that both express and shape this character, illustrates in a marvelous way the circle referred to at the beginning of our description of threefold mimesis." The third mimetic relation of narrative to practice, we said, leads back to the first relation by way of the second relation. At that time, this circle disturbed us in that it might be objected that the first mimetic relation already bears the mark of previous narratives, in virtue of the symbolic structure of action. Is there, we asked, any experience that is not already the fruit of narrative activity? At the end of our inquiry into the refuguration of time by narrative we can affirm without hesitation that this circle is a wholesome one. The first mimetic relation refers, in the case of an individual, to the semantics of desire, which only includes those prenarrative features attached to the demand constitutive of human desire. The third mimetic relation is defined by the narrative identity of an individual or a people, stemming from the endless rectification of a previous narrative by a subsequent one, and from the chain of refugurations that results from this. In a word, narrative identity is the poetic resolution of the hermeneutic circle.

At the end of this first set of conclusions, I would like to indicate the limits of the solution that the notion of narrative identity brings to the initial aporia of temporality. Certainly, the constitution of narrative identity does illustrate in a useful way the interplay of history and narrative in the refuguration of a time that is itself indivisibly phenomenological time and cosmological time. But it also includes, in turn, an internal limitation that bears witness to the first inadequacy of the answer narration brings to the question posed by the aporetics of temporality. In the first place, narrative identity is not a stable and seamless identity. Just as it is possible to compose several plots on the subject of the same incidents (which, thus, should not really be called the same events), so it is always possible to weave different, even opposed, plots about our lives. In this regard, we might say that, in the exchange of roles between history and fiction, the historical component of a narrative about oneself draws this narrative toward the side of a chronicle submitted to the same documentary verifications as any

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other historical narration, while the fictional component draws it toward those imaginative variations that destabilize narrative identity. In this sense, narrative identity continues to make and unmake itself, and the question of trust that Jesus, posed to his disciples—Who do you say that I am?—is one that each of us can pose concerning oneself, with the same perplexity that the disciples questioned by Jesus felt. Narrative identity thus becomes the name of a problem at least as much as it is that of a solution. A systematic investigation of autobiography and self-portraiture would no doubt verify this instability in principle of narrative identity. Next, narrative identity does not exhaust the question of the self-constancy of a subject, whether this be a particular individual or a community of individuals. Our analysis of the act of reading leads us to say rather that the practice of narrative lies in a thought experiment by means of which we try to inhabit worlds foreign to us. In this sense, narrative exercises the imagination more than the will, even though it remains a category of action. It is true that this opposition between imagination and will applies most aptly to that moment of reading we called the moment of stasis. But we added that reading also includes a moment of impetus. This is when reading becomes a provocation to be and to act differently. However this impetus is transformed into action only through a decision whereby a person says: Here I stand! So narrative identity is not equivalent to true self-constancy except through this decisive moment, which makes ethical responsibility the highest factor in self-constancy. Levinas's well-known analysis of promise-keeping and, in a way, his whole work bear witness to this. The plea that the theory of narrative can always oppose to ethics' claim to be the sole judge of the constitution of subjectivity would be to recall that narrativity is not denuded of every normative, evaluative, or prescriptive dimension. The theory of reading has warned us that the strategy of persuasion undertaken by the narrator is aimed at imposing on the reader a vision of the world that is never ethically neutral, but that rather implicitly or explicitly induces a new evaluation of the world and of the reader as well. In this sense, narrative already belongs to the ethical field in virtue of its claim—inseparable from its narration—to ethical justice. Still it belongs to the reader, now an agent, an initiator of action, to choose among the multiple proposals of ethical justice brought forth by reading. It is at this point that the notion of narrative identity encounters its limit and has to link up with the nonnarrative components in the formation of an acting subject.

THE SECOND APORIA OF TEMPORALITY

TOTALITY AND TOTALIZATION

This is an aporia distinct from that of totality per se. The preceding aporia stemmed from the noncongruence between two perspectives on time, that of phenomenology and that of cosmology. This second aporia is born from the dissociation among the three ecstases of time—the future, the past, and the present—despite the unavoidable notion of time conceived of as a collective singular. We always speak of "time." If phenomenology does not provide a theoretical response to this aporia, does thought about history, which we have said transcends the duality of historical and fictional narrative, provide a practical one? The answer to this question constituted what
was at stake in our final two chapters. In what way does this response have to do with practice? In two ways. First, renouncing the speculative solution proposed by Hegel forced us to substitute the notion of totalization for that of totality. Next, this totalization appeared to us to be the fruit of an imperfect mediation between a horizon of expectation, the retrieval of past heritages, and the occurrence of the untimely present. In this double sense, the process of totalization places thinking about history in the practical dimension.

In order to measure the degree of adequation between this practical process of totalization and the theoretical aporia of totality, it will be necessary to undertake another reading of our aporetic inasmuch as the historical approach of our first section emphasized our initial aporia while leaving the various expressions of this second one scattered here and there.

That there is just one time is what the Timaeus presupposes as soon as it defines time as "a moving image of eternity" (37d). Furthermore, this time is coextensive with the single world soul, and is born along with the heavens. Yet this world soul stems from multiple divisions and admixtures, all governed by the dialectic of the Same and the Other.

The discussion that Aristotle devotes to the relations between time and movement also presupposes the oneness of time. The question that presides over his preliminary examination of the tradition and its aporias is "what time is and what is its nature" (Physics, IV, 218a32). The oneness of time is explicitly the aim of the argument that distinguishes time from movement, namely, that there are many movements but just one time. (This argument preserved its force as long as movement itself had not been unified into one thing, which could not occur before the formulation of the principle of inertia.) In return, Aristotle, by preventing himself from elevating time to the rank of a principle of nature, could not say how a soul, in distinguishing instants and counting intervals, could conceive of the unity of time.

As for Augustine, it will be recalled with what force he poses the troublesome question, "What, then, is time?" Nor have we forgotten the confession that follows, which gives his inquiry the tonality of interrogative thinking. The conflict between intentio and distentio may thus be reinterpreted in terms of a dilemma between the assembled unity of time and its bursting apart as a function of memory, anticipation, and attention. Our whole aporia lies in this structure of the threefold present.

Kant seems to echo Augustine when in turn he comes to pose the question, "What, then, are space and time?" (A23, B37). But he does so in order to introduce, with a confident tone, the table of possible answers from which he makes one unequivocal choice, namely, "that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind" (A23, B37-38). So the ideal nature of time assures its oneness. And this oneness of time is that of a form in our capacity to take up a manifold of impressions. This oneness serves in turn the argument in the "metaphysical," then in the "transcendental exposition" of the concept of time. It is because time is a collective singular that it cannot be a discursive concept—that is, a genus divisible into species; instead it is an a priori intuition. Whence the axiomatic form of the argument: "Different times are but parts of one and the same time" (A31, B47). And again, "The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations of one single time that underlies it" (A32, B48). In the same argument, he speaks of "the whole representation" of time which is nothing other than "the original representation" of time (ibid.). So it is as a priori that the intuition of time is posited as the intuition of one unique time.

Yet this unity becomes problematic in the "Transcendental Analytic." In the first place, the doctrine of the schematism introduces the distinction between the "series of time," the "content of time," the "order of time," and the "scope of time in respect of all possible objects." Yet this plurality of "determinations of time" (A145, B184), linked to the plurality of schemata, does not really threaten the unity established on the level of the "Aesthetic." But it is not clear that the same thing may be said about the distinction between the "three modes of time" that the successive examination of the "Analogies of Experience" imposes; namely, permanence, succession, simultaneity. It is the permanence of time that poses the most serious problem. It is partially bound up with the schema of substance, and through this with the principle that bears the same name, permanence. And it is on the occasion of the first of these connections that Kant declares, in parentheses it is true, that "The existence of what is transitory passes away in time but not time itself. To time, itself non-transitory and abiding, there corresponds in the [field of] appearance what is non-transitory in existence, that is, substance. Only in [relation to] substance can the succession and coexistence of appearances be determined in time" (A143, B183). This statement has the ring of a paradox. Permanence somehow includes succession and simultaneity. The "aesthetic," not yet having to deal with specific objects, or objective phenomena, recognizes only the oneness and infinity of time. But now it happens that phenomenal objectivity gives rise to this unexpected feature, permanence, which participates in the same a priori character of all the aspects of time acknowledged by the "Aesthetic."
reflection that is still of its thematic subject. But we shall also return to its examination again within the framework of our third aporia, because here reflection seems to run up against something inscrutable and resistant to any clarification. Nothing, however, allows us to think that Kant was surprised by this immutable and fixed time that does not flow.

This assertion of the unique and unitary character of the form of time, the least discussed assertion of any in Kant, becomes a problem for Husserl. We might think that this aspect belongs to objective time, which he begins by bracketing out. But such is not the case. Even the title of his lectures indicates this. The compound expression that is possible in German—Zeitbewusst-sein—suggests the idea of two things that are one: one consciousness, one time. Indeed, what is ultimately at stake is the self-constitution of time as a single flux. But, within a hyletics—since the constitution of immanent time ultimately depends on this—how is it possible to constitute the unitary form of time without recourse to a principle extrinsic to the manifold of impressions, such as we find in Kant and Brentano? The major discovery with which we have credited Husserl, the constitution of an extended present by the continuous addition of retentions and protentions to the source-point of the living present, only partially answers this question. Only partial totalities—the well-known tempo-objects of the type of the sound that continues to resonate—are constituted in this way. So how are we to pass from such "fragments" of duration to "temporal duration itself"? (p. 45). The direction in which we have to look for a solution is of course well known: the totality of time has to be the corollary of its continuity. But can we draw this corollary from the simple iteration of the phenomenon of retention (and protention)? I do not see how retentions of retentions can make up a single flux. This cannot happen directly as much as we must bring together, in this one flow, memories that are continually issuing from the living present, quasi-presents freely imagined along with their own sets of retentions and protentions, and recollections that do not stand in a direct connection with the living present, yet which are endowed with a positional character not found in merely imagined quasi-presents. Does the phenomenon of "coincidence" that is supposed to transpose, on a wider scale, the phenomenon of the continuation of the present into the recent past really account for what Husserl himself calls the "linking of time"? The insufficiency of this explanation is attested to by the necessity to pursue the constitution of immanent time on a more radical level, reached only in the Third Section of the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. The difficulty that it is supposed to respond to results from the need to acknowledge that consciousness itself, which the unity of time redoubles. Even assuming that such a unity can be spared the distanciation of the lived contents.

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every kind of memory has a fixed place in the unitary flow of time, along with the increasing fading away of these contents resulting from their falling back into an ever more distant and hazy past. In order to confront this difficulty, Husserl splits up the intentionality that slides back and forth along the length of this flux, distinguishing from the primary intentionality that is directed toward the modifications in how a particular object is presented a second form of intentionality that aims at the temporal position of this experienced object independently of its degree of distance from the living present. But the place of a phenomenon in time refers to the totality of the flux of time considered as a form. So we rediscover once again Kant's paradox that time itself does not flow. And it is this constitution that gives meaning to the expression "to happen in time." What the preposition "in" designates is precisely the fixity of the temporal position, distinct from the degree of distanciation of the lived contents.

The difficulty for Husserl is finally to draw, from a phenomenology applied in the first place to the continuous expansions of a point source, a phenomenology of the whole of time. But neither the constitution of tempo-objects that still have, if we may put it this way, one foot in the living present, nor the phenomenon of coincidence stemming from the mutual overlapping of the stages of retention and protention of every quasi-present can perfectly account for the self-constitution of immanent time as a total flux. Husserl's difficulty here is expressed in several ways. Sometimes he invokes "some a priori temporal laws" (the title of §33); sometimes he admits that it is "startling (if not at first sight even contradictory) to assert that the flux of consciousness constitutes its own unity" (p. 106); sometimes he simply confesses, "For all this, names are lacking" (p. 100). We may ask therefore whether Husserl's obstinacy in looking for an answer appropriate to the question of the unity of this flux does not have to do with the most fundamental presupposition of all, that of the unity of consciousness itself, which the unity of time redoubles. Even assuming that such a unity can be spared the criticisms of a Hume or a Nietzsche, the monadic character of its constitution would still be a problem. And the constitution of a common time will then depend on the constitution of an intersubjectivity. We can doubt whether the "communalization" of individual experiences proposed in the fifth Cartesian Meditation succeeds any better in engendering a unique time than does the experience of the coincidence of what is experienced within a single consciousness.

Finally, with Heidegger, the question of temporal totality reaches the highest point of critical reflection and, in this, of perplexity. By stressing, as we have done in our discussion, the aporia of "ordinary time," we have pushed into the background the theme that in fact opens the second section of Being and Time, the possibility of Dasein's Being-a-whole. Nowhere is it said why this reveals, after the fact, the urgency of the question of the "potentiality" of Being-a-whole. But whatever may be said about the priority of the question over the answer, an unexpected turn is given to the question of totality
through this relation to mortality. In the first place, time will not be an infinite given, as in Kant, but rather an aspect of finitude. Mortality—not the event of death in public time, but the fact that each of us is destined for our own death—indicates the internal closure of primordial temporality. Next, time will not be *a* form, in either the Kantian or the Husserlian sense, but a process inherent in *; the most intimate structure of Dasein, namely, Care. There is no need, therefore, to assume a double intentionality, one part adhering to the contents and their interplay of retentions and protentions, the other designating the immutable place of a lived experience in a time that is itself fixed. The question of place is relegated, through the byways of within-time-ness and its leveling off, to the false pretensions of ordinary time.

The perplexity resulting from this response to the question of Being-a-whole arises for several reasons. First, the connection between Being-a-whole and Being-towards-death has to be attested to by the testimony of conscience, whose most authentic expression, according to Heidegger, lies in resolute anticipation. It follows that the meaning of the process of totalization is not accessible to the kind of impersonal reflection that governs Kant's "transcendental aesthetic," nor to as disinterested a subject as Husserl's transcendental ego. At the same time, it becomes difficult to distinguish, within this resolute anticipation, what is existential, hence communicable in principle, and what is existentiell, that is, a personal option for Heidegger the human being. I already indicated above that other existentiell conceptions, those of Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Sartre, are set aside here in the name of a kind of stoicism that makes resolution in the face of death the supreme test of authenticity. Heidegger's choice is certainly acceptable on the level of a personal ethics, but it sets his whole analysis of Being-a-whole in a conceptual fog that is difficult to pierce. Indeed, this analysis seems to be moved by two contrary impulses. According to the first of these, the hermeneutic phenomenology of Care tends to close in on itself in terms of an inner phenomenon, which is not transferable from one Dasein to another, that we can call one's own lived death, just as we speak of one's own lived body. For the second impulse, the temporal structure of Care, restored to the opening of *Sich-vorweg*, Being-ahead-of-itself, opens on the immense dialectic of coming-towards, having-been, and making present. I will not deny that this second impulse given to the question of Being-a-whole takes precedence over the first one only if the existential analysis is borne by an existentiell attitude that places unconcern about one's own death above anticipatory resoluteness, and is thereby inclined to take philosophy as a celebration of life rather than as a preparation for still too caught up in a philosophical anthropology. If we assume that we can abstract the question of Being-a-whole from the kind of stranglehold inflicted upon it by the equating of Being-a-whole and Being-towards-death, an even more serious aporia concerning Being-a-whole is brought to light.

Recall how Heidegger moves from the notion of temporality to that of temporalization, in parallel with his replacement of possibility, in the Kantian sense, with "making-possible." What temporalization makes possible is precisely the unity of coming towards, having-been, and making-present. This unity is said to be undermined from within by the dehiscence of what Heidegger henceforth calls the ecstases of time, referring to the Greek *ekstastikon*, to which the German *Ausser-sich* corresponds. Whence the surprising assertion: "temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' [*Ausser-sich*] in and for itself" (p. 377). In this way, we are returned in one step to the very beginning of our investigation, to the Augustinian *distentio animi*: in short, to the discordant concordance that launched all our analyses. This "outside-of-itself," by means of which time is externalized in relation to itself, constitutes such a powerful structure, at the heart of the basic experience of temporality, that it governs every process of differentiation that, on the two other levels of temporalization, breaks apart its unity. Whether it be a question of the stretching-along of time on the level of historicality, or of the extension of the lapse of time on the level of within-time-ness, the primordial "outside-of-itself" pursues its subversive career right up to its triumph in the ordinary concept of time, said to proceed from within-time-ness by means of a process of leveling off. This ultimate transition, which is also a fall, is made possible by extrapolating the temporal features of Care to the whole ensemble of Being-in-the-world, thanks to which we can speak of the "world-historical" character of beings other than Dasein. The mutual exteriority of the "nows" of chronological time is just a degraded representation. At least it does have the virtue of making explicit, at the price of a belated objectification, that aspect of primordial temporality that means that it gathers things together only by dispersing them.

But how do we know that temporality gathers things together, despite the power of dispersion that undermines it? Is it because, without ever having posed the question, Care is itself taken to be a collective singular—as was the Husserlian consciousness, which is originally one with itself? How has the poetics of narrative responded to this many-sided aporia concerning totality? It first opposed a firm but costly refusal to the ambition of thought to bring about a totalization of history entirely permeable to the light of concepts, and recapitulated in the eternal present of absolute knowledge.

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To this unacceptable solution, the poetics of narrative next opposed an imperfect mediation between the three dimensions of expectation, tradition, and the force of the present.
Is this totalization through an imperfect mediation an adequate reply to the aporia of the totality of time? We may, in my opinion, recognize a good correlation between the imperfect mediation that governs thinking about history and the multiform unity of temporality, on the condition of stressing both the multiform character of the unity assigned to time taken as a collective singular and the imperfect character of said mediation between the horizon of expectation, traditionality, and the historical present.

It is noteworthy, in this respect, that historical thinking transposes, in a resolutely practical way and on the dialogical plane of a common history, the phenomenological analyses we have seen carried out in a speculative manner and on a monological plane. To see this, let us retrace again the principal steps of our ternary analysis of historical consciousness.

By deliberately beginning with the notion of a horizon of expectation, we in a way legitimated the reversal of priorities brought about by Heidegger within the framework of a hermeneutic phenomenology of Care. Horizon of expectation and Being-ahead-of-itself correspond term-by-term to each other in this sense. But, owing to the double transposition just spoken of, expectation is immediately conceived of as a structure of practice. It is acting beings who try to make their history and who undergo the evils engendered by this very effort. What is more, this projection is open to the future of the historical communities we belong to and, beyond these, to the undetermined future of humanity as a whole. The notion of expectation therefore differs from Heidegger’s Being-ahead-of-itself, which runs up against the internal closure that Being-towards-death imposes on all anticipation.

The same kinship and the same contrast can be discerned between Heidegger's having-been and our concept of traditionality. The monological theme of fallenness is transposed into the dialогical theme par excellence of being affected by history. What is more, the pathetic aspect of fallenness is transposed into the practical category of the consciousness of the efficacity of history. Finally, it is the same concepts of trace, heritage, and debt that govern both analyses. But, whereas Heidegger only conceives, at least on the most primordial plane, of a transmission of a heritage from oneself to oneself, traditionality includes the confession of a debt that is fundamentally contracted on behalf of another. Heritages are transmitted principally through language and most often on the basis of symbolic systems implying a minimum of shared beliefs and understandings about the rules permitting the deciphering of signs, symbols, and norms current in a group.

A third set of correspondences, finally, may be discerned on the level of making-present, to which corresponds, on the side of historical consciousness, the force of the present. A kinship can be recognized between the circumstance accorded the presence of things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand and the historical present, concerning which, following Nietzsche, we have underscored its rootedness in "life," at least so long as history can be evaluated in terms of its "advantages" and "disadvantages." However it is here that the reply of historical consciousness to the aporetics of time indicates the greatest gap in the transposition from one plane to another.

On the one hand, the frankly practical character of any initiative gives the notion of a historical present its primary force. Initiative is, above all else, what actualizes the competence of an acting subject. Therefore what comes under any "untimely consideration" are the untimely aspects of all initiative per se. So the present is most clearly grasped in terms of its occurrence in time. On the other hand, the dialогical character of the historical present immediately places it under the category of living-together. Initiatives are inscribed on the common world of contemporaries, to take up again the vocabulary of Alfred Schutz. We showed this with the example of promises, which commit the monadic subject only on the condition of a reciprocity governing mutual expectations and, in the end, a social pact dependent upon the idea of justice.

In many ways, therefore, the imperfect mediation of historical consciousness responds to the multiform unity of temporality.

We have yet to say what corresponds, on the side of historical consciousness, to the very idea of a unity of the three ecstases of time, beyond their differentiation. One important theme from Being and Time can perhaps point the way to an answer. This is the theme of repetition or, better, recapitulation (Wiederholung), whose analysis takes place precisely on the plane of historicality. Repetition, we said, is the name by which the anticipation of the future, the taking up of fallenness, and the Augenblick adjusted to "its time" reconstitute their fragile unity. Repetition, says Heidegger, "is handing down explicitly—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there" (p. 437). In this way, the primacy of anticipatory resoluteness over the passed past is affirmed. But it is not certain that repetition satisfies the prerequisites of time considered as a collective singular.

In the first place, it is striking that this theme is not proposed in the chapter devoted to primordial temporality, at the same level as the ecstatic "Being-outside-itself" of time. In the second place, this theme does not really add much to the theme of anticipatory resoluteness, so strongly stamped by Being-towards-death. Finally, it seems to play no role when making-present, the third ecstasis of time, is taken up for its own sake. This is why the Kantian axiom that different times are just parts of the same time receives no satisfactory interpretation in the hermeneutic phenomenology of temporality.

What is especially remarkable about the reply of historical consciousness is that it proposes an original status for the practical and dialогical category that stands over against the axiom of the oneness of time. This status is that of a
history itself considered as a collective singular. Ought we to speak of a return to Kant then? But it is not the Kant of the first *Critique*, instead it is the Kant of the second *Critique*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*. What is more, such a return to Kant can be made only after a necessary detour through Hegel. It is from the Hegel of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Philosophy of Right* that we have learned how a concept is patiently formed in traversing the great historical mediations that occur on the levels of the economy, law, ethics, religion, and culture in general. Yet, if we no longer believe that these great mediations can culminate in a form of absolute knowledge, set within the eternal present of contemplation, it is nevertheless our mourning for such absolute knowledge that brings us back to the Kantian idea, henceforth intended on the horizon of such historical mediations.

What did we do in our long chapter devoted to historical consciousness but articulate such practical and dialogical mediations? And how may we speak of mediations, even imperfect ones, unless it is within the horizon of a limit-idea that is also a regulative one? This intending of a guiding idea was expressed in a number of different ways in our analyses. The first one was the emergence of the very word "history" in the sense of a collective singular. An epic conception of humanity is presupposed here. Without it, there would be only different human species, and finally different races. To think of history as one is to posit the equivalence between three ideas: one time, one humanity, and one history. This, when we come down to it, is the presupposition behind the cosmopolitan point of view introduced by Kant in his essays on the philosophy of history. But Kant did not have the conceptual instruments, which were only available after Hegel, for integrating the concept of history considered from a cosmopolitan point of view into the edifice of his three *Critiques*, possibly as the third part of the *Critique of Judgment*.

That this idea of a single history and a single humanity is not an empty and lifeless transcendental is something we showed by basing the metahistorical categories of horizon of expectation and space of experience on the affirmation of political and ethical duty, so as to insure that the tension between this horizon of expectation and space of experience be preserved without giving way to schism. For this to happen, we made two propositions: that the Utopian imagination always be converted into specific expectations, and that received heritages be freed of their scleroses. This second requirement dominated our whole analysis of traditionality. If we refused to be caught up in the disjunction of either a hermeneutic of traditions or a critique of ideologies, it was precisely in order to give the critical point of view a handhold. Without memory, we said again and again, there is no principle of hope. If we cease to believe that heritages from the past can yet be reinterpreted in a postcritical age, defined by Max Weber as a "disenchanted world," critical thought would be returned to its pre-Hegelian stage, all historical mediation having exactly the Kantian sense of a world—me im^—^e im,^ and single history, has to be seen as already at work in the prior and contemporary practice of communication, hence in continuity with anticipations buried in tradition itself.

Finally, I will recall the blossoming in our text of the thesis that this directive idea becomes meaningful only as the horizon of the imperfect mediation between future, past, and present, and thus has to do with our treatment of the present as initiative. This cannot be summed up, however, in just the untimely occurrence of a present experienced as an interruption; it also includes all the forms of transactions between expectation and memory. These transactions constitute the most appropriate reply, on the plane of collective practice, to Heideggerian repetition. This power of recapitulation of the present seemed to us to find its best illustration in the act of making a promise, in which are fused personal commitment, interpersonal trust, and the tacit or virtual social pact that confers on the dialogical relation itself the cosmopolitan dimension of a public space.

Such are the many ways in which the imperfect mediation between expectation, traditionality, and initiative require the horizon of a single history, which, in turn, responds to and corresponds to the axiom of a single time. Does this mean that this good correlation between the multiform unity of the ecstases of time and the imperfect mediation of the historical consciousness can still be attributed to narrative? We may doubt so for two reasons. First, narrative taken in the strict sense of a discursive "genre" offers only an inadequate medium for thinking about general history, inasmuch as there are multiple plots for the same course of events and they always get articulated in terms of fragmentary temporalities. Even if the disparity between historical and fictional narrative is surpassed by their interweaving, this never produces more than what above we called a narrative identity. And narrative identity remains that of a person or a character, including those particular collective entities that merit being raised to the rank of quasi-characters. So the notion of plot gives preference to the plural-at trie expense of the collective singular in the refiguration of time. There is no plot of all plots capable of equaling the idea of one humanity and one history. A second type of inadequation between narrative *stricto sensu* and the multiform unity of time results from the fact that the literary category of narrative is itself inadequate to thought about history. It is a fact that we did not openly make use of narrative categories, in the strict sense of the narrative genre, whether oral or written,
characterize the horizon of expectation, the transmission of past traditions, and the force of the present. We may therefore legitimately wonder whether historical thinking does not take us beyond the limits of narrative.

Conclusions

Two responses are possible. We may first observe that historical thinking, without being, as such, narrative, does have a particular affinity for the dis-cursive genre of narrative, which will serve as its privileged medium. This mediating role of narrative is evident in the transmission of traditions. Traditions are essentially narratives. In return, the connection between a horizon of expectation and narrative is less direct. However it does exist. Indeed, we can consider anticipations about the future as anticipated retrospections, thanks to that remarkable property of narrative voice—one of the categories of literary theory that we dealt with in volume 2—that it can place itself at any point of time, which becomes for it a quasi-present, and, from this observation point, it can apprehend as a quasi-past the future of our present. In this way, a narrative past, which is the past of the narrative voice, is assigned to this quasi-present. Prophecy confirms this structure. The prophet sees the imminent future and its menace threatening the present, and recounts the precipitation of the present toward its future ruin as something that has already happened. We might then move from prophecy to Utopia, which joins to its description of the perfect city an anticipatory narration of the steps that lead to it. What is more, this narration is often made from things borrowed from traditional narratives, repainted in new colors. So the future seems to be rep-resentable only given the assistance of anticipatory narratives that transform a living present into a future perfect mode—this present will have been the beginning of a history that will one day be, told.

We must not abuse this extension of the category of narrative, taken as a narrative genre, lest we do violence to the very notion of projecting a horizon, concerning which narrative cannot be more than a subordinate mediation. A second more pertinent response can be made to the objection given above. The notion of narrativity can be taken in a broader sense than the discursive genre that codifies it. We can speak of a narrative program to designate a course of action arising out of an interconnected series of performances. This is the meaning adopted in narrative semiotics and in the psycho-sociology of speech acts, which speak of narrative programs, narrative series, and narrative schemas. We may take such narrative schemas as underlying the narrative genres properly speaking, which confer upon them an appropriate discursive equivalent. It is the potentiality of narrative that the strategic articulation of action holds in reserve that links the narrative schema to the narrative genre. We may express the proximity between these two senses of narrative by distinguishing the recountable from the recounted. It is the re-countable rather than narrative in the sense of a discursive genre that can be taken as coextensive with the mediation brought about by thinking about history between the horizon of expectation, the transmission of traditions, and the force of the present.

To conclude, we can say that narrativity does not offer the second aporia of temporality as adequate a response as it offered to the first aporia. This inade-

quacy will not be seen as a failure if we do not lose sight of the following two maxims. First, the reply of narrativity to the aporias of time consists less in resolving these aporias than in putting them to work, in making them productive. This is how thinking about history contributes to the refiguration of time. Second, any theory reaches its highest expression only when the exploration of the domain where its validity is verified is completed with a recognition of the limits that circumscribe this domain of validity. This is the great lesson we have learned from Kant.

However it is only with the third antimony of temporality that our second maxim will take on its full meaning.

THE APORIA OF THE INSCRUTABILITY OF TIME AND THE LIMITS OF NARRATIVE

Here my rereading reaches the point where our meditation on time not only suffers from its inability to go beyond the bifurcation into phenomenology and cosmology, or even its difficulty in giving a meaning to the totality that is made and unmade across the exchanges between coming-towards, having-been, and being present—but suffers, quite simply, from not really being able to think time. This aporia remained so dissimulated in our analyses that no separate study was devoted to it. It only emerges here and there when the very work of thinking seems to succumb to the weight of its theme. This aporia springs forth at the moment when time, escaping any attempt to constitute it, reveals itself as belonging to a constituted order always already presupposed by the work of constitution. This is what is expressed by the word “inscrutability,” which is the one Kant uses when he runs up against the question of the origin of evil that resists any explanation. Here is where the danger of misinterpretation is greatest. What fails is not thinking, in any acceptation of this term, but the impulse—or to put it a better way, the hubris—that impels our thinking to posit itself as the master of meaning. Thinking encounters this failure not only on the occasion of the enigma of evil but also when time, escaping our will to mastery, surges forth on the side of what, in one way or another, is the true master of meaning.

To this aporia, so diffuse in all our reflections on time, will respond, on the side of poetics, the confession of the limits narrativity encounters outside itself and inside itself. These limits will attest that not even narrative exhausts the power of the speaking that refigures time.

Among the conceptions of time that guided our reflection, some bore the mark of archaisms that cannot entirely...
be mastered by a concept, while others turned in a prospective manner toward hermeticisms that they refused to accept as such into their thinking, but which imposed on it the reversal that puts time in the position of an always already presupposed ground.

Indeed, says Aristotle, "things are in time as they are in number. If this is so, they are contained by time as things in number are contained by number and things in place by place." The oddness of this expression cannot help but strike us: "to be contained by number." In fact, Aristotle returns to this issue a few lines later. "So it is necessary that all things in time should be contained in time. ... a thing, then, will be affected by time." The addition of this last remark tilts the interpretation toward the side of an ancient saying about time, itself expressed in a popular saying that "time wastes things away, and that all things grow old through [hupo] time, and that people forget owing to the lapse of time, but we do not say the same of getting to know or of becoming young or fair." The richness of meaning of such expressions does not pass completely over into the explication Aristotle gives of them. "For time is by its nature the cause rather of decay, since it is the number of change, and change removes what is." I ended my commentary with an assertion that was left hanging. Ancient wisdom, I said, seems to see a hidden collusion between change that destroys things—forgetting, aging, death—and time that simply passes.21

If we journey back in the direction of the archaism that Aristotle's text points to, we encounter the "philosophical story" of the Timaeus, to which, unfortunately, we could devote only one lengthy note. In the expression, "a moving image of eternity," it is not just the aspect of time's being a collective singular that sets thinking to questioning, but precisely this theme's belonging to a philosophical "story." It is only within a philosophical retrieval of a myth that the genesis of time can be brought to language. Being "born along with the heavens" can be spoken of only figuratively. Such a form of philosophical thought preside over the divisions and the intermixings, the entanglements or the circle of the Same and the Other. Above all, only a philosophical story can situate the genesis of time beyond the distinction between psycho-logy and cosmo-logy, by forging the representation of a world soul that both moves and thinks itself. Time is related to this hyper-psychological, hyper-cosmological "reflection."22

How, then, can we avoid being pulled backwards toward the archaism that, without being the oldest either chronologically or culturally, is the archaic element inherent in philosophy—that of the three great pre-Socratics: Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander? It is not a question here of undertaking a study of time in the pre-Socratics at this late stage in our investigation.23 Let us just say that this archaic form of thinking, which no doubt cannot be repeated today in its original and originary voice, points toward a region where the claim of a transcendental subject (in whatever form) to constitute meaning no longer holds sway. This kind of thinking is archaic because it dwells alongside an arkhē that is the condition of possibility for all the presuppositions we can posit. Only a form of thinking that renders itself archaic can understand Anaximander's saying, whose voice can still be heard—in our reading of Aristotle—as the isolated witness to this time that remains inscrutable as much for phenomenology as for its other, cosmology: "the source from which existing things derive their existence is also that to which they return as their destruction, according to necessity; for they give justice and make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to the arrangement of Time [kata tou khronou taxin]."24

This archaism of the pre-Socratics is still part of philosophy in the sense that it is its own arkhē that philosophy repeats when it returns to those who first separated their notion of arkhē from that of a mythical beginning, as found in theogonies and divine genealogies. This break that was brought about within the very idea of an arkhē did not prevent Greek philosophy from inheriting, in a transposed fashion, as a second archaism, the one that it had broken away from, the mythical archaism. We continue to try to avoid getting caught up in it.25 We cannot completely overlook it, however, for it is from this ground that certain, apparently unavoidable, figures of inscrutable time arise. Of all these figures, I will retain only the one that seems to have provided the symbolic schematism to which is grafted the theme referred to above, that everything is contained in time. Jean-Pierre Vernant, in his Myth and Thinking among the Greeks, has traced out in Hesiod, Homer, and Aeschylus, therefore in terms of the three great genres of Greek poetry—-theogony, epic, and tragedy—the comparison of Khronos to Okeanos, which encloses the universe in its untingr course.26 As for those neighboring mythical figures that
assimilate time to a circle, the ambivalence of the significations attached to them is for me of the highest importance. Sometimes the unity and peren-

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niality attributed to this fundamental time radically negate human time, experienced as a factor of instability, destruction, and death; sometimes this great time expresses the cyclic organization of the cosmos, which harmoniously includes the passing of the seasons, the succession of generations, and the periodic return of festivals; sometimes the divine aion gets detached from this image of a circle, which is then connected with the unending round of births and rebirths, as can be seen in much Indian thinking and in Buddhism. The permanence of the aion becomes that of an eternally immobile identity. Here we rejoin Plato's Timaeus, by way of Parmenides and Heracleitus. Two things stand out in this rapid survey of the double archaic ground which Aristotle takes his distance from, yet is secretly near to at the same time: on the one hand, the mark of the inscrutable that this double archaisms stamps on the very work of the concept; on the other hand, the polymorphism of figurations and, across them, of the evaluations of human time, bound to the representation of something beyond time. The latter aspect is undoubtedly a corollary of the first one, for the unrepresentable can only be projected, it seems, in terms of fragmentary representations that prevail now and then, in relation to the variations of temporal experience itself in its psychological and sociological aspects.27

Therefore if an unordinary significance may be given to the expression "being in time," the thought of a Plato or an Aristotle owes such expression to the resurgences of this double archaisms.

Western thought has two archaic inspirations: the Greek and the Hebraic. It is in the background of Augustine's phenomenology that we can hear the voice of the second one, just as we heard the voice of the first one in the background of Aristotle's Physics. The inscrutability of time, but also the diversity of figures of what is beyond time, give rise to thought for a second time.

As regards Book XI of the Confessions, we cannot speak of archaisms insofar as it expresses a theological thinking strongly influenced by Neoplatonic philosophy. What, nevertheless, points to the archaic is the contrast between time and eternity that literally envelops the examination of the notion of time.28 We saw in this contrast three themes that, each in its own way, bore time beyond itself. It is itself in a spirit of praise that Augustine celebrates the eternity of the Word that remains when our words pass away. So immutability plays the role of a limit-idea with regard to temporal experience marked by the sign of the transitory. Eternity is "always stable"; created things never are.29 To think of a present without a future or a past is, by way of contrast, to think of time itself as lacking something in relation to this plenitude; in short, as surrounded by nothingness. Now it is in the mode of lamentation, within the horizon of stable eternity, that the Augustinian soul finds itself exiled to the "region of dissimilarity." The meanings of the lacerated soul are indivisible those of the creature as such and the sinner. In this way, Christian con-

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sciousness takes into account the great elegy that crosses cultural frontiers and sings in a minor key about the sorrow of the finite. And, finally, it is with a note of hope that the Augustinian soul traverses levels of temporalization that are always less "distended" and more "firmly held," bearing witness that eternity can affect the interior of temporal experience, hierarchizing it into levels, and thereby deepening it rather than abolishing it. Just as in the background of the thought of a Plato and an Aristotle we caught sight of the depths of a double archaisms, that of the pre-Socratics retained "in" and, "through" classical philosophy, and that of mythical thinking "negated" but in no way abolished by philosophical thinking, so too must we hear behind the praise, the lamentation, and the hope that accompany Augustinian speculation on eternity and time, a specifically Hebraic form of speaking. Exegesis of this form of speaking reveals a multiplicity of significations that prevent eternity from being reduced to the immutability of a stable present. The difference in levels between Augustine's thought and the Hebraic thinking, which constitutes his archaisms, is concealed by the Greek, and then by the Latin, translation of the well-known ehyeh asher ehyeh in Exodus 3:14a. The Revised Standard Version of the Bible has "I am who I am," as do current French translations. But thanks to this ontologizing of the Hebraic message, we occlude all the senses of eternity that rebel against Helleniza-tion. For example, we thereby lose the most precious sense, whose best equivalent in modern language is expressed by the idea of fidelity. The eternity of Jehovah is above all else the fidelity of the God of the Covenant, accompanying the history of his people.29

As for the "beginning" as reported in Genesis 1:1, Hellenizing speculation must not seek to fix its meaning. First of all, outside of the history of "six days," a "history" marked by an articulated series of speech acts that by degrees inaugurate the rule-governed order of creatures, the seventh "day" being reserved for the joint celebration of creator and creature, in a primordial Sabbath, continually reactualized in worship and praise. Nor may the "beginning" of Genesis 1:1 be separated from that other beginning constituted by the election of Abraham in Genesis 12:1. In this sense, Genesis 1-11 unfolds like a long preface, with its own time, to the history of election. And in turn, the legends of the patriarchs serve as a long preface to the story of the exodus from Egypt.
the giving of the law, the wandering in the wilderness, and the entry into Canaan. In this regard, the Exodus constitutes an event that generates history, thus as a beginning, but in another sense than Genesis 1:1 and 12:1. All these beginnings speak of eternity inasmuch as a certain fidelity is found rooted in them. Of course, there are also texts where God is said to live "forever," "throughout all ages." In Psalm 90:2 we read: "from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." But these texts, borrowed for the most part from hymns and wisdom literature, create a kind of space of dispersion, at least as vast as the one we referred to above in discussing the Greek domain, be it uppusc me circuity ox uuu L1: me transitory character 01 human lice, "hor a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past or as a watch in the night" (Psalm 90:4). Others tend more clearly toward the side of lamentation. "My days are like an evening shadow. . . . But thou, O Lord, art enthroned forever" (Psalm 102:11-12). A slight difference in accent suffices to turn lamentation into praise, "A voice says, 'cry!' And I said, 'What shall I cry?'" "All flesh is grass / and all its beauty is like the flower of the field. / The grass withers, the flower fades, / when the breath of the Lord blows upon it; / The grass withers, the flower fades; / but the word of our God will stand for ever" (Isaiah 40:7-8). (This proclamation opens the book of consolation to Israel attributed to the second Isaiah.) A wholly different mood rules over the sayings of Qoheleth, who sees human life as dominated by ineluctable times (a time to be born, a time to die, etc.) and by an unending return of the same events ("What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done" [Ecclesiastes 1:9]). This variety of tonalities agrees with an essentially nonspeculative, nonphilosophical mode of thinking, for which eternity transcends history from within history.35

This brief tour must suffice to let us sense the richness of meaning concealed as much as revealed in the nunc stans of Augustine's eternal present.

Situated, so to speak, halfway between thinkers who bear their own archaism and those who skirt hermeticism, Kant, at first sight, represents a totally neutral figure. The idea that time must be finally inscrutable seems totally foreign to the Critique of Pure Reason. The anchoring of the concept of time in the transcendental, taken at its lowest level, that of the "transcendental aesthetic," seems to place this concept outside any ontological speculation, as well as outside any fanatical enthusiasm. The status of being a presupposition that is a corollary to that of being transcendental keeps it under the surveillance of a thinking careful to hold in check every impulse of the understanding to cross the limits of its legitimate employment. Essentially, the transcendental stands on guard against all the seductions of the transcendental. And yet. . . . And yet we were surprised by the assertion that changes occur in time, but time does not flow. We were not entirely persuaded by the argument that the third "mode" of time, permanence, also called "time in general," is rendered completely intelligible by its correlation with the schematism of substance and the principle of permanence. The idea of the permanence of time seems richer in meaning than the permanence of something in time. In fact, it seems to be the ultimate condition of possibility for all such things. This suspicion finds reinforcement if we return to what we may well call the riddles of the "transcendental aesthetic." What can be meant by an a priori intuition for which there is no intuition since time is invisible? What meaning are we to give to the idea of a "formal a priori condition of all appearances what-

affected, more fundamental than the being-affected by history referred to in our earlier analyses?32 What is that Gemüt which concerning which it is said that it is affected by objects (A 19, B33) and that it is that within which resides the form of receptivity (A20, B34)? This puzzle becomes all the more pressing when being-affected becomes self-affection. Time is implicated here in a much more radical way, emphasized in the second edition of the Critique (B66-69). Time is still where "we locate [setzen] our representations" and remains the "formal condition for the way we arrange [the representations] in our Gemut." In this sense, it can be nothing else than the way in which our mind is affected by its own activity, that is, by this positing (Setzung); hence, by itself; that is, as an inner sense considered just in terms of its form. The conclusion Kant draws, that the mind does not intuit itself as it is but as it represents itself under the condition of this self-affection, cannot be allowed to cover up the specific difficulty attached to this self-affection, which being-affected culminates in. If there is a point where time is revealed to be inscrutable, at least to the gaze of a transcendental deduction in charge of itself, it most certainly has to do with this notion of the permanence of time, along with the implications for time of self-affection.

It would be useless to seek in Husserl for traces of an archaism or echoes of a hermeticism that would point toward a time more fundamental than any constitution. The goal of the lectures on internal time-consciousness is, as is well known, to constitute in a single stroke both consciousness and the time immanent to it. In this regard, Husserl's transcendentalism is no less vigilant than that of Kant. Nevertheless, beyond the difficulty referred to above about deriving the totality of time from the continuity of the process of the coincidence of longitudinal intentionalities, I would like to refer one last time to the paradox of attempting a discourse on the hyletic once intentionality ad extra has been suspended. All the difficulties, in Kant, tied to self-affection return with a vengeance to threaten the self-constitution of consciousness. These underlying difficulties find their translation on the level of the language in which we attempt to speak of this constitution. What is striking in the first place is the thoroughly metaphorical character of this transcendental hyletics: surging forth, source, falling-
analytic of Dasein to the understanding of Being itself may be said to verge on hermeticism insofar as it is true that the breakthrough brings hermeneutic phenomenology to the limits of its ownmost possibilities. In fact, Heidegger attempts this breakthrough without conceding anything to the modern equivalents of the Schwarmerei—that kind of delirious exaltation denounced by Kant—that were for Heidegger as for Husserl the philosophies of life, of existence, of dialogue.

The relation of the analytic of Dasein to the understanding of Being cannot be revealed, outside of the still programmatic declarations of the long Introduction to Being and Time, except in the signs of the incompleteness of the analytic, the only thing carried to its end in Being and Time as published—signs that also testify that this analytic is not meant to confine itself to a philosophical anthropology. The danger of misunderstanding Heidegger's philosophical project in the period of Being and Time is not only not set aside, it is even made stronger by the assimilation of the problematic of time to that of Being-a-whole, and of this latter to Being-towards-death. It is difficult to see at the end of the second section of Being and Time in what way its analyses satisfy the title given the first part: "The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being" (p. 67). It is the second half of this title that seems to lack a corresponding part in the analysis: that, at best, proposes an interpretation of the ecstatic character of time, but says nothing about how it opens the way to the question of Being. The question of Being-a-whole as explicated by that of Being-towards-death seems instead to close off this horizon.

However, The Basic Problems in Phenomenology goes further in this regard than does Being and Time, by proposing to distinguish between temporal-being (Temporalität)—or "Temporality" in the English translation—and "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit) in the sense given by Being and Time. It is precisely the constantly interrogatory aspect of the thinking that sustains this distinction that, after the fact, makes apparent the inscrutable character of temporality in Being and Time.

This distinction between temporal-being and temporality in fact finds its completion in a movement that remained unperceived in Being and Time, namely, a reversal in Heidegger's use of the notion of a condition of possibility. It is repeated that "the constitution of Dasein's being is grounded in temporality" (Basic Problems, p. 228). But Heidegger now adds that the meaning of temporality is the "ontological condition of the possibility of the understanding of being" (ibid.). This new use of the notion of possibility is governed by the description of temporality as the horizon in terms of which we understand Being. The conjunction of two words, ecstatic and horizontal (in the sense of having to do with a horizon), indicates the opening of the new problematic placed under the title temporal-being (pp. 265-68).

In this new problematic the horizontal aspect of time is directly linked to the intentionality constitutive of each of the ecstases of time, particularly to that of the future, understood in the sense of Being-ahead-of-itself and of coming-towards-itself. The role of Being-towards-death in relation to the totalization of ecstatic time is passed over in silence, while ecstatic transport towards . . ., in the direction of . . ., which indicates the inflection of the problematic, is accentuated. From here on, Heidegger speaks of ecstatic horizontal temporality, where it is understood that horizontal signifies "characterized by a horizon given with the ecstasis itself" (p. 267). To Heidegger, this deploying of a horizon on the basis of the ecstatic bears witness to the rule of the phenomenon of
intentionality over any phenomenological approach. However, in contrast to Husserl, it is the ecstatic horizontal aspect of temporality that conditions intentionality, not the reverse. So intentionality is rethought in a deliberately on-tological sense as the projection toward . . . implied in the understanding of Being. By discerning in this something like a "projection of being upon time" (p. 280), Heidegger thinks he also can discern the orientation of temporality toward its horizon, temporal-being or Temporality.

We must confess that, given the framework of a kind of thinking that still means to be phenomenological—that is, governed by the idea of intentionality—all Heidegger's assertions about this "projection of being upon time" are still cryptic. What help he proposes to making sense of them threatens to overturn them, for example, in the comparison of this new proposal to Plato's well-known "beyonding" (epekeïna tes ousias) in Book VI of the Republic. His proposal is certainly meant to inquire "even beyond being as to that upon which being itself, as being, is projected" (p. 282), but when separated from the idea of the Good, there is not much help to be found in the sage beyond. "We call this whither of the ecstasy the horizon or, more precisely, the horizontal schema of the ecstasy" (p. 302). But then what do we in fact understand when we say that the "most original temporaliZing of temporality as such is Temporality"? (ibid.). In truth, nothing, if we are not in a position to be able to link the distinction between temporal and temporaliZing to the ontological difference; that is, the difference between Being and beings, which is set forth publicly for the first time in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. The distinction between temporal and temporaliZing thus has just a single function—to point toward the ontological difference. Apart from this role, it only succeeds in indicating the inscrutable character of temporality understood as the wholeness of Dasein. For, taken by itself, the distinction between temporal-being and temporality no longer designates a phenomenon accessible to hermeneutic phenomenology as such. The most cumbersome question our whole enterprise runs into may be summed up in the question of whether the unrepresentability of time still has a parallel on the side of narrativity. At first sight, this question seems incongruous. What sense is there in refiGuide the inscrutable? However the poetics of narrative does have some resources when faced with this question. It is in the way that narrativity is carried toward its limits that the secret of its reply to the inscrutability of time lies.

Several times we have broached the question of the limits of narrativity, but never in relation to the unrepresentability of time. For example, we asked whether the Aristotelian model of emplotment could still account for the more complex forms of composition used in contemporary historiography and the modern novel. On the side of historiography, this question led us to elaborate the notions of a quasi-plot, a quasi-character, and a quasi-event, which indicate that the initial model of emplotment is pushed by historiography close to the breaking-point beyond which we may no longer say that history is an extension of narrative.54 We had to say something similar regarding the novel, and to admit that, in this period that some call postmodern, it may be that we no longer know what narrating means. With Walter Benjamin, we deplored the fatal mutation that would result from the passage of humanity to a stage where no one any longer had any experience to communicate to someone else. And with Frank Kermode, we even declared our faith in narrative's capacity for metamorphoses that will allow it for a long time yet to resist such a schism.

But the limits that are at issue here are of another order. The earlier ones had to do with the capacity of narrative to refiGuide the time on the basis of its own internal configuration. Now it is a question of the very limits of such a refiGuide of time by narrative.

The term "limit" can be taken in two senses. By an internal limit, we mean to draw near the inscrutable. By an external limit, we mean that the narrative genre itself overflows into other genres of discourse that, in their own ways, undertake to speak of time. Let us first consider the limits narrative itself explores inside its own domain. The fictional narrative is assuredly the form best equipped for this borderline work. And we already know its preferred method, that of imaginary variations. In the chapter devoted to them above, we were not able to remain within the boundaries we assigned ourselves, namely, examining solutions other than those of history that fiction brings to the problem of the duality of the pheno-nomenological and the cosmological interpretations of time. Moving beyond this framework, we ventured to evaluate the contributions of our tales about time to the explorations of the relations between time and its other. The reader will undoubtedly recall our references to the high points of our three tales about time, moments when the extreme concentration on temporality leads to a variety of limit-experiences worthy of being placed under the sign of eternity. Unforgettable are the tragic choice Septimus makes in Mrs. Dalloway, the three figures of eternity in The Magic Mountain—Ewigkeitssuppe, Wal-purgisnacht, and the Schnee episode—the double eternity of Time Regained, one form of which overcomes lost time and one form of which engenders the work that will attempt to redeem time itself. Fiction multiplies our experiences of eternity in these kinds of ways, thereby bringing narrative in different ways to its own limits. This multiplication of limit-experiences should not surprise us, if we keep in mind the fact that each work of fiction unfolds its own world. In each instance, it is in a different possible world that time allows itself to be surpassed by eternity. This is how tales about time become tales about time and its other. Nowhere is this function of fiction, which is to serve as a laboratory for an
the impression prevailed of a complicity between the nonmastery inherent in our thrownness and fallenness, and ordinary time. At that point, we noted the oscillations that our meditation imposed on our feelings. Sometimes however inhuman they may be. The same tone imposed itself anew, at the end of our aporetics this time, on the beginning of our aporetics, on the occasion of a short note on time in the of the sempiternal elegy, the lyrical figure of the lament. For example, we allowed ourselves briefly, at the have recognized, dissimulated at several places in our text, under the modesty and sobriety of prose, the echoes conflict between love and death, the vastness of a universe that pays no attention to our lament. The reader will have access to this fundamental element. It is not for the narrative art to deplore the brevity of life, the unmarked by national boundaries, that, beyond the episodic, touches the fundamental. Lyric poetry gives a voice, which is also a song, to this fundamental element. Irony is the only thing that stands between this fiction and the naive repetition of a myth. Proust, finally, it will be recalled, narrativizes a metaphysical experience of lost identity, stemming from German Idealism, to the point where we may just as well speak of the supratemporal experience of Beauty as an initiation, whence comes the impulse of creation as it moves toward the work wherein it must be incarnated. It is not by accident, therefore, that in Remembrance of Things Past time seems almost to be remythized. Destructive time, on the one hand, "Time, the artist," on the other. Nor is it an accident that Remembrance of Things Past ends with the words "in the dimension of Time." "In" is no longer taken here in the ordinary sense of a location in some vast container, but in the sense, close both to the archaic and the hermetic, where time contains all things—including the narrative that tries to make sense of this.

There is another way for time to envelop narrative. This is by giving rise to the formation of discursive modes other than the narrative one, which will speak, in another way, of the profound enigma. There comes a moment, in a work devoted to the power of narrative to elevate time to language, where we must admit that narrative is not the whole story and that time can be spoken of in other ways, because, even for narrative, it remains inscrutable.

I myself was made attentive to these external limits of narrative by biblical exegesis. Indeed, the Hebrew Bible can be read as the testament about time in its relations to divine eternity (given all the reservations mentioned above concerning the equivocity of the word "eternity"). And in this text, narrative is not the only way of speaking about time's relation to its other. Whatever the scope of narrative contained therein, it is always in conjunction with other genres that narrative functions in the Hebrew Bible.

This conjunction, in the Bible, between the narrative and the nonnarrative invites us to inquire whether in other forms of literature as well, narrative does not join its meaning effects to those of other genres, to speak of what in time is most rebellious when it comes to representation. I shall limit myself here to referring briefly to the trilogy, well known even today to German poetics: epic, drama, lyric. As regards the first two genres, we have allowed, ever since our analysis of Aristotle's Poetics, that they can be enrolled, without excessive violence, under the banner of narrative, taken in a broad sense, inasmuch as employment is common to all of them. But does the argument that holds for the point of view about the configuration of time still hold for the point of view about its refiguration? It is noteworthy that monologues and dialogues open, within the purely narrative framework of feigned action,

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the one hand, the enchantment of a time that has become unmeasurable through loss of its handholds and measures; on the other hand, the "elevation" (Steigerung) of a modest hero, confronted with the trials of sickness and death, an elevation that sometimes moves through the phases of a clearly acknowledged hermeticism, and that, as a whole, presents the features of an initiation with a cabalistic resonance. Irony is the only thing that stands between this fiction and the naive repetition of a myth. Proust, finally, it will be recalled, narrativizes a metaphysical experience of lost identity, stemming from German Idealism, to the point where we may just as well speak of the supratemporal experience of Beauty as an initiation, whence comes the impulse of creation as it moves toward the work wherein it must be incarnated. It is not by accident, therefore, that in Remembrance of Things Past time seems almost to be remythized. Destructive time, on the one hand, "Time, the artist," on the other. Nor is it an accident that Remembrance of Things Past ends with the words "in the dimension of Time." "In" is no longer taken here in the ordinary sense of a location in some vast container, but in the sense, close both to the archaic and the hermetic, where time contains all things—including the narrative that tries to make sense of this.

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the one hand, the enchantment of a time that has become unmeasurable through loss of its handholds and measures; on the other hand, the "elevation" (Steigerung) of a modest hero, confronted with the trials of sickness and death, an elevation that sometimes moves through the phases of a clearly acknowledged hermeticism, and that, as a whole, presents the features of an initiation with a cabalistic resonance. Irony is the only thing that stands between this fiction and the naive repetition of a myth. Proust, finally, it will be recalled, narrativizes a metaphysical experience of lost identity, stemming from German Idealism, to the point where we may just as well speak of the supratemporal experience of Beauty as an initiation, whence comes the impulse of creation as it moves toward the work wherein it must be incarnated. It is not by accident, therefore, that in Remembrance of Things Past time seems almost to be remythized. Destructive time, on the one hand, "Time, the artist," on the other. Nor is it an accident that Remembrance of Things Past ends with the words "in the dimension of Time." "In" is no longer taken here in the ordinary sense of a location in some vast container, but in the sense, close both to the archaic and the hermetic, where time contains all things—including the narrative that tries to make sense of this.

There is another way for time to envelop narrative. This is by giving rise to the formation of discursive modes other than the narrative one, which will speak, in another way, of the profound enigma. There comes a moment, in a work devoted to the power of narrative to elevate time to language, where we must admit that narrative is not the whole story and that time can be spoken of in other ways, because, even for narrative, it remains inscrutable.

I myself was made attentive to these external limits of narrative by biblical exegesis. Indeed, the Hebrew Bible can be read as the testament about time in its relations to divine eternity (given all the reservations mentioned above concerning the equivocity of the word "eternity"). And in this text, narrative is not the only way of speaking about time's relation to its other. Whatever the scope of narrative contained therein, it is always in conjunction with other genres that narrative functions in the Hebrew Bible.

This conjunction, in the Bible, between the narrative and the nonnarrative invites us to inquire whether in other forms of literature as well, narrative does not join its meaning effects to those of other genres, to speak of what in time is most rebellious when it comes to representation. I shall limit myself here to referring briefly to the trilogy, well known even today to German poetics: epic, drama, lyric. As regards the first two genres, we have allowed, ever since our analysis of Aristotle's Poetics, that they can be enrolled, without excessive violence, under the banner of narrative, taken in a broad sense, inasmuch as employment is common to all of them. But does the argument that holds for the point of view about the configuration of time still hold for the point of view about its refiguration? It is noteworthy that monologues and dialogues open, within the purely narrative framework of feigned action,
that other nonmastery recalled to us by the contemplation of the sovereign movement of the stars; sometimes, on the contrary, the feeling prevailed of the incommensurability between the time allotted mortals and the vastness of cosmic time. In this we found ourselves buffeted back and forth between the resignation engendered by the collusion between these two forms of nonmastery and the grief that is ceaselessly reborn from the contrast between the fragility of life and the power of time that destroys. In this, and other ways, the lyricism of meditative thinking goes right to the fundamental without passing through the art of narrating. This final conjunction of the epic, the dramatic, and the lyric was announced in the Preface to volume 1 of Time and Narrative. Lyric poetry, we said, borders on dramatic poetry. The redescription referred to in The Rule of Metaphor and the refiguration of Time and Narrative thus change their roles, when, under the aegis of "Time, the artist," are conjoined the power of re-description unfolded by lyrical discourse and the mimetic power imparted by narrative discourse.

Let us cast one final glance over the path we have covered. In these concluding pages we have distinguished three levels in the aporetics of time that we first articulated in terms of particular authors and their works. The passage from one level to another indicates a certain progression without for all that turning into a system, under the threat of dismantling the systematic argumentation contained in each aporia and in the last one more than any other. The same wondrous ror all that forming a binding chain. Indeed, nothing obliges us to pass from the notion of narrative identity to that of the idea of the unity of history, then to the confession of the limits of narrative in the face of the mystery of time that envelops us. In one sense, the pertinence of the reply of narrative to the aporias of time diminishes as we move from one stage to the next, to the point where time seems to emerge victorious from the struggle, after having been held captive in the lines of the plot. It is good that it should be so. It ought not to be said that our eulogy to narrative unthinkingly has given life again to the claims of the constituting subject to master all meaning. On the contrary, it is fitting that every mode of thought should verify the validity of its employment in the domain assigned to it, by taking an exact measure of the limits to its employment. Yet, if, from one aporia to another and from one poetic reply to another, the progression is a free one, the reverse order, in return, is binding. It is not true that the confession of the limits of narrative abolishes the positing of the idea of the unity of history, with its ethical and political implications. Rather it calls for this idea. Nor should it be said that the confession of the limits of narrative, correlative to the confession of the mystery of time, makes room for obscurantism. The mystery of time is not equivalent to a prohibition directed against language. Rather it gives rise to the exigence to think more and to speak differently. If such be the case, we must pursue to its end the return movement, and hold that the reaffirmation of the historical consciousness within the limits of its validity requires in turn the search, by individuals and by the communities to which they belong, for their respective narrative identities. Here is the core of our whole investigation, for it is only within this search that the aporetics of time and the poetics of narrative correspond to each other in a sufficient way.

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7. See ibid., pp. 175-225.

SECTION ONE

1. See Time and Narrative, 1:70-87. Need we recall what was said above about the relation between the aporetics of time and the poetics of narrative? If the latter
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belong in principle to the cycle of mimesis, the former stems from a reflective, autonomous mode of thought. However, to the extent that this mode of thought formulates the question to which poetics offers a reply, a privileged relation is established between the aporetics of time and the mimetics of narrative by the logic of questions and answers.

Chapter One

1. The progress of the phenomenology of time in Husserl and Heidegger will reveal in retrospect other, more deeply hidden, defects in the Augustinian analysis. Their resolution of these difficulties will result in even more serious aporias.


3. Below, we shall see that a theory of time enlightened by narrative understanding cannot do without measurable time, even if it cannot rest content with this time alone.


6. Aristotle gives a simple reply to both questions: when I compare long and short syllables, "it cannot be the syllables themselves that I measure since they no longer exist. I must be measuring something which remains fixed in my memory Indo in-fixo manenti* (*Confessions*, XI, 27:35). The notion of a fixed unit is (hereby posed. "For everything which happens leaves an impression [affectionem] on it [my mind], and this impression remains [manet] after the thing itself has ceased to be. It is the impression that I measure, since it is still present, not the thing itself, which makes the impression as it passes" (ibid., 27:36).

7. I am adopting the interpretation of Paul F. Coien, *Die l奇特eithen der Aristoteles* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1964), that the treatise on lime (*Physics*, IV, 10-14) has as its core a short treatise (218b9-219b2) carefully constructed in three sections, to which are appended a series of smaller treatises, loosely connected to the central argument and relating to questions discussed in Aristotle's school or by his contemporaries. The question of the relation between the soul and time, along with that of the instant, are part of these important appendices. Victor Goldschmidt, in a study that is as meticulous and illuminating as his work always is, entitled *Temps physique et Temps Irragique chez Aristote* (Paris: Vrin, 1982), attempts to connect the analyses that follow the deli-nil ion of lime more solidly to the core of his deli nil ion. The instant, however, has lo be considered separately (ibid., pp. 147-89). When the lime comes we shall carefully consider the suggestions contained in these insightful pages.


9. This negative thesis is treated under the heading "preliminary precisions" by Goldschmidt (pp. 22-29), who, unlike Paul Cohen, makes the definition begin only at 291a1. As regards this minor problem of how to divide up the text, Goldschmidt himself advises us "not to insist on being more precise than the author, under pain of giving in, more than need be, to pedantry" (ibid., p. 22).


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11. On the phrase "goes with," cf. Goldschmidt, p. 32: "The verb *akolouthein* . . . does not always indicate a one-way relation of dependence: it may designate concomitance as well as consecutivity." Thus it is stated further on in the *Physics* that movement and time "define each other" (220b16). "Therefore, it is not a question of on-tological dependence but of determinations that mutually accompany each other" (Goldschmidt, p. 33).


13. This reference to the soul's activity, once again, must not lead us astray. It is certainly true that we could not discern the before and after, whether in time or in movement, without an activity of discrimination belonging to the soul. "But we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by before and after; and it is only when we have perceived before and after in motion that we can say that time has elapsed" (*Physics*, 219a22-24). The argument is not intended to stress the verbs "apprehend," "mark," and "perceive," but rather the priority of the before and after belonging to movement in relation to (he before and after belonging to time. The order of priority, first noted on the level of apprehension, attests to the same order on the level of things themselves: first magnitude, then movement, and then time (through the mediation of place). "The distinction of before and after holds primarily, then, in place" (ibid., 291a4).


15. J. C. Callahan notes that in the definition of time number is added to movement as form is to matter. The inclusion of number in the definition of time is essential, in the precise sense of this term (Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948], pp. 77-82).


17. Aristotle admits this. But, scarcely having granted this concession, he returns to his task. Although there would not be lime unless there were soul, there would exist "that of which time is an attribute, i.e. if movement can exist without the soul" (*Physics*, 223a27-28). He can then conclude, as he did above, that the "before and after are attributes of movement, and lime is these qua countable" (ibid., 223a28). In other words, if a soul is required, in order actually to count, movement alone suffices to define lime countable, which "has something to do with movement" and which we call time. Noetic activity may therefore be implied in the argumentation without being included in the definition of time, properly speaking.

18. The *Tanaeu* deserves to be mentioned at this point in our investigation, for there time finds its original place not in the human soul but in the world soul, and has as its ultimate end the task of making the world "still more like the original" (37c). To what, then, is time added by this act of the Demiurge in this "likely story"? What added touch of perfection is given to the world order as its crowning achievement? The first noteworthy feature of the world soul is that its structure links together, before any phenomenology of lime, the cosmological and (he psychological; self-motion (as in the *Phaedo, the Phaedrus, and the Laws*) and knowledge (logos, panneis), and even "solid and hue" *doxai and psileia*. A second, even more important feature is that what time completes is a highly dialectical, ontological constitution, depicted by a series of collisions, the terms of which are indivisible existence and divisible existence, then indivisible sameness and divisible sameness, and finally indivisible difference and divisible difference. In Francis M. Cornford's *Plato's Cosmos: The Timaeus of Plato translated with a running commentary* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), pp. 59-67, we find a diagrammed discussion of this extremely complex ontological constitution. It is taken up again by Luc Brisson, *Le Meme et l'Autre dans la structure ontologique du Timiee tie Platon: le commentaire systematique du Timiee de 277*.

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*Platon* (Paris: Klinkciscck, 1974), p. 275, where he offers a translation of this difficult passage that is quite enlightening.
Brisson reconstructs the entire structure of the *77-maevus* around the polarity of sameness and difference, situating the bases of the philosophy of time on the same level as the dialectic of the "leading kinds" in the *Sophist*. Let us mention a final feature that distinguishes the ontology of time even further from any human psychology. I am referring to the harmonic relations (divisions, intervals, medians, proportional relations) that preside over the construction of the armillary sphere, with its circle of sameness and its circle of difference, and its inner circles. What does time add to this complex dialectical mathematical structure? First, it seals the unity of the movements of the great celestial clock. In this, it is singular, one ("a moving image of eternity" [37d]). Next, owing to the setting of the planets into their appropriate places—Conbrct aptly translates *agalma* (37c) not as "image" but as "a shrine brought into being for the everlasting gods," that is, the planets (cf. pp. 97-101)—this unique time is divided up into days, months, years; hence it permits measurement. From this follows the second definition of time: an "eternal image, but moving according to number" (37d). When all the celestial revolutions, having harmonized their speeds, have returned to the starting point, then we may say that "the perfect number of time fulfills the perfect year" (39d). This perpetual return constitutes the nearest approximation that the world can provide to the perpetual duration of the immutable world. Therefore, beneath the distention of the soul, there is a time—the very one we call Time—that cannot exist without these celestial measures, because it "came into being at the same instant" with the heavens (38b). It is an aspect of the world order. Regardless of what we may think, do, or see, it partakes of the regularity of circular locomotion. In saying this, however, we touch on the point where the marvelous borders on the enigmatic. In the universe of symbols, the circle signifies much more than the circle of geometers and astronomers. Under the cosmo-psychology of the world soul is concealed the ancient wisdom that has always known that time encircles us, surrounds us like an ocean. This is why no project of constituting time can ever abolish the certainly that, like all other beings, we, too, are in Time. This is the paradox that a phenomenology of consciousness cannot ignore. When our time is undone under the pressures of the spiritual forces of distraction, what is laid bare is the river of time, the bedrock of celestial time. There are perhaps moments when as discord wins out over concord, our despair finds, if not consolation, at least a recourse and a rest in Plato's marvelous certainty that time is the apex of the inhuman order of the celestial bodies.


20. Paul Conen does not really seem surprised here. The expression "being contained by time," refers, he thinks, to a figurative representation of time, on the basis of which time is put in an analogous relation to place. Through this representation, time is somewhat reified, "as if it had an independent existence itself and unfolded above the things that are contained by it" (p. 145). Can we be content with just observing "the overtly metaphorical character of the expression "being contained by time""? (ibid.). Is this not rather the ancient mythopoeical ground that resists philosophical exegesis? Conen, it is true, does not fail to mention in this connection the pre-philosophical intuitions that underlie these common expressions (ibid., pp. 146f.). In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), Martin Heidegger comes upon this expression in his presentation of the plan of the Aristotelian treatise, which he simply identifies with his own concept of intratemporality (*Innerezeitigkeit*), "something is in time" (ibid., p. 236). We, too, have opened the door to this expression "being in time" by incorporating it into the temporal character of action of the level of mimesis, and hence into the narrative configuration of action.

21. Conen, pp. 72-73, readily grants this twofold incommensurability of the relation of time to movement itself.

22. A reader instructed by Augustine might solve the aporia in the following terms. The instant is always other, inasmuch as the undifferentiated points of time are always different; whereas what is always the same is the present, even though it is in each case designated by the instance of discourse that contains it. If we do not distinguish between the instant and the present, then we must say, along with W. D. Ross, that "every now is a now," and, in this sense, the same. The "now" is other simply "by being an earlier or a later cross-section of a movement" (Aristotle's *Physics, A Revised Text* with Introduction and Commentary [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936], pp. 86-87). The identity of the instant is therefore reduced to a tautology. Among the commentators who have sought to go beyond Aristotle's text in order to find a less tautological answer to the aporia, Conen (p. 141) quotes Brocker, for whom the instant is considered to be the same as a substratum in the sense that "das was jeweilig jetzt ist, ist dasselbc, sofern es Gegenwart ist, jeder Zeitpunkt ist, wenn er ist und nicht war ordner scin wird, Gegenwart." The instant will always be different insofar as "jeder Zeitpunkt war erst Zukunft, kommt in die Gegenwart und geht in die Vergangenheit" (ibid.), in other words, the instant is held to be in one sense the present, in another sense a point of time, the present that is always the same passing through points in time that are uneasiness different. This solution is philosophically satisfying to the extent that it reconciles the present and the instant. But, we must say, it is not Aristotle's solution, for it breaks with his habitual use of the expression *ho pole*, in the sense of substratum, and does not take into account the reference of the instant as such to the identity of the body that is carried, which is supposed to be "followed" by the identity of the instant. Conen (ibid., p. 91) offers an interpretation which, like that of Ross, is intended to remain faithful to Aristotle and does not resort to the distinction between the present and the instant. The identity of the instant is held to be the simultaneity that is shared by different movements. However, this interpretation, which avoids Augustine only to call upon Kant, parts ways with Aristotle's argument, in which the entire weight of the identity of the instant rests on the relation of before and after, which, for another point of view, constitutes an alternative that is the source of difference. Goldschmidt dismisses this recourse to simultaneity to interpret the identity of the instant. "To be in one and the same "now"" (*Physics, 21c246*) cannot mean to be simultaneous but must mean to have the same substratum. "The subject communicates its identity to the movement, with respect to which the before and after can then be said to be identical in two ways: inasmuch as one and the same movement is the substratum, and with regard to its essence, distinct from the movement, inasmuch as each instant makes the potentiality of ‘he moving body pass into act’" (p. 50). This actuality belonging to the in-slanl, which is heavily emphasized throughout Goldschmidt's commentary, is finally what constitutes the dynamism of the instant, beyond the analogy between the instant and the point.

23. Ibid., p. 46.

24. This shift from one vocabulary to the other can be observed in this comment, made as if in passing: "Further, there is the
same time everywhere at once, but not the same time before and after, for while the present [parousa] change is one, the change which has happened [ldgmenomen] and that which will happen [mcllousa] are different” (Physics, 22(b5-8). In this way, Aristotle passes without difficulty from the ideas of the instant and the before and after to those of present, past, and future, inasmuch as the only thing that is relevant for the discussion of the aorist is the opposition between identity and difference.

25. It is in the context of analyses of the expressions occurring in ordinary language (“sometimes,” “one day,” “before,” “suddenly”) that Aristotle makes recourse to the

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INOCs t figc'21 vocabulary of present, past, and future. “The [now] is the link of time, as has been said (for it connects past and future time), and it is a limit [lperas] of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the other)” (Physics, 222a 10-12). Once again, he admits the imperfect nature of the analogy with the point. “But this is not obvious as it is with the point, which is fixed” (ibid., 222a3-14). Conen, who did not follow Brocker in his interpretation of the first aorist of the instant (as different and as same), comes closer to him in his interpretation of the second aorist (the instant as connecting and dividing). According to Conen, Aristotle had two notions of the instant. As long as he considered it as one qua substratum and as different qua essence, he conceived of it in relation to a multitude of points belonging to a single line. On the other hand, when he considered the “now” as the unity of a moving body, he conceived of the instant as producing time, even though it follows the fate of the body in the production of its movement. “According to the first conception, a number of ‘nows’ corresponds to the body in motion” (Conen, p. 115). Conen believes, however, that it is possible to reconcile these two notions in extremis (ibid., pp. 115-16). Here again, Goldschmidt's use of the notion of the dynamic instant, the true expression of potentiality in act, confirms and clarifies Conen's interpretation.

26. Without following in this direction, Goldschmidt observes in relation to the analyses of chapter 13, "Here it is no longer a question of time in its becoming, as undifferentiated, but of a structured time, one structured on the basis of the present instant. The latter determines not only the before and after (22a9) but, more precisely, the past and (he future" (Goldschmidt, p. 98). It is then necessary to distinguish a narrower sense of a structured time and a different instant. "The present instant is then no longer and instant. 'The present instant is then no longer and instant. The instant of the form of which "other" events related to the present form with it in each case a determined and quantifiable lapse of time (227a27)" (ibid., p. 29). A certain polysemy of the instant thus seems unavoidable ("in how many ways we speak of the 'now,' " [Physics, 222b28]), as is suggested by the ordinary language expressions examined in chapter 14 (all of which, to different degrees, refer to the present instant). Goldschmidt comments, "The instant itself, which had served to determine time by before and after and which, in this function, was always 'other' (219a25), is now situated and understood as a present instant, starting from which, in both directions—although with opposite senses—the before and after arc organized" (p. 110).

27. If a transition from Aristotle toward Augustine could be found in the Aristotelian doctrine, would this not be in the theory of time in the Ethics or the Poetics, rather than in the aorist of the instant in the Physics? This is the path that Goldschmidt explores (pp. 159-74). Indeed, pleasure, escaping all movement and all genesis, constitutes a complete whole that can only be an instantaneous production; sensation, too, is produced at all once; all the more so, the happy life that wrests us away from the vicissitudes of fortune. If this is the case, it is so insofar as the instant is also an operation of consciousness, in which "the act transcends the genetic process of which it is, nevertheless, the term" (ibid., p. 181). This is no longer the time of movement, subjected to the order of the imperfect act of potentiality. It is rather the time of the completed act. In this respect, if tragic time never coincides with physical time, it does concur with the time of ethics.

The time that "accomprises" the unfolding of the plot is not that of a genesis but that of a dramatic action considered as a whole; it is the time of an act and not that of a genesis (ibid., pp. 407-8). My own analyses of Aristotle's Poetics in volume 1 of this work agree with this conclusion. This development of the Aristotelian theory of time is impressive, but it does not lead from

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INOCs t lage $2z$.zt Aristotle to Augustine. The instant-as-totality of the Ethics is distinguished from the instant-as-limit of the Physics only by being taken out of time. We can no longer say that it is "in time." Consequently, according to Victor Goldschmidt's analysis, it is less in the direction of Augustine than that of Plotinus and Hegel that the instant-as-totality in the Ethics and—possibly—in the Poetics actually points.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), ed. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana, vol. 10 (The Hague; M. Nijhoff, 1966). According to Boehm's important preface, these lectures were the result of Edith Stein's reworking (Ausarbeitung) of Husserl's manuscripts in her role as his assistant from 1916 to 1918. It was this manuscript, in Stein's handwriting, that Husserl entrusted to Heidegger in 1926, and which was then published by the latter in 1928, hence after Being and Time (1927), in volume 9 of the Jahrbuch fur Philosophische undpnomENOLOGische Forschung, under the title "Edmund Husserls Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologisch-des inneren Zeitbewusstseins." I shall cite the English translation by James S. Churchill, with an Introduction by Calvin O. Schrag, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). While it is incumbent on a historical reconstruction of the genuine thought of Husserl not to ascribe to him in its every detail a text that was prepared and written by Edith Stein, and to submit the main text to a critical examination in the light of the Beilagen and the er-ginzeiul 7 Taxis published by Boehm in Husserliana, vol. 10, and finally to compare these lectures with the Bernau Manuscript soon to be published by the Husserl Archives of Louvain—a philosophical investigation like ours can be based on the text of the lectures as it appeared under Husserl's signature in 1928, and as it was edited by Boehm in 1966. It is, therefore, this text—and this text alone—that we will interpret and discuss under the title of the Husserlian theory of time.

2. "From an Objective point of view every lived experience, like every real being..." “suddenly”) that Aristotle makes recourse to the in its every detail a text that was prepared and written by Edith Stein, and to submit the main text to a critical examination in the light of the Beilagen and the er-ginzeiul 7 Taxis published by Boehm in Husserliana, vol. 10, and finally to compare these lectures with the Bernau Manuscript soon to be published by the Husserl Archives of Louvain—a philosophical investigation like ours can be based on the text of the lectures as it appeared under Husserl's signature in 1928, and as it was edited by Boehm in 1966. It is, therefore, this text—and this text alone—that we will interpret and discuss under the title of the Husserlian theory of time.

3. "What we accept, however, is not the existence of a world-time, the existence of a concrete duration, and the like, but time and duration appearing as such. These, however, are absolute data which would be senseless to call into question" (ibid., p. 23.) There follows an enigmatic statement: "To be sure, we also assume an existing time; this, however, is not the time of the world of experience but the immanent time of the How of consciousness" (ibid.).

4. By hyletics, Husserl means the analysis of the matter (hyle)—or raw impression—of an intentional act, such as perception, abstracting from the form (morphe) that animates it and confers a meaning on it.

5. These two functions of apprehensions—ensuring the expressibility of sensed time and making the constitution of objective time possible—are closely connected to each other in the following text. "Sensed' temporal data are not merely sensed; they are also charged lchafleti with characters of apprehension, and to these again belong certain requirements and qualifications whose function on the basis of the sensed data is to measure appearing times and time-relations against one another and to bring this or that into an Objective order of one sort or another and seemingly to separate this or that into real orders. Finally, what is constituted here as valid. Objective being Sein is the
one infinite Objective time in which all things and events—material things with their physical properties, minds with their mental states—have their definite temporal positions which can be measured by chronometers" (ibid., p. 26). And further on:

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6. Phenomenologically speaking, Objectivity is not even constituted through 'primary' content but through characters of apprehension and the regularities [Gesetzmassigkeit] which pertain to the essence of these characters" (ibid., p. 27).

6. The comparison of the pair objective time/internal time with the pair perceived red/sensed red reinforces this suspicion. "Sensed red is a phenomenological datum which exhibits an Objective quality animated by a certain function of apprehension. This datum is not itself a quality. Not the sensed, but the perceived red is a quality in the true sense, i.e., a characteristic of an appearing thing. Sensed red is red only in an equivocal sense, for red is the name of a real quality" (ibid., p. 25). The phenomenology of time brings about the same sort of pairing and superimposition. "If we call a phenomenological datum 'sensed' which through apprehension corporeally given makes us aware of something Objective, which means, then, that it is Objectively perceived, in the same sense we must also distinguish between a 'sensed' temporal datum and a perceived temporal datum" (ibid.).

7. In this respect, Gerard Grand, Le Sens du temps cl de la perception chez E. Husserl (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), is not wrong in seeing the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness as an enterprise that runs counter to all of Husserlian phenomenology, inasmuch as this phenomenology is first and foremost a phenomenology of perception. For this phenomenology, a hyletics of the sensed must be subordinated to a noetics of the perceived. The Empfindung (sensation, impression) is always superseded in the intention of the thing. What appears is always, par excellence, the perceived, not the sensed. It is always traversed by the intending of the object, it is therefore only as a result of an inversion of the movement of intentional consciousness directed toward the object that the sensed can be established as a distinct appearing, in a hyletics that is itself autonomous. So we have to say that the phenomenology that is directed toward the object only temporarily subordinates the hyletics to the noetic, in anticipation of the elaboration of a phenomenology in which the subordinated layer would become the deepest one. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness is held, by anticipation, to belong to that phenomenology that is deeper than any phenomenology of perception. The question thus arises whether a hyletics of time can free itself from the noetics required by a phenomenology directed toward objects, whether it can keep the promise made in §§ 85 of Ideas, Book I, namely, “descending into the obscure depths of the ultimate consciousness which constitutes all such temporality as belongs to mental processes” (Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982], p. 203). It is in Ideas, I, § 81, that the suggestion is made that perception may perhaps constitute just the most superficial level of phenomenology and that the work as a whole is not placed on the level of the definitive and genuine absolute. And § 81 refers precisely to the 1905 lectures on internal time-consciousness (ibid., p. 194, n. 26). At least we know what price is to be paid here—nothing less than the bracketing of perception itself.

8. The term Erscheinung (appearing) can thus be preserved, but its sense is restricted. The same thing is true of perceiving. "We speak here with reference to the perception of the duration of the sound" [Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness p. 46].

9. As early as the Introduction, Husserl had granted himself the following license: "The evidence that consciousness of a tonal process, a melody, exhibits a succession even as I hear it is such as to make every doubt or denial appear senseless" (ibid., p. 23). In speaking of "a sound" docs Husserl not provide himself with the unity of a duration as required by intentionality itself? This would seem to be the case, insofar as

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(he capacity of an object to be apprehended as the same tests upon the unity of meaning of a concordant intention. Cf. Denise Souchc-Dagues, Le Dtcvloppement de l'inten-tionalite dans la phenomenologic husserlienne (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).

10. Grand aptly characterizes the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness as "a phenomenology without phenomena" (Le Senc du temps, p. 47), in which Husserl strives to describe "perception with or without the perceived" (ibid., p. 52). I part ways with Grand, however, when he compares the Husserlian present to the Hegelian absolute ("the proximity in question here is that of the Absolute, that is to say, of the Hegelian problem that necessarily emerges after the results of the truths on the Kantian level" [ibid., p. 46]). The interpretation I am proposing of the third section of the Lectures excludes this comparison inasmuch as it is the entire flow of time, as well as the living present, that would be carried to the level of the absolute.

11. "By Zeitobjekte [Churchill translates this as 'temporal Objects'], in this particular sense, we mean Objects which are not only unities in time but also . . . include temporal extension in themselves [Zeitextension]" [Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 43].

12. Jacques Derrida, in Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evans-ton: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 60-69, stresses the subsersive aspect of this solidarity between the living present and retention as regards the primacy of the Augenblick, hence the point-like present, identical to itself, required by the intuitionist conception of the sixth Logical Investigation. "Despite this motif of the punctual now as 'primal form' (Urform) of consciousness (Ideas I), the body of the description in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness and elsewhere prohibits our speaking of a simple self-identity of the present. In this way not only is what could be called the metaphysical assurance par excellence shaken, but, closer to our concerns, the 'im selben Augenblick' argument in the Investigations is undermined" (ibid., pp. 63-64).

Irrespective of the alleged dependence of the Husserlian theory of intuition on pure self-presence in the point-like now, it is precisely to the Husserl of the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness that we must credit the discovery that "the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention)" (ibid., p. 64; his emphasis). And in so doing, Husserl gives a strong sense to the distinction between the present and the instant, which is the decisive moment of our entire analysis. To preserve his discovery, we must not place on the same side, under the common heading 'otherness,' the
non-perception characteristic of recollection and the nonperception ascribed to retention, under the threat of cancelling out the essential phenomenological difference between retention, which is constituted in continuity with perception, and recollection, which alone is, in the strong sense of the word, a nonperception. In this sense, Husserl paves the way for a philosophy of presence that would include the sui generis otherness of retention. Derrida is not mistaken in seeing in the trace, as early as the writing of *Speech and Phenomena*, "a possibility which not only must inhabit the pure actuality of the now but must constitute it through the very movement of difference it introduces" (ibid., p. 67). And he goes on to add, "Such a trace is—if we can employ this language without immediately contradicting it or crossing it out as we proceed—more 'primordial' than what is phenomenologically primordial" (ibid.). Below, we shall subscribe to a similar conception of the trace. But it can only counter a phenomenology that confuses the living present with the point-like instant. By contributing to the defeat of this confusion, Husserl sharpens the Augustinian notion of the threefold present and, more precisely, of the "present of the past."

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13. O P


15. Therefore "the continuity of running-off-of of an enduring Object is a continuum whose phases are the continua of the modes of running-off of the different temporal points of the duration of the Object" (*Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, pp.49-50). This continuity between the original impression and the retentional modification is stressed by B. Crcnct, "Die gegenwartige Gegenwart. Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit in Husserls Analyse des Zeitbewusstseins," in Ernst Wolfgang Orth, ed., *Zeit und Zeitslichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Freiburg/Munich: Karl Alber, 1983), pp. 16-57; see also idem, "La presence du passe dans Panalyse husserlicic de la conscience du temps," *Revue de metaphysique et de morale* 8X (1983): 178-98. According to Crcnc, what is in question is not (he combining together of presence and nonpresence. "The crucial question becomes (hat of (he phenomenonation of absence. . . . The subject can apprehend itself as a constituting subject only if its presence goes beyond the present and spills over onto the past present and the present to come" (ibid., p. 179). This "extended present" (ibid., p. 183) is indivisibly now (Jetzpunki and the present of the past.

16. The parts 'Stile' which by a process of abstraction we can throw into relief can be only in the entire running-off. This is also true of the phases and points of the continuity of running-off" (Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 48). A parallel with Aristotle might be sought in taking up (he paradox that the instant both divides and connects. Under Ihe fast aspect, it proceeds from the continuity it interrupts; under the second aspect, it produces the continuity.

17. The German sich abschatten is difficult to translate. "Moreover, every earlier point of this series shades off [\(\check{\upsilon}W; \text{abschatten}\) again] wiederem as a now in the sense of retention. Thus, in each of these retentions is included a continuity of retentional modifications, and (his continuity is itself again a point of actuality which retentionally shades off" (ibid., p. 51).

18. It is interesting to note that Husserl here compare the heritages of the present of the past.

19. It is with the same intention that the source-point is said to begin the "'generation' ['Erzeugung'] of the enduring Object," at the beginning of §11. The notions of "generation" and "source-point" arc to be understood as making sense in terms of each other.

20. In the same sense, "Just as in perception, I sec what has being now, and in extended perceptions, no matter how constituted, what has enduring being, so in primary resemblance 1 see what is past. What is past is given therein, and givenness of the past is memory" (ibid., p. 189); by "iterative structure" we are to understand the modification of retentional modifications of an original impression due to which a "now" becomes not only a having-been-now but a having-been-a-having-been. It is in this way that each new retention modifies prior

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retentions, because of the structure of this modification of modifications, each retention is said to carry within itself the "heritage" of the entire preceding process. This expression signifies that "the past is continually remodeled on the basis of the present of retention and I that 1 it is only this present modification of the past that permits the experience of temporal duration" (ibid., p. 190). 1 would add that this iteration contains the seed of the apprehension of the duration as a form.

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21. The theory of retention represents a real advance in relation to the Augustinian analysis of the image of the past, held to be an "impression fixed in the mind." The intentionality of the present replies directly to the enigma of a vestige that would be at once something present and the sign of something absent.

22. These two terms arc to be found side by side (ibid., p. 57).

23. "Everything thus resembles perception and primary remembrance and yet is not itself perception and primary remembrance" (ibid., p. 58).

24. Note the insistence on characterizing "the past itself as perceived" (ibid., p. 61), and on the "just past" in its "self-givenness" (Schicksalgegebenheit) (ibid.).

25. In Haysiespecl, hhe most forceful passage in (he *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* is (he following. "Heredofores, consciousness of the past, i.e., the primary one, was not perception because perception was designated as the act originally constituting the now. Consciousness of the past, however, does not constitute a now but rather a 'just-having-been' [ein soeben gewesen] that intuitively precedes the now. However, if we call perception the act in which all 'origination' lies, which constitutes originally, then primary remembrance is perception. For only in primary remembrance do we see what is past; only in it is the past constituted, i.e., not in a representative but in representative way" (ibid., p. 64; his emphases).

26. We therefore find in §20 a phenomenological elucidation of the phenomena classed by literary criticism under the headings of narrated time and the time of narra-ion, or of acceleration and slowing down, of abbreviation, even of inserting one narrative inside another. For example, "And in the same temporal interval in which the precenilation really takes place, we can 'in freedom' accommodate larger and smaller parts of the presented event with its modes of running-off and consequently run through it more quickly or slowly" (ibid., p. 71). However, we must admit that Husserl hardly deviates from the identical reproduction of a past that is presented and then represented, and this
considerably limits the foundational power of this analysis with respect to literary criticism.

27. Bernet uses the following terms to emphasize the significance of the theory of reproduction through recollection in ascertaining the status of truth in a metaphysics of the extended present. "The concept of truth inherent in the Husserlian analysis of recollection stems from the wish to neutralize the temporal difference in the split presence of intentional consciousness to itself. This analysis is marked by an epistemological preoccupation that entails an examination of the truth of memory as a correspondence, the being of consciousness as representation or reproduction, and the temporal absence of the past as a masked presence of consciousness to itself" ("La presence du passe," p. 197). Bernet is not wrong in opposing to this epistemological preoccupation at-

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tempts such as Danto's and my own to connect historical truth to narrativity, rather than to a split presence of consciousness to itself (ibid., p. 198). I would say that narrativity constitutes this split presence and not the opposite.

28. Husserl no longer italicizes the "re-" of Representation and he writes repräsen-tieren without a hyphen.

29. The assertion that "notwithstanding these differences, expectational intuition is something primordial and unique exactly as is intuition of the past" (ibid., p. 81) will find its full justification only in a philosophy that will put care in the place occupied by perception in Husserl's phenomenology of perception.

30. We may wonder, nevertheless, whether the appearance of a vocabulary relating to "form," to which is connected that of "place" or temporal position, is not an indication of the guiding role played secretly by the representation of objective time in the development of the pure description. Everything occurs as if the idea of unique linear succession served as an ideological guide for seeking and finding, in the relation between the secondary intentionality of representation and the primary intentionality of retention, an approximation that is as close as possible to the idea of linear succession. This presupposition is concealed under the a priori laws that Husserl deciphers in the constitution of the flux. This recurrent objection must be kept constantly in mind in order to understand the strategic role of the third section of the work. This is where we discover the true ambition of the Husserlian undertaking.

31. "We must distinguish at all times: consciousness (flux), appearance (immanent Object), and transcendent object (if it is not the primary content of an immanent Object)" (ibid., p. 101).

32. "Because it is individually preserved, the primordial now-intention appears in the ever new simultaneous consciousness, posited in one with intentions which, the further they stand temporally from the now-intention, the more they throw into relief an ever increasing difference or disparity. What is at first coincident and then nearly coincident becomes ever more widely separated: the old and the new no longer appear to be in essence completely the same but as ever different and strange, despite similarity as to kind. In this way arises the consciousness of the 'gradually changed,' of the growing disparity in the (lux of continuous identification" (ibid., pp. 113-14).

33. §§42-45 are loosely connected to what precedes. I3ochm considers them to have been written after 1911. The fact that they were added at a relatively late date confirms the hypothesis that this final touch added to the manuscripts also stands as the final word.

34. We cannot help but recall the Augustinian thesis that memory is a presence of things past, due to the impressional character of an image impressed upon the mind.


36. The text quoted in the preceding note continues: "but there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition of an inner state is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time" (ibid.).

37. Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science, trans P. G. Lucas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955), pp. 11-16, has perfectly characterized the ontological form of the problem and stressed the role of Leibniz's refutation of Newton in eliminating the third solution. It remained for Kant to substitute for the

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Leibnizian solution, which made time and space phaenomena Dei, one that would make them representations of the human mind.

38. On this interpretation of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in terms of the axi-omatization of mathematical science and the ability to construct mathematical entities in a Euclidian space, cf. Martin, pp. 29-36. This excellent interpreter of Kant refers the reader to the transcendental doctrine of "Method," chapter 1, section 1, A713, B741: "Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts, mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from the construction of concepts," where constructing a concept is representing (darstellen) a priori the intuition corresponding to it. In the second of his "General Observations on the Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant connects the intuitive character of space and time and the relational and constructivist character of the sciences made possible by the former as follows: "everything in our knowledge which belongs to intuition . . . contains nothing but mere relations" (B67). We shall return below to what follows in this text (B67-68), where time is considered as that in which we "place" our representations and where time is connected to Selbstaffektion through our action. It is noteworthy that it is still with respect to the Gemüt that this can be said "pharnomenologically."

39. If "the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us" (A42). At first sight, the "only in us" seems to align Kant with Augustine and Husserl. In fact, it separates him from them as well. The "only" marks the scar of his polemical argument. As for the "in us," it designates no one in particular, but the humana conditio, according to the words of the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. See "On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World," in Kant: Selected Precritical Writings and Correspondence with Heek, trans. G. B. Ker-fcrd and D. E. Walford (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968), pp. 45-92.
40. J. N. Findlay, *Kant and the Transcendental Object: A Hermeneutic Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 82-83. According to Findlay, the Kantian conception of pure intuition "does not exclude many obscure and dispositional elements" (ibid., p. 90). Findlay finds in the handling of the schematism "the same sort of 'ontologization' of the dispositional" (ibid.).

41. The very definition of sensibility in terms of receptivity, which is maintained in the "Transcendental Aesthetic," opens the way for this consideration. "Sensibility is the receptivity of a subject by which it is possible for the subject's representative state to be affected in a definite way by the presence of some object" (*Inaugural Dissertation*, p. 54; his emphasis). The condition of our being-affected is not visibly identified with the conditions for the constitution of mathematical entities. Following the lines of the *Dissertation*, a phenomenology of configuration might be sketched out that would link together the condition of being-affected and the capacity for empirical structuring. The final lines of Section III give some credence to the idea of an indirect phenomenology that would be blind to—or rather, blinded by—the reasoning through presupposition.

Concerning space and time, it is said, "But truly each of the concepts without any doubt has been acquired, not by abstraction from the sensing of objects indeed (for sensation gives the matter and not the form of human cognition), but from the very action of the mind, an action co-ordinating the mind's sensa according to perpetual laws, and each of the concepts is like an immutable diagram and so [ideoquc] is to be cognized intuitively" (ibid., p. 74; his emphasis).

42. Kant sees in the sensible form "a law of coordination" (lex quaedam . . . coor-dinandi), by means of which the objects affecting our senses "coalesce into some representational whole" (in totum aliquod representationis coalescunt). For this to occur:

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43. Kant, it is true, observes, "the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous is not to be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot have its origin in concepts alone" (A32, 1347). He immediately adds, however, "It is immediately contained in the intuition and representation of time" (ibid.).

44. "Consequently there must be found in the objects of perception, that is, in the appearances, the substratum which represents time in general" (B225).
45. "Now since absolute time is not an object of perception, this determination of position cannot be derived from the relation of appearances to it. On the contrary, the appearances must determine for one another their position in time, and make their time-order a necessary order. In other words, that which follows or happens must follow in conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in the preceding state" (B245).
46. The kinship between the second analogy and the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason does deserve special mention. "The principle of sufficient reason is thus the ground of possible experience, that is, of objective knowledge of appearances in respect of their relation in I he order of time" (A210, B246). Mai in lia takes particular attention to his connection between the principle of sufficient reason and the synthetic a priori judgment.
47. "Thus we find three senses of "I" in Kant: the "I think" of transcendental apperception; the absolute self, in itself, that acts and suffers; and the represented self, represented as is every other object through self-affection. The error of rational psychology, which is laid bare by the paradoxes of Pure Reason, in the transcendental dialectic, amounts to confusing the self in itself, the soul, with the "I think," which is not an object, and in this way producing a philosophical monster: a subject that is its own object.
48. "The I have dynamical relations from which all others spring, are therefore inherent, consequence, and composition" (A215). These three dynamical relations are what imply the three "modes" in accordance with which the order of time is determined.
49. Thus we find three senses of "I" in Kant: the "I think" of transcendental apperception; the absolute self, in itself, that acts and suffers; and the represented self, represented as is every other object through self-affection. The error of rational psychology, which is laid bare by the paradoxes of Pure Reason, in the transcendental dialectic, amounts to confusing the self in itself, the soul, with the "I think," which is not an object, and in this way producing a philosophical monster: a subject that is its own object.
50. "Thus the understanding under the title of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, performs this act upon the passive subject, whose faculty | Wirkung" it is, and we are therefore justified in saying that inner sense is affected thereby" (B153-54). Herman de Vlcschauwcr, *La Deduction Transcendante dans l'oeuvre de Kant* (Paris: Lcroux, 1934-37), says regarding this passage, "Ultimately it is the understanding that, by restricting the form of time to the synthesis of this pure manifold, determines the internal sense of which time is the form and which is nothing other than the self considered in its passivity" (2:208).
51. Kant calls his activity a "movement." But this is not the same movement as that in which Aristotle grafted his analysis of time. Empirical movement cannot have a place among the categories. Rather it is the movement implied in the description or construction of a space. "Movement consists in the succession of determinations of inner sense produced by the act of synthesis implied in the construction of a determined space" (de Vlcschauwcr, 2:216).

52. Concerning the fate of inner sense, gradually defroned from the role of the intuition of the soul and reduced to being a mere medium of self-affection, cf. de Vlcschauwcr, 2:552-94; 3:85-140. See also Jean Nabert's admirable article, "L'es-perience interna chez Kant," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 31 (1924): 205-68. Nabert places great emphasis on the mediation of space in determining temporal experience. Question: "If it could not find itself outside the regular movement of a body in space, in order to ground its own mobility, would our inner life still be able to discern its own flowing"? (ibid., p. 226). Answer: "the inner sense draws the material for its knowledge from external intuitions" (ibid., p. 231). "The deep-lying interconnection that binds the consciousness of succession to the determination of space" (ibid., p. 241) depends on the impossibility of finding any figure at all in internal intuition. The line, as a result, is more than simply an analogy that is added on; it is constitutive of the consciousness of succession, this consciousness being "the internal aspect of an operation that includes a determination in space" (ibid., p. 242). Nabert does concede, it is true, "But, on the other hand, there is no intuition of space that has not first been determined in its unity by the schematism of understanding. In this respect, time wins back its full rights; it provides thought with the means for its unfolding mid for transferring the order of time to phenomena and to their existence. This is what the schematism will demonstrate in the pages that follow." Let us conclude with Nabert, "If, alter this, things help us in determining our own existence in time, they are returning to us what we have lent them" (ibid., p. 254). Cf. also ibid., pp. 267-68.
mean by the criterion is the existential analytic of Dasein to be assessed as regards its primordiality, or lack of it? What, indeed, do we claim that in characterizing Dasein ontologically

7. The second division of our potentiality-for-Being.

the possibility that is "not to be outstripped" possibility of Dasein—an unparalleled one, to be sure—toward which we are pulled by an expectation that is itself unique—

authentic Being-towards-death" (the title of §53). In accordance with this projection, Being-towards-death constitutes a

totality must therefore be taken up again on another, more radical level.

5.  This ambition of grasping time as a whole is the existential recovery of the well known problem of the oneness of time,

and that only by means of it is inner experience—not indeed the consciousness of my own existence, but the determination of it in time—

my own death, and thus the untransferable character of my own death

true of Dasein, that is to say, that death is essentially mine). Nor shall I retrace the analyses that determine the

3.  The status of these existentials is a great source of misunderstanding. To bring them to language we must either create new words, at the risk of not being understood by anyone, or make advantage of long-forgotten semantic resonances in ordinary language still preserved in (the German language, or revive the ancient meanings of these words, or even apply an etymological method to them that, in practice, generates neologisms—the risk now being that they become untranslatable into other languages and even into ordinary German. The vocabulary of temporality will give us a broad idea of this almost desperate struggle to make up for the words that are lacking. The simplest words, such as "future," "past," and "present," will be the site of this extenuating labor of language.

5.  According to its title, the first part of Being and Time (and the only one published) was intended to be "The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as He Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being" (ibid., p. 59).

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the preceding thesis, not presupposed, but proved, be the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not" (B27K).

5.  When Gottfried Martin places die conceptual network of the Critique under the title "The Being of Nature" (Kant's Metaphysics anil Theory of Science, pp. 70-105), and within the context of the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason, this is free of paradox for him since it is simply (the axiomatic form of a Newtonian nature. It is this network, constituted jointly by the four tables—judgments, categories, schemata, and principles—that articulates the ontology of "nature.

CITA'THR TIRIP-

1. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). The first edition appeared in 1927 as a special issue of the Jahrbuch fur phenomenologische Forschirnir, vol. 3 (Halle: Niemeyer Verlag), edited by Edmund Husserl. It included the subtitle "Part One," which was to disappear with the 5th edition. Sein und Zeit now forms volume 2 of Part 1 of the Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975-) of Heidegger's writings. Today any reading of Being and Time must be completed by a reading of the lectures from the course Heidegger gave at the University of Marburg in the summer session of 1927 (hence shortly after the publication of Being and Time), now published as Volume 24

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of the Gesamtausgabe under the title Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975), The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). I shall make frequent reference to this work, in part to make up for the absence of a French translation of the second division of Being and Time, because there are numerous parallels between these two works. My second reason for doing so has to do with the difference in strategy in each of them. Unlike Being and Time, the 1927 course proceeds from ordinary time back toward primordial time, moving in this way from misunderstanding to authentic understanding. Because of this regressive approach, we find a long discussion devoted to the Aristotelian treatise on time, held to be the authoritative document for all of Western philosophy, which is supposed to be conjoined with an interpretation of Augustine that is announced without being elaborated any further (See Basic Problems, p. 231). Unless otherwise noted all italics in the passages cited from Being and Time are from the English translation.

2.  Question: "What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly?"

Answer: "Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground" (Being and Time, p. 59).

54.  In Note I we read the following astonishing assertion: "in the above proof it has been shown that outer experience is really immediate, and that only by means of it is inner experience—not indeed the consciousness of my own existence, but the determination of it in time—

this advanced stage in the investigation. Yet it is now stated that we do not possess at this stage the assurance (Sicherung) that the fore-sight (Vorsicht) that guides our interpretation has indeed brought the whole of the entity which it has taken as its theme into our fore-having (Vorhaben). So Heidegger's hesitation has to do with the quality of the seeing that is to grasp the unity of the structural moments of Care. "Only then can the question of the meaning of the unity which belongs to the whole entity's totality of Being (Seinsganzheit), be formulated and answered with any phenomenal assurance" (ibid., p. 275). But how can this primordial character be "guaranteed" (gewährleistet)? It is here that the question of the authenticity appears to parallel the question of primordiality. "As long as the existential structure of an authentic potentiality-for-Being has not been brought into the idea of existence, the fore-sight by which an existential Interpretation is guided will lack primordiality" (ibid., p. 276).

8. Being-towards-the-end is the existential with respect to which Being-towards-death is in each case and for each individual the existentiel. "But as something of the character of Dasein, death is only in an existentiel Being towards death" (ibid., p. 277).

9. "But can Dasein also exist authentically as a whole? How is the authenticity of existence to be determined at all, if not with regard to authentic existing? Where do we gel our criterion for this? . . . But an authentic potentiality-for-Being is attested by the conscience ([Mein-v.wgl]"

10. At the end of die analysis of Being towards-death, we read this strange vow: "The question of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole and of its existential constitution Mill hangs in mill air (schwebt/häule). It can be pul on a phenomena! basis which will .stand the lesl (probläufiig) only if il can cling (sich . . . halten) to a possible authenticity of its Being which is attested (bezeugt) by Dasein itself. If we succeed in uncovering that atestation (bezeugung) phenomenologically, together with what it attests, then the problem will arise anew as to whether the anticipation of future death, which we have hitherto projected only in its ontological possibility, has an essential connection with that authentic potentiality-for-Being which has been attested (bezeug-teul)" (ibid., p. 331).

11. Chapter 6 in the next section of this volume will be devoted entirely to the search for a mode of totalizing the three orientations of historical time that, without ever returning to Hegel, will do justice to this need for a totalization amidst dispersion.

12. We shall see the place to be accorded to the idea of our debt to the past, to the dead, and to the forgotten victims in my attempt below to give a meaning to the notion of the past as it once was (see below, chap. 6).

13. In the following passage Heidegger seems to allow for the freedom of espousing his formula on the basis of different personal experiences: "Temporality has different possibilities and different ways of temporalizing itself. The basic possibilities of existence, the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein, are grounded ontologically on possible totalizations of temporality" (Being and Time, pp. 351-52). I believe that he was thinking here of differences related, not to the past, present, and future, but to the various ways of connecting the existential to the existential.

14. The initial program of Being and Time, as explicitly stated in the Introduction, was to bring us back to "the question of the meaning of Being" at the end of the analytic of Dasein. If the published work does not fulfill this vast program, the hermeneutics of Care does at least preserve this intention by closely binding the projection inherent in Care to "the primary projection of the understanding of Being" (ibid., p. 372). Human projections, in fact, arc so only by reason of this ultimate grounding. "But in these projections there lies hidden the 'upon-which' (woraufhin) of the projection; and on this, as it were, the understanding of Being nourishes itself" (ibid., p. 371).

15. The prefix vor- has the same expressive force as the zu of Zukunft. We find it in the expression Sich vorweg, ahead-of-itself, which defines Care in its widest scope, on the same level as coming-towards-itself.

16. This distinction between having-been, intrinsically implied in coming-towards, and the past, extrinsically distinct from the future, will be of the greatest importance when we discuss the status of the historical past in chapter 6.

17. The term "prescntify" has already been used, in a Husserlian context, to translate Vergegenwärtigen, which has a sense closer to "representation" than to "presentation." "Enprcscnt," "enprcscnting" arc Albert Hofstadter's translation of Gegenwär-tigen in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

18. If temporality can be thought of as (temporalizing), nevertheless the ultimate relation between Zeit and Sein remains suspended in mid-air as long as the idea of Being has not been clarified. This lacuna will not be filled in Being and Time. Despite this incompleteness, Heidegger can be credited with the solution to one of the major aporias of time—its invisibility as a unique totality.

19. The essence of temporality "is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the cestasces" (ibid., p. 377).

20. An "equiprimordiality" (Gleichursprunglichkeit) (ibid., p. 378) of the three cestasces results from the difference among the modes of temporalizing. "But within this' equiprimordiality, the modes of temporalizing are different. The difference lies in the fact that the nature of the totalizing can be determined primarily in terms of the different cestasces" (ibid.).

21. We state above what Heidegger expects from these final analyses concerning (he attestation of the primordial by the authentic. Chapter 3, devoted to fundamental temporality, ends with these words: "In working out Ausarbeitung) the temporality of Dasein as everydayness, historically, and within-time-ncss, we shall be gelling for the first time a relentless insight into the complications of a primordial ontology of Dasein" (ibid., p. 382). These complications are unavoidable inasmuch as facatical (faktisch) Dasein exists in (he world alongside and amidst the entities it encounters in the world. It is, therefore, (he structure of Being-in-the-world, described in the first division, (hat must be "worked out" in this way, along with the complex concretizing of temporality, until it rejoins, by way of the structure of within-lime-ncss, its starting point in everydayness (as is made clear in Chapter IV, "Temporality and liveness") But, for a hermeneutic phenomenology, what is closest is, in truth, what is farthest away.

22. "The specific movement Bewegtheit) in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its 'historizing'. The question of Dasein's 'connectedness' is the ontological problem of Dasein's historizing. To lay bare the structure of historizing, and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one has achieved an
ontological understanding of historicality" (ibid., p. 427).

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23. Here the German language can play with the roots of words and divide the compound term Selbststandigkeit (translated as "self-constancy") into Standigkeit des Selbst, which would be something like "keeping the self" in the sense in which one keeps a promise. Heidegger expressly connects the question "Who?" to that of the self: "the question of the constancy of the Self, which we defined as the 'who' of Dasein" (ibid., p. 427); cf. the note attached to this statement, which refers the reader to §64: Sorge und Selbstschaft).

24. "The existential Interpretation of historiography as a science aims solely at demonstrating its ontological derivation from Dasein's historicality. . . . In analyzing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity is not 'temporal' because it 'stands in history'; but that, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being" (ibid., p. 428).

25. This initial reply does not facilitate the task of grounding historiography in historicality. How, indeed, can we ever move from the history of each person to the history of all? Is not the ontology of Dasein radically monadic in this respect? Below, we shall sec to what extent a new transition, that from individual fate (Schicksal) to common destiny (Geschick), answers this major difficulty.

26. The German here plays on the prefixes zurück (back-) and über (over-) tacked to the verbs kommen (to come), nehmen (to take), and liefern (to hand over). English is better suited to render these expressions than is French: to come back, to take over a heritage, to hand down possibilities that have come down to one.

27. I do not deny that the deliberate choice of expressions such as these (in a text that was published, we must remember, in 1927) supplied ammunition for Nazi propaganda and that it contributed to blinding Heidegger to the political events of those dark years. However, it must also be said that he was not the only one to speak of community (Geineinschaft) instead of society (Gesellschaft), of struggle (Kampf), of combative obedience (kämpfende Nachfolge), and of faithfulness (Treue). For my part, I would incriminate instead the unconditional transfer to the communal sphere of the most fundamental theme of all, Being-towards-death, despite the continually repeated affirmation that Being-towards-death is untransferable. This transfer is responsible for the sketch of a heroic and tragic political philosophy open to misapplication. It looks as though Heidegger did see the resources that might be offered by the concept of a "generation," introduced by Dilthey in an essay of 1875 to fill the gap between individual fate and collective destiny. "Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dascin" (ibid., p. 436). I shall return to this concept of a generation in chapter 4.

28. By means of this roundabout expression, Heidegger succeeds in placing Being itself in the past (dageweisen) by a striking shortcut, but one that is exasperating for translators.

29. "The repealing of that which is possible does not bring again [Wiederbringen] something that is 'past,' nor does it bind the 'present' back to that which has already been 'outstripped'" (ibid., p. 437). Repetition, in this sense, confirms the gap in meaning separating having-been, which is intrinsically tied to coming-towards, and the past, which, snipped down to (he level of things prescnt-at-hand and ready-to-hand, is only extrinsically opposed to (he future, as is attested to by common sense when il opposes, in a nondialectical manner, the determined, completed, necessary character of the past to the undetermined, open, possible nature of the future.

30. Heidegger is playing here on the quasi-homophony between the wieden of Wiederholung and the wider of erwidern and of Widerruf.

31. "Authentic Being-towards-death—that is to say, the finitude of temporality—is the hidden basis of Dasein's historicality. Dascin does not first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating. For this no historiography is as yet needed" (ibid., p. 438). The Basic

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Problems of Phenomenology explicitly compares repetition to resoluteness. Resoluteness is, in effect, already Dasein's repetitive coming back to itself (see Basic Problems, p. 287). Finally, both phenomena can be considered as authentic modalities of the present, distinct from the simple "now."

32. §73 is boldly titled "The Ordinary Understanding of History, and Dasein's Historizing"—Das vulgiire Verstandnis der Geschichte und das Geschwien des Daseins (Being and Time, p. 429).

33. The "locus of the problem of history. . . . is not to be sought in historiography as the science of history" (ibid., p. 427). "The existential Interpretation of historiography as a science aims solely at demonstrating Nachweis its ontological derivation from Dasein's historicality" (ibid., p. 428). It is noteworthy that, even in his preparatory statements, Heidegger anticipates the need to join within-time-ness to historicity in order, precisely, to account for the role of the calendar and the clock in establishing history as a human science. "Even without a developed historiography, factual Dasein needs and uses a calendar and a clock" (ibid., p. 429). This indicates that we have moved from historicity to within-time-ness. Both, however, proceed from the temporality of Dasein: "historicality and within-time-ness turn out to be equiprimordial. Thus, within its limits, the ordinary interpretation of the temporal character of history is justified" (ibid.).

34. "We contend that what is primarily historical is Dasein. That which is secondarily historical, however, is what we encounter within-the-world—not only equipment ready-to-hand, in the widest sense, but also the enivroning Nature as 'the very soil of history'" (ibid., p. 433).

35. The concept of a trace will play an eminently role in my own attempt to rebuild the bridges burned by Heidegger between the plichnoincological concept of time and what he calls the "ordinary" concept of time.

36. Contrary to the reader's expectation, the final paragraph of the section on "Historicality" (§77) adds nothing to the thesis of the subordination of historiography to his-torizing, even though Heidegger directly takes on Dilthey, with the assistance of Count Yorck, Dilthey's friend and correspondent. What is at issue is the alternative that a philosophy of "life" and a "psychology" might offer to hermicncutic phenomenology that puts historizing at the basis of the human sciences. In the correspondence of Count Yorck, Heidegger finds reinforcement for his thesis that what governs the methodology of the
human sciences is not a special type of object but an ontological feature of human beings, which Yorck called das Ontische to distinguish it from das Historische.

37. At the end of §75 we read, "Nevertheless, we may venture a projection of the ontological genesis of historiology as a science in terms of Dasein's historicity. This projection will serve to prepare us for the clarification of the task of destroying the history of philosophy historiologically—a clarification which is to be accomplished in what follows" (ibid., p. 444). By referring in this way to §6 of Being and Time, Heidegger confirms that these pages mark the dismissal of the human sciences on behalf of the true task, left unfinished in Being and Time: "the task of destroying the history of ontology" (ibid., p. 41).

38. Heidegger had intimated at the outset of his study on historicity that within-time-ness was, in a sense yet to be determined, anticipated by historicity. In the final lines of §72 that open this study, we read, "Nevertheless [gleichwohl], Dasein must also be called 'temporal' in the sense of 'Being in time'" (ibid., p. 420). We have to admit that, "since . . . time as within-time-ness also 'stems' ['aus . . . slamm'] from the temporality of Dasein, historicity and within-time-ness turn out to be equiprimordial. Thus [daher], within its limits, the ordinary interpretation of the temporal character of history is justified" (ibid., p. 429). This turn of events in the analysis is, moreover, anticipated at the very heart of the study of historicity. The interpretation

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of Dasein's stretching along in terms of the "connectedness of life" had already intimated that the analysis of historicity could not be brought to its conclusion without including what everydayness teaches. But everydayness is not confined to producing figures of fallcncss; it functions as a reminder of the horizon against which all these analyses are conducted, namely, the horizon of the world, which the subjectivism of (he philosophies of life—and also, we might add, the intimist tendency in Heidegger himself, seen in all his analyses centered around Being-towards-death—threatens to conceal from our sight. Contrary to all subjectivism, we must say, "The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world" (ibid., p. 440). Moreover, we must speak of "the history of the world" (Geschichte der Welt) in an entirely different sense than Hegel did, for whom world-history (Wellgeschichte) is made up of the succession of spiritual configurations: "With the existence of historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world" (ibid.). There is no doubt that Heidegger wanted to shatter the dualism of Mind and Nature. "And even Nature is historical," not in the sense of natural history but in the sense in which the world is hospitable or inhospitable. Whether it signifies a countryside, a place to live, a resource to exploit, a battlefield, or a cultic site, nature makes Dasein a being within-lhc-world that, as such, is historical, beyond any false opposition between an "external" history and an "inner" one, which would be that of the soul. "We call such entities the 'world-historical' [Welt-Geschichtliche]" (ibid.). Heidegger readily admits that, here, he is about to exceed the limits of his theme but claims that it does lead to the threshold of "the ontological enigma of the movement of historizing in general" (ibid., p. 441).

39. The analysis of within-time-ness begins with the admission that the analysis of historicity was made "without regard for the 'fact' (Tatsache) that all historizing runs its course 'in time'" (ibid., p. 456). This analysis cannot help but be incomplete if it must include the everyday understanding of Dasein—in which "factically (faktisch) . . . all history is known merely as that which happens 'within-time'" (ibid.). The term that poses a problem here is not so much "everyday" (the first part of Being and Time begins all of its analyses on this level) as "factically" and "facticity" (Fa'ktizitat), which indicate the link between an analysis that remains within the sphere of phenomenology and the one that already belongs to the natural sciences and to history. "If the existential analytic is to make Dasein ontologically transparent in its very facticity, then the factual 'onto-temporal' interpretation of history must also be explicitly given its due" (ibid.). The transition made through everyday time along the path from ordinary time to primordial time in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology confirms that within-time-ness (intratemporality), the final stage of the process of derivation in Being and Time, also stems from primordial time.

40. "Factual Dasein takes time into its reckoning, without any existential understanding of temporality. Reckoning with time is an existential kind of behavior which must be clarified before we turn to the question of what it means to say that entities are 'in time'. All Dasein's behavior is to be Interpreted in terms of its being—that is, in terms of temporality. We must show how Dasein as temporality temporizes a kind of behavior which relates itself to time by taking it into its reckoning. Thus our previous characterization of temporality is not only quite incomplete in that we have not paid attention to all the dimensions of this phenomenon; it is also defective in principle because something like world-time, in the rigorous sense of the existential-temporal conception of the world, belongs to temporality itself. We must come to understand how this is possible and why it is necessary. Thus the 'time' which is familiar to us in the ordinary way—the time 'in which' entities occur—will be illuminated, and so will the within-time-ness of these entities" (ibid., pp. 456-57).

41. The making-present which awaits and retains, interprets itself. . . . The

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making-present which interprets itself—in other words, that which has been interpreted and is addressed in the 'now'—is what we call 'time'" (ibid., p. 460).

42. "The 'there' is disclosed in a way which is grounded in Dasein's own temporality as ecstatically stretched along, and with this disclosure a 'time' is allotted to Dasein; only because of this can Dasein, as factically thrown, 'take' its time and lose it" (ibid., p. 463).

43. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, it is ordinary time that refers back to primordial time, by means of the authentic pre-understanding of time contained in the "now," which, in (he ordinary conception, adds onto itself to constitute the whole of time. The use of the clock assures the transition between the operation of counting "nows' and the intervals between them and that of counting with . . . or reckoning with time (ibid., pp. 257!'). In this way, the self-explication of what is pre-understood in the common conception gives rise to the understanding of original time that Being and Time ascribes to the level of within-time-ness. It is noteworthy that phenomena ascribed to different moments in Being and Time—significance (tied to the usefulness of clocks), datability, the spanncdncss (Gespanntheit) resulting from being stretched along (Erstreckung), publicness—are all grouped together in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (pp. 261-64). World-time
of the Bedeutungskeit in virtue of which an instrument refers to every other instrument on the level of everyday understanding.

44. "Such reckoning does not occur by accident, but has its existential-ontological necessity in the basic state of Dasein as Care. Because it is essential to Dasein that it exists fallingly as something thrown, it interprets its time concernfully by way of time-reckoning. \(\because\) this, the 'real' making-public of time gets (componere: cd, so that we must say that Dasein's thrownness is the reason why 'there is' time publicly" (Being and Time, p. 464).

45. "In its thrownness Dasein has been surrendered to the changes of day and night. Day with its brightness gives it the possibility of sight; night takes this away" (ibid., p. 465). But what is day if not what the sun dispenses? "The sun dates the time which is interpreted in concern. In terms of this dating arises the 'most natural' measure of time—the day. . . . Dasein historically" ex from day to day by reason of its way of interpreting time by dating it—a way which is adumbrated in its thrownness into the 'there'" (ibid., pp. 465-66).

46. "Thus when time is measured, it is made public in such a way that it is encountered on each occasion and at any time for everyone as 'now and now and now.' This time which is 'universally' accessible in clocks is something that we come across as a present-at-hand multiplicity of 'nows', so lo speak, though the measuring of time is not directed thematically towards time as such" (ibid., p. 470). The consequences for historiography are considerable to the extent that the latter depends on the calendar and on clocks. "Provisionally it was enough for us to point out the general 'connection' of the use of clocks with that temporality which takes its time. Just as the concrete analysis of astronomical time-reckoning in its full development belongs to the existential-ontological Interpretation of how Nature is discovered, the foundations of historic-logical and calendrical 'chronology' can be laid bare only within the orbit of the tasks of analyzing historiological cognition existentially" (ibid., p. 471).

47. "With the discloscdness of the world, world-time has been made public, so that every temporally concerned Being alongside entities within-the-world understands these entities circumspectively as encountered 'in time'" (ibid.).

48. "This entity does not have an end at which it just stops, but is exists finitely" (ibid., p. 378). Infinity is the product of both deviation and leveling-off. How does "inauthentic temporality, as inauthentic," temporalize "an in-limitless time out of the finite"? "Only because primordial time is finite can the 'derived' time temporalize it-

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self as infinite. In the order in which we get things into our grasp through the understanding, the finitude of time does not become fully visible [sichtbar] until we have exhibited herausgestellt 'endless time' so that these may be contrasted" (ibid., p. 379). The premise of the infinity of time, which Being and Time derives from the failure to recognize the finitude of Being-towards-death, will in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology be directly related to the "endlessness" characterizing the series of "nows" in the ordinary conception of time. To be sure, the 1927 course also mentions Dasein's forgetfulness of its own essential finitude; but it does so only to add that it is "not possible to go into further detail here on the finitude of time, because it is connected with the difficult problem of death, and this is not the place to analyze death in that connection" (Basic Problems, p. 273). Docs this mean that the sense of Ganzsein is less an integral part of Being-towards-death in this course than in Being and Time? This suspicion receives support in the addition—to which we shall return in our concluding pages—of the problematic of Temporaliität to that of Zeitlichkeit. This problematic, which is new in relation to Being and Time, indicates the primacy of the question of an ontological horizon that is now grafted to the ecstatic character of time, which stems solely from an analytic of Dasein.

49. "In the everyday way in which we are with one another, the leveled-off sequence of 'nows' remains completely unrecognizable as regards its origin in the temporality of the individual einzelner Dasein" (Being and Time, p. 477).

50. This remark has all the more importance for us in that history's equal legitimacy is recalled here as it is "understood publicly as happening within-time" (p. 478). This sort of oblique recognition of history plays an important role in subsequent discussions of the status of history in relation to a hermeneutic phenomenology.

51. Heidegger translates this passage as follows. "Das namlich ist die Zeit: das Gezahlte an der im Horizon! des Früher und Später hegengneulden Bewegung." In the English translation of Being and Time we read: "For this is time; that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of earlier and after" (p. 473). This translation suggests the ambiguity of a definition in which levelled-off has already taken place but remains indiscernible as such, even while admitting the possibility of an existential interpretation. I shall refrain from making any definitive judgment concerning the interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of time in Heidegger. He himself promised to return to it in the second part of Being and Time after a discussion of the Seinsfrage of ancient ontology. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology will fill this lacuna (pp. 232-56). The discussion of Aristotle's treatise on time is so important in (he strategy developed in the 1927 course that it determines the starting point for the return path from (he ordinary concept of time toward the understanding of primordial time. Everything turns around the interpretation of the Aristotelian "now" (to nun). We also have important texts by Heidegger on Aristotle's Physics that restore the context of the Greek physis, the underlying meaning of which, Heidegger claims, has been radically misconstrued by philosophers and by historians of Greek thought. Cf. "Ce qu'est et comment se determine la Physis: Aristote. Physics B, I," seminar given during 1940, in Martin Heidegger, Questions II, trans. F. Fedier (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), pp. 165-276. The German original was published with a facing Italian translation by G. Guzzoli in // Pensiero nos. 2 and 3 (1958).

52. "Ever since Aristotle all discussions \(\text{Erdrterungen}\) of the concept of time have clung in principle to the Aristotelian definitions; that is, in taking time as their theme, they have taken it as it shows itself in circumspective concern" (Being and Time, p. 473). I shall not discuss here the famous note in Being and Time where it is stated that the "priority which Hegel has given to the 'now' which has been levelled-off, makes it plain that in defining the concept of time he is under the sway of the manner in which time is ordinarily understood, and this means that he is likewise under the sway


54. I am adopting here the distinction made by Herve Barcau in La Construction de la notion de temps (Strasbourg: Atelier d'impression du Departement de Physique, 1985).


56. Toulmin and Goodfield cite a poem by John Donne deploring "the world's proportion disfigured" (ibid., p. 77).

57. Ibid., pp. 141-70.

58. Ibid., pp. 197-229.

59. Ibid., p. 251.

60. The full significance of this paradox is revealed only when narrative, understood as a mimesis of action, is taken as the criterion for this meaning.


62. The discontinuity between a time without a present and a time with a present does not seem to me to be incompatible with C. F. von Weisssieker's hypothesis concerning the irreversibility of physical processes and the temporal logic of probability. According to von Weisssacker, quantum physics forces us to reinterpret the second law of thermodynamics, which links the direction of time to the entropy of a closed system, in terms of probabilities. The entropy of a given state must henceforth be conceived of as the measure of the probability of the occurrence of this state—more improbable earlier states being transformed into more probable later ones. If we ask what is meant by the terms "earlier" and "later" implied by the metaphors of the direction of time or the arrow of time, the renowned physicist replies that everyone in our culture, hence every physicist, implicitly understands the difference between past and future. The past is more like the order of facts; it is unalterable. The future is the possible. Probability, then, is a quantitative, mathematizable grasp of possibility. As for the probability of becoming, in the direct sense in which it is taken by physics here, it will always be in the future. It follows that the quantitative difference between past and future is not a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics. Instead it constitutes its phnomencological premise. It is only because we first have an understanding of this difference that we are able to do physics. Generalizing this thesis, we can say that this distinction is constitutive for the fundamental concept of experience. Experience draws a lesson from the past for the future. Time, in the sense of this qualitative difference between fact and possibility, is a condition for the possibility of experience. So, if experience presupposes time, the logic in which we describe the propositions express-

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63. We shall return at length to the problem of dating within the framework of a study of connectors set in place by historical thought between cosmic time and phe-nomenological time.

64. This is perhaps the sense we should give to the bothersome expression faklistisch in Heidegger. While adding a foreign accent to worldhood—an existential term—it clings to worldhood thanks to the phenomenon of contamination between the two orders of the discourse on time.

65. The objection of circularity that could easily be directed at the reversibility of all these analyses is no more threatening here than it was when I turned this argument against my own analyses in Part I in volume I, when I introduced the stage of mimesis,. Circularit is a healthy sign in any hermeneutical analysis. This suspicion of circularity can, in any event, be attributed to the basic aporetical character of the question of time.
2. Physics, IV, 12, 220b1-22a9.
3. We may characterize the following analysis as a transcendental one inasmuch as it is the universal aspect of the institution of the calendar that is addressed. Thus it is to be distinguished from, without rejecting, the genetic approach practiced by French sociology at the beginning of this century. There the problem of the calendar was treated within (the framework of the social origin of reigning notions, including that of time. The danger for this school of thought was its making a collective consciousness the source of all these notions, somewhat like a Plotinian Nous. This danger was greatest in Durkheim, in his The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, for whom social origin and religious origin tended to become confused. It was less present in the work of Maurice Halbwachs cited above, p. 275, n. 3. There the project of a total genesis of concepts was reduced to more modest proportions, the collective memory being attributed to some specific group rather than to society in general. However, on oc-

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casion, the problems of origins were well posed in terms of problems of structures. The differentiation of different moments, inherent in the conception of time, wrote Durkheim, "doc's not consist merely in a commemoration, either partial or integral, of our past life. It is an abstract and impersonal frame which surrounds, not only our individual existence, but that of humanity. It is like an unlimited chart, where all duration is spread out before the mind, and upon which all possible events can be located in relation to fixed and determinate guidelines. . . . This alone is enough to give us a hint that such an arrangement ought to be collective" (Elementary Forms, p. 23). The calendar is an appropriate instrument for this collective memory. "A calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activities, while at the same time its function is to assure their regularity" (ibid.). Here is where a genetic sociology contributes in a decisive way to the description of the connectors used in history, whose significance rather than origin we are attempting to disentangle. The same thing may be said concerning inquiries into the history of calendars still in use today, such as the Julian-Gregorian calendar (cf. P. Coudere, Le Calendrier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961)).

4. Rene Hubert, in "Etude sommaire dc la representation du temps dans la religion et la magie," in his Melanges d'histoire des religions (Paris: Mean, 1909), attaches great importance to the notion of a festival. On this ground, he proposes the idea of "critical dates" tied to the necessity of giving order to the periodicity of festivals. No less important is the fact that the intervals between such critical dates are qualified by the aftereffects of the festivals and made equivalent to one another by their return, given the reservation that, for magic and religion, the function of the calendar is not so much to measure time as to give it a rhythm, to assure the succession of lucky and unlucky days, of favorable and unfavorable times.

5. In a noteworthy text, "Temps et Mythe," Recherches Philosophiques 5 (1935-36): 235-51, Georges Dumézil strongly emphasizes the "amplitude" of mythical time, whatever differences there may be between myth and ritual. In the case where a myth is the narrative of events that are themselves periodic, the ritual assures the correspondence between mythical and ritual periodicity. In the case where a myth relates unique events, the efficacy of these founding events spreads over a broader stretch of time than that of the action recounted. Here again, ritual assures the correspondence between this longer stretch of time and the founding mythical event by commemoration and imitation, when it is a question of past events, or by prelurgical anil preparation, when it is a question of future events. In a hermeneutics of historical consciousness, to commemorate, to actualize, and to prefigurate are three functions that underline the scaning of the past as tradition, the present as actual, and the future as the horizon of expectation and as eschatological. On this point, see below, chap. 10.


9. Recall our earlier discussion of the problem, in Ilcing and I line, posed by the passage from mortal temporality to public historicity (cf. above, pp. 67-68). It is worth noting that it is just at the moment of passing from the notion of individual late (Schicks<d) to our common destiny (GY.vc/mA) that Heidegger makes a brief allusion 300 Notes to Pages 110-12 to the concept of a "generation," encountered as I shall discuss further below in the work of Dilthey: "Dascin's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizeing of Dascin" (Being and Time, p. 436). Heidegger acknowledges this reference to Dilthey in a footnote.


11. Cf. my discussion of his important essay on this topic below, pp. 111-12.

12. Dilthey discusses this problem in a study devoted to the history of the moral and political sciences: "Uber das Studium der Geschichte, der Wissenschaften vom Menc-schen, der Geschellschaft und dem Staat" (1875). reprinted in Wilhelm Dilthey, Ge-sammte Schriften (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1924) 5:31-73. Only a few pages of this essay are directly related to our topic (pp. 36-41). Among the auxiliary concepts of this history, Dilthey is especially interested in those that constitute "the scaffolding | das [rater:| of the course | der Verlauf|] of intellectual movements" (ibid., p. 36). One of these is the concept of a generation. Dilthey also made use of this concept in his biography of Schliccmachcr, without providing a theoretical justification for it or seeing the difficulties it involves. Mannheim's essay is more thoroughgoing in its analysis: Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in idem, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul Kecskemety (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 276-322. He also gives a bibliography of the discussion to 1927, when this article was first published.

13. Other thinkers had noted how little individuals in the same age-group were each other's contemporaries, as well as how individuals of different ages could share the same ideals at a given historical moment. In the work of the art historian Pinter, Mannheim finds the notion of the noncontemporaneity of the contemporaneous (Ungleich-zeitigkeit des Gleichzeitigkeit) (in

14. Regarding the biological, psychological, cultural, and spiritual aspects of the notion of growing up, the standard work is still Michel Philibert, \textit{L'Echelle des ages} (Paris: Seuil, 1968).

15. Nor docs Dillhcy make this idea of continuity, which allows for interruptions, steps backward, subsequent renewals, and transfers from one culture to another, too rigid. What is essential is that the connection between old and new not suffer from total discontinuity. Helow (in chapter 9), I shall take up again the discussion of this problem of continuity in history.

16. His source of inspiration in Husserl's work is the fifth Cartesian Meditation, in which Husserl attempts to give our knowledge of another person an intuitive status on the same level as that of self-reflection, by means of the analogical apprehension of the phenomena of "pairing" (Passung). However, unlike Husserl, Schutz takes as hopeless, useless, and even detrimental the enterprise of constituting our experience of the other person within \textit{(in)} and starting from \textit{(ais)}

cogological consciousness. Experience of the other person for Schutz is as primitive a given as is experience of one's own self, and, if should be added, just as immediate. This immediacy is not so much that of a cognitive operation as of a practical faith. We believe in the existence of the other person because we act upon and with that person, and because we are affected by that person's action. In this sense, Schutz rediscovers Kant's great insight in (he Critique of Practical Reason: we do not know the other person, but we treat him or her as a person or a thing. The existence of the other is implicitly admitted by the mere fact that we comport ourselves toward this person in one way or another.

17. For Weber, too, "orientation toward the other" is a structure of \textit{sociales Wirken} (cl. Economy and Society, ed Giinther Roth and Clans Wtlich, trans. Ephraim

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Fischhoff et al. [Berkely: University of California Press, 1978], SS1 and 2). We practically affect and are affected by the other person.


19. It is not that imagination plays no role in those relationships Schutz takes as direct. My own motives already require, if they are to be clarified, a kind of imaginative recollection. So do my partner's. When I ask you a question, for example, I imagine in the future perfect tense how you will have answered itc. In this sense, even an allegedly direct social relationship is already symbolically mediated. The synchrony between two streams of consciousness is assured by the correspondence between the prospective motives of one of them and the explicative motives of the other.

20. "On the contrary, all experience of contemporaries is predicative in nature. It is formed by means of interpretive judgments involving all my knowledge of the social world, although with varying degrees of explicitness" (ibid., p. 183). It is particularly noteworthy that Schutz attributes the phenomenon of "recognition" to this abstract level, in a sense distinct from Hegel's, as "a synthesis of my own interpretations of his experiences" (p. 184). Whence his expression, a "synthesis of recognition" (ibid.).

21. I am following the broad distinction in Schutz's analysis between a we-orientation and a they-orientation, between a direct kind of orientation and an anonymous form based on typifications. Schutz takes care to nuance this opposition with a careful study (at which he excels) of the degrees of anonymity in the world of contemporaries. The result is a series of figures that warrants the progression toward complete anonymity. For example, certain collective forms—a governing board, a state, a nation, a people, a class—are still close enough to us that we attribute responsible actions to (hem by analogy. Artifical objects, on the contrary (libraries, for example), are closer to the pole of anonymity.

22. It is even more curious that Schutz says so little about the world of successors. Undoubtedly this was due to the fact that he considers the social phenomenon as something that has already taken shape. This is why it only overlaps time up to the present now. But it is also because he puts too much emphasis on the determined, already accomplished aspect of the past. (This is debatable, insofar as the meaning of the past for us is constantly being reinterpreted.) It is why for Schulz the future has to be completely undetermined and undetermined (cf. ibid., p. 214). (This too is debatable, insofar as, through our expectations, our fears, our hopes, our predictions, and our plans, the future is at least in part tied to our actions.) That the world of successors is by definition not historical is admisible; that it is therefore absolutely free is contestable as an implication. Below, I shall draw on the reflections of Reinhart Koselleck about our horizon of expectation to forge a more complete and more balanced conception of the world of contemporaries, of predecessors, and of successors. Schutz's major contribution to our problem is his having seen, on the basis of what is still a Husserlian phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the traditional role played by anonymity between private time and public time.

23. Criticism of (he testimony of surviving witnesses is more difficult to carry out, due to the inextricable confusion with (he quasi-present, remembered as it was experienced at the moment of the event, than is a reconstruction founded only on documents, without even taking into account the distortions inherent in (he selection made due to interest—or disinterest—by memory.

24. "Since my knowledge of the world of predecessors comes to me through signs, what these signs signify is anonymous and detached from any stream of consciousness" (ibid., p. 209).


302 Notes to Pages 115-18 and Row, 1972), in volume I. It is the Mediterranean itself, we said, that is the true hero of this epic that ends when the clash of great powers changed theaters. Who dies in this work? The answer is a tautology: only mortals die. We saw these mortals crossing mountains and plains, along with the nomads and the sheepchiders. We saw them navigate over the liquid plains, leading "precarious lives" (ibid., p. 139) on inhospitable islands, laboring along land and sea routes. I said that nowhere in Braudel's immense work did I feel the pain humans suffer as much as in the first part, entitled "The Role of the
Environment," for it is there that people are caught closest to living and dying. And could Braudel have called his second part "Collective Destinies and General Trends" if violence, war, and persecution did not ceaselessly refer the reader back from the collective destinies that make up global history to the unique destiny of human beings, each of whom suffers and each of whom dies? The lists of martyrs of those witnessing peoples—the Moors and the Jews—makes the bond between collective destiny and individual fate an indestructible one. This is why, when Braudel, reflecting upon the meaning of his work, asks if in minimizing the role of events and individuals he may have denied the importance of human freedom (ibid., p. 1243), we may ask instead if it is not death that history mishandles even though it is our memory of the dead. It cannot do otherwise inasmuch as death marks the lower bound of that microhistory that the historical reconstruction of the whole seeks to break away from. Yet, surely, it is the whisper of death that keeps Braudel from founding his "structuralism" on "the approach which under the same name is at present causing some confusion in the other human sciences," and that allows him to end by saying, "It does not tend towards the mathematical abstraction of relations expressed as functions, but instead towards (he very sources of life in its most concrete, everyday, indestructible and anonymously human expression" (ibid., p. 1244).


27. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, p. 30; my emphasis.


29. Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1971), 2:326B.


33. Such a break is suggested by the conclusion to Le Goff's article. "The new document, extended beyond traditional texts—which are themselves transformed insofar as quantitative history is revealed to be possible and pertinent—to data must be treated as a document/monument. Whence the urgency to elaborate a new doctrine capable of transferring these document/monuments from the level of memory to that of historical science" (ibid., p. 47). The underlying assumption here is the opposition, introduced by Michel Foucault in his The Archeology of Knowledge, trails. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), between the continuity of memory and (he discontinuity of the new documentary history. ("The document is not the fortunacl tool of a history dial is primarily and fundamentally memory; history is one way in which a society recognizes and develops a mass of documentation with which it is inextricably linked" [ibid., p. 6, cited by Le Goff, p. 451.) However, even though Le Goff does accept this opposition between memory, presumed to be continuous, and history, which has become discontinuous, he does not seem to exclude the possibility that the discontinuity of history, far from getting rid of memory, contributes to its enrichment by criticizing it. "The documentary revolution tends to promote a new unit of 303

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information. Instead of the fact that leads to the event and to a linear history, the privileged position passes to the datum, which leads to the series and to a discontinuous history. Collective memory reevaluates itself, organizing itself into a cultural patrimony. The new document is stored in data bases and dealt with by means of such structures. A new discipline has arisen, one that is still taking its first steps, and that must respond in contemporary terms to the requirement for calculations as well as to the constantly increasing criticism of its influence on our collective memory" (ibid., p. 42). Foucault's opposition between the continuity of memory and the discontinuity of the history of ideas will be discussed further, within the context of an analysis devoted to the notion of tradition, owing to the place that the notion of discontinuity takes there (cf. below, pp. 142-56).

34. Marc Bloch's The Historian's Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (New York: Knopf, 1953), is filled with a number of terms taken to be synonymous with one another: "testimony," "remains," "vestiges," "residues," and finally "traces" (or in the English translation of Bloch's work: "tracks"). What "do we really mean by document, if it is not a 'track,' as it were—the mark, perceptible to the senses, which some phenomenon, in itself inaccessible, has left behind?" (p. 55). Everything is said here, lint everything is an enigma.


37. See above, chap. 3, n. 34.

38. Being and Time, p. 432.

39. Recall the text cited earlier: "We contend that what is primarily historical is Dasein. That which is secondarily historical, however, is what we encounter within-the-world ffnnerweliich—not only equipment ready-to-hand, in the widest sense, but also the environting Nature as the 'very soil of history'" (ibid., p. 433).

40. The remainder of the cited passage directly concerns my own proposal about the trace as one category of historical time: "It belongs to Dasein's average kind of Being, and to that understanding of Being which proximally prevails. Thus proximally passes to the datum, which leads to the series and to a discontinuous history. Collective memory reevaluates itself, organizing itself into a cultural patrimony. The new document is stored in data bases and dealt with by means of such structures. A new discipline has arisen, one that is still taking its first steps, and that must respond in contemporary terms to the requirement for calculations as well as to the constantly increasing criticism of its influence on our collective memory" (ibid., p. 42). Foucault's opposition between the continuity of memory and the discontinuity of the history of ideas will be discussed further, within the context of an analysis devoted to the notion of tradition, owing to the place that the notion of discontinuity takes there (cf. below, pp. 142-56).

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41. The difficulty in pinning down the use of the term falkisch in Being and Time also bears witness to (his fact.


43. As was the case in each of the three works we considered at the end of Part II, in volume 2: Mrs. Dalloway, Der Zauberberg, and A la recherche du temps perdu.

CIIAI'TIR FIVH

1. With few exceptions, the analyses that follow refer without explicitly quoting them to the literary texts analyzed at the end of Part III in volume 2 and the phenomenological theories discussed at the beginning of Part IV in this volume.

2. This method of correlation implies that we be attentive exclusively to the discoveries made by fiction as such and to their philosophical lessons, in contrast to all the attempts, however legitimate these may be in their own order, to spoil a philosophical influence at the origin of the literary work under consideration. I have already expressed my reasons for this
3. Comparing this with the solution contributed by history to the aporias of time calls for considering these aporias in the opposite order to that we encountered in our
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aporetics of time. We move in this way from the aporias that phenomenology invents to those it discovers. The didactic advantages of the strategy adopted here are not negligible. First of all, we thereby go straight to the principle underlying the disarray between fiction and history. Next, we avoid the trap of limiting fiction to the exploration of internal time-consciousness, as if the function of fiction, with respect to the antagonism between the rival perspectives on time, were limited to a simple retreat outside the field of conflict. On the contrary, it is up to fiction to explore this very antagonism in its own way, by submitting it to specific variations. Finally, fiction's treatment of the aporias that are constitutive of phenomenological time will take on new relief as a result of being placed against the background of the confrontation, at the heart of fiction, between phenomenological time and cosmic time. The full range of nonlinear aspects of time will, therefore, be unfolded before us.
8. For this expression borrowed from Dilthey (*Zusammenhang des Lebens*), see above, p. 111. I shall return in the closing pages of this work to the same problem under a new title, that of narrative identity. This notion will crown the union of history and fiction under the aegis of the phenomenology of time.

CHAPTER SIX

2. "Historical conceptions arc *Vertrctungen* meant to signify *bedeuten*: what once was *was . . . einst war* in a considerably more complicated way open to inexhaustible description" (ibid.). Contrary to Theodor Lessing, for whom history alone confers sense on the nonsensical (the *sinnlos*), this *Gegeniiber* imposes a directive and a corrective on historical research, removing it from the arbitrariness that seems to affect the work of selection and organization that the historian performs. Otherwise, how could he work of one historian correct that of another and claim to be closer to what happened *(treffen)*? Heussi also caught sight of those features of the *Gegeniiber* that make standing-for such a riddle for historical knowledge, namely (following Troeltsch), the overwhelming richness of this *Gegeniiber*, which inclines it toward the side of meaninglessness, along with (he multivocal structures of the past, which draw it toward intelligibility. In sum, the past consists of *(he plenitude of possible incitations to historical configuration* *(die l'-ilie des moglichen Anreize zu historischer Gestaltung)* (ibid., p. 49).
3. This term, *reprsentance*, is found in Francois Wahl, cd.. *Qu'est-ce que le strucuidisme?* (Paris: Seuil, 1968). p. 11.
4. In this regard, Bloch's *Historian's Craft* is revealing. He is quite aware of the problem of the trace, which arises for him by way of the notion of a document *(what do we really mean by document, if it is not a 'trace,' as it were—the mark, perceptible to the senses, which some phenomenon, in itself inaccessible, has left behind?)* (ibid., p. 55; trans. altered)). This enigmatic reference to the (race is immediately attached to the notion of indirect observation familiar to the empirical sciences, insofar as the physicist or the geographer, for example, depend on observations made by others. Of course, the historian, unlike the physicist, cannot provoke the appearance of the trace. But this infirmity of historical observation is compensated for in two ways: the historian can multiply the number of reports by witnesses and confront them with one another. In this sense, Bloch speaks of evidence converging from *"sources of many different kinds"* (ibid., p. 67). Above all, he can emphasize those documents that arc "witnesses in spite of themselves" (ibid., p. 61), that is, those documents not intended to inform or instruct their contemporaries, much less future historians. However, for a philosophical investigation into the ontological import of the notion of a trace, this concern to indicate how knowledge by means of traces belongs to the realm of observation tends to conceal the enigmatic character of the notion of a trace of the past. Authenticated testimony functions like a proxy eyewitness observation. We see through the eyes of someone else. An illusion of contemporaneity is thereby created that allows us to equate knowledge by traces with knowledge by indirect observation.

Yet no one has more magnificently underscored the tie between history and time than MarcBloch when he defines history as the science of "men in time" (ibid., p. 27).
5. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), is a posthumous work first published under the editorship of T. M. Knox in 1946, based on a series of lectures Collingwood wrote in 1936, following his inauguration as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford, and then revised up to 1940. The editor has brought together in Part V, entitled "Epilogomena," the most systematic parts of the work finished by Collingwood (ibid., pp. 205-324).
6. In the plan adopted by the editor of *The Idea of History*, the section on "History as Recnactmcnt of Past lxiaperience" (pp. 282-302) expressly follows the section on "The Historical Imagination" (pp. 231—49), which was Collingwood's inaugural lecture at Oxford, and the section on "Historical lviervenice," where the concept of human history is opposed to the concept of human nature, and where the concept of rccnactmcnt is dealt with directly without passing through reflection upon the imagination. This order of exposition makes sense if the closing pages of this work to the same problem under a new title, that of narrative identity. This notion will crown the union of history and fiction under the aegis of the phenomenology of time.
7. Por Collingwood, the question is not so much knowing how history is to be distinguished from the natural sciences as whether there can be another knowledge of man than historical knowledge. He gives a clearly negative answer to this question, for the quite simple reason that the concept of human history comes to occupy (he place assigned by Locke and Hume lo thal of human nature; "the right way of investigating mind is by the methods of history" (ibid., p. 207)). *"History is what the science of human nature professed lo be"*(ibid.). *"The Science of human mind resolves itself into history*" (ibid., p. 220). Collingwood calls lie "interpretation of evidence" (ibid., pp. 9—10) what
I am here calling documentary proof. (The linglish word “evidence” rarely can be translated into French by evidence, and then principally with reference to juridical matters from which the theory of history borrows it.) In this regard, he says, “evidence is a collective name for things which singly are called documents, and a document is a thing existing here and now, of such a kind that the historian, by thinking about it, can get answers to the questions he asks about past events” (ibid., p. 10).

8. The semiological aspect of the problem is evident, although Collingwood does not use this term. External changes are not what historians consider but what they look through to discern the thought that resides in them (ibid., p. 214). This relationship between outside and inside corresponds to what Dilthey designates as Ausdruck (expression).


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10. “Philosophy is reflective. . . . thought about thought” (*The Idea of History*, p. 1). On the historical plane the Gegenifer of proof is the “past, consisting of particular events in space and time which are no longer happening” (ibid., p. 5). Or, again, “actions of human beings that have been done in the past” (ibid., p. 9). The question is “How do historians know? How do they come to apprehend the past?” (ibid., p. 3).

11. The accent on the aspect of the past means that the question can only be dealt with by people qualified in two respects: they must be historians who are experienced in their profession, and they must be philosophers capable of reflecting on this experience.

12. The relationship between historical evidence and our imagination situates historical research wholly within the logic of questions and answers. This logic was presented in Collingwood’s *An Autobiography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939). Gadamer pays homage to it in his own attempt to make this logic the equivalent of the dialectical method of Plato, following the failure of Hegel. Collingwood, in this regard, is a precursor: “Question and evidence, in history, are correlative. Anything is evidence which enables you to answer your question—the question you are asking now” (*The Idea of History*, p. 281).

13. Collingwood can even appeal to Kant’s saying about the imagination, that “blind but indispensable faculty,” which “does the entire work of historical construction” (ibid., p. 241). Only the historical imagination has “as its special task to imagine the past” (ibid., p. 242). We are thus at the antipodes of the idea of eyewitness testi-ribly transmitted by authorized sources. “So there are properly speaking no data” (ibid., p. 249). The idealism inherent in this thesis of an a priori imagination breaks out in the concluding lines of the section devoted to it: we have to take the historical imagination as “a self-dependent, self-determining, and self-justifying form of thought” (ibid., p. 249). We must even go so far as aquas-identification of the work of the historian with that of the novelist to do full justice to the concept of reenactment: “Both the novel and history are self-explanatory, self-justifying, the product of an autonomous or self-authorizing activity; and in both cases this activity is the a priori imagination” (ibid., p. 246).

14. In this respect, Kex Martin’s proposal, in *Historical Explanation: Reenactment and Pratical Inference* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), to bring about a rap-protelietment between reevioactivityrII and practical inference constitutes the most fruitful attempt 1 know to link Collingwood to the philosophy of history of Danto, Walsh, and those all von lierting. Cartesication, practical inference, and reenactment have to be thought together.

15. The Roman constitution, or its modification by Augustus, when rethought is no less an eternal object than is a triangle for Whitehead: “The peculiarity which makes it historical is not the fact of its happening in time, but the fact of its becoming known to us by our re-thinking the same thought which we are investigating, and thus coming to understand that situation” (*The Idea of History*, p. 218).

16. “Thus the historical process is a process in which man creates for himself this or that kind of human nature by re-creating in his own mind the thought that he is destined to be” (ibid., p. 226). This work has to re-enact the past in his own mind (ibid., p. 282). The idea of reenactment thus tends to become substituted completely for testimony, the force of which is to maintain the otherness of the witness and the otherness of what his witness testifies to. 307

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17. *The Idea of History* uses several equivalent expressions: “the subject-matter of history” is not the individual act as it occurred but “the act of thought itself, in its survival and revision at different times and in different persons” (ibid., p. 303). This implies recognizing the “self by which the act of the single activity as a historical occurrence is die through the diversity of its own acts” (ibid., p. 306). This object “must be of such a kind that it can revive itself in the historian’s mind; the historian’s mind must be such as to offer a home for that revival” (ibid., p. 304), “Historical knowledge, then, has for its proper object thought: not things thought about, but the act of thinking itself” (ibid., p. 305).

18. This concern for distance toward the ancients is quite strong among French historians. François Furet recognized this in his book *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), that intellectual curiosity break away from the spirit of commemoration or execration. *Un autre Moyen Age*, to use the French title of one of Jacques Le Goff’s books—*Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)—is a Middle Ages that is “other” than us. And Paul Veyne, in his *L’Inventaire des Différences* (Paris: Seuil, 1976), says “The Romans existed in a manner both as exotic and as ordinary as that of the Tibetans, for example, or the Mabikwara—nothing more and nothing less—so it becomes impossible any other way to consider them as a sort of leading example” (p. 8).

19. This model was sufficiently seductive to inspire both Raymond Aron and Henri Marrou. The first part of Section II of Aron’s *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, trans. George .1. Irwin (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), entitled "From the Individual to History," proceeds from self-knowledge to knowledge of others, and from there to historical knowledge. In its details, it is true, the argument tends to break up the apparent progression suggested by this plan. But the coincidence of a self with itself being impossible (ibid., p. 56), others constitute the true mediator between me and myself. In turn, our knowledge of others never adds up to a fusion of consciousnesses but always requires the mediation of signs, so that, finally, historical knowledge, founded upon works originating from such consciousnesses, is revealed to be as originary as the knowledge of others and self-knowledge. Consequently, for Aron, “the ideal of resurrection is not so much inaccessible as it is alien to history” (ibid., p. 77). If for Henri Marrou, on the other hand, understanding others remains (he basic model for historical knowledge, this is for reasons that have lo do with his conjoining of epistemology with ethics in historical knowledge.

20. Understanding others today and understanding people from the past share the same (essentially ethical) dialectic of the Same and the Other. On the one hand, we basically know what resembles us; on the other hand, understanding others demands that we practice an epoché of our own preferences in order to understand the other person as other than ourselves. It is the suspicious temperament of positivist historiography that prevents us from recognizing the identity in the bond of friendship that links us and others today and us and others from earlier times. This bond is more essential than that of curiosity, which, in fact, keeps the other at a distance.
others contains, even more than docs understanding oneself, the same gap between lived experience and retrospection. However, this docs not mean that the problem is the same in both cases.

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21. Cf. Paul Veyne, "La Conceptualisation historique," in Faire de l'histoire, ed. Jacques Le Golf and Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), 1:62-92. Weber's method of ideal types anticipated this movement of thought. Hut it is French historiography that has most accentuated the effect of taking a distance tied to historical conceptualization. To conceptualize is to break away from the point of view, the lack of knowledge and illusions, and the whole language of past people. It is already to distance them from ourselves in time. To conceptualize is to adopt the ethnologist's attitude of mere curiosity—if not that of the entomologist.

22. The invariant, declares Veyne, "explains its own historical modifications on the basis of its internal complexity. Beginning from this complexity, it also explains its eventual disappearance" (L'InveilUaire des differences, p. 24). Thus Roman imperialism, for example, is one of the two great variants of the invariant of a political power's search for security. Instead of seeking such security by means of an equilibrium with other political powers, as in the Greek variant, Roman imperialism seeks it by means of the conquest of the whole human horizon "to its limits, to the sea or to (the barbarians, in order finally to be the only one left in the work! when everything has been conquered" (p. 17).

23. "Hence the conceptualization of an invariant allows us to explain events. By playing with the variables, we may recreate, on the basis of the invariant, the diversity of historical modifications" (ibid., pp. 18-19). And even more strongly: "only the invariant individualizes" (ibid., p. 19).

24. Veyne will go so far as to say that "the historical fads may be individualized without being set in their place in a spatio-temporal context" (ibid., p. 48). And even that "history does not study humanity in time—it studies human materials subsumed under concepts" (ibid., p. 30). History may be defined at this price as the "science of differences, of individualities" (ibid., p. 52).


26. "To envisage history as an operation will be to attempt ... to understand it as (he relationship between a place (a recruiting headquarters, a milieu, a profession, etc.) and some procedures of analysis (a discipline)" (ibid., p. 4).

27. This argument will not surprise readers of Horkheimer and Adorno, the great masters of the Frankfurt School, who showed the same will-to-domination to be at work in the rationalisms of the Enlightenment. We also find a related form in the early works of Iahcrmas, where the claim of instrumental reason lo annex the historical-herculcmial sciences is denounced. Some of tie Certeau's statements go much farther in the direction of classical Marxism and suggest a too linear and mechanical relation, to my taste, between historical production and social organization. For example, "from the assembling of the documents to the editing of the book, historical practice is entirely relative to the structure of society" (ibid., p. 13). "Throughout, history remains configured by the structure wherein it is elaborated" (ibid., p. 16). On the other hand, what he says about the production of documents and the "redistribution of space" that it implies (ibid., p. 22) is quite illuminating.

2K. The rest of this text is quite eloquent: "to take up again an old name which no longer corresponds with its new trajectory, we may say that (search) docs not begin from 'rareties' (remains of the past) to arrive at a synthesis (present understanding), but rather it begins from a formalization (a present system) in order to give rise to 'remains' (indices of its limits and in that way a 'past' that is the product of labor)" (ibid., p. 27).

29. With (his formula, Rankc defined the ideal of historical objectivity. "History had assigned lo it the task of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of ages to come. The present study docs not assume such a high office; it wants to show only what actually happened | Wie es eigentlich gewesen|" (Geschichten der ro-

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manischen und germanischen Volkervon 1494-1514, in Fiirsten und Volker, ed. Willy Andreas [Wiesbaden, 1957], p. 4, cited by Leonard Kriger, Ranke: The Meaning of History [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977], p. 5.) This well-known Rankean principle does not correspond to the ambition of reaching the past itself, with no mediating interpretation, so much as the historian's vow to divest himself of all personal preferences, to "extinguish my own self, as it were, to let the things speak and the mighty forces appear that have arisen in the course of centuries," as Ranke put it in his Uber die Epochen der neueren Geschichte (in ibid.).


31. "I will consider the historical work as what it most manifestly is—that is to say, a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them" (Metahistory, p. 2; his emphasis). Further on, White repeats that "historical accounts purport to be verbal models, or icons, of specific segments of the historical process" (ibid., p. 30). Similar expressions are also found in the articles subsequent to Metahistory: the ambition of choosing "the plot structure that he considers most appropriate for ordering events of that kind so as to make them Jinto a comprehensible story" (Tropics, p. 84). The sublety of the historian lies in "matching up a specific plot structure with the set of events that he wishes to endow with a meaning of a particular kind" (ibid., p. 85). In these two images—most appropriate, matched up—the whole problem of re-presentation of the past is posed along with the operation of emplotment.

32. "This preconceptual linguistic protocol will in turn be—by virtue of its essentially prefigurative nature—characterizable in terms of the dominant tropological mode in which it is cast" (Metahistory, p. 30; his emphasis). It is not called prefigurative in my sense (mimesis,); that is, as a structure of human praxis prior to the work of configuration by the historical or fictional narrative, but in the sense of a linguistic operation unfolding on the level of the as-yet unsorted mass of documentary evidence, "by identifying the dominant mode (or modes) of discourse, one penetrates to thai level of consciousness on which a world of experience is constituted prior lo being analyzed" (ibid., p. 33; his emphasis).

33. "Ellis is why, in opposition to the binarism in vogue in linguistics and structural anthropology, llayden While returns to the four dopes of Kamus and Vico. His essay on the "Historical Text as Literary Artifact" presents a detailed criticism of .lakohson's binarism. It is not surprising, in this regard, that Tropics of Discourse contains several essays devoted either directly or indirectly to Vico, who is revealed to be White's real master, assisted by Kenneth Burke and his Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). The expression "master-tropes" comes from this latter work.
34. At least, this is how I understand the following assertion, which is disconcerting at first sight: "Irony, Metonomy, and Synecdoche arc kinds of Metaphor, but they differ from one another in the kinds of reductions or integrations they effect on the literal level of their meanings and by the kinds of illuminations they aim at on the figurative level. Metaphor is essentially representational, Metonomy is reductionist. Synecdoche is integrative, and Irony is negational" (Metahistory, p. 34; his emphases).

35. This problem is taken up again in the essay "Fictions of Factual Representation" (Tropics, pp. 122-34). Metaphor emphasizes resemblance, metonomy continuity,
the heritage of living potentialities. Nevertheless I rejoin him when I include otherness in this debt. Loss is assuredly a figure of otherness. That the writing of history does more than play a trick on death is already indicated by the close tie between the restitution of this debt and the return of the repressed, in the psychoanalytic sense of this term. We cannot repeat enough that the dead, for whom history mourns, were once living. We shall see, in terms of some reflections on tradition, how expectation turned toward the future and the destitution of everything historical by the unlimeniness of the present dialectic/c this debt, at the same time that this debt dialectizes the loss.

CHAPTER SEVEN

2. Gadamer willingly refers to the distinction, inherited from biblical hermeneutics during the era of Pietism, between three "subtilities": subtilitas comprehendi, subtilitas explicandi, and subtilitas applicandi. Together these three subtilities constitute interpretation. It is in a sense similar to this that I speak elsewhere of the hermeneutic arch that emerges out of life, crosses through the literary work, and returns to life. Application constitutes the final segment of this arch.
4. In my conclusion I will return to this distinction between "in" and "beyond" reading.
5. See Tinte and Narrative, 1:70.
6. Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961; 2d. cd., 1981). The second edition contains an important Afterword. This work's objective, we read in the Preface, is to pursue "the author's means of controlling his reader." And further: "My subject is the technique of non-didactic fiction, viewed as the art of communicating with readers—the rhetorical resources available to the writer of epic, novel, or short story as he tries, consciously or unconsciously, to impose his fictional world upon the reader." The psychological analysis of written texts (psycho-graphics) is not, for all that, stripped of all rights; a genuine problem stemming from the psychology of creation remains—that of understanding why and how a real author adopts a particular disguise, this mask rather than that one; in short, why and how the author assumes the "second self" that makes him an "implied author." The problem of the complex relations between the real author and the various official versions he gives of himself fully remains (ibid., p. 71). Cf. also Booth's essay, contemporary with The Rhetoric of Fiction, "Distance and Point of View" in Essays in Criticism 11 (1961): 60-79.
7. As Booth says, "though the author can to some extent choose his disguises, he can never choose to disappear" (The Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 20).
8. The realism of subjectivity is only apparently opposed to naturalistic realism. As realism it stems from the same rhetoric as dos its contrary, striving for the apparent effacement of the author.
10. In this respect Sartre's polemic against Mauriac seems quite pointless. (Jean-Paul Sartre, "Francois Mauriac and Freedom," in Literary and Philosophical Essays, trans. Annette Michelson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 7-25.) In assuming the raw realism of subjectivity, the novelist takes himself to be God no less than does the omniscient narrator. Sartre grossly underestimates the tacit agreement that confers upon the novelist the right to know what he is attempting to write about. It may be one of the clauses of this contract that the novelist know nothing at all or not be allowed the right to know the mind of a character except through someone else's eyes; but jumping from one viewpoint to another remains a considerable privilege, compared to our resources for knowing other people in so-called "real" life.
11. "No impersonal novelist hides behind a single narrator or observer, the multiple points of view of Ulysses or as I,so Dying, or the objective surfaces of The Awkward Age or Compton-Burnett's Parents and Children, the author's voice is never really silenced. It is, in fact, one of the things we read fiction for" (The Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 60).
12. Once again, these considerations do not lead us back to a psychology of the author; what the reader discerns in the markings of the text is the implied author. "We infer [the implied author] as an ideal, literary, created version of the real man; he is the sum of his own choices" (ibid., p. 75). This second self is the creation of the work. The author creates an image of himself, just as he does of me, the reader.
14. In the opening lines of The Rhetoric of Fiction, it is stated that "one of the most obviously artificial devices of the storyteller is the trick of going beneath the surface of the action to obtain a reliable view of a character's mind and heart" (ibid., p. 3). Booth declines this category in the following way: "I have called a narrator reliable when he speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work" (ibid., p. 158; his emphasis).
15. According to Booth, a narrator in which the author's voice can no longer be discerned, this mask rather than that one; in short, why and how the author assumes the "second self" that makes him an "implied author." The problem of the complex relations between the real author and the various official versions he gives of himself fully remains (ibid., p. 71). Cf. also Booth's essay, contemporary with The Rhetoric of Fiction, "Distance and Point of View" in Essays in Criticism 11 (1961): 60-79.

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nation in which author, narrator, and reader join one another on the intellectual level, Booth does not conceal his misgivings about Camus's strategy in The Fall. Here the narrator seems to him to draw the reader into Clamence's spiritual collapse. Booth is certainly not mistaken to stress the higher and higher price that has to be paid for a narration that lacks the counsel of a reliable narrator. He may even be justified in fearing that a reader who is thrown into confusion, mystified, puzzled, to the point of being "thrown off balance" will be secretly tempted to give up the task that Erich Auerbach ascribed to narration: "To give meaning and order to our lives" (ibid., p. 371, quoting Mimeisis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard Trask [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953], pp. 485-86). The danger is indeed that persuasion will give way to the seduction of perversity. This is the problem posed by the "seductive rogues" who narrate much modern fiction (ibid., p. 379). Above all, however, Booth is right to stress, in contrast to every allegedly neutral aes-
thic, that the viewpoint of characters as it is communicated to and imposed upon the reader possesses not only psychological and aesthetic aspects but social and moral ones as well.

His whole polemic centered on the unreliable narrator tends to show that the rhetoric of impartiality, of impassibility, conceals a secret commitment capable of seducing readers and of making them share, for example, an ironic interest in the fate of a character apparently bent on self-destruction. Wayne Booth can thus fear that a great part of contemporary literature goes astray, caught up in a demoralizing operation that is all the more effective in that the rhetoric of persuasion resorts to a more deeply hidden strategy. We may nevertheless wonder who is the judge of what is finally pernicious. If it is true that the ridiculous and odious trial of Madame llovary does not justify a contrario every sort of insult to the strict minimum of ethical consensus without which no community could survive, it is also true that even the most pernicious, the most perverse attempt at seduction—the attempt, for instance, to ascribe value to the degradation of women, to cruelty and torture, to racial discrimination, or to advocate dis-involvemcnt, ridicule (in short, ethical divestment), to the exclusion of any broader or higher system of values—can, at the limit, on the level of the imaginary, possess an ethical function: serving as a means of distanciation.

17. This is why Booth can only mistrust authors who generate confusion. All his admiration is reserved for those who create not only clarity but worthy universal values as well. His reply to his critics appears in the Afterword to the second edition of The Rhetoric of Fiction, "The Rhetoric in Fiction and Fiction as Rhetoric: Twenty-One Years Later" (ibid., pp. 401-57). In another essay, "The Way I Loved George Elliot: Friendship with Books as a Neglected Metaphor," Kenyan Review 11 (1980): 4-27, he introduces us to the dialogical relation between the text and the reader the model of friendship he finds in Aristotelian ethics. He thereby links up with Henri Marrou, who spoke of the relation of the historian to the people of the past. Reading, too, according to Booth can be enriched by the reappearance of a virtue that was so dear to the ancients.

18. "In short, the writer should worry less about whether his narrators are realistic than about whether the image he creates of himself, his implied author, is one that his most intelligent and perceptive readers can admire" (The Rhetoric of Fiction, p. 395; his emphasis). "When human actions are formed to make an art work, the form that is made can never be divorced from the human meanings, including the moral judgments, that are implicit whenever human beings act" (ibid., p. 397).
19. "The author makes his readers. . . . But if he makes them well—that is makes them see what they have never seen before, moves them into a new order of perception."

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and experience altogether—he finds his reward in the peers he has created" (ibid., pp. 397-98).
20. Michel Charles, Rhetorique de la lecture (Paris: Scuil, 1977). "It is a matter of examining how a text presents, even 'theorizes' about, explicitly or not, the reading or readings that we actually do or could do; how it leaves us free (makes us free) or how it constrains us" (ibid., p. 9; his emphasis). I will not attempt to draw a full-fledged theory from Charles's work, for he has insisted on preserving the "fragmentary" character of his analysis of reading, which he perceives to be a "massive, enormous, omnipresent object" (ibid., p. 10). Texts that prescribe their own reading and even inscribe it within their own borders constitute an exception rather than a rule. These texts, however, do resemble the limit-case of the absolutely unreliable narrator proposed by Wayne Booth. These limit-cases give rise to a reflection that can itself be said to go to the limit, a reflection that draws an exemplary analysis from exceptional cases. This is the legitimate extrapolation made by Charles when he states as "an essential fact [that] reading belongs to the text, it is inscribed in it" (ibid., p. 9).
21. Concerning the oscillations between reading and reader, cf. ibid., pp. 24-25 (Remarque III). The theory of reading does not escape rhetoric "inasmuch as it presupposes that any reading transforms its reader and inasmuch as it controls this transformation" (ibid., p. 25). In this context, the rhetoric in question is no longer that of the text but that of any and all critical activity.
22. The borderline between reading and reader is not clearly drawn: "At the point where we arc, the reader is responsible for this scholarly reading that has been described to us, so that the opposition is now between the frivolousncss of the writer and the seriousness of reading" (ibid., p. 48). This statement is counterbalanced by the following one. "The brotherhood of readers and author is obviously an effect of the text. The book presupposes a complicity that it, in fact, constructs out of bits and pieces" (ibid., p. 53). But later we read, concerning the appeal of the text, that "A process is thus set in motion at the end of which, inevitably, the reader (the perfect reader) will be the author of the book" (ibid., p. 57). And further on: "The Prologue describes us, we who read it; it describes us as we are occupied in reading it" (ibid., p. 58).
23. "The postulate of the completeness of the work or of its closure conceals the ordered process of transformation that constitutes the 'text-to-be-read'; the closed work is a work that has been read, which by this token has lost all efficacy and all power" (ibid., p. 61).
24. In saying this, Charles does not allow himself to waver from his thesis that reading is inscribed in the text. "And to assume that decision is free is (again) an effect of the text" (ibid., p. 118). So the notion of an "effect" makes us go outside the text while still remaining within it. This is where I see the limit of Charles's undertaking. His theory of reading never manages to free itself from a theory of writing, when it does not simply turn into one, as is evident in the second part of his book, where Genette, Paulhun, Dumarsais and Fontanier, Bernard Lamy, Claude Fleury, and Cordomoy teach us an art of reading that is totally implicated in the art of writing, speaking, and arguing, on the condition, however, that the design of persuasion remain perceptible. "It is a matter of acting as though the text, writing, arc "assimilated" by rhetoric; it is a matter of showing that a rereading of rhetoric is possible on the basis of the experience of the text, of writing" (ibid., p. 211). To be sure, aiming at the receiver does define the rhetorical point of view and is enough to keep it from dissolving into the poetical point of view. But what the receiver does is not taken into consideration here inasmuch as the receiver is inscribed within the text, is its intention. "To analyse the structure of Adolphe is therefore to analyze the relation between a text and its interpretation, as neither of these two elements can be treated in isolation; structure does not designate ... a principle of order preexisting in the text, but the 'response' of a text to reading" (ibid., p. 215; his emphasis). Here
Michel Charles's *Rhetorique de la lecture* overlaps Jauss's *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, which we shall discuss below, to the extent that the history of the reception of a text is included in a new reception of it and, in this way, contributes to its current meaning.  
25. It is true that Charles takes such pains in rereading classical rhetoric in order to indicate the limits of a normative rhetoric that claims to control its effects. "A rhetoric that did not impose this limit on itself would deliberately 'turn back into' an 'art of reading' in which discourse is conceived of as a function of possible interpretations, its perspective being based on an unknown element: readings yet to come" (ibid., p. 211).

26. Remarque IV returns to this formulation: "The reading of a text is indicated within the text." But a correction follows: "The reading is in the text, but it is not written there; it is the future of the text" (ibid., p. 247).

27. Speaking of "the infinite reading that makes Rabelais work a text." Charles states that "A typology of discourses must be coupled with a typology of readings; a history of genres with a history of reading" (ibid., p. 287; his emphases). This is what we shall do in the pages that follow.

28. Michel Charles both invites us to take this step and forbids us to do so. "In this text by Baudelaire, there are thus elements with a variable rhetorical status. This variability produced a dynamics of reading" (ibid., p. 254; his emphasis). Only it is not this dynamics that interests Charles here but instead the fact that the interplay of interpretations is finnally what constructs the text: "A reflexive text, it reconstructs itself out of the debris of reading" (ibid., p. 254). The reflexivity of reading moves back into the text. This is why his interest in the art of reading is finally always obliterated by his interest in the structure that results from reading. In his sense, the theory of reading remains a variant of a theory of writing for Charles.

29. Sec Time and Narrative, 1:77.


33. The German term is *Wirkung* in the double sense of effect and response. In order to distinguish his own enterprise from that of Jauss, Iscr prefers to use the expression *Wirkungstheorie* rather than *Rezeptionstheorie* (The Act of Reading, p. x.). But the asserted interaction between the text and the reader implies something more than the unilateral efficacy of the text, as the study of the dialectical aspects of this interaction confirms. Moreover, to the allegation that a theory of reception is more sociological than literary—"A theory of response has its roots in the text; a theory of reception arises from a history of readers' judgments" (ibid., p. x.)—we might reply that a theory of literary effects runs the danger of being more psychological than . . . literary.


36. In this brief study of the activity of reading proposed by Iscr, I do not discuss the criticism he levels against efforts to ascribe a referential function to literary works. According to him, (his would be to submit a literary work to a ready-made and pre-established meaning; for example, to a catalog of established norms. For a hermeneutic such as ours, which seeks nothing behind the work and which, on the contrary, is attentive to its power of detection and transformation, the assimilation of the referential function to that of the denotation remains a variant of a theory of writing for Charles.

37. Gerard Genctc expresses similar reservations in his *Nouveau Discours du recit* (Paris: Seuil, 1983). "Unlike the implied author, who is, in the reader's mind, the idea of a real author, the implied reader, in the head of the real author, is the idea of a possible reader. . . . Sometimes the implied reader should actually be rechristened the *virtual reader*" (ibid., p. 103; his emphasis).

38. On the relation between the implied reader and the actual reader, cf. *The Act of Reading*, pp. 27-38. The category of implied reader exists mainly to reply to the accusations of subjectivism, psychologism, mentalism, or of the "affective fallacy," leveled at a phenomenology of reading. In Iscr himself, the implied reader is clearly distinguished from any real reader, to the extent that "the implied reader as a concept has its roots firmly planted in the structure of the text" (ibid., p. 34). "To sum up, then, the concept of implied reader is a transcendental model which makes it possible for the structural effects of literary texts to be described" (ibid., p. 38). In fact, faced with the proliferation of literary categories of "reader," conceived of as heuristic concepts that mutually correct one another, the phenomenology of the act of reading takes a step outside the circle of these heuristic concepts, as can be seen in Part III of *The Act of Reading*, devoted to the dynamic interaction between the text and the real reader.


40. "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory" (ibid., pp. 3-45). This long essay stems from Jauss's inaugural lecture given in 1967 at the University of Constance.

41. Jauss wants to restore to literary history the dignity and the specificity it has lost, through a scries of misfortunes, owing to the way it continually slips back into psychobiography; owing also to the reduction by Marxist dogmatism of the social effect of literature to a mere reflection of the socioeconomic infrastructure; and owing, finally, to the hostility, in the age of structuralism, of literary theory itself to any consideration extrinsic to the text, set up as a self-sufficient entity; to say nothing of the constant danger that a theory of reception will be reduced to a sociology of taste, parallelizing a psychology of reading, which is the fate threatening a phenomenology of reading.
42. The German *dialogische* need not be translated here by "dialectical." The works of Bakhtin and those of Francis Jacques give an unquestionable legitimacy to the term "dialogical." Jauss is to be commended for having connected his dialogical concept of reception to Gacitau Picon's *Introduction a line esthetique de la literature* (Paris: Gallimard, 1953) and to Andre Malraux's *The Voices of Silence*, trans. Gilbert Stuart and Francis Price (Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday, 1967).

43. This concept is borrowed from Husserl, *Ideas I*, §§27 and 82.

44. It is important, in order to distinguish Jauss's enterprise from Iscr's, to stress the intersubjective character of the horizon of expectations that founds all individual understanding of a text and the effect that it produces (*Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, p. 41). Jauss has no doubt that this horizon of expectation can be reconstructed objectively (ibid., pp. 42-43).

45. A comparison is to be made here with the notion of style in Granger's *Essai d'une philosophic lin style*. The singular character of a work is the result of the unique solution provided for a set of circumstances, grasped as a singular problem to be solved.

46. "The classical, according to Hegel, 'signifies itself' (Bedeutende) and interprets itself (Deutende) . . . . What we call 'classical' does not first require the overcoming of historical distance—for in its own constant mediation it achieves this overcoming" (Truth and Method, p. 257).


48. Siegfried Kraucaur (discussed by Jauss, pp. 36—37) states that the temporal curves of different cultural phenomena constitute so many "shaped times," resisting all integration. If this is the case, how could one hold, as Jauss docs, that "this multiplicity of literary phenomena . . . when seen from the point of view of an aesthetics of reception, coalesces again for the audience that perceives them and relates them to one another as works of its present, in the unity of a common horizon of literary expectations, memories, and anticipations that establishes their significance? (ibid., p. 36; his emphasis). It is perhaps too much to ask of the historical effect of works of art that it lend itself to a totalization such as this, if it is true that no teleology governs it. Despite the vigorous criticism leveled at the concept of the "classical" in Gadamer, in which he sees a Platonic or Hegelian residue, Jauss is himself searching for a canonical rule, without which any literary history would perhaps be directionless.

49. Jauss mentions in this respect the sense of parody in Cervantes' *Don Quixote* and in Diderot's *Jacques the Fatalist* (ibid., p. 24).

50. This antimony parallels that which appeared above with regard to inquiry. Jauss, again here, breaks an arduous path between the extremes of heterogeneous multiplicity and systematic unification. According to him, "it must also be possible . . . to arrange the heterogeneous multiplicity of contemporaneous works in equivalent, opposing, and hierarchical structures, and thereby to discover an overarching system of relationships in the literature of a historical moment" (ibid., p. 36). But if we refuse every Hegelian-type teleology, as well as every Platonic-style archetype, how can we prevent the historicity characteristic of the chain of innovations and receptions from dissolving into pure multiplicity? Is any integration possible other than that of the last reader (concerning whom Jauss himself says he is the vanishing point but not the goal of the process of evolution? [ibid., p. 34]). Speaking of "the historical dimension of literature," he states that what determines "this historical articulation . . . [is] the history of influence: that which results from the event' and which from the perspective of the present constitutes the coherence of literature as the prehistory of its present manifestation" (ibid., p. 39). However, for lack of any conceptually thought-out interconnection, the principle of this organic continuity must perhaps be seen as unnamable.

51. My conception of mimesis, which at one and the same time discovers and transforms, is in perfect agreement with Jauss's critique of the aesthetics of representation, presupposed by both the adversaries and the proponents of the social function of literature.

52. This first distance explains why a work like *Madame Bovary* influenced customs more by its formal innovations (in particular by introducing a narrator who is the "impartial" observer of his heroine) then did the openly moralizing interventions or denunciations so dear to socially committed writers. The absence of any answer to the moral dilemmas of an epoch is perhaps the most effective weapon available to literature to act on social customs and to change praxis. A direct line runs from Flaubert to Brecht. Literature acts only indirectly on social customs by creating what could be called second-order gaps in relation to the first-order gap between imaginary and everyday reality.

53. The final chapter of this section will show how the action of literature on the reading public's horizon of expectation is placed within the more comprehensive dialectic between a horizon of expectation and a space of experience, which we shall use, following Reinhart Koselleck, to characterize historical consciousness in general. The intersection of history and fiction will serve as the privileged instrument for the inclusion of the literary dialectic within an encompassing historical dialectic.


55. Michael Rifatcree was one of the first to show the limits of structural analysis and, in general, of mere description of the text in his debate with .lakobson and Levi-Strauss. Jauss commends him as the one who "introduced the turn from the structural description to the analysis of the reception of the poetic text" (*Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, p. 141), even if, he adds, Kiffalere is "more interested in the pregen elements of reception and in the 'rule of actualization' than in the aesthetic activity of the leader who take up or receive the text" (ibid.). Cf. Michael Kiffalere, "The Reader's Perception of Narrative," in *Interpretation of Narrative*, ed. Mario .J. Valdes and Owen Miller (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 28-37.

57. The reader is thereby asked to "measure and to broaden the horizon of one's own experience vis-a-vis the experience of the other" (ibid., p. 147).

58. I will not discuss poiesis here. It is nonetheless of importance to the theory of

59. Remember that in Aristotle's Poetics characters are classified as "better" than, "worse" than, or "like" ourselves; remember, too, that in the discussion of the rhetoric of fiction the strongest reservations expressed by Wayne Booth had to do with the moral effects of the strategy of persuasion in the modern novel.

60. On the translation of catharsis by "clarification" and "purification," cf. my chapter on Aristotle's Poetics in volume I, in particular p. 50.

61. Cf. ibid., p. 49.


63. In the following chapter, we shall return to this similarity, strengthening it, drawing support form the notion of narrative voice introduced in volume 2, pp. 95-99.

64. I have described elsewhere a comparable dialectic between appropriation and distanciation; see "The Task of Hermeneutics," Philosophy Today 17 (1973): 1-12-24.


66. This distinction between reading as stasis or pause and reading as impetus [envoi] explains Jauss's oscillations in his estimation of the role of application in literary hermeneutics. As stasis, application tends to be identified with aesthetic understanding; as impetus, it detaches itself from this in rereading and displays its cathartic effects; it then functions as a means of "correcting other applications which continue to be subject to the pressure of situations and to the constraints imposed by decisions to be made concerning direct action;" ("Limites et taches d'une hermeneutique lit-teraire," p. 133).

67. I will not return again here to the reasons presented above why I prefer to speak of conjoin! refiguration or of interweaving rather than of intersecting reference. But this does concern the same problems as those presented in volume I, pp. 77—X2.


71. Once again I rejoin Hannah Arendt's line analyses on the relation between narr-
noting that universal history constitutes only the lowest degree of its level, given the lack of a directive idea that would govern the compilation of the abstract summaries and pictures that convey the illusion of lived experience. (The philosophical history of the world will not, therefore, be a universal history in the sense of a synoptic view of national histories set side by side, as on a geographer's map.) The next form to be rejected is "pragmatic history," despite its concern to make both past and present mutually meaningful, for it does so only at the price of a moralizing tendency that places history at the mercy of each particular historian's convictions. (Be-
low, in discussing Reinhart Koselleck's work, I shall return to this important question of historic! magistra viuae.) Even more surprising is Hegel's harangue against "critical history," the very heart of reflective history, for despite its acuteness in the use of sources, it shares the faults of all that is merely critical, wherein are summed up all the resistances to speculative thought, centered upon questions about conditions of possibility and losing contact with the things themselves. It is not surprising therefore that Hegel prefers "specialized history" (the history of art, of science, of religion, etc.), for it at least has the virtue of comprehending one spiritual activity as a function of the forces of the Spirit that give particularity to the spirit of a nation. This is why Hegel puts specialized history at the summit of the modes of reflective history. The passage to philosophical world history nonetheless does constitute a qualitative leap in his traversal of the varieties of history writing.

3. This presupposition has the same epistemological status as does the conviction (Überzeugung) that at the end of chapter 6 of the Phenomenology of Spirit is attached to the certitude of self that comes with the agent's becoming one with his intention and his action.

4. Even if we can name several antecedents to the Hegelian enterprise, these arguments that are supposed to reveal its inadequacy are themselves borrowed from the complete system, which has no precedent. Anaxagoras's Nous! Plato has already rejected a philosophy for which real causality remained external to the reign of the Spirit. The doctrine of providence? Christians have only understood it in a fragmented way in terms of arbitrary interventions. They have not applied it to the whole of the world. What is more, in declaring the ways of the Lord hidden, they have lied the task of knowing God. Leibniz's theodicy? Leibniz's categories remain "abstract and indeterminate" (Lectures, p. 42) because they have demonstrated historically and not "metaphysically" how historical reality (its with God's plans. His failure to explain evil bears witness to this: "It should enable us to comprehend all the ills of the world, including the existence of evil, so that the thinking spirit may be reconciled with the negative aspects of existence" (ibid., pp. 42-43). So long as evil has not been incorporated into the great plan of the world, the belief in Nous, in providence, in a divine plan, is left hanging. As for Hegel's own philosophy of religion, even it is not a sufficient help. Within it there is a strong affirmation that God has revealed himself, but it poses the same problem: how to think through to the end what is only an object of faith? How can we know God rationally? This question sends us back to the determinations of speculative philosophy as a whole.

5. This idea of a double intensionality finds echoes in contemporary thought. I have referred a number of times to Hermann Liibbe's essay "Was aus Handlungen Geschi-chten niclit?" There would be nothing to tell, Liibbe says, if everything happened just as we planned and intended. We only recount what made our simple projects complicated, what made them go wrong, or even become unrecognizable. Typical, in this regard, is the project ruined by the interference of other enterprises. When the produced effect does not agree with the reasons for any of the participants' acts—for example, the inauguration of the stadium at Nuremberg which the architect of the Third Reich planned for the day that was in fact the one when the allies attained their victory—and, even more so, when this effect cannot be attributed to any other third party, we have to narrate how and why things turned out differently than anyone could have foreseen. Hegel takes up this account just where Liibbe leaves off, dial is, with the neutral—or ironic, or despairing—admission of the place of chance in history, in Cournot's sense of the term "chance."

6. "The historical fact is essentially irreducible to order: chance is the foundation of history," says Raymond Aron, following Cournot (Introduction to the Philosophy of History, p. 16).

7. What I am calling the larger tautology, the one that constitutes the project brought to term by the Stufengang, repeats the smaller tautology, the short-circuit, of the famous declaration that "the only thought which philosophy brings with it is the simple idea of reason—the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process." This affirmation of meaning as given by itself remains Hegel's unshakable philosophical credo, as may be seen on the page following it in Hoffminter's edition of these lectures: "That world-history is governed by an ultimate design, that it is a rational process—whose rationality is not that of a particular subject, but a divine and absolute reason—this is a proposition whose truth we must assume; its proof lies in the study of world history itself, which is the image and enactment of reason" (ibid., p. 28).

8. This passage was anticipated, as we said above, in special history, wherein we already perceive something of this abolition of narrative in the abstraction of the idea.

9. Let us set aside the political arguments that denounce Hegel as an apologist of the repressive state, or even as a forerunner of totalitarianism. Eric Weil has laid these arguments to rest insofar as they concern Hegel's relation to the states contemporary with him. "Compared to the France of the Restoration or England before the Reform Act of 1832, or Metternich's Austria, Prussia was an advanced state" (Hegel cl l'Etat [Paris: Vrin, 19501, p. 19). More important, "Hegel justified the sovereign, national state about as much as a physicist justifies the weather" (ibid., p. 78). Nor should we linger over the more tenacious presupposition that Hegel believed that history was fulfilled in that it fully comprehended itself in his philosophy. The marks of the incompleteness of the history of the Srate are sufficiently numerous and clear in his work that we should stop labeling him with this foolish idea. No Stale has reached the fullness of meaning that Hegel saw only as a seed and in inchoate forms. Cf. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pars. 330-40, pp. 212-16. The philosophy of history comes to occupy precisely that zone of right without law, which the philosophy of right can speak about only in terms of the Kantian langiage of the essay on perpetual peace (cf. ibid., par. 333, pp. 213-14). The Stufengang of the spirits of the nations takes the place of international law, which has not yet reached its maturity in the sphere of actual right. In this sense, the philosophy of history is ahead of the philosophy of right. In return, the philosophy of right, which is capable of completing in its own sphere what the philosophy of history designates as
incomplete, may also correct one essential point of the philosophy of history. It is not certain that this lime will be one of great men of history, or at least of national heroes in times of peace as well as in times of war (cf. Hegel el l'Etat, pp. 81-84). What is still to come is the slate that will become, internally, everyone's state and, externally, the world state. Thinking history does not seal up the past, it only comprehends what in it has already taken place, the surpassed past (cf. Philosophy of Right, par. 343, p. 216). In this sense, I he completion spoken of in the famous passage of the Preface to (he Philosophy of Right means nothing more that what Eric Weil has seen in it: "one form of life has grown old" (Hegel el l'Etat, p. 104).

Another form may therefore arise on the horizon. What is important is that the present in which the surpassed past is deposited be sufficiently efficacious so that it does not cease to unfold itself in memory and in anticipation.


I. I. What is most astonishing is that we encounter these two currents of anti-Hegelianism in Ranke. On the one hand, the cunning of reason is denounced as "a representation supremely unworthy of Goiil and of humanity [eine hochst unwiirdige Vorstellung von Goll und Menschheit]" to the benefit of a theology of history without philosophy: "each age is immediately before God." On the other hand, the historian wants to know the facts and to reach the past such as it really was, to the benefit of a history that also does without any philosophy.

12. What has become unbelievable to us is contained in the following assertion: "the present world and the present form and self-consciousness of the spirit contain [begreifl] within them all the stages which appear to have occurred earlier in history. These did admittedly take shape independently and in succession; but what the spirit is now, it has always been implicitly, and the difference is merely in the degree to which this implicit character has been developed" (Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 150).

13. In fact, in Hegel's text, this transition was already quite weak. Cf. ibid., pp. 52-53.

14. My position here is close to that of Hans-Giorg Gadamer. He did not hesitate to begin the second part of his great work Truth and Method with the following surprising declaration: "If we arc to follow Hegel rather than Schleiermacher, the history of hermeneutics must place its emphases quite differently" (p. 153; cf. also pp. 306-10). For Gadamer, too, we can never refute Hegel with arguments that reproduce moments recognized and surpassed in his speculative enterprise (ibid., p. 307). Given false interpretations and weak refutations, we "have to preserve the truth of Hegel's thought" (ibid.). Hence when Gadamer writes that "to exist historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete [Geschichtlichkeit heisst, nie im Sichwissen aufgehen]" (ibid., p. 269), he too abandons Hegel rather than conquering him through criticism. The Archimedean point from where Hegel's philosophy could be toppled can never be found through reflection (ibid., p. 308).

Gadamer breaks Hegel's "magic spell" (ibid., p. 307) by a confession that has the force of a renunciation. What he renounces is the very idea of an "absolute fusion | Vermiffung—mediation | of history and truth" (ibid., p. 306).

CHAPTER TEN

1. Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: The Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tibric (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985). To which disciplines do these two historical categories belong? For Koselleck, they are regulative concepts, having to do with a well-defined enterprise, that of a conceptual semantics applied to (he vocabulary of history and the time of history. As semantic, this discipline deals with the meaning of words and of texts rather than with the states of affairs and processes arising out of social history. As a conceptual semantics, it seeks to disentangle the significations of the key words—history, progress, crisis, and so on—that in relation to social history stand as both indicators and factors of change. Indeed, to the extent that these key words bring to language the underlying changes for which social history provides the theory, they contribute to producing, diffusing, and reinforcing the social transformations they name through this very fact of their ascending to the linguistic level. This double relation of conceptual history to social history only appears if we accord to semantics the autonomy of being a distinct discipline.

2. "Experience is the present past (Gegenwartige Vergangenheit) whose events have been incorporated (einverleibt) and can be remembered" (ibid., p. 272).

3. Koselleck does not fail to refer to Gadamer's Truth and Method (pp. 310-25) as regards the meaning of this term, Erfahrung, and its implications for thought about history (ibid., p. 323, n. 4).

4. "As history converged as event and representation [Darstellung], the linguistic basis was laid for the transcending turning point leading to the historical philosophy of idealism" (Futures Past, pp. 27-28). Koselleck refers to J.-G. Droysen, Historik, ed. R. Hübner (Munich and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1943), pp. 325 and 357.

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5. I will leave aside here the rapprochements between Historik and Poetik that stem from this epic quality of history as it is told. Koselleck sees the terms "history" and "novel" as coming close to each other between 1690 and 1750, not as a way of depreciating history but in order to elevate the truth claims of the novel. Reciprocally, Leibniz could speak of history as God's novel. And Kant used the term "novel" metaphorically in the ninth thesis of his "History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" to express the natural unity of general history.

6. "Time becomes a dynamic and historical force in its own right," says Koselleck (ibid., p. 246), and he points to the proliferation between 1770 and 1830 of such constructions as Zeit-Abschnitt, -Anschauung, -Ansicht, -Aufgabe, and so on, which evaluate time itself in terms of its historical qualities. Zeitgeist is the most striking example from this flowering of terms (cf. ibid., p. 258).

7. This idea of a new time, which has led to our idea of modernity, takes on its full relief if we contrast it with two topoi of previous historical thought that kept this idea from coming to light. It stands out, first of all, against the collapsed background of those political eschatologies whose manifestations Koselleck traces through the sixteenth century. Placed against this horizon of the end of the world, the temporal difference between past events and present ones is inessential. What is more, these events all being in varying ways anticipated "figures" of the end, there circulate among them all those relationships of
an analogical symbolism whose density of meaning carries the day over their chronological relations. The second contrast makes understandable the change in the horizon of expectation to which we owe the modern positing of the problem of the relation of the future to the past. It has to do with a famous topos which is even more tenacious: historia magistra vitae—history is life's teacher (cf. ibid., pp. 21-38, subtitled "The Dissolution of the Topos into the Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process"). Once reduced to a collection of examples, histories of the past are divested of their original form of temporality which differentiated them from one another, and they become merely the occasion for a learning experience that actualizes them in the present. At this price, these examples become information or monuments. And through their peregrination, they are both the symptom and the reminder of the continuity between past and future. Today, contrary to this neutralizing of historical time through the teaching function of the exempla, the conviction of living in new times has, so to speak, "temporalized history" (cf. the section in ibid., pp. 73-155, entitled "Theory and Method in the Historical Determination of Time"). In return, the past, now deprived of its exemplary status, is cast outside our space of experience into the shadows of what no longer exists.

8. Koselleck cites a text from Lessing's The Education of the Human Race, where such acceleration is not just acknowledged but also wished for and willed (ibid., p. 18; cf. also p. 297, n. 78). Also this passage from Robespierre: "The time has come to call upon each to realize his own destiny. The progress of human reason has laid the basis for this great Revolution, and the particular duty of hastening it has fallen to you" (ibid., referring to "Sur la Constitution, 10 Mai 1793," Oeuvres completes 9:495). Kant echoes (his in his "perpetual Peace," which is "not just an empty idea . . . for we may hope that the periods within which equal amounts of progress arc made will become progressively shorter" (ibid.).

9. At the same time, the two previous schemata are reversed. It is from the projected and chosen future that the true eschatologies are born, they are called Utopias. They are what, thanks to human action, indicate the horizon of expectation and they are what give the true lessons of history, the ones that teach us the future that is open to us. The power of history, instead of crushing us, exalts us, for it is our own work, even when we do not know what we are doing.

10. Cf. ibid., pp. 198-213: "On the Disposability of History." Another noteworthy expression is the Machbarkeit der Geschichte (ibid.)

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1. Recall Francois Furet's remark in his Interpreting the French Revolution: "What sets the French Revolution apart is that it was not a transition but a beginning and a haunting vision of that beginning. Its historical importance lies in one trait that was unique to it, especially since this 'unique' trait was to become universal: it was the first experiment with democracy" (ibid., p. 79).

12. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (London: Allen and Unwin, 1926), p. 23. This notion of "circumstances" has a considerable scope. I have placed it among the most primitive components of the notion of action at the level of mimesis. Such circumstances are also what is imitated on the level of mimesis, within the framework of the plot, as a synthesis of the heterogeneous. In history, too, plot brings together goals, causes, and chance.

13. Koselleck cites this saying from Novalics: if we know how to apprehend history on a broad scale, then we "observe the covert interlinking of the before and after, and learn how to compose history from hope and memory" (ibid., p. 270).

14. "This then is a matter of epistemological categories which assist in the foundation of the possibility of a history. . . . there is no history which could be constituted independently of the experiences and expectations of active human agents" (ibid., p. 269). "Accordingly, these two categories are indicative of a general human condition; one could say that they indicate an anthropological condition without which history is neither possible nor conceivable" (ibid., p. 270).


18. We have already encountered this problem with the polarity between sedimentation and innovation in the traditionally characteristic of the life of the paradigms of exemplum. The same two extremes reappear: servile replication and schism. And as I have said, I share with Frank Kermode, from whom I borrow this notion of a schism, the visceral refusal of any revision that would transform the criticism of received paradigms into a schism. Cf. Time and Narrative, 2:7 — 28.

19. Koselleck seems to suggest something similar: "Thus it could happen that an old relation once again came into force; the greater the experience the more cautious one is, but also the more open is the future. If this were I he case, then the end of Nesciit as optimizing progress would have arrived" (itittrics f'tal, p. 'K8). However, the historian and semanlist n1 historical concepts will say no more than this.

20. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 26711. Whether "we are expressly aware of it or not, the power [Wirkung] of this effective-history is at work . . . we see that the power Machi of effective-history does not depend on its being recognised" (ibid., p. 268).

21. Jean Grondin, "La conscience du travail de l'histoire et le probleme de la verite hermeneutique," Archives de philosophie 44 (19X1): 435-53. There is a precedent to this notion of being-affected by history in the Kantian idea of Selbstaukehr, referred to above in my discussion of the aorism of time. We affect ourselves, Kant says in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, by our own acts. By drawing the line, he had already said in the first edition, we produce lime, but we have no direct intuition of this productive act, unless it is by way of the representation of objects determined by this synthetic activity. Cf. above, pp. 54-57.

22. Cf. above, p. 303 n. 33. 326

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24. He speaks of "the history of thought, of knowledge, of philosophy, of literature . . . seeking, and discovering, more and more discontinuities, whereas history itself appears to be abandoning the irruption of events in favour of stable structures" (The Archeology of Knowledge, p. 6).


27. On this point, the Archeology of Knowledge does correct the impression of an overall coherence and a total substitution suggested by The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), even though this latter work only considered three epistemological fields, without saying anything about other such fields, and even less about the societies where they took place. "Archeology disarticulates the synchrony of breaks, just as it destroyed the abstract unity of change and event" (Archeology of Knowledge, p. 176). To this comment is attached a warning against any overly monolithic interpretation of an episteme, which would quickly lead back to the rule of a sovereign subject (cf. ibid., 191-92). At the limit, if a society were submitted to an overall mutation in every respect, we would find ourselves at that hypothesis of David Hume's, reported by Karl Mannheim, where one generation would completely replace another generation all at once. However, as we have
seen, the continuous replacement of generations one after the other contributes to preserving the continuity of the historical fabric.


29. Up to the mutation that is currently taking place, according to Foucault, history has been governed by one and the same end: "the reconstitution, on the basis of what the documents say, and sometimes merely hint at, of the past from which they emanate and which has now disappeared far behind them; the document was always treated as the language of a voice since reduced to silence, its fragile, but possibly decipherable trace" (*Archeology*, p. 6). There follows the formula wherein is implied the long-range significance of Foucault's archeology: "The document is not the fortunate tool of a history that is primarily and fundamentally memory; history is one way in which a society recognizes and develops a mass of documentation with which it is inextricably linked" (ibid., p. 7; his emphasis).

30. Cf. above, pp. 144-47.


32. Ibid., p. 151.

33. Cf. *Truth and Method*, pp. 25K-67. "If we are trying to intuitually a historical phenomenon from the historical distance that is characteristic of our hermeneutical situation, we are always subject to the effects of effective-history" (ibid., p. 267).

34. "The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in no-lion. It is not historical consciousness that first sets the surrounding horizon in motion. But in it this motion becomes aware of itself" (ibid., p. 271). It does not really matter that Gadamer applies the term "horizon" to the dialectic between past and present, whereas Koselleck reserves it for our expectations. We could say that through this term Gadamer describes a constitutive tension of the space of experience. He can do so to the extent that expectation itself is one component of what we are here calling the horizon of the present.

35. Together these worlds "constitute the one great horizon that moves from within and, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our self-consciousness" (ibid.).

36. Here the hermeneutics of texts is a good guide: "every encounter with tradition"

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that takes place within historical consciousness involves the experience of tension between the text and the present. The hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naive assimilation but consciously bringing it out. This is why it is part of the hermeneutical approach to project an historical horizon that is different from the horizon of the present" (ibid., p. 273).


39. Ibid., pp. 333-41.

40. Cf. ibid., pp. 245-74.

41. Following Heidegger, Gadamer writes, "A person who is trying to understand is exposed to distraction from fore-meanings that are not borne out by the things themselves. The working-out of appropriate projects, anticipatory in nature, to be confirmed 'by the things' themselves is the constant task of understanding. The only 'objectivity' here is the confirmation of a fore-meaning in its being worked out" (ibid., pp. 236-37). Looking for a *homologia* in the very conflict of interpretations bears witness to this: "the goal of all communication [Verstindigung] and understanding is agreement [Einversi(indnis) concerning the object" (ibid., p. 260). The anticipation of meaning that governs the understanding of texts is not lirst private but public (ibid., pp. 261-62).

42. "Our historical consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is heard. It is present only in (the) multifariousness of such voices: this constitutes (he nature of the tradition in which we want lo share and have a part. Modern historical research itself is not only research, but the transmission of tradition" (ibid., pp. 252-53).

43. "At any rate understanding in the human sciences shares one fundamental condition with the continuity of traditions, namely, that it lets itself be addressed by tradition" (ibid., p. 251). "Modern historical research itself is not only research, but the transmission of tradition" (ibid., p. 253).

44. "The place between strangeness and familiarity that a transmitted text has for us is that intermediate place between being an historically intended separate object and being part of a tradition. The true home of hermeneutics is in this intermediate area" (ibid., pp. 262-63). This idea should be compared with Hayden White's that history is as much a way of becoming reacquainted with the unfamiliar as of making the familiar unfamiliar. As he puts it, "The worm of criticism was already present in the famous lexl from Heidegger about understanding from which (iadainer's hermeiieutical reflection begins: "In the circle [of understanding] is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves" (*Being and Time*, p. 195). Heidegger does not say concretely how an interpreter learns to discern an anticipation of meaning "in terms of the things themselves" from fancies and popular conceptions, however.

45. I do not mean to attenuate the conflict between the hermeneutical of traditions and the critique of ideologies. Their "ambition lo be universal," to recall the theme of the controversy between Gadamer and Habermas in Karl-Otto Apel et al., *Her-meneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), starts from two different places, the reinterpretation of texts received from tradition, for the one, the critique of systematically distorted forms of communication for the other. This is why we may not simply superimpose on each other what Gadamer calls a prejudice, which is a favorable prejudice, and what Habermas calls an ideology, which is a systematic distortion of our communicative competence. We can only show that, speaking from two different perspectives, each must integrate a part of the other's argument, as I have attempted to demonstrate in my essay "Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue," referred to above.

47. For everything concerning the discussion internal to critical theory, I must declare my debt to an unpublished work of J.-M. Ferry, "Ethique de la communication et theorie de la democratic chez Habermas" (1984).
48. This broad struggle, which occupies the second part of \textit{Truth and Method}, is the same one that was fought in its first part against the claims of aesthetic judgment to set itself up as the tribunal of aesthetic experience, and it is also the one that is carried out in its third part against a similar reduction of language to a merely instrumental function that would conceal the power of speech to bring to language the richness of our integral experience.


51. Cf. \textit{Time and Narrative}, 1:54-55, 156.

52. Ibid., pp. 135-43.


54. Cf. Paul Ricœur, "Les implications de la th{é}orie des actes dc langage pour la th{é}orie g{é}n{é}rale dc l'ell{é}rique," forthcoming in \textit{Archives de Philosophie du Droit}.


56. Cf. above, pp. 113-14.

57. Emmanuel Mounier and Paul Landsberg had already seen in this notion of crisis, beyond the contingent character of the crisis of the 1950s, a permanent element of the notion of a person, one conjoined to those of confrontation and commitment.

58. Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life}, trans. Peter Reuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980). "Only so far as history serves life will we serve it: but there is a degree of doing history and an estimation of it which brings with it a withering and degenerating of life: a phenomenon which is now as necessary as it may be painful to bring to consciousness through some remarkable symptoms of our age" (ibid., p. 7). And a bit further on: "These reflections are un-

59. He was preceded in this respect by Jacob Burckhardt in his \textit{Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen} (\textit{Force and Freedom: Reflections on History}, trans. James Hastings Nichols [New York: Pantheon, 1943]), where the question of the historical (das Historische) is substituted for any inquiry into the systematic principle of universal his-

50. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Advantage and Disadvantage of History}, trans. Peter Lefort, Alphonso Lingis (Evanston:

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tory. To the question of what anthropological invariants make human beings historical, Burckhardt responds with his theory of the Polenzen tien Geschichtlichen: (he state, religion, culture, the first two of which constitute principles of stability, the third of which expresses the creative aspect of the spirit. Before Nietzsche did so, Burckhardt emphasized the irrational character of life and of the needs he found at the source of what he called the potentialities for history. He also affirmed the connection between life and crisis. In fact, Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will lies as a common background to both Nietzsche and Burckhardt. But because Burckhardt remained faithful to the concept of \textit{Geist}, he could not accept the brutal simplification Nietzsche brought about in his essay, emphasizing life alone, and the relations between these two friends deteriorated seriously following its publication. A more detailed comparison of Nietzsche and Burckhardt may be found in Herbert Schnidtelback, \textit{Geschichtsphilosophie nach Hegel: Die Probleme des Historismus} (Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber, 1974), pp. 48-89.

60. This limiting use of the term "horizon" should be noted, in contrast to the connotations of openness that appeared in my two preceding analyses. For Nietzsche, "horizon" has instead the sense of an encompassing setting. "The unhistorical re-

61. We might say that Nietzsche's own excess in this text is his refusal to distinguish the genealogical critique of historical culture from the critique in the epistemological sense of history as a science. It is precisely this excess, this refusal to distinguish between these two critiques, that is the sovereign indication of the untimely. Nietzsche is well aware that he was skirtsing another form of sickness insofar as the unhistorical was close to a superrational point of view, like the one a

62. We rediscover here the topoi of \textit{historia magistra vitae} referred to above.

63. Here again we may refer to what was said above about the contrast between renactment of the Same and the "inventory of differences."

64. Nietzsche's attack against the separation of interior and exterior, against the emphasis on inferiority, against the opposition between form and content, recalls a similar struggle, carried out in the name of "substance," \textit{Sittlichkeif}, in Hegel's \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, (he in the name of (he \textit{Volksgeist} in his philosophy of history. Hegel's phantom springs up again and again in Nietzsche's work.

65. It is worth noting that here the expression "to make history," which I discussed above, appears: "il is a matter of indifference what you do as long as history itself is preserved nice and 'objective,' namely by (ose who can never themselves make history" \textit{(Advantage and Disadvantage of History}, p. 31).
66. Hegel is supposed not only to have announced the end of history but to have brought it about by writing it down. He thereby inculcated the belief in (he "old age of mankind" (ibid., p. 44) and scaled humanity, which was ready for the last judgment, a bit more within the *momenta morti* that Christianity has taught without respite. Following Hegel, human beings could only be successors without any descendants, latecomers, epigoni—in short, there is room only for the antiquarian vision of history.

67. He carries the scandal to the point of farce. Hegel is said to have seen "the apex and terminus of world history ... in his own Berlin existence!" (ibid., p. 47).

68. Taking up the image of a "republic of geniuses," inherited from Schopenhauer,

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Nietzsche sees such giants as escaping the process (Prozess) of history to "live in timeless simultaneity (zeitlos-gleichzeitig), thanks to history, which permits such cooperation" (ibid., p. 53). Another sense of the present appears here, coming from the contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous, which we have already considered in speaking of the concept of a generation.

69. "Ilic whole conclusion of Nietzsche's broadside is an appeal to youth, that at times approaches the level of demagogy, against the history of scholars born with gray hairs. "Thinking of youth at this point I cry land ho! land ho!" (ibid., p. 58; his emphasis).

70. We too may say, "And yet!" Nowhere does Nietzsche really appeal to an intuition stemming just from life. His antidotes, his counterpoisons are also interpretations. The unhistorical, or worse the suphistorical, are not returns to the animal indiffer-ence referred to at the beginning but a moment of ironical nostalgia. Of course, in other works, Nietzsche does call for running "the time of life alone," but a culture based on forgetting demands more, a greater culture. Even when Nietzsche speaks of life "alone," we must not forget the genealogical status—that is, the philological and symptomatic status— of all his "concepts" relative to life, to emotions, and to the body. After all, what would a great culture be if not the rediscovery of the good use of history, even it were as such only the good use of a form of sickness, as one of Nietzsche's most detested predecessors put it? Are we to save history along with its three ways, monumental, antiquarian, and critical? Are we to return history to its function of serving life? How can we do this unless we discern in the past its unaccomplished promises, its cut-off possibilities of actualization, rather than its successes? If not, how are we to make sense of (he fact (hat his book ends with one last appeal to the Greek idea of culture? What greater irony, for a Hegel, than this communion in the great dream of German philosophical Romanticism! Hence Nietzsche's "Un timely" discourse invites us to reread the philosophy of tradition in light of its strebende Hoffnung, a rereading guided not by the fait accompli of the present but by its "force." -

**CONCLUSIONS**

1. These conclusions might have been called a Postscript. Indeed, they are the result of a rereading undertaken almost a year after finishing the manuscript of this third volume of *Time and Narrative*. Their composition is contemporary with the final revisions to that manuscript.


3. On these concepts of cohesion ("the connectedness of life"), "movement" (Be-wegtheit), and "self-constancy," cf. *Being and Time*, §72, pp. 424-29.


5. See *Time and Narrative*, t:200, n. 16.

6. Ibid., pp. 71-76.

7. The figuration of time by a line reinforces the assumption of the oneness of time, li is in virtue of this representation that lime can be said to be linear.

8. Cf. (he phrase "the inmanent time of (he flow of consciousness" (Phenomenol-2Hy of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 23).

9. For this difficult argument, see the texts of Husserl cited above, pp. 41-43.


11. This enclosure is especially prepared for from the early stages of the analytic of Dascin. If, in fact, Dascin is capable of receiving an existential characterization, it is

331 Notes to *Entvorgiemen* _pi_ its relation to existence, where existence means that Dascin "has its Being

* a has it as its own (dass es je sein Sein als seiniges zu sein hal!" (Being and

* p3). By so emphasizing the "each time" (je in German) of existence, Heideg-

* c cannot be "represented" (Vertretbarkeit) by another means that "no one

* ^_w, 1 abnehmen] the Other's dying from him." (ibid., p. 284). So it is not surpris-

* ing that fhe Heidegger, fragments into mortal time, historical time, and cosmic time

12 [f at the end of our periclip, we find ourselves once again on Augustinian

ground, if " because the problematic of temporality does not radically change its frame of fcfcrcncc in passing from Augustine's animus

\vline to Heidegger's Dascin, in passing through Husserl's innermost consciousness. The distributive aspect of the existential, the "each time" referred to above, imposes a residual subjective tone on an analysis that means however to be deliberately ontological. This is undoubtedly

one of the reasons why the first part of *Being and Time* was left without a sequel.

13. These comments focussed on Heidegger do not exclude our seeking other correlations -with Husserl's analyses. For example, between the

retentions of retentions and tradit Jonality. We explored this direction in our chapter on fiction and its imaginative variations.


15. Even if a kind of thinking of a different order, that of a theology of history, which is not taken into account here, proposes to link a

Genesis to an Apocalypse, it certainly does not propose to do so by introducing a plot of all plots that this thinking could set in relation to the
beginning and end of all things. The simple fact that we have four Gospels to recount the event held to be the turning point of history in the confession of the early Christian church suffices to prevent theological thinking from proceeding on the basis of a univocal superplot. 16. The case of ancient Israel, referred to above with regard to the notion of narrative identity, is particularly striking. Gerhard von Rad was able to devote the first volume of his Theology of the Old Testament, trans. D. M. G. Stalker (New York: Harper and Row, 1962-65), to a "theology of traditions" constituted by the progressive integration of narratives of different origins into one continuous narrative that finds its initial dimensions, structure, and contours in the work of the Jahwist. To this core were added other narratives that prolonged this narration beyond the founding of the Davidic monarchy, as can be seen in the Deuteronomistic history. The case of ancient Israel is especially interesting for our thesis insofar as the narrative medium is revealed to be the principal vehicle of the confession of faith bearing on the relations of a covenant (between a people and its God. It is also interesting in another way. It might be objected that this theology of traditions includes nonnarrative sections, especially the laws, which turn this part of the Hebraic Bible into a kind of teaching, a Torah. To this we may respond that the mass of legislation subsequently added to the emblematic figure of Moses could be integrated into the theology of traditions only at the price of a narrativization of the legislative moment itself. The giving of the law is turned into an event worthy of being recounted and integrated into the overall narrative. So it is relatively easy to posit the equation between tradition and narrative. As for the conjunction between narrative and nonnarrative, I shall return to this below. Cf. Paul Ricœur, "Temps b ibérique," Archivio di Filosofia 53 (1985): 29-35. 17. See Time and Narrative, 2:88-93.

18. For example, the Jews who survived the Babylonian Exile projected their vision of new times in terms of a new Exodus, a new wilderness, a new Zion, a new Davidic kingship. 332 Notes to Pages 260-70 19. This is the meaning Gricomas retains in his narrative semiotics. In a neighboring sense, Claude Chabrol, in his dissertation, "Elements de psycho-sociologie du langage," uses the term "narrative schema" to designate the course covered by such complex acts as Gift, Aggression, Exchange, etc., which are both interactions and interlocutions at the same time, and which receive an appropriate expression in speech acts such as commissions and orders. So another categorization than that of genres can be applied to such narrative schemas, that of speech acts.

20. Goldschmidt, p. 76.

21. This opening to an abyss of meaning rejoinis that other opening, also encountered in our commentary on Aristotle (pp. 16f.), the invincible obscurity of the definition of movement itself as the encectyle of what is as such possible (Physics, II, 201a0-11).

22. In this respect, I am also reminded of considerations of a more existential kind circulating around the expression "being in time" which the philosophical story of the Timaeus led us to.


27. This is the correlation that guides Vernant's analyses (sec ibid., pp. 88-95) aimed at reconstituting the mental activity of ancient Greeks through a historical psychology.


29. Let us recall this passage from Augustine: "in eternity nothing moves into the past: all is present. Time, on the other hand, is never all present at once" (Confessions, 11:13). Also: "Your years are completely present to you all at once, because they are at a permanent standstill [simul stant]" (ibid., 13: 16). Cf. Time and Narrative, 1:236, n. 35, regarding the question of which term is positive and which negative.

30. Any exegesis of Exodus 3: 14 must take into account the declaration that follows it. "And he said, 'Say this to the people of Israel, 'I am has sent me to you.'" God also said to Moses, 'Say this to the people of Israel, "The Lord, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you'; this is my name forever, and thus I am to be remembered throughout the generations'" (3: 14-15).

31. The unpronounceable name of JHWH designates the vanishing point common to the suprahistorical and the intrahistorical. Accompanied by the prohibition against graven images, this "name" preserves the inscrutable and sets it at a distance from its own historical figures.

32. These questions are given considerable development and a new orientation in Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), particularly in §§9, 10, and 32-34. See also The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, §§7-9 and 21, and Interpretation phy-nomenologique de la "Critique de la Raison pure" de Kant, trans. E. Martinacu (Paris: Gailimard, 1982), from volume 25 of the Gesamtausgabe.


34. In this work, we need not take a stand concerning Heidegger's ambition, stated at the end of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, to ground a scientific ontology on the new a priori that Temporality henceforth constitutes (ibid., p. 327). In any case, Heidegger's intention not to allow this science to turn into a new form of hermeticism is strongly underscored in the closing pages of his lectures (which were not completed) where he takes up for his own use the opposition Kant makes in the short manuscript "Von cinem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796) between the sobriety of the Plato of the letters and the supposedly intoxicated Plato of the Academy, a mystagogic in spite of himself.

35. See Time and Narrative, 1: 175-225.

36. The word "magic" falls from Proust's pen when he speaks of the moribund figures at the dinner of death's-heads that follows the Visititation scene. "These were puppets bathed in (he immaterial colours of the years, puppets which exteriorized Time, Time which by Habit is made invisible and to become visible seeks bodies, which wherever it finds it seizes, to display its magic lantern upon them." (3:967)

37. The first intersection characterizes the Pentateuch. With the Jahwist document, narrative and laws are interwoven. In this way the immemorial aspect of narrative, turned toward what went before by the prefaces to the prefaces that precede the narratives of the covenant and deliverance, intersects with the immemorial aspect of the Law, condensed into the Revelation at Sinai. Other significant interweavings can be added to this one. The prophetic openness to time provokes, as a kind of recoil effect, an overturning of the theology of traditions developed by the Pentateuch. In turn, the historicity common to both traditions and prophets, which is retrospective as well as prospective, is confronted by that other form of the immemorial,
wisdom, gathered into the wisdom writings of Proverbs, the book of Job, and Ecclesiastes. Finally, all these figures of the immemorial are reactualized in the laments and praises found in the Psalms. So it is by a chain of nonnarrative mediations that, in the Bible, narrative is brought to the stage of a confessional narrative (see above, p. 2(K) n. 16).


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